Astral Codex Ten

Europeans

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Europeans

Article

Europeans is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 8 times across 8 issues between April 12, 2021 and August 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as “Before Europeans applied the word “panther” to the big cat”; “cheap labor that the Europeans and Japanese ruthlessly tapped”; “The way that Europeans decimated Native Americans with smallpox blankets”. It most often appears alongside China, India, United States.

Metadata

  • Category: Concepts
  • Mention count: 8
  • Issue count: 8
  • First seen: April 12, 2021
  • Last seen: August 12, 2025

Appears In

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

Links For April
April 12, 2021 · Original source
16: Before Europeans applied the word “panther” to the big cat found in Asia / the Americas, it was a mythical animal akin to the chimera or pegasus (its name comes from pan+therion, “all animals”, and it was probably originally one of those “head of an X, body of a Y, tail of a Z” deals). Read more here, but mentioning this at all is an excuse to show you this picture of a mythical panther from the heraldry of Henry VI:
Inline links: here, heraldry of Henry VI
Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower
May 21, 2021 · Original source
We didn’t just get tremendous economic growth though – we got “magical” results, but they were based on a one-time confluence of factors that “overwhelmed the normal rule that lots of twenty-and thirty-somethings make for an expensive-capital environment.” What were these one-time accelerants? He identifies the peace dividend – cuts in military spending that allowed capital to be put to more productive uses – as one such change, along with the emergent dominance of the US dollar, particularly boosted by Russian demand thanks to the collapse of their currency, and a later boost in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. With the Europeans’ decision to eliminate national currencies (agreed upon in a 1992 treaty, with the Euro to be introduced in 1999), they became relatively unattractive, and the Euro itself (an “unprecedented experiment in pan-government planning”) was too risky. Many holders of European currencies switched to the US dollar, such that between 1994 and 2002 (“when the euro finally got some traction and the surge dialed back”) there was a $2 trillion increase in the money supply. Zeihan also points to a collapse in commodities prices influenced by the elimination of Russian demand, but continued Russian production of oil and other commodities, followed by a collapse in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. This story of capital coming to the West (“allowing consumption-driven growth not simply to soar, but to explode”) is one of chance world events. However, the story of capital coming from the Boomer cohort is one of demographics. By the 2000s, they’re the mature workers of Zeihan’s four stages described above – and as the bulge in the demographic pyramid, they started flooding the world with capital. Accordingly, “The cost of credit plummeted to levels never before experienced.” Zeihan suggests that developed-world demographics are the cause of booms in places that haven’t been well-developed, from Southern Europe to Brazil, Russia, and India. But he says it’s quickly coming to an end; Boomer savings into stocks and bonds will be moving to low-risk instruments and then turning into withdrawals rather than savings, and the cohort behind them is too small to replace all of that capital. And it’s a worldwide phenomenon: In every single developed country there is currently an American-style population inversion between the about-to-retire and the about-to-be-mature-workers age groups. Japan’s Boomers bulge is a decade older than the American equivalent, while Spain’s is roughly fifteen years younger. Everyone else falls somewhere in between. It dictates a period of chronically low growth and high credit costs, just not on precisely the same time frame. The undeveloped world is that way because it can’t self-fund, so without foreign capital, their growth will come to an end. In sum, the 1990-2005 period of high growth and easy capital was a historical anomaly; “the post-Cold War financial flight was a once-in-a-generation event” and the demographic bulge that coincided with it won’t come around again for decades, if ever. 4 2: America’s incredible advantages As noted above, Zeihan really likes America’s position in the world. He likes its demographics (relative to other developed countries) and loves its geography. Taking the population question first, in America, “the demographic inversion is only a temporary development.” America is younger than the rest of the developed world, as it urbanized later and its enormous size made having kids easier despite that urbanization (i.e., the suburbs exist). This makes the demographic crunch a single-generation issue, as the Millennials are a huge cohort. And even if they weren’t, America assimilates immigrants more easily than other places – Zeihan attributes this to it being a “settler society” – which can help with demographic problems. The rest of the developed world doesn’t have similar cohorts following their massive Boomer and Gen-X analogues. Accordingly: While the American financial world will be past its period of maximum stress by 2030, for the rest of the world 2030 will simply be another year of an ever-deepening imbalance between retirees and taxpayers, with smaller and smaller generations coming up the ranks generating less and less growth. For the developed world beyond the United States—and even large portions of the developing world—chronic capital poverty and permanent recession will be the new normal from which there is no return. Together with America’s Millennial-led growth and abundant energy (there’s a chapter explaining how shale is a done deal that, as of the mid-2014 writing, already made America the world’s largest energy producer 5), by 2030 Zeihan sees it as practically the only country with an economy worth noting. Anyone who is familiar with American geography should see the argument that’s coming about that aspect of Zeihan’s model. Isn’t the Mississippi River a pretty big deal? And those oceans on the east and west coasts seem like nice borders. Indeed, while he gives us many reasons why there was always going to be an American superpower, geography is central to his story. He has lots to say about America’s internal river systems, farmland, and other geographic features. What mountain barriers exist are apparently better than in other countries in terms of allowing internal transport; the Rockies have major passes, several of which have large cities within them, and the easiest pass in the Appalachians featured America’s first National Road, 130 miles of buried logs that linked two rivers, and thus the east coast with the best farmland in the world. As we saw with his exposition on the Nile, Zeihan puts a lot of emphasis on the value of river systems. He argues that America’s waterway network alone should be sufficient for “global dominance.” The numbers he provides in support of this point are impressive. For example, “the Mississippi is only one of twelve major navigable American rivers. Collectively, all of America’s temperate-zone rivers are 14,650 miles long. China and Germany each have about 2,000 miles, France about 1,000. The entirety of the Arab world has but 120.” He praises US barrier islands that mitigate oceanic destruction and effectively create another river system, as well as the fact that the river system is an actual network. All of this gives America more internal waterways than the rest of the world combined. Thus, we get cheap transportation for “Nebraska corn or Tennessee whiskey or Texas oil or New Jersey steel or Georgia peaches or Michigan cars,” enabling savings that “can be used for whatever Americans (or their government) want, from iPhones to aircraft carrier battle groups.” America doesn’t have to spend on artificial infrastructure, like German roads and rails, but when it does, the competition from the rivers keeps transport costs low. Cheap internal transportation has other benefits. “It’s a recipe for small government and high levels of entrepreneurship,” as small government keeps taxes low, leaving people with plenty of capital. Some people may think of the American consumer with disdain, but it isn’t a new phenomenon. Zeihan points out that America has been the world’s largest consumer market “since shortly after the Civil War.” His observation about a robust food supply forming the base of any civilization bodes well for America, which apparently has the largest connected stretch of quality farmland in the world (the Midwest), the value of which is exponentially increased by the fact that it overlaps with so many of these amazing river systems. It isn’t just the Midwest that he gushes over. California’s Central Valley and the Sacramento River, and Washington and Oregon’s farmland with the Columbia and Snake Rivers get praise. The only major farmland more than 150 miles from a navigable waterway is some of the Great Plains near the Rockies. ***** Zeihan provides a reminder that national security is actually a thing, and that at its most basic level, it’s about protection against invasions. It was something of a shock reading about America’s land borders in that context. “As Santa Anna discovered during the Texas Independence War, there is no good staging location in (contemporary) Mexican territory that could strike at American lands.” And, “Canada’s border with the United States is much longer, more varied, and even more successful at keeping the two countries separated,” thanks to mountains and thick forests over much of it. The mid-continent lands are much more connected, but Zeihan frames these Canadian areas as basically American; they’re physically separated from Canada’s core eastern provinces, so trade with them is weaker than with the closer American states. Then there are the oceans. As much as Zeihan loves deserts for protection, he loves oceans more (particularly in a post-World War II world; more on that below). We get a story about the War of 1812 nearly splitting America into three when the British attacked Baltimore. America learned about “strategic vulnerability and sea approaches,” as the attack “on Baltimore—indeed, the entire war effort—would have been impossible without launching grounds in Canada and the Caribbean.” American foreign policy since then can be understood with respect to this lesson. Zeihan cites it as inspiration for America’s steps to make its ocean borders truly impenetrable, such as working to sever Canada from Britain, and the imperial-era acquisitions of Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Puerto Rico, and de facto control of Cuba (preventing enemies from cutting off Mississippi River-based trade from the rest of the world). There’s more to Zeihan’s being awestruck by America than his analysis of its balance of transport advantages. He argues that America has been the world leader for agriculture, technology, finance, and industry since the Civil War, and runs through a litany of reasons for its preeminence: America is like a continent-sized island (because of its effective land borders), which is always going to be a more natural naval power than a more landlocked country.
Inline links: 4, 5
Its historical geographic divisions have apparently held to this day, with the north controlling politics, Shanghai and central China forming an economic core, the south a perennial secessionist threat, and the interior ignored. (This book predates the genocidal campaign against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, though Tibet has suffered its share of atrocities.) Recent unification came about only after America took the threat of Japan away, and its economic rise coincided with its participation in America’s free trade network. With that change, “Instead of being raided for raw materials, China was guaranteed access to global supplies. The endless supplies of cheap labor that the Europeans and Japanese ruthlessly tapped now allowed China to generate its own goods for export, this time with the revenues flowing to the Chinese instead of overseas interests.”
Inline links: campaign against the Uighurs in Xinjiang
Your Book Review: Plagues And Peoples
June 17, 2021 · Original source
The way that Europeans decimated Native Americans with smallpox blankets has been a key driver in ancient civilization expansion. The moment the city folk come in contact with tribes, smaller towns, anyone in the countryside they also bring the city folk diseases. This makes civilization expansion fundamentally easier.
The book does not offer explicit expectations of what comes after COVID-19. He talked about European life after The Black Death but most of the implications were because of such a substantial amount of death, not because Europeans couldn’t go to bars. Through his telling of history there is not a huge correlation between plagues and technological progress or social progress. Reading the book, though, offers some solace. Humans have struggled, coped, and evolved with parasites and viruses since before humanity. This relationship is not new. As powerful of a force COVID-19 seems today, microparasites of the past have definitely been more influential on human history. At least now we know what they are. McNeill makes an adequately vague prediction about the future:
Tales Of Takeover In CCF-World
July 03, 2023 · Original source
Given that Native Americans lost their war with European settlers, why do existing Native American tribes still have some land and rights? Why didn't Europeans finish them off and take their last few paltry resources?
One reason is ethical; eventually enough Europeans took the Natives' side (or were just squeamish about genocide) that the equilibrium was only displacing most of the natives, not all of them.
The second will work temporarily: human power will start high relative to AI power, but decline over time. There will be a period where humans can damage AIs enough that it's not worth the AIs fighting us, But that time will end at some point around the Singularity. Unless humans do something to keep control, AIs will be smarter than humans, run at faster speeds, and control everything (we'll give them control of the economy, and - as bad an idea as it sounds - we may have to give them control of the military to stay competitive with other countries that do so). At some point AIs' tech/wealth/numbers advantage over humans will be even bigger than Europeans' tech/wealth/numbers advantage over Native Americans, and AIs will stop worrying that we can do much damage on our way out.
Contra Hanson On Medical Effectiveness
April 24, 2024 · Original source
Europeans in 1600 likely prided themselves on the ways in which their “modern” medicine was superior to what “primitives” had to accept. But we today aren’t so sure: seventeenth century medical theory was based on the four humors, and bloodletting was a common treatment. When we look back at those doctors, we think they may well have done more harm than good.
Highlights From The Comments On Lynn And IQ
January 16, 2025 · Original source
First, he corrected my misconception about Reich on ancient European cognitive evolution. Reich had said that pre-agriculture Europeans were “2-3 standard deviations” below moderns. I had interpreted that as IQ deviations of 15 points, making them genetic IQ 55-70, which would have been pretty crazy. Stone tells me he actually meant PGS deviations, each of which was about 3-4 IQ points, so he’s claiming that pre-agriculture Europeans had genetic IQ of 90 (they probably also had lower IQ for environmental reasons).,
Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability
July 03, 2025 · Original source
You mention epidemiologists being the biggest losers of stratification in polygenic scores, but I think it is important to note a related group: the people who take polygenic scores trained in one population (with a ton of stratification) and directly apply them to other populations to make claims about innate abilities (see: this post). This is especially true for Edu/IQ GWAS, where every behavior geneticist has been screaming "do not do that!" since the very first study came out. People like Kirkegaard, Piffer, Lasker, etc. (and their boosters on social media like Steve Sailer and Cremieux) dedicated their careers to taking crappy GWAS data from and turning it into memes that show Africans on the bottom and Europeans on the top. These people also happen to be the court geneticists, so to speak, for SSC/ACX. I don't mean to come off as antagonistic and I'm sure some people will see this comment and immediately discount me as being an ideologue/Lysenkoist/etc so it does my broader position no favors, but this stuff has done and continues to do an enormous amount of damage to the field (including the now complete unwillingness of public companies like 23andme to collaborate on studies of sensitive traits
Inline links: this post
So maybe there’s more of a role here for problems [2] and [3], about the difficulty of applying a score trained on Europeans to non-European populations? My question there is - shouldn’t this produce nonsense results, rather than results which reflect the populations’ real-world IQs? I think the counterargument here would have to be that by coincidence or colonialism, the populations with the furthest genetic difference from Europeans also happen to have the lowest real-world IQs (for social reasons) - or at least that this trend holds in a vague enough way to produce the vague correlation seen on the graph. There’s some evidence for this - this Piffer’s application of EA4 predicts that Chinese (real average IQ 105) have the same educational attainment as Puerto Ricans (real average IQ 82). So maybe it’s just showing average genetic distance from its European sample after all, and Chinese and Puerto Ricans are about equally distant on average? This wouldn’t explain why the predictor correctly finds that Ashkenazi Jews come out highest, but that could be because their “European” sample did include Ashkenazi Jews, and so here problem [1] does come in.
Maybe the best we can do is blame autocorrelation? That is, for all the data points on the graph, there are really only three clusters - Europeans, Africans, and everyone else. So you really only need ~3 unlucky coincidences to get this finding. And three unlucky coincidences, if you admitted they were three unlucky coincidences, wouldn’t be statistically significant, let alone “p = 7e-08” (lol). So maybe all the technical issues just explain why we shouldn’t take the scores seriously, and the answer to why it matches reality is a combination of “bad luck” and “it doesn’t really match reality that well, cf. the Chinese vs. Puerto Rican issue, but with enough autocorrelated data points even small coincidental matches look very significant”.
Highlights From The Comments On Liberalism And Communities
August 12, 2025 · Original source
I don’t buy the money argument. The USA is already the richest country in the world. Adding more money won’t make it less like it is. One problem the USA seems to face is that many of the world’s good and bad ideas are invented there. Europeans have a bit of perspective, and can take from the American experience whatever seems good to them. In the USA, as soon as you decide to do something sensible like build a strong community within the liberal framework, a new shiny object comes along and interrupts your plans. Being on the forefront isn’t easy!