Western world

Article

Western world is a recurring place in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 11, 2023 and December 04, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as “the West is always going to be richer”; “Try listing every problem the Western world has at the moment”. It most often appears alongside Google, Achilles, ACX.

Metadata

  • Category: Places
  • Mention count: 2
  • Issue count: 2
  • First seen: August 11, 2023
  • Last seen: December 04, 2025

Appears In

None.

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

August 11, 2023 · Original source
Meanwhile, what is happening in the non-Western world? I can imagine two replies to this. One corresponds to what people often say about the Iraq war: “you can’t just import institutions into a place where the culture isn’t ready”. You can tell this in a key of triumphalism – the West is always going to be richer, until the Rest of the world changes radically – or a key of despair – the Rest is never going to become democratic. At the end, briefly, the book seems to lean this way: “standard approaches to policy are poorly equipped to understand or deal with the institutional-psychological mismatches that arise from globalization.”
His hypothesis comes from cross-cultural psychology. The West got rich because Westerners are different. People from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic societies are WEIRD – the acronym comes from a previous article of his. In particular, compared to everyone else in the world and in history, modern Westerners:
These maps from one of the scientific articles behind WEIRD show the basic causal claim: the medieval church reduced the intensity of kinship institutions. He tells it with an extraordinary mastery of a very wide range of sources from anthropology, psychology, behavioural economics, economic history, and historical narrative. This book is for everyone, but the connoisseur will enjoy the bibliography: if you think it's important and relevant, it's probably in there, and there was also plenty of work which I did not know, and now feel I should. It takes a very smart person to keep this many balls in the air. Being at Harvard probably doesn't hurt either – that's the “collective brain” of the human network, which makes an appearance later on in the book. So this book really sets down a marker: the anthropologists are returning from the Amazon, the Sudan and Polynesia, and coming for Western history and economics. It will be interesting to see how those target disciplines react. Is it true? Economists and historians think about Western history very differently. Historians love irony and contingency. They enjoy byways. Triumphalist, linear narratives of progress are distrusted as “Whig history”. Growth economists, by contrast, are all about the linear bigness. They have a relentless focus on the one question of how the West got rich, and if you call that triumphalist, they will take out a chart of South Sudanese child mortality and laugh at you. Both historians and historical economists — a more appropriate name than “economic historians” nowadays — are interested in causality. But economists have a crunchier, more “scientific” standard for what counts as proof of causality. You've got to have a treatment and a control group, and by default if you claim there are no confounds, they won't believe you. You need you some plausible exogeneity. A random river where Napoleon's armies stopped. The distance from Wittemberg where Luther nailed up his theses. And then, how does that affect something that matters today (if it doesn't, then who cares?) Of course, the longer ago the exogenous treatment, the more impressive the result. You can see the incentives that these disciplinary demands might set up, and that might worry you. At worst, you might get a kind of “underground river” concept of history, where X happened long ago
December 04, 2025 · Original source
Wages never jumped back to the point where they would be if the pandemic had never happened, but they’re back to growing as fast as ever. So this could explain the mini-vibecession of 2023-2024. Still, I claim there is a broader vibecession. Young people felt closed out from opportunities before 2023, and they still feel that way. Since only the 2023-2024 period saw falling real wages, this can’t be the full explanation. The Housing Theory Of Everything John Burn-Murdoch, after examining some of these same data, agrees that wages can’t be the full story. He writes: Are millennials wrong to complain? I fear not. The per capita measure is a beautifully simple rejoinder, but it misses one crucial detail. Wealth accumulation — just like income — matters primarily to millennials today as a means to home ownership, especially as we move into an era of high interest rates. If we deflate wealth by the index of house prices instead of the CPI, millennials’ assets only go about half as far as boomers’ once did. We’re left with a smaller millennial deficit than the original chart implied, but a deficit nonetheless. The YIMBYs at Works In Progress go further, and present The Housing Theory Of Everything (or at least of everything bad): Try listing every problem the Western world has at the moment. Along with Covid, you might include slow growth, climate change, poor health, financial instability, economic inequality, and falling fertility. These longer-term trends contribute to a sense of malaise that many of us feel about our societies. They may seem loosely related, but there is one big thing that makes them all worse. That thing is a shortage of housing: too few homes being built where people want to live. And if we fix those shortages, we will help to solve many of the other, seemingly unrelated problems that we face as well. Here is the Case-Shiller index, the standard measure of US home prices. I’ve started it in 1985 to match our other graphs: If I were designing an index to present the case that capitalism had not failed, I would have avoided naming it “Case Shiller”. During this time, average home price has approximately doubled. Might this only reflect falling interest rates? That is, suppose people can only afford a certain level of monthly mortgage payment. When interest rates are high, that mortgage payment would correspond to a cheap house; when they are low, that same person willing to spend that same amount could buy a more expensive house. To really work with this, we need average mortgage payment over time. Kevin Drum has this up to 2020: …but it matters a lot whether this that spike at the end is a temporary pandemic effect or a permanent regime change. I’ve tried to calculate an updated version from FRED data: Average monthly payment in 1985 dollars. Going to tell my bank I’m paying my mortgage in 1985 dollars from now on. This matches Drum’s data enough to build confidence, and it shows that the post-pandemic spike has lasted. Mortgage payments are almost twice as high as in the 2010s. The COVID housing spike was partly a function of lockdown locking people in their houses (meaning that having a nice house was more important), and partly a function of the government cutting mortgage rates to alleviate lockdown-related economic distress. But why did it last even after COVID lockdowns ended? Partly because the homebuyers who bought houses during COVID will never move again, because that would mean giving up their great mortgages.