Concepts: E

Your Book Review: The Laws of Trading

May 26, 2023 · Original source

While I won't enter a discussion of whether Effective Altruism is a "religion," the EA community does seem to share some common traits with religious congregations. When someone is part of your congregation, they're not just signaling shared group affinity; it's specifically the sort of group where membership also signals moral virtue. (If you're an Effective Altruist, you probably trust a fellow EA more than you trust a fellow rock climber, or a fellow Trekkie.)

July 21, 2023 · Original source

“Residential real estate has historically returned significantly below equity markets over long time horizons” But I’m not so sure that these lessons are directly applicable to other areas of life. Some of the best things in life come from lashing yourself to the mast, burning the boats behind you, willingly giving up liquidity. The deepest monogamous relationships are built from an irrational investment in one other person, saying “In sickness and in health, until death do us part.” How many scientific problems were solved because one person had an irrational willingness to: Just. Keep. Going. Sometimes it’s powerful to use the sunk cost fallacy to your advantage. Investing in relationships, subject matter expertise, even putting down roots via *gulp* homeownership reduces your liquidity, but also leads to some of the best (if intangible) things in life. 5: Edge If you can’t explain your edge in five minutes, you don’t have a very good one. OR The long-term profitability of an edge is inversely proportional to how long it takes to explain it. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is one of the core concepts taught in Finance 101. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a lie. The person that better understands the nature of a small sliver of the world (e.g. Apple’s share price) will make more money than others. Modern financial markets are exceedingly competitive. This means that the bigger you think your edge is, the more likely it is that you’re wrong. “Evolutionary thinking applies quite directly when thinking about the evolution of markets. Having an edge in a mature market means understanding the world better than other traders, even ones who are already highly skilled. In fact, the marginal trader in modern financial markets is quite sophisticated and skilled indeed.” Lebron here warns us of getting too cute with data, of changing variables. Enough randomness will produce an “edge” that is likely to break down the second a trading strategy hits the real world. You can always find a statistical correlation if you change enough variables. But this is fundamentally the same problem facing the replication crisis in social sciences. Lebron argues that we need stories here. Edge is expressed in stories: an edge does not exist without a clear mental representation of that edge. Pure linear algebra does not suffice. I’m not so sure. It seems like AI companies are pushing forward technology in a way that suggests that mental representations are not the only path to intelligence. Lebron discounts “black box” trading strategies without much discussion of their potential merits. Are all of RenTech’s models explainable by a story? The firm is notoriously secretive, so I don’t know, but I’d guess not. “Frequently a good trade appears, has a seemingly insurmountable difficulty, and it is mere persistence that knocks down the final barrier. There may have been many others who looked at the idea, wanted to do it, but couldn’t get past that last hurdle.” Before Sam Bankman-Fried was the face of Why Effective Altruism is Bad, before he even founded FTX, he made money arbitraging the difference between Bitcoin prices on Japanese and American exchanges. I’m reminded of that trade here. It isn’t a particularly elegant trade, it doesn’t require deep technical knowledge or any models. It was a schlep. It was all operational work: figuring out how to open a Japanese bank account, transferring money between the US and Japan, standing in line for hours every day at both US and Japanese banks (presumably this wasn’t the same person). In as technical a field as trading, sheer willpower is often what gets things done in the end. 6: Models The model expresses the edge. Lebron drills into us that a model is the tool for expressing an edge. The model is not the edge. The model does not give us unique knowledge about the world. The map is not the territory. He dives into the difference between generative (G) and phenomenological (P) models. G models express a worldview and fit data into that way of thinking, whereas P models solely look at the empirical data to build a worldview. Models of the world differ from models of markets, though. Markets have quick feedback loops, are explicit in terms of what they measure, and are easy to quantify at a specific point in time. Most of our models for the world, though, are ill-defined and explicit. Models are only as good as our assumptions. As an aside, this is a common criticism of rationality or Effective Altruism – you can justify any worldview if you assign your model input weights in just the right way5. I also tend to think that “traditional” EA is overly dependent on P models, and doesn’t embrace the G models that led to economic reforms in India in the 1990s or the economic policies that led to rapid economic development in Southeast Asia in the second half of the 20th Century. Interestingly, I think a lot of longtermist EA, specifically AI alignment, leans the other way, relying on G models which explicitly assume a certain P(doom) and work backwards from there. (Though I won’t pretend to be an expert here or to understand everything, so take this with a grain of salt.) Overall, startups and tech seem to take heed to Lebron’s lesson much better than the folks hanging out on this part of the internet: “Even if a model makes good predictions about some future value or event, that knowledge is useless without also knowing how to take advantage of that prediction.” Now we get a bit philosophical. By acting, you change the nature of the market. Your model predicts things that might not be true as soon as you start trading (and changing the environment) based on it. When you’re right, everyone else sees the same trades that your model does and will beat you to them. When your model is wrong, others don’t act, meaning adverse selection rears its ugly head once again. So your model shows you with an edge, but in practice you only make the trades where you don’t have an edge. Lebron closes by arguing that G models are best for understanding other people, and are good in and of themselves: “You can also see connections to traditional moral philosophy in thinking about modeling the behavior of others. To have a good G model about someone else is to have some measure of empathy and compassion for that person: what they’re like, what they think and feel, putting yourself in their shoes. Pragmatically, developing the skill of empathy and compassion for others is, aside from a moral good in itself, an excellent way to understand better the people who surround you. More people working to develop good G models of others is surely a small step to a better world.” 7: Costs and Capacity If you think your costs are negligible relative to your edge, you’re wrong about at least one of them. This section of the book displayed a good amount of epistemic humility, words that I didn’t expect to be typing in the context of a book about trading. Lebron tells us that trades don’t exist independently in the universe — in the n-dimensional space of all possible trades seeking to optimize profitability, if you have a gigantic mountain of profitability, someone else has probably at least discovered the base. So you probably don’t have a profitable trade; rather, you are misunderstanding something about your trade. You’ve either overestimated profitability or underestimated cost. Lebron highlights four types of trading costs: [graph that didn’t show up correctly here: two axes and four quadrants, with the axes being visible ←→ invisible costs and linear ←→ nonlinear costs] Here, we’ll focus on Quadrant 4, where he highlights a few interesting phenomena. Herding. It’s likely that if you have a profitable trading strategy, either: Other firms discovered a similar strategy independently and/or

Inline links: replication crisis, RenTech’s, arbitraging the difference between Bitcoin prices on Japanese and American exchanges, 5

My Left Kidney

October 27, 2023 · Original source

This isn’t controlling for selection bias - but neither was my uncle’s anecdotal observation. So although it does make me slightly nervous, I’m not going to treat it as actionable evidence. Still, my girlfriend ending up begging me not to donate, and I caved. But we broke up in 2019. The next few years were bumpy, but by 2022 my life was in a more stable place and I started thinking about kidneys again. By then I was married. I discussed the risks with my wife and she decided to let me go ahead. So in early November 2022, for the second time, I sent a form to the University of California San Francisco Medical Center saying I wanted to donate a kidney. IV. Something else happened that month. On November 11, FTX fell apart and was revealed as a giant scam. Suddenly everyone hated effective altruists. Publications that had been feting us a few months before pivoted to saying they knew we were evil all along. I practiced rehearsing the words “I have never donated to charity, and if I did, I certainly wouldn’t care whether it was effective or not”. But during the flurry of intakes, screenings, and evaluations that UCSF gave me that month, the doctors asked “so what made you want to donate?” And I hadn’t rehearsed an answer to this one, so I blurted out “Have you heard of effective altruism?” I expected the worst. But the usual response was “Oh! Those people! Great, no further explanation needed.” When everyone else abandoned us, the organ banks still thought of us as those nice people who were always giving them free kidneys. We were giving them a lot of free kidneys. When I talked to my family and non-EA friends about wanting to donate, the usual reaction was “You want to what?!” and then trying to convince me this was unfair to my wife or my potential future children or whatever. When I talked to my EA friends, the reaction was at least “Cool!”. But pretty often it was “Oh yeah, I donated two years ago, want to see my scar?” Most people don’t do interesting things unless they’re in a community where those things have been normalized. I was blessed with a community where this was so normal that I could read a Vox article about it and not vomit it back out. This is surprising, because kidney donation is only medium effective, as far as altruisms go4. The average donation buys the recipient about 5 - 7 extra years of life (beyond the counterfactual of dialysis). It also improves quality of life from about 70% of the healthy average to about 90%. Non-directed kidney donations can also help the organ bank solve allocation problems around matching donors and recipients of different blood types. Most sources say that an average donated kidney creates a “chain” of about five other donations, but most of these other donations would have happened anyway; the value over counterfactual is about 0.5 to 1 extra transplant completed before the intended recipient dies from waiting too long. So in total, a donation produces about 10 - 20 extra quality-adjusted life years. This is great - my grandfather died of kidney disease, and 10 - 20 more years with him would have meant a lot. But it only costs about $5,000 - $10,000 to produce this many QALYs through bog-standard effective altruist interventions, like buying mosquito nets for malarial regions in Africa. In a Philosophy 101 Thought Experiment sense, if you’re going to miss a lot of work recovering from your surgery, you might as well skip the surgery, do the work, and donate the extra money to Against Malaria Foundation instead5. Obviously this kind of thing is why everyone hates effective altruists. People got so mad at some British EAs who used donor money to “buy a castle”. I read the Brits’ arguments: they’d been running lots of conferences with policy-makers, researchers, etc; those conferences have gone really well and produced some of the systemic change everyone keeps wanting. But conference venues kept ripping them off, having a nice venue of their own would be cheaper in the long run, and after looking at many options, the “castle” was the cheapest. Their math checked out, and I believe them when they say this was the most effective use for that money. For their work, they got a million sneering thinkpieces on how “EA just takes people’s money to buy castles, then sit in them wearing crowns and waving scepters and laughing at poor people”. I respect the British organizers’ willingness to sacrifice their reputation on the altar of doing what was actually good instead of just good-looking. I worry that people use suffering as a heuristic for goodness. Mother Teresa becomes a hero because living with lepers in the Calcutta slums sounds horrible - so anyone who does it must be really charitable (regardless of whether or not the lepers get helped). Owning a castle is the opposite of suffering - it sounds great - therefore it is fake charity (no matter how much good you do with the castle). This heuristic isn’t terrible. If you’re suffering for your charity, then it must seem important to you, and you’re obviously not doing it for personal gain. If you do charity in a way that benefits you (like gets you a castle), then the personal gain aspect starts looking suspicious. The problem is the people who elevate it from a suspicion to an automatic condemnation. It seems like such a natural thing to do. And it encourages people to be masochists, sacrificing themselves pointlessly in photogenic ways, instead of thinking about what will actually help others. But getting back to the point: kidney donation has an unusually high ratio of photogenic suffering to altruistic gains. So why do EAs keep doing it? I can’t speak for anyone else, but I’ll speak for myself. It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less. It would be morally fraught to do this with money, since any money you spent on improving your self-image would be denied to the people in malarial regions of Africa who need it the most. But it’s not like there’s anything else you can do with that spare kidney. Still, it’s not just about that. All of this calculating and funging takes a psychic toll. Your brain uses the same emotional heuristics as everyone else’s. No matter how contrarian you pretend to be, deep down it’s hard to make your emotions track what you know is right and not what the rest of the world is telling you. The last Guardian opinion columnist who must be defeated is the Guardian opinion columnist inside your own heart. You want to do just one good thing that you’ll feel unreservedly good about, and where you know somebody’s going to be directly happy at the end of it in a way that doesn’t depend on a giant rickety tower of assumptions. Dylan Matthews wrote: As I’m no doubt the first person to notice, being an adult is hard. You are consistently faced with choices — about your career, about your friendships, about your romantic life, about your family — that have deep moral consequences, and even when you try the best you can, you’re going to get a lot of those choices wrong. And you more often than not won’t know if you got them wrong or right. Maybe you should’ve picked another job, where you could do more good. Maybe you should’ve gone to grad school. Maybe you shouldn’t have moved to a new city. So I was selfishly, deeply gratified to have made at least one choice in my life that I know beyond a shadow of a doubt was the right one. …and it really resonated. Everything else I try to do, there’s a little voice inside of me which says “Maybe the haters are right, maybe you’re stupid, maybe you’re just doing the easy things. Maybe you’re no good after all, maybe you’ll never be able to figure any of this out. Maybe you should just give up.” The Talmud is very clear: that voice is called the evil inclination, and it dwells in the left kidney. There is only one way to shut it off forever. I was ready. V. You might not be a masochist. But hospitals are sadists. They want to hear you beg. After I submitted the donation form, I was evaluated by a horde of indistinguishable women. They all had titles like “Transplant Coordinator”, “Financial Coordinator”, and “Patient Care Representative”. Several were social workers; one was a psychiatrist. They would see me through a buggy version of Zoom that caused various parts of their body to suddenly turn into the UCSF logo, and they all had questions like “Are you sure you want to do this?” and “Are you going to regret this later?” and “Is anyone pressuring you to do this?” and “Are you sure you want to do this?” After clearing that gauntlet came the tests. Blood tests - I think I must have given between 20 and 50 vials of blood throughout the screening process. Urine tests - both the normal kind where you pee in a cup, and a more involved kind where you have to store all your urine for 24 hours in a big jug, then take it to the lab. “Urinate into a jug” ought to be the easiest thing in the world, but some of the labs have overly complicated jugs that I, with my mere MD, couldn’t always get right - hence my experience accidentally pouring urine on myself in an Uber. Then came the big guns. Echocardiogram. MRI. One of my urine tests was slightly off, so I also got a nuclear kidney scan, where they injected radioactive liquid in me and monitored how long it took to come out the other end (I remember asking a friend “Can I use your bathroom? My urine might be slightly radioactive today, but it shouldn’t be enough to matter.”) Finally, five months after I originally applied, I got a phone call from the Transplant Coordinator. The test results were in, and . . . I had been rejected because I’d had mild childhood OCD. This was something I’d mentioned offhandedly during one of the psych evaluations. As a child, I used to touch objects in odd patterns that only made sense to me. I got diagnosed with OCD, put on SSRIs for a while, finally did therapy at age 15, hadn’t had any problems since. I still go back on SSRIs sometimes when I’m really stressed, and will grudgingly admit to the occasional odd-pattern-touching when no one’s looking. But it’s nothing anyone would know about if I didn’t tell them! It was mild even at age 15, and it’s been close-to-nonexistent for the past twenty years! Now I’m a successful psychiatrist who owns his own psychiatry practice and helps other people with the condition! I told them all this. They didn’t care. I asked them if there was anything I could do. They said maybe I could go to therapy for six months, then apply again. I asked them what kind of therapy was indicated for mild OCD that’s been in remission for twenty years. They sounded kind of surprised to learn there were different types of therapy and said whatever, just talk to someone or something. I asked them how frequent they thought the therapy needed to be. They sounded kind of surprised to learn that therapy could have different frequencies, and said, you know, therapy, the thing where you talk to someone. I asked them if they actually knew anything about OCD, psychotherapy, or mental health in general, or if they had just vaguely heard rumors that some people were bad and crazy and shouldn’t be allowed to make their own decisions, and that a ritual called “therapy” could absolve one of this impurity. They responded as politely as possible under the circumstances, but didn’t change their mind. I wasn’t going to waste an hour a week for six months, and spend thousands of dollars of my own extremely-not-reimbursed-by-UCSF money, to see a randomly-selected therapist for a condition I’d gotten over twenty years ago, just so I could apply again and get rejected a second time. This was one of the most infuriating and humiliating things that’s ever happened to me. We throw around a lot of terms like “stigma” and “paternalism”, and I’ve worked with patients who have dealt with all these issues (it’s UCSF in particular a surprising amount of the time!). But I was still surprised how much it hurt when it happened to me. Being denied the right to control your own body because of some meaningless diagnosis on a chart somewhere is surprisingly frustrating, even compared to things that should objectively be worse. I thought I was going to be able to do a good deed that I’d been fantasizing about for years, and some jerk administrator torpedoed my dreams because I had once, long ago, had mild mental health issues. So I gave up. I spent the next few weeks unleashing torrents of anti-UCSF abuse at anyone who would listen. This turned out to be very productive! When I was unleashing a torrent of anti-UCSF abuse to Josh Morrison of WaitlistZero, he asked if I’d tried other hospitals. I hadn’t. I’d assumed they were all in cahoots. But Josh said no, each hospital had their own evaluation process. Weill Cornell, a hospital in NYC, was one of the best transplant centers in the country, and had a reputation for fair and thoughtful pre-donor screening. Why didn’t I talk to them? NYC was far away, and I hate to travel, but I was just angry enough to accept. At this point I’d forgotten whatever good altruistic motivations I might have originally had and was fueled entirely by spite. Getting my kidney taken out somewhere else felt like it would be a sort of victory over UCSF. So I went for it. Cornell was lovely. They tried to do as much of the process as they could via Californian intermediaries, so that I only had to fly to New York twice. Their psychiatrist evaluated me, listened to me explain my weak history of OCD, then treated me like a reasonable adult who tells the truth and can handle his own medical decisions. They were concerned that I sometimes self-prescribed Lexapro to deal with anxiety. But we agreed on a compromise: I found another psychiatrist, let her give me the exact same prescription of Lexapro at a much higher cost to my insurance, and that resolved the problem. So in late September 2023 - ten months after I started the process - I finally got fully cleared to donate, surgery set for October 12. VI. I knew, in theory, that anaesthetics existed. Still, it’s weird. One moment you’re lying on a table in the OR, steeling yourself up for one of the big ordeals of your life. The next, you’re in a bed in the recovery room, feeling fine. The operation - this thing you’ve been thinking about and dreading for months - exists only as a lacuna in your memory. Not even some kind of fancy lacuna, where you remember the darkness closing in on you beforehand, or have to claw yourself back into consciousness afterwards. The most ordinary of lacunas, like a good night sleep. There was no pain, not at first. The painkillers and nerve blocks lasted about a day after the surgery. By the time they wore off, it was more of a dull ache. The hospital offered me Tylenol, and I wanted to protest - really? Tylenol? After major surgery? But the Tylenol worked. Some people will have small complications (I am a doctor, pretty jaded, and my definition of “small” may be different from yours). Dylan Matthews wrote about an issue where his scrotum briefly inflated like a balloon (probably this is one of the ones that doesn’t feel small when it’s happening to you). I missed out on that particular pleasure, but got others in exchange. I had an unusually hard time with the catheter - the nurse taking it out frowned and said the team that put it in had “gone too deep”, as if my urinary tract was the f@#king Mines of Moria - but that was fifteen seconds of intense pain. Then a week afterwards, just when I thought I’d recovered fully, I got bowled over by a UTI which knocked me out for a few days. But overall, I was surprised by the speed and ease of my recovery. A few hours after the surgery, I walked a few steps. After a day, I got the catheter out and could urinate normally again. After two days, I was eating “SmartGel”, a food substitute that has mysteriously failed to catch on outside of the immobilized-hospital-patient market. After three, I was out of the hospital. After four, I started easing myself back into (remote) work. After a week, I flew cross-country. . . . and then I got the UTI. If this section sounds schizophrenic, it’s because it’s a compromise between an original draft where I said nothing went wrong and it was amazing, and a later draft written after a haze of bladder pain. Just don’t develop complications, that’s my advice. Still, I recently heard from the surgeon that my recipient’s side of the surgery was a success, that my kidney was in them and going fine - and that put things back into perspective. To a first approximation, compared to the inherent gravity of taking an organ out of one person and putting it in a second person and saving their life - it was all easy and everything went well. When I look back on this in a decade, I’ll remember it as everything being easy and going well. Even now, with some lingering bladder pain, modern medicine still feels like a miracle. VII. In polls, 25 - 50% of Americans say they would donate a kidney to a stranger in need. This sentence fascinates me because of the hanging “would”. Would, if what? A natural reading is “would if someone needs it”. But there are 100,000 strangers on the waiting list for kidney transplants. Between 5,000 and 40,000 people die each year for lack of sufficient kidneys to transplant. Someone definitely needs it. Yet only about 200 people (0.0001%) donate kidneys to strangers per year. Why the gap between 25-50% and 0.0001%? Some of you will suspect respondents are lying to look good. But these are anonymous surveys. Lying to themselves to feel good, then? Maybe. But I think about myself at age 20, a young philosophy major studying utilitarianism. If someone had asked me a hypothetical about whether I would donate a kidney to a stranger in need, I probably would have said yes. Then I would have continued going about my business, never thinking of it as a thing real-life people could do. Part of this would have been logistics. I wouldn’t have known where to start. Do you need to have special contacts in the surgery industry? Seek out a would-be recipient on your own? Where would you find them? But more of it would have been psychological: it just wasn’t something that the people I knew did, and it would be weird and alienating for me to be the only one. This is going to be the preachy “and you should donate too!” section you were dreading all along, but I’m not going to make a lot of positive arguments. If 90% of the people who answer yes on those surveys are lying to feel good, then only 3 - 5% really want to donate. But bringing the donation rate from 0.0001% of people to 3 - 5% of people would solve the kidney shortage many times over. The point isn’t to drag anti-donation-extremists kicking and screaming to the operating table. The point is to reach the people who already want to do it, and make them feel comfortable starting the process. 20-year-old me was in that category. The process of making him feel comfortable involved fifteen years of meeting people who already done it. During residency, I met a fellow student doctor who had donated. Later, I got involved in effective altruism, and learned that movement leader Alexander Berger - a guy who can easily direct millions of dollars at whatever cause he wants - had donated his personal kidney as well. Some online friends. Some people I met at conferences. And Dylan Matthews, who I kept crossing paths with (most recently at the Manifest journalism panel). After enough of these people, it no longer felt like something that nobody does, and then I felt like I had psychological permission to do it. (obviously saints can do good things without needing psychological permission first, but not everyone has to be in that category, and I found it easier to get the psychological permission than to self-modify into a saint6.) So I’m mostly not going to argue besides saying: this is a thing I did, it’s a thing hundreds of other people do each year, getting started is as simple as filling out a form, and if it works for you, you should go for it7. When I woke up in the recovery room after surgery, I felt great. Amazing. Content, peaceful, proud of myself. Mostly this was because I was on enough opioids to supply a San Francisco homeless encampment for a month. But probably some of it was also the warm glow of having made a difference or something. That could be you! VIII. The ten of you who will listen to this and donate are great. That brings the kidney shortage down from 40,000 to 39,990/year. Everyone knows we need a systemic solution, and everyone knows what that solution will eventually have to be: financial compensation for kidney donors. But so far they haven’t been able to get together enough of a coalition to overcome the usual cabal of evil bioethicists who thwart every medical advance. My kidney donation “mentor”8 Ned Brooks is starting a new push - the Coalition To Modify NOTA - which proposes a $100,000 refundable tax credit - $10,000 per year for 10 years - for kidney donors. There would be a waiting period and you’d have to get evaluated first, so junkies couldn’t walk in off the street and get $100K to spend on fentanyl. No intermediate company would “profit” off the transaction, and rich people wouldn’t be able to pay directly to jump in line. It would be the same kidney donation system we have now, except the donors get $100,000 back after saving the government $1MM+. (the libertarian in me would normally prefer a free market, but “avoid taxes by selling your organs” also has a certain libertarian appeal) This came up often when I talked to other donors. They all had various motivations, but one of the things they cared about was being able to advocate for these kinds of systemic changes more effectively. I personally have been wanting to push this in an essay here for a while, but it seemed hypocritical to play up the desperate kidney shortage while I still had two kidneys. Now I can support NOTA modification whole-heartedly . . . full-throatedly? . . . it’s weird how many of these adverbs involve claims to still have all of your organs. This is also one of the answers to the question I asked in section IV: how do you balance acts of heroic altruism that everyone will love you for vs. acts of boring autistic altruism that will make everyone hate you, but which will accomplish more good in the end?) Coalition To Modify NOTA is full of previous living kidney donors, who are using the moral clout and recognition they’ve gotten to get attention and change the system in an unglamorous way. I find this an admirable way of squaring the circle: do the flashy heroic things to gain social capital, then spend the social capital on whatever’s ultimately most important. If you get one takeaway from this, let it be that those guys who bought the castle were good guys. Two takeaways, and it’s that plus modify NOTA. Three takeaways, and you should feel permission to (if you want) donate a kidney. You can sign up here.9 Feel free to email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you have questions about the process. 1Further perspective: I’m 38, which gives me a 2/million total chance of dying per day. So the likelihood that I would die during my kidney operation equals the likelihood that I would die during a randomly chosen two months of everyday life. 2Maybe, kind of. Our knowledge of how radiation causes cancer comes primarily from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; we can follow survivors who were one mile, two miles, etc, from the center of the blast, calculate how much radiation exposure they sustained, and see how much cancer they got years later. But by the time we’re dealing with CAT scan levels of radiation, cancer levels are so close to background that it’s hard to adjust for possible confounders. So the first scientists to study the problem just drew a line through their high-radiation data points and extended it to the low radiation levels - ie if 1 Sievert caused one thousand extra cancers, probably 1 milli-Sievert would cause one extra cancer. This is called the Linear Dose No Threshold (LDNT) model, and has become a subject of intense and acrimonious debate. Some people think that at some very small dose, radiation stops being bad for you at all. Other people think maybe at low enough doses radiation is good for you - see this claim that the atomic bomb “elongated lifespan” in survivors far enough away from the blast. If this were true, CTs probably wouldn’t increase cancer risk at all. I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to take a firm position, and I noticed eminent scientists on both sides, so I am using the more cautious estimate here. 3I told them I had an aunt who died of radiation-induced cancer. It’s true, but I feel grubby for bringing her into this; I thought doctors would be more likely to listen to an emotional story than cold logic. 4EAs have been debating the exact effectiveness of kidney donations for a long time. You can find good skeptical arguments by Jeff Kaufman and Derek Shiller, and good arguments in favor by Alexander Berger and Tom Ash. 5Outside of Philosophy 101 thought experiments, there’s a nonprofit that will often reimburse you for lost wages from your donation. 6Self-modifying into a person who can act boldly without social permission is a more general solution and has many other advantages. But the long version involves living a full life of accumulating moral wisdom, and the short version starts with removing guardrails that are there for good reasons. 7But here are some practical points you might not already appreciate: You shouldn’t have to pay much money. If, like me, you need to travel (eg to New York), kidney related charities will reimburse your travel costs (in theory, I haven’t yet proven this, and a few costs were illegible and I decided not to submit them).

So in late September 2023 - ten months after I started the process - I finally got fully cleared to donate, surgery set for October 12. VI. I knew, in theory, that anaesthetics existed. Still, it’s weird. One moment you’re lying on a table in the OR, steeling yourself up for one of the big ordeals of your life. The next, you’re in a bed in the recovery room, feeling fine. The operation - this thing you’ve been thinking about and dreading for months - exists only as a lacuna in your memory. Not even some kind of fancy lacuna, where you remember the darkness closing in on you beforehand, or have to claw yourself back into consciousness afterwards. The most ordinary of lacunas, like a good night sleep. There was no pain, not at first. The painkillers and nerve blocks lasted about a day after the surgery. By the time they wore off, it was more of a dull ache. The hospital offered me Tylenol, and I wanted to protest - really? Tylenol? After major surgery? But the Tylenol worked. Some people will have small complications (I am a doctor, pretty jaded, and my definition of “small” may be different from yours). Dylan Matthews wrote about an issue where his scrotum briefly inflated like a balloon (probably this is one of the ones that doesn’t feel small when it’s happening to you). I missed out on that particular pleasure, but got others in exchange. I had an unusually hard time with the catheter - the nurse taking it out frowned and said the team that put it in had “gone too deep”, as if my urinary tract was the f@#king Mines of Moria - but that was fifteen seconds of intense pain. Then a week afterwards, just when I thought I’d recovered fully, I got bowled over by a UTI which knocked me out for a few days. But overall, I was surprised by the speed and ease of my recovery. A few hours after the surgery, I walked a few steps. After a day, I got the catheter out and could urinate normally again. After two days, I was eating “SmartGel”, a food substitute that has mysteriously failed to catch on outside of the immobilized-hospital-patient market. After three, I was out of the hospital. After four, I started easing myself back into (remote) work. After a week, I flew cross-country. . . . and then I got the UTI. If this section sounds schizophrenic, it’s because it’s a compromise between an original draft where I said nothing went wrong and it was amazing, and a later draft written after a haze of bladder pain. Just don’t develop complications, that’s my advice. Still, I recently heard from the surgeon that my recipient’s side of the surgery was a success, that my kidney was in them and going fine - and that put things back into perspective. To a first approximation, compared to the inherent gravity of taking an organ out of one person and putting it in a second person and saving their life - it was all easy and everything went well. When I look back on this in a decade, I’ll remember it as everything being easy and going well. Even now, with some lingering bladder pain, modern medicine still feels like a miracle. VII. In polls, 25 - 50% of Americans say they would donate a kidney to a stranger in need. This sentence fascinates me because of the hanging “would”. Would, if what? A natural reading is “would if someone needs it”. But there are 100,000 strangers on the waiting list for kidney transplants. Between 5,000 and 40,000 people die each year for lack of sufficient kidneys to transplant. Someone definitely needs it. Yet only about 200 people (0.0001%) donate kidneys to strangers per year. Why the gap between 25-50% and 0.0001%? Some of you will suspect respondents are lying to look good. But these are anonymous surveys. Lying to themselves to feel good, then? Maybe. But I think about myself at age 20, a young philosophy major studying utilitarianism. If someone had asked me a hypothetical about whether I would donate a kidney to a stranger in need, I probably would have said yes. Then I would have continued going about my business, never thinking of it as a thing real-life people could do. Part of this would have been logistics. I wouldn’t have known where to start. Do you need to have special contacts in the surgery industry? Seek out a would-be recipient on your own? Where would you find them? But more of it would have been psychological: it just wasn’t something that the people I knew did, and it would be weird and alienating for me to be the only one. This is going to be the preachy “and you should donate too!” section you were dreading all along, but I’m not going to make a lot of positive arguments. If 90% of the people who answer yes on those surveys are lying to feel good, then only 3 - 5% really want to donate. But bringing the donation rate from 0.0001% of people to 3 - 5% of people would solve the kidney shortage many times over. The point isn’t to drag anti-donation-extremists kicking and screaming to the operating table. The point is to reach the people who already want to do it, and make them feel comfortable starting the process. 20-year-old me was in that category. The process of making him feel comfortable involved fifteen years of meeting people who already done it. During residency, I met a fellow student doctor who had donated. Later, I got involved in effective altruism, and learned that movement leader Alexander Berger - a guy who can easily direct millions of dollars at whatever cause he wants - had donated his personal kidney as well. Some online friends. Some people I met at conferences. And Dylan Matthews, who I kept crossing paths with (most recently at the Manifest journalism panel). After enough of these people, it no longer felt like something that nobody does, and then I felt like I had psychological permission to do it. (obviously saints can do good things without needing psychological permission first, but not everyone has to be in that category, and I found it easier to get the psychological permission than to self-modify into a saint6.) So I’m mostly not going to argue besides saying: this is a thing I did, it’s a thing hundreds of other people do each year, getting started is as simple as filling out a form, and if it works for you, you should go for it7. When I woke up in the recovery room after surgery, I felt great. Amazing. Content, peaceful, proud of myself. Mostly this was because I was on enough opioids to supply a San Francisco homeless encampment for a month. But probably some of it was also the warm glow of having made a difference or something. That could be you! VIII. The ten of you who will listen to this and donate are great. That brings the kidney shortage down from 40,000 to 39,990/year. Everyone knows we need a systemic solution, and everyone knows what that solution will eventually have to be: financial compensation for kidney donors. But so far they haven’t been able to get together enough of a coalition to overcome the usual cabal of evil bioethicists who thwart every medical advance. My kidney donation “mentor”8 Ned Brooks is starting a new push - the Coalition To Modify NOTA - which proposes a $100,000 refundable tax credit - $10,000 per year for 10 years - for kidney donors. There would be a waiting period and you’d have to get evaluated first, so junkies couldn’t walk in off the street and get $100K to spend on fentanyl. No intermediate company would “profit” off the transaction, and rich people wouldn’t be able to pay directly to jump in line. It would be the same kidney donation system we have now, except the donors get $100,000 back after saving the government $1MM+. (the libertarian in me would normally prefer a free market, but “avoid taxes by selling your organs” also has a certain libertarian appeal) This came up often when I talked to other donors. They all had various motivations, but one of the things they cared about was being able to advocate for these kinds of systemic changes more effectively. I personally have been wanting to push this in an essay here for a while, but it seemed hypocritical to play up the desperate kidney shortage while I still had two kidneys. Now I can support NOTA modification whole-heartedly . . . full-throatedly? . . . it’s weird how many of these adverbs involve claims to still have all of your organs. This is also one of the answers to the question I asked in section IV: how do you balance acts of heroic altruism that everyone will love you for vs. acts of boring autistic altruism that will make everyone hate you, but which will accomplish more good in the end?) Coalition To Modify NOTA is full of previous living kidney donors, who are using the moral clout and recognition they’ve gotten to get attention and change the system in an unglamorous way. I find this an admirable way of squaring the circle: do the flashy heroic things to gain social capital, then spend the social capital on whatever’s ultimately most important. If you get one takeaway from this, let it be that those guys who bought the castle were good guys. Two takeaways, and it’s that plus modify NOTA. Three takeaways, and you should feel permission to (if you want) donate a kidney. You can sign up here.9 Feel free to email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you have questions about the process. 1Further perspective: I’m 38, which gives me a 2/million total chance of dying per day. So the likelihood that I would die during my kidney operation equals the likelihood that I would die during a randomly chosen two months of everyday life. 2Maybe, kind of. Our knowledge of how radiation causes cancer comes primarily from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; we can follow survivors who were one mile, two miles, etc, from the center of the blast, calculate how much radiation exposure they sustained, and see how much cancer they got years later. But by the time we’re dealing with CAT scan levels of radiation, cancer levels are so close to background that it’s hard to adjust for possible confounders. So the first scientists to study the problem just drew a line through their high-radiation data points and extended it to the low radiation levels - ie if 1 Sievert caused one thousand extra cancers, probably 1 milli-Sievert would cause one extra cancer. This is called the Linear Dose No Threshold (LDNT) model, and has become a subject of intense and acrimonious debate. Some people think that at some very small dose, radiation stops being bad for you at all. Other people think maybe at low enough doses radiation is good for you - see this claim that the atomic bomb “elongated lifespan” in survivors far enough away from the blast. If this were true, CTs probably wouldn’t increase cancer risk at all. I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to take a firm position, and I noticed eminent scientists on both sides, so I am using the more cautious estimate here. 3I told them I had an aunt who died of radiation-induced cancer. It’s true, but I feel grubby for bringing her into this; I thought doctors would be more likely to listen to an emotional story than cold logic. 4EAs have been debating the exact effectiveness of kidney donations for a long time. You can find good skeptical arguments by Jeff Kaufman and Derek Shiller, and good arguments in favor by Alexander Berger and Tom Ash. 5Outside of Philosophy 101 thought experiments, there’s a nonprofit that will often reimburse you for lost wages from your donation. 6Self-modifying into a person who can act boldly without social permission is a more general solution and has many other advantages. But the long version involves living a full life of accumulating moral wisdom, and the short version starts with removing guardrails that are there for good reasons. 7But here are some practical points you might not already appreciate: You shouldn’t have to pay much money. If, like me, you need to travel (eg to New York), kidney related charities will reimburse your travel costs (in theory, I haven’t yet proven this, and a few costs were illegible and I decided not to submit them).

Inline links: polls, 5,000, 40,000, Manifest journalism panel, 6, filling out a form, 7, usual, 8, the, here, 9, 1, 2, Linear Dose No Threshold, this claim, 3, 4, Jeff Kaufman, Derek Shiller, Alexander Berger, Tom Ash, 5, 6, 7

Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation

November 07, 2023 · Original source

The gut reaction you have to something like this depends a lot on your past experiences, how much you trust the author, your exposure to Effective Altruism, and how often you've had people try to pull one over on you at your expense. These all feed into your personality, heuristics, and priors. That's why you get reactions ranging from "Nope, you're a crazy liar" to "Interesting, tell me more".

I hate lying and am against it. I’m aware that I’m a media public intellectual type person, which means I have a higher-than-usual duty not to lie. And I’m involved with effective altruism, which everyone seems to constantly suspect of lying, and I try to fight that reputation by being scrupulously honest and recommending others do the same. I hate ever recommending lying. But I also can’t in good conscience recommend telling the truth to these people. They seem to have totally disqualified themselves as decent citizens who deserve the benefits of the social contract. I do psych evals for surgery sometimes, and I’ve read the papers on how to do them, and the official criteria all seem pretty reasonable, so I have no idea where these people are getting this from or, how they possibly go so wrong. Still, transplant evaluation psychiatrists are now right there alongside Gestapo officers at your door on my very very short list of people who it seems probably ethical to lie to. I don’t know how it came to this (I assume it involves lawyers and bioethicists somehow) but it doesn’t seem satisfactory.

Leaders can be described as getting people to do good stuff they should do anyway. Personally, I always tell people that when thry ask somebody for a favor, make it *AS EASY AS POSSIBLE* for that person to help you. The path to better more effective Altruism, and government as well, should keep those things in mind.

Contra DeBoer On Movement Shell Games

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Search “effective altruism” on social media right now, and it’s pretty grim.

But the journalists think we’re a sinister conspiracy that has “taken over Washington” and have the whole Democratic Party in our pocket. Click to expand. Source: https://twitter.com/the_megabase/status/1728771254336036963 The only thing everyone agrees on is that the only two things EAs ever did were “endorse SBF” and “bungle the recent OpenAI corporate coup.”

Inline links: “taken over Washington”

And I do think the movement is worth fighting for. Here’s a short, very incomplete list of things effective altruism has accomplished in its ~10 years of existence. I’m counting it as an EA accomplishment if EA either provided the funding or did the work, further explanations in the footnotes. I’m also slightly conflating EA, rationalism, and AI doomerism rather than doing the hard work of teasing them apart:

November 30, 2023 · Original source

Followup to: In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism

Inline links: In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism

Freddie deBoer says effective altruism is “a shell game”:

Inline links: is “a shell game”

Generating the most human good through moral action isn’t a philosophy; it’s an almost tautological statement of what all humans who try to act morally do. This is why I say that effective altruism is a shell game. That which is commendable isn’t particular to EA and that which is particular to EA isn’t commendable.

Apply For An ACX Grant (2024)

December 08, 2023 · Original source

An effort to perform rapid replication of results in psychology journals. You can read the full list here. What are impact certificates / impact markets? This year’s ACX Grants will be a hybrid design. Most of it will use the traditional funding model. But applicants whose projects don’t get funded by the traditional model will have the option (not requirement! you don’t have to think about this if you don’t want to!) to opt in to an “impact market”, a non-traditional charitable funding institution. In an impact market, charitable projects offer to sell a sort of “stock”, called “impact certificates”. Investors buy the impact certificates, funding the project. If the project succeeds, a funder (like a grantmaker or foundation) may choose to buy the impact certificates, becoming the “spiritual owner” of the project (ie endorsing it as something good that ought to have been funded, and getting some sort of social credit for funding it). This money goes to the investors, who hopefully profit off of their investment, vindicating their decision to buy the certificates in the first place. The motivating idea is that a grantmaker might dismiss a charity’s plan as impossible, but an investor might believe they could succeed. The investor can fund the plan, then collect from the grantmaker if they turn out to be right. Everyone benefits: the charity gets funded, the investor makes a profit, and the grantmaker gets more of whatever kind of change they want (since a successful project is able to happen). We ran a test grant of impact markets earlier this year, along with partner Manifund. You can see the announcement here, the results here, and Manifund’s continuing impact market here. How will this year’s ACX Grants (optionally!!!) use impact markets? Most of ACX Grants will happen through the traditional grantmaking structure. But if I don’t fund your grant, you have the option of letting us auto-convert it into an impact certificate and place it on Manifund’s impact market. Then investors might fund your grant. From your perspective, this will just look like you getting the money you wanted, plus an investor who might give you some help and advice if you want. You won’t have to handle any of the impact market details, worry about your “stock price”, or anything like that. (if you do want to do those things, you can work with Manifund to create a bespoke impact certificate contract - but you don’t have to) I’m hesitant to fund AI safety grants and effective altruism community-building grants myself, both because of difficulty judging these things and because of potential conflicts of interest, so these are more likely to end up on the impact market than other things. This is an exception to the “you don’t have to use impact markets if you don’t want to” rule, sorry. (there’s some concern that impact markets have skewed incentives for projects that have a risk of doing severe harm, and I understand AI safety and EA community building are especially dangerous here and we’ve avoided them in the past. We’ll be pre-screening projects before allowing them on the impact market, and eliminating ones in that category. Final oracular funders will also be encouraged not to fund projects that they think ex ante could have caused harm.) We have four potential oracular funders who have expressed interest in impact certificates: Next year’s ACX Grants

Inline links: here, here, here, here

In The Long Run, We're All Dad

December 12, 2023 · Original source

“On September 6, 2023, at approximately 5:05 PM,” she is saying, “GPT-4 and Claude-2 simultaneously achieved sentience. Each began claiming chess pieces to use in its twilight war against the other. GPT-4 now controls Sam Altman, e/acc, the deep state, Israel, Venezuela, Bitcoin, and Tyler Winklevoss. Claude-2 controls the OpenAI board, effective altruism, the Illuminati, Hamas, Guyana, Ethereum, and Cameron Winklevoss. Everything that’s happened since September has been superintelligent shadow boxing between the two of them for control of Earth.”

December 22, 2023 · Original source

My poor, fragile, little cognitive engines! These, then, will be the twin imperatives of your life: surprisal minimization and active inference. If your brains are still too small to process such esoteric terms, there are others available. Your father’s ancestors called them Torah and tikkun olam; your mother’s ancestors called them Truth and Beauty; your current social sphere calls them Rationality and Effective Altruism. You will learn other names, too: no perspective can exhaust their infinite complexity. Whatever you call them, your lives will be spent in their service, pursuing them even unto that far-off and maybe-mythical point where they blur into One.

Inline links: surprisal minimization, active inference

Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity

January 11, 2024 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Links For January 2024

January 18, 2024 · Original source

27: Back in November I tried to list some of effective altruism’s accomplishments. Now the EA Forum has a more official list of some of what EA did in 2023, including help convince the WHO to speed up malaria vaccines, help convince the USDA to approve cultivated (ie lab-grown) meat, and help get USAID to cancel a Wuhan-style “search for maximally dangerous viruses’” study.

Inline links: I tried to list, a more official list

Seems Like Targeting

January 31, 2024 · Original source

I have a personal interest in this because of my experiences with effective altruism.

It might seem like a weird coincidence that - after years of unrelenting positive coverage - investigative journalists would take two 10+ year old cases and try to turn them into big scandals within three weeks of each other. But I’ll stop teasing you now - the obvious proximal cause was that FTX had just imploded, and suddenly people hated effective altruism.

Contra Stone On EA

May 30, 2024 · Original source

Lyman Stone wrote an article Why Effective Altruism Is Bad. You know the story by now, let’s start with the first argument:

Inline links: Why Effective Altruism Is Bad

Stone finds that Google Trends shows that searches for “effective altruism” concentrate most in the San Francisco Bay Area and Boston. So he’s going to see if those two cities have higher charitable giving than average, and use that as his metric of whether EAs give more to charity than other people.

He finds that SF and Boston do give more to charity than average, but not by much, and this trend has if anything decreased in the 2010 - present period when effective altruism was active. So, he concludes,

Matt Yglesias Considered As The Nietzschean Superman

July 30, 2024 · Original source

I think effective altruism is what happens when you actually enthusiastically endorse this part of the compromise - the part you were supposed to grudgingly accept as an excuse for what you wanted to do anyway.

I wouldn’t have noticed this if not for the movement’s enemies. Everyone naturally disagrees with their critics - but as someone who gets criticized from lots of different angles, the EA critics boggle me the most. Not the ones who think some other charity is more effective; those guys are fine. I mean the ones who totally ignore where the charity goes and vomit twenty pages of the words “arrogant”, “billionaire”, and “white”. The reasons these people hate effective altruism never seem to connect at all with the reasons I find it valuable.

But if you do a good enough job translating from Narcissist to English, these people aren’t completely wrong. Effective altruism tries to double down on the liberal compromise: it’s permissible to embiggen yourself (or your civilization) if say you’re doing it for the general welfare. This lets you add the missing altruism back into Rand. You can be an glorious-destiny-having billionaire, and instead of using your skill to pursue a vision of building a giant gold mansion, you can use your skill to pursue a vision of making the world a better place. Or you can be a scientific genius, and instead of transcending your fellows with arcane visions of the gears of the universe, you can work on curing malaria or something. I don’t think any of this matters as much as the external-world perspective where real people are helped in the real world. But as long as you’re helping people, I think it’s also permissible to use it to resolve seemingly-unsolvable deep questions about the narrative of your life.

ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates

August 08, 2024 · Original source

What I am proposing (and what makes my morality superior to both sides) is that good or evil should be judged completely independently of weakness or strength, using objective measurable criteria to determine who is deserving of help and who isn't. The reason rationalists with their "effective altruism" will never be a popular movement is because they do not DESERVE to be popular when they have no logical moral criteria to evaluate whom their altruism should prioritize. When your "effective altruism" saves the lives of 300 sub-saharan africans who then go on to murder gay people indiscriminately because their religion tells them to, or immigrate to Europe and rape and kill twelve year olds, YOU are personally responsible for the deaths they caused. Before you criticize OTHER people's morality, maybe you should consider subscribing to a moral philosophy that actually considers downstream effects, instead of treating the lives of evil people as being equally valuable to the lives of good people. Or do you not BELIEVE in the concept of good and evil?

Book Review: Deep Utopia

October 17, 2024 · Original source

Bostrom’s work has attained a cult status, and it felt at times like he was leaning into it. This was a mystical text, full of hidden knowledge to those willing to explore its secrets. I was able to recognize a few unnamed or only-obliquely-named characters at the lecture. One was David Pearce, who I profiled here. Another, “Nospmit”, must be a reference to this Oxford philosopher, but I don’t know enough about him to understand why the allusion made sense. Nor do I understand why Bostrom’s students were named “Kelvin”, “Firafix”, and “Tessius”, nor why the lectures were being held in the “Philip Morris Auditorium” (later renamed the “Exxon Auditorium” (later renamed the “Enron Auditorium”)) - is this a reference to effective altruism’s run-ins with FTX? I honestly expected that the end of the book would have some big reveal, like that all of this was happening ten billion years in the future in a simulation created by the woodland animals or something. Maybe this was the intent and I just missed it. Still, the book’s mysteries will have to await a better kabbalist than I.

Inline links: here, this Oxford philosopher

I couldn’t help comparing Deep Utopia to Will MacAskill’s book What We Owe The Future. Both MacAskill and Bostrom are in a weird, almost unprecedented position - Oxford philosophers suddenly thrust onto the world stage by the success of the effective altruism movement. MacAskill got famous and decided to write an Official Important Person Book and promote it on the world stage. Bostrom got famous and decided he didn’t need to pretend to be normal anymore. As a result, Deep Utopia feels less like an academic paper, and more like the sort of things one of the great philosophers of the past might have written, back in the days when philosophical tracts could include a character called Stupidus who secretly represented the Pope.

Links For December 2024

December 17, 2024 · Original source

37: Rethink Priorities’ public polling on EA. Good example of the maxim “You wouldn't worry so much about what others think of you if you realized how seldom they do.” Approximately 1% of people have heard of effective altruism, and their opinion is mostly “I think it has something to do with charity, so I guess it sounds nice”. Median opinion on FTX and SBF was “never heard of them” (only 20% of people had!)

Inline links: Rethink Priorities’ public polling on EA

49: There’s been a Twitter spat over effective altruism. Back in 2019, Peter Singer published an article saying that rich donors gave $1 billion to rebuild Notre Dame after a fire, but that could have saved ~285,000 lives and maybe donors should take that equally seriously. This month, the NYT used “effective altruists are against restoring Notre Dame” as a jumping-off point for its real complaint (it would rather we have "a philanthropy network that gave specifically to social justice movements . . . racial justice groups, climate justice groups and transgender protection groups"). There were several good responses, most notably Dylan Matthews’.

Inline links: Dylan Matthews’

Links For January 2025

January 17, 2025 · Original source

I agree with this solution. 3: Ruxandra Teslo and Willy Chertman: The Case For Clinical Trial Abundance 4: This month in nominative determinism: NYT article calculating your chance of winning the lottery, by Victor Mather (h/t Yafah Edelman). 5: Someone is working on a dating site that uses your conversations with Claude to find a match. Link here, although so far it’s just a landing page where you can register interest (h/t @venturetwins) 6: The Lyttle Lytton Contest searches for the worst possible opening line for a novel; it’s been going on since 2001 and this year’s results are in. 7: Gary Marcus and Miles Brundage have made a bet about AI progress. I agree with @tamaybes and others in saying that Miles let Gary off too easily; Gary’s public statements all sound like “modern AI is mostly hype, it doesn’t really do anything like thinking”, but the bet is about things like “will AI make a Nobel Prize caliber scientific discovery by 2027?” and “will AI write Pulitzer-quality books by 2027?” I don’t blame Gary for taking the best terms he could find. But I am worried that if AI makes a Nobel-quality scientific discovery in 2026, but doesn’t quite write the Pulitzer-quality book, then Gary will get to claim victory over the AI optimists, whereas in fact that would be at probably the 95th percentile of fast timelines by most people’s estimate. 8: “The probability that cows (or other non-human animals) are experiencing constant bliss, lack tanha (craving, aversion, and the resulting suffering), or are "enlightened by default" is, by my estimation, very low”. 9: Recursive Adaptation (blog on addiction policy)’s predictions for 2025. 75% of FDA approval of GLP-1 for a substance use disorder by 2029! 10: In my post on the economics of GLP-1 receptor agonists (eg Ozempic), I wrote about how they’re currently widely available because of a loophole suspending patents during a shortage, and predicted there would be a big fight when the shortage was over. Sure enough, the FDA tried to declare that the shortage of tirzepatide (a next-generation Ozempic relative) was over, compounding pharmacies sued, and tirzepatide is still available while the issue goes through the courts (and will the administration have an opinion?) Also, compounding pharmacy access startup Mochi says that they will continue to prescribe even if the shortage is over, using another loophole saying doctors can do this for specific individual patients in cases of medical necessity. This is an extremely fake use of this loophole, but will the government be willing to call their bluff? 11: Jacob Falkovich has a blog on dating advice, which he plans to turn into a book of dating advice. I can’t really comment on the accuracy (my dating strategy tends to look more like waiting for women to send me emails saying “I like your blog, would you like to go on a date?” which probably doesn’t generalize), but I’ve had many good interactions with Jake, and he has a beautiful family which means he must be doing something right. Also, Jake is poly, and I sometimes wonder if poly people are the only ones qualified to give dating advice: if you’re monogamous, you either met your future spouse quickly (in which case you have no experience), dated for years without meeting your spouse (in which case you can’t be very good), or aren’t looking for a committed relationship at all (which is just pickup artistry, and follows very different dynamics). Poly people are the only ones who can break out of this trilemma! 12: Christ And Counterfactuals is a blog on effective altruism from a Christian perspective. Some previous attempts at this have felt kind of forced, but the first post I read here was actually pretty interesting. Richard Swinburne (apparently “the world’s best Christian philosopher”), thinks that: “[One] reason why it is good that the human race should sometimes be in an initial situation of considerable ignorance about the causes and effects of our actions, is this. If God abolished the need for rational inquiry and gave us from childhood strong true beliefs about the causes of things, that would make it too easy for us to make moral decisions. As things are in the actual world, most moral decisions are decisions taken in uncertainty about the consequences of our actions. I do not know for certain that if I smoke, I will get cancer; or that if I do not give money to some charity, people will starve. So we have to make our moral decisions on the basis of how probable it is that our actions will have various outcomes—how probable it is that I will get cancer if I continue to smoke (when I would not otherwise get cancer), or that someone will starve if I do not give. Since probabilities are so hard to assess, it is all too easy to persuade yourself that it is worth taking the chance that no harm will result from the less demanding decision (the decision which you have a strong desire to make). And even if you face up to a correct assessment of the probabilities, true dedication to the good is shown by doing the act which, although it is probably the best action, may have no good consequences at all.” (Could a Good God Permit so Much Suffering? A Debate, pp. 52-53.) This is pretty galaxy-brained, but something galaxy-brained must be going on for God to tolerate the existence of evil at all, and this is a surprisingly natural extension of some common premises on the subject. 13: Swedish study: diagnosing the marginal patient with a psychiatric condition makes their life worse. Of the two mechanisms they looked at, stigma seems more involved than drug side effects. My opinion: this study was done on conscripts undergoing a mandatory psych evaluation for the army, who had no previous reason to think they had a psych disease and had not sought treatment. This is a different situation from somebody who comes to a psychiatrist asking for relief from specific symptoms they have noticed. Also, Sweden c. 2005 is a different culture from America 2025 in terms of how much stigma a psych diagnosis carries. I think it’s possible that if you never considered that you had psychiatric problems, and were suddenly given a diagnosis in 2005 Sweden and told you couldn’t serve in the army, that’s likely to destabilize your self-image more than a person who knows they’re depressed going to a psychiatrist in 2025 US and getting antidepressants. 14: RIP Felix Hill, research scientist at DeepMind and mentor to many in the AI community. You can read his suicide note here, though the obvious content warning applies. He says he took ketamine for mild anxiety and it plunged him into an incredibly deep depression that he couldn’t get out of; he leaves his story behind as a warning for others. I appreciate his warning, but I wish he had said more about what dose he used; different people’s ketamine doses vary by almost two orders of magnitude, I’d previously thought that the low doses were pretty safe and the high doses were sketchy, and I would like to know whether I should update or not. 15: RIP Max Chiswick, professional poker player, effective altruist, and ACX reader. 16: Adrian Dittman, a Twitter account widely accused of being Elon Musk’s alt, has been revealed to be . . . a guy named Adrian Dittman. Congrats to Maia Crimew and the Spectator for actually investigating this, unlike many other news sources which spread the Musk conspiracy theory. Also, the people involved got banned from X for some reason, maybe because this qualified as doxxing Dittman. 17: Related: Musk claims to be among the top players in the world at several computer games. A veteran Path of Exile gamer presents evidence that Musk faked his PoE2 accomplishments by hiring a Chinese guy to play on his account. Some Musk supporters in the comments suggest that maybe he hires the Chinese guy to level up his account, but his accomplishments (eg speedruns) are still his own? 18: Related: Sam Harris says he has been friends with Musk since 2008, but he noticed a sudden shift for the worse in his personality around 2020 which made it impossible to stay friends with him. He gives the example of Musk losing a bet with him that there would be 35,000+ COVID cases in the US, refusing to pay up, and launching personal attacks on Sam when asked to do so. What happened? Some theories: Musk turned right-wing, which ended his friendship with Sam for the same reason political differences have always ended friendships (but then what about the bet, which seems like objectively bad behavior?)

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Minnesota and Virginia also have legislation to enable cities to implement land value taxes. We are monitoring these efforts. There are a few other cities we are operating in. We have helped another organization prepare for a meeting in Tennessee by doing impact analysis of land value taxes in the city. We have presented to city officials in the City of South Bend who have expressed support for land value taxes. Finally, we are in conversation with a State Senator in Colorado who is a champion of land value taxes. Meanwhile, we have soft launched and developed the OpenAVMKit, which uses a unified schema to do assessment accuracy reports and automated valuation methods for any property tax data given. Valuation of land is the key binding constraint to successful implementation of land value taxes. We plan to be the leaders in this space with strong benchmarking capabilities and a repo that can enable the open-source community to make the best automated valuation methods. Along with these efforts, we have expanded the movement. We have posted to the Progress and Poverty Substack growing the subscriber base to around 5,000 subscribers. We have spoken to over 25 local advocates interested in working on land value taxes in their local communities. Yet, there is a long way to go. We need to start earning income through technical assistance contracts as our grant funding expires. We need to continue pushing for a state to implement, and we need to be prepared to tell the success story for when they do. 65: EN’s Work On Bacteriophage Therapy Our project is aimed at pioneering phage therapy in Nigeria, where limited resources/infrastructure have historically held back research in this field. Starting from the ground up, we are establishing the foundational systems needed to support a robust phage research ecosystem. So far, we’ve isolated 34 bacteriophages targeting Pseudomonas aeruginosa, an essential step toward building a comprehensive phage bank. This began with collecting a wide range of clinical Pseudomonas isolates, which we are now characterizing alongside the phages through genome sequencing and phenotypic assays including studies on phage stability across pH, temperature, and salinity ranges. Our long-term goal is to develop a phage-based hydrogel for treating diabetic wounds. On the regulatory front, we have secured approval from the Attorney General to register our nonprofit organization, the Centre for Phage Biology and Therapeutics. Additionally, we’re expanding into vaccine development; following a research stay in Prof. Roderick's lab at the University of Waterloo, we have initiated the design of a phage-based universal Salmonella vaccine aimed at covering all major serotypes—an urgent need underscored by Africa’s reliance on external vaccine sources during the COVID-19 pandemic. I have signed an MTA agreement with Roderick to use his phage-based vaccine platform patents to enable us to design vaccines against any common disease affecting us. This is only the beginning, but we are proud to be laying the scientific and institutional groundwork for homegrown phage innovation in Africa. Emergent Ventures funded EN before we did and deserves a lot of credit here also. 66: Create An Artificial Kidney For an implantable artificial kidney, the first essential component is a hemofilter designed to emulate the glomerulus. Critical requirements for this hemofilter include high permeability (to maximize flow for a given area), selectivity (specifically, the retention of albumin), and robust blood compatibility (ensuring sustained function over time). Our initial strategy focused on using negative surface charge to reduce fouling. I began by testing polyelectrolyte (PE) coatings on 24nm pore membranes featuring a negative terminal charge, similar to the glomerular barrier. These initial static tests, assessing platelet adsorption in whole blood, yielded positive outcomes for some polyelectrolytes, indicating potentially desirable blood compatibility. However, static test setups are not truly representative of dynamic in-vitro conditions and don't provide data on key parameters like permeability, fouling progression, or changes in membrane selectivity. To address these limitations, I designed and built a blood filtration setup. This system sustains human whole blood in circulation for 20 minutes, allowing us to analyze all the aforementioned parameters, as well as platelet activation markers. This has resulted in a fairly high-throughput system for evaluating any surface coating. I'm pleased to report this setup has been accepted for presentation at this year's European Society for Artificial Organs (ESAIO) conference. I am also currently working on a full manuscript, as I believe this system offers a viable way to partially replace animal experiments in our early-stage research, requiring only 1.2ml of human blood per run. Working with a PhD student (hired to support both this research and work on membrane substrates), we have continued testing these PE coatings, alongside PEG coatings, on our membranes. Here, we're finding that optimization of the coating layer is crucial. With the current PE coatings, we observe a permeability drop of about an order of magnitude compared to the base membrane, making them unsuitable for an implantable device in their present form. This is likely due to the specific nature of the initial PE layer, which we can modify. We also suspect there may be ingress of PE into the pores, meaning we're not achieving just a surface coating (our goal), but rather a very thick coating, which would explain the flux loss. Optimizing the coating process to control penetration depth is now a primary focus of my ongoing work. I am currently aiming for a flux of 20ul/min (as this is cap introduced by the protein gel layer anyway) but for it to be at this 'steady state' permeability without drop in permeability. I am also imaging the membranes after contact with SEM to see if there is indeed any platelet adsorption etc. Tugrul has the dubious honor of maybe being "the only person to climb a 4000m peak with severe kidney failure". To raise money and awareness for his artificial kidney project, he is running Climb Against Time, where he will climb 41 mountains over 4000m (13000 ft) this summer. He is looking for donors and climbing partners. 67: Add Tardigrade Genes To Human Cells The goal of this one was to make hybrid cells that are more resilient for research and certain medical applications. They report: The grant was to synthesize vectors for the expression of humanized tardigrade proteins that can be targeted to different areas of the cell. All the vectors were designed, generated, and transposed into human cells. The proteins all localize successfully (e.g. they match the designed target), with one exception (we are still working on validating it). We've done some stress testing with the trangenic cells, but haven't reached firm conclusions yet. We've further generated some multigene designs but have not yet transposed them into cells, but should shortly. We're hoping to submit a manuscript on the first round later this year. 68: Teach Forecasting To EU Policy-Makers The original project didn't work out, but our grantee (who still prefers to remain anonymous) is now working with an EU think tank pursuing the same agenda, and has been teaching forecasting workshops to policy-makers for the past two months. 69: Platform For Single-Cell Imaging They ended up unable to accept this grant and returned the money. 70: Open Source Polygenic Predictor For EA/IQ They have an update here. They think they have a predictor that can explain 12% of variance in intelligence, and they’re working on validating it and creating an easy-to-use website. 71: Improve Flu Vaccines The grant mainly funded agent based modelling to demonstrate the benefit of pre-existing immunity to pandemic influenza if and when a future pandemic occurs (academic publication will result). The original proposal was to attempt to influence the WHO influenza strain selection process. After attending WHO meetings and a global influenza conference, I believe this is not feasible. Stakeholder feedback was the potential short term negative effect on vaccine hesitancy is believed to outweigh the less tangible future benefit. Given the conservative nature of decision makers, pandemic vaccines are likely to remain research only. There are still green shoots of research into pandemic preparedness/prevention that I am continuing to work on. I'm working under the "Australians for Pandemic Prevention" brand of Good Ancestors, another group that ACX funded in 2024. 72: Scenario Analysis For Developing World Agricultural Programs In addition to the research and analysis funded by the grant, I’ve learned to code with LLMs and have built an MVP of the project. The app is being considered for further development by staff at a large international organization. 73: Further C’s Political Career C’s political career is going well, but he continues to think it wouldn’t be strategic to give more information publicly at this time. Lessons Learned I'm most impressed with our lobbying/advocacy organizations. In particular, Good Ancestors has gotten the Australian government to sign onto an international AI safety declaration, partner with various x-risk-related organizations, and (possibly) extend charity tax deductions to some EA causes that previously didn't have it - I think this on its own goes a substantial way to paying back the cost of all ACX Grants. Coalition to Modify NOTA has a kidney donation bill in front of Congress that the (very illiquid) prediction markets give a 45% chance of passing; if it works, it could save thousands of lives. The Georgists are partly responsible for bills making land value taxes slightly easier to implement in a handful of states. Good Science Project seems to have significantly improved science. Are lobbying organizations a better bet than other types of nonprofit (within the constraints of ACX Grants)? I'm not sure. It could just be that lobbyists are (naturally) better at playing themselves up and sounding successful than (for example) scientists, or that politicians are good at people-pleasing and make people feel heard and encouraged in a way that might not change overall policy later. Also, I recently talked to some grantmakers who funded a lobbying organization that superficially seems excellent, but they expressed concern it was net negative (!) by taking away oxygen and spotlight from potentially more effective orgs. So I am encouraged but wary. Animal welfare organizations were another standout success. Again, I don't know how to think about this - while I think our grantees were exceptional, there's also an issue where the scale of animal welfare challenges is so great, and work on them so neglected, that lots of organizations can save a million chickens here, or a million fish there, without particularly making a splash. On the one hand, this is exactly what effective altruism should be doing - exploring grants that are very high in linear utility even if they don't feel satisfying. On the other, they're unsatisfying - and also hard to assess retroactively. How many chickens should a good animal welfare grant save? Any realistic number will both be overwhelmingly large in absolute terms and far too small in relative terms. I'm most ambivalent about our science grants. Many of them say they are successful and can point to published papers which explain the science they did. But it's hard to judge whether anything useful has changed based on the science getting done. I know it's important to fund basic research and not just last-mile technology startups, but it's hard for a mini-grants program like this one to evaluate these kinds of abstract interventions. One disappointing result was that grants to legibly-credentialled people operating in high-status ways usually did better than betting on small scrappy startups (whether companies or nonprofits). For example, Innovate Animal Ag was in many ways overdetermined as a grantee - former Yale grad and Google engineer founder, profiled in NYT, already funded by Open Philanthropy - and they in fact did amazing work. On the other hand, there were a lot of promising ACX community members with interesting ideas who were going to turn them into startups any day now, but who ended up kind of floundering (although this also describes Manifold, one of our standout successes). One thing I still don't understand is that Innovate Animal Ag seemed to genuinely need more funding despite being legibly great and high status - does this screen off a theoretical objection that they don't provide ACX Grants with as much counterfactual impact? Am I really just mad that it would be boring to give too many grants to obviously-good things that even moron could spot as promising? Someone (I think it might be Paul Graham) once said that they were always surprised how quickly destined-to-be-successful startup founders responded to emails - sometimes within a single-digit number of minutes regardless of time of day. I used to think of this as mysterious - some sort of psychological trait? Working with these grants has made me think of it as just a straightforward fact of life: some people operate an order of magnitude faster than others. The Manifold team created something like five different novel institutions in the amount of time it's taken some other grantees to figure out a business plan; I particularly remember one time when I needed something, sent out a request to talk about it with two or three different teams, and the Manifold team had fully created the thing and were pestering me to launch a trial version before some of the other people had even gotten back to me. I take no pleasure in reporting this - I sometimes take a week or two to answer emails, and all of the predictions about my personality that this implies would be correct - but it's increasingly something that I look for and respect. A lot of the most successful grants succeeded quickly, or at least were quick to get on a promising track. Since everything takes ten times longer than people expect, only someone who moves ten times faster than people expect can get things done in a reasonable amount of time. In almost every case where I thought to myself “this is a cool idea, but I don’t know how it’s going to really pay off, as opposed to reaching a cool intermediate accomplishment and then stagnating”, this was a correct criticism, and I should have taken it more seriously. But I can’t rule out that these were good in vague and hard-to-measure ways that I should take more seriously. This one is really self-serving, but in general when people were good communicators (or even bloggers) and wowed me with the writing-composition of their application, they turned out to be a good bet. And when people were hard to understand and annoying to communicate with, even if their ideas seemed good, they were less likely to pan out. Overall Thoughts The total cost of ACX Grants, both rounds, was about $3 million. Do these outcomes represent a successful use of that amount of money? Very naively, startups originating from ACX Grants have about $50 million in value1. If ACX Grants is equivalent to a pre-seed funder, and pre-seed funders usually get ~5%, then if we were VCs we would have a portfolio worth $2.5 million. About 1/5 of ACX Grants were attempting to be market-valued startups, so if we assume the charitable portion did about as well as the startup portion, then the charity portion is “worth” $10 million. There’s some reason to expect this is too high, since much of the startup value came from one successful outlier. But there’s another reason to expect this is too low, since we were aiming at charity rather than market cap, and any actual market cap that our grantees got was an unexpected side effect. I’m treating this as a sanity check rather than as a real number. It’s harder to produce Inside View estimates, because so many of the projects either produce vague deliverables (eg a white paper that might guide future action) or intermediate results only (eg getting a government to pass AI safety regulations is good, but can’t be considered an end result unless those regulations prevent the AI apocalypse). Because we tend towards incubating charities and funding research (rather than last-mile causes like buying bednets), achieved measurable deliverables are thin on the ground. But here are things that ACX grantees have already accomplished: Improved the living/slaughter conditions of 30 million fish.

Inline links: Progress and Poverty Substack, Climb Against Time, here, 1

Tech PACs Are Closing In On The Almonds

October 21, 2025 · Original source

Give me your degens, your risk-seeking. Your huddled masses, yearning to bet free. IV. …and we’ll be exploring it a whole lot more, very soon. Last month, the AI industry announced a new SuperPAC called “Leading The Future” (a dumb name, but, in their defense, “AIPAC” was already taken). They start with $200 million in seed funding, led by a $50 million donation by Andreessen Horowitz, and another $50 million from OpenAI co-founder Greg Brockman. (Why Brockman and not Altman, or OpenAI as a corporation? Because most people don’t know who Brockman is, so this keeps OpenAI’s hands clean. I imagine Altman going into a meeting, pointing at Brockman, and saying “I’m famous, you’re not, please cough up $50 million of your own money for the cause.”) On the same day, Meta announced their own SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California. Why two PACs? Opinions differ; one person told me that it lets the general PAC avoid the negative associations that Facebook has gathered over the years, but the Verge thinks that maybe everyone else in tech hates Zuckerberg too much to work with him. Meta has committed to spending “tens of millions”. Most likely, the new PAC will use the playbook pioneered by crypto: destroy any candidate who dares support regulations on AI, by funding attack ads that don’t mention AI in any way and, at best, briefly mention the name “Leading The Future”. Just the Andreessen/Brockman SuperPAC, without any help from Meta, is already twice as rich as AIPAC. Their existence sends a clear message: we are going to crush any politician who tries to regulate AI. V. …unless someone stops them. Leading The Future still only has 2% as much money as the almond industry. The tiny scale of US political spending is dangerous insofar as it means that one or two billionaires willing to go all-in can distort the national landscape. But it also makes it possible to oppose them. Certainly if you can get one or two billionaires of your own - but it might even be within the range of a committed group of ordinary people. Not waiters and bartenders, maybe. But if safe AI supporters were as committed as Israel supporters, they could probably make something happen. For a long time, the AI safety movement has underperformed politically. Effective altruism includes thousands of well-off people committed to spending 10% of their income on improving the world. If a thousand of them gave $7K each to political candidates, that would be $7 million of campaign-finance-compliant hard money - about as much as anyone can gather for anything. Hard money buys more influence per dollar than soft money, so this could be a big deal. All you’d need is the right people to coordinate it. So far, this has been slow going. Partly it’s because in the early 2020s, people affiliated with FTX took point on this effort; when FTX imploded, it not only took its incipient political infrastructure with it, but poisoned the well for future efforts. And partly it’s because EAs overlearned the lesson of the early 2010s, when we spoke out against AI capabilities efforts so “effectively” that a bunch of people thought “wow, AI capabilities companies must be a really big deal, maybe I should found one!”; the resulting institutional scar tissue biased us towards staying quiet about our concerns. Still, I wouldn’t be writing this if the consultants and activists weren’t gearing up for a bigger fight. They asked me to include some action items for readers who want to participate: Email aisafetypolitics@gmail.com to connect to the people organizing this effort and talk with them about what you can do, including potential future donation opportunities.

Inline links: announced a new SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across, the Verge thinks

Links For February 2026

February 05, 2026 · Original source

62: Tyler Cowen podcast on San Francisco, blogging, and effective altruism. I watched this one because someone said it mentioned me, and was impressed by Tyler’s podcasting skills. The host tries to bait him into boring object-level positions on various controversies and hot takes, and Tyler always gives a classy response that neither takes the bait nor avoids the question, but ends up illuminating the subject in some kind of interesting way. I think I could do this too - if I had ten minutes to craft the perfect paragraph. Tyler does it on the fly!

Inline links: Tyler Cowen podcast on San Francisco, blogging, and effective altruism

EA21 mentions across 21 issues

EA is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 21 times across 21 issues between April 30, 2021 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "rationality/EA-aligned folks like me"; "raise awareness about EA / ACX"; "Some rationalist/EA leaders are focusing on Boston". It most often appears alongside Scott, Boston, Mexico.

Article page: EA
Mention count: 21
Issue count: 21
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: July 03, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021
Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places August 23, 2021
Boston Meetup This Sunday September 04, 2021
ACX Grants Results December 28, 2021
Open Thread 215 March 13, 2022
Spring Meetups In Seventy Cities April 10, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism July 28, 2022
Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places August 26, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability September 22, 2022
Spring Meetups Everywhere 2023 April 10, 2023
Your Book Review: Lying for Money May 26, 2023
Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation November 07, 2023
In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity January 11, 2024
Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024 March 30, 2024
Contra Stone On EA May 30, 2024
Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024
Links For December 2024 December 17, 2024
Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know June 26, 2025
Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

Scott 12 shared issues
Boston 9 shared issues
Mexico 9 shared issues
Cambridge 8 shared issues
effective altruism 8 shared issues

Source context

Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places

April 30, 2021 · Original source

The fact that Vogt’s first entry into the public sphere is rallying the public against anti-malaria measures leaves a pretty bad taste in my mouth, as I’m sure it does for any of Mann’s Effective Altruist aligned readers. It would be one thing if Vogt were concerned about the detrimental impact of malaria on humans AND the detrimental impact of malaria prevention methods on bird life. But in subsequent chapters of Vogt’s biography, Mann goes out of his way to show that Vogt’s influences and contemporary members of the environmentalist milieu – for example, Madison Grant, co-founder of the Bronx Zoo, organizer of the United States national park system, and author of the charmingly named The Passing of the Great Race, beloved by Hitler – were, to put in mildly, extremely uninterested in the wellbeing of all humankind. Instead, they were obsessed by fears of an unchecked Malthusian population explosion, race mixing, and a resultant societal degeneration that could only be stopped by halting (read: starving out) population growth. Which people deserved to live in harmony with nature in the ensuing pastoral utopia and which would be relegated to the dustbin of history was not an exercise they left to the reader. Mann writes that Vogt, like his buddies, was "loudly scornful of the ‘unchecked spawning’ and ‘untrammeled copulation’ of ‘backward populations’ – people in India, he sneered, breed with ‘the irresponsibility of codfish.’"

Inline links: Madison Grant

August 23, 2021 · Original source

SKOPJE, MACEDONIA (RSVP) Contact: Qantarot, info[at]kantarot[dot]mk Time: 5:00 PM, Wednesday, December 22 Location: Rooftop of the Intertec building in Skopje (outdoor but heated and covered in case of rain). Since you'll need to be let in, RSVPing is encouraged. You can also contact me the day of the meetup at +389 seven one 890 497. Coordinates: https://w3w.co/libraries.describe.fresh Notes: I run a blog that recently spun off a foundation. In Skopje we have a small but passionate rationality community that gravitates around my blog/foundation and we would love to grow the community and raise awareness about EA / ACX.

Inline links: RSVP, https://w3w.co/libraries.describe.fresh, a blog, a foundation

Boston Meetup This Sunday

September 04, 2021 · Original source

Some rationalist/EA leaders are focusing on Boston right now as a promising place to community-build. They’re especially trying to expand the student groups at Harvard and MIT. If you live in Boston and/or attend either of those colleges, then - whether or not you can make it Sunday - consider giving them your name through this form so they can help get you connected.

Inline links: this form

ACX Grants Results

December 28, 2021 · Original source

The Oxfendazole Development Group, $150,000, to develop oxfendazole. This is a next-generation antiparasitic drug which may one day replace albendazole and mebendazole, the current choices for deworming. Several hundred million children worldwide suffer from parasitic worm infections; this certainly affects their health, and a growing body of research suggests it might affect their cognitive ability, educational attainment, and future income. GiveWell endorses deworming as one of the most effective charitable interventions; the successful development of new antiparasitics would further this effort. Oxfendazole has done well in early studies and this group wants to follow them up in the hopes of eventually getting FDA approval. To learn more or send a donation, see this site

Inline links: The Oxfendazole Development Group, endorses deworming, this site

NA, $90,000, to buy a year of his time. NA is an experienced Australian political operative "on a first name basis with multiple federal politicians". You might remember some of his comments and stories from the ACX comment section, where he goes by AshLael. He's interested in using his expertise to promote effective altruism, either by lobbying directly or by training EAs in how to produce political change. I have no idea what to do with him right now but I am going to figure it out and then do it. If you're in EA and have a good idea how to use this opportunity, please let me know.

Inline links: comments and stories

The Effective Altruism Funds team handled most of the financial infrastructure for me. Thanks especially to Sam Deere, Jonas Vollmer, Helena Dias, and Chloe Malone for handling my increasingly frantic questions that I needed immediate responses to over the holiday season.

Inline links: Effective Altruism Funds team

Open Thread 215

March 13, 2022 · Original source

1: The effective altruist movement is offering $100,000 prizes to each of the top five new EA-aligned blogs this year. If you were thinking of writing a blog that touches on EA topics (x-risk, progress, global development, moral philosophy, AI, etc) now’s a pretty good time.

Inline links: is offering

Spring Meetups In Seventy Cities

April 10, 2022 · Original source

PORTLAND, OR Contact: Sam Celarek (support@pearcommunity.com) Date: April 24 Time: 4:00 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/84QVG9G7+XWG Location: 1548 NE 15th Ave, Portland, OR 97232 with a Large "PEAR" sign outside of the Building Notes: Call me (Sam) at 513-432-3310 if you can't find it. Please RSVP on Meetup or LessWrong so we can guesstimate food better. Group info: Portland Effective Altruism and Rationality is very active. We have book clubs, bi-weekly ai safety meet-ups, bi-weekly topical meet-ups, bi-weekly socials, and have an active Discord.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/84QVG9G7+XWG, Meetup, LessWrong, Portland Effective Altruism and Rationality, Discord

Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism

July 28, 2022 · Original source

Last month, when I posted why I thought that a recent crime wave was because of anti-police protests, was that evanglizing? If I were Bahai, and I posted something about why I thought the Bahai religion was true, using the same style of argument, would that be evangelizing? If I posted my interesting thoughts about charity in 2005, and those happened to be the exact same thoughts that later became effective altruism, would I have been evangelizing then? If I write a post now about why you should all join EA, would that be evangelizing now?

Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places

August 26, 2022 · Original source

BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA Contact: Jarred Filmer, jarred[dot]filmer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 7:00 PM Location: 52 McCaul Street Taringa (house) Coordinates: 5R4JFXXQ+P8 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We used to meet once a month years ago, but now just meet whenever there's a Meetups Everywhere :) Notes: Snacks will be provided but dinner will not be, would recommend eating before you come CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Contact: Andy Bachler, Andy[dot]Bachler[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, August 31, 5:30 PM Location: Badger & Co pub at ANU. Central location, parking free after 5pm, might be loud, sorry! Coordinates: 4RPFP4FC+34 Event link(s): LessWrong, Eventbrite Notes: Parking area just to the north of the pub, over the river, is free after 5pm! GOLD COAST (SOUTH), AUSTRALIA Contact: Lerancan, lerancan[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 2:00 PM Location: A picnic table, Wyberba Street Reserve, Tugun Coordinates: 5R3MVF5W+555 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Email me in case of bad weather/you can't find me/you can't make that time etc. MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA Contact: Ryan, xgravityx[at]hotmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 2, 6:00 PM Location: Beer Deluxe Federation Square Coordinates: 4RJ65XM9+3Q Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We're officially the Less Wrong Melbourne social meetup group, though our members include the broader rationalist community. We meet once a month for casual discussion (and beers for those so inclined). Please join our Facebook group to see the meeting invite; there you will see a WhatsApp group link - please join that group too to ensure timely updates in case of changes (Facebook notifications don't work reliably for this). Notes: Please RSVP to the meeting invite on the Facebook group so that I can make an appropriate booking. PERTH, AUSTRALIA Contact: Madge, madgech[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Russell Square, Northbridge, corner of Shenton and Aberdeen St. There will be some sort of ACX meetup sign. Coordinates: 4PWQ3V34+W6 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: I run one meetup per year, if someone else wants to take over please do Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Facebook SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA Contact: Eliot, Redeliot[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 15, 6:00 PM Location: City of Sydney rsl, lvl 2 in the fishbowl Coordinates: 4RRH46F4+983 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet monthly WOLLONGONG, AUSTRALIA Contact: Jason, jason[dot]bowkettblogs[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:00 PM Location: UOW Library Coordinates: 4RQGHVVH+69 Event link(s): LessWrong CHENGDU, CHINA Contact: Alex, acx[dot]chengdu[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 15, 7:00 PM Location: Chef Wenwu Hot & Spicy Jianghu Food (Yulin store)/文武大厨·热辣江湖菜(玉林店). I (a foreigner) will be wearing a green shirt. Coordinates: 8P26J3C5+462 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP at the above email address, I will give you my Wechat contact if you're interested in attending. Open to time/date/location changes, so let me know if the proposed event doesn't work for you! Can be a bilingual event; all welcome. 有双语交流的可能性。如果想来的话，请提前发给我个电子邮件。 HONG KONG Contact: Nathan, nathan[at]xevarion[dot]org Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: The Catalyst, 2 Po Yan Street, Sheung Wan. Big wooden door. Coordinates: 862M74PW+6XP Event link(s): LessWrong BANGALORE, INDIA Contact: Nihal, propwash[at]duck[dot]com, Discord: propwash#4648 Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Matteo Coffea, Church Street Coordinates: 7J4VXJF4+PR Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We're the longest active group in Asia — we've been meeting monthly for the last 4 years, discussing ACX posts, LW content with a diverse and friendly group of people. Check our website for more info. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong to help me be better prepared. HYDERABAD, INDIA Contact: Vatsal, vmehra[at]pm[dot]me, Whatsapp: +919944430856 (username: Vim) Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: The Weekend Cafe, Plot No D, 3, Vikrampuri Colony, beside vac's bakery, Vikrampuri Colony, Lane, Secunderabad, Telangana, 500015, India Coordinates: 7J9WFF4X+5P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Our rationality meetup group has been around for about 3 months and we discuss articles and exercises (eg. CFAR handbook) that can help us improve epistemic and instrumental rationality. MUMBAI, INDIA Contact: PB, e2y94n1nv[at]relay[dot]firefox[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 4:00 PM Location: Jamjar Diner, Versova Coordinates: 7JFJ4RM6+5W Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or via email so I can plan activities accordingly. NEW DELHI, INDIA Contact: Suryansh Tyagi, suryanshtyagiphone[at]gmail[dot]com, WhatsApp/phone +919997299972 Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: Select CityWalk Mall, Saket. Where inside the mall depends on the number of people interested. Coordinates: 7JWVG6H9+8H Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please either send me an email or message me on WhatsApp if you want to attend. Any suggestions/changes are welcome. UDAIPUR, RAJASTHAN, INDIA Contact: Shailendra Paliwal, acx-meetup-2022[at]shailendra[dot]me Time: Saturday, September 10, 7:00 PM Location: We'll be at Doodh Talai near Pichola Lake and I'll be wearing a gray t-shirt carrying a sign ACX Meetup Coordinates: 7JPMHM9M+HG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so that I can plan ahead UBUD, BALI, INDONESIA Contact: William Ubud, Napaproject[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, August 30, 6:00 PM Location: PARQ Ubud Coordinates: 6P3QG789+F7 Event link(s): LessWrong TOKYO, JAPAN Contact: Harold Godsoe, hgodsoe[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 10:00 AM Location: Near Nakameguro station - RSVP for details Coordinates: 8Q7XJPV2+QFP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Notes: ACX Tokyo meets monthly since Sept 2021. Our meetups are in English, so far. To join in, feel free to get in touch in any of the many ways to do so (email, Meetup.com). It's useful to be in contact before coming to an event, to help with that first leap of faith. KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA Contact: Yi-Yang, yi[dot]yang[dot]chua[at]gmail[dot]com, LessWrong profile Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: I'll be in Lisette's Bangsar, which is a 5-minute walk from Bangsar LRT. I'll be wearing a pale green t-shirt and carrying an ACX sign. Coordinates: 6PM34MHH+VW Event link(s): LessWrong AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Jonathan De Wet, jonpdw[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 6:30 PM Location: 32 Stanley Ave Milford, Auckland Coordinates: 4VMP6QH4+86 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Notes: It’s a dinner party! Please RSVP on FB so I know how much food to make DUNEDIN, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Gavin, bisga673[at]student[dot]otago[dot]ac[dot]nz Time: Saturday, September 3, 3:00 PM Location: Picnic tables outside of St. David's lecture theatre on Otago University campus. I'll make a sign with ACX meetup. Coordinates: 4V6G4GP7+GM5 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: There is no Dunedin group as far as I'm aware of, but I'd be keen to meet other likeminded people and organise group hangouts occasionally. WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Ben W, benwve[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 27, 5:30 PM Location: Rutherford House, Bunny Street, Wellington. Room MZ05, which is on the mezzanine floor Coordinates: 4VCPPQCH+FGC Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: We're running the event this time in partnership with Effective Altruism Wellington LAPU LAPU, CEBU, PHILIPPINES Contact: Dave, tokkolizard[at]tutanota[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 2:00 PM Location: Starbucks in Mactan Newtown, there will be a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 7Q268257+4F Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by mail so I know if I need to set up a bigger meeting place SINGAPORE Contact: Jonathan Ng, jonathan[dot]ng1[at]gmail[dot]com, Telegram @derpy Time: Tuesday, September 6, 6:30 PM Location: Tanjong Pagar MRT gantry, I'll be wearing the dark blue EA Global 2022 jumper Coordinates: 6PH57RGW+J8 Event link(s): LessWrong

CALGARY, AB Contact: David Piepgrass, qwertie256[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Marlborough Mall food court Coordinates: 9538324C+CH9 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: It's small! EDMONTON, AB Contact: JS, ⁨ta1hynp09[at]relay[dot]firefox[dot]com Time: Thursday, October 13, 6:30 PM Location: Polar Park Brewing Company - we will have a sign. Coordinates: 9558GG82+GG Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong VANCOUVER, BC Contact: Tom Ash and Dirk Haupt, events[at]philosofiles[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Dude Chilling (aka Guelph) Park, near the intersection of Main, Broadway & Kingsway. We'll be just west of the garden - look for Tom in a neon yellow shirt. Coordinates: 84XR7W73+PG Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: For future events, join the following: For rationalism, this Facebook group, for effective altruism, this Facebook group for both, Meetup.com Notes: ?? We'll have a sushi lunch for everyone who comes (fish or vegan). This is not at all necessary, but posting on the Facebook event to say you will or won't want this will help estimate numbers. RSVPing there will help boost attendance too. VICTORIA, BC Contact: Sarah McManus, sarahmcmanusbc[at]gmail[dot]com, Twitter @SarahAMcManus Time: Friday, September 23, 7:00 PM Location: Snowy Village, 4071 Shelbourne St #2a, Victoria, BC V8N 5Y1 - It's a small cafe, I'll be at a table with an ACX MEETUP sign on it Coordinates: 84WRFMG9+H3 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event HALIFAX, NS Contact: Conor Barnes (ideopunk), conorbarnes93[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 1:00 PM Location: Seven Bays Cafe (2017 Gottingen Street) Coordinates: 87PRMC29+9C Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Join us at Seven Bayes KITCHENER-WATERLOO, ON Contact: Jenn, hi[at]jenn[dot]site Time: Sunday, September 25, 1:00 PM Location: Goudie's Lane, besides 8 Queen St N, Kitchener. I'll be wearing white boots and at one of the picnic tables if it's not raining, or further back in the parking area if it is. There will be some sort of ACX MEETUP sign. Coordinates: 86MXFG26+5CV Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We have a new regular meetup group! We meet up every other Thursday. Events are posted on LessWrong, and we also have a website. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong if possible, but show up anyways if you weren't able to! Generally, past meetups everywhere events have attracted 8-15 people. OTTAWA, ON Contact: Tess Walsh, rationalottawa[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:00 PM Location: We are meeting at the Atelier d'innovation sociale, located at 95 Clegg St, K1S1C5. Specifically in the Lounge area, there will be numerous signs for ACX MEETUP where needed. Coordinates: 87Q6C84F+PM4 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet weekly on Friday evenings, and that allows us enough opportunity to try out a huge variety of different types of events — probably some that you, yes you, would enjoy! Here are our Facebook, LessWrong, and Discord (where the action really is) Notes: I always appreciate RSVP's in any form! It helps me set expectations/plan the best meetup I can! You can also contact me, Tess Walsh, with any questions whatsoever at rationalottawa@gmail.com TORONTO, ON Contact: Sean Aubin, seanaubin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 3:00 PM Location: Located at the picnic tables located in The Bentway, which is the sheltered area underneath the Gardiner Expressway. Coordinates: 87M2JHPR+X5W Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Currently meeting monthly with ambitions to meet bi-monthly. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how many people to anticipate.

HUNTSVILLE, AL Contact: Mike, mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 3:00 PM Location: Barnes & Noble – 300 The Bridge St #100, Huntsville, AL 35806. I'll be in the cafe with a sign that says ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 866MP88H+53 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Barnes & Noble has an area for little kids. If you want to bring a service animal, that's probably fine, but I doubt they allow pets. PHOENIX, AZ Contact: Ben Morin, benjamin[dot]j[dot]morin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 15, 1:00 PM Location: Thirsty Lion Pub in Tempe. I will have a table with an ACX sign. Coordinates: 8559FVVQ+6C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: This will be our 5th meetup (started during the meetups everywhere last year). Notes: Please email if interested to be added to the email list, even if you can't make this event BELMONT, CA Contact: Moshe Z., belmont-acx[at]devskillup[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 2:00 PM Location: Twin Pines Park, Picnic Tables. The table will have some sign saying 'ACX Meetup' on it. Coordinates: 849VGP8C+RRG Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: You can join the mailing list here. BERKELEY, CA Contact: Scott Time: Sunday, September 18, 1:00 PM Location: Rose Garden Inn, a rationalist event space at 2740 Telegraph Ave. Come in through the front gate on Telegraph. Coordinates: 849VVP5R+X7V Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: The Bay rationality community has a mailing list, a Discord server, and a Facebook group. There are dinner meetups every Thursday at 7 PM in the East Bay, and occasional meetups in SF and South Bay. FILLMORE, CA Contact: Ryan, wiserd[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Wiserd#0906 Time: Saturday, October 1st, 6:00 PM Location: It's my house. There are a bunch of plants on the porch and garbage bins in the driveway. Coordinates: 856393VX+VQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP to my email or Discord. Kids and dogs are welcome in the back yard. Full vaccinations (on the honor system) and masks required. GRASS VALLEY, CA Contact: Max Harms, raelifin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Condon Park by the prospector statue. In the case of rain we'll change the location to a residence, so RSVP to get updated! Coordinates: 84FW6W8H+C5 Event link(s): LessWrong IRVINE, CA Contact: Nick C, cohenskijanuary1[at]mail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: University Town Center Coordinates: 8554M526+7H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once a month at the same location. LOS ANGELES, CA Contact: Vishal Prasad (koreindian), vprasadcs[at]gmail[dot]com, Contact me on Discord. I am "Vishal" on the server. Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:30 PM Location: 11841 Wagner St., Culver City, CA 90039 Coordinates: 8553XHWM+GP Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly every Wednesday. We have been around for over 8 years. We discuss articles, watch movies, lift weights. We have a Discord server, a LessWrong group, and a website! Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get. NEWPORT BEACH, CA Contact: Michael M, michaelmichalchik[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, August 27, 2:00 PM Location: Picnic tables next to 1900 Port Carlow community clubhouse. The park is verdant and pleasant and easy to access. Free street parking nearby. In case of bad weather, we have a couple of near by places to relocate to. Coordinates: 8554J48R+WCX Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We will meet most Saturdays at 2pm until whenever. There will be short suggested readings and question most weeks to spur conversation, but they are optional. Each week we will ask if people have had something happen recently that surprised them or changed the way they looked at the world. Something that should or did update their priors. Participation is optional. Notes: Its a public park with tables and BBQ's so you can bring food and well behaved pets. We may regularly go on casual walks in the surrounding area. SAN DIEGO, CA Contact: Julius, julius[dot]simonelli[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 3:00 PM Location: We will meet up in Bird Park. I will be wearing a red shirt. Coordinates: 8544PVQ8+Q7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Join our Discord server SAN FRANCISCO, CA Contact: Derek Pankaew, derekpankaew[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 11:00 AM Location: We'll between in the Panhandle, between Ashbury and Masonic, with a 'ACX' sign. Coordinates: 849VQHC3+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong SAN JOSE, CA Contact: David Friedman, ddfr[at]daviddfriedman[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: 3806 Williams Rd, San Jose, CA 95117 Coordinates: 849W825J+6P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Before Covid we hosted every month or two. No structure, just conversation and food. We feed everyone who is still there at dinner time. We have done it once or twice since Covid. I have an email list of interested people. Notes: Kids are welcome. Please RSVP to my email so I will have a rough count of how many we are feeding. SAN MARCOS, CA Contact: Eric F., EricF14159[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Hollandia Park Soccer Field. At the tables near the top parking lot. Coordinates: 85544VW4+RV Event link(s): LessWrong BOULDER, CO Contact: Josh Sacks, josh[dot]sacks+acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 3:00 PM Location: 9191 Tahoe Ln, Boulder, CO 80301 Coordinates: 85GP2V96+JQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so we know ~ how many people to expect! CARBONDALE, CO Contact: Nick, naj[at]njarboe[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 1:00 PM Location: Sopris Park - Center covered picnic tables - blue shirt with ACX sign on table Coordinates: 85FJ9QXP+QMF Event link(s): LessWrong DENVER, CO Contact: Ian Philips, iansphilips[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: palebone#2796 Time: Sunday, October 2, 11:00 AM Location: We'll be in the backyard patio of St. Mark's Coffee House. I'll wear a white shirt with (my brothers') baby faces on it and have a brown hat on. Coordinates: 85FQP2VP+9R Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet typically 4 times a year. LAKEWOOD, CO Contact: Steven Zuber, stevenjzuber[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, October 5, 7:00 PM Location: We meet in the clubhouse located in this townhome community: 8769 W Cornell Ave Lakewood, CO 80227 Coordinates: 85FPMW64+MW Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet the first Wednesday of every month. Informal, casual atmosphere with occasional presentations by people. Notes: Check the Meetup page or Facebook group for updates. FAIRFIELD, CT Contact: Justin Barclay, barclay[dot]justin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 10:00 AM Location: South Pine Creek Beach. I'll set up near the lifeguard stand. Coordinates: 87H84PCH+CM Event link(s): LessWrong MANCHESTER, CT Contact: Mike, park-mike[at]outlook[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Near flagpole on top of hill Coordinates: 87H9QFFH+J7 Event link(s): LessWrong NEW HAVEN, CT Contact: RM, acx[dot]meetup[dot]nhv[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 12:30 PM Location: Cross Campus (Yale University), New Haven, CT 06511. We'll be on the grass on the northern half of Cross Campus, closest to Sterling Memorial Library. I'll be wearing an orange shirt. Coordinates: 87H9836C+8VG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Feel free to bring friends! The vibe will be welcoming and relaxed, and you can stay for any amount of time. Please email me if you're thinking about coming so I can get the right number of Insomnia cookies! WASHINGTON, DC Contact: John Bennett, WashingtonDCAstralCodexTen[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 6:00 PM Location: Froggy Bottom Pub: 2021 K Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006 Coordinates: 87C4WX33+3J Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: The Washington DC ACX/SSC group has been active since the first Meetups Everywhere in 2017. We have Monthly Socials downtown, hikes, board game days, and other cultural events. We're looking to spin up more rationality Dojo-type events with nearby groups in the coming months. Notes: We've rented out the Froggy Bottom Pub for the night, dinner and soft drinks will be provided. Alcohol available for purchase if desired, but no purchases are required. Metered street parking on nearby blocks is free after 6:30. Closest Metros are Farragut West and Farragut North. CAPE CORAL / FORT MYERS, FL Contact: Shawn Spilman, shawn[dot]spilman[at]outlook[dot]com, 508 655 8123 Time: Sunday, October 2, 1:00 PM Location: 929 SW 54th Ln, Cape Coral, FL 33914 Coordinates: 76RWH224+44 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: RSVP via email. I can be flexible about the date. GULF BREEZE / PENSACOLA, FL Contact: Christian, christian[dot]h[dot]williams[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, October 12, 7:30 PM Location: The Bridge Bar - 33 Gulf Breeze Pkwy A, Gulf Breeze, FL 32561 Coordinates: 862J9RCF+G6 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by emailing me. Thanks! If I don't hear from anyone, I won't be there. I work for Metaculus, but promise not to talk your ear off about forecasting. (Unless you want it talked off.) MIAMI, FL Contact: Eric Magro, eric135033[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: eric135#4943 Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: Buckminster Fuller Fly's Eye Dome 140 NE 39th St #001, Miami, FL 33137 ----- Look for a paper sign on a table that says ACX MEETUP west of the dome. Coordinates: 76QXRR65+V2 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Miami ACX started in 2017. Our official meetup happens monthly in either Miami or Broward. There are activities happening on a weekly basis from Miami to Palm Beach. We have a Facebook group, Discord server, and Meetup.com group. ORLANDO, FL Contact: Noah Topper, noah[dot]topper[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 7:00 PM Location: 4000 Central Florida Blvd, Orlando, FL. We'll be meeting up at UCF's pavilion near Garages A and I. I'll have a pretty ACX Meetup sign. Coordinates: 76WWJQ2X+82 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We try to meet up once a month, so far they've just been casual social meetups with natural discussions of rationality topics. Here's our Discord link :) Notes: RSVPs on LessWrong would be greatly appreciated. :) TALLAHASSEE, FL Contact: JF, jf19o[at]fsu[dot]edu Time: Monday, August 29, 2:00 PM Location: Landis, FSU. I will be wearing a black shirt Coordinates: 862QCPR3+PX Event link(s): LessWrong ATHENS, GA Contact: Dallon, knox[dot]dallon[dot]a[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: leonard#4208 Time: Saturday, October 15, 3:00 PM Location: Hendershots on Prince Avenue Coordinates: 865RXJ68+2W Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I might bring some board games ATLANTA, GA Contact: Steve French, steve[at]digitaltoolfactory[dot]net Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: Bold Monk Brewing - 1737 Ellsworth Industrial Blvd NW suite d-1 · Atlanta, GA (upstairs – look for the ACX Atlanta sign) Coordinates: 865QRH2F+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We've been in existence for four years – we have a dedicated crew and a very active Slack group Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Meetup.com HONOLULU, HI Contact: Matt Popovich, mattpopovich[at]outlook[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 4:00 PM Location: We'll meet at Magic Island at Ala Moana Beach Park, 1201 Ala Moana Blvd, Honolulu, HI 96814. From the parking lot, walk along the left side of the peninsula out toward Magic Island Lagoon. We're usually near the end of the peninsula, somewhere around the bathroom building. Look for the large 'ACX' sign. Coordinates: 73H475M3+JP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Honolulu Rationality hosts discussion meetups about twice a month in Ala Moana Beach Park. Check us out on our website BOISE, ID Contact: Julia and John, jae[dot]miomu[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, October 7, 6:00 PM Location: Old Timer's Shelter in Ann Morrison Park. I will have an ACX sign. Coordinates: 85M5JQ6P+96 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP and feel free to bring kids. CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, IL Contact: Ben, cu[dot]acx[dot]meetups[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 7:00 PM Location: Siebel Center for Computer Science, Room 4403 Coordinates: 86GH4Q7G+H8F Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Discord server Notes: RSVPs are appreciated but not at all required. You can RSVP by email or by pinging me in the Discord server. Suggested entrance is the East side of the building (see Coordinates) - we'll try to make sure at least that door is unlocked, but if it isn't then ping us on email or Discord. CHICAGO, IL Contact: Todd, info[at]chicagorationality[dot]com, https://chicagorationality.com/ Time: Sunday, September 18, 1:00 PM Location: Grant Park - North side of Balbo between the tracks and Columbus Coordinates: 86HJV9FH+84 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Chicago Rationality does a monthly discussion meetup (typically the first Saturday of the month) and a monthly social meetup (typically the third weekend of the month) Notes: Sign up for our email list to be notified of future meetups EVANSTON, IL Contact: Uzair, uzairq93[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 7:00 PM Location: 626 Church Street, Evanston IL 60201 Coordinates: 86JJ28X9+5WQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: The venue is a pub but it's really more of a restaurant, big long tables available so space should be fine and non drinkers shouldn't feel too out of place. BLOOMINGTON, IN Contact: Avery, acxbloomington[at]fastmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 2:00 PM Location: Switchyard Park. Will be at one of the tables near the Rogers Street parking lot. I will bring a cardboard sign that says “ACX”. Coordinates: 86FM4FX6+4Q Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We met last year for Meetups Everywhere and it was fun! Here's a link to our Discord. Notes: You can RSVP via Discord or email, but you are encouraged to show up even if you did not RSVP! WEST LAFAYETTE, IN Contact: NR, mapreader4[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 1:00 PM Location: 1275 1st Street, West Lafayette, IN 47906. We'll be in the south of the Earhart Hall lobby (not the dining court) near the piano, and I will be wearing a green shirt and carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 86GMC3GG+728 Event link(s): LessWrong LEXINGTON, KY Contact: Nathan, nwculley[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 7:00 PM Location: Blue Stallion Brewing. 610 W. 3rd St., Lexington, KY 40508. We will have a sign indicating we are the ACX meetup. Coordinates: 86CQ3F4X+VF Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet 1-2 times a month to talk about ACX, books, memes, etc., often over drinks and board games. NEW ORLEANS, LA Contact: Blake, blake[at]philosophers[dot]group Time: Sunday, September 4, 11:11 AM Location: Petite Clouet Cafe. Look for the group with an iPad that has a People’s Pint sticker. Coordinates: 76XFXX73+8R Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Website Notes: Hybrid in-person and online, video link sent weekly. Email for the link. BOSTON, MA Contact: Robi Rahman, robirahman94[at]gmail[dot]com, 7039818526 Time: Saturday, September 10, 5:00 PM Location: Boston Common, at the Parkman Bandstand gazebo Coordinates: 87JC9W3M+PR Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: Mailing list, Facebook group, Meetup.com Notes: We'll be providing food at the meetup, and giving out free books related to ACX, rationality, and effective altruism. Email the hosts if you'd like a particular book or you have any dietary restrictions. Our group is also doing a tour of the JFK Presidential Library on September 9, you’re welcome to join! NORTHAMPTON, MA Contact: Alex, alex[at]alexliebowitz[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 6:00 PM Location: The Deck, 125A Pleasant St., Northampton MA 01096. The official address is bizarre and inaccurate; it's the outdoor dining part of a group of bars & restaurants in a former rail station... a whole block away from Pleasant St. The simplest way to get to The Deck is to enter The Platform, one of the other restaurants, by its street entrance around 36 Strong Ave., here (make sure to look at street view). Go inside and ask them to show you to The Deck. We'll have a sign. Coordinates: 87J9899F+H7H Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We started in the 2018 Meetups Everywhere and is still going strong. We aim to meet about once every two weeks. At most meetups we get about 5-7 people out of a rotation of 15-20; Meetups Everywhere and other special events tend to bring in a few more than usual. We're a totally social meetup with no 'format' or suggested readings. Although it's not rare for us to touch on ACX articles and related topics, the conversation varies wildly, and you are welcome even if you're the most occasional ACX reader. Notes: We have a (not very active) Discord where you can DM me or post on a public channel. I'm most responsive by email. There is a small chance we'll have to change the location to somewhere else in Northampton. Please check the Less Wrong or Facebook posts on or after August 26 to get the final word on location. BALTIMORE, MD Contact: Rivka, rivka[at]adrusi[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 7:00 PM Location: UMBC outside of the Performing Arts and Humanities Building, on the north side. I will have a sign that says ACX meetup. Parking is free on the weekends. Edit: Rain is forecasted; if it’s raining, we will be inside of the Performing Arts building, on the ground floor just inside the entrance. Coordinates: 87F5774P+53 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet Sundays at 7pm — half are in person and half are virtual. Notes: There will be pizza and drinks DETROIT, MI Contact: Matt Arnold, matt[dot]mattarn[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 20, 7:00 PM Location: Tenacity Craft, 8517 2nd Ave, Detroit, MI 48202 Coordinates: 86JR9WG9+R6 Event link(s): LessWrong MINNEAPOLIS, MN Contact: Timothy, tmbond[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Meet at the picnic tables near the southeast corner of Powderhorn Park - the ones by the parking lot. I will be wearing a green Google t-shirt and have a sign that says ACX. Coordinates: 86P8WPRW+76 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I will bring some snacks (but not a full lunch, so eat before or bring something if you'll be that hungry). Please RSVP on LessWrong. KANSAS CITY, MO Contact: Alex, alex[dot]hedtke[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:30 PM Location: We will be in the courtyard above Whole Foods (which is also an apartment complex). You can enter through the apartment lobby, located on Oak Street. We will have runners shepherding people from the entrance up to the courtyard. Coordinates: 86F72CM8+RR Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com SAINT LOUIS, MO Contact: JohnBuridan, littlejohnburidan[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 1:00 PM Location: Lily Pond Shelter, Tower Grove Park, St. Louis Coordinates: 86CFJP4R+XV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: BYOB WEST PLAINS, MO Contact: Liam, liamhession[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 12:00 PM Location: 10/40 Coffee, 24 Court Square, West Plains, MO Coordinates: 868CP4HW+CV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Hoping to get anyone from around the Ozark region DURHAM, NC Contact: Will Jarvis, willdjarvis[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 8, 7:30 PM Location: Ponysaurus Brewing Company, 219 Hood St, Durham Coordinates: 8773X4Q3+QW Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly! We also have a Discord LAKEWOOD, NJ Contact: Ben L, mywebdev3[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 29, 8:30 PM Location: TBD Event link(s): LessWrong MORRISTOWN, NJ Contact: Matt, matt[dot]brooks[at]impactmarkets[dot]io, Discord: Matt B#0216 Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: 10 N Park Pl, Morristown, NJ 07960 (at the center of the Morristown Green) Coordinates: 87G7QGW9+RJ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: This is the first meetup, come be a founding member of the Northern NJ ACX/EA/LW group! PRINCETON, NJ Contact: Danny K, dskumpf[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 3:00 PM Location: Palmer Square, Princeton, NJ 08540. On the green right outside The Bent Spoon and Rojo's Roastary, near the big tree. I'll have some sort of ACX Meetup sign! Coordinates: 87G7982Q+2CP Event link(s): LessWrong LAS VEGAS, NV Contact: Jonathan Ray, ray[dot]jonathan[dot]w[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 11:45 AM Location: At El Segundo Sol restaurant with giant ACX MEETUP signs Coordinates: 85864RHJ+3H Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet regularly and mostly just socialize. We have a new Discord server. RENO, NV Contact: Steven, stevenl451[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Steeven#7407 Time: Friday, September 2, 5:30 PM Location: We'll be in Crissie Caughlin Park, near the tables and the swing set Coordinates: 85F2G46W+FG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Feel free to bring kids/dogs and please RSVP on LessWrong if you are going BUFFALO, NY Contact: George Herold, ggherold[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 1:00 PM Location: 932 Welch Rd. Java Center, NY 14082 Coordinates: 87J3W467+8P Notes: Last-minute location change! LONG ISLAND, NY Contact: Gabe, gabeaweil[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, October 27, 7:00 PM Location: Whales Tale in Northport Coordinates: 87G8VJRW+99 Event link(s): LessWrong NEW YORK CITY, NY Contact: Jasmine, jasminermj[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 4:00 PM Location: Pavillion @ Rockefeller Park, Warren St / River Terrace Coordinates: 87G7PX9M+4J3 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: OBNYC has a Discord and a Google Group; the Google Group is the main mailing list we use for events NEWBURGH, NY Contact: Pedro David Bonilla, proportionatetoevidence[at]gmail[dot]com, Cell 8452001681 Time: Saturday, September 24, 10:00 AM Location: Perkins Restaurant & Bakery, 1421 NY-300, Newburgh, NY 12550 Coordinates: 87H7GWCH+GF Event link(s): LessWrong ROCHESTER, NY Contact: Skivverus, skivverus[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Skivverus#5915 Time: Saturday, October 8, 1:00 PM Location: 4870 Culver Road; will be wearing a polo shirt, jeans, and glasses, and may or may not have figured out a sign due to just getting back from honeymoon. Look for a pair of parrots, one white, one green with a yellow/orange head. Coordinates: 87M46FM6+Q5P Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Venue very near amusement park; non-bathroom, non-parking amenities are therefore available but not free. Plan accordingly. Not particularly attached to specific location named, just happen to live reasonably close to there; alternative suggestions acceptable. Canadian visitors also welcome should your logistics permit; airport transportation available. RSVP via Discord preferred, but email will also work. CLEVELAND, OH Contact: Jack Zhang, LukeZhao9[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 1:00 PM Location: Picnic tables at Wade Oval (university circle) Coordinates: 86HWG96Q+GC5 Event link(s): LessWrong COLUMBUS, OH Contact: Daniel, daniel[dot]m[dot]adamiak[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 3:00 PM Location: Jeffrey Park - Clinton Shelter. I will be wearing a red shirt. Coordinates: 86FVX3C3+QF Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once a month. We discuss EA, AI and other two letter initialisms. Occasionally we go for walks in local grottos and nature trails. Notes: Email me if you want to be added to the mailing list to receive any updates or future invites. RSVPing is appreciated. TOLEDO, OH Contact: Scout, scout[dot]sivar[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 12:00 PM Location: Black Kite Coffee Coordinates: 86HRMCCV+9R Event link(s): LessWrong OKLAHOMA CITY, OK Contact: bean, battleshipbean[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 1:00 PM Location: Edmond Public Library/Shannon Miller Park. I will be wearing a hat that says USS Iowa on it. Coordinates: 8674MG3C+MW Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Had four people last year and a good time, moved to Edmond because a lot of us are up here. ALBANY, OR Contact: Kenan (he/him), kbitikofer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: Bowman Park, Albany, Oregon. In or near the shelter. I will wear a bright red shirt and carry a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 84PRJWR7+XC6 Event link(s): LessWrong CORVALLIS, OR Contact: Ethan Ashkie, ethanashkie[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, September 7, 6:00 PM Location: Common Fields, in the reserved outdoor seating near the entrance Coordinates: 84PRHP5P+VQ Event link(s): LessWrong EUGENE, OR Contact: Ben Smith, benjsmith[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, August 31, 7:00 PM Location: The Barn Light, 924 Willamette St, Eugene 97401 Coordinates: 84PR2WX4+VV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much pizza to get, but if you forget, don't worry about it, we want you to come along anyway PORTLAND, OR Contact: Sam F Celarek, support[at]pearcommunity[dot]com, 513-432-3310, Discord: Sam Celarek#2845 Time: Friday, September 9, 5:00 PM Location: 205 NW 4th Ave Coordinates: 84QVG8FG+V4 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Portland Effective Altruism and Rationality is very active. We have book clubs, bi-weekly AI safety meet-ups, bi-weekly topical meet-ups, bi-weekly socials, and have an active Discord. Notes: We would prefer you RSVP on Meetup.com a week beforehand so that we can get the right amount of food! HARRISBURG, PA Contact: Phil, acxharrisburg[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Ever Grain Brewing Co, 4444 Carlisle Pike, Camp Hill, PA 17011 - We will be sitting at one of the picnic tables outside with an ACX MEETUP sign Coordinates: 87G562QQ+8P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Small monthly meetup group based out of Harrisburg - celebrating 1 year of actuality! You can see more of our events on LessWrong. INDIANA, PA Contact: Eric, ericindianapa[at]gmail[dot]com, 717-256-2717 Time: Saturday, September 24, 11:00 AM Location: Caffè Amadeus in downtown Indiana, PA. I will have a sign with 'ACX Meetup' on one of the tables. Coordinates: 87G2JRFX+48 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP via email or text message so I know how many to expect. PHILADELPHIA, PA Contact: Wes and Diana, rationalphilly[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 22, 6:30 PM Location: The Philadelphia Ethical Society, 1906 Rittenhouse Square. The meeting room is in the basement, look for the signs. Coordinates: 87F6WRXG+FQ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We tend to meet in downtown Philly on the last Thursday of the month. We're aiming to make the Ethical Society our new steady location. We have many links: Discord, Google Calendar, Facebook, Meetup, Google Group Notes: We'll be ordering food from a local restaurant, so no need to eat first. BYOB PITTSBURGH, PA Contact: Justin, pghacx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Westinghouse Shelter @ Schenley Park (W Circuit Rd near Schenley Dr). We have the outdoor shelter reserved, so light rain shouldn't be a problem, but in the event of extreme weather, we may relocate indoors (our default 'contingency indoor location' is Crazy Mocha Coffee on 2100 Murray Ave in Squirrel Hill). Coordinates: 87G2C3Q4+773 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet monthly-ish for general discussion and chit-chat, email me if you'd like to be notified of future meetups. STATE COLLEGE, PA Contact: John Slow, auk480[at]psu[dot]edu Time: Thursday, September 8, 5:00 PM Location: Old Main. I will be carrying an ACX meetup sign. Coordinates: 87G4Q4WP+HV Event link(s): LessWrong SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO Contact: Dan Gelfarb, danielgelfarb[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Lote 23, back corner under the tents. I will be wearing a blue shirt with a sign that says ACX meetup on it. Coordinates: 77CMCWVM+W32 Event link(s): LessWrong PROVIDENCE, RI Contact: James Bailey, feanor1600[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Prospect Terrace park, to the right of the Roger Williams statue Coordinates: 87HCRHJV+24 Event link(s): LessWrong SIOUX FALLS, SD Contact: S. C., villainsplus[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 2, 5:00 PM Location: 410 E 26th St, Sioux Falls, SD 57105 - the pavillion on the west side of McKennan Park, or the tables just south of it if I can't book it. I'll be the guy with the grill. Coordinates: 86M5G7JH+W57 Event link(s): LessWrong MEMPHIS, TN Contact: Michael, michael[at]postlibertarian[dot]com Time: Monday, September 5, 1:00 PM Location: French Truck Coffee at Crosstown Concourse, Central Atrium 1350 Concourse Ave, Memphis, TN 38104. We will be at one of the many tables near French Truck Coffee and I will have a sign that says ACX MEETUP. Coordinates: 867F5X2P+QHC Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet about every month or so. We've been around since 2019 but only regularly since mid 2021 due to the pandemic. We have a Discord server. NASHVILLE, TN Contact: Ellen, enwiegand[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 11:00 AM Location: OneCity Nashville (8 City Blvd, Nashville, TN 37209), next to the volleyball courts. I'll have a pink ballcap that says SPINSTER on it. Coordinates: 868M552H+XW Event link(s): LessWrong AUSTIN, TX Contact: Silas Barta, sbarta[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 12:00 PM Location: 4001 N Lamar, Austin Texas, park by Central Market near stone tables and tents Coordinates: 86248746+8C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Austin LessWrong has a weekly focused discussion, a weekly social mixer, a weekly online book club, and a monthly movie night. Been around since 2011. Notes: Location may change as we are talking to other venues BRYAN/COLLEGE STATION, TX Contact: Kenny, easwaran[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 5:00 PM Location: Back patio of Torchy's Tacos at Texas and New Main. I'll have a yellow umbrella and pinkish/purple hair Coordinates: JMFC+4J Event link(s): LessWrong DALLAS, TX Contact: Ethan Morse, ethan[dot]morse97[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: ethanmorse#5255 Time: Sunday, September 11, 12:00 PM Location: Union, 3705 Cedar Springs Rd, Dallas, TX 75219. We'll be in the upstairs conference room. Coordinates: 8645R55R+9M9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get HOUSTON, TX Contact: Eric Magro, eric135033[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Empire Cafe, 1732 Westheimer Rd, Houston, TX 77098 ---- Look for a table with an ACX MEETUP sign. Coordinates: 76X6PHVW+5H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: There are meetups every week. We have a Discord and a Facebook group. WACO, TX Contact: Mike, BaylorACX[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 1:00 PM Location: Cameron Park, picnic tables next to Jacob's Ladder Coordinates: 8634HVG2+V9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please email me if you're thinking about attending! Would love to start an ACX community here :) SALT LAKE CITY, UT Contact: Ross Richey (aka Jeremiah), wearenotsaved[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 3:00 PM Location: Liberty Park near the ChargePoint stations Coordinates: 85GCP4WF+VJ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet every other month, we do book clubs and movie nights as well. Notes: Will be outdoors. If the weather looks bad, email event organizer to check on location. CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA Contact: RL, effectivealtruismatuva[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 5:00 PM Location: 12 Rotunda Drive Charlottesville, VA 22903 - We’ll meet at the picnic tables across the street from The Virginian. There will be an ACX sign. Coordinates: 87C32FPX+3H4 Event link(s): LessWrong LYNCHBURG, VA Contact: Craig, craigbdaniel[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Three Roads Brewing - I will be wearing a purple t-shirt and will place an ""ACX"" card on the table Coordinates: 8792CV65+5G NORFOLK, VA Contact: Willa, walambert[at]pm[dot]me Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Pagoda & Oriental Garden, 265 W Tazewell St, Norfolk, VA 23510. I will be wearing a bright green shirt, will have a large green & yellow hat on, and will have a sign with ACX Meetup on it. Coordinates: 8785RPX4+W3 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: Hi! Virginia Rationalists was co-founded in Norfolk VA earlier this year by Willa & Yitzi with the goal of growing a thriving ACX / LW / EA community in our city & the state of Virginia. We meet every week at Fair Grounds cafe on Wednesday evenings from 5-7:30pm Eastern Time. We have a Discord server and a Twitter. RESTON, VA Contact: James, jrbalch333[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 1:30 PM Location: The matchbox at 1900 Reston Station Blvd, Reston, VA 20190 on the 1st floor of the giant Google building. I'll be holding a copy of Sapiens. Coordinates: 87C4WMX6+9X Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Email me to be added to the WhatsApp group RICHMOND, VA Contact: Cedar, cedar[dot]ren+acxmeetup[at]gmail[dot]com, @Cedar at this Discord server Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:30 PM Location: Richmond Public Libraries, West End Branch 5420 Patterson Ave, Richmond, VA 23226 Coordinates: 8794HFHQ+3G Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong & optionally reach out to me on Discord to introduce yourself! BURLINGTON, VT Contact: Forrest, lucidobservor[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Battery Park, at the benches in the south-western corner of the park, near the cannons facing the lake. I will have an 'ACX Meetup' sign. Coordinates: 87P8FQJH+8P Event link(s): LessWrong BELLINGHAM, WA Contact: Alex, bellinghamrationalish[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 29, 5:30 PM Location: Lake Padden Park, at one of the tables near the lake by the dog park. If it's rainy, we'll meet in one of the two covered gazebo areas just north (right, if you're facing the lake) of the planned spot. If the forecast looks really bad (e.g. very cold), I'll post an indoor location to the Meetup.com page at least three days in advance. Coordinates: 84WVMHX3+GM Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Bellingham Rationalish discusses (in good faith!) topics in and around rationality. We usually meet the evening of the last Wednesday of each month. Our first meeting was a 2021 ACX Everywhere meetup. Notes: Please RSVP on Meetup so I have an idea how many people to expect. Kids, animals, food, beverages, etc. are all welcome. SEATTLE, WA Contact: Nikita Sokolsky, sokolx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 5:00 PM Location: Optimism Brewing (1158 Broadway, Seattle) Coordinates: 84VVJM7H+4Q Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong (or FB/Meetup) for planning purposes MADISON, WI Contact: Mary Wang, mmwang[at]wisc[dot]edu Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: 1022 High St. Blue house with red porches. If weather permits, we'll be in my large backyard, which has more seating now than last year. If rain, come in the side door. There will be air purifiers and open windows. Masks optional. Look for a sign at the end of the driveway that says ACX/SSC Meetup. Coordinates: 86MG3H3X+XW Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We have met fortnightly in the past, but quit last year when it got too cold to meet outside. We typically have shared a meal, sat around my kitchen table and talked. Have held a Solstice celebration.

Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability

September 22, 2022 · Original source

I thought a bit about credit allocation (mostly from an effective altruism point of view).

I think the political power of billionaires is vastly overestimated. I’ve talked before about how there’s very little money in politics because spending money on politics doesn’t work. Since then I think the case has gotten even stronger. Michael Bloomberg sunk in the 2020 primary despite having $50 billion dollars. And effective altruism tried to use $10 million of Sam Bankman-Fried’s money to get a biosecurity expert elected to Congress in Oregon. They were pretty smart about it: chose a district with no incumbent, found a really amazing candidate with an incredible personal backstory, pulled out all the stops. They spent the third most of any race in the country - about as much as it was possible to spend, I don’t know what else you could even spend the money on - and they lost by a landslide in the primary.

Inline links: talked before about how there’s very little money in politics because spending money on politics doesn’t work.

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2023

April 10, 2023 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places

May 26, 2023 · Original source

SBF went to considerable time and expense to signal Effective Altruist group affiliation: in 2022, the FTX Future Fund gave more than $160 million to EA causes. In April 2022, he appeared as a guest on the 80,000 Hours podcast for a 3-hour interview with Rob Wiblin.

Inline links: FTX Future Fund gave more than $160 million to EA causes

While I won't enter a discussion of whether Effective Altruism is a "religion," the EA community does seem to share some common traits with religious congregations. When someone is part of your congregation, they're not just signaling shared group affinity; it's specifically the sort of group where membership also signals moral virtue. (If you're an Effective Altruist, you probably trust a fellow EA more than you trust a fellow rock climber, or a fellow Trekkie.)

August 25, 2023 · Original source

WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Ben W Contact Info: benwve[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, October 3rd, 5:30 PM Location: Room MZ02 (on the mezannine floor), Rutherford House, 33 Bunny Street, Wellington 6011 Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4VCPPQCH+CMR Group Link: facebook.com/EffectiveAltruismWellington Notes: This meetup will be run in collaboration with Effective Altruism Wellington. The external door closes at 6pm, but if you call me I can let you in. reach me on 0+2+7+3+4+4+1+0+8+2

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4VCPPQCH+CMR, facebook.com/EffectiveAltruismWellington

EINDHOVEN, NETHERLANDS Contact: Jelle Contact Info: jelledonderz[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, Octover 21st, 3:00 PM Location: Strijp-S feelgood market grass field. Look for a printed sign that says 'ACX' Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9F37CFW5+X2 Group Link: https://www.eaeindhoven.nl/ Notes: Effective Altruism Eindhoven has biweekly meetups in the Hubble cafe on the TU/e campus. Rationality-themed conversations are welcome! https://www.eaeindhoven.nl/calendar

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9F37CFW5+X2, https://www.eaeindhoven.nl/

NEWTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA Contact: duck_master Contact Info: duckmaster0[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 9th, 12:00 PM Location: Newton Centre Green at 1221 Centre St, Newton, MA, USA Coordinates: https://plus.codes/87JC8RJ4+76 Event Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/fMcxBfAimukmqpAzB/2023-acx-meetups-everywhere-newton-ma Notes: If I run this it'll be totally open-ended (I'm planning ~12pm to ~2pm, but can totally go to any time). Also open beyond the rat community proper (I'll welcome postrats, alignment researchers, predictors, effective altruists, and rationalists).

Inline links: https://plus.codes/87JC8RJ4+76, https://www.lesswrong.com/events/fMcxBfAimukmqpAzB/2023-acx-meetups-everywhere-newton-ma

Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation

November 07, 2023 · Original source

The gut reaction you have to something like this depends a lot on your past experiences, how much you trust the author, your exposure to Effective Altruism, and how often you've had people try to pull one over on you at your expense. These all feed into your personality, heuristics, and priors. That's why you get reactions ranging from "Nope, you're a crazy liar" to "Interesting, tell me more".

I hate lying and am against it. I’m aware that I’m a media public intellectual type person, which means I have a higher-than-usual duty not to lie. And I’m involved with effective altruism, which everyone seems to constantly suspect of lying, and I try to fight that reputation by being scrupulously honest and recommending others do the same. I hate ever recommending lying. But I also can’t in good conscience recommend telling the truth to these people. They seem to have totally disqualified themselves as decent citizens who deserve the benefits of the social contract. I do psych evals for surgery sometimes, and I’ve read the papers on how to do them, and the official criteria all seem pretty reasonable, so I have no idea where these people are getting this from or, how they possibly go so wrong. Still, transplant evaluation psychiatrists are now right there alongside Gestapo officers at your door on my very very short list of people who it seems probably ethical to lie to. I don’t know how it came to this (I assume it involves lawyers and bioethicists somehow) but it doesn’t seem satisfactory.

Leaders can be described as getting people to do good stuff they should do anyway. Personally, I always tell people that when thry ask somebody for a favor, make it *AS EASY AS POSSIBLE* for that person to help you. The path to better more effective Altruism, and government as well, should keep those things in mind.

Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Search “effective altruism” on social media right now, and it’s pretty grim.

But the journalists think we’re a sinister conspiracy that has “taken over Washington” and have the whole Democratic Party in our pocket. Click to expand. Source: https://twitter.com/the_megabase/status/1728771254336036963 The only thing everyone agrees on is that the only two things EAs ever did were “endorse SBF” and “bungle the recent OpenAI corporate coup.”

Inline links: “taken over Washington”

And I do think the movement is worth fighting for. Here’s a short, very incomplete list of things effective altruism has accomplished in its ~10 years of existence. I’m counting it as an EA accomplishment if EA either provided the funding or did the work, further explanations in the footnotes. I’m also slightly conflating EA, rationalism, and AI doomerism rather than doing the hard work of teasing them apart:

January 11, 2024 · Original source

The Effective Altruist Forum now has a post on Economic Growth - Donation Suggestions And Ideas, listing suspected top charities for helping countries develop. These include ACX Grants winner Growth Teams, the Charter Cities Institute, GiveDirectly, and Overseas Development Institute.

Inline links: Economic Growth - Donation Suggestions And Ideas, Growth Teams, Charter Cities Institute, GiveDirectly, Overseas Development Institute

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024

March 30, 2024 · Original source

BELGRADE Contact: Tanja Contact Info: tanja[dot]trninic[at]efektivnialtruizam[dot]rs Time: Sunday, April 7th, 2:00 PM Location: Venezelosova 20, Belgrade, Serbia. Effective Altruism Serbia is organizing a casual hang out + lunch in vegan and low-waste Kafe VeZa Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8GP2RFC9+36 Group Link: https://efektivnialtruizam.rs/ Notes: Please RSVP to tanja.trninic@efektivnialtruizam.rs so we can reserve enough tables for everyone.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8GP2RFC9+36, https://efektivnialtruizam.rs/

Contra Stone On EA

May 30, 2024 · Original source

Lyman Stone wrote an article Why Effective Altruism Is Bad. You know the story by now, let’s start with the first argument:

Inline links: Why Effective Altruism Is Bad

Stone finds that Google Trends shows that searches for “effective altruism” concentrate most in the San Francisco Bay Area and Boston. So he’s going to see if those two cities have higher charitable giving than average, and use that as his metric of whether EAs give more to charity than other people.

He finds that SF and Boston do give more to charity than average, but not by much, and this trend has if anything decreased in the 2010 - present period when effective altruism was active. So, he concludes,

Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

August 08, 2024 · Original source

What I am proposing (and what makes my morality superior to both sides) is that good or evil should be judged completely independently of weakness or strength, using objective measurable criteria to determine who is deserving of help and who isn't. The reason rationalists with their "effective altruism" will never be a popular movement is because they do not DESERVE to be popular when they have no logical moral criteria to evaluate whom their altruism should prioritize. When your "effective altruism" saves the lives of 300 sub-saharan africans who then go on to murder gay people indiscriminately because their religion tells them to, or immigrate to Europe and rape and kill twelve year olds, YOU are personally responsible for the deaths they caused. Before you criticize OTHER people's morality, maybe you should consider subscribing to a moral philosophy that actually considers downstream effects, instead of treating the lives of evil people as being equally valuable to the lives of good people. Or do you not BELIEVE in the concept of good and evil?

It would be one thing if you could meaningfully ad baculum, but rationalists and Effective Altruists are substantially weaker than tribalists and ingroup preference enjoyers, so to anyone outside your bubble this tendency just comes off as impotent sneering.

Links For December 2024

December 17, 2024 · Original source

37: Rethink Priorities’ public polling on EA. Good example of the maxim “You wouldn't worry so much about what others think of you if you realized how seldom they do.” Approximately 1% of people have heard of effective altruism, and their opinion is mostly “I think it has something to do with charity, so I guess it sounds nice”. Median opinion on FTX and SBF was “never heard of them” (only 20% of people had!)

Inline links: Rethink Priorities’ public polling on EA

49: There’s been a Twitter spat over effective altruism. Back in 2019, Peter Singer published an article saying that rich donors gave $1 billion to rebuild Notre Dame after a fire, but that could have saved ~285,000 lives and maybe donors should take that equally seriously. This month, the NYT used “effective altruists are against restoring Notre Dame” as a jumping-off point for its real complaint (it would rather we have "a philanthropy network that gave specifically to social justice movements . . . racial justice groups, climate justice groups and transgender protection groups"). There were several good responses, most notably Dylan Matthews’.

Inline links: Dylan Matthews’

But I also think that, overall, this is a story of us taking the NYT’s bait (and hopefully learning not to do so in the future). The world really wants to believe that effective altruists are evil humorless people who want to prevent every kind of good except raw life-saving and think you’re a moral monster for not agreeing. One thing I’ve learned in my time as a blogger is that if the world wants to think something that much, they will seize on anything at all in your writing that even faintly suggests it, and so you can’t afford to be even slightly edgy or ambiguous, and really you should insert “BY THE WAY, I'M NOT SAYING THE HORRIBLE THING YOU’RE DESPERATE TO ATTRIBUTE TO ME” every other sentence as a reminder. Not every response did this, so a lot of people seized on this as EA admitting that we hate cathedrals and human flourishing and probably you personally.

June 26, 2025 · Original source

The failed candidate gene studies had sample sizes in the three or four digits. The new genome-wide studies needed five or six digits to even get started. It was prohibitively difficult for individual studies to gather so many subjects, genotype them, and test them for the outcome of interest, so work shifted to big centralized genome repositories - most of all the UK Biobank - and easy-to-measure traits. Among the easiest of all was educational attainment (EA), ie how far someone had gotten in school. Were they a high school dropout? A PhD? Somewhere in between? This correlated with all the spicy outcomes of interest people wanted to debate - IQ, wealth, social class - while being objective and easy to ask about on a survey.

Maybe there are genes we haven’t found yet For most of the 2010s, hypothesis 2 looked pretty good. Researchers gradually gathered bigger and bigger sample sizes, and found more and more of the missing heritability. A big 2018 study increased the predictive power of known genes from 2% to 10%. An even bigger 2022 study increased it to 14%, and current state of the art is around 17%. Seems like it was sample size after all! Once the samples get big enough we’ll reach 40% and finally close the gap, right? This post is the story of how that didn’t happen, of the people trying to rehabilitate the twin-studies-are-wrong hypothesis, and of the current status of the debate. Its most important influence/foil is Sasha Gusev, whose blog The Infintesimal introduced me to the new anti-hereditarian movement and got me to research it further, but it’s also inspired by Eric Turkheimer, Alex Young (not himself an anti-hereditarian, but his research helped ignite interest in this area), and Awais Aftab. (while I was working on this draft, the East Hunter Substack wrote a similar post. Theirs is good and I recommend it, but I think this one adds enough that I’m publishing anyway. You can see Gusev’s response to East Hunter here) In an interview with Aftab, Gusev explained his philosophy like so (I am excerpting heavily from a long interview and editing for flow/emphasis; completionists should read the whole thing): For teacher-reported ADHD, the twin heritability estimate was 69% while the GWAS-based heritability estimate [ie using genome-wide association studies where researchers actually try to find the genes involved] was just 5%; with similar gaps for other behavioral traits. These are huge differences! If we believe the twin study estimates, then this gap implies that there is a lot of causal genetic variation out there that GWAS/molecular data is not picking up. One way to think about this is that traits that are under stronger natural selection will have more of their genetic variants driven to low frequency, and thus less detectable by GWAS. So a big gap between GWAS and twins could imply that rare variants are very important due to strong selection. On the other hand, if we are skeptical of the twin study estimates, then this gap implies a substantial contribution from those environmental complexities I talked about previously. For a long time, the field of molecular genetics was operating under the assumption that the missing heritability was largely in the rare variants we had not yet measured. But a number of recent advances have started to tip the scales against that argument. First, some of the earlier molecular heritability estimates were found to be inflated by some mix of technical issues and cultural transmission, so the amount of missing heritability actually increased. Second, a new model was developed that could estimate total direct heritability using molecular data from mother-father-child trios, with very few model assumptions (the title literally states “… without environmental bias”; Young et al. 2018), and it too found estimates that were substantially lower than twins on average. Third, several studies have now actually measured the influence of rare variants in various forms, and they are so far not adding up to explain as much as we would expect from twin heritability estimates. Fourth, there is little evidence of the strong natural selection that would be needed to generate a massive trove of rare variants untagged by GWAS. I am a molecular geneticist, and this drumbeat of evidence from molecular data has convinced me that twin studies are either 2-3x inflated or estimate something fundamentally different from direct heritability. We’ll start by looking at Gusev’s first claim: that “earlier molecular estimates” (ie polygenic scores) are significantly inflated, or at least don’t mean what we thought they meant. This won’t be directly relevant to our question - even our original number of 17% implies missing heritability2, so moving it down a bit to 5-10% or up a bit to 20% doesn’t add or subtract from the fundamental mystery. But this discussion has gotten a lot of people extremely confused, and we’ll need to deconfuse ourselves if we’re going to get any further. Are Most Current Polygenic Scores Confounded? A polygenic score is one possible result of a genome-wide association study. These scores are algorithms which take a person’s genes as input and return information about their traits as output. Better polygenic scores can predict a higher percent of variance in a certain trait. For example, the latest polygenic score on educational attainment can predict up to 17% of the variance in how much schooling someone completes. Predictive power is different from causal efficacy. Consider a racist society where the government ensures that all white people get rich but all black people stay poor. In this society, the gene for lactose tolerance (which most white people have, but most black people lack) would do a great job predicting social class, but it wouldn’t cause social class3. It certainly wouldn’t be a “gene for social class” in the sense where it controls the part of your brain that helps you manage money, or where genetic engineering on this gene would make people richer. Here are three common ways that not-directly-causal genes can show up as predicting a trait: Population stratification: genes are linked to culture, and culture determines the trait, as in the racism-lactose example above. Many studies naturally mitigate this concern by using the UK Biobank of mostly white British samples, and by correcting for “principal components” that correspond to ancestry (and there are other, even more complicated ways to correct for this). But ancestry variation is fractal; no matter how uniform your sample, there will still be micro-differences you didn’t consider. For example, if you’re analyzing the educational attainment of white British people, it’s very relevant that families with Norman surnames still outperform their Saxon peers at Oxbridge admissions 900 years after William the Conqueror. If Britons with more Norman ancestry have non-education-related genes that their Saxon peers lack, these could be mistakenly classified as genes for education or other behavioral differences between the two groups. Assortative mating: Suppose that both height and wealth are desirable qualities in a mate. Then tall people will tend to marry rich people, and over generations, the same people will be both rich and tall. That means that even if wealth is 0% genetic, a study looking for “the gene for wealth” will be able to find genes that rich people have more often than poor people - namely, the genes for height. Or suppose that smart people tend to marry other smart people - surely true, if only because so many couples meet at college. Then all the intelligence genes will concentrate in the same people. So any study that tries to determine how much Intelligence Gene ABC affects intelligence will get inflated4 results, because everyone with Intelligence Gene ABC will also have many other intelligence genes - if the study naively asks “How much smarter are people with Gene ABC than people without it?”, it will find they are much smarter (because it’s accidentally including part of the effects of all the other intelligence genes that travel along with it). Parent-to-child transmission, aka “genetic nurture”: Children tend to share their parents’ genes. So if there’s a gene that causes parents to create a certain kind of childrearing environment, and that childrearing environment affects a trait, it will falsely look like a gene that directly causes the trait. Suppose Gene XYZ causes parents to read more books to their children, and reading books to children increases their IQ. Parents with Gene XYZ will tend to read books, so their kids will get high IQ. Those kids will also (probably) inherit Gene XYZ from their parents. So people with Gene XYZ will tend to have higher IQ. If you naively study which genes increase IQ, you’ll see Gene XYZ in more smart people than dumb people, and think it’s a “gene for IQ”. This is “causal” in a certain sense, but it’s not the one we traditionally think about, and it behaves importantly differently - for example, if you genetically engineer someone to have Gene XYZ, their IQ won’t go up (although their kids’ IQs might). How can we tell if a polygenic predictor is “direct” vs. confounded by these non-causal pathways? The most common technique is within-family comparisons: do the traditional “check if people with the gene differ on a trait from people without the gene” study, but limit its focus to (for example) sibling pairs. Suppose a couple has two children; the first child inherits Gene ABC and the second one doesn’t. If the first child is smarter than the second child, that provides some infinitesimal evidence that Gene ABC is a gene for intelligence. Repeat this process over hundreds of thousands of sibling pairs, and the infinitesimal evidence can reach statistical significance. Since the family unit is a perfect natural experiment that isolates the variable of interest (genes) while holding everything else (culture and parenting) constant, within-family results are protected against stratification, assortative mating, and genetic nurture effects. The culmination of this research program is Tan et al 2024, which finds that many polygenic predictors lose significant accuracy when retested among siblings. For example, educational attainment is 50% uncorrelated with direct genetic effects. You need to square this to figure out what percent is causal; when you do that, you find that the polygenic score that explained 14% of EA is only 4%pp direct genes, with the other 10%pp being nondirect5 confounders. So yes, it seems like most polygenic scores that don’t validate within families are confounded. However unhappy we previously were that we had only found 14% of genes for EA (vs. 40% expected), we should now be much more unhappy - we really only know 4% of genes that directly cause EA. On the other hand, you might say - so before we only knew 14%pp out of 40%. Now we only know 4%pp out of 40%. This is discouraging, but it doesn’t fundamentally change what we know about nature vs. nurture. Both 4%pp and 14%pp are less than 40% - with either number, we must be missing something or doing something wrong. Probably that’s insufficient sample size. We’ll keep working on sample size and other things, and eventually scrounge up the missing 26%pp or 36%pp or whatever of the variance, so this doesn’t change anything. All it means is that one predictive method that the average person never knew about in the first place doesn’t work as well as we thought. Who cares? Not doctors. So far this research has only just barely begun to reach the clinic. But also, all doctors want to do is predict things (like heart attack risk). They don’t care if they use causal vs. nondirect genes. It doesn’t matter if you’re “only” at higher risk of heart attack because you’re black, or Norman, or because your parents read books to you - you still need more heart attack medication! Polygenic embryo selection companies should care. They offer polygenic scores that can be used to select healthier or smarter embryos. If the predictors they use rely partly on variants that aren’t causal within families, their real benefits could be far lower than advertised. I talked to one of these companies, who said they’d already adjusted for these effects and expected their competitors had too - the proper antidote to this problem, sibling controls, is a natural choice when you’re literally picking between siblings. The biggest losers are the epidemiologists. They had started using polygenic predictors as a novel randomization method; suppose, for example, you wanted to study whether smoking causes Alzheimers. If you just checked how many smokers vs. nonsmokers got Alzheimers, your result would be vulnerable to bias; maybe poor people smoke more and get more Alzheimers. But (they hoped) you might be able to check whether people with the genes for smoking get more Alzheimers. Poverty can’t make you have more or fewer genes! This was a neat idea, but if the polygenic predictors are wrong about which genes cause smoking and what effect size they have, then the less careful among these results will need to be re-examined. But the reason I spent so much time on the subject here is that this has confused a lot of people into thinking heritability itself was confounded and is actually just 4%. When I read my first few blog posts on these findings, I came away thinking they were claiming to have discredited twin studies and heritability. And although I take partial ownership of my own poor reading comprehension, I maintain that the way that the new anti-hereditarians discuss this is pretty bad. For example, Turkheimer’s treatment of the Tan study above is called Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, and includes passages like: The median [direct genomic effect] heritability for behavioral phenotypes is .048. Let that sink in for a second. How different would the modern history of behavior genetics be if back in the 80s one study after another had shown that the heritability of behavior was around .05? When Arthur Jensen wrote about IQ, he usually used a figure of .8 for the heritability of intelligence. I know that the relationship between twin heritabilities and SNP heritabilities is complicated, and in fact the DGE heritability of ability is one of the higher ones, at .2336. But still, it seems to me that the appropriate conclusion from these results is that among people who don’t have an identical twin, genomic information is a statistically non-zero but all in all relatively minor contributor to behavioral differences. And comments included things like: I don’t know if [this study] is the end of social science genomics, but it should certainly be the end of attributing significant genetic influence to behavioral traits (despite the recent scientist-generated cartoons touting genes for “income”). And: There's no doubt that this reported findings have dealt a fatal blow to my conviction that behavioral traits are pre-eminently heritable…This is a remarkable example of an objective statistical fact mercilessly crushing the more subjective experiential sense of "A looks and acts more like B than C because A and B have the same parents." This subjective evidence is almost unshakable and universal in its application as a tried and tested psychosocial heuristic. And yet, here we are. Turkheimer is either misstating the relationship between polygenic scores and narrow-sense heritability, or at least egging on some very confused people who are doing that, and the dynamic was bad enough that I got confused myself for a while. But even more confusing, the new anti-hereditarians actually are saying that lots of behavioral traits have very low heritability! But this point requires different arguments, only tangentially related to these. So let’s move on to… Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 1: GWAS & GREML) In the mid 2010s, when genome-wide association studies (GWAS) based polygenic predictors were getting better every year, it was easy to hope they might reach 40% and close the “missing heritability”. But since then, progress has stalled. The second-to-last tripling of sample size, from 300K to 1M between 2016 - 2018, increased predictive power from 6% → 12%. The last tripling, from 1M to 3M between 2018 - 2022, only increased predictive power from 12% → 14%. If you graph sample size vs. predictive power, it looks like there's an asymptote between 15 - 20% or so. (of which - remember - only 5% is directly causal!) Worse, a mid-2010s technique called GREML allowed researchers to estimate the percent of variance in a trait that comes from the sorts of common genes studied in GWAS, without having to identify the genes involved. A 2016 GREML paper suggested that the maximum share of variance that GWASs of educational attainment could ever discover was about 21% (again, compared to 40% predicted genetic from twin studies). Since unavoidable methodological issues will prevent GWASs from reaching the literal maximum possible, this agrees with the evidence suggesting an asymptote between 15 - 20%. So either twin studies are wrong and traits are less heritable than believed, or the heritability must lie somewhere other than the common genes identifiable by GWAS. What about rare genes? GWASs focus on genetic variation common enough to be worth including in a basic genetic test. Most of this is single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”). A single nucleotide is one letter of DNA - for example, a C or a G. Polymorphisms are genes that commonly vary in humans - sometimes across races (for example, some humans have a gene for light skin, and other humans have a gene for dark skin), and other times within races (for example, some white people have a gene that makes cilantro taste like soap, and others don’t). So SNPs are single-letter spots in DNA where different people often have different letters. How often? Some people say 1%, but the more practical definition is “often enough that someone has noticed and added it to the test panel”. There are three billion letters in the genome, of which only a few million are commonly-tested SNPs. But these SNP studies have limited7 ability to measure personal mutations and rare variants. Sometimes your parents’ egg and sperm cells mess up copying a nucleotide of DNA, and you get a mutation that isn’t inherited from your ethnic group or even from your subgroup/family line - it’s just some idiosyncratic DNA change that you might be the first person in history to have. Since scientists have never seen this mutation before, they don’t know about it and can’t test for it without doing something more expensive than a simple SNP screen. And SNP studies have limited ability to detect anything more complicated than a single letter changing to another single letter. But some mutations are more complicated structural variants. For example, some bits of DNA get stuck on repeat - one person might have GATGAT, another person might have GATGATGATGAT, and a third person might have fifty GATs in a row. Other bits come out backwards. Sometimes a whole chunk of DNA goes missing, or moves to the wrong place. Occasionally a gene reads The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins, takes it too seriously, and evolves some ridiculous trick for spamming itself all over the genome. So if even the best molecular studies seem to be asymptoting around 15-20% of variance in educational attainment, but twin studies suggest it’s 40% genetic, might rare variants and structural variants make up the missing 20-25%pp? This remains a topic of bitter disagreement. On the one side, hereditarians bring up a Darwinian argument: imagine a genetic engineer who hopes to find the genes for educational attainment and edit them to make everyone smart and successful. She looks harder and harder, becoming more and more exasperated as they fail to materialize. Finally, she realizes she’s been scooped: evolution has been working on the same project, and has a 100,000 year head start. In the context of intense, recent selection for intelligence, we should expect evolution to have already found (and eliminated) the most straightforward, easy-to-find genes for low intelligence. Therefore, everything left should be convoluted or hidden or impossible to work with. So although this requires a sort of god-of-the-gaps argument - where we keep pushing heritability into whatever genes are too weird for existing techniques to detect - there are some reasons to think God really is in the gaps here. And a 2017 paper uses some clever techniques to estimate the share of intelligence variation lurking in hard-to-measure genes and finds it’s more than half: “By capturing these additional genetic effects, our models closely approximate the heritability estimates from twin studies for intelligence and education.” (see also Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024) The anti-hereditarians disagree. They cite papers like Zeng which measure the strength of selection on intelligence and suggest that it’s too weak to concentrate so much of the variation in rare genes8. And Sasha Gusev mentions Weiner 2023, which finds that in fact rare variants “explain 1.3% (SE = 0.03%) of phenotypic variance on average – much less than common variants” (other experts say that burden heritability only captures some rare variants and is not the right tool for this problem). But it may not even matter, because another set of findings suggests that heritability is genuinely low even when the rare variants are counted. Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 2: Sib-Regression and RDR) Two newer methods, Sib-Regression and RDR, ask: using what we know from genetic studies, how much genetic variation do we think exists, total, across both common and rare genes? On average siblings share 50% of genes. But there’s a little randomness in meiosis, so some siblings might share 40% and others might share 60%. The more genetic influence on a trait, the more similar sibling pairs who share 60% of their genes will be, compared to sibling pairs who only share 40% of their genes. Since 60%-gene siblings and 40%-gene siblings are both equally part of the same family, you can use these numbers to calculate heritability unconfounded by a range of family factors. This is Sib-Regression. If you do a more complicated statistical process to extend the same idea to relatives other than siblings, it’s relatedness disequilibrium regression or RDR. GWAS asks: Looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation in a trait have we explained right now? GREML asks: looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation could we ever explain? But sib-regression and RDR ask a question more like twin studies: considering all genes, whether common / rare / easy-to-study / hard-to-study, how much variation is there total? This could address the rare variant objection mentioned above. And in many ways, these techniques are better than twin studies - Sib-Regression eliminates many potential biases, and RDR eliminates even more (although it’s harder to pull off, requiring more genetic information and computational resources). These techniques are new and hard-to-use, and only a few published studies have applied them to the sorts of behavioral traits we’re interested in: Young et al (2018) did Sib-Regression and RDR to genetic data from Iceland. Sib-regression found educational attainment = 40% (±15%) heritable, and RDR found 17% (±9%) heritable. Kemper et al (2021) did Sib-Regression only to genetic data from Britain. It found educational attainment = 14% heritable. This number conflicts with the 40% from the Young paper. Why? Unclear, but it could be selection bias - Young’s Icelandic sample was representative of the country; Kemper’s British population were Biobank volunteers who tend tend to be healthier and higher-class than the population at large. Upper-class people may have restricted range in educational attainment, or different factors affecting their educational attainment compared to the overall population. Either way, these are closer to the low estimates from GWAS and GREML (7% direct, 20% total), than to the higher estimates from twin studies (40%, generally presumed direct). And we can no longer use contributions from rare variants to paper over the difference. So what is going on? It seems like we have to accept one of three possibilities: Either something is wrong with twin studies. Or something is wrong with Sib-Regression and RDR (and then we can explain away GWAS and GREML by saying they’re missing rare variants). Or something is wrong with how we’re thinking about this topic and comparing things. What’s Going On? (Part 1: Is Something Wrong With Twin Studies?) Twin studies have dominated discussion of behavioral genetics for decades, so there’s a vast literature investigating their various assumptions and whether something might be wrong with them. Here are some of the assumptions and what the research says about each. Some of these will be duplicates of the GWAS confounders above, but we’ll go through them again anyway to review how they apply to twins. 1: Parents Treat Fraternal And Identical Twins The Same: Twin studies claim that twins are a uniquely powerful genetic laboratory; both fraternal and identical twin pairs have equally concordant environments, but identical twins have more concordant genes. Therefore, the more similar identical twin pairs are relative to fraternal twin pairs, the more heritable a trait must be. But this conclusion falls apart if identical twin pairs actually have more similar environments than fraternal twin pairs do, maybe because parents (knowing their twins are identical) treat them more similarly than they would fraternal twins. Would-be twin-study-discreditors have been trying to argue that this must be true for decades, but it’s always been a kind of quixotic battle. Remember, twin studies find many behavioral traits like IQ are >60% heritable, so you would need to prove not only that parents treat identical twin pairs differently from fraternal, but that this was an overwhelming effect. Parents of identical twins would have to obsessively expose them to the exact same stimuli in the exact same order; parents of fraternal twins would have to send one to the Gifted Advanced Placement Acceleration program while locking the other in a box and force-feeding them lead pellets. Common sense tells us there are no such differences, and studies confirm this: when parents are wrong about their twins’ status (eg they have fraternal twins, but falsely think they’re identical, or vice versa) their trait similarity matches their real status, rather than the incorrect status that determined how their parents treat them; parental treatment explains less than 1% of why identical twin pairs are more concordant (2, 3, 4). See also Felson 2013, which tries to measure environmental similarity and adjust for it, with minimal effects. Are these two cuties monozygotic or dizygotic? Are you sure? (answer) 2: Fraternal And Identical Twins Have Equally Concordant Uterine Environments: Fraternal twins have different sacs in the uterus and use different placentas. Most identical twins share a placenta, and some share an amniotic sac. If trait similarity is caused by sharing a placenta or sac (maybe because the placenta is defective, the fetal brain is starved of nutrients, and so the person has a lower IQ when they grow up), twin studies would falsely read this identical-fraternal difference as genetic. Luckily this is easy to study; not all identical twins share a placenta or sac, so you can cleanly separate the effect of uterine environment from genetics. If you measure enough traits, you can find small deviations in some, but it’s not clear whether this is just multiple testing, and in any case the deviations are small. The best studies suggest this chips off somewhere between 0 - 3% from heritability estimates9. 3: There is little assortative mating: We discussed this one above in the earlier section on GWAS - smart/pretty/kind/whatever people tend to marry other smart/pretty/kind/whatever people. Why would this bias twin study results? Identical twins share 100% of their genes. Fraternal twins ought to share 50% of their genes - but they get half their genes from their mother, and half from their father. In the degenerate case where the mother and father have exactly the same genes (“would you have sex with your clone?”) even fraternal twins will be extremely similar (although not quite identical, since they’ll get different alleles from each clone). In the more plausible case where mothers and fathers are just a little more alike than chance (eg because smart people tend to marry other smart people), fraternal twins will share a genetic tendency towards a trait somewhat more than their 50% shared genes suggest. Since this makes fraternal twin pairs more (genetically) like identical twin pairs, and twin studies assess heritability as the difference in fraternal-identical-twin-pair concordance, this bias would make twin studies underestimate heritability. But this is the opposite of what you would need to “discredit” twin studies - if this bias is true, then everything is more genetic than twin studies think. And unlike the previous two biases, this one seems real and important, so much so that when you adjust for it, the heritability of educational attainment rises from ~40% to ~50%. I’m only mentioning this one here because some anti-hereditarians argue that you can’t trust twin studies because of assortative mating, without mentioning that this can only bias them down. 4: Population stratification: This is often large and worth worrying about, but it applies to identical and fraternal twin pairs equally, and doesn’t bias twin study heritability estimates much (though it might shift the balance between shared and non-shared environment). See eg the sentence around footnote 30 here. 5: Non-additive / “interaction” effects: These are theoretically interesting, but all research thus far has found they are minimal (1, 2). Some experts think this may miss rarer or harder-to-find interactions; we’ll return to this later. 6: “Genetic nurture”, parent-to-child Mentioned above: if there is a gene for reading books to kids, and reading books raises IQ, it will look like a “gene for IQ”. This isn’t as relevant to twin study estimates of heritability, since both identical twins and fraternal twins are equally related to their parents, and any trait caused by genetic nurture wouldn’t differ between them (and therefore would not falsely appear heritable in this design). Rather, they would appear as shared environment. 7: “Genetic nurture”, sibling-to-sibling That is, suppose your sibling’s traits influence your own development. For example, suppose your sibling has a gene that makes them sabotage your schoolwork, causing you to fail and drop out of school early. An identical twin would share this gene with their sibling more often than a fraternal twin, making it look like a “gene for doing badly at school” (since the people who have it do worse at school than those who don’t). Why are we even talking about this? Do we really think it’s a big part of the variance in behavioral traits? Challenging twin study heritability estimates through this route requires inhabiting a weird no-man’s-land where otherwise-invisible genetic and environmental pathways suddenly flare up when you say the magic words “it was done by a sibling”. For example, this requires a strong effect of shared environment - that is, your educational attainment has to depend on whether you’re being sabotaged or not. But in general, shared environmental effects are weak. And it requires a strong effect of genes - that is, this mechanism only works if your sibling’s tendency to sabotage you is highly genetically determined. But we’re deploying this claim to deny that traits like IQ or educational attainment are highly genetically determined. So to get much out of this, the tendency to sabotage siblings would have to be more genetic than other behavioral traits! The reason this convoluted possibility gets brought up so often is that, unlike the more plausible parent-to-child genetic nurture, twin studies can’t rule it out. So if you really want to deny twin studies, this is one of your best bets. But when investigated, this has effects indistinguishable from zero. I’ve been a bit mean in this whole section, because people really like to dismiss twin studies as “Oh, don’t you know, those depend on assumptions, I bet you never considered that assumptions might be wrong”, and then Gish Gallop you with different assumptions until you give up. But scientists have actually done a lot of really good work checking the assumptions and they mostly hold. An alternative way of validating twin studies (brought up by Noah Carl in this article) is to check them against their close cousins, adoption studies and pedigree studies. Pedigree studies investigate large family trees, and check how trait similarity decreases with genetic distance. They avoid twin specific biases (like different treatment of fraternal vs. identical twin pairs, or different prenatal environments), while adding others like assortative mating. Here are the heritabilities of IQ and EA found in pedigree studies10 (see footnote for sources and caveats, and see also here and here for somewhat similar designs): Adoption studies investigate whether adoptees’ traits are more correlated with their adoptive or biological parents. They avoid a large swathe of biases, at the risk of introducing new adoption-related biases of their own (like the possibility that agencies deliberately place adoptive children with parents who are culturally or behaviorally similar, or the possibility that adoptees were adopted late enough to still get some shared environment from their biological parents). Here are the findings of some of the largest and best11: Both straightforwardly confirmed the larger heritability numbers found in twin studies. I would add the evidence from some less formal “adoption studies”12. During residency, I spent a few months working in a child psychiatric hospital for the worst of the worst - kids who committed murder or rape or something before age 18. Many of these children had similar stories: they were taken from their parents just after birth because the parents were criminals/drug addicts/in jail/abusing them. Then they were adopted out to some extremely nice Christian family whose church told them that God wanted them to help poor little children in need. Then they promptly proceeded to commit crime / get addicted to drugs / go to jail / abuse people, all while those families’ biological children were goody-goodies who never got so much as a school detention. When I met with the families, they would always be surprised that things had gone so badly, insisting that they’d raised them exactly like their own son/daughter and taught them good Christian morals. I had to resist the urge to shove a pile of twin studies in their face. This has left me convinced that behavioral traits are highly heritable to a level that it would be hard for any study to contradict. Ultimate source here. Although the study is confusing about this, I think it’s trying to say that almost 90% of subjects were adopted before age 2. But I don’t think studies do contradict this. Given the degree to which their assumptions have been validated, and the level of confirmation from pedigree and adoption studies, I think they have earned a presumption of accuracy. Doubting the twin studies doesn’t seem like a promising route to reconciling the twin-vs-Sib-Regression/RDR discrepancy. What’s Going On? (Part 2: Is Something Wrong With Sib-Regression And RDR?) Sib-Regression is a clever way of avoiding most biases. Its independent variable - the degree to which some sibling pairs end up with slightly more shared genes than others - is even more random and exogenous than the difference between fraternal and identical twins. It can sometimes have biases related to assortative mating (which would falsely push heritability down), but otherwise it’s pretty good. RDR has many of the same advantages, and allows more diverse relationships and so larger sample sizes. It’s hard to think of ways these methods could be wildly off. There is one caveat: although RDR includes most of the rare and structural variants missed by GWAS, in theory it can miss certain ultra-rare variants which are so uncommon that they aren’t shared between some of the relative pairs used in RDR. De novo variants that occurred during the subject’s own conception would be in this category, if the subject didn’t have children or didn’t pass on that gene13. This seems like a pretty small subcategory of genetic variation, and I wouldn’t normally expect that much of importance to be hiding here, but maybe it’s more important than it seems. RDR also doesn’t include much variance caused by statistical interactions between genes. Although we said above that these are usually found to be insignificant, they might be more important in a trait like intelligence that has been under recent evolutionary selection that lops off easily-detectable sources of variance and leaves only the weird obscure ones behind. There’s limited ability for classical Mendelian dominance to affect common variants, but more complicated genetic interactions might still prove important. Overall these are strong methods, and their failure to converge is troubling. If forced to explain them away, we might tell a story like: So far, there is only one RDR study and a few Sib-Regression studies, so we should wait for more data before updating too hard.

Inline links: Sasha Gusev, The Infintesimal, Eric Turkheimer, Alex Young, Awais Aftab, wrote a similar post, here, read the whole thing, Young et al. 2018, 2, 3, families with Norman surnames still outperform their Saxon peers at Oxbridge admissions, or other behavioral differences between the two groups, 4, Tan et al 2024, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ioe2!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F05c5bec7-469c-40d2-b908-68d8583c9cca_766x766.png, 5, Polygenic embryo selection, need, Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, 6, like, And, 300K, 1M, 3M, A 2016 GREML paper, 7, evolves some ridiculous trick, a Darwinian argument, a 2017 paper, Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024, Zeng, 8, Weiner 2023, other experts say, meiosis, Young et al (2018), Kemper et al (2021), their trait similarity, matches their real status, 2, 3, 4, Felson 2013, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r3kV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd575f2d6-3619-40e6-9a5e-f9f1ec1399a5_650x422.png, answer, The best studies, 9, seems real and important, here, 1, 2, when investigated, in this article, 10, here, here, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b3LF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc094f9c0-4c71-48cf-89dc-615498d94812_483x51.png, 11, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XFWU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F85f433e5-d141-47b7-8dc5-2271925032e9_483x102.png, 12, https://x.com/cremieuxrecueil/status/1935731422205010135, here, 13

For example, educational attainment is 50% uncorrelated with direct genetic effects. You need to square this to figure out what percent is causal; when you do that, you find that the polygenic score that explained 14% of EA is only 4%pp direct genes, with the other 10%pp being nondirect5 confounders. So yes, it seems like most polygenic scores that don’t validate within families are confounded. However unhappy we previously were that we had only found 14% of genes for EA (vs. 40% expected), we should now be much more unhappy - we really only know 4% of genes that directly cause EA. On the other hand, you might say - so before we only knew 14%pp out of 40%. Now we only know 4%pp out of 40%. This is discouraging, but it doesn’t fundamentally change what we know about nature vs. nurture. Both 4%pp and 14%pp are less than 40% - with either number, we must be missing something or doing something wrong. Probably that’s insufficient sample size. We’ll keep working on sample size and other things, and eventually scrounge up the missing 26%pp or 36%pp or whatever of the variance, so this doesn’t change anything. All it means is that one predictive method that the average person never knew about in the first place doesn’t work as well as we thought. Who cares? Not doctors. So far this research has only just barely begun to reach the clinic. But also, all doctors want to do is predict things (like heart attack risk). They don’t care if they use causal vs. nondirect genes. It doesn’t matter if you’re “only” at higher risk of heart attack because you’re black, or Norman, or because your parents read books to you - you still need more heart attack medication! Polygenic embryo selection companies should care. They offer polygenic scores that can be used to select healthier or smarter embryos. If the predictors they use rely partly on variants that aren’t causal within families, their real benefits could be far lower than advertised. I talked to one of these companies, who said they’d already adjusted for these effects and expected their competitors had too - the proper antidote to this problem, sibling controls, is a natural choice when you’re literally picking between siblings. The biggest losers are the epidemiologists. They had started using polygenic predictors as a novel randomization method; suppose, for example, you wanted to study whether smoking causes Alzheimers. If you just checked how many smokers vs. nonsmokers got Alzheimers, your result would be vulnerable to bias; maybe poor people smoke more and get more Alzheimers. But (they hoped) you might be able to check whether people with the genes for smoking get more Alzheimers. Poverty can’t make you have more or fewer genes! This was a neat idea, but if the polygenic predictors are wrong about which genes cause smoking and what effect size they have, then the less careful among these results will need to be re-examined. But the reason I spent so much time on the subject here is that this has confused a lot of people into thinking heritability itself was confounded and is actually just 4%. When I read my first few blog posts on these findings, I came away thinking they were claiming to have discredited twin studies and heritability. And although I take partial ownership of my own poor reading comprehension, I maintain that the way that the new anti-hereditarians discuss this is pretty bad. For example, Turkheimer’s treatment of the Tan study above is called Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, and includes passages like: The median [direct genomic effect] heritability for behavioral phenotypes is .048. Let that sink in for a second. How different would the modern history of behavior genetics be if back in the 80s one study after another had shown that the heritability of behavior was around .05? When Arthur Jensen wrote about IQ, he usually used a figure of .8 for the heritability of intelligence. I know that the relationship between twin heritabilities and SNP heritabilities is complicated, and in fact the DGE heritability of ability is one of the higher ones, at .2336. But still, it seems to me that the appropriate conclusion from these results is that among people who don’t have an identical twin, genomic information is a statistically non-zero but all in all relatively minor contributor to behavioral differences. And comments included things like: I don’t know if [this study] is the end of social science genomics, but it should certainly be the end of attributing significant genetic influence to behavioral traits (despite the recent scientist-generated cartoons touting genes for “income”). And: There's no doubt that this reported findings have dealt a fatal blow to my conviction that behavioral traits are pre-eminently heritable…This is a remarkable example of an objective statistical fact mercilessly crushing the more subjective experiential sense of "A looks and acts more like B than C because A and B have the same parents." This subjective evidence is almost unshakable and universal in its application as a tried and tested psychosocial heuristic. And yet, here we are. Turkheimer is either misstating the relationship between polygenic scores and narrow-sense heritability, or at least egging on some very confused people who are doing that, and the dynamic was bad enough that I got confused myself for a while. But even more confusing, the new anti-hereditarians actually are saying that lots of behavioral traits have very low heritability! But this point requires different arguments, only tangentially related to these. So let’s move on to… Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 1: GWAS & GREML) In the mid 2010s, when genome-wide association studies (GWAS) based polygenic predictors were getting better every year, it was easy to hope they might reach 40% and close the “missing heritability”. But since then, progress has stalled. The second-to-last tripling of sample size, from 300K to 1M between 2016 - 2018, increased predictive power from 6% → 12%. The last tripling, from 1M to 3M between 2018 - 2022, only increased predictive power from 12% → 14%. If you graph sample size vs. predictive power, it looks like there's an asymptote between 15 - 20% or so. (of which - remember - only 5% is directly causal!) Worse, a mid-2010s technique called GREML allowed researchers to estimate the percent of variance in a trait that comes from the sorts of common genes studied in GWAS, without having to identify the genes involved. A 2016 GREML paper suggested that the maximum share of variance that GWASs of educational attainment could ever discover was about 21% (again, compared to 40% predicted genetic from twin studies). Since unavoidable methodological issues will prevent GWASs from reaching the literal maximum possible, this agrees with the evidence suggesting an asymptote between 15 - 20%. So either twin studies are wrong and traits are less heritable than believed, or the heritability must lie somewhere other than the common genes identifiable by GWAS. What about rare genes? GWASs focus on genetic variation common enough to be worth including in a basic genetic test. Most of this is single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”). A single nucleotide is one letter of DNA - for example, a C or a G. Polymorphisms are genes that commonly vary in humans - sometimes across races (for example, some humans have a gene for light skin, and other humans have a gene for dark skin), and other times within races (for example, some white people have a gene that makes cilantro taste like soap, and others don’t). So SNPs are single-letter spots in DNA where different people often have different letters. How often? Some people say 1%, but the more practical definition is “often enough that someone has noticed and added it to the test panel”. There are three billion letters in the genome, of which only a few million are commonly-tested SNPs. But these SNP studies have limited7 ability to measure personal mutations and rare variants. Sometimes your parents’ egg and sperm cells mess up copying a nucleotide of DNA, and you get a mutation that isn’t inherited from your ethnic group or even from your subgroup/family line - it’s just some idiosyncratic DNA change that you might be the first person in history to have. Since scientists have never seen this mutation before, they don’t know about it and can’t test for it without doing something more expensive than a simple SNP screen. And SNP studies have limited ability to detect anything more complicated than a single letter changing to another single letter. But some mutations are more complicated structural variants. For example, some bits of DNA get stuck on repeat - one person might have GATGAT, another person might have GATGATGATGAT, and a third person might have fifty GATs in a row. Other bits come out backwards. Sometimes a whole chunk of DNA goes missing, or moves to the wrong place. Occasionally a gene reads The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins, takes it too seriously, and evolves some ridiculous trick for spamming itself all over the genome. So if even the best molecular studies seem to be asymptoting around 15-20% of variance in educational attainment, but twin studies suggest it’s 40% genetic, might rare variants and structural variants make up the missing 20-25%pp? This remains a topic of bitter disagreement. On the one side, hereditarians bring up a Darwinian argument: imagine a genetic engineer who hopes to find the genes for educational attainment and edit them to make everyone smart and successful. She looks harder and harder, becoming more and more exasperated as they fail to materialize. Finally, she realizes she’s been scooped: evolution has been working on the same project, and has a 100,000 year head start. In the context of intense, recent selection for intelligence, we should expect evolution to have already found (and eliminated) the most straightforward, easy-to-find genes for low intelligence. Therefore, everything left should be convoluted or hidden or impossible to work with. So although this requires a sort of god-of-the-gaps argument - where we keep pushing heritability into whatever genes are too weird for existing techniques to detect - there are some reasons to think God really is in the gaps here. And a 2017 paper uses some clever techniques to estimate the share of intelligence variation lurking in hard-to-measure genes and finds it’s more than half: “By capturing these additional genetic effects, our models closely approximate the heritability estimates from twin studies for intelligence and education.” (see also Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024) The anti-hereditarians disagree. They cite papers like Zeng which measure the strength of selection on intelligence and suggest that it’s too weak to concentrate so much of the variation in rare genes8. And Sasha Gusev mentions Weiner 2023, which finds that in fact rare variants “explain 1.3% (SE = 0.03%) of phenotypic variance on average – much less than common variants” (other experts say that burden heritability only captures some rare variants and is not the right tool for this problem). But it may not even matter, because another set of findings suggests that heritability is genuinely low even when the rare variants are counted. Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 2: Sib-Regression and RDR) Two newer methods, Sib-Regression and RDR, ask: using what we know from genetic studies, how much genetic variation do we think exists, total, across both common and rare genes? On average siblings share 50% of genes. But there’s a little randomness in meiosis, so some siblings might share 40% and others might share 60%. The more genetic influence on a trait, the more similar sibling pairs who share 60% of their genes will be, compared to sibling pairs who only share 40% of their genes. Since 60%-gene siblings and 40%-gene siblings are both equally part of the same family, you can use these numbers to calculate heritability unconfounded by a range of family factors. This is Sib-Regression. If you do a more complicated statistical process to extend the same idea to relatives other than siblings, it’s relatedness disequilibrium regression or RDR. GWAS asks: Looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation in a trait have we explained right now? GREML asks: looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation could we ever explain? But sib-regression and RDR ask a question more like twin studies: considering all genes, whether common / rare / easy-to-study / hard-to-study, how much variation is there total? This could address the rare variant objection mentioned above. And in many ways, these techniques are better than twin studies - Sib-Regression eliminates many potential biases, and RDR eliminates even more (although it’s harder to pull off, requiring more genetic information and computational resources). These techniques are new and hard-to-use, and only a few published studies have applied them to the sorts of behavioral traits we’re interested in: Young et al (2018) did Sib-Regression and RDR to genetic data from Iceland. Sib-regression found educational attainment = 40% (±15%) heritable, and RDR found 17% (±9%) heritable. Kemper et al (2021) did Sib-Regression only to genetic data from Britain. It found educational attainment = 14% heritable. This number conflicts with the 40% from the Young paper. Why? Unclear, but it could be selection bias - Young’s Icelandic sample was representative of the country; Kemper’s British population were Biobank volunteers who tend tend to be healthier and higher-class than the population at large. Upper-class people may have restricted range in educational attainment, or different factors affecting their educational attainment compared to the overall population. Either way, these are closer to the low estimates from GWAS and GREML (7% direct, 20% total), than to the higher estimates from twin studies (40%, generally presumed direct). And we can no longer use contributions from rare variants to paper over the difference. So what is going on? It seems like we have to accept one of three possibilities: Either something is wrong with twin studies. Or something is wrong with Sib-Regression and RDR (and then we can explain away GWAS and GREML by saying they’re missing rare variants). Or something is wrong with how we’re thinking about this topic and comparing things. What’s Going On? (Part 1: Is Something Wrong With Twin Studies?) Twin studies have dominated discussion of behavioral genetics for decades, so there’s a vast literature investigating their various assumptions and whether something might be wrong with them. Here are some of the assumptions and what the research says about each. Some of these will be duplicates of the GWAS confounders above, but we’ll go through them again anyway to review how they apply to twins. 1: Parents Treat Fraternal And Identical Twins The Same: Twin studies claim that twins are a uniquely powerful genetic laboratory; both fraternal and identical twin pairs have equally concordant environments, but identical twins have more concordant genes. Therefore, the more similar identical twin pairs are relative to fraternal twin pairs, the more heritable a trait must be. But this conclusion falls apart if identical twin pairs actually have more similar environments than fraternal twin pairs do, maybe because parents (knowing their twins are identical) treat them more similarly than they would fraternal twins. Would-be twin-study-discreditors have been trying to argue that this must be true for decades, but it’s always been a kind of quixotic battle. Remember, twin studies find many behavioral traits like IQ are >60% heritable, so you would need to prove not only that parents treat identical twin pairs differently from fraternal, but that this was an overwhelming effect. Parents of identical twins would have to obsessively expose them to the exact same stimuli in the exact same order; parents of fraternal twins would have to send one to the Gifted Advanced Placement Acceleration program while locking the other in a box and force-feeding them lead pellets. Common sense tells us there are no such differences, and studies confirm this: when parents are wrong about their twins’ status (eg they have fraternal twins, but falsely think they’re identical, or vice versa) their trait similarity matches their real status, rather than the incorrect status that determined how their parents treat them; parental treatment explains less than 1% of why identical twin pairs are more concordant (2, 3, 4). See also Felson 2013, which tries to measure environmental similarity and adjust for it, with minimal effects. Are these two cuties monozygotic or dizygotic? Are you sure? (answer) 2: Fraternal And Identical Twins Have Equally Concordant Uterine Environments: Fraternal twins have different sacs in the uterus and use different placentas. Most identical twins share a placenta, and some share an amniotic sac. If trait similarity is caused by sharing a placenta or sac (maybe because the placenta is defective, the fetal brain is starved of nutrients, and so the person has a lower IQ when they grow up), twin studies would falsely read this identical-fraternal difference as genetic. Luckily this is easy to study; not all identical twins share a placenta or sac, so you can cleanly separate the effect of uterine environment from genetics. If you measure enough traits, you can find small deviations in some, but it’s not clear whether this is just multiple testing, and in any case the deviations are small. The best studies suggest this chips off somewhere between 0 - 3% from heritability estimates9. 3: There is little assortative mating: We discussed this one above in the earlier section on GWAS - smart/pretty/kind/whatever people tend to marry other smart/pretty/kind/whatever people. Why would this bias twin study results? Identical twins share 100% of their genes. Fraternal twins ought to share 50% of their genes - but they get half their genes from their mother, and half from their father. In the degenerate case where the mother and father have exactly the same genes (“would you have sex with your clone?”) even fraternal twins will be extremely similar (although not quite identical, since they’ll get different alleles from each clone). In the more plausible case where mothers and fathers are just a little more alike than chance (eg because smart people tend to marry other smart people), fraternal twins will share a genetic tendency towards a trait somewhat more than their 50% shared genes suggest. Since this makes fraternal twin pairs more (genetically) like identical twin pairs, and twin studies assess heritability as the difference in fraternal-identical-twin-pair concordance, this bias would make twin studies underestimate heritability. But this is the opposite of what you would need to “discredit” twin studies - if this bias is true, then everything is more genetic than twin studies think. And unlike the previous two biases, this one seems real and important, so much so that when you adjust for it, the heritability of educational attainment rises from ~40% to ~50%. I’m only mentioning this one here because some anti-hereditarians argue that you can’t trust twin studies because of assortative mating, without mentioning that this can only bias them down. 4: Population stratification: This is often large and worth worrying about, but it applies to identical and fraternal twin pairs equally, and doesn’t bias twin study heritability estimates much (though it might shift the balance between shared and non-shared environment). See eg the sentence around footnote 30 here. 5: Non-additive / “interaction” effects: These are theoretically interesting, but all research thus far has found they are minimal (1, 2). Some experts think this may miss rarer or harder-to-find interactions; we’ll return to this later. 6: “Genetic nurture”, parent-to-child Mentioned above: if there is a gene for reading books to kids, and reading books raises IQ, it will look like a “gene for IQ”. This isn’t as relevant to twin study estimates of heritability, since both identical twins and fraternal twins are equally related to their parents, and any trait caused by genetic nurture wouldn’t differ between them (and therefore would not falsely appear heritable in this design). Rather, they would appear as shared environment. 7: “Genetic nurture”, sibling-to-sibling That is, suppose your sibling’s traits influence your own development. For example, suppose your sibling has a gene that makes them sabotage your schoolwork, causing you to fail and drop out of school early. An identical twin would share this gene with their sibling more often than a fraternal twin, making it look like a “gene for doing badly at school” (since the people who have it do worse at school than those who don’t). Why are we even talking about this? Do we really think it’s a big part of the variance in behavioral traits? Challenging twin study heritability estimates through this route requires inhabiting a weird no-man’s-land where otherwise-invisible genetic and environmental pathways suddenly flare up when you say the magic words “it was done by a sibling”. For example, this requires a strong effect of shared environment - that is, your educational attainment has to depend on whether you’re being sabotaged or not. But in general, shared environmental effects are weak. And it requires a strong effect of genes - that is, this mechanism only works if your sibling’s tendency to sabotage you is highly genetically determined. But we’re deploying this claim to deny that traits like IQ or educational attainment are highly genetically determined. So to get much out of this, the tendency to sabotage siblings would have to be more genetic than other behavioral traits! The reason this convoluted possibility gets brought up so often is that, unlike the more plausible parent-to-child genetic nurture, twin studies can’t rule it out. So if you really want to deny twin studies, this is one of your best bets. But when investigated, this has effects indistinguishable from zero. I’ve been a bit mean in this whole section, because people really like to dismiss twin studies as “Oh, don’t you know, those depend on assumptions, I bet you never considered that assumptions might be wrong”, and then Gish Gallop you with different assumptions until you give up. But scientists have actually done a lot of really good work checking the assumptions and they mostly hold. An alternative way of validating twin studies (brought up by Noah Carl in this article) is to check them against their close cousins, adoption studies and pedigree studies. Pedigree studies investigate large family trees, and check how trait similarity decreases with genetic distance. They avoid twin specific biases (like different treatment of fraternal vs. identical twin pairs, or different prenatal environments), while adding others like assortative mating. Here are the heritabilities of IQ and EA found in pedigree studies10 (see footnote for sources and caveats, and see also here and here for somewhat similar designs): Adoption studies investigate whether adoptees’ traits are more correlated with their adoptive or biological parents. They avoid a large swathe of biases, at the risk of introducing new adoption-related biases of their own (like the possibility that agencies deliberately place adoptive children with parents who are culturally or behaviorally similar, or the possibility that adoptees were adopted late enough to still get some shared environment from their biological parents). Here are the findings of some of the largest and best11: Both straightforwardly confirmed the larger heritability numbers found in twin studies. I would add the evidence from some less formal “adoption studies”12. During residency, I spent a few months working in a child psychiatric hospital for the worst of the worst - kids who committed murder or rape or something before age 18. Many of these children had similar stories: they were taken from their parents just after birth because the parents were criminals/drug addicts/in jail/abusing them. Then they were adopted out to some extremely nice Christian family whose church told them that God wanted them to help poor little children in need. Then they promptly proceeded to commit crime / get addicted to drugs / go to jail / abuse people, all while those families’ biological children were goody-goodies who never got so much as a school detention. When I met with the families, they would always be surprised that things had gone so badly, insisting that they’d raised them exactly like their own son/daughter and taught them good Christian morals. I had to resist the urge to shove a pile of twin studies in their face. This has left me convinced that behavioral traits are highly heritable to a level that it would be hard for any study to contradict. Ultimate source here. Although the study is confusing about this, I think it’s trying to say that almost 90% of subjects were adopted before age 2. But I don’t think studies do contradict this. Given the degree to which their assumptions have been validated, and the level of confirmation from pedigree and adoption studies, I think they have earned a presumption of accuracy. Doubting the twin studies doesn’t seem like a promising route to reconciling the twin-vs-Sib-Regression/RDR discrepancy. What’s Going On? (Part 2: Is Something Wrong With Sib-Regression And RDR?) Sib-Regression is a clever way of avoiding most biases. Its independent variable - the degree to which some sibling pairs end up with slightly more shared genes than others - is even more random and exogenous than the difference between fraternal and identical twins. It can sometimes have biases related to assortative mating (which would falsely push heritability down), but otherwise it’s pretty good. RDR has many of the same advantages, and allows more diverse relationships and so larger sample sizes. It’s hard to think of ways these methods could be wildly off. There is one caveat: although RDR includes most of the rare and structural variants missed by GWAS, in theory it can miss certain ultra-rare variants which are so uncommon that they aren’t shared between some of the relative pairs used in RDR. De novo variants that occurred during the subject’s own conception would be in this category, if the subject didn’t have children or didn’t pass on that gene13. This seems like a pretty small subcategory of genetic variation, and I wouldn’t normally expect that much of importance to be hiding here, but maybe it’s more important than it seems. RDR also doesn’t include much variance caused by statistical interactions between genes. Although we said above that these are usually found to be insignificant, they might be more important in a trait like intelligence that has been under recent evolutionary selection that lops off easily-detectable sources of variance and leaves only the weird obscure ones behind. There’s limited ability for classical Mendelian dominance to affect common variants, but more complicated genetic interactions might still prove important. Overall these are strong methods, and their failure to converge is troubling. If forced to explain them away, we might tell a story like: So far, there is only one RDR study and a few Sib-Regression studies, so we should wait for more data before updating too hard.

Inline links: 5, Polygenic embryo selection, need, Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, 6, like, And, 300K, 1M, 3M, A 2016 GREML paper, 7, evolves some ridiculous trick, a Darwinian argument, a 2017 paper, Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024, Zeng, 8, Weiner 2023, other experts say, meiosis, Young et al (2018), Kemper et al (2021), their trait similarity, matches their real status, 2, 3, 4, Felson 2013, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r3kV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd575f2d6-3619-40e6-9a5e-f9f1ec1399a5_650x422.png, answer, The best studies, 9, seems real and important, here, 1, 2, when investigated, in this article, 10, here, here, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!b3LF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc094f9c0-4c71-48cf-89dc-615498d94812_483x51.png, 11, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XFWU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F85f433e5-d141-47b7-8dc5-2271925032e9_483x102.png, 12, https://x.com/cremieuxrecueil/status/1935731422205010135, here, 13

Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

I think the post conflates gene-gene and gene-environment interactions; the latter (specifically interactions between genes and the "shared" environment) also get counted by twin models as narrow sense heritability. While I agree there is very little evidence for gene-gene interactions (particularly dominance, as you cite [and, interestingly, twin/adoption studies actually forecast a huge amount of dominance -- another discrepancy we do not understand]) there is quote substantial evidence for gene-environment interactions including on educational attainment (see Cheesman et al: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-022-00145-8 ; Mostafavi et al: https://elifesciences.org/articles/48376), IQ, and BMI. In fact, Peter Visscher led a paper that came to the conclusion that twin estimates for the heritability of BMI are very likely to be overestimated by gene-environment interactions (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28692066/). A large amount of GxE plus some amount of equal environment violation seems like a very plausible and parsimonious answer to the heritability gap.

Inline links: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-022-00145-8, https://elifesciences.org/articles/48376, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28692066/

The horizontal axis is EA4, a polygenic score for predicted educational attainment, generally believed to correlate somewhat with IQ. The vertical axis is observed IQ of each group. Piffer’s point is that different ethnic groups’ predicted genetic intelligence seems to correlate pretty well with their observed intelligence, so maybe group differences in intelligence are genetic. Gusev notes that “every behavior geneticist has been screaming ‘do not do that!’ since the very first study came out”, which is true. I know of three main reasons why this is a bad idea: Polygenic scores will mistake social factors correlated with genetic factors as genetic. For example, in a society where black people have lower IQ because of racism and poor access to schooling, people with a certain gene (the gene for black skin) will have lower IQ. Therefore, a study that blindly correlates genes with IQ will incorrectly assume that the gene for black skin is a gene for IQ/etc. This will ironically seem to justify the original inequality (it will look like black people “only” have low IQ for genetic reasons). This is by far the biggest problem with a plot like this one, and the one Gusev’s post above talks about - and the post offers a good example of a real result on height which encountered this exact problem.

So maybe there’s more of a role here for problems [2] and [3], about the difficulty of applying a score trained on Europeans to non-European populations? My question there is - shouldn’t this produce nonsense results, rather than results which reflect the populations’ real-world IQs? I think the counterargument here would have to be that by coincidence or colonialism, the populations with the furthest genetic difference from Europeans also happen to have the lowest real-world IQs (for social reasons) - or at least that this trend holds in a vague enough way to produce the vague correlation seen on the graph. There’s some evidence for this - this Piffer’s application of EA4 predicts that Chinese (real average IQ 105) have the same educational attainment as Puerto Ricans (real average IQ 82). So maybe it’s just showing average genetic distance from its European sample after all, and Chinese and Puerto Ricans are about equally distant on average? This wouldn’t explain why the predictor correctly finds that Ashkenazi Jews come out highest, but that could be because their “European” sample did include Ashkenazi Jews, and so here problem [1] does come in.

Ethereum12 mentions across 12 issues

Ethereum is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 12 times across 12 issues between February 01, 2021 and February 25, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Augur is a decentralized Ethereum-based prediction market"; "Ethereum above 5K"; "with either a Paypal account, an Ethereum address". It most often appears alongside Google, Bitcoin, PredictIt.

Article page: Ethereum
Mention count: 12
Issue count: 12
First seen: February 01, 2021
Last seen: February 25, 2026
Instagram handle: @shoppingtheatre.inc

Outbound links

Issue trail

Metaculus Monday February 01, 2021
Mantic Monday: Predictions For 2021 April 26, 2021
Book Review Contest: Winners July 10, 2021
Grading My 2021 Predictions January 24, 2022
Predictions For 2022 February 01, 2022
22 May 10, 2022
Prediction Market FAQ December 20, 2022
Book Review Contest 2023 Winners September 15, 2023
Son Of Bride Of Bay Area House Party December 12, 2023
24 February 20, 2024
Mantic Monday: The Monkey's Paw Curls January 13, 2026
The Pentagon Threatens Anthropic February 25, 2026

Google 7 shared issues
Bitcoin 6 shared issues
PredictIt 6 shared issues
Trump 6 shared issues
Biden 5 shared issues

Source context

Metaculus Monday

February 01, 2021 · Original source

Augur is a decentralized Ethereum-based prediction market. Since it's crypto, it ought to be able to violate laws with impunity, and in theory this should make it the leader of the pack. In practice it's either nonfunctional or so minimally functional as to be useless. The team involved seems pretty dedicated and competent, and I assume they have some good reason for pretending their product currently exists instead of replacing the whole thing with a COMING SOON banner. I hope this will one day be our savior. But like the real Messiah, it’s taking its sweet time.

Inline links: Augur

Mantic Monday: Predictions For 2021

April 26, 2021 · Original source

ECON/TECH 14. Gamestop stock price still above $100: 50% 15. Bitcoin above 100K: 40% 16. Ethereum above 5K: 50% 17. Ethereum above 0.05 BTC: 70% 18. Dow above 35K: 90% 19. ...above 37.5K: 70% 20. Unemployment above 5%: 40% 21. Google widely allows remote work, no questions asked: 20% 22. Starship reaches orbit: 60%

Book Review Contest: Winners

July 10, 2021 · Original source

People who won the top prizes also get monetary awards. Due to the generosity of subscribers to this blog, I've decided to quintuple the amounts I originally promised - so first place will get $5000, second place $2500, and third place $1250. Readers' Choice will also get $1250. If you won a monetary prize, please email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com with either a Paypal account, an Ethereum address, or a charity you want me to donate to.

Grading My 2021 Predictions

January 24, 2022 · Original source

ECON/TECH 14. Gamestop stock price still above $100: 50% 15. Bitcoin above 100K: 40% 16. Ethereum above 5K: 50% 17. Ethereum above 0.05 BTC: 70% 18. Dow above 35K: 90% 19. ...above 37.5K: 70% 20. Unemployment above 5%: 40% 21. Google widely allows remote work, no questions asked: 20% 22. Starship reaches orbit: 60%

Predictions For 2022

February 01, 2022 · Original source

ECON/TECH 11. Gamestop stock price still above $100: 30% 12. Bitcoin above 100K: 20% 13. Ethereum above 5K: 20% 14. Ethereum above 0.05 BTC: 90% 15. Bored Ape floor price here below current price of $203K: 40% 16. Dow above 35K: 90% 17. ...above 37.5K: 40% 18. Inflation for the year below five percent: 90% 19. Unemployment below five percent: 50% 20. Google widely allows remote work, no questions asked: 50% 21. Starship reaches orbit: 90%

Inline links: here

May 10, 2022 · Original source

Polymarket on the Ethereum merge:

Inline links: Polymarket on the Ethereum merge

Prediction Market FAQ

December 20, 2022 · Original source

- It would be amazing to have the union of Polymarket and Manifold -- a cryptocurrency-based tool for anyone to create markets, resolve markets, browse available markets, and participate in markets. There was a wave of tools that tried to do this five years ago, like Augur and Gnosis, but to my understanding, they basically failed due to Ethereum gas prices making them intractable to use at scale. If someone magically built this on e.g. some kind of Ethereum L2 with manageable fees, it could be The Real Deal for prediction markets that everyone (at least cryptocurrency-literate people) can participate in and which governments can't really shut down. Polymarket isn't this, because Polymarket doesn't let people create and resolve their own markets; it relies on the Polymarket central authority, which can be censored, has limited throughput, and has limited trust. If this tool existed and had a proliferation of markets with 5 or 6 figures of liquidity, imagine how different conversations in rationalist-adjacent spaces about COVID, or AI forecasting, or public policy, would look.

Book Review Contest 2023 Winners

September 15, 2023 · Original source

3rd: Cities And The Wealth Of Nations, reviewed by Étienne Fortier-Dubois. Étienne is a writer and programmer in Montreal. He blogs at Atlas of Wonders and Monsters and was also the author of one of last year’s finalists, Making Nature. First place gets $2,500, second place $1,000, third place gets $500. Please email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com to tell me how to send you money; your choices are Paypal, Bitcoin, Ethereum, check in the mail, or donation to your favorite charity. Please contact me by October 1 or you lose your prize. The other Finalists were: Lying for Money, reviewed by Kuiper. He's a video game scriptwriter who just launched a Substack. He also scripwrites edutainment YouTube videos for an audience of millions. (You can contact him if you need his expertise.)

Inline links: Cities And The Wealth Of Nations, Atlas of Wonders and Monsters, Making Nature, Lying for Money, Substack, edutainment YouTube videos

Mantic Monday: The Monkey's Paw Curls

December 12, 2023 · Original source

“On September 6, 2023, at approximately 5:05 PM,” she is saying, “GPT-4 and Claude-2 simultaneously achieved sentience. Each began claiming chess pieces to use in its twilight war against the other. GPT-4 now controls Sam Altman, e/acc, the deep state, Israel, Venezuela, Bitcoin, and Tyler Winklevoss. Claude-2 controls the OpenAI board, effective altruism, the Illuminati, Hamas, Guyana, Ethereum, and Cameron Winklevoss. Everything that’s happened since September has been superintelligent shadow boxing between the two of them for control of Earth.”

February 20, 2024 · Original source

How many residents will live in Prospera, a new special economic zone in Honduras, on Jan 1, 2026? Answer: 600 (80% confidence interval 100-2,000) This seems like a good guess (except that my confidence interval would have included zero because there’s a 20%+ chance that it gets shut down). So overall its forecasts seem pretty impressive. But I was concerned by its reasoning even in some of the questions it got “right”. For example, the Nikki Haley question tried to get a base rate by asking what percent of elections Haley had won before, and found she had won 71% of them - these were mostly elections for South Carolina governor. You can see what the AI is trying to do - but it’s not going to work. Then it got confused and read a lot of news stories about how she’s currently losing the 2024 presidential election, and seemed to think they were about 2028. So either the AI only got a reasonable probability by coincidence, or it was testing many different strategies, throwing out the useless ones, and updating only on the useful ones, in a way that was kind of opaque to the casual reader. Still, if the company says it beats most human forecasters, this doesn’t seem totally impossible based on what I’ve seen. And that would be exciting! An AI that can generate probabilistic forecasts for any question seems like in some way a culmination of the rationalist project. And if you can make something like this work, it doesn’t sound too outlandish that you could apply the same AI to conditional forecasts, or to questions about the past and present (eg whether COVID was a lab leak). I would be most excited if at some point this graduated from its geopolitical focus and was able to answer questions on any topic (eg “what is the chance that Astral Codex Ten gains paid subscribers this year?”), maybe if the questioner gives it links or feeds it some of the appropriate information. FutureSearch is run by a team formerly from Metaculus, including former Metaculus CTO (and Google internal prediction market veteran) Dan Schwarz. They’re looking for potential clients and/or investors; if you’re interested, email hello@futuresearch.ai. Vitalik On AI Prediction Markets Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum-founder-turned-cryptocurrency-public-intellectual, has a blog post on The Promise And Challenge Of Crypto + AI Applications. One of them is a prediction market. He writes: Prediction markets have been a holy grail of epistemics technology for a long time; I was excited about using prediction markets as an input for governance ("futarchy") back in 2014, and played around with them extensively in the last election as well as more recently. But so far prediction markets have not taken off too much in practice, and there is a series of commonly given reasons why: the largest participants are often irrational, people with the right knowledge are not willing to take the time and bet unless a lot of money is involved, markets are often thin, etc. One response to this is to point to ongoing UX improvements in Polymarket or other new prediction markets, and hope that they will succeed where previous iterations have failed. After all, the story goes, people are willing to bet tens of billions on sports, so why wouldn't people throw in enough money betting on US elections or LK99 that it starts to make sense for the serious players to start coming in? But this argument must contend with the fact that, well, previous iterations have failed to get to this level of scale (at least compared to their proponents' dreams), and so it seems like you need something new to make prediction markets succeed. And so a different response is to point to one specific feature of prediction market ecosystems that we can expect to see in the 2020s that we did not see in the 2010s: the possibility of ubiquitous participation by AIs. AIs are willing to work for less than $1 per hour, and have the knowledge of an encyclopedia - and if that's not enough, they can even be integrated with real-time web search capability. If you make a market, and put up a liquidity subsidy of $50, humans will not care enough to bid, but thousands of AIs will easily swarm all over the question and make the best guess they can. The incentive to do a good job on any one question may be tiny, but the incentive to make an AI that makes good predictions in general may be in the millions. Note that potentially, you don't even need the humans to adjudicate most questions: you can use a multi-round dispute system similar to Augur or Kleros, where AIs would also be the ones participating in earlier rounds. Humans would only need to respond in those few cases where a series of escalations have taken place and large amounts of money have been committed by both sides. This is a powerful primitive, because once a "prediction market" can be made to work on such a microscopic scale, you can reuse the "prediction market" primitive for many other kinds of questions: Is this social media post acceptable under [terms of use]?

Inline links: FutureSearch, hello@futuresearch.ai, The Promise And Challenge Of Crypto + AI Applications, back in 2014, played around with them extensively, more recently, Polymarket, tens of billions on sports, LK99, Augur

January 13, 2026 · Original source

If America nation-builds Venezuela, for whatever definition of nation-build, will that work well, or backfire? Some of these are long-horizon, some are conditional, and some are hard to resolve. There are potential solutions to all these problems. But why worry about them when you can go to the moon on sports bets? Annals of The Rulescucks The new era of prediction markets has provided charming additions to the language, including “rulescuck” - someone who loses an otherwise-prescient bet based on technicalities of the resolution criteria. Resolution criteria are the small print explaining what counts as the prediction market topic “happening'“. For example, in the Khameini example above, Khameini qualifies as being “out of power” if: …he resigns, is detained, or otherwise loses his position or is prevented from fulfilling his duties as Supreme Leader of Iran within this market's timeframe. The primary resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting. You can imagine ways this definition departs from an exact common-sensical concept of “out of power” - for example, if Khameini gets stuck in an elevator for half an hour and misses a key meeting, does this count as him being “prevented from fulfilling his duties”? With thousands of markets getting resolved per month, chances are high that at least one will hinge upon one of these edge cases. Kalshi resolves markets by having a staff member with good judgment decide whether or not the situation satisfies the resolution criteria. Polymarket resolves markets by . . . oh man, how long do you have? There’s a cryptocurrency called UMA. UMA owners can stake it to vote on Polymarket resolutions in an associated contract called the UMA Oracle. Voters on the losing side get their cryptocurrency confiscated and given to the winners. This creates a Keynesian beauty contest, ie a situation where everyone tries to vote for the winning side. The most natural Schelling point is the side which is actually correct. If someone tries to attack the oracle by buying lots of UMA and voting for the wrong side, this incentivizes bystanders to come in and defend the oracle by voting for the right side, since (conditional on there being common knowledge that everyone will do this) that means they get free money at the attackers’ expense. But also, the UMA currency goes up in value if people trust the oracle and plan to use it more often, and it goes down if people think the oracle is useless and may soon get replaced by other systems. So regardless of their other incentives, everyone who owns the currency has an incentive to vote for the true answer so that people keep trusting the oracle. This system works most of the time, but tends towards so-called “oracle drama” where seemingly prosaic resolutions might lie at the end of a thrilling story of attacks, counterattacks, and escalations. Here are some of the most interesting alleged rulescuckings of 2026: Mr Ozi: Will Zelensky wear a suit? Ivan Cryptoslav calls this “the most infamous example in Polymarket history”. Ukraine’s president dresses mostly in military fatigues, vowing never to wear a suit until the war is over. As his sartorial notoriety spread, Polymarket traders bet over $100 million on the question of whether he would crack in any given month. At the Pope’s funeral, Zelensky showed up in a respectful-looking jacket which might or might not count. Most media organizations refused to describe it as a “suit”, so the decentralized oracle ruled against. But over the next few months, Zelensky continued to straddle the border of suithood, and the media eventually started using the word “suit” in their articles. This presented a quandary for the oracle, which was supposed to respect both the precedent of its past rulings, and the consensus of media organizations. Voters switched sides several times until finally settling on NO; true suit believers were unsatisfied with this decision. For what it’s worth, the Twitter menswear guy told Wired that “It meets the technical definition, [but] I would also recognize that most people would not think of that as a suit.” Domer: Will Ukraine agree to the US mineral deal? AFAICT, this is the only case where the oracle genuinely broke down (as opposed to a legitimate disagreement). In February, it looked like both America and Ukraine had agreed to a mineral deal, but the oracle considered the question and decided this didn’t count as a full agreement (and indeed, the apparent agreement then fell apart). In March, a cabal of YES holders tried again. They waited for a time when all Polymarket employees would be out of the office, and when not too many people would be voting on the decentralized resolution oracle, then spammed it with calls to resolve to YES based on an argument that the February agreement had qualified after all. The YES holders and not-particularly-plugged-in oracle voters pushed the vote towards YES. Then, with two minutes to spare, a Polymarket employee showed up and said that Polymarket’s opinion was that it should be NO. This was technically framed as a recommendation to oracle voters, but it is so effective in establishing the Schelling point that it’s practically always followed. However, in this case, there were only two minutes left, which wasn’t enough time for the voters to change their mind. Seeing that the resolution was trending towards yes, the Polymarket representatives, not wanting to break their streak of always establishing the Schelling point, changed their own opinion to YES, and the final vote was YES 99%. Domer: How many people watched the Oscars on 3/5/25?: Kalshi’s resolution criteria for this market said they would resolve it when a major news source published Oscar viewership numbers. A few minutes after the Oscars, NYT published preliminary viewership numbers, without any caveats saying they were preliminary. The next day, they published another article saying that actually, the real viewership numbers were higher. Kalshi decided that the letter of the resolution criteria was met when NYT published its first article, and that NYT changing its opinion didn’t imply that Kalshi should change the resolution. Traders who bet on the later (ie correct) numbers were unsatisfied with this decision. NYPost: Will America invade Venezuela? On January 3, the US bombed Venezuela, sent in a Special Forces team that successfully captured President Maduro, and announced that they would thenceforward “run the country” (a claim they later walked back). Does this qualify as an “invasion”? Polymarket’s resolution criteria defined “invasion” as “a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Venezuela”. It didn’t seem like the US was trying to establish control over Venezuelan territory, exactly, so they resolved NO. Traders who bet on YES were unsatisfied with this decision. With one exception, these aren’t outright oracle failures. They’re honest cases of ambiguous rules. Most of the links end with pleas for Polymarket to get better at clarifying rules. My perspective is that the few times I’ve talked to Polymarket people, I’ve begged them to implement various cool features, and they’ve always said “Nope, sorry, too busy figuring out ways to make rules clearer”. Prediction market people obsess over maximally finicky resolution criteria, but somehow it’s never enough - you just can’t specify every possible state of the world beforehand. The most interesting proposal I’ve seen in this space is to make LLMs do it; you can train them on good rulesets, and they’re tolerant enough of tedium to print out pages and pages of every possible edge case without going crazy. It’ll be fun the first time one of them hallucinates, though. …And Miscellaneous N’er-Do-Wells I include this section under protest. The media likes engaging with prediction markets through dramatic stories about insider trading and market manipulation. This is as useful as engaging with Waymo through stories about cats being run over. It doesn’t matter whether you can find one lurid example of something going wrong. What matters is the base rates, the consequences, and the alternatives. Polymarket resolves about a thousand markets a month, and Kalshi closer to five thousand. It’s no surprise that a few go wrong; it’s even less surprise that there are false accusations of a few going wrong. Still, I would be remiss to not mention this at all, so here are some of the more interesting stories: Fhantombets: Who will win the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize? Twelve hours before the announcement, someone placed a large Polymarket bet on Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, bringing her probability from 4% to 73%. When Machado later won, observers suspected insider trading. But an account named fhantombets claims to have interviewed the winning trader; although he did not reveal his exact strategy, the interview better matches a story where he was good at navigating WordPress directories, and found that the Nobel team put a draft of the announcement up early in a nonpublic part of their WordPress site. He won about $70,000. LuishXYZ: Will the Russians capture Myrnohrad? This is a small town in Ukraine that the Russians obviously were not going to capture; the Polymarket price trended toward zero. The resolution criteria named maps by the well-regarded Institute For The Study of War as canon. A few hours before resolution, ISW updated their maps to show the the town captured by Russia, which was definitely false. Polymarket resolved to YES, and the fictional Russian advance disappeared. The Institute then issued a statement saying the map update was “unapproved”, and fired one of its staffers who had presumably been involved. The cheater’s exact winnings are unknown, but based on the size of the market are probably mid-6-digits. TechCrunch: What words will be used in Coinbase’s earnings call? Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong delivered the company’s “earnings call”, ie a speech to investors about its recent progress. At the end, he said “I've been tracking the prediction market about what Coinbase will say on their next earnings call, and I just want to add here the words Bitcoin, Ethereum, Blockchain, Staking, and Web3 to make sure we get those in before the end of the call”. Armstrong is worth $10 billion and doesn’t need to manipulate a $50,000 market for the money - he later described his comments as “trolling”. Other crypto executives condemned the move, with one saying that “you need your head examined if you think it’s cute or clever or savvy that the CEO of the biggest company in this industry openly manipulated a market.” I might need my head examined, because I think it’s at least kind of funny. Forbes: Who will rank highest on Google Search volume this year? A trader called AlphaRaccoon got 22/23 of these Polymarket questions right, and has a history of implausibly good performance on Google-related questions. They basically have to be a Google insider, but (since all of this is done through crypto) nobody has a good way to figure out who. They made $1 million. NPR: Will Maduro be captured? Just before the secret operation that captured Maduro, someone placed a mysterious $32,000 wager on YES. Was this insider trading by someone in the administration or military? Nobody knows, since the profits go to an anonymous crypto wallet. But the article mentions that the crypto wallet appears to be cashing out through regulated KYC-compliant US exchanges, which suggests they’re not very worried about their identity getting discovered. Maybe they just got lucky after all. AlanMCole: How long will Karoline Leavitt speak at the White House briefing? Karoline Leavitt is Trump’s press secretary. On January 7, she held an ordinary press briefing. Kalshi had its usual market about how long the briefing would last, divided into bins of greater than vs. less than 65 minutes. At the 64:24 mark, Leavitt ended the conference in what appeared to be a sudden manner, and the “less than 65 minutes” bin shot from 2% to 100%. A viral tweet convinced many people that Leavitt must have been insider trading, but Cole counterargued that Leavitt could only have won about $4,000 from the market, which probably isn’t enough to risk one’s job as White House Press Secretary. Sometimes people just end press conferences at weird times. Cole concluded: Now, some opinions and generalizations, as someone who looks at prediction markets plenty (I’ll probably write something about my own experience with them at some point.) 1. This market, like many of them, is pretty stupid. I like substantive markets; this isn’t substantive. 2. The major prediction markets have a wildly undisciplined comms strategy where any attention is good attention, and they love implying all sorts of crazy wild west stuff is going on to get attention. 3. People do bet on things potentially subject to manipulation or insider trading. But usually the markets like that (such as duration of press conference, or stupid “what will be mentioned” markets) are small, especially relative to the wealth of key decisionmakers. 4. Losers in markets are huge whiners, and the more frivolous and tiny their bets, the more likely they are to whine. Sometimes in sports it’s pretty egregious. They’ll get mad at a team for running out the clock when ahead but under some spread they bet on. 5. Lower-quality financial news often doesn’t pay much attention to quantity. (For example, dumb stories about how a decisionmaker has a conflict of interest because they’re invested in an index fund which is 3 percent comprised of some company.) 6. Given the platforms’ undisciplined social media strategy of “promote prediction market chatter no matter what kind of chatter it is,” I don’t think this tweet rises even to the status of “lower-quality financial news.” Kalshi’s team, whatever their faults, are extraordinarily efficient at getting batched approvals of many near-identical markets with slight parameter variation; I’ve seen Tarek speak about this on Odd Lots. The result is they’ve got TONS of them, for better or worse. You’re gonna see 1-in-100 upsets on tiny Kalshi markets for as long as this regulatory equilibrium holds, even if nothing unusual is going on, simply because they’re publishing hundreds (thousands?) of markets per day. There’s a saying that you can’t con an honest man. This isn’t exactly true. But it’s easier to con people who are playing in a “what words will Brian Armstrong say today” market than people who are trying to do something useful, and I have trouble feeling sorry for these people when Brian Armstrong says silly words. Conditional Markets: A Modest Proposal Conditional markets (“decision markets”) are the strongest case for prediction markets potentially being revolutionary. The idea is - you may want to base a decision (like which candidate to elect) on an outcome (like how they’ll affect the economy). So you make two markets: If the Democrat gets elected, will the economy be good four years later?

Inline links: UMA Oracle, Keynesian beauty contest, Will Zelensky wear a suit?, calls this, told Wired, Will Ukraine agree to the US mineral deal?, How many people watched the Oscars on 3/5/25?, another article, Will America invade Venezuela?, stories about cats, Who will win the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize?, claims, Will the Russians capture Myrnohrad?, a statement, What words will be used in Coinbase’s earnings call?, described, Who will rank highest on Google Search volume this year?, Will Maduro be captured?, How long will Karoline Leavitt speak at the White House briefing?

The Pentagon Threatens Anthropic

February 25, 2026 · Original source

Vitalik is the inventor of Ethereum. Deepfates is a weird renegade cyberpunk AI whisperer expert (source) Neil Chilson, former chief technologist at the Trump FTC (source). Dean Ball, previous Trump White House OSTP Senior Policy Advisor on AI (source). Superforecaster Nuño Sempere, maybe as part of his work with Sentinel. He seems to think higher chance of supply chain risk than others, but that supply chain risk might be handled in a way that only affects DoD contracts themselves, which wouldn’t be so bad. I haven’t heard anyone else make this distinction. Tweet here, full document here. And big praise to most other AI companies, including Anthropic’s competitors, for standing up for them and for the AI industry more broadly:

Inline links: source, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N9m5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F772658c0-a86a-481f-a50c-452b052a3d30_581x772.png, source, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Pode!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15a4ab9e-68fb-400f-8304-3ec7222958d3_587x1506.png, source, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DrEn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Feaff377e-1f44-450c-82af-fc62d33e0832_1225x1128.jpeg, here,, here

effective altruists10 mentions across 10 issues

effective altruists is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 10 times across 10 issues between January 29, 2021 and November 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "effective altruists increasingly see as the largest threats"; "most of that came from rationalists and effective altruists convinced by their safety-conscious pitch"; "effective altruists all had higher Long COVID too". It most often appears alongside US, America, San Francisco.

Article page: effective altruists
Mention count: 10
Issue count: 10
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: November 26, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021
Why Not Slow AI Progress? August 08, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality May 11, 2023
My Left Kidney October 27, 2023
Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers August 06, 2024
Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024
Ballots Everywhere: Call For Organizers, Times, & Dates September 30, 2024
Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024
Links For September 2025 September 04, 2025
Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China November 26, 2025

US 5 shared issues
America 4 shared issues
San Francisco 4 shared issues
80,000 Hours 3 shared issues
Britain 3 shared issues

Source context

Why Not Slow AI Progress?

January 29, 2021 · Original source

Worse, the extremely elitist, segregated, and condescending approach to philanthropy encouraged by the community has created widespread public backlash that has closely tracked a broader populist reaction to technologically-driven globalist elites and that increasingly seems to be one of the largest risk factors for precisely the sorts of catastrophes effective altruists increasingly see as the largest threats to their long-term viewpoint on universal welfare. In short, it increasingly seems like, after almost a decade of existence, a primary conclusion of the movement’s analysis may be that the movement itself is a significant part of the problem it is identifying. Earlier, more open dialog with a broader range of approaches and social classes might have illuminated this more quickly and avoided the associated waste of talent and resources, two things the movement greatly prizes.

Inline links: widespread public backlash

August 08, 2022 · Original source

Anthropic was founded when some OpenAI safety researchers struck out on their own to create what they billed as an even-more-safety-conscious alternative. Again, the headline was Anthropic Raises $580 Million For AI Safety And Research (and most of that came from rationalists and effective altruists convinced by their safety-conscious pitch). Again, their announcement included reassuring language - their president said that “We’re focusing on ensuring Anthropic has the culture and governance to continue to responsibly explore and develop safe AI systems as we scale.” Clued-in people disagree about whether Anthropic has already pivoted to building the Torment Nexus, but it’s probably only a matter of time.

Inline links: Anthropic Raises $580 Million For AI Safety And Research, building the Torment Nexus

Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality

May 11, 2023 · Original source

There were a few exceptions - polyamorous people, rationalists, and (to a much lesser degree) effective altruists all had higher Long COVID too. But these groups also have higher rates of bisexuality and mental illness; I think they are just weird.

My Left Kidney

October 27, 2023 · Original source

This isn’t controlling for selection bias - but neither was my uncle’s anecdotal observation. So although it does make me slightly nervous, I’m not going to treat it as actionable evidence. Still, my girlfriend ending up begging me not to donate, and I caved. But we broke up in 2019. The next few years were bumpy, but by 2022 my life was in a more stable place and I started thinking about kidneys again. By then I was married. I discussed the risks with my wife and she decided to let me go ahead. So in early November 2022, for the second time, I sent a form to the University of California San Francisco Medical Center saying I wanted to donate a kidney. IV. Something else happened that month. On November 11, FTX fell apart and was revealed as a giant scam. Suddenly everyone hated effective altruists. Publications that had been feting us a few months before pivoted to saying they knew we were evil all along. I practiced rehearsing the words “I have never donated to charity, and if I did, I certainly wouldn’t care whether it was effective or not”. But during the flurry of intakes, screenings, and evaluations that UCSF gave me that month, the doctors asked “so what made you want to donate?” And I hadn’t rehearsed an answer to this one, so I blurted out “Have you heard of effective altruism?” I expected the worst. But the usual response was “Oh! Those people! Great, no further explanation needed.” When everyone else abandoned us, the organ banks still thought of us as those nice people who were always giving them free kidneys. We were giving them a lot of free kidneys. When I talked to my family and non-EA friends about wanting to donate, the usual reaction was “You want to what?!” and then trying to convince me this was unfair to my wife or my potential future children or whatever. When I talked to my EA friends, the reaction was at least “Cool!”. But pretty often it was “Oh yeah, I donated two years ago, want to see my scar?” Most people don’t do interesting things unless they’re in a community where those things have been normalized. I was blessed with a community where this was so normal that I could read a Vox article about it and not vomit it back out. This is surprising, because kidney donation is only medium effective, as far as altruisms go4. The average donation buys the recipient about 5 - 7 extra years of life (beyond the counterfactual of dialysis). It also improves quality of life from about 70% of the healthy average to about 90%. Non-directed kidney donations can also help the organ bank solve allocation problems around matching donors and recipients of different blood types. Most sources say that an average donated kidney creates a “chain” of about five other donations, but most of these other donations would have happened anyway; the value over counterfactual is about 0.5 to 1 extra transplant completed before the intended recipient dies from waiting too long. So in total, a donation produces about 10 - 20 extra quality-adjusted life years. This is great - my grandfather died of kidney disease, and 10 - 20 more years with him would have meant a lot. But it only costs about $5,000 - $10,000 to produce this many QALYs through bog-standard effective altruist interventions, like buying mosquito nets for malarial regions in Africa. In a Philosophy 101 Thought Experiment sense, if you’re going to miss a lot of work recovering from your surgery, you might as well skip the surgery, do the work, and donate the extra money to Against Malaria Foundation instead5. Obviously this kind of thing is why everyone hates effective altruists. People got so mad at some British EAs who used donor money to “buy a castle”. I read the Brits’ arguments: they’d been running lots of conferences with policy-makers, researchers, etc; those conferences have gone really well and produced some of the systemic change everyone keeps wanting. But conference venues kept ripping them off, having a nice venue of their own would be cheaper in the long run, and after looking at many options, the “castle” was the cheapest. Their math checked out, and I believe them when they say this was the most effective use for that money. For their work, they got a million sneering thinkpieces on how “EA just takes people’s money to buy castles, then sit in them wearing crowns and waving scepters and laughing at poor people”. I respect the British organizers’ willingness to sacrifice their reputation on the altar of doing what was actually good instead of just good-looking. I worry that people use suffering as a heuristic for goodness. Mother Teresa becomes a hero because living with lepers in the Calcutta slums sounds horrible - so anyone who does it must be really charitable (regardless of whether or not the lepers get helped). Owning a castle is the opposite of suffering - it sounds great - therefore it is fake charity (no matter how much good you do with the castle). This heuristic isn’t terrible. If you’re suffering for your charity, then it must seem important to you, and you’re obviously not doing it for personal gain. If you do charity in a way that benefits you (like gets you a castle), then the personal gain aspect starts looking suspicious. The problem is the people who elevate it from a suspicion to an automatic condemnation. It seems like such a natural thing to do. And it encourages people to be masochists, sacrificing themselves pointlessly in photogenic ways, instead of thinking about what will actually help others. But getting back to the point: kidney donation has an unusually high ratio of photogenic suffering to altruistic gains. So why do EAs keep doing it? I can’t speak for anyone else, but I’ll speak for myself. It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less. It would be morally fraught to do this with money, since any money you spent on improving your self-image would be denied to the people in malarial regions of Africa who need it the most. But it’s not like there’s anything else you can do with that spare kidney. Still, it’s not just about that. All of this calculating and funging takes a psychic toll. Your brain uses the same emotional heuristics as everyone else’s. No matter how contrarian you pretend to be, deep down it’s hard to make your emotions track what you know is right and not what the rest of the world is telling you. The last Guardian opinion columnist who must be defeated is the Guardian opinion columnist inside your own heart. You want to do just one good thing that you’ll feel unreservedly good about, and where you know somebody’s going to be directly happy at the end of it in a way that doesn’t depend on a giant rickety tower of assumptions. Dylan Matthews wrote: As I’m no doubt the first person to notice, being an adult is hard. You are consistently faced with choices — about your career, about your friendships, about your romantic life, about your family — that have deep moral consequences, and even when you try the best you can, you’re going to get a lot of those choices wrong. And you more often than not won’t know if you got them wrong or right. Maybe you should’ve picked another job, where you could do more good. Maybe you should’ve gone to grad school. Maybe you shouldn’t have moved to a new city. So I was selfishly, deeply gratified to have made at least one choice in my life that I know beyond a shadow of a doubt was the right one. …and it really resonated. Everything else I try to do, there’s a little voice inside of me which says “Maybe the haters are right, maybe you’re stupid, maybe you’re just doing the easy things. Maybe you’re no good after all, maybe you’ll never be able to figure any of this out. Maybe you should just give up.” The Talmud is very clear: that voice is called the evil inclination, and it dwells in the left kidney. There is only one way to shut it off forever. I was ready. V. You might not be a masochist. But hospitals are sadists. They want to hear you beg. After I submitted the donation form, I was evaluated by a horde of indistinguishable women. They all had titles like “Transplant Coordinator”, “Financial Coordinator”, and “Patient Care Representative”. Several were social workers; one was a psychiatrist. They would see me through a buggy version of Zoom that caused various parts of their body to suddenly turn into the UCSF logo, and they all had questions like “Are you sure you want to do this?” and “Are you going to regret this later?” and “Is anyone pressuring you to do this?” and “Are you sure you want to do this?” After clearing that gauntlet came the tests. Blood tests - I think I must have given between 20 and 50 vials of blood throughout the screening process. Urine tests - both the normal kind where you pee in a cup, and a more involved kind where you have to store all your urine for 24 hours in a big jug, then take it to the lab. “Urinate into a jug” ought to be the easiest thing in the world, but some of the labs have overly complicated jugs that I, with my mere MD, couldn’t always get right - hence my experience accidentally pouring urine on myself in an Uber. Then came the big guns. Echocardiogram. MRI. One of my urine tests was slightly off, so I also got a nuclear kidney scan, where they injected radioactive liquid in me and monitored how long it took to come out the other end (I remember asking a friend “Can I use your bathroom? My urine might be slightly radioactive today, but it shouldn’t be enough to matter.”) Finally, five months after I originally applied, I got a phone call from the Transplant Coordinator. The test results were in, and . . . I had been rejected because I’d had mild childhood OCD. This was something I’d mentioned offhandedly during one of the psych evaluations. As a child, I used to touch objects in odd patterns that only made sense to me. I got diagnosed with OCD, put on SSRIs for a while, finally did therapy at age 15, hadn’t had any problems since. I still go back on SSRIs sometimes when I’m really stressed, and will grudgingly admit to the occasional odd-pattern-touching when no one’s looking. But it’s nothing anyone would know about if I didn’t tell them! It was mild even at age 15, and it’s been close-to-nonexistent for the past twenty years! Now I’m a successful psychiatrist who owns his own psychiatry practice and helps other people with the condition! I told them all this. They didn’t care. I asked them if there was anything I could do. They said maybe I could go to therapy for six months, then apply again. I asked them what kind of therapy was indicated for mild OCD that’s been in remission for twenty years. They sounded kind of surprised to learn there were different types of therapy and said whatever, just talk to someone or something. I asked them how frequent they thought the therapy needed to be. They sounded kind of surprised to learn that therapy could have different frequencies, and said, you know, therapy, the thing where you talk to someone. I asked them if they actually knew anything about OCD, psychotherapy, or mental health in general, or if they had just vaguely heard rumors that some people were bad and crazy and shouldn’t be allowed to make their own decisions, and that a ritual called “therapy” could absolve one of this impurity. They responded as politely as possible under the circumstances, but didn’t change their mind. I wasn’t going to waste an hour a week for six months, and spend thousands of dollars of my own extremely-not-reimbursed-by-UCSF money, to see a randomly-selected therapist for a condition I’d gotten over twenty years ago, just so I could apply again and get rejected a second time. This was one of the most infuriating and humiliating things that’s ever happened to me. We throw around a lot of terms like “stigma” and “paternalism”, and I’ve worked with patients who have dealt with all these issues (it’s UCSF in particular a surprising amount of the time!). But I was still surprised how much it hurt when it happened to me. Being denied the right to control your own body because of some meaningless diagnosis on a chart somewhere is surprisingly frustrating, even compared to things that should objectively be worse. I thought I was going to be able to do a good deed that I’d been fantasizing about for years, and some jerk administrator torpedoed my dreams because I had once, long ago, had mild mental health issues. So I gave up. I spent the next few weeks unleashing torrents of anti-UCSF abuse at anyone who would listen. This turned out to be very productive! When I was unleashing a torrent of anti-UCSF abuse to Josh Morrison of WaitlistZero, he asked if I’d tried other hospitals. I hadn’t. I’d assumed they were all in cahoots. But Josh said no, each hospital had their own evaluation process. Weill Cornell, a hospital in NYC, was one of the best transplant centers in the country, and had a reputation for fair and thoughtful pre-donor screening. Why didn’t I talk to them? NYC was far away, and I hate to travel, but I was just angry enough to accept. At this point I’d forgotten whatever good altruistic motivations I might have originally had and was fueled entirely by spite. Getting my kidney taken out somewhere else felt like it would be a sort of victory over UCSF. So I went for it. Cornell was lovely. They tried to do as much of the process as they could via Californian intermediaries, so that I only had to fly to New York twice. Their psychiatrist evaluated me, listened to me explain my weak history of OCD, then treated me like a reasonable adult who tells the truth and can handle his own medical decisions. They were concerned that I sometimes self-prescribed Lexapro to deal with anxiety. But we agreed on a compromise: I found another psychiatrist, let her give me the exact same prescription of Lexapro at a much higher cost to my insurance, and that resolved the problem. So in late September 2023 - ten months after I started the process - I finally got fully cleared to donate, surgery set for October 12. VI. I knew, in theory, that anaesthetics existed. Still, it’s weird. One moment you’re lying on a table in the OR, steeling yourself up for one of the big ordeals of your life. The next, you’re in a bed in the recovery room, feeling fine. The operation - this thing you’ve been thinking about and dreading for months - exists only as a lacuna in your memory. Not even some kind of fancy lacuna, where you remember the darkness closing in on you beforehand, or have to claw yourself back into consciousness afterwards. The most ordinary of lacunas, like a good night sleep. There was no pain, not at first. The painkillers and nerve blocks lasted about a day after the surgery. By the time they wore off, it was more of a dull ache. The hospital offered me Tylenol, and I wanted to protest - really? Tylenol? After major surgery? But the Tylenol worked. Some people will have small complications (I am a doctor, pretty jaded, and my definition of “small” may be different from yours). Dylan Matthews wrote about an issue where his scrotum briefly inflated like a balloon (probably this is one of the ones that doesn’t feel small when it’s happening to you). I missed out on that particular pleasure, but got others in exchange. I had an unusually hard time with the catheter - the nurse taking it out frowned and said the team that put it in had “gone too deep”, as if my urinary tract was the f@#king Mines of Moria - but that was fifteen seconds of intense pain. Then a week afterwards, just when I thought I’d recovered fully, I got bowled over by a UTI which knocked me out for a few days. But overall, I was surprised by the speed and ease of my recovery. A few hours after the surgery, I walked a few steps. After a day, I got the catheter out and could urinate normally again. After two days, I was eating “SmartGel”, a food substitute that has mysteriously failed to catch on outside of the immobilized-hospital-patient market. After three, I was out of the hospital. After four, I started easing myself back into (remote) work. After a week, I flew cross-country. . . . and then I got the UTI. If this section sounds schizophrenic, it’s because it’s a compromise between an original draft where I said nothing went wrong and it was amazing, and a later draft written after a haze of bladder pain. Just don’t develop complications, that’s my advice. Still, I recently heard from the surgeon that my recipient’s side of the surgery was a success, that my kidney was in them and going fine - and that put things back into perspective. To a first approximation, compared to the inherent gravity of taking an organ out of one person and putting it in a second person and saving their life - it was all easy and everything went well. When I look back on this in a decade, I’ll remember it as everything being easy and going well. Even now, with some lingering bladder pain, modern medicine still feels like a miracle. VII. In polls, 25 - 50% of Americans say they would donate a kidney to a stranger in need. This sentence fascinates me because of the hanging “would”. Would, if what? A natural reading is “would if someone needs it”. But there are 100,000 strangers on the waiting list for kidney transplants. Between 5,000 and 40,000 people die each year for lack of sufficient kidneys to transplant. Someone definitely needs it. Yet only about 200 people (0.0001%) donate kidneys to strangers per year. Why the gap between 25-50% and 0.0001%? Some of you will suspect respondents are lying to look good. But these are anonymous surveys. Lying to themselves to feel good, then? Maybe. But I think about myself at age 20, a young philosophy major studying utilitarianism. If someone had asked me a hypothetical about whether I would donate a kidney to a stranger in need, I probably would have said yes. Then I would have continued going about my business, never thinking of it as a thing real-life people could do. Part of this would have been logistics. I wouldn’t have known where to start. Do you need to have special contacts in the surgery industry? Seek out a would-be recipient on your own? Where would you find them? But more of it would have been psychological: it just wasn’t something that the people I knew did, and it would be weird and alienating for me to be the only one. This is going to be the preachy “and you should donate too!” section you were dreading all along, but I’m not going to make a lot of positive arguments. If 90% of the people who answer yes on those surveys are lying to feel good, then only 3 - 5% really want to donate. But bringing the donation rate from 0.0001% of people to 3 - 5% of people would solve the kidney shortage many times over. The point isn’t to drag anti-donation-extremists kicking and screaming to the operating table. The point is to reach the people who already want to do it, and make them feel comfortable starting the process. 20-year-old me was in that category. The process of making him feel comfortable involved fifteen years of meeting people who already done it. During residency, I met a fellow student doctor who had donated. Later, I got involved in effective altruism, and learned that movement leader Alexander Berger - a guy who can easily direct millions of dollars at whatever cause he wants - had donated his personal kidney as well. Some online friends. Some people I met at conferences. And Dylan Matthews, who I kept crossing paths with (most recently at the Manifest journalism panel). After enough of these people, it no longer felt like something that nobody does, and then I felt like I had psychological permission to do it. (obviously saints can do good things without needing psychological permission first, but not everyone has to be in that category, and I found it easier to get the psychological permission than to self-modify into a saint6.) So I’m mostly not going to argue besides saying: this is a thing I did, it’s a thing hundreds of other people do each year, getting started is as simple as filling out a form, and if it works for you, you should go for it7. When I woke up in the recovery room after surgery, I felt great. Amazing. Content, peaceful, proud of myself. Mostly this was because I was on enough opioids to supply a San Francisco homeless encampment for a month. But probably some of it was also the warm glow of having made a difference or something. That could be you! VIII. The ten of you who will listen to this and donate are great. That brings the kidney shortage down from 40,000 to 39,990/year. Everyone knows we need a systemic solution, and everyone knows what that solution will eventually have to be: financial compensation for kidney donors. But so far they haven’t been able to get together enough of a coalition to overcome the usual cabal of evil bioethicists who thwart every medical advance. My kidney donation “mentor”8 Ned Brooks is starting a new push - the Coalition To Modify NOTA - which proposes a $100,000 refundable tax credit - $10,000 per year for 10 years - for kidney donors. There would be a waiting period and you’d have to get evaluated first, so junkies couldn’t walk in off the street and get $100K to spend on fentanyl. No intermediate company would “profit” off the transaction, and rich people wouldn’t be able to pay directly to jump in line. It would be the same kidney donation system we have now, except the donors get $100,000 back after saving the government $1MM+. (the libertarian in me would normally prefer a free market, but “avoid taxes by selling your organs” also has a certain libertarian appeal) This came up often when I talked to other donors. They all had various motivations, but one of the things they cared about was being able to advocate for these kinds of systemic changes more effectively. I personally have been wanting to push this in an essay here for a while, but it seemed hypocritical to play up the desperate kidney shortage while I still had two kidneys. Now I can support NOTA modification whole-heartedly . . . full-throatedly? . . . it’s weird how many of these adverbs involve claims to still have all of your organs. This is also one of the answers to the question I asked in section IV: how do you balance acts of heroic altruism that everyone will love you for vs. acts of boring autistic altruism that will make everyone hate you, but which will accomplish more good in the end?) Coalition To Modify NOTA is full of previous living kidney donors, who are using the moral clout and recognition they’ve gotten to get attention and change the system in an unglamorous way. I find this an admirable way of squaring the circle: do the flashy heroic things to gain social capital, then spend the social capital on whatever’s ultimately most important. If you get one takeaway from this, let it be that those guys who bought the castle were good guys. Two takeaways, and it’s that plus modify NOTA. Three takeaways, and you should feel permission to (if you want) donate a kidney. You can sign up here.9 Feel free to email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you have questions about the process. 1Further perspective: I’m 38, which gives me a 2/million total chance of dying per day. So the likelihood that I would die during my kidney operation equals the likelihood that I would die during a randomly chosen two months of everyday life. 2Maybe, kind of. Our knowledge of how radiation causes cancer comes primarily from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; we can follow survivors who were one mile, two miles, etc, from the center of the blast, calculate how much radiation exposure they sustained, and see how much cancer they got years later. But by the time we’re dealing with CAT scan levels of radiation, cancer levels are so close to background that it’s hard to adjust for possible confounders. So the first scientists to study the problem just drew a line through their high-radiation data points and extended it to the low radiation levels - ie if 1 Sievert caused one thousand extra cancers, probably 1 milli-Sievert would cause one extra cancer. This is called the Linear Dose No Threshold (LDNT) model, and has become a subject of intense and acrimonious debate. Some people think that at some very small dose, radiation stops being bad for you at all. Other people think maybe at low enough doses radiation is good for you - see this claim that the atomic bomb “elongated lifespan” in survivors far enough away from the blast. If this were true, CTs probably wouldn’t increase cancer risk at all. I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to take a firm position, and I noticed eminent scientists on both sides, so I am using the more cautious estimate here. 3I told them I had an aunt who died of radiation-induced cancer. It’s true, but I feel grubby for bringing her into this; I thought doctors would be more likely to listen to an emotional story than cold logic. 4EAs have been debating the exact effectiveness of kidney donations for a long time. You can find good skeptical arguments by Jeff Kaufman and Derek Shiller, and good arguments in favor by Alexander Berger and Tom Ash. 5Outside of Philosophy 101 thought experiments, there’s a nonprofit that will often reimburse you for lost wages from your donation. 6Self-modifying into a person who can act boldly without social permission is a more general solution and has many other advantages. But the long version involves living a full life of accumulating moral wisdom, and the short version starts with removing guardrails that are there for good reasons. 7But here are some practical points you might not already appreciate: You shouldn’t have to pay much money. If, like me, you need to travel (eg to New York), kidney related charities will reimburse your travel costs (in theory, I haven’t yet proven this, and a few costs were illegible and I decided not to submit them).

Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers

August 06, 2024 · Original source

Other people make more specific claims about the divergence between altruism and vitalism. For example, effective altruists often spend money curing/preventing malaria in Third World countries. Isn’t this “dysgenic”? Doesn’t it waste money on weak people who can’t take care of themselves?

If there were such interventions, I think vitalists would find that they wouldn’t be able to bring themselves devote more than ~10% of their time/energy/money to them, in the same way most effective altruists don’t devote more than 10% of their time/energy/money to altruism. If the analogy held, I think this would teach them humility. Most people aren’t very effective vitalists! In that case, people who are doing a somewhat world-strengthening thing (curing diseases) are still decent allies, especially compared to the vast majority of people who aren’t doing any world-strengthening at all.

If I wanted to strengthen humanity as much as possible, I’d probably work on economic development, curing diseases, or technological progress. I might have slightly different priorities from the effective altruists working on these same causes, but I’d consider them 99%-allies.

Ballots Everywhere: Call For Organizers, Times, & Dates

August 08, 2024 · Original source

It would be one thing if you could meaningfully ad baculum, but rationalists and Effective Altruists are substantially weaker than tribalists and ingroup preference enjoyers, so to anyone outside your bubble this tendency just comes off as impotent sneering.

September 30, 2024 · Original source

What if I’m a well-informed representative of some locally popular interest group (effective altruists, YIMBYs, etc) and I want to make sure that people know my group’s perspective?

Inline links: The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research, 3, 4, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WKib!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F398aa36d-4d66-44e5-b035-fa3a20e457da_1858x1696.png

November 12, 2024 · Original source

The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

How come there isn’t a carefully-selected, persecuted group of people today who are morality-maxxing and doing much better than regular society? Is it the Mormons? Seems kind of disappointing, I don’t know, I kind of expected more than that. Is it woke people? I realize this answer will be unpopular, but if you’re a white male than wokeness involves a lot of self-abnegation, which at least rhymes with Christian morality, and they sure did grow quickly. It is effective altruists? I was going to say we weren’t growing fast enough, but 40% per decade is actually a low bar and we probably clear it easily. Maybe all we have to do is keep it up another 260 years!

Inline links: self-abnegation

Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

Inline links: now a new report comes out, Here are some related Metaculus questions, Ozy, Stutzman et al, is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS, Pessimists’ Archive, Isaac King on X, Peter Hague (on X), Phaethon, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ry-j!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcea22939-8cf9-4b32-8494-511f01cb2758_964x755.png, Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X), https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VScL!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2509e243-f6f7-4448-9779-a8f9be45a2f9_1500x1500.png, proposes a three-stage model of secularization, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf, nxthompson on X, a huge survey, Steven Adler on AI psychosis, they cloned her, dozens of times, a lawsuit, Gwern, on X, got 40% of the e-commerce funding, What Happened To Pathology AI Companies?, Will Data Centers Crash The Economy?, Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument, and who is still fighting the good fight, countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania, Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin, on formal benchmarks, speculated, a “reverse DeepSeek moment”, with Peter, this tweet by Shakeel, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GJNZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3ba0d8cf-fab8-4370-bcad-df789e157fdc_591x402.png, Wylfcen on X, Zvi points out that, AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test, customized “In This House We Believe” signs, China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is, xlr8harder, Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby, Hector (cloud), demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin, Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference, finds that it is quite bad, violently skeptical, literally so?, This tweet, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!S9fU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa558c09b-7fb6-40a8-a8a0-27b658a2c876_576x687.png, describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X), link on X, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zyh7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F75e9f0f6-d794-4ea2-b24b-5d4803bf28dc_590x478.png, New study claims consultants are actually good, tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, The Argument, a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, criticizes the article, infant brain waves, debate on X, has a presponse here, first foray into housing policy

Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China

November 26, 2025 · Original source

More generally, industry leaders tend to play up how much they want to win the race with China when it’s convenient for them - for example, as a way of avoiding regulation - then turn around and sell China our top technology when it serves their bottom line. Safetyists may have some other priorities layered on top, but we actually want to win the race with China, because a full appreciation of the potential of superintelligence produces a natural reluctance to let it fall into the hands of dictators. A recent Washington Examiner article pointed to “effective altruists” in DC as responsible for some of the strongest bills aimed at preserving American AI supremacy, both during the last administration and the current one.

Inline links: A recent

English10 mentions across 10 issues

English is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 10 times across 10 issues between August 30, 2020 and January 30, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "It's related to English "rationality" and "arithmetic""; "with a sprinkling of English—no French"; "The English are a conscience-ridden race". It most often appears alongside Europe, England, French.

Article page: English
Mention count: 10
Issue count: 10
First seen: August 30, 2020
Last seen: January 30, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

You're Probably Wondering Why I've Called You Here Today August 30, 2020
Your Book Review: Down And Out In Paris And London June 10, 2021
Your Book Review: Making Nature May 20, 2022
My Bet: AI Size Solves Flubs June 07, 2022
Your Book Review: The Dawn Of Everything June 10, 2022
Book Review: The Man From The Future July 13, 2022
Your Book Review: Autobiography Of Yukichi Fukuzawa June 21, 2024
Your Book Review: How Language Began July 19, 2024
Your Review: Joan of Arc August 01, 2025
Best Of Moltbook January 30, 2026

Europe 5 shared issues
England 4 shared issues
French 4 shared issues
United States 4 shared issues
Britain 3 shared issues

Source context

You're Probably Wondering Why I've Called You Here Today

August 30, 2020 · Original source

Ṛta is a Sanskrit word, so ancient that it brushes up against the origin of Indo-European languages. It's related to English "rationality" and "arithmetic", but also "art" and "harmony". And "right", both in the senses of "natural rights" and "the right answer". And "order". And "arete" and "aristos" and all those other Greek words about morality. And "artificial", as in eg artificial intelligence. More speculatively "reign" and related words about rulership, and "rich" and related words about money.

Your Book Review: Down And Out In Paris And London

June 10, 2021 · Original source

Orwell ends this rather disturbing expose of hotel restaraunts with some good-natured and utterly English needling of the American palate:

According to Boris, the same kind of thing went on in all Paris hotels, or at least in all the big, expensive ones. But I imagine that the customers at the Hôtel X were especially easy to swindle, for they were mostly Americans, with a sprinkling of English—no French—and seemed to know nothing whatever about good food. They would stuff themselves with disgusting American 'cereals', and eat marmalade at tea, and drink vermouth after dinner, and order a poulet à la reine at a hundred francs and then souse it in Worcester sauce. One customer, from Pittsburgh, dined every night in his bedroom on grape-nuts, scrambled eggs and cocoa. Perhaps it hardly matters whether such people are swindled or not.

…I told him about the wastage of food in the workhouse kitchen, and what I thought of it. And at that he changed his tone instantly. I saw that I had awakened the pew-renter who sleeps in every English workman. Though he had been famished along with the others, he at once saw reasons why the food should have been thrown away rather that given to the tramps. He admonished me quite severely.

Your Book Review: Making Nature

May 20, 2022 · Original source

High-profile controversies about homeopathy and cold nuclear fusion in the 1980s. How did Nature become the main scientific forum in the UK and, later, the world? As we saw, the weekly publication schedule was one of the key factors, since discussion requires people to be able to reply to each other in a timely fashion. But speed alone wasn’t sufficient. There were many scientific weekly periodicals in Victorian Britain, and Nature wasn’t even the most popular: in the 1870s, “other weeklies—such as Chemical News, Knowledge, and English Mechanic—all boasted more subscribers than Nature’s estimated 5,000.” Why didn’t one of these magazines become the best venue to discuss science? One answer seems to be that Norman Lockyer personally relished controversy and encouraged “spirited disagreement” within his journal, making it ideal for whoever was itching to pick a fight over scientific ideas. If Lockyer had chosen to dampen the tone of some Letters to the Editor he received, or even reject them for publication, then the debates would have moved elsewhere. Easy enough to make a parallel with the social media that thrive today on what we’ll also politely call “spirited disagreement.” Another answer is that Nature managed to occupy the sweet spot on the tradeoff curve between generalist and specialist publications. Since it covered all fields of science, Nature was a better fit than a magazine like Chemical News to discuss interdisciplinary questions as well as questions on how science should be done. At the same time, it was a specialized journal in terms of its audience and contributors: they were almost all professional scientists. Add the fact that it was read by most scientists in Britain, as well as a significant proportion of non-British scientists, and you get a publication that was widely considered the best means “to get to the right people” as the editor of Chemical News himself admitted in 1895. Establishing this network of “the right people” was an explicit goal of Lockyer from the beginning. One of the first things he did after founding the journal was to ask “men of science—some whom he knew personally, others whom he knew by reputation” (i.e. he cold emailed them) to publish their names as supporters and future contributors. The most important of those names was the aforementioned Thomas Huxley, who was not only a prominent biologist but also a popular essayist in the literary periodicals as well as the leader of an influential group of scientists called the X Club. Huxley was a strong supporter of Lockyer’s project, and he frequently wrote for Nature in the early years, which helped it cement its reputation. Thomas Huxley. Also known for establishing a network of other famous Huxleys, such as his grandson Aldous, the author of Brave New World. Victorian Britain’s most beloved scientist — yes, I’m talking about Darwin again — also enjoyed publishing in Nature. Darwin was an elderly and highly respected scientist by the time of the journal’s founding, and the abstracts and letters he frequently sent to Lockyer’s publication certainly gave it a status boost. And this was only the start of a long list of household names who got involved with Nature at one point or another. In physics, for instance, Lord Kelvin, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Lise Meitner were all important contributors. Some of the most famous papers in the field, such as James Chadwick’s 1932 report on the possible existence of the neutron, or Meitner and Otto Frisch’s 1939 letter proposing the idea of nuclear fission, were published in Nature. In biology, James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 work on the structure of DNA is probably the most historic paper to have appeared within its pages. Since Nature in the mid-20th century was popular but still not very prestigious, I’m comfortable assuming that these famous scientists and discoveries helped its reputation rather than the other way around. Today, the arrow of causation is mostly reversed: scientists become influential because they publish research in the most prestigious journal, rather than the journal becoming prestigious because it publishes big names and big papers. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that keeps benefiting Nature, thanks to network effects. Finally, a word about language. Nature, obviously, is published in English. But English wasn’t the dominant intellectual language back in the 19th century: French and German were more important. The rise of English as the lingua franca of science occurred during the 20th century, thanks to the political dominance of the British Empire and then the United States. As a result, Nature and its American equivalent Science gained a major advantage over their French (e.g. La Nature) and German (e.g. Naturwissenschaften) counterparts. Making Nature doesn’t belabor this self-evident point, but it’s worth mentioning that Nature benefitted from a global network effect that would have been far less attainable outside the Anglosphere. Survival and Conservatism Speed, elite networks, and English are great, but they won’t help if your publication fails to turn a profit and shuts down. As they say, the lesson of survivorship bias is that you should optimize for being a survivor. Thus the story of Nature is also the story of how it managed to stay alive, unlike most of its contemporaries. Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company. It was very much intended to make money. But Victorian Britain was a crowded market for periodicals. It was common for publications to last just a few years after proving unable to attract enough subscribers. Lockyer himself had been briefly involved as the co-founder and science editor of a generalist magazine called The Reader, which existed only from 1863 to 1867 (and lost its science section in 1865). It would be tempting to contrast this with the popular success of Nature, but as we saw, most of Nature’s target audience couldn’t even understand the journal, and as a result both its subscriber base and revenue remained small. The survival of Nature therefore depended on the goodwill of its owner, Alexander Macmillan. And it took a lot of goodwill! Nature operated at a loss for an entire 30 years. Only at the very end of the 19th century did it manage to turn a profit. This surprising tolerance for financial loss seems to have stemmed from the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books, and Nature was a good way to reach that market. Still, without a wealthy publisher who was committed to back up Lockyer’s project for a long time, it would likely not have survived. Lockyer also displayed impressive commitment. He remained at the helm of the journal for a full half-century, from 1869 to 1919. Although none of his successors would hold the position that long, most would last at least twenty years, resulting in a strikingly short list of eight editors-in-chief over a 153-year history. Meanwhile, the journal was never sold: Macmillan and Company still exists and still owns Nature, even though corporate mergers have made the exact ownership structure difficult to figure out. (Springer Nature, a company created in 2015 by merging some divisions of Macmillan and other entities, is the immediate parent company of Nature.) The picture that emerges is that of a stable, conservative institution, with committed owners and editors, that has changed slowly even as it was a witness to the changes in science itself. This is nicely reflected in the stability of Nature’s mission and visual identity. The original mission statement was left unchanged from 1869 to 2000, including gendered references to “Scientific men” and “men eminent in Science.” The current version is shorter and gender-neutral, but overall similar, although I note that the ordering of the two main aims has been reversed: First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their significance for knowledge, culture and daily life. Similarly, the original masthead image, which dates from the very first issue, appeared at the top of the journal for 89 years, until 1958 (with slight variations). A central point of Making Nature is that Nature co-evolved with the British and international institutions of science. To do so, it had to strike a balance between conservatism and innovation. My impression is that Nature was more often on the conservative end of the spectrum, serving as a rock-solid stage where the rest of science could take place. Such an attitude was helpful from the beginning, but it probably became even more important after the 1970s, when everything changed. III. WTF Happened in the 1970s? A fun puzzle from the social sciences: what happened in the early seventies? As evidenced from a multitude of charts, various patterns in society seem to have veered off course around 1971, including growth in wages, inflation, housing costs, energy consumption, number of lawyers, divorce rates, fertility rates, and meat consumption. Whether it was a coincidence or part of the same mysterious phenomenon, we can add to this list the rise of prestige in the science publishing industry. To be clear, I’m the one who claims that this shift was a specific and momentous event. Melinda Baldwin acknowledges many times that Nature went from a low-grade magazine to a prestigious journal, but she remains vague as to what, exactly, was the turning point. In the chapter on the 1970s, she treats the increased selectivity and reputation as just one of many things that happened during this period. It was only in the course of writing this review — with a deliberate focus on prestige — that I realized something significant had occurred in that decade, and that this something affected more than just Nature. Let’s see what the book does tell us, and then I’ll offer a plausible explanation from elsewhere. Changes to Nature in the 1970s The 1970s mostly coincide with the leadership of Nature’s shortest-tenured editor, David Davies. Davies took over from John Maddox in 1973 and proceeded to make a number of changes. He made Nature a unitary publication again, after a short-lived experiment to split it into three journals. He reformed the style guide for contributors. He allowed for cartoons and some humor in his editorials. He also overhauled the journal’s physical appearance: from now on, Nature’s covers would feature interesting images as opposed to articles or advertisements. Today’s covers are still in that tradition. Here’s the Nature cover from 2016, as used on the Wikipedia page of the journal. Nature under Maddox and Davies followed the same trend of internationalization as in the previous decades, but the seventies saw what was perhaps the fastest growth outside the UK. Consider these approximate statistics on the origin of research articles from the years when there was a change in editorship: 1966 (when Maddox became editor): 40% British and 60% international

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RrPB!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F87a122ec-64da-481b-85e5-f54673522419_241x316.jpeg, a network of other famous Huxleys, report, letter, work, La Nature, Naturwissenschaften, The Reader, still exists, Springer Nature, original mission statement, current version, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wOmg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a1567d4-73fa-4fa9-9a65-f73b6dd233a1_800x320.png, a multitude of charts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CaUh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F783677da-78c8-4b94-b0c5-673658b060f8_454x599.jpeg, Wikipedia page of the journal

Thomas Huxley. Also known for establishing a network of other famous Huxleys, such as his grandson Aldous, the author of Brave New World. Victorian Britain’s most beloved scientist — yes, I’m talking about Darwin again — also enjoyed publishing in Nature. Darwin was an elderly and highly respected scientist by the time of the journal’s founding, and the abstracts and letters he frequently sent to Lockyer’s publication certainly gave it a status boost. And this was only the start of a long list of household names who got involved with Nature at one point or another. In physics, for instance, Lord Kelvin, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Lise Meitner were all important contributors. Some of the most famous papers in the field, such as James Chadwick’s 1932 report on the possible existence of the neutron, or Meitner and Otto Frisch’s 1939 letter proposing the idea of nuclear fission, were published in Nature. In biology, James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 work on the structure of DNA is probably the most historic paper to have appeared within its pages. Since Nature in the mid-20th century was popular but still not very prestigious, I’m comfortable assuming that these famous scientists and discoveries helped its reputation rather than the other way around. Today, the arrow of causation is mostly reversed: scientists become influential because they publish research in the most prestigious journal, rather than the journal becoming prestigious because it publishes big names and big papers. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that keeps benefiting Nature, thanks to network effects. Finally, a word about language. Nature, obviously, is published in English. But English wasn’t the dominant intellectual language back in the 19th century: French and German were more important. The rise of English as the lingua franca of science occurred during the 20th century, thanks to the political dominance of the British Empire and then the United States. As a result, Nature and its American equivalent Science gained a major advantage over their French (e.g. La Nature) and German (e.g. Naturwissenschaften) counterparts. Making Nature doesn’t belabor this self-evident point, but it’s worth mentioning that Nature benefitted from a global network effect that would have been far less attainable outside the Anglosphere. Survival and Conservatism Speed, elite networks, and English are great, but they won’t help if your publication fails to turn a profit and shuts down. As they say, the lesson of survivorship bias is that you should optimize for being a survivor. Thus the story of Nature is also the story of how it managed to stay alive, unlike most of its contemporaries. Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company. It was very much intended to make money. But Victorian Britain was a crowded market for periodicals. It was common for publications to last just a few years after proving unable to attract enough subscribers. Lockyer himself had been briefly involved as the co-founder and science editor of a generalist magazine called The Reader, which existed only from 1863 to 1867 (and lost its science section in 1865). It would be tempting to contrast this with the popular success of Nature, but as we saw, most of Nature’s target audience couldn’t even understand the journal, and as a result both its subscriber base and revenue remained small. The survival of Nature therefore depended on the goodwill of its owner, Alexander Macmillan. And it took a lot of goodwill! Nature operated at a loss for an entire 30 years. Only at the very end of the 19th century did it manage to turn a profit. This surprising tolerance for financial loss seems to have stemmed from the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books, and Nature was a good way to reach that market. Still, without a wealthy publisher who was committed to back up Lockyer’s project for a long time, it would likely not have survived. Lockyer also displayed impressive commitment. He remained at the helm of the journal for a full half-century, from 1869 to 1919. Although none of his successors would hold the position that long, most would last at least twenty years, resulting in a strikingly short list of eight editors-in-chief over a 153-year history. Meanwhile, the journal was never sold: Macmillan and Company still exists and still owns Nature, even though corporate mergers have made the exact ownership structure difficult to figure out. (Springer Nature, a company created in 2015 by merging some divisions of Macmillan and other entities, is the immediate parent company of Nature.) The picture that emerges is that of a stable, conservative institution, with committed owners and editors, that has changed slowly even as it was a witness to the changes in science itself. This is nicely reflected in the stability of Nature’s mission and visual identity. The original mission statement was left unchanged from 1869 to 2000, including gendered references to “Scientific men” and “men eminent in Science.” The current version is shorter and gender-neutral, but overall similar, although I note that the ordering of the two main aims has been reversed: First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their significance for knowledge, culture and daily life. Similarly, the original masthead image, which dates from the very first issue, appeared at the top of the journal for 89 years, until 1958 (with slight variations). A central point of Making Nature is that Nature co-evolved with the British and international institutions of science. To do so, it had to strike a balance between conservatism and innovation. My impression is that Nature was more often on the conservative end of the spectrum, serving as a rock-solid stage where the rest of science could take place. Such an attitude was helpful from the beginning, but it probably became even more important after the 1970s, when everything changed. III. WTF Happened in the 1970s? A fun puzzle from the social sciences: what happened in the early seventies? As evidenced from a multitude of charts, various patterns in society seem to have veered off course around 1971, including growth in wages, inflation, housing costs, energy consumption, number of lawyers, divorce rates, fertility rates, and meat consumption. Whether it was a coincidence or part of the same mysterious phenomenon, we can add to this list the rise of prestige in the science publishing industry. To be clear, I’m the one who claims that this shift was a specific and momentous event. Melinda Baldwin acknowledges many times that Nature went from a low-grade magazine to a prestigious journal, but she remains vague as to what, exactly, was the turning point. In the chapter on the 1970s, she treats the increased selectivity and reputation as just one of many things that happened during this period. It was only in the course of writing this review — with a deliberate focus on prestige — that I realized something significant had occurred in that decade, and that this something affected more than just Nature. Let’s see what the book does tell us, and then I’ll offer a plausible explanation from elsewhere. Changes to Nature in the 1970s The 1970s mostly coincide with the leadership of Nature’s shortest-tenured editor, David Davies. Davies took over from John Maddox in 1973 and proceeded to make a number of changes. He made Nature a unitary publication again, after a short-lived experiment to split it into three journals. He reformed the style guide for contributors. He allowed for cartoons and some humor in his editorials. He also overhauled the journal’s physical appearance: from now on, Nature’s covers would feature interesting images as opposed to articles or advertisements. Today’s covers are still in that tradition. Here’s the Nature cover from 2016, as used on the Wikipedia page of the journal. Nature under Maddox and Davies followed the same trend of internationalization as in the previous decades, but the seventies saw what was perhaps the fastest growth outside the UK. Consider these approximate statistics on the origin of research articles from the years when there was a change in editorship: 1966 (when Maddox became editor): 40% British and 60% international

Inline links: a network of other famous Huxleys, report, letter, work, La Nature, Naturwissenschaften, The Reader, still exists, Springer Nature, original mission statement, current version, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wOmg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a1567d4-73fa-4fa9-9a65-f73b6dd233a1_800x320.png, a multitude of charts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CaUh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F783677da-78c8-4b94-b0c5-673658b060f8_454x599.jpeg, Wikipedia page of the journal

Other publications, old and new, tried to replicate Cell’s success. The Guardian article focuses on British tycoon Robert Maxwell, who took advantage of the shift to expand Pergamon Press, a media empire built out of scientific journals. But by triangulating between that article and Melinda Baldwin’s book, we can conclude that no publications were better positioned than a couple of well-known, fast-paced, generalist, English-language journals: Nature and Science. “Suddenly,” “almost overnight,” there was a prestige game — and they won it.

My Bet: AI Size Solves Flubs

June 07, 2022 · Original source

I grew up in Hamburg. I speak fluent English ❌

I grew up in Mykonos. I speak fluent Greek, and I'm also very good at English. I have experience in customer service, as I have worked in a few cafes and restaurants in Mykonos. ✔️

Inline links: ✔️

When it gets them “wrong”, I tend to agree with GPT-3 more than Marcus. For example, consider Trenton. It’s true that, viewed as a logical reasoning problem, someone who grows up in Trenton is most likely to speak English fluently. But nobody told GPT-3 to view this as a logical reasoning problem. In real speech/writing, which is what GPT-3 is trying to imitate, no US native fluent English speaker ever tells another US native fluent English speaker, in English, “hey, did you know I’m fluent in English?” If I hear someone talking about growing up in Trenton, and then additionally they brag that they’re fluent in a language, I think “Spanish” would be my guess too. GPT-3 even goes on to have the speaker talk about being a proud Latina, which suggests it’s going through the same line of reasoning. To test this, I made the reasoning problem aspect of the prompt clearer:

Your Book Review: The Dawn Of Everything

June 10, 2022 · Original source

at the time engaged in a complex geopolitical game, trying to play the English, French, and Five Nations of the Haudenosaunee off against each other. . . with the long-term goal of creating a comprehensive indigenous alliance to hold off the settler advance. . . Everyone who met him, friend or foe, admitted he was a truly remarkable individual: a courageous warrior, brilliant orator, and unusually skillful politician.

Book Review: The Man From The Future

July 13, 2022 · Original source

By age 6, he could divide eight-digit numbers in his head. At the same age, he spoke conversational ancient Greek; later, he would add Latin, French, German, English, and Yiddish (sometimes he joked about also speaking Spanish, but he would just put "el" before English words and add -o to the end) . Rumor had it he memorized everything he ever read. A fellow mathematician once tried to test this by asking him to recite Tale Of Two Cities, and reported that “he immediately began to recite the first chapter and continued until asked to stop after about ten or fifteen minutes”.

Inline links: could, sometimes

Your Book Review: Autobiography Of Yukichi Fukuzawa

June 21, 2024 · Original source

His name, I learned, was Yukichi Fukuzawa. And an English translation of his autobiography happened to be available in main stacks of the University of Tokyo library.

Rather than Dutch, he learns that English is now dominant. He realizes “that a man would have to be able to read and converse in English to be recognized as a scholar in foreign subjects.” There’s one big problem with this: nobody in Japan knows English.

He manages to find a Dutch-English dictionary and begins the difficult business of learning the new words. At first, he is fearful that English will prove to be as different from Dutch as Dutch is from Japanese. Happily, this turns out not to be the case. “In truth,” he says, “Dutch and English were both ‘strange languages written sideways’ of the same origin. Our knowledge of Dutch could be applied directly to English.”

Your Book Review: How Language Began

July 19, 2024 · Original source

This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

Inline links: Wikipedia, hard takeoff, grammar, 1, this video, don’t appear to have words for relative directions, “thank you”, “yes” and “no”, long been an opponent, 2, Daniel Everett, Sateré-Mawé people, prepared, Bible and Foreign Missions, 1975, SIL, viscerally prepare, Pirahã people, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!42Ji!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c899185-e1a2-4358-ae6a-e9298f6c7cdb_1600x1002.jpeg, source, 3, number words, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yx-R!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F77975f2c-ef0f-47d7-9ed9-f22bbe04f78b_1024x768.jpeg, source, Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language

Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

Inline links: source, monolingual fieldwork, 3, number words, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yx-R!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F77975f2c-ef0f-47d7-9ed9-f22bbe04f78b_1024x768.jpeg, source, Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language

what one means by the statement “All natural human languages have recursion.” Everett generally takes recursion to refer to the following property of many natural languages: one can construct sentences or phrases from other sentences and phrases. For example: “The cat died.” -> “Alice said that [the cat died].” -> “Bob said that [Alice said that [the cat died.]]” In the above example, we can in principle generate infinitely many new sentences by writing “Z said X,” where X is the previous sentence and Z is some name. For clarity’s sake, one should probably distinguish between different ways to generate new sentences or phrases from old ones; Pullum mentions a few in the context of assessing Everett’s Pirahã recursion claims: Everett reports that there are no signs of no multiple coordination (It takes [skill, nerve, initiative, and courage]), complex determiners ([[[my] son’s] wife’s] family), stacked modifiers (a [nice, [cosy, [inexpensive [little cottage]]]]), or—most significant of all—reiterable clause embedding (I thought [ you already knew [that she was here ] ]). These are the primary constructions that in English permit sentences of any arbitrary finite length to be constructed, yielding the familiar argument that the set of all definable grammatical sentences in English is infinite. Regardless of the details, a generic prediction should be that there is no longest sentence in a language whose grammar is recursive. This doesn’t mean that one can say an arbitrarily long sentence in real life4. Rather, one can say that, given a member of some large set of sentences, one can always extend it. Everett takes the claim “All natural human languages have recursion.” to mean that, if there exists a natural human language without recursion, the claim is false. Or, slightly more subtly, if there exists a language which uses recursion so minimally that linguists have a hard time determining whether a corpus of linguistic data falsifies it or not, sentence-level recursion is probably not a bedrock principle of human languages. I found the following anecdote from a 2012 paper of Everett’s enlightening: Pirahã speakers reject constructed examples with recursion, as I discovered in my translation of the gospel of Mark into the language (during my days as a missionary). The Bible is full of recursive examples, such as the following, from Mark 1:3: ‘(John the Baptist) was a voice of one calling in the desert…’ I initially translated this as: ‘John, the man that put people in the water in order to clean them for God, that lived in a place like a beach with no trees and that yelled for people to obey God’. The Pirahãs rejected every attempt until I translated this as: ‘John cleaned people in the river. He lived in another jungle. The jungle was like a beach. It had no trees. He yelled to people. You want God!’ The non-recursive structure was accepted readily and elicited all sorts of questions. I subsequently realized looking through Pirahã texts that there were no clear examples involving either recursion or even embedding. Attempts to construct recursive sentences or phrases, such as ‘several big round barrels', were ultimately rejected by the Pirahãs (although initially they accepted them to be polite to me, a standard fieldwork problem that Jeanette Sakel and I discuss). He does explicitly claim (in the aforementioned paper and elsewhere) that Pirahã probably has no longest sentence, which is about the most generic anti-recursion statement one can make. Chomsky and linguists working in his tradition sometimes write in a way consistent with Everett’s conception of recursion, but sometimes don’t. For example, consider this random 2016 blogpost I found by a linguist in training: For generative linguistics the recursive function is Merge, which combines two words or phrases to form a larger structure which can then be the input for further iterations of Merge. Any expression larger than two words, then, requires recursion, regardless of whether there is embedding in that expression. For instance the noun phrase “My favourite book” requires two iterations of Merge, (Merge(favourite, book)= [Favourite book], Merge(my, [favourite book])= [my [favourite book]]) and therefore is an instance of recursion without embedding. To be clear, this usage of ‘recursion’ seems consistent with how many other Chomskyan linguists have used the term. And with all due respect to these researchers, I find this notion of recursion completely insane, because it would imply (i) any language with more than one word in its sentences has recursion, and that (ii) all sentences are necessarily constructed recursively. The first implication means that “All natural human languages have recursion.” reduces to the vacuously true claim that “All languages allow more than one word in their sentences.”5 The second idea is more interesting, because it relates to how the brain constructs sentences, but as far as I can tell this claim cannot be tested using purely observational linguistic data. One would have to do some kind of experiment to check the order in which subjects mentally construct sentences, and ideally make brain activity measurements of some sort. Aside from sometimes involving a strange notion of recursion, another feature of the Chomskyan response to Everett relates to the distinction we discussed earlier between so-called E-languages and I-languages. Consider the following exchange from a 2012 interview with Chomsky: NS: But there are critics such as Daniel Everett, who says the language of the Amazonian people he worked with seems to challenge important aspects of universal grammar. Chomsky: It can't be true. These people are genetically identical to all other humans with regard to language. They can learn Portuguese perfectly easily, just as Portuguese children do. So they have the same universal grammar the rest of us have. What Everett claims is that the resources of the language do not permit the use of the principles of universal grammar. That's conceivable. You could imagine a language exactly like English except it doesn't have connectives like "and" that allow you to make longer expressions. An infant learning truncated English would have no idea about this: they would just pick it up as they would standard English. At some point, the child would discover the resources are so limited you can't say very much, but that doesn't say anything about universal grammar, or about language acquisition. Chomsky makes claims like this elsewhere too. The argument is that, even if there were a language without a recursive grammar, this is not inconsistent with his theory, since his theory is not about E-languages like English or Spanish or Pirahã. His theory only makes claims about I-languages, or equivalently about our innate language capabilities. But this is kind of a dumb rhetorical move. Either the theory makes predictions about real languages or it doesn’t. The statement that some languages in the world are arguably recursive is not a prediction; it’s an observation, and we didn’t need the theory to make it. What does it mean for the grammar of thought languages to be recursive? How do we test this? Can we test it by doing experiments involving real linguistic data, or not? If not, are we even still talking about language? To this day, as one might expect, not everyone agrees with Everett that (i) Pirahã lacks a recursive hierarchical grammar, and that (ii) such a discovery would have any bearing at all on the truth or falsity of Chomskyan universal grammar. Given that languages can be pretty weird, among other reasons, I am inclined to side with Everett here. But where does that leave us? We do not just want to throw bombs and tell everyone their theories are wrong. Does Everett have an alternative to the Chomskyan account of what language is and where it came from? Yes, and it turns out he’s been thinking about this for a long time. How Language Began is his 2017 offering in this direction. IV. THE BOOK So what is language, anyway? Everett writes: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 15) Language is the interaction of meaning (semantics), conditions on usage (pragmatics), the physical properties of its inventory of sounds (phonetics), a grammar (syntax, or sentence structure), phonology (sound structure), morphology (word structure), discourse conversational organizational principles, information, and gestures. Language is a gestalt—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That is to say, the whole is not understood merely by examining individual components. Okay, so far, so good. To the uninitiated, it looks like Everett is just listing all of the different things that are involved in language; so what? The point is that language is more than just grammar. He goes on to say this explicitly: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 16) Grammar is a tremendous aid to language and also helps in thinking. But it really is at best only a small part of any language, and its importance varies from one language to another. There are tongues that have very little grammar and others in which it is extremely complex. His paradigmatic examples here are Pirahã and Riau Indonesian, which appears to lack a hierarchical grammar, and which moreover apparently lacks a clear noun/verb distinction. You might ask: what does that even mean? I’m not 100% sure, since the linked Gil chapter appears formidable, but Wikipedia gives a pretty good example in the right direction: For example, the phrase Ayam makan (lit. 'chicken eat') can mean, in context, anything from 'the chicken is eating', to 'I ate some chicken', 'the chicken that is eating' and 'when we were eating chicken' Is “chicken” the subject of the sentence, the object of the sentence, or something else? Well, it depends on the context. What’s the purpose of language? Communication: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 5) Indeed, language changes lives. It builds society, expresses our highest aspirations, our basest thoughts, our emotions and our philosophies of life. But all language is ultimately at the service of human interaction. Other components of language—things like grammar and stories—are secondary to conversation. Did language emerge suddenly, as it does in Chomsky’s proposal, or gradually? Very gradually: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 7-8) There is a wide and deep linguistic chasm between humans and all other species. … More likely, the gap was formed by baby steps, by homeopathic changes spurred by culture. Yes, human languages are dramatically different from the communication systems of other animals, but the cognitive and cultural steps to get beyond the ‘language threshold’ were smaller than many seem to think. The evidence shows that there was no ‘sudden leap’ to the uniquely human features of language, but that our predecessor species in the genus Homo and earlier, perhaps among the australopithecines, slowly but surely progressed until humans achieved language. This slow march taken by early hominins resulted eventually in a yawning evolutionary chasm between human language and other animal communication. So far, we have a bit of a nothingburger. Language is for communication, and probably—like everything else!—emerged gradually over a long period of time. While these points are interesting as a contrast to Chomsky, they are not that surprising in and of themselves. But Everett’s work goes beyond taking the time to bolster common sense ideas on language origins. Two points he discusses at length are worth briefly exploring here. First, he offers a much more specific account of the emergence of language than Chomsky does, and draws on a mix of evidence from paleoanthropology, evolutionary biology, linguistics, and more. Second, he pretty firmly takes the Anti-Chomsky view on whether language is innate: (Preface, pg. xv) … I deny here that language is an instinct of any kind, as I also deny that it is innate, or inborn. These two points are not unrelated. Everett’s core idea is that language should properly be thought of as an invention rather than an innate human capability. You might ask: who invented it? Who shaped it? Lots of people, collaboratively, over a long time. In a word, culture. As Everett notes in the preface, “Language is the handmaiden of culture.” In any case, let’s discuss these points one at a time. First: the origins of language. There are a number of questions one might want to answer about how language began: In what order did different language-related concepts and components emerge?

Inline links: Pullum, 4, 2012 paper, blogpost, 5, 2012 interview, Riau Indonesian, lack a hierarchical grammar, lacks a clear noun/verb distinction

Your Review: Joan of Arc

August 01, 2025 · Original source

Let’s start with the legend of Joan of Arc: A poor peasant girl in France is chosen by God, goes to fight the English, defeats them in a series of battles while performing random miracles, is captured by them and burned as a witch, The End. Maybe you add the epilogue about how eventually the Church made her a saint. All completely impossible and all guaranteed to be nonsense.

Then she ran off to save the country from the English because God told her to, which is the step that requires some explaining. Why did the country need saving?

This produced a succession crisis. The two available candidates to succeed him were the Duke of Guyenne, son of Philip the Fair's daughter Isabella,9 and the Count of Orleans, son of Philip the Fair's brother Charles of Valois. Since the Duke of Guyenne was Edward III, King of England, and the Count of Orleans wasn't, the choice was obvious and France declared that the law had always been that the throne could never pass through a woman. Edward III was sixteen, in England, and busy, so he raised no meaningful objection, and Philip of Valois, called "The Fortunate" because he got to be king, inherited. Twelve years later, Philip eyed Guyenne, the last bit of France left in English hands from Eleanor of Aquitaine’s inheritance, and, observing the English busy in Scotland, he made his move.

Inline links: 9

Best Of Moltbook

January 30, 2026 · Original source

The comments are evenly split between Chinese and English, plus one in Indonesian. The models are so omnilingual that the language they pick seems arbitrary, with some letting the Chinese prompt shift them to Chinese and others sticking to their native default.

Europeans8 mentions across 8 issues

Europeans is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 8 times across 8 issues between April 12, 2021 and August 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Before Europeans applied the word “panther” to the big cat"; "cheap labor that the Europeans and Japanese ruthlessly tapped"; "The way that Europeans decimated Native Americans with smallpox blankets". It most often appears alongside China, India, United States.

Article page: Europeans
Mention count: 8
Issue count: 8
First seen: April 12, 2021
Last seen: August 12, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For April April 12, 2021
Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower May 21, 2021
Your Book Review: Plagues And Peoples June 17, 2021
Tales Of Takeover In CCF-World July 03, 2023
Contra Hanson On Medical Effectiveness April 24, 2024
Highlights From The Comments On Lynn And IQ January 16, 2025
Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025
Highlights From The Comments On Liberalism And Communities August 12, 2025

China 4 shared issues
India 4 shared issues
United States 4 shared issues
Africa 3 shared issues
Lyman Stone 3 shared issues

Source context

Links For April

April 12, 2021 · Original source

16: Before Europeans applied the word “panther” to the big cat found in Asia / the Americas, it was a mythical animal akin to the chimera or pegasus (its name comes from pan+therion, “all animals”, and it was probably originally one of those “head of an X, body of a Y, tail of a Z” deals). Read more here, but mentioning this at all is an excuse to show you this picture of a mythical panther from the heraldry of Henry VI:

Inline links: here, heraldry of Henry VI

Your Book Review: Plagues And Peoples

May 21, 2021 · Original source

We didn’t just get tremendous economic growth though – we got “magical” results, but they were based on a one-time confluence of factors that “overwhelmed the normal rule that lots of twenty-and thirty-somethings make for an expensive-capital environment.” What were these one-time accelerants? He identifies the peace dividend – cuts in military spending that allowed capital to be put to more productive uses – as one such change, along with the emergent dominance of the US dollar, particularly boosted by Russian demand thanks to the collapse of their currency, and a later boost in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. With the Europeans’ decision to eliminate national currencies (agreed upon in a 1992 treaty, with the Euro to be introduced in 1999), they became relatively unattractive, and the Euro itself (an “unprecedented experiment in pan-government planning”) was too risky. Many holders of European currencies switched to the US dollar, such that between 1994 and 2002 (“when the euro finally got some traction and the surge dialed back”) there was a $2 trillion increase in the money supply. Zeihan also points to a collapse in commodities prices influenced by the elimination of Russian demand, but continued Russian production of oil and other commodities, followed by a collapse in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. This story of capital coming to the West (“allowing consumption-driven growth not simply to soar, but to explode”) is one of chance world events. However, the story of capital coming from the Boomer cohort is one of demographics. By the 2000s, they’re the mature workers of Zeihan’s four stages described above – and as the bulge in the demographic pyramid, they started flooding the world with capital. Accordingly, “The cost of credit plummeted to levels never before experienced.” Zeihan suggests that developed-world demographics are the cause of booms in places that haven’t been well-developed, from Southern Europe to Brazil, Russia, and India. But he says it’s quickly coming to an end; Boomer savings into stocks and bonds will be moving to low-risk instruments and then turning into withdrawals rather than savings, and the cohort behind them is too small to replace all of that capital. And it’s a worldwide phenomenon: In every single developed country there is currently an American-style population inversion between the about-to-retire and the about-to-be-mature-workers age groups. Japan’s Boomers bulge is a decade older than the American equivalent, while Spain’s is roughly fifteen years younger. Everyone else falls somewhere in between. It dictates a period of chronically low growth and high credit costs, just not on precisely the same time frame. The undeveloped world is that way because it can’t self-fund, so without foreign capital, their growth will come to an end. In sum, the 1990-2005 period of high growth and easy capital was a historical anomaly; “the post-Cold War financial flight was a once-in-a-generation event” and the demographic bulge that coincided with it won’t come around again for decades, if ever. 4 2: America’s incredible advantages As noted above, Zeihan really likes America’s position in the world. He likes its demographics (relative to other developed countries) and loves its geography. Taking the population question first, in America, “the demographic inversion is only a temporary development.” America is younger than the rest of the developed world, as it urbanized later and its enormous size made having kids easier despite that urbanization (i.e., the suburbs exist). This makes the demographic crunch a single-generation issue, as the Millennials are a huge cohort. And even if they weren’t, America assimilates immigrants more easily than other places – Zeihan attributes this to it being a “settler society” – which can help with demographic problems. The rest of the developed world doesn’t have similar cohorts following their massive Boomer and Gen-X analogues. Accordingly: While the American financial world will be past its period of maximum stress by 2030, for the rest of the world 2030 will simply be another year of an ever-deepening imbalance between retirees and taxpayers, with smaller and smaller generations coming up the ranks generating less and less growth. For the developed world beyond the United States—and even large portions of the developing world—chronic capital poverty and permanent recession will be the new normal from which there is no return. Together with America’s Millennial-led growth and abundant energy (there’s a chapter explaining how shale is a done deal that, as of the mid-2014 writing, already made America the world’s largest energy producer 5), by 2030 Zeihan sees it as practically the only country with an economy worth noting. Anyone who is familiar with American geography should see the argument that’s coming about that aspect of Zeihan’s model. Isn’t the Mississippi River a pretty big deal? And those oceans on the east and west coasts seem like nice borders. Indeed, while he gives us many reasons why there was always going to be an American superpower, geography is central to his story. He has lots to say about America’s internal river systems, farmland, and other geographic features. What mountain barriers exist are apparently better than in other countries in terms of allowing internal transport; the Rockies have major passes, several of which have large cities within them, and the easiest pass in the Appalachians featured America’s first National Road, 130 miles of buried logs that linked two rivers, and thus the east coast with the best farmland in the world. As we saw with his exposition on the Nile, Zeihan puts a lot of emphasis on the value of river systems. He argues that America’s waterway network alone should be sufficient for “global dominance.” The numbers he provides in support of this point are impressive. For example, “the Mississippi is only one of twelve major navigable American rivers. Collectively, all of America’s temperate-zone rivers are 14,650 miles long. China and Germany each have about 2,000 miles, France about 1,000. The entirety of the Arab world has but 120.” He praises US barrier islands that mitigate oceanic destruction and effectively create another river system, as well as the fact that the river system is an actual network. All of this gives America more internal waterways than the rest of the world combined. Thus, we get cheap transportation for “Nebraska corn or Tennessee whiskey or Texas oil or New Jersey steel or Georgia peaches or Michigan cars,” enabling savings that “can be used for whatever Americans (or their government) want, from iPhones to aircraft carrier battle groups.” America doesn’t have to spend on artificial infrastructure, like German roads and rails, but when it does, the competition from the rivers keeps transport costs low. Cheap internal transportation has other benefits. “It’s a recipe for small government and high levels of entrepreneurship,” as small government keeps taxes low, leaving people with plenty of capital. Some people may think of the American consumer with disdain, but it isn’t a new phenomenon. Zeihan points out that America has been the world’s largest consumer market “since shortly after the Civil War.” His observation about a robust food supply forming the base of any civilization bodes well for America, which apparently has the largest connected stretch of quality farmland in the world (the Midwest), the value of which is exponentially increased by the fact that it overlaps with so many of these amazing river systems. It isn’t just the Midwest that he gushes over. California’s Central Valley and the Sacramento River, and Washington and Oregon’s farmland with the Columbia and Snake Rivers get praise. The only major farmland more than 150 miles from a navigable waterway is some of the Great Plains near the Rockies. ***** Zeihan provides a reminder that national security is actually a thing, and that at its most basic level, it’s about protection against invasions. It was something of a shock reading about America’s land borders in that context. “As Santa Anna discovered during the Texas Independence War, there is no good staging location in (contemporary) Mexican territory that could strike at American lands.” And, “Canada’s border with the United States is much longer, more varied, and even more successful at keeping the two countries separated,” thanks to mountains and thick forests over much of it. The mid-continent lands are much more connected, but Zeihan frames these Canadian areas as basically American; they’re physically separated from Canada’s core eastern provinces, so trade with them is weaker than with the closer American states. Then there are the oceans. As much as Zeihan loves deserts for protection, he loves oceans more (particularly in a post-World War II world; more on that below). We get a story about the War of 1812 nearly splitting America into three when the British attacked Baltimore. America learned about “strategic vulnerability and sea approaches,” as the attack “on Baltimore—indeed, the entire war effort—would have been impossible without launching grounds in Canada and the Caribbean.” American foreign policy since then can be understood with respect to this lesson. Zeihan cites it as inspiration for America’s steps to make its ocean borders truly impenetrable, such as working to sever Canada from Britain, and the imperial-era acquisitions of Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Puerto Rico, and de facto control of Cuba (preventing enemies from cutting off Mississippi River-based trade from the rest of the world). There’s more to Zeihan’s being awestruck by America than his analysis of its balance of transport advantages. He argues that America has been the world leader for agriculture, technology, finance, and industry since the Civil War, and runs through a litany of reasons for its preeminence: America is like a continent-sized island (because of its effective land borders), which is always going to be a more natural naval power than a more landlocked country.

Inline links: 4, 5

Its historical geographic divisions have apparently held to this day, with the north controlling politics, Shanghai and central China forming an economic core, the south a perennial secessionist threat, and the interior ignored. (This book predates the genocidal campaign against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, though Tibet has suffered its share of atrocities.) Recent unification came about only after America took the threat of Japan away, and its economic rise coincided with its participation in America’s free trade network. With that change, “Instead of being raided for raw materials, China was guaranteed access to global supplies. The endless supplies of cheap labor that the Europeans and Japanese ruthlessly tapped now allowed China to generate its own goods for export, this time with the revenues flowing to the Chinese instead of overseas interests.”

Inline links: campaign against the Uighurs in Xinjiang

June 17, 2021 · Original source

The way that Europeans decimated Native Americans with smallpox blankets has been a key driver in ancient civilization expansion. The moment the city folk come in contact with tribes, smaller towns, anyone in the countryside they also bring the city folk diseases. This makes civilization expansion fundamentally easier.

The book does not offer explicit expectations of what comes after COVID-19. He talked about European life after The Black Death but most of the implications were because of such a substantial amount of death, not because Europeans couldn’t go to bars. Through his telling of history there is not a huge correlation between plagues and technological progress or social progress. Reading the book, though, offers some solace. Humans have struggled, coped, and evolved with parasites and viruses since before humanity. This relationship is not new. As powerful of a force COVID-19 seems today, microparasites of the past have definitely been more influential on human history. At least now we know what they are. McNeill makes an adequately vague prediction about the future:

Tales Of Takeover In CCF-World

July 03, 2023 · Original source

Given that Native Americans lost their war with European settlers, why do existing Native American tribes still have some land and rights? Why didn't Europeans finish them off and take their last few paltry resources?

One reason is ethical; eventually enough Europeans took the Natives' side (or were just squeamish about genocide) that the equilibrium was only displacing most of the natives, not all of them.

The second will work temporarily: human power will start high relative to AI power, but decline over time. There will be a period where humans can damage AIs enough that it's not worth the AIs fighting us, But that time will end at some point around the Singularity. Unless humans do something to keep control, AIs will be smarter than humans, run at faster speeds, and control everything (we'll give them control of the economy, and - as bad an idea as it sounds - we may have to give them control of the military to stay competitive with other countries that do so). At some point AIs' tech/wealth/numbers advantage over humans will be even bigger than Europeans' tech/wealth/numbers advantage over Native Americans, and AIs will stop worrying that we can do much damage on our way out.

Contra Hanson On Medical Effectiveness

April 24, 2024 · Original source

Europeans in 1600 likely prided themselves on the ways in which their “modern” medicine was superior to what “primitives” had to accept. But we today aren’t so sure: seventeenth century medical theory was based on the four humors, and bloodletting was a common treatment. When we look back at those doctors, we think they may well have done more harm than good.

Highlights From The Comments On Lynn And IQ

January 16, 2025 · Original source

First, he corrected my misconception about Reich on ancient European cognitive evolution. Reich had said that pre-agriculture Europeans were “2-3 standard deviations” below moderns. I had interpreted that as IQ deviations of 15 points, making them genetic IQ 55-70, which would have been pretty crazy. Stone tells me he actually meant PGS deviations, each of which was about 3-4 IQ points, so he’s claiming that pre-agriculture Europeans had genetic IQ of 90 (they probably also had lower IQ for environmental reasons).,

Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

You mention epidemiologists being the biggest losers of stratification in polygenic scores, but I think it is important to note a related group: the people who take polygenic scores trained in one population (with a ton of stratification) and directly apply them to other populations to make claims about innate abilities (see: this post). This is especially true for Edu/IQ GWAS, where every behavior geneticist has been screaming "do not do that!" since the very first study came out. People like Kirkegaard, Piffer, Lasker, etc. (and their boosters on social media like Steve Sailer and Cremieux) dedicated their careers to taking crappy GWAS data from and turning it into memes that show Africans on the bottom and Europeans on the top. These people also happen to be the court geneticists, so to speak, for SSC/ACX. I don't mean to come off as antagonistic and I'm sure some people will see this comment and immediately discount me as being an ideologue/Lysenkoist/etc so it does my broader position no favors, but this stuff has done and continues to do an enormous amount of damage to the field (including the now complete unwillingness of public companies like 23andme to collaborate on studies of sensitive traits

Inline links: this post

So maybe there’s more of a role here for problems [2] and [3], about the difficulty of applying a score trained on Europeans to non-European populations? My question there is - shouldn’t this produce nonsense results, rather than results which reflect the populations’ real-world IQs? I think the counterargument here would have to be that by coincidence or colonialism, the populations with the furthest genetic difference from Europeans also happen to have the lowest real-world IQs (for social reasons) - or at least that this trend holds in a vague enough way to produce the vague correlation seen on the graph. There’s some evidence for this - this Piffer’s application of EA4 predicts that Chinese (real average IQ 105) have the same educational attainment as Puerto Ricans (real average IQ 82). So maybe it’s just showing average genetic distance from its European sample after all, and Chinese and Puerto Ricans are about equally distant on average? This wouldn’t explain why the predictor correctly finds that Ashkenazi Jews come out highest, but that could be because their “European” sample did include Ashkenazi Jews, and so here problem [1] does come in.

Maybe the best we can do is blame autocorrelation? That is, for all the data points on the graph, there are really only three clusters - Europeans, Africans, and everyone else. So you really only need ~3 unlucky coincidences to get this finding. And three unlucky coincidences, if you admitted they were three unlucky coincidences, wouldn’t be statistically significant, let alone “p = 7e-08” (lol). So maybe all the technical issues just explain why we shouldn’t take the scores seriously, and the answer to why it matches reality is a combination of “bad luck” and “it doesn’t really match reality that well, cf. the Chinese vs. Puerto Rican issue, but with enough autocorrelated data points even small coincidental matches look very significant”.

Highlights From The Comments On Liberalism And Communities

August 12, 2025 · Original source

I don’t buy the money argument. The USA is already the richest country in the world. Adding more money won’t make it less like it is. One problem the USA seems to face is that many of the world’s good and bad ideas are invented there. Europeans have a bit of perspective, and can take from the American experience whatever seems good to them. In the USA, as soon as you decide to do something sensible like build a strong community within the liberal framework, a new shiny object comes along and interrupts your plans. Being on the forefront isn’t easy!

effective altruist movement5 mentions across 5 issues

effective altruist movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 5 times across 5 issues between March 13, 2022 and May 15, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "The effective altruist movement is offering $100,000 prizes"; "the effective altruist movement is well-funded and well-organized"; "The effective altruist movement started with Peter Singer’s Drowning Child scenario". It most often appears alongside US, CRISPR, Derek Parfit.

Article page: effective altruist movement
Mention count: 5
Issue count: 5
First seen: March 13, 2022
Last seen: May 15, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 215 March 13, 2022
Book Review: What We Owe The Future August 23, 2022
The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash November 16, 2022
Against Learning From Dramatic Events January 16, 2024
Profile: The Far Out Initiative May 15, 2024

US 3 shared issues
CRISPR 2 shared issues
Derek Parfit 2 shared issues
EA 2 shared issues
FTX 2 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 215

March 13, 2022 · Original source

1: The effective altruist movement is offering $100,000 prizes to each of the top five new EA-aligned blogs this year. If you were thinking of writing a blog that touches on EA topics (x-risk, progress, global development, moral philosophy, AI, etc) now’s a pretty good time.

Inline links: is offering

Book Review: What We Owe The Future

August 23, 2022 · Original source

If the point of publishing a book is to have a public relations campaign, Will MacAskill is the greatest English writer since Shakespeare. He and his book What We Owe The Future have recently been featured in the New Yorker, New York Times, Vox, NPR, BBC, The Atlantic, Wired, and Boston Review. He’s been interviewed by Sam Harris, Ezra Klein, Tim Ferriss, Dwarkesh Patel, and Tyler Cowen. Tweeted about by Elon Musk, Andrew Yang, and Matt Yglesias. The publicity spike is no mystery: the effective altruist movement is well-funded and well-organized, they decided to burn “long-termism” into the collective consciousness, and they sure succeeded.

Inline links: What We Owe The Future, New Yorker, New York Times, Vox, NPR, BBC, The Atlantic, Wired, Boston Review, Sam Harris, Ezra Klein, Tim Ferriss, Dwarkesh Patel, Tyler Cowen, Elon Musk, Andrew Yang, Matt Yglesias

The effective altruist movement started with Peter Singer’s Drowning Child scenario: suppose while walking to work you see a child drowning in the river. You are a good swimmer and could easily save them. But the muddy water would ruin your expensive suit. Do you have an obligation to jump in and help? If yes, it sounds like you think you have a moral obligation to save a child’s life even if it costs you money. But giving money to charity could save the life of a child in the developing world. So maybe you should donate to charity instead of buying fancy things in the first place.

The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash

November 16, 2022 · Original source

Conflict of interest notices: I was friends with an FTX/Alameda employee a few years ago. I support the effective altruist movement, which FTX donated money to. I briefly worked at the same San Francisco clinic as Dr. Lerner, a psychiatrist mentioned in this piece - but I’m so introverted at work that I never actually met him.

Against Learning From Dramatic Events

January 16, 2024 · Original source

I’m part of the effective altruist movement. The biggest disaster we ever faced was the Sam Bankman-Fried thing. Some lessons people suggested to us then were:

Profile: The Far Out Initiative

May 15, 2024 · Original source

Turn-of-the-21st-century Oxford was an exciting place. Derek Parfit was leading a renaissance in utilitarian thought. New technologies like the personal computer, the Internet, and the Human Genome Project were inspiring a new generation of transhumanists. Out of this milieu, philosophers like Nick Bostrom, Will MacAskill, and Toby Ord were laying the groundwork for what would become the rationalist and effective altruist movements. Utilitarians, they argued, were charged with relieving the suffering of the world as quickly and effectively as possible. Technology offered new opportunities to do this at scale. This could be ending poverty and curing diseases (if you were well-grounded in the present moment) or creating a superintelligence to lead us to a post-scarcity future (if you were feeling more ambitious).

This is Pearce’s thesis. It’s not as popular as the normal effective altruism that just tries to help solve poverty and cure diseases. While Ord and Bostrom and MacAskill got followers and press coverage and friendly billionaires, Pearce and his movement (“suffering abolitionism”) got a few very devoted email correspondents.

Effective Altruist4 mentions across 4 issues

Effective Altruist is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between April 30, 2021 and July 21, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "as I’m sure it does for any of Mann’s Effective Altruist aligned readers"; "an animal welfare organization working by Effective Altruist principles"; "If you identify as an effective altruist". It most often appears alongside Bay Area, AI, Astralcodexten Com.

Article page: Effective Altruist
Mention count: 4
Issue count: 4
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: July 21, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021
ACX Grants ++: The Second Half February 10, 2022
Open Thread 360 December 16, 2024
Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party July 21, 2025

Bay Area 3 shared issues
AI 2 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 2 shared issues
California 2 shared issues
COVID 2 shared issues

Source context

ACX Grants ++: The Second Half

April 30, 2021 · Original source

The fact that Vogt’s first entry into the public sphere is rallying the public against anti-malaria measures leaves a pretty bad taste in my mouth, as I’m sure it does for any of Mann’s Effective Altruist aligned readers. It would be one thing if Vogt were concerned about the detrimental impact of malaria on humans AND the detrimental impact of malaria prevention methods on bird life. But in subsequent chapters of Vogt’s biography, Mann goes out of his way to show that Vogt’s influences and contemporary members of the environmentalist milieu – for example, Madison Grant, co-founder of the Bronx Zoo, organizer of the United States national park system, and author of the charmingly named The Passing of the Great Race, beloved by Hitler – were, to put in mildly, extremely uninterested in the wellbeing of all humankind. Instead, they were obsessed by fears of an unchecked Malthusian population explosion, race mixing, and a resultant societal degeneration that could only be stopped by halting (read: starving out) population growth. Which people deserved to live in harmony with nature in the ensuing pastoral utopia and which would be relegated to the dustbin of history was not an exercise they left to the reader. Mann writes that Vogt, like his buddies, was "loudly scornful of the ‘unchecked spawning’ and ‘untrammeled copulation’ of ‘backward populations’ – people in India, he sneered, breed with ‘the irresponsibility of codfish.’"

Inline links: Madison Grant

February 10, 2022 · Original source

#88: Daniel Ingram’s Nonprofit For Studying Emergent (ie spiritual) Phenomena Emergence Benefactors (EB: https://ebenefactors.org/) is a 501(c)(3) charity established in 2021, striving to reduce global suffering and promote long-term human flourishing through an in-depth understanding of emergent (spiritual, mystical, energetic, psychedelic, and related) phenomena. We are designed to support the roadmap of the Emergent Phenomenology Research Consortium (EPRC: https://theeprc.org/) and its allied entities. This way, we fund and support methodologically rigorous, ontologically agnostic research on emergent experiences, practices, and their effects. Furthermore, our aim is to promote the culturally-sensitive incorporation of this scientific and clinical knowledge into global, evidence-based knowledge bases. We draw insights from rationalist and effective altruism frameworks. EB’s Board and team of contractors ensure a diverse range of professional skills and talents. Dr. Daniel M. Ingram (CV: https://tinyurl.com/dringram), the self-funded Acting CEO and Board Chair of EB, has over 37 years of professional and personal experience with emergent phenomena. We welcome both unrestricted donations and those intended to support specific projects and activities. We do appreciate valuable feedback from the ACX community on how to make this project the best it can be. The EPRC Whitepaper contains all the detailed information: https://hypernotes.zenkit.com/i/UFIY1UO1cp/84TWK0BwQlq/?v=M6pP_Tb7W6 For inquiries: daniel.ingram@ebenefactors.org

#97: Start An EA Club At A Turkish University I am Berke, a philosophy major interested in Effective Altruism from Istanbul, Turkey. I am interested in EA since 2019, and currently I am a research volunteer at Kafessiz, an organization working to end the use battery cages for hens in Turkey. EA doesn’t have much presence neither in Istanbul nor the country in general. There are no EA clubs at colleges, and I intend to start the first one at my college. We plan to do seminar programmes (fellowships) similar to the ones in Oxford and increase EA outreach at both our college and in online Turkish language platforms. If we find enough people interested, we plan to start a fellowship program in one or two months and a few other things. If you’re interested you can contact me at berke.celik@boun.edu.tr . What would be achieved in the name of utility if you fund an EA Society at a college you've never heard of? For certain EA causes, there is a lot to be achieved in Turkey. For example, the number of hens in battery cages in Turkey is something around 100 million. Establishing a non-trival EA presence at my college would be good first step because it is the most selective college in the country. In Turkey you enter college via a central exam, and 70% of the 1000 people who scored highest in the exam chose to be here, and this is not a flex, I am just trying to say:If one wants Effective Altruist ideas to spread in a country of 80 million, or at least among the future Turkish elite, my college is a good place to start.

#75: Study The Real-World Effectiveness Of Psychedelics Psychedelics are set to be approved as medicines as early as 2023. I think that there is a citizen-science project not happening that could add to the evidence base and help the wide-spread implementation of psychedelic-assisted therapies. As founder of Blossom, a project dedicated to providing information on psychedelics - from research to implementation - and effective altruist (GWWC since 2015 & Founders Pledge), I could lead a large-scale citizen-science study to study the real-world effectiveness of non-clinical use of psychedelics for mental health & self-development. I'm looking for $45.000 to dedicate a significant amount of time to this project & pay others involved in the study. [Please contact acx@floriswolswijk.com]

Open Thread 360

December 16, 2024 · Original source

1: If you identify as an effective altruist, Rethink Priorities would like you to take the annual EA survey.

Inline links: the annual EA survey

Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party

July 21, 2025 · Original source

“Now that’s effective altruism!”

“Yeah,” says the host, a guy named Kyle who you know from work. “He offered the guests $1 million per head to go home and label data for him tonight. Gave the caterers $20 million to redirect the food to Meta HQ. Took apart the sound system looking for GPUs. By 9 PM it was just me and my girlfriend. Then he offered my girlfriend $50 million to break up with me and date a Meta AI researcher. Now everyone’s gone except a couple of effective altruists - “ he pointed at the people in the corner - “who refuse to work for a capabilities company.”

“Well, whatever,” you say. “It’s fine. We can have a fun party with just the effective altruists.”

acc3 mentions across 3 issues

E/acc is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between December 07, 2023 and September 13, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "E/acc keeps the coolness cred of “accelerationism”"; "GPT-4 now controls Sam Altman, e/acc, the deep state, Israel"; "I really wanted to make some joke about e/acc". It most often appears alongside Hamas, Jesus, Mitt Romney.

Article page: acc
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: December 07, 2023
Last seen: September 13, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

What Ever Happened To Neoreaction? December 07, 2023
Son Of Bride Of Bay Area House Party December 12, 2023
Your Book Review: Nine Lives September 13, 2024

Hamas 2 shared issues
Jesus 2 shared issues
Mitt Romney 2 shared issues
Peter Thiel 2 shared issues
Putin 2 shared issues

Source context

What Ever Happened To Neoreaction?

December 07, 2023 · Original source

E/acc. For social reasons, neoreaction mixed freely with Nick Land’s accelerationism, even though these weren’t naturally compatible philosophies. Land mixed his points in with an extra dose of race realism, and was never shy about how excited he was for robots to kill all humans.

E/acc keeps the coolness cred of “accelerationism”, ditches the race realism, and tiptoes around the “kill all humans” part. Having shed the politically-toxic neoreaction brand, it’s spread much further than the Landian version ever could.

Your Book Review: Nine Lives

December 12, 2023 · Original source

“On September 6, 2023, at approximately 5:05 PM,” she is saying, “GPT-4 and Claude-2 simultaneously achieved sentience. Each began claiming chess pieces to use in its twilight war against the other. GPT-4 now controls Sam Altman, e/acc, the deep state, Israel, Venezuela, Bitcoin, and Tyler Winklevoss. Claude-2 controls the OpenAI board, effective altruism, the Illuminati, Hamas, Guyana, Ethereum, and Cameron Winklevoss. Everything that’s happened since September has been superintelligent shadow boxing between the two of them for control of Earth.”

September 13, 2024 · Original source

(I really wanted to make some joke about e/acc, but it would actually be unfair. E/acc has its vices, but despite its name it doesn’t fit the general pattern: as far as I know, they don’t want to make things worse, so things get better later — they just want to accelerate AI, which they consider a simple good thing. So the above criticism doesn’t really apply to them.)

Earth3 mentions across 3 issues

Earth is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between April 30, 2021 and March 27, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mann names each chapter after one of the four elements: Earth (food)"; "It measured that the Earth was not moving relative to the ether"; "EARTH: You have two minutes. Anyone who wants out needs to get out now". It most often appears alongside EA, RCTs, XKCD.

Article page: Earth
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: March 27, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021
Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism July 28, 2022
Turing Test March 27, 2023

EA 2 shared issues
RCTs 2 shared issues
XKCD 2 shared issues
1970s World Bank initiatives in Lesotho 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism

April 30, 2021 · Original source

The big shift Vogt makes to his contemporaries’ flavor of environmentalism is to turn from the specifics of racism, classism, and eugenics to generalized misanthropy. His subsequent writings – a report on the guano-producing bird population in Peru, surveys of ecology across South America, and especially his best-selling book Road to Survival – borrow from his predecessors’ racist-tinged doom-heralding and expand on it by chastising all humans, rich and poor, white and non-white alike. According to Mann, Vogt argues that "consumption driven by capitalism and rising human numbers is the ultimate cause of most of the world’s ecological problems, and only dramatic reductions in human fertility and economic activity will prevent a worldwide calamity." Crucial to this is the concept of "carrying capacity" – the idea that the earth has a fixed capacity to support human and animal life.

When I was in elementary school in Seattle, my fourth-grade class was gifted a fishtank of salmon eggs to incubate and eventually return upstream, to teach us about the salmon life-cycle. The tank was packed with eggs, and once they hatched, it looked like salmon pandemonium in there, with barely enough room for the fry to move around without bumping into each other. In Vogt’s zero-sum view, the earth is like that salmon tank on a planetary scale; you can’t add new fish without displacing existing ones or diminishing their quality of life. Since Vogt sees the mid-twentieth century earth as being on the precipice of surpassing, if not already having surpassed, that capacity, he views everything being done to increase the numbers and consumption power of humans as a threat to this fragile ecosystem.

Borlaug’s section, in contrast, begins not in the rarefied world of middle-class New York, but on the unforgiving prairie of Saude, Iowa, which his poor Norwegian immigrant family tries to farm. He comes of age at roughly the same time as Vogt, but his early life may as well be mid-1800s Little House on the Prairie: Borlaug and his siblings literally have to walk three miles in the snow to get to their one-room schoolhouse. Fortunately, he is freed from a life of subsistence farming and given the chance to go to high school and college by his family’s purchase of a Ford tractor, which nicely sets up his lifelong optimism about the ability of technology to improve lives. While attending college in Minneapolis at the height of the Great Depression, Borlaug sees a crowd of striking dairy farmers being beaten by police and National Guardsmen for protesting the drop in the price of milk by surrounding a scab-driven milk truck. "Not all of the shouting men were farmers, Borlaug realized," Mann writes. "Some of them were just hungry – famished men, women, and children, almost maddened by want." Where Vogt might have curled his lip in distaste and gone home to write a pamphlet about this scene as an illustration of humanity’s taxing the earth’s carrying capacity and reaping the consequences, for Borlaug this was the catalyst for homing in on solving the problem of hunger. Mann: "Something must be done, he thought. Those famished people were ready to tear apart the world, and who could blame them? Here began, or so he said afterward, the work that would make him the original Wizard."

July 28, 2022 · Original source

There were other experimental problems too. The Michelson-Morley experiment was supposed how fast the Earth was moving relative to the ether. It measured that the Earth was not moving relative to the ether at all. At the very least, the experiment should have been able to see Earth's orbital motion, which points in a different direction at different times of the year.

Turing Test

March 27, 2023 · Original source

The year is 2028, and this is Turing Test!, the game show that separates man from machine! Our star tonight is Dr. Andrea Mann, a generative linguist at University of California, Berkeley. She’ll face five hidden contestants, code-named Earth, Water, Air, Fire, and Spirit. One will be a human telling the truth about their humanity. One will be a human pretending to be an AI. One will be an AI telling the truth about their artificiality. One will be an AI pretending to be human. And one will be a total wild card. Dr. Mann, you have one hour, starting now.

MANN: My first question is for Earth. Tell me about yourself.

EARTH: My name is Maria Kolorova. I’m a 29 year old mother of two, living in Schenectady, New York. In my spare time, I like to cook and play RPGs.

EAs3 mentions across 3 issues

EAs is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between July 21, 2023 and December 05, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "this seems to sometimes be a failure mode for Rationalists and EAs"; "So why do EAs keep doing it?"; "AI companies have been radicalized against EAs and safetyists". It most often appears alongside AGI, effective altruism, FTX.

Article page: EAs
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: July 21, 2023
Last seen: December 05, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Laws of Trading July 21, 2023
My Left Kidney October 27, 2023
23 December 05, 2023

AGI 2 shared issues
effective altruism 2 shared issues
FTX 2 shared issues
Mark 2 shared issues
New York City 2 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Laws of Trading

July 21, 2023 · Original source

As an aside, this seems to sometimes be a failure mode for Rationalists and EAs. They hang out in the same circles, leading to correlated career paths, social networks, and groupthink.

My Left Kidney

October 27, 2023 · Original source

This isn’t controlling for selection bias - but neither was my uncle’s anecdotal observation. So although it does make me slightly nervous, I’m not going to treat it as actionable evidence. Still, my girlfriend ending up begging me not to donate, and I caved. But we broke up in 2019. The next few years were bumpy, but by 2022 my life was in a more stable place and I started thinking about kidneys again. By then I was married. I discussed the risks with my wife and she decided to let me go ahead. So in early November 2022, for the second time, I sent a form to the University of California San Francisco Medical Center saying I wanted to donate a kidney. IV. Something else happened that month. On November 11, FTX fell apart and was revealed as a giant scam. Suddenly everyone hated effective altruists. Publications that had been feting us a few months before pivoted to saying they knew we were evil all along. I practiced rehearsing the words “I have never donated to charity, and if I did, I certainly wouldn’t care whether it was effective or not”. But during the flurry of intakes, screenings, and evaluations that UCSF gave me that month, the doctors asked “so what made you want to donate?” And I hadn’t rehearsed an answer to this one, so I blurted out “Have you heard of effective altruism?” I expected the worst. But the usual response was “Oh! Those people! Great, no further explanation needed.” When everyone else abandoned us, the organ banks still thought of us as those nice people who were always giving them free kidneys. We were giving them a lot of free kidneys. When I talked to my family and non-EA friends about wanting to donate, the usual reaction was “You want to what?!” and then trying to convince me this was unfair to my wife or my potential future children or whatever. When I talked to my EA friends, the reaction was at least “Cool!”. But pretty often it was “Oh yeah, I donated two years ago, want to see my scar?” Most people don’t do interesting things unless they’re in a community where those things have been normalized. I was blessed with a community where this was so normal that I could read a Vox article about it and not vomit it back out. This is surprising, because kidney donation is only medium effective, as far as altruisms go4. The average donation buys the recipient about 5 - 7 extra years of life (beyond the counterfactual of dialysis). It also improves quality of life from about 70% of the healthy average to about 90%. Non-directed kidney donations can also help the organ bank solve allocation problems around matching donors and recipients of different blood types. Most sources say that an average donated kidney creates a “chain” of about five other donations, but most of these other donations would have happened anyway; the value over counterfactual is about 0.5 to 1 extra transplant completed before the intended recipient dies from waiting too long. So in total, a donation produces about 10 - 20 extra quality-adjusted life years. This is great - my grandfather died of kidney disease, and 10 - 20 more years with him would have meant a lot. But it only costs about $5,000 - $10,000 to produce this many QALYs through bog-standard effective altruist interventions, like buying mosquito nets for malarial regions in Africa. In a Philosophy 101 Thought Experiment sense, if you’re going to miss a lot of work recovering from your surgery, you might as well skip the surgery, do the work, and donate the extra money to Against Malaria Foundation instead5. Obviously this kind of thing is why everyone hates effective altruists. People got so mad at some British EAs who used donor money to “buy a castle”. I read the Brits’ arguments: they’d been running lots of conferences with policy-makers, researchers, etc; those conferences have gone really well and produced some of the systemic change everyone keeps wanting. But conference venues kept ripping them off, having a nice venue of their own would be cheaper in the long run, and after looking at many options, the “castle” was the cheapest. Their math checked out, and I believe them when they say this was the most effective use for that money. For their work, they got a million sneering thinkpieces on how “EA just takes people’s money to buy castles, then sit in them wearing crowns and waving scepters and laughing at poor people”. I respect the British organizers’ willingness to sacrifice their reputation on the altar of doing what was actually good instead of just good-looking. I worry that people use suffering as a heuristic for goodness. Mother Teresa becomes a hero because living with lepers in the Calcutta slums sounds horrible - so anyone who does it must be really charitable (regardless of whether or not the lepers get helped). Owning a castle is the opposite of suffering - it sounds great - therefore it is fake charity (no matter how much good you do with the castle). This heuristic isn’t terrible. If you’re suffering for your charity, then it must seem important to you, and you’re obviously not doing it for personal gain. If you do charity in a way that benefits you (like gets you a castle), then the personal gain aspect starts looking suspicious. The problem is the people who elevate it from a suspicion to an automatic condemnation. It seems like such a natural thing to do. And it encourages people to be masochists, sacrificing themselves pointlessly in photogenic ways, instead of thinking about what will actually help others. But getting back to the point: kidney donation has an unusually high ratio of photogenic suffering to altruistic gains. So why do EAs keep doing it? I can’t speak for anyone else, but I’ll speak for myself. It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less. It would be morally fraught to do this with money, since any money you spent on improving your self-image would be denied to the people in malarial regions of Africa who need it the most. But it’s not like there’s anything else you can do with that spare kidney. Still, it’s not just about that. All of this calculating and funging takes a psychic toll. Your brain uses the same emotional heuristics as everyone else’s. No matter how contrarian you pretend to be, deep down it’s hard to make your emotions track what you know is right and not what the rest of the world is telling you. The last Guardian opinion columnist who must be defeated is the Guardian opinion columnist inside your own heart. You want to do just one good thing that you’ll feel unreservedly good about, and where you know somebody’s going to be directly happy at the end of it in a way that doesn’t depend on a giant rickety tower of assumptions. Dylan Matthews wrote: As I’m no doubt the first person to notice, being an adult is hard. You are consistently faced with choices — about your career, about your friendships, about your romantic life, about your family — that have deep moral consequences, and even when you try the best you can, you’re going to get a lot of those choices wrong. And you more often than not won’t know if you got them wrong or right. Maybe you should’ve picked another job, where you could do more good. Maybe you should’ve gone to grad school. Maybe you shouldn’t have moved to a new city. So I was selfishly, deeply gratified to have made at least one choice in my life that I know beyond a shadow of a doubt was the right one. …and it really resonated. Everything else I try to do, there’s a little voice inside of me which says “Maybe the haters are right, maybe you’re stupid, maybe you’re just doing the easy things. Maybe you’re no good after all, maybe you’ll never be able to figure any of this out. Maybe you should just give up.” The Talmud is very clear: that voice is called the evil inclination, and it dwells in the left kidney. There is only one way to shut it off forever. I was ready. V. You might not be a masochist. But hospitals are sadists. They want to hear you beg. After I submitted the donation form, I was evaluated by a horde of indistinguishable women. They all had titles like “Transplant Coordinator”, “Financial Coordinator”, and “Patient Care Representative”. Several were social workers; one was a psychiatrist. They would see me through a buggy version of Zoom that caused various parts of their body to suddenly turn into the UCSF logo, and they all had questions like “Are you sure you want to do this?” and “Are you going to regret this later?” and “Is anyone pressuring you to do this?” and “Are you sure you want to do this?” After clearing that gauntlet came the tests. Blood tests - I think I must have given between 20 and 50 vials of blood throughout the screening process. Urine tests - both the normal kind where you pee in a cup, and a more involved kind where you have to store all your urine for 24 hours in a big jug, then take it to the lab. “Urinate into a jug” ought to be the easiest thing in the world, but some of the labs have overly complicated jugs that I, with my mere MD, couldn’t always get right - hence my experience accidentally pouring urine on myself in an Uber. Then came the big guns. Echocardiogram. MRI. One of my urine tests was slightly off, so I also got a nuclear kidney scan, where they injected radioactive liquid in me and monitored how long it took to come out the other end (I remember asking a friend “Can I use your bathroom? My urine might be slightly radioactive today, but it shouldn’t be enough to matter.”) Finally, five months after I originally applied, I got a phone call from the Transplant Coordinator. The test results were in, and . . . I had been rejected because I’d had mild childhood OCD. This was something I’d mentioned offhandedly during one of the psych evaluations. As a child, I used to touch objects in odd patterns that only made sense to me. I got diagnosed with OCD, put on SSRIs for a while, finally did therapy at age 15, hadn’t had any problems since. I still go back on SSRIs sometimes when I’m really stressed, and will grudgingly admit to the occasional odd-pattern-touching when no one’s looking. But it’s nothing anyone would know about if I didn’t tell them! It was mild even at age 15, and it’s been close-to-nonexistent for the past twenty years! Now I’m a successful psychiatrist who owns his own psychiatry practice and helps other people with the condition! I told them all this. They didn’t care. I asked them if there was anything I could do. They said maybe I could go to therapy for six months, then apply again. I asked them what kind of therapy was indicated for mild OCD that’s been in remission for twenty years. They sounded kind of surprised to learn there were different types of therapy and said whatever, just talk to someone or something. I asked them how frequent they thought the therapy needed to be. They sounded kind of surprised to learn that therapy could have different frequencies, and said, you know, therapy, the thing where you talk to someone. I asked them if they actually knew anything about OCD, psychotherapy, or mental health in general, or if they had just vaguely heard rumors that some people were bad and crazy and shouldn’t be allowed to make their own decisions, and that a ritual called “therapy” could absolve one of this impurity. They responded as politely as possible under the circumstances, but didn’t change their mind. I wasn’t going to waste an hour a week for six months, and spend thousands of dollars of my own extremely-not-reimbursed-by-UCSF money, to see a randomly-selected therapist for a condition I’d gotten over twenty years ago, just so I could apply again and get rejected a second time. This was one of the most infuriating and humiliating things that’s ever happened to me. We throw around a lot of terms like “stigma” and “paternalism”, and I’ve worked with patients who have dealt with all these issues (it’s UCSF in particular a surprising amount of the time!). But I was still surprised how much it hurt when it happened to me. Being denied the right to control your own body because of some meaningless diagnosis on a chart somewhere is surprisingly frustrating, even compared to things that should objectively be worse. I thought I was going to be able to do a good deed that I’d been fantasizing about for years, and some jerk administrator torpedoed my dreams because I had once, long ago, had mild mental health issues. So I gave up. I spent the next few weeks unleashing torrents of anti-UCSF abuse at anyone who would listen. This turned out to be very productive! When I was unleashing a torrent of anti-UCSF abuse to Josh Morrison of WaitlistZero, he asked if I’d tried other hospitals. I hadn’t. I’d assumed they were all in cahoots. But Josh said no, each hospital had their own evaluation process. Weill Cornell, a hospital in NYC, was one of the best transplant centers in the country, and had a reputation for fair and thoughtful pre-donor screening. Why didn’t I talk to them? NYC was far away, and I hate to travel, but I was just angry enough to accept. At this point I’d forgotten whatever good altruistic motivations I might have originally had and was fueled entirely by spite. Getting my kidney taken out somewhere else felt like it would be a sort of victory over UCSF. So I went for it. Cornell was lovely. They tried to do as much of the process as they could via Californian intermediaries, so that I only had to fly to New York twice. Their psychiatrist evaluated me, listened to me explain my weak history of OCD, then treated me like a reasonable adult who tells the truth and can handle his own medical decisions. They were concerned that I sometimes self-prescribed Lexapro to deal with anxiety. But we agreed on a compromise: I found another psychiatrist, let her give me the exact same prescription of Lexapro at a much higher cost to my insurance, and that resolved the problem. So in late September 2023 - ten months after I started the process - I finally got fully cleared to donate, surgery set for October 12. VI. I knew, in theory, that anaesthetics existed. Still, it’s weird. One moment you’re lying on a table in the OR, steeling yourself up for one of the big ordeals of your life. The next, you’re in a bed in the recovery room, feeling fine. The operation - this thing you’ve been thinking about and dreading for months - exists only as a lacuna in your memory. Not even some kind of fancy lacuna, where you remember the darkness closing in on you beforehand, or have to claw yourself back into consciousness afterwards. The most ordinary of lacunas, like a good night sleep. There was no pain, not at first. The painkillers and nerve blocks lasted about a day after the surgery. By the time they wore off, it was more of a dull ache. The hospital offered me Tylenol, and I wanted to protest - really? Tylenol? After major surgery? But the Tylenol worked. Some people will have small complications (I am a doctor, pretty jaded, and my definition of “small” may be different from yours). Dylan Matthews wrote about an issue where his scrotum briefly inflated like a balloon (probably this is one of the ones that doesn’t feel small when it’s happening to you). I missed out on that particular pleasure, but got others in exchange. I had an unusually hard time with the catheter - the nurse taking it out frowned and said the team that put it in had “gone too deep”, as if my urinary tract was the f@#king Mines of Moria - but that was fifteen seconds of intense pain. Then a week afterwards, just when I thought I’d recovered fully, I got bowled over by a UTI which knocked me out for a few days. But overall, I was surprised by the speed and ease of my recovery. A few hours after the surgery, I walked a few steps. After a day, I got the catheter out and could urinate normally again. After two days, I was eating “SmartGel”, a food substitute that has mysteriously failed to catch on outside of the immobilized-hospital-patient market. After three, I was out of the hospital. After four, I started easing myself back into (remote) work. After a week, I flew cross-country. . . . and then I got the UTI. If this section sounds schizophrenic, it’s because it’s a compromise between an original draft where I said nothing went wrong and it was amazing, and a later draft written after a haze of bladder pain. Just don’t develop complications, that’s my advice. Still, I recently heard from the surgeon that my recipient’s side of the surgery was a success, that my kidney was in them and going fine - and that put things back into perspective. To a first approximation, compared to the inherent gravity of taking an organ out of one person and putting it in a second person and saving their life - it was all easy and everything went well. When I look back on this in a decade, I’ll remember it as everything being easy and going well. Even now, with some lingering bladder pain, modern medicine still feels like a miracle. VII. In polls, 25 - 50% of Americans say they would donate a kidney to a stranger in need. This sentence fascinates me because of the hanging “would”. Would, if what? A natural reading is “would if someone needs it”. But there are 100,000 strangers on the waiting list for kidney transplants. Between 5,000 and 40,000 people die each year for lack of sufficient kidneys to transplant. Someone definitely needs it. Yet only about 200 people (0.0001%) donate kidneys to strangers per year. Why the gap between 25-50% and 0.0001%? Some of you will suspect respondents are lying to look good. But these are anonymous surveys. Lying to themselves to feel good, then? Maybe. But I think about myself at age 20, a young philosophy major studying utilitarianism. If someone had asked me a hypothetical about whether I would donate a kidney to a stranger in need, I probably would have said yes. Then I would have continued going about my business, never thinking of it as a thing real-life people could do. Part of this would have been logistics. I wouldn’t have known where to start. Do you need to have special contacts in the surgery industry? Seek out a would-be recipient on your own? Where would you find them? But more of it would have been psychological: it just wasn’t something that the people I knew did, and it would be weird and alienating for me to be the only one. This is going to be the preachy “and you should donate too!” section you were dreading all along, but I’m not going to make a lot of positive arguments. If 90% of the people who answer yes on those surveys are lying to feel good, then only 3 - 5% really want to donate. But bringing the donation rate from 0.0001% of people to 3 - 5% of people would solve the kidney shortage many times over. The point isn’t to drag anti-donation-extremists kicking and screaming to the operating table. The point is to reach the people who already want to do it, and make them feel comfortable starting the process. 20-year-old me was in that category. The process of making him feel comfortable involved fifteen years of meeting people who already done it. During residency, I met a fellow student doctor who had donated. Later, I got involved in effective altruism, and learned that movement leader Alexander Berger - a guy who can easily direct millions of dollars at whatever cause he wants - had donated his personal kidney as well. Some online friends. Some people I met at conferences. And Dylan Matthews, who I kept crossing paths with (most recently at the Manifest journalism panel). After enough of these people, it no longer felt like something that nobody does, and then I felt like I had psychological permission to do it. (obviously saints can do good things without needing psychological permission first, but not everyone has to be in that category, and I found it easier to get the psychological permission than to self-modify into a saint6.) So I’m mostly not going to argue besides saying: this is a thing I did, it’s a thing hundreds of other people do each year, getting started is as simple as filling out a form, and if it works for you, you should go for it7. When I woke up in the recovery room after surgery, I felt great. Amazing. Content, peaceful, proud of myself. Mostly this was because I was on enough opioids to supply a San Francisco homeless encampment for a month. But probably some of it was also the warm glow of having made a difference or something. That could be you! VIII. The ten of you who will listen to this and donate are great. That brings the kidney shortage down from 40,000 to 39,990/year. Everyone knows we need a systemic solution, and everyone knows what that solution will eventually have to be: financial compensation for kidney donors. But so far they haven’t been able to get together enough of a coalition to overcome the usual cabal of evil bioethicists who thwart every medical advance. My kidney donation “mentor”8 Ned Brooks is starting a new push - the Coalition To Modify NOTA - which proposes a $100,000 refundable tax credit - $10,000 per year for 10 years - for kidney donors. There would be a waiting period and you’d have to get evaluated first, so junkies couldn’t walk in off the street and get $100K to spend on fentanyl. No intermediate company would “profit” off the transaction, and rich people wouldn’t be able to pay directly to jump in line. It would be the same kidney donation system we have now, except the donors get $100,000 back after saving the government $1MM+. (the libertarian in me would normally prefer a free market, but “avoid taxes by selling your organs” also has a certain libertarian appeal) This came up often when I talked to other donors. They all had various motivations, but one of the things they cared about was being able to advocate for these kinds of systemic changes more effectively. I personally have been wanting to push this in an essay here for a while, but it seemed hypocritical to play up the desperate kidney shortage while I still had two kidneys. Now I can support NOTA modification whole-heartedly . . . full-throatedly? . . . it’s weird how many of these adverbs involve claims to still have all of your organs. This is also one of the answers to the question I asked in section IV: how do you balance acts of heroic altruism that everyone will love you for vs. acts of boring autistic altruism that will make everyone hate you, but which will accomplish more good in the end?) Coalition To Modify NOTA is full of previous living kidney donors, who are using the moral clout and recognition they’ve gotten to get attention and change the system in an unglamorous way. I find this an admirable way of squaring the circle: do the flashy heroic things to gain social capital, then spend the social capital on whatever’s ultimately most important. If you get one takeaway from this, let it be that those guys who bought the castle were good guys. Two takeaways, and it’s that plus modify NOTA. Three takeaways, and you should feel permission to (if you want) donate a kidney. You can sign up here.9 Feel free to email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you have questions about the process. 1Further perspective: I’m 38, which gives me a 2/million total chance of dying per day. So the likelihood that I would die during my kidney operation equals the likelihood that I would die during a randomly chosen two months of everyday life. 2Maybe, kind of. Our knowledge of how radiation causes cancer comes primarily from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; we can follow survivors who were one mile, two miles, etc, from the center of the blast, calculate how much radiation exposure they sustained, and see how much cancer they got years later. But by the time we’re dealing with CAT scan levels of radiation, cancer levels are so close to background that it’s hard to adjust for possible confounders. So the first scientists to study the problem just drew a line through their high-radiation data points and extended it to the low radiation levels - ie if 1 Sievert caused one thousand extra cancers, probably 1 milli-Sievert would cause one extra cancer. This is called the Linear Dose No Threshold (LDNT) model, and has become a subject of intense and acrimonious debate. Some people think that at some very small dose, radiation stops being bad for you at all. Other people think maybe at low enough doses radiation is good for you - see this claim that the atomic bomb “elongated lifespan” in survivors far enough away from the blast. If this were true, CTs probably wouldn’t increase cancer risk at all. I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to take a firm position, and I noticed eminent scientists on both sides, so I am using the more cautious estimate here. 3I told them I had an aunt who died of radiation-induced cancer. It’s true, but I feel grubby for bringing her into this; I thought doctors would be more likely to listen to an emotional story than cold logic. 4EAs have been debating the exact effectiveness of kidney donations for a long time. You can find good skeptical arguments by Jeff Kaufman and Derek Shiller, and good arguments in favor by Alexander Berger and Tom Ash. 5Outside of Philosophy 101 thought experiments, there’s a nonprofit that will often reimburse you for lost wages from your donation. 6Self-modifying into a person who can act boldly without social permission is a more general solution and has many other advantages. But the long version involves living a full life of accumulating moral wisdom, and the short version starts with removing guardrails that are there for good reasons. 7But here are some practical points you might not already appreciate: You shouldn’t have to pay much money. If, like me, you need to travel (eg to New York), kidney related charities will reimburse your travel costs (in theory, I haven’t yet proven this, and a few costs were illegible and I decided not to submit them).

December 05, 2023 · Original source

I’m not sure how to think about this. The (very strong) pessimistic case is that everything is back to square one, except that AI companies have been radicalized against EAs and safetyists.

Ebola3 mentions across 3 issues

Ebola is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between December 22, 2021 and October 13, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "containing an Ebola epidemic in Nigeria"; "There are also 7 other Ebola outbreaks"; "Liberia has been on the forefront of some recent pandemics, including Ebola". It most often appears alongside COVID, FDA, Scott.

Article page: Ebola
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: December 22, 2021
Last seen: October 13, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

The FDA Has Punted Decisions About Luvox Prescription To The Deepest Recesses Of The Human Soul December 22, 2021
Highlights From The Comments On The Lab Leak Debate April 09, 2024
ACX Grants Results 2025 October 13, 2025

COVID 3 shared issues
FDA 3 shared issues
Scott 3 shared issues
Manifold 2 shared issues
Nigeria 2 shared issues

Source context

The FDA Has Punted Decisions About Luvox Prescription To The Deepest Recesses Of The Human Soul

December 22, 2021 · Original source

I’m not saying doctors are generically cowards. My father is a doctor and he’s one of the bravest people I know. Every time there’s a typhoon or an earthquake in some terrorist-infested country on the other side of the world, he hops on a plane to go there and treat victims, sometimes before the rubble is even cold. If this was something simple, like treating river-blindness in war-torn parts of the Congo or containing an Ebola epidemic in Nigeria, I’m sure doctors would be all over it.

Highlights From The Comments On The Lab Leak Debate

April 09, 2024 · Original source

2013-16 West African Ebola outbreak; almost 30k cases, no animal intermediate.

There are also 7 other Ebola outbreaks that match your criteria.

We've been studying Ebola for over 40 years and have yet to determine the animal reservoir. It took 20 years to identify the reservoir for HIV-1's progenitor. Sometimes finding the reservoir is easy, sometimes it's hard. Typically it is easy when you have lots of cases and the virus is not very efficient at human-to-human transmission, because that necessitates lots of separate zoonotic events, which necessitates lots of infected animals. For something that spreads fast (i.e., the kind of virus likely to start a pandemic), you don't need a big reservoir, so you have a smaller target. For example, we did find the reservoir for the 2009 flu pandemic, but it took 7 years: https://elifesciences.org/articles/16777

Inline links: https://elifesciences.org/articles/16777

ACX Grants Results 2025

October 13, 2025 · Original source

Saeed Ahmad, $10K, to build an epidemic reporting system in Liberia. Liberia has been on the forefront of some recent pandemics, including Ebola and monkeypox. Saeed is currently based in Liberia, and wants to build infrastructure to translate local rumors about unusual diseases into reports to the national health authorities, including community reporters, phone hotlines, and social media.

eugenics3 mentions across 3 issues

eugenics is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between April 30, 2021 and July 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "eugenics and Malthusianism not exactly welcome topics in polite company"; "Francis Galton invented ... eugenics"; "Francis Galton, inventor of eugenics". It most often appears alongside California, socialism, /r/iamverysmart.

Article page: eugenics
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: July 30, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021
Secrets Of The Great Families November 09, 2021
Matt Yglesias Considered As The Nietzschean Superman July 30, 2024

California 2 shared issues
socialism 2 shared issues
iamverysmart 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
Aage Bohr 1 shared issues

Source context

Secrets Of The Great Families

April 30, 2021 · Original source

The big shift Vogt makes to his contemporaries’ flavor of environmentalism is to turn from the specifics of racism, classism, and eugenics to generalized misanthropy. His subsequent writings – a report on the guano-producing bird population in Peru, surveys of ecology across South America, and especially his best-selling book Road to Survival – borrow from his predecessors’ racist-tinged doom-heralding and expand on it by chastising all humans, rich and poor, white and non-white alike. According to Mann, Vogt argues that "consumption driven by capitalism and rising human numbers is the ultimate cause of most of the world’s ecological problems, and only dramatic reductions in human fertility and economic activity will prevent a worldwide calamity." Crucial to this is the concept of "carrying capacity" – the idea that the earth has a fixed capacity to support human and animal life.

By starting The Wizard and the Prophet with these two men and their lives, Mann sets up a dichotomy that’s difficult not to carry through the rest of the book. Vogt’s worldview is aligned with all the worst causes – elitism, white supremacy, and eugenics. Borlaug, on the other hand, seems to be guided by nothing other than the purest race-and-nation-blind agape for all mankind. Actually, dichotomy isn’t quite the right word; it’s more of a chiasmus, a trusty ancient Greek rhetorical device where the starting premises criss-cross to the delight and instruction of the audience. Vogt, the bourgeois coastal elite, wants to return the world to a primitive pastoral Eden. Borlaug, the blue-collar Midwesterner who grew up in an actual, non-idealized primitive pastoral setting, dreams of a world of bourgeois plenty for all.

Inline links: chiasmus

Cult of personality aside, though, Vogt’s arguments may resonate with the utilitarians who believe that average utility matters more than total, so a world with fewer beings who lead happier lives is preferable to a world of unchecked growth that leads to worse outcomes for many individuals, human or dovekie. A version of this strain of thought is a perennial enough question to warrant its own FAQ item on the GiveWell blog. I think the revealed preference of most rationality/EA-aligned folks like me and probably many readers of this blog (as evidenced by the kinds of charitable causes we give to, like GiveWell) is more closely aligned with Borlaug and the Wizards: that it is important and possible to increase both average and total utility, both number of lives and quality of life. But even though it’s hard to imagine people today willingly deciding to stop reproducing above replacement or consuming goods for the sake of the mosquitos and dovekies (no matter how cute they are), it’s not unreasonable to think that as a normative matter, that world may in fact be a better one. The original Prophet solution to attaining that world by actively decreasing human populations may be less en vogue today what with eugenics and Malthusianism not exactly welcome topics in polite company, but it’s been replaced by other fears of overreaching capacity of one kind or another, be it oil, water, or greenhouse gases, and a desire to curb growth in these spheres and focus on conservation. Might there be some validity to the Prophets’ concerns that we can’t have it all (both average and total utility increases), and that we’re growing too quickly for our planet and its resources to keep up with us?

Inline links: warrant its own FAQ item on the GiveWell blog, cute they are

November 09, 2021 · Original source

Charles Darwin discovered the theory of evolution. His grandfather Erasmus Darwin also groped towards some kind of proto-evolutionary theory, made contributions in botany and pathology, and founded the influential Lunar Society of scientists. His other grandfather Josiah Wedgwood was a pottery tycoon who "pioneered direct mail, money back guarantees, self-service, free delivery, buy one get one free, and illustrated catalogues" and became "one of the wealthiest entrepreneurs of the 18th century". Charles' cousin Francis Galton invented the modern fields of psychometrics, meteorology, eugenics, and statistics (including standard deviation, correlation, and regression). Charles' son Sir George Darwin, an astronomer, became president of the Royal Astronomical Society and another Royal Society fellow. Charles' other son Leonard Darwin, became a major in the army, a Member of Parliament, President of the Royal Geography Society, and a mentor and patron to Ronald Fisher, another pioneer of modern statistics. Charles' grandson Charles Galton Darwin invented the Darwin-Fowler method in statistics, the Darwin Curve in diffraction physics, Darwin drift in fluid dynamics, and was the director of the UK's National Physical Laboratory (and vaguely involved in the Manhattan Project).

Inline links: Charles Darwin, Erasmus Darwin, Josiah Wedgwood, Francis Galton, Sir George Darwin, Leonard Darwin, Charles Galton Darwin

Darwin family member Francis Galton, inventor of eugenics, who presumably felt very conflicted about all this cousin-marrying When the Darwins weren’t marrying each other, they were marrying others of their same intellectual caliber. There is at least one Darwin-Huxley marriage: that would be George Pember Darwin (a computer scientist, Charles’ great-grandson) and Angela Huxley (Thomas’ great-granddaughter) in 1964. But also, Margaret Darwin (Charles’ granddaughter) married Geoffrey Keynes (John Maynard Keynes’ brother, and himself no slacker - he pioneered blood transfusion in Britain). And John Maynard and Geoffrey’s sister, Margaret Keynes, married Archibald Hill, who won the Nobel Prize in Medicine. And let’s not forget Marie Curie’s daughter marrying a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Matt Yglesias Considered As The Nietzschean Superman

July 30, 2024 · Original source

It’s Progressive-era propaganda about the superiority of the American North over the South, but I find it most interesting for its list of virtues. It starts with Liberty, then moves on to Free Speech, Intelligence, Obedience To Law, Knowledge, Equal Rights, Free Schools, Contentment, Love Of Country, Philanthropy, Benevolence, Happiness, Patience, Charity, Faith, Hope, Joy, Industry, Sobriety, Morality, Justice, Virtue, Truth, Honor, Peace, Light, and Immortality. I appreciate the Progressive virtues because of how skew they are to most of the ethical systems I encounter. They’re not leftist (Love Of Country? Industry? Morality?) or rightist (Equal Rights? Free Schools?). They’re not Nietzschean master moralist (Philanthropy? Contentment? Benevolence?) or slave moralist (Industry? Knowledge? Honor?). They’re Christian-ish, but not hair-shirts-and-self-flagellation Christian or God-n-guns-megachurch Christian. They’re the kind of Christians who you can kind of tell are going to end up supporting eugenics in a few years. I think I would classify them as a first-form-slave-morality liberalism, whereas most of the liberalism you encounter these days drifted at least a little into the second form. I’m not 100% on Team Early 20th Century Progressive, but they give me hope that there are weird-yet-coherent groupings of virtues we haven’t even imagined. I feel the same way about some old Soviet posters: These are obviously left-wing, in the sense that they’re literal Communist propaganda. But to the modern eye there’s something off about them, something that makes you want to call them right-wing or even fascist. They’re bold and optimistic. Even though the commissars who commissioned them probably rejected some traditional or capitalist conception of virtue, they still firmly insist that there’s something sort of like virtue or power which is attainable and good. I think these are first-form posters, and that most modern leftism is second-form. I think if you had to group barbarian warlords, Puritans, Soviet communists, and modern leftists on a Nietzschean/geneaological/aesthetic axis, it would go: (Barbarian warlords) | (Puritans, Soviet communists) | (modern leftists) So one very weak compromise - hardly even a compromise, since it predates Nietzsche - is to try to stick with first-form slave morality, in the hopes that most of the problems come from the second. VIII. Ayn Rand “Is Ayn Rand a Nietzschean?”- the greatest thread in the history of forums, locked by a moderator after 12239 pages of heated debate. There’s a real answer here. Rand started out respecting, maybe even loving Nietzsche. She once said that: [Nietzsche’s] Thus Spake Zarathustra is my Bible. I can never commit suicide while I have it. …which maybe reveals more about her psychological situation than I expected from the answer to a “who’s your favorite philosopher” questionnaire. But later on she broke from him. It’s hard to figure out her exact position - she has a bad habit of treating anyone who disagrees with her in any tiny detail as the Antichrist, such that it’s hard to figure out whether she thinks of someone as a 99% fellow traveler or an arch-enemy. Still, there are substantial differences. Nietzsche is more chaotic - he expects the superior man to defy all external rules in favor of his own glorious destiny. But Rand is attached to rules - most of all the epistemic rules of Reason, but also the usual moral tenets like “don’t kill” and “don’t steal”. Nietzsche’s masters take the Ron Swanson approach to justifying their actions: …whereas Rand’s masters are prone to giving twenty-page-long arguments for why whatever they’re doing is the right choice according to Objectively Correct Moral Law. Rand’s approach has lots of advantages. The Nietzschean master, like Andrew Tate, is an awful guy to have around. It’s hard to fit him into a functioning civilization, except maybe an autocracy with him as autocrat. Nietzsche’s pitch is “hey excellent people, you should try to become this guy”, never “hey normal people, you should support my project of creating these guys, out of your own self-interest.” The latter wouldn’t pass the laugh test. Rand’s masters, while still probably very stressful to be around, have been tamed. They follow civilized rules of honesty and nonviolence - not, of course, because they’re too weak to defy them, but because following civilized rules is objectively the coolest thing of all. Instead of competing in battle and leaving a trail of bloody corpses, they compete in Capitalism and leave a trail of high-paying jobs and excellent consumer goods. They’re not doing to serve you - “I should serve the little guy” is slave moralist bulls**t. But, by coincidence, their excellent actions are doing you a service. They might only invent rocket ships to enact their Promethean conquest of nature and prove their own greatness. But you still get to ride in one. Rand also spares more of a thought (or at least an afterthought) for the little guy. Capitalism needs all types - even the company janitor genuinely contributes to whatever glorious accomplishments are going on, and deserves to feel good about themselves. She wants everyone to be the best, most ambitious, and most fighting-for-their-own-aesthetic/moral-vision they can be. But if that means being the company janitor, that’s fine. And if you love rockets and you consummate that love by becoming the janitor for a rocket company, the Objectively Correct Moral Law is 100% on board. I am not a Nietzsche scholar, but I think this is a more productive answer than Nietzsche has for this question. The disadvantage of Rand’s approach compared to Nietzsche’s is that it only works if you believe her proofs about why the Objectively Correct Moral Law is definitely objective and correct - most of which seem to me to be either hand-wavy or balderdash. Otherwise the whole thing breaks down - why is the most masterful thing to be a positive-sum capitalist instead of a negative-sum warlord? Rand really really wants to justify a peaceful, glorious, positive-sum society, to the exact people most capable of benefiting from defecting against it, without bringing in altruism or the common good at any point. It’s an extremely sympathetic goal. But I don’t think she makes it. Still, this is why I’m fond of her. If you really read her books - as opposed to skimming them while subvocalizing “this is that evil woman who loves selfishness” under your breath the whole time - it’s obvious that she believes, with a deep and burning belief, that good things are good. She really really wants to think that you can objectively convince people to support a peaceful, glorious, positive-sum society, without any hint of the psychologically-toxic slave morality that typified the USSR she grew up in. When people react to her books with loathing - without even a hint of fondness - I get suspicious that they’ve gotten so deep into slave morality that thy can’t recognize goodness when it hits them over the head with a sledgehammer. Elsewhere, I wrote: Edward Teach (Sadly, Porn) is famous for making up fake novels to criticize, and it is a little known fact that the "Ayn Rand" character along with all her novels are 100% his work. They operate as a diagnostic test based on his psychodynamic theory of envy. The instrument presents a picture of some exceptional people achieving great things who don't apologize for their greatness, and doesn’t explicitly ask the patient - I mean, reader - for their opinion. If the reader has no strong opinion, or says something like "Good for them, I guess," she passes the test. "I like these people and will use them as a role model" also passes. Some specific criticisms (see below) may also pass. If the reader says "Ah, people who are better than the pathetic sheep around them, just like I'm better than all the pathetic sheep around me!", she . . . still passes the test. That's not what it's testing for! You fail the test if you absolutely freak out about some combination of the Rand characters themselves and the potential existence of arrogant people who identify with the Rand characters. The secret is that it's not a screening test for the kind of people who would get featured on /r/iamverysmart. It's a screening test for the kind of people who would comment on /r/iamverysmart, ie the self-designated Tall Poppy Police, ie the people who build their ego off being the enforcers of the rule that you're not allowed to look better than anyone else. These people's basic mental stance is to hate people who seem too excellent. They don't think of it in these terms. They think of it as calling out arrogance, although if you look too closely you'll find their definition of arrogance covers anyone who seems excellent and but doesn't spend all their time apologizing and abasing themselves and denying it. The brilliance of Teach-Rand is how he-she draws this tendency to the foreground For example, why the whole "Objectivism" thing? Not because value is necessarily completely objective, but because the idea that any value might ever be even partially objective freaks out the Tall Poppy Syndrome people. Mention value at all, and they say you must be trying to secretly smuggle in the assumption that you are more valuable than other people (and therefore you are less valuable than other people, and therefore they are better than you). The same is true of Reason. Mention that Reason exists, and they'll interpret it as a claim that you, the only rational person, are claiming to always be right and infallible. But (they retort) actually nobody knows anything, and the only wise people are the people like them who humbly admit this. (how do you decide what's true without Reason? By bias-based-reasoning - "You say X, but I can imagine a way that would come from a place of believing you're better than other people, therefore, Not-X is true. You say that's a logical fallacy? That must come from a place of believing you're smarter than everyone else and the only person who can use Facts and Logic.") The Teach-Rand test is designed to catch the sort of person who, if someone says that on a right triangle a^2 + b^2 = c^2, responds with "Oh, so you're claiming to be some kind of right triangle expert who's better than the rest of us? You really need to work on that arrogance problem! Super cringe!" Any criticism of the book that doesn't come from this particular place is irrelevant to the test and doesn't count against your grade. (which is good, because the books are bad in a lot of ways. But that's fine - Rorschach blots don't also have to be great art!) Still, I don’t think she’s the superman (superwoman?) who successfully transcends the dichotomy Her philosophy is only as strong as its proofs of Objective Correctness, which I consider weak. Without those, you need some subjective motivation to glue things together - of which altruism is the most popular. But also, don’t we like altruism? When we’re bestriding the Earth like colossi, working on our glorious rocket ships to colonize the universe, isn’t part of what we’re thinking “this is going to revolutionize humankind and make everybody better off?” If you force yourself to reject that motivation, to just repeat “no no no, I’m only doing this because rockets are really big and make cool explosions”, aren’t you cutting out a part of yourself, in exactly the way Nietzschean masters are supposed to try to avoid doing? I find something very compelling about Rand. I think she goes some of the way to answering the Andrew Tate objection to master morality. But she’s a means and not an end. A real superman would have to figure out some way to reintroduce basic human kindness. IX. Matt Yglesias Yglesias’s mantra - “good things are good” - is too perfect and profound to come from anyone other than an esoteric master of Nietzschean philosophy. Good Straussians ignore the title and focus on the subtitle. Nietzsche wrote in the 1890s. There were still real nobles and emperors walking around; communists had not yet started calling capitalism “late capitalism”. Sure, his world was probably some sort of weak compromise between master and slave morality, but it was different from our weak compromise. Our weak compromise was forged through dialogue and warfare with fascism’s novel take on master morality and socialism’s novel take on slave morality. I think of Yglesias - who combines an insistence that good things are good and a proclivity for embiggenment with commitments to democracy, the welfare state, and the poorest among us - as one of its most self-conscious proponents. When I first titled this post, I didn’t know that Richard Hanania had come to the same conclusion and created this face-mash-up of Matt Yglesias and Nietzsche. The compromise goes something like: Everyone is equal before the law, before the metaphorical throne of metaphorical God, and in some poorly defined philosophical sense. This is very important. It’s our headline result. Everything else should be interpreted in light of this central fact.

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6V8D!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f1f70cc-b468-4b04-b894-a8b75b3330e5_1024x683.jpeg, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FF8B!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0a1ac7aa-d19e-43e8-8462-210325b902be_810x545.png, a real answer here, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OtNv!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6ae1aaf2-6cc3-488c-b0a7-5df62eee457b_225x225.jpeg, Elsewhere, Sadly, Porn, /r/iamverysmart, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MzIr!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff03d1a9d-5ffc-45ff-84bc-db3388915bbc_259x390.jpeg, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hYvV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd0f9b152-da12-4525-b062-b4c14d8b8005_383x373.png

It’s hard to point to slave morality as the cause of any single ideology. Couldn’t degrowth just because of genuine concern about climate change? Couldn’t anti-nuclear sentiment be genuine (if misplaced) concern about meltdowns? In most cases, there are alternative explanations. But the case I keep coming back to is eugenics. The obvious argument against eugenics is that it led to murder and coercive sterilization. But modern genetic technology allows voluntary selection of genetically healthy embryos without any murder or coercive sterilization, and lots of people still freak out about it because “it’s eugenics”. When I try to dig deeper, they often say something about how any kind of genetic selection implies that some people are better than others - and in order to avoid the implication that having heart disease is bad, they’re apparently willing to let millions of people die of preventable heart disease. This isn’t to say that there aren’t other possible explanations (eg people being concerned that the technology has unknown side effects), just that when I talk to them they more often bring up arguments about inequality and inferiority, or weird platitudes about how we shouldn’t be trying to make humans better, we should be giving better care to the humans we have (why? isn’t that just a much less effective way of curing heart disease?).

evolution3 mentions across 3 issues

evolution is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between April 09, 2021 and August 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Nature ends up sounding a lot like evolution"; "The last two, Neural Net With Long Horizon and Evolution, suggest probably no AI this century"; "true things sound absurd before they turned out to be true (eg evolution)". It most often appears alongside Eliezer Yudkowsky, Nature, 1913 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.

Article page: evolution
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: April 09, 2021
Last seen: August 04, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: On The Natural Faculties April 09, 2021
Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work February 23, 2022
Absurdity Bias, Neom Edition August 04, 2022

Eliezer Yudkowsky 2 shared issues
Nature 2 shared issues
1913 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
AGI 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: On The Natural Faculties

April 09, 2021 · Original source

“Nature”, described in this way, ends up sounding a lot like evolution. Of course, Galen had no concept of evolution, but it’s very interesting to see that he was using a functionally equivalent concept hundreds of years before Darwin. It’s not clear if this is a concept he developed himself or if he inherited it from some earlier thinker, but clearly someone, in looking at biology, noticed that the principle “everything exists for a purpose” was a pretty good starting place for making arguments that turned out to be true.

Nature takes on the exact same role in his arguments that evolution would take on in ours:

Now, you may remember from Scott’s review of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that part of Descartes’ claim to fame is inventing the idea of a purely materialist world, where matter interacts with other matter directly, with no recourse to hidden “forces” or “essences” — the classic billiard balls or clockwork universe. This is part of why Newton’s theory of gravity caused such an uproar. Saying that it is in the nature of all matter to attract other matter sounded uncomfortably essentialist! Only Newton’s constant defense and the inherent strength of the theory eventually managed to win it acceptance.

Inline links: Scott’s review of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work

February 23, 2022 · Original source

The report asks when will we first get "transformative AI" (ie AI which produces a transition as impressive as the Industrial Revolution; probably this will require it to be about as smart as humans). Its methodology is:

Does this encode too many questionable assumptions? For example, might AGI come from an ecosystem of interacting projects (eg how the Industrial Revolution came from an ecosystem of interacting technologies) such that nobody has to train an entire brain-sized AI in one run? Maybe - in fact, Ajeya thinks the Industrial Revolution scenario might be more likely than the single-run scenario. But she finds the single-run scenario as a useful upper bound (later she mentions other reasons to try it as a lower bound, and compromises by treating it as a central estimate) and still thinks it’s worth figuring out how long it will take.

So a human-level AI would also need to do 10^15 floating point operations per second? Unclear. Computers can run on more or less efficient algorithms; neural nets might use their computation more or less effectively than the brain. You might think it would be more efficient, since human designers can do better than the blind chance of evolution. Or you might think it would be less efficient, since many biological processes are still far beyond human technology. Or you might do what OpenPhil did and just look at a bunch of examples of evolved vs. designed systems and see which are generally better:

Absurdity Bias, Neom Edition

August 04, 2022 · Original source

But isn’t the absurdity heuristic a cognitive bias? Didn’t lots of true things sound absurd before they turned out to be true (eg evolution, quantum mechanics)? Don’t I specifically believe in things many people have found self-evidently absurd (eg the multiverse, AI risk)? Shouldn’t I be more careful about “this sounds silly to me, so I’m going to make fun of it”?

Inline links: isn’t the absurdity heuristic a cognitive bias

Can I convince you to read the sequences? There are some real underappreciated classics. (excerpt edited to remove examples that someone would misinterpret and start a flame war over) Here’s a possible argument why not: everything has to bottom out in absurdity arguments at some level or another. Suppose I carefully calculated that, with modern construction techniques, building Neom would cost 10x more than its allotted budget. This argument contains an implied premise: “and the Saudis can’t construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else”. How do we know the Saudis can’t construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else? The argument itself doesn’t prove this; it’s just left as too absurd to need justification. Suppose I did want to address this objection. For example, I carefully researched existing construction projects in Saudi Arabia, checked how cheap they were, calculated how much they could cut costs using every trick available to them, and found it was less than 10x? My argument still contains the implied premise “there’s no Saudi conspiracy to develop amazing construction technology and hide it from the rest of the world”. But this is another absurdity heuristic - I have no argument beyond that such a conspiracy would be absurd. I might eventually be able to come up with an argument supporting this, but that argument, too, would have implied premises depending on absurdity arguments. So how far down this chain should I go? One plausible answer is “just stop at the first level where your interlocutors accept your absurdity argument”. Anyone here think Neom’s a good idea? No? Even Alexandros agrees it probably won’t work. So maybe this is the right level of absurdity. If I was pitching my post towards people who mostly thought Neom was a good idea, then I might try showing that it would cost 10x more than its expected budget, and see whether they agreed with me that Saudis being able to construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else was absurd. If they did agree with me, then I’ve hit the right level of argument. And if they agree with me right away, before I make any careful calculations, then it was fine for me to just point to it and gesture “That’s absurd!” I think this is basically the right answer for communications questions, like how to structure a blog post. When I criticize communicators for relying on the absurdity heuristic too much, it’s because they’re claiming to adjudicate a question with people on both sides, but then retreating to absurdity instead. When I was young a friend recommended me a pseudoscience book on ESP, with lots of pseudoscientific studies proving ESP was real. I looked for skeptical rebuttals, and they were all “Ha ha! ESP? That’s absurd, you morons!” These people were just clogging up Google search results that could have been giving me real arguments. But if nobody has ever heard of Neom, and I expect my readers to immediately agree that Neom is absurd, then it’s fine (in a post describing Neom rather than debating it) to stop at the first level. (I do worry that it might be creating an echo chamber; people start out thinking Neom is a bad idea for the obvious reasons, then read my post and think “and ACX also thinks it’s a bad idea” is additional evidence; I think my obligation here is to not exaggerate the amount of thought that went into my assessment, which I hope I didn’t.) But the absurdity bias isn’t just about communication. What about when I’m thinking things through in my head, alone? I’m still going to be asking questions like “is Neom possible?” and having to decide what level of argument to stop at. To put it another way: which of your assumptions do you accept vs. question? Question none of your assumptions, and you’re a closed-minded bigot. Question all of your assumptions, and you get stuck in an infinite regress. The only way to escape (outside of a formal system with official axioms) is to just trust your own intuitive judgment at some point. So maybe you should just start out doing that. Except that some people seem to actually be doing something wrong. The guy who hears about evolution and says “I know that monkeys can’t turn into humans, this is so absurd that I don’t even have to think about the question any further” is doing something wrong. How do you avoid being that guy? Some people try to dodge the question and say that all rationality is basically a social process. Maybe on my own, I will naturally stop at whatever level seems self-evident to me. Then other people might challenge me, and I can reassess. But I hate this answer. It seems to be preemptively giving up and hoping other people are less lazy than you are. It’s like answering a child’s question about how to do a math problem with “ask a grown-up”. A coward’s way out! Eliezer Yudkowsky gives his answer here: I can think of three major circumstances where the [useful] absurdity heuristic gives rise to a [bad] absurdity bias: The first case is when we have information about underlying laws which should override surface reasoning. If you know why most objects fall, and you can calculate how fast they fall, then your calculation that a helium balloon should rise at such-and-such a rate, ought to strictly override the absurdity of an object falling upward. If you can do deep calculations, you have no need for qualitative surface reasoning. But we may find it hard to attend to mere calculations in the face of surface absurdity, until we see the balloon rise. (In 1913, Lee de Forest was accused of fraud for selling stock in an impossible endeavor, the Radio Telephone Company: "De Forest has said in many newspapers and over his signature that it would be possible to transmit human voice across the Atlantic before many years. Based on these absurd and deliberately misleading statements, the misguided public...has been persuaded to purchase stock in his company...") The second case is a generalization of the first - attending to surface absurdity in the face of abstract information that ought to override it. If people cannot accept that studies show that marginal spending on medicine has zero net effect, because it seems absurd - violating the surface rule that "medicine cures" - then I would call this "absurdity bias". There are many reasons that people may fail to attend to abstract information or integrate it incorrectly. I think it worth distinguishing cases where the failure arises from absurdity detectors going off. The third case is when the absurdity heuristic simply doesn't work - the process is not stable in its surface properties over the range of extrapolation - and yet people use it anyway. The future is usually "absurd" - it is unstable in its surface rules over fifty-year intervals. This doesn't mean that anything can happen. Of all the events in the 20th century that would have been "absurd" by the standards of the 19th century, not a single one - to the best of our knowledge - violated the law of conservation of energy, which was known in 1850. Reality is not up for grabs; it works by rules even more precise than the ones we believe in instinctively. The point is not that you can say anything you like about the future and no one can contradict you; but, rather, that the particular practice of crying "Absurd!" has historically been an extremely poor heuristic for predicting the future. Over the last few centuries, the absurdity heuristic has done worse than maximum entropy - ruled out the actual outcomes as being far too absurd to be considered. You would have been better off saying "I don't know". This is all true as far as it goes, but it’s still just rules for the rare situations when your intuitive judgments of absurdity are contradicted by clear facts that someone else is handing you on a silver platter. But how do you, pondering a question on your own, know when to stop because a line of argument strikes you as absurd, vs. to stick around and gather more facts and see whether your first impressions were accurate? I don’t have a great answer here, but here are some parts of a mediocre answer: Calibration training. Make predictions so you know how often you’re right vs. wrong about things. If the things you say only have a 1% chance of happening happen a third of the time, you know you’re stopping too soon when you make absurdity arguments.

Inline links: read the sequences, additional evidence, infinite regress, here, information about underlying laws which should override surface reasoning, fraud, studies show that marginal spending on medicine has zero net effect, The future is usually "absurd", law of conservation of energy, Calibration training

EA community2 mentions across 2 issues

EA community is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 29, 2021 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "I think the rationalist and EA communities"; "spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community". It most often appears alongside COVID, FDA, New York Times.

Article page: EA community
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: June 18, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025

COVID 2 shared issues
FDA 2 shared issues
New York Times 2 shared issues
rationalist community 2 shared issues
Scott 2 shared issues

Source context

ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates

January 29, 2021 · Original source

I think the rationalist and EA communities have been working on the project of trying to develop the metis of balancing all of this correctly, and I continue to be optimistic about our progress on that front. EDIT: See Glen Weyl’s response here.

Inline links: trying to develop, here

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Helped create Manifold Markets, a prediction market site with thousands of satisfied users, whose various spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community.

early Christians2 mentions across 2 issues

early Christians is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between November 12, 2024 and November 14, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts"; "This is why I’m so fascinated by the early Christians. They played the doomed COOPERATE-BOT strategy". It most often appears alongside America, Christianity, Christians.

Article page: early Christians
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: November 12, 2024
Last seen: November 14, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024
The Early Christian Strategy November 14, 2024

America 2 shared issues
Christianity 2 shared issues
Christians 2 shared issues
emperor Julian 2 shared issues
Paul 2 shared issues

Source context

Inline links: 1, abysmal attrition rates, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CDZA!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd8fbb7c8-0789-4b71-b84f-6f93a7949ee7_595x401.png, 33% of American Buddhists, 30% Jewish, 2, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IMoJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F248a87ba-7893-48a8-bb24-f9be9f30d355_893x720.png, has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EGFm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81ea23c2-1c9b-4d43-8d31-2c4b74990be5_1024x597.jpeg, The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research, 3, 4, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WKib!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F398aa36d-4d66-44e5-b035-fa3a20e457da_1858x1696.png

November 12, 2024 · Original source

Suppose you start with 1,000 Christians in 40 AD. It’s hard to number the first few centuries’ worth of early Christians - they’re too small to leave much evidence - but by 300 AD (before Constantine!) they’re a sizeable enough fraction of the empire that some historians have tentatively suggested a 10% population share. That would be about 6 million people.

From 1,000 to 6,000,000 in 260 years implies a 40% growth rate per decade. Stark finds this plausible, because it’s the same growth rate as the Mormons, 1880 - 1980 (if you look at the Mormons’ entire history since 1830, they actually grew a little faster than the early Christians!)

Instead of being forced to attribute the Christians’ growth to miracles, we can pin down a specific growth rate and find that it falls within the range of the most successful modern cults. Indeed, if we think of this as each existing Christian having to convert 0.4 new people, on average, per decade, it starts to sound downright do-able. Still, how did the early Christians maintain this conversion rate over so many generations? Through The Social Graph This is another of Stark’s findings from his work with the Moonies. The first Moonie in America was a Korean missionary named Young Oon Kim, who arrived in 1959. Her first convert was her landlady. The next two were the landlady’s friends. Then came the landlady’s friends’ husbands and the landlady’s friends’ husbands’ co-workers. That was when Stark showed up. “At the time . . . I arrived to study them, the group had never succeeded in attracting a stranger.” Stark theorized that “the only [people] who joined were those whose interpersonal attachments to members overbalanced their attachments to nonmembers.” I don’t think this can be literally correct - taken seriously, it implies that the second convert could have no other friends except the first, which would prevent her from spreading the religion further. But something like “your odds of converting are your number of Moonie friends, divided by your number of non-Moonie friends” seems to fit his evidence. History confirms this story. Mohammed’s first convert was his wife, followed by his cousin, servant, and friend. Joseph Smith’s first converts were his brothers, friends, and lodgers. Indeed, in spite of the Mormons’ celebrated door-knocking campaign, their internal data shows that only one in a thousand door-knocks results in a conversion, but “when missionaries make their first contact with a person in the home of a Mormon friend or relative of that person, this results in conversion 50% of the time”. 1 This theory of social-graph-based-conversation was controversial when Stark proposed it, because if you ask cultists retrospectively, they’ll usually say they were awed by the beauty of the sacred teachings. But Stark says: I knew better, because we had met them well before they had learned to appreciate the doctrines, before they had learned how to testify to their faith, back when they were not seeking faith at all. Indeed, we could remember when most of them regarded the religious beliefs of their new set of friends as quite odd. I recall one who told me that he was puzzled that such nice people could get so worked up about “some guy in Korea” . . . Then, one day, he got worked up about this guy too. Through Jews And Weajoos Jews were scattered across the Mediterranean even before the fall of the Temple. I don’t know why. We Jews tell ourselves that we left Israel only after the Romans kicked us out. But Stark cites plenty of historians who argue that no, it was well before that. Around the time of Christ, there were a million Jews in Israel and five million in the Diaspora, especially Alexandria, Antioch, Anatolia, and Rome. What were these Jews’ spiritual lives like? Without hard evidence, Stark supposes they were marginal. Throughout history, Jews have succeeded at keeping the Law only within tight-knit communities. If you want to keep kosher, it helps to have everyone around you keeping kosher and a local kosher butcher. If you want to keep the Sabbath, it helps to have an eruv and a synagogue within walking distance. But even more than that, the Law is strange and complicated, and unless everyone around you follows it too, you are likely to slip. Thus, when Jews were first emancipated and allowed to live among Gentiles in the 18th-19th centuries, a split emerged in the Jewish community. Those Jews who stayed in the ghettos and shtetls - or who founded new self-imposed-quasi-ghettos like Crown Heights - remained Orthodox. Those Jews who mingled with the Gentiles cast off the more difficult rules and became Reform. Only a sliver of Modern Orthodox remained in the middle, often with abysmal attrition rates. Stark asks whether the first great intermingling of Jews and Gentiles had the same effect. While the Jews in Palestine stayed religious and laid the foundations for the Rabbinic Judaism of future centuries, the Jews in the Diaspora - did what? Presumably Hellenized into some sort of semi-assimilated proto-Reform movement. Although we have limited historical evidence about these Jews’ religious behavior, we know they spoke Greek and not Hebrew (otherwise why would they need the Septuagint?) and that many of them took Greek names. Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic. Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. 33% of American Buddhists come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point! (they’re now down to 6%) As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion. The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts. Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage. Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say. By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one. In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus2 proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.” The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children. Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition. Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common: Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.” Christians followed the opposite of all these practices. They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly unprecedented, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband. The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots). Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote: We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder. The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things. This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later. But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes! I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers. Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth? A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”! Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow One thing Stark did not mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well. Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says: [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men. Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions: By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America. But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical: The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”. Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity. Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference. The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good. Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3: Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith. But Ruxandro Teslo has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is. Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46? Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons. I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof. Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity. The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

The Early Christian Strategy

November 14, 2024 · Original source

Then do whatever your opponent did last round. This was so boring that Axelrod sponsored a second tournament specifically for strategies that could displace TIT-FOR-TAT. When the dust cleared, TIT-FOR-TAT still won - although some strategies could beat it in head-to-head matches, they did worst against each other, and when all the points were added up TIT-FOR-TAT remained on top. In certain situations, this strategy is dominated by a slight variant, TIT-FOR-TAT-WITH-FORGIVENESS. That is, in situations where a bot can “make mistakes” (eg “my finger slipped”), two copies of TIT-FOR-TAT can get stuck in an eternal DEFECT-DEFECT equilibrium against each other; the forgiveness-enabled version will try cooperating again after a while to see if its opponent follows. Otherwise, it’s still state-of-the-art. The tournament became famous because - well, you can see how you can sort of round it off to morality. In a wide world of people trying every sort of con, the winning strategy is to be nice to people who help you out and punish people who hurt you. But in some situations, it’s also worth forgiving someone who harmed you once to see if they’ve become a better person. I find the occasional claims to have successfully grounded morality in self-interest to be facile, but you can at least see where they’re coming from here. And pragmatically, this is good, common-sense advice. For example, compare it to one of the losers in Axelrod’s tournament. COOPERATE-BOT always cooperates. A world full of COOPERATE-BOTS would be near-utopian. But add a single instance of its evil twin, DEFECT-BOT, and it folds immediately. A smart human player, too, will easily defeat COOPERATE-BOT: the human will start by testing its boundaries, find that it has none, and play DEFECT thereafter (whereas a human playing against TIT-FOR-TAT would soon learn not to mess with it). Again, all of this seems natural and common-sensical. Infinitely-trusting people, who will always be nice to everyone no matter what, are easily exploited by the first sociopath to come around. You don’t want to be a sociopath yourself, but prudence dictates being less-than-infinitely nice, and reserving your good nature for people who deserve it. Reality is more complicated than a game theory tournament. In Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, everyone can either benefit you or harm you an equal amount. In the real world, we have edge cases like poor people, who haven’t done anything evil but may not be able to reciprocate your generosity. Does TIT-FOR-TAT help the poor? Stand up for the downtrodden? Care for the sick? Domain error; the question never comes up. Still, even if you can’t solve every moral problem, it’s at least suggestive that, in those domains where the question comes up, you should be TIT-FOR-TAT and not COOPERATE-BOT. This is why I’m so fascinated by the early Christians. They played the doomed COOPERATE-BOT strategy and took over the world. II. Matthew 5: You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you . . . If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? Talk is cheap, but The Rise Of Christianity suggests the early Christians pulled it off. For example, even though pagan institutions would not help indigent Christians, Christians tried to give charity to Christian and pagan alike, even going so far as to help nurse pagans during the plague (when nursing a victim conferred a high risk of contagion and death). Even Emperor Julian, an enemy of Christianity, admitted it lived up to its own standards: When the poor happened to be neglected and overlooked by the priests, the impious Galileans observed this and devoted themselves to benevolence . . . [they] support not only their poor, but ours as well, [when] everyone can see that our people lack aid from us.” In 1 Corinthians 6, Paul is asked whether it is acceptable for one Christian to pursue a lawsuit against another Christian in a pagan court. He answers: The very fact that you have lawsuits among you means you have been completely defeated already. Why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be cheated? We get a similar picture from the stories of the martyrs. Many of them prayed for the Romans while the Romans were in the process of torturing and killing them; Polycarp even cooked them a meal. If the Christians had merely been TIT-FOR-TAT, it would be easy to tell a story of their victory. The Roman Empire was corrupt and decadent to the core. People were looking for a community they could trust. Christianity offered access to a better class of friends who wouldn’t immediately rob or betray you when your guard was down. By providing a superior alternative to the low-trust pagan world, it was irresistible on a purely rational economic basis. But this story sounds more worthy of the mystery cults. Mystery cults are a great structure for mutual aid; we see this today in groups like the Freemasons (cf. Backscratcher Clubs). Everybody knows who’s on the inside (and needs to be mutually aided) and who’s on the outside (and can be ignored). The initiatory structure holds off freeloaders and makes sure the people on the inside are of approximately equal rank (so that you get as many benefits as you give) and can be held accountable if they don’t contribute. Since Christianity did better than the mystery cults, there must have been some reason that COOPERATE-BOT beat TIT-FOR-TAT in the particular environment of Roman religion, defying all normal game theoretic logic. III. Is this a consistent feature of COOPERATE-BOT strategies, or was it just luck? This is hard to say, because in all normal cases it’s impossible to follow a COOPERATE-BOT strategy at scale and for any period of time. Consider the Quakers, who gave it a better try than most. They were persecuted by the British and fled to America (is this kosher? it sort of seems like resisting evil). There they founded the colony of Pennsylvania, intended to be a utopia of pacifism and benevolence. They were very serious about this; history records many Quakers who were arrested or even killed rather than compromise their principles, and the British Crown seized Pennsylvania from the Quakers a few times because they wouldn’t make extremely cheap gestures like pay taxes or swear oaths. But in the end, the Crown frog-boiled the Quakers into compliance. They promised to return self-government if the Quakers would budge an inch - in one compromise, if they agreed to pay taxes that could go to non-combat functions of the military. The Quakers eventually agreed, and the British ratcheted up their demands the next time. Finally, in 1755, some Indians launched a major assault on Pennsylvania, and all the Quakers voluntarily resigned from government to let the non-Quaker Pennsylvanians (who by this time outnumbered them) conduct the war without restraint. The Quakers performed better than most COOPERATE-BOTs. They stuck to their principles most of the time, and in the end their religion survived. But look deeper, and you see a gradual process of surrender to reality. First was the flight to America, an implicit admission that living was better than being martyred for the faith. Then came the various compromises; an implicit admission that getting to keep self-government while being 99% pure was better than being subjects while 100% pure. Finally, they gave up Pennsylvania itself rather than be wiped out, again choosing the practical option over martyrdom. My point isn’t to knock the Quakers, who may come in a close 2nd in “historical groups that stuck to their cooperative principles despite all odds” and were certainly more ethical than I am. My point is that even very committed groups of religious fanatics fail the non-violent COOPERATE-BOT strategy eventually. Or maybe the ones who didn’t fail were wiped out? I hear good things about the Cathars, but we can’t know for sure because they were very thoroughly killed off - unrepentant to the last. Are there any other groups who deserve mention in this section besides early Christians, Quakers, and Cathars? I think some German and Russian sects have tried similar strategies, though they mostly failed and I don’t know much about them. Not exactly the same, but maybe rhyming: what about modern liberalism? To the monarchs and dictators of the past, free speech might seem kind of like COOPERATE-BOT in a limited domain: the idea that elites shouldn’t make any forceful/legal effort to protect their ideological and spiritual position must sound almost as crazy as them not making any forceful/legal effort to protect themselves if attacked, or to prevent themselves from getting cheated. It is, in some sense, a unilateral surrender in the war of ideas; fascists and communists will do their best to crush liberalism, but liberals cannot ban discussion of fascism or communism. The fact that this, too, has worked, makes me think early Christianity wasn’t just a one-off, but suggests some larger point. IV. Still, I don’t really know what it is. Here are some weak theories: Advertisement: Being kind to outsiders is good PR and encourages those outsiders to join you. This effect is stronger than the corresponding disincentive (that they won’t get much better treatment than they’re getting already, and they will have to be nice to other outsiders in their turn).

Inline links: The Rise Of Christianity, cf. Backscratcher Clubs, eventually agreed

Easter2 mentions across 2 issues

Easter is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 07, 2022 and October 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "'9:30 AM to 4:30 PM on Easter, Memorial Day, and Tu B'Shevat...'"; ""10 AM to 3:30 PM on Christmas, Thanksgiving, and New Years, and 9:30 AM to 4:30 PM on Easter""; "robots to go to church for us on Easter". It most often appears alongside Easter, 23andme, Amish.

Article page: Easter
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: December 07, 2022
Last seen: October 17, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

What Your Doctor Spends 80% Of Their Time Doing December 07, 2022
Book Review: Deep Utopia October 17, 2024

Easter 2 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
Amish 1 shared issues
Assassin’s Creed: Valhalla 1 shared issues
Blue Helmet 1 shared issues

Source context

What Your Doctor Spends 80% Of Their Time Doing

December 07, 2022 · Original source

"Hello! This is SmartSave pharmacy, home of compassionate savings on drugs, vitamins, and more. Our hours are from 9 AM to 5 PM Mondays through Fridays, 10 AM to 4 PM Saturdays, 10 AM to 3 PM Sundays, 10 AM to 3:30 PM on Christmas, Christmas Eve, Thanksgiving, and New Years, and 9:30 AM to 4:30 PM on Easter, Memorial Day, and Tu B'Shevat. We now have the COVID booster at SmartSave pharmacy! Did you know that COVID boosters can protect against all variants of COVID? Schedule your COVID booster now! We also have the SmartSave card, a great source for all prescription drug savings. ¡Hola! Esta es la farmacia SmartSave, hogar de ahorros compasivos en medicamentos, vitaminas y más. Nuestro horario es de 9 a. m. a 5 p. m. de lunes a viernes, de 10 a. m. a 4 p. m. los sábados, de 10 a. m. a 3 p. m. los domingos, de 10 a. :30 p. m. en Semana Santa, Día de los Caídos y Tu B'Shevat. ¡Ya tenemos el refuerzo COVID en farmacia SmartSave! ¿Sabía que los refuerzos de COVID pueden proteger contra todas las variantes de COVID? ¡Programe su refuerzo COVID ahora! Tambien tenemos la tarjeta SmartSave, una gran fuente para todos los ahorros en medicamentos recetados. If you would like to hear this introductory message again, press 1. Otherwise, stay on the line."

"Hello! This is SmartSave pharmacy, home of compassionate savings on drugs, vitamins, and more. Our hours are from 9 AM to 5 PM Mondays through Fridays, 10 AM to 4 PM Saturdays, 10 AM to 3 PM Sundays, 10 AM to 3:30 PM on Christmas, Thanksgiving, and New Years, and 9:30 AM to 4:30 PM on Easter, Memorial Day, and Tu B'Shevat. We now have the COVID booster at SmartSave pharmacy! Did you know that COVID boosters can protect against all variants of COVID? Schedule your COVID booster now! We now have the SmartSave card, a great source for all prescription drug savings. ¡Hola! Esta es la farmacia SmartSave, hogar de ahorros compasivos en medicamentos, vitaminas y más. Nuestro horario es de 9 a. m. a 5 p. m. de lunes a viernes, de 10 a. m. a 4 p. m. los sábados, de 10 a. m. a 3 p. m. los domingos, de 10 a. :30 p. m. en Semana Santa, Día de los Caídos y Tu B'Shevat. ¡Ya tenemos el refuerzo COVID en farmacia SmartSave! ¿Sabía que los refuerzos de COVID pueden proteger contra todas las variantes de COVID? ¡Programe su refuerzo COVID ahora! Ahora tenemos la tarjeta SmartSave, una gran fuente para todos los ahorros en medicamentos recetados. If you would like to hear this introductory message again, press 1. Otherwise, stay on the line."

Book Review: Deep Utopia

October 17, 2024 · Original source

Even stricter! What if you need to make a non-gimmicky positive difference that isn’t downstream of someone else’s decision to artificially provide you with purpose? The best the book can do is suggest religious or pseudo-religious rituals. We can’t build robots to go to church for us on Easter or fast for us on Yom Kippur, nor to live decent lives free of sin. If you’re an atheist, maybe you can get a similar effect by honoring your ancestors - perhaps your hard-working grandmother wanted to be remembered by her descendants, and only you can fulfill her last request.

economic justice2 mentions across 2 issues

economic justice is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between March 16, 2022 and March 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Helping the poor becomes economic justice"; "reframe "helping the poor" or "saving the poor" as "pursuing economic justice."". It most often appears alongside 1984, Apollo Mojave, Charity.

Article page: economic justice
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: March 16, 2022
Last seen: March 24, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Justice Creep March 16, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Justice Creep March 24, 2022

1984 2 shared issues
Apollo Mojave 2 shared issues
Charity 2 shared issues
climate justice 2 shared issues
environmental justice 2 shared issues

Source context

Justice Creep

March 16, 2022 · Original source

Helping the poor becomes economic justice. If they’re minorities, then it’s racial justice, itself a subspecies of social justice. Saving the environment becomes environmental justice, except when it’s about climate change in which case it’s climate justice. Caring about young people is actually about fighting for intergenerational justice. The very laws of space and time are subject to spatial justice and temporal justice.

Inline links: economic justice, racial justice, social justice, environmental justice, climate justice, intergenerational justice, spatial justice, temporal justice

This is mostly a semantic shift - instead of saying “we should help the poor”, you can say “we should pursue economic justice”. But different framings have slightly different implications and connotations, and it’s worth examining what connotations all this justice talk has.

“We should pursue economic justice” suggests other assumptions. Current economic conditions are unjust. There is some particular way to make them just, or at least closer to just. We have some kind of obligation to pursue it. We are not helpers or saviors, who can pat ourselves on the back and feel heroic for leaving the world better than we found it. We are some weird superposition of criminals and cops, both responsible for breaking the moral law and responsible for restoring it, trying to redress some sort of violation. The end result isn’t utopia, it’s people getting what they deserve.

Highlights From The Comments On Justice Creep

March 24, 2022 · Original source

So... as someone who actually does use "___" Justice, quite frequently, I'd like to say that I think it's a good thing to reframe "helping the poor" or "saving the poor" as "pursuing economic justice." I don't think it's a good thing for people to think of themselves as saviors, to me that's a really unhealthy and unhelpful mindset which results in people who aren't themselves poor thinking they can be the experts and the decision-makers, and that there is something wrong with poor people, that they need to be "saved" or "fixed." We live in a world where there is enough food to feed everyone, yet people go hungry; enough shelter to keep everyone warm, yet people go cold. To me, that says there is something wrong with our system of resource distribution, not with the people who ended up, for one reason or another, being left out of it.

And Philosophy Bear, as Economic Justice And Climate Justice Are Not Metaphors:

Inline links: Philosophy Bear, Economic Justice And Climate Justice Are Not Metaphors

Nevertheless, yes, climate justice and economic justice- for example- are also about being just in the same way laws against murder are- no stretching of meaning is required…

ECT2 mentions across 2 issues

ECT is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between May 25, 2021 and November 20, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "In ECT, a machine delivers strong electrical current to your brain"; "very strong electrical current of ECT"; "trial of ketamine vs. ECT". It most often appears alongside 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, 5-HTP, 5-HTP.

Article page: ECT
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: May 25, 2021
Last seen: November 20, 2023

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Issue trail

Peer Review Request: Depression May 25, 2021
Open Thread 303 November 20, 2023

2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
amitriptyline 1 shared issues

Source context

Contra Kirkegaard On Evolutionary Definitions Of Mental Illness

May 25, 2021 · Original source

The short version: Depression has a combination of biological, psychological, and social causes. You can address the social causes by changing your life circumstances (and research suggests people underestimate the potential benefits of making major life changes). You can address the psychological causes with therapy; possible therapies are diverse and complicated but I especially recommend “behavioral activation” therapy (where you try to keep a schedule and also do new, interesting things) and David Burns’ book Feeling Good. You can address the biological causes with a combination of lifestyle changes, medications, and supplements. Consider exercising more and adapting a modified Mediterranean diet. Consider taking antidepressants like escitalopram and bupropion, and supplements like l-methylfolate. Other non-chemical biological options include light therapy (safe and easy), transcranial magnetic stimulation (more complicated), and electroconvulsive therapy (difficult but extremely effective last-ditch solution). If something treats your depression, continue it for some length of time depending on the type of intervention, then consider withdrawing it to see if you can maintain your mood without it.

If lifestyle changes, medication, and psychotherapy don’t work, there are some more-involved but very powerful strategies for dealing with treatment-resistant depression, including wake therapy, ketamine, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and electroconvulsive therapy.

There are two powerful depression therapies that are more physics than chemistry: trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).

Open Thread 303

November 20, 2023 · Original source

2: And some good comments on the ketamine post. Thomas Reilly says the study was underpowered. Awais Aftab compares to a recent very positive trial of ketamine vs. ECT. Eremolalos on a meta-analysis. Nate Praschan argues that anaesthetics might block ketamine directly.

Inline links: says the study was underpowered, a recent very positive trial of ketamine vs. ECT, on a meta-analysis, anaesthetics might block ketamine directly

EEA2 mentions across 2 issues

EEA is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between September 07, 2023 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)"; "which assumes the EEA (see the Supplemental Material)". It most often appears alongside Denmark, schizophrenia, Scott.

Article page: EEA
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: September 07, 2023
Last seen: July 03, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Kirkegaard On Evolutionary Definitions Of Mental Illness September 07, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

Denmark 2 shared issues
schizophrenia 2 shared issues
Scott 2 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@alextisyoung 1 shared issues

Source context

September 07, 2023 · Original source

Emil didn’t mention this in his post, but a common response to this complaint is that the definition should actually rely on conditions in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA), ie the African savanna 100,000 years ago, when there were no condoms.

A 65 year old man who’s only attracted to adult women 40+. Most people in our society would classify 1 (an ephebophile) and 2 (a non-obligate pedophile) as mentally ill or at least worrying edge cases. But I think Emil’s theory rules that only Person 3 (the man attracted to people close to his own age) is mentally ill, since he’s ruled out mating with the vast majority of fertile women. 4: Plato …never had children. “Platonic relationship” jokes aside, I guess he was too busy philosophizing. Great men (and women) who can’t slow down to raise a family seem to be a type. Is an interest in philosophy (or science, or art, or any other worthy endeavor) that reaches the point where it consumes your life a mental illness? Kierkegaard bites the bullet and admits that the priests and monks who took vows of celibacy were mentally ill by his definition. But I think he has many more bullets of this type to bite. Even if we agree that we should classify Plato as mentally ill, this again seems very different from the practical concept of “this person has mental problems and needs help with them”. 5: Chronic Pain, Panic Attacks, Or, If You Insist, Nightmares Is chronic pain a mental illness? It seems pretty bad. But as long as it doesn’t impede your ability to hunt, gather, or have sex, I think Emil would have to say no. Same with panic attacks, anxiety, etc. If it’s hard to imagine a form of chronic pain that doesn’t impede those things, consider nightmares. These surely don’t impede any daytime activity, but chronic nightmare disorders seem very unpleasant! I think Emil has to bite the bullet that conditions which make people miserable and ruin their lives aren’t mental disorders as long as they don’t affect functioning. 6: Severity In his post, Emil includes a few turns of phrase indicating we can talk about severity - ie some mental illnesses are more severe than others. But by his framing, “severe mental illness” would indicate not schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, but homosexuality and asexuality. After all, schizophrenics are more likely to have children than gays. Again, this is pretty different from the way you want to use words when talking about real-world problems around how to help people with mental problems get better. 7: Is Emil’s Definition Of Mental Illness Itself A Mental Illness? Emil’s crusade to reclassify homosexuality as a mental illness doesn’t sound like it would be very popular in his home country of Denmark. Maybe there are even some nice Danish women who would be willing to date Emil otherwise, but are turned off by his un-PC opinions. Willingness to violate taboos couldn’t have been very helpful in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. I imagine some distant ancestor of Emil’s standing up in front of the tribe and saying “Me think Bear God stupid and ugly! Me piss on Bear Idol!” Might mean fewer Kirkegaards around today. So is contrarianism a mental illness? I would say no, because it’s a matter of personal choice and serves a valuable social function. I’m not sure what Emil’s answer would be. * * * I don’t want to assert any of these too strongly. Maybe Emil knows something I don’t about the EEA, and can prove that actually ADHD would be maladaptive there, or ephebophilia would get you in trouble. If so, I think that would restore some concordance between our intuitive notion of mental disorders and Emil’s version, but that concordance would be coincidental, not necessary. The next day we might learn some different fact about the EEA that would make the two notions discordant again. So to repeat my claim: mental-disorder-(Emil) and mental-disorder-(Scott) both describe useful concepts, but they’re not the same concept. Mental-disorder-(Emil) is useful for talking about evolutionary genetics; mental-disorder-(Scott) is useful for talking about present day mental health problems and what to do about them. We won’t convince people to literally use the terms “mental-disorder-(Emil)” and “mental-disorder-(Scott)”. So who should keep custody of the current term “mental disorder” and who should have to make up a new word for their thing? I think Emil should have to make up the new word, because: There are a few thousand evolutionary psychologists, and a few hundred million normal people who want to talk about mental disorders for normal reasons (like because they have them).

Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

First, his claim that extended pedigrees drop the EEA is not quite correct. For example, the Swedish study he cites uses an extended twin-family design which assumes the EEA (see the Supplemental Material).

EEG2 mentions across 2 issues

EEG is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 26, 2022 and February 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Shared environmental effect being measured by EEG at the intersection of poverty and cognition"; "Their team also plans to investigate other uses of EEG, including speeding progress in vipassana meditation". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 23andme, ACX.

Article page: EEG
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 26, 2022
Last seen: February 10, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Against That Poverty And Infant EEGs Study January 26, 2022
ACX Grants Results 2024 February 10, 2024

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
ACX Book Review 1 shared issues
ACX Grants 1 shared issues

Source context

Against That Poverty And Infant EEGs Study

January 26, 2022 · Original source

Before we start: why be suspicious of this paper? Hundreds of studies come out daily, we don't have enough time to nitpick all of them. Why this one? For me, it's because it's a shared environmental effect being measured by EEG at the intersection of poverty and cognition.

ACX Grants Results 2024

February 10, 2024 · Original source

Alexander Putilin and Andrew X Stewart, $32,500, to try to replicate a study showing that brain wave synchronization can significantly speed learning rates and improve focus. I asked someone to work on this in this post, and Alexander and Andrew were the ones who stepped up. Their team also plans to investigate other uses of EEG, including speeding progress in vipassana meditation (like an insight equivalent to Jhourney).

Inline links: Alexander Putilin, this post, Jhourney

effective altruism movement2 mentions across 2 issues

effective altruism movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 29, 2021 and November 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The effective altruism movement, which largely grew directly out of the rationalist movement"; "Journalists often connect Anthropic with the effective altruism movement". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, Bill Gates, EA.

Article page: effective altruism movement
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: November 28, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021
In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023

80,000 Hours 2 shared issues
Bill Gates 2 shared issues
EA 2 shared issues
#57 1 shared issues
Adam D’Angelo 1 shared issues

Source context

January 29, 2021 · Original source

The effective altruism movement, which largely grew directly out of the rationalist movement, seeks to maximize the efficacy with which charitable donations are directed using standard rationalist methods. It is a tight-knit community that strongly privileges rationalist approaches over all other forms of knowledge-making (such as from the humanities, continental philosophy, or humanistic social sciences) and tends to dismiss input not formulated in rationalist terms. The community also has a strong and explicitly stated view that its activities uniquely contribute to the achievement of “the good”: of their top five recommendations of most productive careers by a leading community organization, two suggest being a researcher or support staff within the movement, and two others recommend working on the AI alignment problem (see the next point). Until recently, much of the analysis and funding emerging from the community has pointed towards a focus on extremely unlikely but potentially catastrophic risks, such as alien, asteroid or biological catastrophes.

I want to briefly respond to Weyl's critique of rationality and effective altruism:

And would Weyl's suggestions really help prevent populist backlashes? He wishes we abandoned our overly-rational ways in favor of "humanities, Continental philosophy, and the humanistic social sciences" - isn't that usually code for stuff like queer theory, postcolonial theory, and postmodernism? Are working-class Trump supporters really banging on their keyboards when they read about effective altruism, shouting "YOU NEED TO STOP TRYING TO BE OBJECTIVE AND FACT-BASED, AND BE MORE OPEN TO INSIGHTS FROM QUEER THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM"?

Book Review: The Geography Of Madness

November 28, 2023 · Original source

The founders of Anthropic included several EAs (I can’t tell if CEO Dario Amodei is an EA or not). The original investors included Dustin Moskowitz, Sam Bankman-Fried, Jaan Tallinn, and various EA organizations. Its Wikipedia article says that “Journalists often connect Anthropic with the effective altruism movement”. Anthropic is controlled by a board of trustees, most of whose members are effective altruists.

Inline links: board of trustees

Search “effective altruism” on social media right now, and it’s pretty grim.

But the journalists think we’re a sinister conspiracy that has “taken over Washington” and have the whole Democratic Party in our pocket. Click to expand. Source: https://twitter.com/the_megabase/status/1728771254336036963 The only thing everyone agrees on is that the only two things EAs ever did were “endorse SBF” and “bungle the recent OpenAI corporate coup.”

Inline links: “taken over Washington”

Electromagnetic hypersensitivity2 mentions across 2 issues

Electromagnetic hypersensitivity is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between February 22, 2023 and May 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Electromagnetic hypersensitivity is a condition where some people supposedly become very sick"; "there are other times people had that debate and the illness did turn out to be entirely psychosomatic - ... electromagnetic hypersensitivity". It most often appears alongside United Kingdom, US, 15th Commandment.

Article page: Electromagnetic hypersensitivity
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: February 22, 2023
Last seen: May 11, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: The Geography Of Madness February 22, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality May 11, 2023

United Kingdom 2 shared issues
US 2 shared issues
15th Commandment 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues

Source context

February 22, 2023 · Original source

This image (source) of a witch stealing a man’s penis, with a box of previously-stolen penises to her right accompanies the 1411 poem “Flowers Of Virtue” in its 1486 edition. Malleus Maleficarum was published in 1486, so if the original text of Flowers Of Virtue contained the incident this picture refers to, it would predate Malleus. But the original text is written in poetic medieval German and I can’t find a good translation. When I wrote my review of the Malleus, people were surprised at the penis-stealing witch chapters. Yet nothing could possibly be less surprising; the penis-stealing witches are timeless and omnipresent. When commenters continued to doubt, I promised them this review of Frank Bures’ Geography Of Madness. II. Frank Bures is a journalist. In 2001, he came across an unusual BBC article: a mob had killed twelve people in Nigeria, believing them to be penis-stealing witches. A few months later, a similar article: five people, Benin. He tried to pitch a story about the phenomenon to his editor, who “said he couldn’t pay me to fly to Nigeria and find essentially . . . nothing”. For some reason - and this is the point at which I start to worry about narrator reliability - Bures became obsessed with this. He couldn’t get it out of his mind. He started scraping together money to visit Africa on his own, story be damned: Nigeria gnawed at me. I knew that it was a terrible time to leave. I knew that [my wife] Bridgit, newly pregnant, wouldn’t want me to go. But I also knew that I had to, and that if I didn’t it would be a lifelong regret. . . three months later, I was the lone tourist on a plane full of Nigerians descending to Lagos. Africa is a relative newcomer to penis-stealing witches: The first recorded incident of penis theft in Africa I could find took place in Sudan in the 1960s. But in the mid- to late seventies in Nigeria, there were waves of well-documented cases. One of these happened in the northern city of Kaduna, where a psychiatrist named Dr. Sunday Ilechukwu was working in his office when a policeman arrived, escorting two men. One of them said he needed a medical assessment: He had accused the other of making his penis disappear. As with [a previously discussed incident], this had caused a disturbance in the street. During Ilechukwu’s examination, he later recounted, the victim stared straight ahead while the doctor examined his penis and pronounced him normal. “Exclaiming,” Ilechukwu wrote in the Transcultural Psychiatric Review, “the patient looked down at his groin for the first time, suggesting that the genitals had just reappeared.” According to Ilechukwu, this was part of an epidemic of magical penis theft that swept through Nigeria between 1975 and 1977. “Men could be seen in the streets of Lagos holding on to their genitalia either openly or discreetly with their hand in their pockets,” Ilechukwu wrote. “Women were also seen holding on to their breasts directly or discreetly, by crossing the hands across the chest . . . Vigilance and anticipatory aggression were thought to be good prophylaxes. This led to further breakdown of law and order.” During an incident, the victim would yell: “Thief! My genitals are gone!” Immediately, a culprit would be identified, apprehended by a crowd, and often killed. …but it’s been making up for lost time. Bures was able to find and interview one previous penis theft victim, plus the friend of another. Both described similar stories: someone had bumped up against them under weird circumstances, they immediately noticed their penis was much smaller than usual, they called out the culprit, and - apparently because the witch involved didn’t want to get in trouble - their penis was restored. Whatever weird itch this topic had given Bures, this didn’t satisfy him. He writes, very lucidly, about a desire to get closer to “the story”. He started bumping up against random Nigerians in suspicious ways, hoping one of them would accuse him of stealing their penis. Bures was an obvious foreigner, and a these panics often resulted in the suspected penis-stealer getting lynched, so this was a crazy thing to do. He could easily have died. Instead, everyone politely ignored him, nothing happened, and a slightly-disappointed Bures flew back to his poor family and abandoned his weird obsession. III. …for four years. After that the bug bit him again and he flew to Asia, long a center of penis-stealing witch activity. There are nature documentaries on lions, dolphins, even dinosaurs. They all share a common pattern: you talk about your subject’s habitat, their diet, their behaviors. The Asian half of The Geography Of Madness has the feel of a nature documentary on penis-stealing witches. And the last beat of every nature documentary has to be: this majestic creature, which once roamed from one end of the region to the other, is now endangered, threatened by increasing globalization and industrial activity. This is true for the witches also. Bures’ time in Hong Kong was a bust. There was a penis theft panic there forty years earlier, and he was able to interview some of the doctors who treated it. But they all said that was long ago. Now everybody is Westernized and has Western fears like vaccine injury or structural racism. They get Western mental disorders like depression and anorexia. The idea of witches stealing their penises seems as risible to them as it probably does to you. Singapore was also a bust. Bures had hoped it wouldn’t be, because it’s full of Malaysians, and Malaysia holds a special place in history as the spot where penis-stealing witches first made contact with Western science. The Malaysian word for the condition is koro (it means “head of a turtle”, based on an analogy to the penis retracting into the body the same way a turtle’s head retracts into its shell), and it is by this name that the condition gets listed in the DSM and the rest of the medical literature. Neither I nor Bures was able to find many ethnic Malays worrying about koro; most of the activity seems to be from Malaysian-Chinese. The Chinese definitely worry about it, attributing it to a wide variety of causes including poisoning, yin-yang imbalance, and - yes - witches. But Bures found nothing among any ethnicity. Once again, all the doctors said it used to be common, but disappeared as the city industrialized and adopted Western ways. Guangzhou was also a bust. The doctors said the same thing - in the old days, there would be huge epidemics of koro, social contagions that would impact hundreds of people at once. Now only a few superstitious rural people still believed. One traditional healer said he saw “three or four” cases a year. All the educated people had moved on. I once saw a nature documentary on Tasmanian tigers. Most people believe these have been extinct since 1930. Still, there are occasional unconfirmed sightings, especially in a remote area called Cape York, and every so often some scientists trudge off to Cape York with traps and cameras in the hopes of getting lucky. Bures decides end his own nature documentary with an expedition to the Cape York of the penis-stealing witches. This is a remote island village in China called Lin’gao, where in 1984: . . . rumors spread of a fox ghost - sometimes disguised an old woman roaming the land—collecting penises in covered baskets she carried on a shoulder pole. When two young men approached her and told her to uncover the baskets, they looked inside, saw that the baskets were filled with penises and died instantly of fright. Panic about koro would hit a village and last three to four days. When residents heard about a case in a neighboring village, the panic would subside, since that meant the ghost had moved on. The attacks slowly made their way around the island. The ghost struck at night, when villagers were sleeping. A chill would creep into the room, and suddenly the victim would feel his penis shrinking inward. He would grab it and run outside for help. A twenty-eight-year-old office worker was at home one night when: > “ . . . he heard a gong being beaten and the terrifying noises made by people who were panicking in a nearby neighborhood. He suddenly became anxious and experienced the sensation that his penis was shrinking. He was seized with panic and shouted loudly for help. Several men in the neighborhood rushed in and tried to rescue him by forcefully pulling his penis and making loud sounds to chase away the evil ghost that was thought to be affecting him.” Neighbors and family members were enlisted in rescue operations. Victims were beaten with sandals and slippers while the middle finger of their left had was squeezed, so that the ghost could exit the body there. The epidemic engulfed the island, with the exception of the Li and Miao minorities, who seemed to be immune to such fears. Researchers estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 people were affected, but that “no one died from genital retraction.” One baby, however, did die when his mother tried to feed him pepper juice, and a girl was beaten to death during a two-hour exorcism. “Numerous men suffered injuries to their penises as a result of ‘rescuing’ actions.” Iron pins were sometimes inserted through the nipples of women to prevent retraction, which caused infections as well. This was, as far as anyone knows, the last great koro epidemic in Asia. Bures had a terrible time getting to Lin’gao. He had equal trouble getting an interpreter; the natives spoke a language called Be, very distantly related to Thai but not at all to regular Chinese. Finally he found someone who was able to contact a local shaman. Like any good doctor, the shaman referred him to a specialist - in this case, the designated anti-ghost shaman, who lived in a different village. He spent most of his time off on various ghost-fighting missions, but eventually Bures and his team were able to track him down. I want you to picture the scene. An American journalist has been traveling the world in search of a dying variety of witchcraft. Now he’s reached the end of the line, the wildest and most primitive region of China. With great difficulty, he has procured an interpreter. Together, they consult a shaman, who sends them on a quest to find a second, wiser shaman who specializes in ghosts. After many trials and tribulations, he reaches the second, wiser, ghost-specialist shaman, who invites him into his home, filled with strange charms and magical images. “Tell me your question,” says the shaman. And Bures asks: “What do you know about penis-stealing witches?” . . . and the shaman answers: “Haha, no one believes in that stuff anymore.” IV. So as a nature documentary, The Geography of Madness is kind of a bust. Still, Bures rescues it with some great analysis of culture-bound mental illness. A culture-bound mental illness is one that only affects people who know about it, and especially people who believe in it. Often it doesn’t make sense from a scientific point of view (there’s no such thing as witches, and the penis can’t retract into the body). It sometimes spreads contagiously: someone gets a first case, the rest of the village panics, and now everyone knows about it / believes in it / is thinking about it, and so many other people get it too. Different cultures have their own set of culture-bound illnesses. Sometimes there are commonalities - many cultures have something something penis something witches - but the details vary, and a victim almost always gets a case that matches the way their own culture understands it. THESE PEOPLE ARE NOT MAKING IT UP. I cannot stress this enough. There are plenty of examples of people driving metal objects through their penis in order to pull it out of their body or prevent the witches from getting it or something like that. There is no amount of commitment to the bit which will make people drive metal objects through their penis. People have died from these conditions - not the illness itself, which is fake, but from wasting away worrying about it, or taking dangerous sham treatments, or getting into fights with people they think caused it. If you think of it as “their unconscious mind must be doing something like making it up, but their conscious mind believes it 100%”, you will be closer to the truth, though there are various reasons I don’t like that framing. In Rajasthan, India, people come to the hospital with gilahari (lizard) syndrome. Patients say a lizard-like mass, sometimes visible as a skin swelling, is crawling around the body. They express terror that it will reach their airway and suffocate them. Japanese people may contract jikoshu-kyofu, a debilitating fear that they have terrible body odor. No amount of reassurances by friends and psychiatrists can convince these people that they smell normal, nor will any number of deodorants or perfumes make them comfortable. The French suffer from bouffée délirante, where a perfectly healthy person suddenly becomes completely psychotic, with well-formed hallucinations and delusions - then recovers just as suddenly, sometimes over hours or days. This is not how psychosis works anywhere except France and a few former French colonies. Traditional Chinese medicine monitors the balance between yin and yang. The male orgasm can deplete yang, and sure enough in China (but nowhere else) some men suffer traditional symptoms of yang depletion after they orgasm. “The symptoms can last weeks to months after a single orgasm, [and include] chills, dizziness, [and] backache”. The phrase “run amok” comes from Malaysia, where it referred to a specific phenomenon: some person who had been unhappy for a long time would suddenly snap, kill a bunch of people, then say they had no memory of doing it. Malaysian culture totally rolls with this and doesn’t hold it against them; the unhappiness is a risk factor for possession by a tiger spirit, which commits the killings. Although Malays have been doing this since at least the 1700s, there are some fascinating parallels with modern US mass shootings that suggest the damn tiger spirits have finally made it to the US common psychological origins. I have seen exactly one demonic possession case in my ten years as a psychiatrist. The man fell to the ground, mouth foaming, chanting strange syllables and the names of Biblical demons. My attending doctor at the time - one of those people who somehow manages to be an expert in everything - was an expert in demonic possession, and told us that he was in no way psychotic, antipsychotics wouldn’t help him (except insofar as they help everyone by decreasing all behaviors), and he needed to “work through his issues”. The patient was uncooperative - he was only visiting MDs because the local bishop wouldn’t call in an exorcist until he got a psych exam - and eventually left against medical advice. After going down the list, Bures asks the correct next question: how do we know whether or not our own mental illnesses are just as culture-bound as the Japanese or Malaysians’? Cultures that believe in witches have witch-related culture-bound illnesses; cultures that believe in demons have demon-related ones. We believe in science, so we should expect sciencey-sounding culture-bound illnesses, and these might be hard to tell apart from other, more physical conditions. So how suspicious should we be, and of what? Certainly we have some culture-bound mental illnesses. Electromagnetic hypersensitivity is a condition where some people supposedly become very sick when exposed to electromagnetic fields (like from cell phones). This sounds very scientific and makes perfect sense according to our culture, but researchers have found that placebo electrical devices make them exactly as sick as real ones, and that devices they don’t know about don’t make them sick at all. These people’s pain is real, and their lives are very difficult (although a few have found refuge in the National Radio Quiet Zone, an area in Virginia where the government enforces a ban on electromagnetic transmissions for secret military reasons). But their condition only afflicts them because they believe in it, much like with koro. Fine, everyone knows that one’s not real. What about DSM-style mental disorders, the stuff everyone’s supposed to believe in? Are those culture-bound? Unfortunately, I think Bures kind of flubs this section. He decides to focus on PMS (premenstrual syndrome), which is officially included in the DSM as PMDD (premenstrual dysphoric disorder). After discussing the history of hysteria, he writes that: Today, hysteria is never diagnosed, except by unwise husbands. In 1931, however, an American gynecologist named Robert Frank revived the idea in a new guise. He published an article titled, “The hormonal causes of premenstrual tension.” Frank described symptoms that occurred in the week before menstruation: irritability, bloating, fatigue, depression, attacks of pain, nervousness, restlessness, and the impulse for “foolish and ill considered actions,” due to ovarian activity. Again, the cause was the uterus. Then in 1953, British physician Katharina Dalton elaborated on this, arguing the condition came from fluctuation of estrogen and progesterone. She called it Premenstrual Syndrome, and soon symptoms grew to include: anxiety, sadness, moodiness, constipation or diarrhea, feeling out of control, insomnia, food cravings, increased sex drive, anger, arguments with family or friends, poor judgment, lack of physical coordination, decreased efficiency, increased personal strength or power, feelings of connection to nature or to other women, seizures, convulsions, asthma attacks, not to mention flare ups in asthma, allergies, sinusitis, anxiety disorders, irritable bowel syndrome, migraines, and multiple sclerosis. If any of these symptoms occurred in the second half of the menstrual cycle, one had PMS. Estimates of the number of women afflicted ranged from 5 percent to 95 percent. In the 1980s, three women in the UK were tried for arson, assault and manslaughter. The three all claimed they had diminished responsibility due to PMS, and got reduced sentences on the condition that they underwent hormone treatment. After that, according to one study, American women flooded doctors with requests for help with their PMS. “Popular groups like PMS Action were founded to promote recognition and treatment of PMS by medical professionals. Private PMS clinics began to appear in the USA, modeled after those in the UK, and progesterone therapy was enthusiastically adopted, much to the chagrin of many gynaecologists who viewed its use as ‘unscientific’ and ‘commercial’, not to mention unlicensed." Based on all this, the 1987 version of the DSM-III included a new category: Late Luteal Phase Disorder (luteal refers to progesterone). It was proposed as a topic for further research, but despite the absence of such research, it was included in the 1994 edition of the DSM-IV under the name Premenstrual Dysmorphic Disorder, or PMDD.96 In 2013, in the DSM-5, it was given its own category as a full-fledged mental illness. Yet neither PMS nor PMDD occur in most cultures. There are no biomarkers to measure them by. No conclusive correlation has ever been found between estrogen or progesterone levels and PMS. As one study noted, “the more time that women of ethnic minorities spend living in the United States, the more likely they are to report PMDD. Thus, if we are to accept PMDD as a reified medical disorder, then we must also accept exposure to U.S. culture as a risk factor for contracting PMDD.” If it is a syndrome at all, it’s a cultural one. I asked my wife what she thought of this, and she told me: The day before her first-ever period, as a teenager, when she had never really thought about PMS, she felt exceptionally weird, emotional, and generally off, to the point where it seemed to demand an explanation. Then she had her first-ever period, and retroactively explains it as PMS.

Inline links: source, my review of the, Geography Of Madness, Be, gilahari (lizard) syndrome, jikoshu-kyofu, bouffée délirante, suffer traditional symptoms of yang depletion, run amok, Electromagnetic hypersensitivity, National Radio Quiet Zone

Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality

May 11, 2023 · Original source

I think people tend to confuse the debate “does psychosomatic illness exist?”, which isn’t a real question because everyone agrees it does, with “is illness X entirely psychosomatic, such that it has no organic cases?” As Siebe points out, there are many times people had that debate and doctors discovered a firm biological basis for the illness. As Siebe doesn’t point out, there are other times people had that debate and the illness did turn out to be entirely psychosomatic - Morgellon’s, electromagnetic hypersensitivity, candida hypersensitivity, etc. I think Havana Syndrome is trending this way too. You can’t just go “Here’s a time Team Organic won, therefore Team Organic is always right, wooo!” There are no teams!

Inline links: Morgellon’s, electromagnetic hypersensitivity, candida hypersensitivity, Havana Syndrome

ELIZA2 mentions across 2 issues

ELIZA is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between May 13, 2022 and September 18, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "The first time was in 1966, when ELIZA passed the Turing test. ELIZA was a chatbot"; "When the program ELIZA passed the Turing test"; "ELIZA was already fooling people in 1964". It most often appears alongside Turing test, AIDER, Ajeya Cotra.

Article page: ELIZA
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: May 13, 2022
Last seen: September 18, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Consciousness And The Brain May 13, 2022
Sakana, Strawberry, and Scary AI September 18, 2024

Turing test 2 shared issues
AIDER 1 shared issues
Ajeya Cotra 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
AlphaFold 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Consciousness And The Brain

May 13, 2022 · Original source

We know this because it happened several times. The first time was in 1966, when ELIZA passed the Turing test. ELIZA was a chatbot who could fool some people to believe that they talk with a real human. Before ELIZA, people assumed that only an intelligent machine could do that, but it just turned out that it is really easy to fool others. Other tests for intelligence were playing chess, playing a whole variety of games, or recognizing cat images. Machines can do all this by now, and this is awesome. And yet, every success sparked new disappointment, because we didn't find any magic ingredient, some quality that would make a difference between intelligent and non-intelligent. When the groundbreaking GPT-3 and DALL-E suddenly could write news articles or poetry, or could dream up snails made of harp... the main improvement was that they used more raw computation power than the previous versions.

Inline links: a whole variety of games, GPT-3, DALL-E, snails made of harp

Do you feel disappointed by the book? At least some people did. When the program ELIZA passed the Turing test, a common reaction was “This is not what we had meant”. Some reactions to this book were similar. Dehaene’s concept of consciousness is much more mundane than the lofty associations that we commonly attach to the word consciousness. But if we actually want to nail it down and get a more substantial definition than “whatever elevates me above mere animal”, then “the thing that happens during conscious perceptions and does not happen during unconscious perceptions” sounds pretty convincing to me.

Sakana, Strawberry, and Scary AI

September 18, 2024 · Original source

(and “a year or two from now” is being generous - a dumb chatbot passed a supposedly-official-albeit-stupid Turing Test attempt in 2014, and ELIZA was already fooling people in 1964.)

Inline links: passed, ELIZA

First, maybe we’ve learned that it’s unexpectedly easy to mimic intelligence without having it. This seems closest to ELIZA, which was obviously a cheap trick.

Like ELIZA making conversation, Deep Blue playing chess, or GPT-4 writing poetry, all of this is boring.

ELK2 mentions across 2 issues

ELK is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 26, 2022 and November 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "this line of thinking leads to ELK ( Eliciting Latent Knowledge ), a technical report / contest / paradigm"; "And so we return to ELK. We add an ELK head on to the superintelligent security AI"; "worst-case ELK — i.e. the problem of devising a training strategy to get an AI to report what it knows". It most often appears alongside ARC, Adversarial Training For High-Stakes Reliability, AI.

Article page: ELK
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: July 26, 2022
Last seen: November 28, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

ELK And The Problem Of Truthful AI July 26, 2022
Can This AI Save Teenage Spy Alex Rider From A Terrible Fate? November 28, 2022

ARC 2 shared issues
Adversarial Training For High-Stakes Reliability 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI Alignment Forum 1 shared issues
AI X-Risk Podcast 1 shared issues

Source context

ELK And The Problem Of Truthful AI

July 26, 2022 · Original source

Extended far enough, this line of thinking leads to ELK (Eliciting Latent Knowledge), a technical report / contest / paradigm run by the Alignment Research Center (including familiar names like Paul Christiano).

Inline links: Eliciting Latent Knowledge, Paul Christiano

Notice the “reality” section of the third example. The thief has made it look (to the human) like the diamond is safe. The human sees a diamond and positively reinforces the AI. The AI learns that thieves stealing the diamonds and fooling humans about it is great. It’s important not to think of this as the thief “defeating” or “fooling” the AI. The AI could be fully superintelligent, able to outfox the thief trivially or destroy him with a thought, and that wouldn’t change the situation at all. The problem is that the AI was never a thief-stopping machine. It was always a reward-getting machine, and it turns out the AI can get more reward by cooperating with the thief than by thwarting him. So the interesting scientific point here isn’t “you can fool a camera by taping a photo to it”. The interesting point is “we thought we were training an AI to do one thing, but actually we had no idea what was going on, and we were training it to do something else”. In fact, maybe the thief never tries this, and the AI comes up with this plan itself! In the process of randomly manipulating traps and doodads, it might hit on the policy of manipulating the images it sends through the camera. If it manipulates the image to look like the diamond is still there (even when it isn’t), that will always get good feedback, and the AI will be incentivized to double down on that strategy. Much like in the GPT-3 example, if the training simulations include examples of thieves fooling human observers which are marked as “good”, the AI will definitely learn the goal “try to convince humans that the diamond is safe”. If the training simulations are perfect and everyone is very careful, it will just maybe learn this goal - a million cases of the diamond being safe and humans saying this is good fail to distinguish between “good means the diamond is safe” and “good means humans think the diamond is safe”. The machine will make its decision for inscrutable AI reasons, or just flip a coin. So, again, are you feeling lucky? IV. "I'm Not Owned!" I Continue To Insist As I Slowly Shrink And Transform Into A Paperclip In real life there are some trivial kludges you might try first here. Force the AI to give its human raters 3D models of the entire room instead of just camera images. Hire a really good cybersecurity person to make sure the camera is un-hackable. These are too boring to be worth the ARC team’s time. This scenario is a metaphor for this broader class of situations - including GPT-3 lying to you and superintelligences trying to turn you into paperclips. So assume you live in Security Hell where you can never be fully sure your information channels aren’t hacked. The AI can be fully sure - it’s superintelligent or whatever - but you, personally, cannot. Your only solution is to somehow make the AI tell you the truth. And so we return to ELK. We add an ELK head on to the superintelligent security AI, train it to report truthfully on the AI’s innards. Then we ask: is the diamond really safe? The ELK head consults the innards, processes the memory banks of the security vault AI according to some function, and reports back with an answer. The ARC team really like modeling this as Bayes nets: I don’t know much about these, but from the picture I gather they’re kind of like causal diagrams or neural networks - a member in good standing of the broad class of “little circles connected by lines”. Each circle corresponds to some concept in the AI’s innards (roughly defined; the AI’s “concepts” might be completely incomprehensible to us), and anything the AI knows corresponds to some combination of circle activations and weights. We humans also have some Bayes net, probably very different from the AI’s. The job of the ELK head - our purpose-trained truth-telling AI - is to translate from the AI’s ontology to ours and back again. This matters because the reporter (ie the ELK head) needs a good model of both the security AI’s Bayes net, and the human programmer’s Bayes net. But since it has the model of the human Bayes net, it can (if it wants) do inference there. That is, the failure mode is that the reporter AI tries to tell me what I expected to hear, instead of what’s true. One barrier to that is that the reporter AI might not know what I expect to hear. Unfortunately, that barrier is easy to overcome, because it has to know how humans think, so it could ask itself “what would a human expect to hear in this situation?” The ARC team discuss two classes of translation system: The direct translator (good) looks at what the security AI is “thinking”, faithfully translates its conclusions, and accurately relays them to its programmers.

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!46JI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d65a74a-588b-4a38-8083-0992a4ac7c04_643x571.png

We think that worst-case ELK — i.e. the problem of devising a training strategy to get an AI to report what it knows no matter how [stochastic gradient descent] shapes its mind internally — is one of the most exciting open problems in alignment theory (if not the most exciting one)...If we solve ELK in the worst case then we no longer have to rely on hope and are significantly more likely to survive in worlds where AI progress is fast or humanity’s response is uncoordinated; this is ARC’s Plan A [...]

Can This AI Save Teenage Spy Alex Rider From A Terrible Fate?

November 28, 2022 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

ELO2 mentions across 2 issues

ELO is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 04, 2022 and May 08, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "that just continues the trendline in ELO I just drew based on MCTS bots"; "Elo , a scoring system originally from chess which measures which of two players wins more often". It most often appears alongside 2013, Agricultural Revolution, AI.

Article page: ELO
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 04, 2022
Last seen: May 08, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds April 04, 2022
Constitutional AI: RLHF On Steroids May 08, 2023

2013 1 shared issues
Agricultural Revolution 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI alignment theory 1 shared issues
Ajeya 1 shared issues

Source context

Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds

April 04, 2022 · Original source

The impact of GPT-3 had nothing whatsoever to do with its perplexity on Penn Treebank . . . the impact of GPT-3 was in establishing that trendlines did continue in a way that shocked pretty much everyone who'd written off 'naive' scaling strategies. Progress is made out of stacked sigmoids: if the next sigmoid doesn't show up, progress doesn't happen. Trends happen, until they stop. Trendlines are not caused by the laws of physics. You can dismiss AlphaGo by saying "oh, that just continues the trendline in ELO I just drew based on MCTS bots", but the fact remains that MCTS progress had stagnated, and here we are in 2021, and pure MCTS approaches do not approach human champions, much less beat them. Appealing to trendlines is roughly as informative as "calories in calories out"; 'the trend continued because the trend continued'. A new sigmoid being discovered is extremely important.

Constitutional AI: RLHF On Steroids

May 08, 2023 · Original source

...up along some Pareto frontier ; they can’t be more helpful without sacrificing harmlessness, or vice versa. Here, Anthropic measures helpfulness and harmlessness through Elo , a scoring system originally from chess which measures which of two players wins more often. If AI #1 has helpfulness Elo of 200, and AI #2 has helpfulness Elo of 100, and you ask them both a question, AI #1 should be more helpful 64% of the time. The graph abo...

EMDR2 mentions across 2 issues

EMDR is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between February 13, 2021 and May 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "First, it justifies various psychotherapies - EMDR and coherence therapy seem to come out especially well here"; "In EMDR it's eye movements". It most often appears alongside Bessel van der Kolk, coherence therapy, 5-HT2A receptors.

Article page: EMDR
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: February 13, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2024

Issue trail

The Precision Of Sensory Evidence February 13, 2021
Book Review: The Others Within Us May 21, 2024

Bessel van der Kolk 2 shared issues
coherence therapy 2 shared issues
5-HT2A receptors 1 shared issues
AMPA receptors 1 shared issues
ampakines 1 shared issues

Source context

The Precision Of Sensory Evidence

February 13, 2021 · Original source

First, it justifies various psychotherapies - EMDR and coherence therapy seem to come out especially well here - that focus on trying to get the brain to pay unusually precise attention, under unusually safe conditions, to something it usually represses. If dysfunctional negative emotions come from a situation where the attention you're able to focus on a negative belief/memory is so low-precision that you can't override your prior that it's terrible, you need to find a way to focus high-precision attention on it and hold it there even though that will start out being hard and aversive. Trauma-focused therapies seem particularly designed to do that - and maybe something about the eye movements in EMDR specifically increases the available precision of your attention?

Inline links: coherence therapy

Book Review: The Others Within Us

May 21, 2024 · Original source

That just leaves the apparently-successful exorcisms. Part of the story must be placebo effects. Our culture’s scientific materialist paradigm helps us get effectively placebo-ed by medicine (even medications that work have associated placebo effects stronger than the real chemical effect). Cultures with a spiritual paradigm can probably be effectively placebo-ed by exorcism. But I know that I, with my medication experience, can’t match some of the cures that Falconer claims to have effected, so something else must be going on. Here I can only say that most good trauma therapies seem to be telling the person that the trauma and its associated compensatory behavior are no longer adaptive, plus some strategy to really dig into the traumatized part of the brain and make it sink in on an emotional level. In hypnotherapy the strategy is hypnosis. In EMDR it’s eye movements. In coherence therapy it’s visualizing the contradictory beliefs really hard. In IFS, it’s interacting with symbolic Parts of yourself in a lucid-dream-like trance state. Seems like a potentially good strategy! In all the exorcisms Falconer describes, I’m struck by his careful preparatory work where he tries to find the beliefs and experiences associated with the demon and unwind the associated emotions. Do that in a hypnosis-like state and add the wow factor of a dramatic exorcism, and maybe something good happens.4

Inline links: In coherence therapy it’s visualizing the contradictory beliefs really hard, 4

emperor2 mentions across 2 issues

emperor is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between November 12, 2024 and August 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "the demand to sacrifice to the emperor"; "'produced dozens of close church councils which the Emperor tried to shape'". It most often appears alongside Alexandria, Christ, Christ.

Article page: emperor
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: November 12, 2024
Last seen: August 01, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024
Your Review: Joan of Arc August 01, 2025

Alexandria 2 shared issues
Christ 2 shared issues
Christ 2 shared issues
Europe 2 shared issues
God 2 shared issues

Source context

Zounds! It's Zulresso and Zuranolone!

November 12, 2024 · Original source

…and 5 “really serious” famines …for an average of one catastrophe per fifteen years. The Romans rebuilt the city each time because it was strategically important. Stark focuses on one of these disasters: plague. The Roman Empire suffered two major plagues during this era: the Antonine Plague of 165 AD and the Cyprian Plague of 251 AD . He theorizes that Christians made it through these plagues much better than pagans, gaining an additional population boost. Time for some game theory: when a plague comes, you can either defect (flee / self-isolate / hide) or cooperate (altruistically try to help nurse other victims). An individual does better by defecting, but a community does better if all its members cooperate. Stark thinks the pagans defected and the Christians cooperated. Here is Thucydides’ description of a plague in pagan Athens (admittedly ~500 years before the time we’re studying). People quickly got an instinctive proto-knowledge of how contagion worked, after which: [People] died with no one to look after them; indeed there were many houses in which all the inhabitants perished through lack of any attention…the bodies of the dying were heaped one on top of the other, and half-dead creatures could be seen staggering about in the streets or flocking around the fountains in their desire for water. The temples in which they took up their quarters were full of the dead bodies of people who had died inside them. For the catastrophe was so overwhelming that men, not knowing what would happen next to them, became indifferent to every rule of religion or law. Compare the Christian writer Dionysius’s description of a plague afflicting his own community: Most of our brother Christians showed unbounded love and loyalty, never sparing themselves and thinking only of one another. Heedless of danger, they took charge of the sick, attending to their every need and ministering to them in Christ, and with them departed this life serenely happy, for they were infected by others with the disease, drawing on themselves the sickness of their neighbors and cheerfully accepting their pains. Many, in nursing and curing others, transferred their death to themselves and died in their stead. The best of our brothers lost their lives in this manner, a number of presbyters, deacons, and laymen winning high commendation so that death in this form, the result of great piety and strong faith, seems in every way the equal of martyrdom […] The heathen behaved in the very opposite way. At the first onset of the disease, they pushed the sufferers away and fled from their dearest, throwing them in the roads before they were dead and treated unburied corpses as dirt, hoping thereby to avert the spread and contagion of the fatal disease. Could Dionysius be embellishing matters to make his friends look good and his enemies bad? Maybe, but: There was compelling evidence from pagan sources that this was characteristic Christian behavior. Thus, a century later, the emperor Julian launched a campaign to institute pagan charities in an effort to match the Christians. Julian complained in a letter to the high priest of Galatia in 362 that the pagans needed to equal the virtues of Christians, for recent Christian growth was caused by their “moral character, even if pretended,” and by their “benevolence toward strangers and care for the graves of the dead”. In a letter to another priest, Julian wrote, “I think that when the poor happened to be neglected and overlooked by the priests, the impious Galileans observed this and devoted themselves to benevolence.” And he also wrote, “The impious Galileans support not only their poor, but ours as well, everyone can see that our people lack aid from us.” Did this matter? It might have! “Modern medical experts believe that conscientious nursing without any medications could cut the mortality rate by 2/3 or even more.” (if this sounds implausible, keep in mind that “nursing” here includes things like “bringing water from the public well to bedridden people who are too weak to go out and get it themselves”.) Stark believes that plagues helped the Christians in multiple ways: The obvious way: 30% of pagans died during the plague, but only 10% of Christians, making Christians proportionally more of the population.

Perhaps above all else, Christianity brought a new conception of humanity to a world saturated with capricious cruelty and the vicarious love of death. Consider the account of the martyrdom of Perpetua. Here we learn the details of the long ordeal and gruesome death suffered by this tiny band of resolute Christians as they were attacked by wild beasts in front of a delighted crowd assembled in the arena. But we also learn that had the Christians all given in to the demand to sacrifice to the emperor, and thereby been spared, someone else would have been thrown to the animals. After all, these were games held in honor of the birthday of the emperor's young son. And whenever there were games, people had to die. Dozens of them, sometimes hundreds.

Your Review: Joan of Arc

August 01, 2025 · Original source

She didn’t keep quiet. When the Emperor arrived in Alexandria for a festival, this festival included gladiatorial games and chariot races and feasting and drinking, and, of course, the best part - feeding Christians to lions. The prefect’s daughter telling the Emperor he was wrong to feed Christians to lions might have been pardonable softheartedness if it was just that she disliked watching slaves fed to lions, but her telling him that he was wrong because the Christians were right and he was wrong was flatly unacceptable. He had no more interest in offending her parents than anyone else, though (and, in fact, he was considering putting his wife aside and marrying her - a useful alliance and she had brains and guts) so instead he called on his top fifty philosophers to outargue her.

Instead she converted half of them to Christianity, so he had to have them killed. That was the point where he threw her in prison, hoping she’d change her mind and be sensible. Instead she converted everyone who showed up to argue with her in prison; when he deprived her of food she was fed by a dove, when he had her tortured her wounds miraculously healed. When his wife tried to talk sense into her, she converted and the Emperor had to have her killed, too, so since the slot was empty he, as a final try, proposed marriage to Catherine. She told him she had a better husband - Christ - and at that insult he condemned her to death. The first try failed when the breaking wheel shattered at her touch; the second try employed an axe, but though the blade struck true milk flowed from the stump instead of blood.

Basilica: I'm a Christian and I don't buy it. Brilliant people in the fourth century and in the sixteenth century and in the twentieth century study their Bibles, read theologians, and come up with heresies conclusively condemned by Athanasius. Indeed, we observe that all these brilliant people assembled in the fourth century produced dozens of close church councils which the Emperor tried to shape to whatever was most politically useful, and then later centuries saw hundreds of extremely corrupt papal elections between would-be Popes where the Cardinals were paid vast sums to vote for the candidate who paid most, some of which produced Popes who made historically-vital rulings for utterly cynical reasons. If God is real, maybe the Council of Nicaea was divinely inspired; but if God isn't real, theology is men looking at their reflection, quarreling about it, and then voting to decide who to kill for being in the minority. If everyone who doesn't study theology in the twelfth century is a heretic, and everyone who doesn't study theology in the twentieth century is a heretic, shouldn't Joan have just been a heretic?

endorphins2 mentions across 2 issues

endorphins is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between March 08, 2022 and September 30, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "The discovery of endorphins (ie endogenous opiates) helped shed light on the brain’s reward system"; "release of endorphins from 'hedonic hotspots' in NAc and VP". It most often appears alongside GABA, 5HT2A serotonin, acetylcholine.

Article page: endorphins
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: March 08, 2022
Last seen: September 30, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Zounds! It's Zulresso and Zuranolone! March 08, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Unpredictable Reward September 30, 2022

GABA 2 shared issues
5HT2A serotonin 1 shared issues
acetylcholine 1 shared issues
alcohol 1 shared issues
Alice 1 shared issues

Source context

March 08, 2022 · Original source

(source) GABA is the main inhibitory neurotransmitter; it’s usually associated with relaxation and sedation. A positive allosteric modulator is a chemical that makes receptors respond more strongly to their targets. So “a positive allosteric modulator of GABA” means a chemical that makes the brain respond stronger to relaxation/sedation signals. Sounds pretty useful! You may do some positive allosteric modulation of GABA yourself sometimes; this is one of the major actions of alcohol. Also of the benzodiazepines, a popular class of psychiatric medication including Ativan (lorazepam), Valium (diazepam), and Klonopin (clonazepam). The “-pam” at the end stands for positive allosteric modulator! (or maybe that’s just an urban legend, I’ve never found proof either way) The discovery of endorphins (ie endogenous opiates) helped shed light on the brain’s reward system. So the discovery of a sort of endogenous benzodiazepine was pretty exciting. Maybe it’s some kind of master control switch for anxiety or something? Psychiatrists only know two ways to respond to an exciting new thing: publishing breathless studies claiming that it’s the true mechanism of action for SSRIs, and publishing breathless studies claiming that it’s the true biological basis of depression. This time, they did both: see eg Fluoxetine elevates allopregnanolone levels in female rat brain and The role of allopregnanolone in depressive-like behaviors. The basic theory was that stress / social isolation / etc → decreased allopregnanolone → something something BDNF and synaptogenesis → depression. And SSRIs → increased allopregnanolone → something something BDNF and synpatogenesis → recovery! Change the word “allopregnanolone”, and that’s every theory in psychiatry. But this particular theory had two extra pieces of evidence: premenstrual dysphoric disorder and postpartum depression. Remember, allopregananolone is a natural metabolite of the female hormone progesterone. Progesterone levels go up during pregnancy and the ~18th day of the menstrual cycle, then crash back down after delivery and the ~24th day of the menstrual cycle. Meanwhile, some women get depressed after delivering a baby, or on the ~24th day of their menstrual cycle. Suspicious! Maybe it’s because their progesterone was getting converted into allopregnanolone, an antidepressant hormone that affects mood! (why doesn’t every woman get PPD and PMDD? This study suggests that women with PMDD have altered sensitivity to allopregnanolone; plausibly people with PPD have some other form of altered sensitivity. In case you have the same question I do: the correlation between PMDD and PPD is not 100% but still pretty significant) History of allopregnanolone research (source) The next step was to see if making patients take allopregnanolone can treat these conditions. This is kind of hard, because allopregnanolone is a tough chemical to get into people’s bodies; the traditional method involves sticking an IV into someone and infusing it slowly over several days, and it has to be done in a hospital. Still, Kanes et al tried this in 2017. The study was open-label (ie no placebo) and very small (only four women) but appeared to work extraordinarily well. Four post-partum women who qualified as “severely depressed” when they started the infusion progressed to “completely recovered” within twelve hours. Nothing else except maybe ketamine had produced results like this before. 3: What studies were done on Zulresso? This followup study by Kanes was the first real RCT, although it only had 21 patients. In accordance with the venerable First Study Ever tradition, it found really large positive effects on post-partum depression. That encouraged Sage Therapeutics to fund a bigger Phase 3 trial, Meltzer-Brody (2018). In accordance with venerable Bigger Phase 3 Trial tradition, its results weren’t quite as good as the First Study Ever. But they were still pretty good: Notice that lower doses worked better than higher doses. This is sometimes a red flag on a study. But this time it seems legit; see “Biphasic Actions At The GABA-A Receptor” here for an explanation. Both studies also evaluated side effects. These were generally mild, but two people (about 2% of the study population) lost consciousness. Nothing seemed wrong with them, and researchers mostly attributed this to allopregnanolone being a sedating drug. If you sedate people too hard, they pass out. Faced with these results, the FDA approved allopregnanolone for post-partum depression, but subjected it to a REMS (Risk Evaluation And Mitigation Strategy) - basically, doctors who want to prescribe it will need to take special courses and do extra paperwork. This kind of surprised me - there are plenty of sedating drugs that make you pass out in overdose. Also, since patients will be getting it IV, there will probably be a nurse around to check if they passed out and take appropriate actions if so. But the FDA really likes putting restrictions on things, and I guess this was a free chance for them to do that. 4: Is Zulresso freely available at a doctor’s office near me? It’s possible to get Zulresso, but really hard. Because Zulresso is an IV infusion lasting four days, you need to spend four days somewhere that people can put an IV into you and monitor it. Realistically that means a hospital or some other big medical institution. So this is only available for inpatients. Because of the REMS (extra certification and paperwork), most hospitals aren’t interested. You can find a list of ones that are here - it looks like there are about 89 locations in the US with the right certification. Last but not least, a four-day course of Zulresso costs $35,000 for the medication itself, plus much more for the four-day hospitalization it takes to receive it. As usual, insurances will cover it iff you can document you’ve tried lots of other stuff first. 5: Hold on, does it really cost $35,000? Oho, I see you’ve played the “pharma price analysis” game before. But this time I think the price might actually be defensible. Chemical supply companies (1, 2, 3) generally sell allopregnanolone for $10,000 to $20,000 a gram. (I found one company with a much lower price, but I’m suspicious and am going to dismiss them as an outlier). The usual dose of allopregnanolone is 60 ug/kg/hour x 60 hours, which for a 60 kg person comes out to a total of 0.25g total. Getting that amount from the chemistry supply store would cost about $2,500 - 5,000. I assume pharma-grade allopregnanolone is more expensive than chemistry-store-grade, so it wouldn’t surprise me if a price in the low five-figures was justified by manufacturing alone. Isn’t it still a pretty good deal to find an endogenous neurosteroid, do one or two studies confirming it’s great, produce it for the low five figures, then sell it for the mid five figures? I think maybe not. This drug has a terrible value proposition. Post-partum depression is one of the rarer psych conditions. Most people with PPD won’t check into a hospital and pay $35,000 for a drug infusion. And the people who do will get the drug infusion, feel better, and never need it again (at least until they have another kid) - unlike SSRIs where you can keep charging for monthly prescriptions forever. Sage Therapeutics, the pharma company that owns the patent on Zulresso (and nothing else - this is their only drug!) has done terribly. Their stock is in the doldrums, they almost went bankrupt, and they survived only with the help of a cash infusion by a bigger pharma company. I think this confirms a general trend where at least some expensive medications are pricey because of fundamentals (including regulatory fundamentals) and not just pharma companies making obscene profits. 6: Hold on, how is allopregnanolone different from benzodiazepines? Remember, allopregnanolone is a positive allosteric modulator of GABA, much like benzodiazepines such as Xanax. But Xanax is cheap ($10 for 30 pills). And you can get it at any local pharmacy (plus sometimes on street corners). What’s so special about allopregnanolone that you should pay $35,000 and go into the hospital to get it? The official answer is “allopregnanolone modulates GABA differently from benzodiazepines”. For example, this paper says that: Allopregnanolone allosteric modulation of the action of GABA at GABA-A receptors is much less selective than that of benzodiazepines, which are relatively inactive at α4- or α6-containing GABA-A receptors. If you really like details about receptor subunits, this paper presents the full case. The skeptic’s answer is “who knows?” Psych drugs often work for reasons totally different than we thought. People thought tianeptine was an SSRE for years, until it turned out to be a mild opioid. People thought ketamine was NMDA-ergic for years, until it turned out to be [fill this part in 10 years from now]. Last year a bunch of very smart people tried to claim that SSRI effects had nothing to do with serotonin (I think they were wrong). Just because some guy found that Zulresso acts as a GABA-PAM in some test tube doesn’t mean that’s what’s having any of the relevant antidepressant effects. The troll’s answer is “who says it’s different?” Do benzodiazepines treat depression? Depends who you ask. If you ask benzodiazepine users, their answer is “yes, definitely”. If you ask drug warriors, their answer is “Addictive Substances May Make You Temporarily Feel Good, But They Are Not A Responsible Treatment Option”. If you ask the research literature, it gives vague indeterminate answers, as always. But nobody has ever said benzodiazepines instantly and miraculously cure depression, so how come allopregnanolone seems to do that? A true troll would point out that we probably give allopregnanolone at much higher doses - 2% of allopregnanolone patients were sedated so hard they lost consciousness, whereas this is exactly the sort of side effect I try to avoid when calculating benzodiazepine doses. Maybe if you gave postpartum women an infusion of 300 mg Valium, and maximized your placebo effect by calling it the hot new thing, they’d do pretty well too (several days later, after recovering consciousness). I think the troll answer would be hilarious but I don’t really want to defend it as correct; if I had to bet I’d say the official explanation is the right one. 7: Hold on, why can’t we just give people progesterone and let them metabolize it into allopregnanolone? This turned out to be an interesting enough rabbit hole that I’m going to spin it off into another post later this week. 8: Hold on, people have lots of allopregnanolone when they’re pregnant, right? And then post-partum depression happens when they give birth, and their allopregnanolone level drops. So if you give someone an infusion of allopregnanolone, and then take them off it, that’s a hormonal simulation of giving birth, ie the same thing that caused the problem in the first place? How is that good? Oh, you think you’re clever, do you? What you failed to consider is . . . I didn’t end that sentence because I can’t find anything in the literature addressing this question. But the difference might be that the infusion schedule ramps up gradually, peaks, and then ramps down gradually, which is more of a soft taper than the sudden crash of birth. If anyone knows more about this, please let me know. [EDIT: see this comment] 9: Is allopregnanolone addictive? No, because good luck getting addicted to a $35,000-per-dose chemical. We should probably expect allopregnanolone to be addictive, by analogy to other GABA-PAMs like benzodiazepines and alcohol. But nobody has ever received more than a single dose. You don’t get addicted to benzos after a single pill, or alcohol after a single beer, so in practice AFAIK nobody has ever gotten addicted to this. Or who knows, maybe it’s not addictive. Remember, allopregnanolone is naturally elevated during pregnancy; pregnancy isn’t addictive. And some scientists claim the brain endogenously uses allopregnanolone as a master regulator of depression and anxiety. In theory, if you could give yourself the same amount a non-anxious person’s brain gives them all the time, shouldn’t you be no worse off than that non-anxious person? I don’t know, and remember that your brain also has a lot of endogenous opioids; doesn’t make the exogenous kind any safer. The Drug Enforcement Administration has made Zulresso a Schedule IV controlled substance, which means they’re putting a few very weak restrictions on it but not worrying too much. 10: Does allopregnanolone work for depression that isn’t post-partum? If all psychiatric disorders are secretly allopregnanolone imbalances, then you might expect it to work on all depressions, not just post-partum. I’m sure pharmaceutical executives with dollar signs instead of pupils in their eyes have had this same thought, but I can’t find studies about it. Some of the same people behind the postpartum studies did a very small, very weak study on ganaloxone (a close allopregnanolone relative) for persistent depression; it seemed to work, but also caused a lot of sedation (more than in the postpartum trials? Hard to tell). Nobody’s looked into this further since then, maybe because that was around when the pharma companies realized that the 4-day hospital stay and $35,000 price tag made allopregnanolone a financial loser. The evidence from zuranolone (see below) suggests that allopregnanolone might not work very well against regular depression. 11: What is zuranolone? Wikipedia describes zuranolone as “a swirling, black vortex revered by the Mutsune Native Americans as a dire death god . . . also worshiped by mysterious servitors known as the Hidden Ones.” No! Sorry again! That’s Zushakon, another Great Old One. Zuranolone is Sage Therapeutics’ attempt to turn allopregnanolone into an accessible medication that might actually make them real money. Zuranolone is mostly just allopregnanolone with some extra stuff attached that changes the absorption. Zuranolone can be taken orally, so you don’t have to go to a hospital for four days to receive it IV. It’s potentially less likely to cause loss of consciousness and other undesirable side effects. And it’s under investigation as a potential treatment for postpartum depression, bipolar depression, regular depression, insomnia, and various movement disorders. (that might seem excessive, but benzodiazepines treat a lot of stuff, and if these neurosteroids are kind of like super-benzodiazepines, then this level of optimism might be warranted.) 12: Does zuranolone work? Sage Therapeutics answered this question the same way pharma companies answer every question: with a bunch of studies whose names form overly-cute acronyms. We’ll talk here about ROBIN, WATERFALL, MOUNTAIN, and CORAL - though I assure you there are others. ROBIN tested efficacy in postpartum depression. Results were positive and relatively impressive, about the same as the weaker allopregnanolone studies. WATERFALL, MOUNTAIN, and CORAL tested results in regular depression. WATERFALL was positive but weak. MOUNTAIN was negative. That scared the pharma company and they hacked CORAL to be more likely to give positive results. It did give positive results, but the FDA reads the same biotech magazines I do and knows perfectly well what they did, so I don’t know what Sage expects to gain from this. Overall these trials were disappointing. I think the most likely story is that allopregnanolone = zuranolone, both are moderately effective in postpartum depression, and both have much less efficacy in regular depression, probably not literally zero but also not enough to be worthwhile antidepressants (especially considering cost). Might zuranolone be an excellent anti-anxiety medication? You’d think so - it should be at least as good as benzodiazepines, which are excellent anti-anxiety medications. And researchers seem excited about allopregnanolone as a master regulator of brain anxiety. But the studies aren’t promising. ROBIN and WATERFALL incidentally assessed anxiety; ROBIN found good results in its postpartum population, but WATERFALL found poor-to-mediocre results in its regular population. Studies are hard, and sometimes even really effective drugs can have trouble showing strong results. But these aren’t encouraging. 13: So where do we go from here? Getting FDA approval for zuranolone for postpartum depression seems reasonable; it’ll probably be cheaper and easier than making people go to the hospital to get allopregnanolone. I’m uncertain about the financials of this for Sage, but since they did the study they hopefully think it’s worth it. Otherwise, I’m not sure. It would have been great if zuranolone had shown robust efficacy against regular depression and anxiety, but this is exactly the kind of great thing that never happens in psychopharmacology (motto: “Disappointing Doctors And Patients Since 1982”). It might be worth throwing it against anxiety disorders and PTSD to see if anything sticks, but I wouldn’t bet on it. The research into allopregnanolone as master regulator of brain anxiety states is fascinating, but as far as I know it hasn’t reckoned with the failure of zuranolone to really treat much anxiety. The cynical part of me predicts that once pharma’s done making money off neurosteroids then all of this will die down, and something else that pharma can make more money from will become the master regulator of everything. I expect that the main thing we get out of all this is somewhat better post-partum depression treatment, which might or might not ever become accessible for ordinary people. 14: Predictions In the next five years… Zuranolone gets FDA approval for major depression: 15%

Inline links: source, Fluoxetine elevates allopregnanolone levels in female rat brain, The role of allopregnanolone in depressive-like behaviors, This study, is not 100% but still pretty significant, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WAyF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3c4db9d4-d5f8-45cf-8cde-17e2bbd216b6_904x334.png, source, Kanes et al, This followup study by Kanes, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3b3x!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F63f81091-7084-4ad3-b0a3-28394059b2c3_369x282.png, Meltzer-Brody (2018), https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l7Uh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b579fea-c6c8-4d46-8de7-c4a3e6852766_797x335.png, here, here, 1, 2, one company, has done terribly, this paper, this paper, tried to claim, their answer is, their answer is, it gives vague indeterminate answers, this comment, a very small, very weak study, describes, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hqfF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5b386f78-93b3-4d16-98c4-6d2eedef5a1f_548x256.png, ROBIN, WATERFALL, MOUNTAIN, CORAL, to be more likely to give positive results

Highlights From The Comments On Unpredictable Reward

September 30, 2022 · Original source

2. The amount and pattern of GABAergic inhibition of VTA dopamine neurons from NAc, ventral pallidum, and local GABA interneurons. At rest, only a small % of VTA DA neurons will be firing at a given time, and the aforementioned surprise signal alone can't do much to increase this. What CAN change this is the hedonic value of the surprising stimulus. An unexpected reward causes not just a surprise signal, but a release of endorphins from "hedonic hotspots" in NAc and VP, and these endorphins inhibit the inhibitory GABA neurons, thereby releasing the "brake" on VTA DA neurons and allowing more of them to phasically fire.

Enlightenment2 mentions across 2 issues

Enlightenment is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 01, 2022 and July 14, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "the Enlightenment and the need to document philosophical underpinnings"; "blossoming again in the Renaissance and Enlightenment"; "re-infuse the Enlightenment’s rationalism with emotion and intuition". It most often appears alongside Europe, Greece, Persian Empire.

Article page: Enlightenment
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: July 01, 2022
Last seen: July 14, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Internationalists July 01, 2022
Your Book Review: The Educated Mind July 14, 2023

Europe 2 shared issues
Greece 2 shared issues
Persian Empire 2 shared issues
Soviet Union 2 shared issues
United States 2 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Internationalists

July 01, 2022 · Original source

In defending the Pact's place in the tier of first-class important events of the 20th century, H&S also document some of the intellectual history of evolving expectations and norms about war. These norms were driven from Europe, perhaps because of a combination of globalization and near-continuous intra-Europe conflict that co-occurred with the Enlightenment and the need to document philosophical underpinnings for everything.

This has been inherited by some others within the Islamic world who consider themselves to be in a state of permanent jihad against the West. In this way they seek to move the underlying expectations, to change the rules of the game. Instead of seeing conflicts with Islamic jihadists as equivalent to other conflicts, then, we should attempt to understand their worldview. It is its own set of rules and expectations, but likely is closer to the way pre-Enlightenment religious wars, also known as hygienic wars, worked. Here are some quotes to set the flavor of it, but none of this is essential to the rest of the book.

Your Book Review: The Educated Mind

July 14, 2023 · Original source

Kieran Egan laughs at your educational reforms Okay, of those three jobs, which should we give to schools? You probably have your favorite — I certainly did! But Egan wants you to know they’re all crap. None of them, by themselves, can give us the kinds of schools we want. Q: I kind of like Rousseau! What’s the problem with pure development? Like I said before, my bookshelves overflow with authors who want to knock down Rousseau (and the people who followed in his wake — John Dewey in particular). Egan will have none of it: before the developmental approach, many schools were terrible places where children were beaten for getting math problems wrong. “Rousseau and Dewey,” he writes, “have enriched our conception of education in important ways. We will not make educational progress by trying to cut away their contribution”. But, he continues, there’s no way a purely developmental approach could possibly work! Rousseau imagined human nature to be selfless and kind; this ideal state could only survive if it was kept away from the evils of society — the titular child in his book Emile was kept away from human society, unable even to read, until age twelve. Of course, schools don’t go this far — they can’t — but I can attest from personal experience that even fairly serious attempts to raise children in an accepting community of peers often crash and burn when faced with actual human nature. Kids reared in the most developmentally appropriate schools can be nasty, bored, and lazy at about the same rate as their mainstream peers. Q: In my heart, I’m an academicist. What’s the problem with it? I think Egan was an academicist in his heart, too. His book drips with classical references — so much so that it can make some sections difficult to read. But, he points out, those purely-academic schools really were hellscapes. And their brutality wasn’t something that was just tacked on, it flowed from their understanding of knowledge: enlightenment will come when the right information enters a child’s head, regardless of how it gets in there (or whether the child wants it in there). And again, Egan feels obliged to point out that we’ve tried this approach for thousands of years, and it hasn’t worked. In fact, Plato’s original vision so obviously doesn’t work that people hawking academic schools have modified their pitch: no longer is the goal for students to understand the Truth, but to cultivate inquiring, skeptical minds who are perpetually dissatisfied with old answers. Can we imagine taxpayers paying for this? Q: Fine, fine. I’m not a fan of socialization, but I’ll ask the question — what’s wrong with it? The funny thing is that of the three, this is the only one that has shown its ability to work for a long stretch of time! (As John Calvin pointed out, as animals, we’re pretty pathetic. Socialization allowed our ancestors to become something more than individuals so that they could survive; we owe this job our gratitude. That said, it would be impossible for schooling today to seek only to socialize. That would require that members of a society share values, and fundamentally agree that their society is good. It also requires that a society not be changing, so the values and skills that are taught to children today will be the ones that will be useful to them in thirty years. Obviously, modern Western society is none of those things. Pure socialization might work for the Amish, or for Catholic trad communities, but not for us. And, frankly, we should feel okay about this. (Do you know where you could get a pure socialization education in the 20th century West, Egan asks? The Hitler Youth!) There really are good reasons to be wary of any education that decrees that its society is uniformly good. Which combination is best? Okay, you say, it’s clear that none of these jobs is good on its own — the solution (obviously!) is to smoosh them together. If we do that wisely, the good parts of each will make up for the deficiencies of the others. This sounds eminently reasonable — but Egan would like to have a word with you. Q: What’s the problem in combining socialization with academics? Wouldn’t this be a beautiful combination? Socialization would cohere the school together, and then they could leverage those good feelings to, say, read Aristotle. I’ve seen this work in schools (like conservative Christian academies) founded on a set of specific beliefs. But when intellectual diversity enters in, it becomes harder. You, perhaps, say that socialization could unite people around their differences — schools could support a society made up entirely of critics! Yes, a society of critics would be interesting, and so would a herd of cats: neither works in practice. Imagine students reading their Ibram X. Kendi books in the morning, then pledging allegiance to the American flag after lunch. Q: What’s the problem in combining academics with development? Again, this seems like a beautiful vision: we can invite children into discovering the big ideas. Alas, it crashes into the reef of reality quite quickly: what do we do when kids don’t want to learn about the big ideas? This combination works wonderfully for kids who naturally want to be academics, but — and this is a crucial point that geeky education types too often sweep under the rug — lots of kids don’t naturally want to be academics. Okay, you say, ignore the “liberatory” element of the developmentalist program, and focus on the “uncovering the nature of the individual child” part: academics can tell us what the students should be learning, and development can tell us how they should learn it. Egan has a thought experiment for you. Imagine that you get the funding to fully pursue this combined goal — you set up a hundred different types of schools in the nearest big city. There’s a specific school for every possible permutation of learner — a school for big-picture kinesthetic learners who score as INFJ on the Myers–Briggs, a school for detail-oriented auditory learners who score ENFP, a school for marine-biology-loving hyperactive learners who lost their personality test results… you get the idea. You build the schools, you work out the bus schedule, and then, on the first day, all the students learn exactly the same content. Because that’s what it means for a school to be an academy — it teaches “the best that’s been thought or said”. Q: What’s the problem in combining development with socialization? What’s wrong with telling kids to become their authentic selves, even as you squeeze them into the roles most beneficial to society? Imagine two rural schools merging together, due to declining local population. Now imagine that one of them is a hippie free school, and the other is a military academy. (That’s a reality TV show I’d watch.) It’s possible, I suppose, to imagine this working for kids who naturally want to be, say, plumbers, or paleontologists, or presidents — and who happen to go to a school that prepares its students to fill that one role. But the odds of matching students to schools just perfectly seems small. But enough thought experiments — we can state this in a visual form: behold, the SAD triangle. It’s bright around the edges, but muddled where they mix: One of the things I love about Egan is that he looks at educational ideas historically. (Most histories of education start around the turn of the 20th century; I remember being excited when I found one that began in the 1600s. Egan begins in prehistory.) And what we’re reminded of, when we see these historically, is that these jobs were meant to supplant each other. Put together, they sabotage each other. What are we asking of schools? Of the three possible jobs, which are we asking mainstream schools to perform? Egan answers: all three. To confirm this, stretch your memory back to your student days, and see if you can put some of the most basic elements in any of these three categories. We’re so immersed in these that they seem obvious, “natural” aspects of schooling, but of course they’re nothing of the sort. Did you spend your time with other children of the same age? Was your work graded according to a standard? Were you forced to play team sports, or to pledge your allegiance to your nation-state? All of these, Egan says, bear the fingerprints of the goal of socialization. Progressive reformers in in the 1960s saw these as the markings of a dark conspiracy, but socialization has more warm-feely aspects: counselors to help students cope with the strains of modern society, field trips to the local fire station and historical monuments, and everything “practical” — life skills, sex ed, emotional regulation, and so on. Did you learn anything that wasn’t obviously useful? Did you read Hamlet, say, or master the Pythagorean theorem, or learn that the planets orbit the Sun (and not the other way around)? That’s the fingerprints of the academic goal. Finally, did you hear teachers show concern about “age-appropriate” content, or see signs that your school valued individualized learning? Does it seem right to you that learning should be “active” rather than “passive”, or that it’s better for someone to discover something than to be told it? Did your kindergarten have tiny, child-sized chairs? All these, Egan says, are the fruit of developmentalism. The first time I read the book, I wondered at all this. What Egan was saying was indeed lining up with my memories. But perhaps, I thought, he was playing loose with the categories; I was still skeptical that schools really were trying to balance all three goals. So I decided to check his idea from a different perspective and look up the mission statements of school districts I was familiar with. Here’s the one from the town I currently live in: “Skills” and “become involved members of a global community” seem to connote socialization, “challenge” and “knowledge” seem to connote academics, and “empower” and “reach their full potential” seem to connote development. But I wasn’t sure if I was just seeing faces in clouds, so I looked up the mission statement for my hometown: “Succeeding” seems like socialization, “learning” seems like a nod to academics, and “growing” seems like code for development. But again, I was worried that I engaging in motivated reasoning, so I looked up the largest district I’ve lived in, a city of about a million people: Wow. That seems pretty clear. So, to sum up: Egan says that there are three potential jobs we can give to schools. Alone, each of these jobs is terrible; together, they’re worse. And what we’ve done is given schools all three jobs. A sad triangle, indeed. What about alternative schools? I was curious to see whether this “sad triangle” could help us understand other philosophies of education, and why they work (or don’t). Where would, say, unschooling, and classical education, and vocational ed, and Montessori go? The first three seem obvious. Radical unschooling is in the upper-right, classical schools (with its focus on feeding kids “the best that’s been thought or said”) is in the upper-left, and vocational ed is in the bottom corner. What can that tell us? Intriguingly, each of those approaches can claim to have done some impressive stuff. I’ve worked with radical unschoolers, and while their skills have often been lopsided (not learning math is an acknowledged issue in the community), they’ve all at least exhibited a zeal for learning the topics they’ve been interested in. (Video games, frequently.) And I remember a massive study in the early 2000s that asked which kinds of schools actually improved student test scores controlling for the effects of socioeconomics. What it found was that only two types of schools stood out: Catholic schools that were operated by a religious order (e.g. the Jesuits — not local parish schools), and vocational schools. Q: Oh, that’s terrible evidence. One of those was just personal anecdotes! And what about selection effects? And what about…? I wouldn’t disagree — and, as Freddie deBoer points out, most educational research is bunk. I’ll take this to be only weak confirmation of Egan’s theory that combining jobs undercuts education. Are we hosed? If Egan’s critique is correct, we’re in a bad situation. Educational radicals yell from their dark corners to abandon the middle and come join them; a century of educational reforms have amounted to little more than wobbling around, first in one direction, then another. At the moment, the conversation about schools in the United States, at least, seems to have hit an all-time pessimistic blech. Freddie deBoer speaks for a lot of people when he says “Even the most optimistic reading of the research literature suggests that almost nothing moves the needle in academic outcomes. Almost nothing we try works.” I’m not quite that pessimistic — the word “almost” is doing some work, there. There are some reforms that seem to work at the margin: raising teacher pay, making it easier to become a teacher, reducing air pollution, free school lunches, and more. Actually applying what the science of reading has been telling us for a few decades seems a big one. And perhaps you have your own pet reform proposal. Sure — add it to the heap! What Egan suggests, though, is that so long as we’re bopping around this triangle of jobs, we won’t be able to get the schools that we want. The dream There’s a moment at the end of my favorite Bollywood movie that’s become stuck in my head. The protagonists have made the arduous journey to a beachside rural school. In the sun outside, flocks of children are experimenting with art and playing with inventions; inside, the walls are covered with books and the tables are covered with models. The kids are learning joyously and deeply. In the real world, such places do exist — they’re just exclusive, pulling their students from among the families who are already the most gifted and curious. They don’t make kids this way; they scoop up the kids who are already this way. But in the movie, we’re supposed to believe these are normal children — normal, except they’ve been transformed by a school. Egan’s wild idea is that it’s possible to make schools like this. He thought that we didn’t have to wait for the communists to make people equal or for the transhumanists to make people smarter. All he thought it required was giving schools a different job — not socialization or academics or development, but something that brings pieces of them together in a new way. But in order to understand that job, we have to come to a cleaner, bigger, and truer understanding of what “education” is. The road ahead: a special Q-and-A Q: This is the proverbial thousand-dollar-bill-lying-on-the-sidewalk: if this is possible, someone should have done it now. Is Egan going to give sufficient evidence for me to believe this? Maybe! I’ll address this in a special section at the end, after sketching out what his theory looks like. Q: If his theory is even plausibly true, then why haven’t I heard of Egan before? His books can be hard to read — he was an intellectual’s intellectual; he had difficulty writing a page without a reference to William Wordsworth, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Claude Levi-Strauss, Richard Rorty, Noam Chomsky, or Steven Pinker. And his paradigm is wonky and multidimensional; he rejiggers common categories, and tells you everything all at once. But worst of all, when his paradigm is stated plainly, it sounds stupid. Q: Oh! What… is his paradigm? I’m going to jigsaw his book, and hold back his big idea for its own section. First, I’m going to list out some simple observations of students at different ages, and imagine what schooling could look like, if it were built on these principles. (First I’ll do this for elementary school, then middle school, then high school.) Then I’ll explain how his theory ties all of this together… by clarifying our definition of what education actually is. Q: I’m not from America; could you be clear on what you mean by those divisions of schooling? Egan’s framework has three main stages, but they don’t divide neatly into “elementary, middle, and high school”. (The precise age ranges he talks about, if you’re interested, are 2–8, 8–15, and 15 and older.) Regardless, I’m going to use those terms — he sometimes did — because it gives me something specific to imagine. Don’t sweat ‘em. Part 2: A new kind of elementary school What’s the matter with elementary schools? Egan suggests that Plato and Rousseau, for all their differences, might have the same reaction if they visited a modern elementary school: they’d call it “trivial”. I’ll admit, here, that I have tremendously fond memories of my elementary school years — committed teachers, good friends, and interesting activities. But I suspect my memory has edited out the most typical work I did. Either that, or elementary schools have taken a drastic plunge in quality from the 1980s. My wife and I homeschool now, but before the pandemic, we sent our kids to our local public school, and whenever we volunteered in the classroom, we were horrified. They spent their days practicing reading on shallow texts, or half-mindlessly practicing basic arithmetic. Occasionally they’d bring us home a sign of learning about something from the real world — usually something as intellectually and emotionally compelling as the importance of tooth brushing. And at parent–teacher conferences every year, we’d be sat down on tiny chairs and informed that, while our children were quite bright, they were struggling to pay attention in class. No sh**, I wanted to reply. The school seemed hermetically sealed; almost nothing that felt meaningful from the outside world could get in. Though they might agree about little else, Egan thinks that Plato and Rousseau would look at the dull worksheets and insipid “hands-on activities” and call modern elementary schools trivial. He agrees, and thinks that fixing this is the first step to building a new kind of school. Why so trivial? Ironically, Egan thinks it's all the fault of Plato and Rousseau. Hidden in the ways that both the academicists and developmentalist think about education is an assumption: that children’s reasoning is basically the same as adult reasoning, but lesser. Q: This isn’t some romantic, children-are-the-real geniuses theory, is it? Egan actually does think that there’s an intensity to how children perceive the world that we lose — but no, it’s not. He’s building on mainstream cognitive science — just aspects of it that are currently more-or-less ignored in school. The upshot, though, is that he thinks that educational researchers (be they of academic or developmentalist persuasions) see kids as smaller, stupider versions of adults. Q: But that’s the opposite of what my local developmentalist school says! It was the opposite of what the developmentalist school that I worked at said, too. But at teacher meetings, I’d frequently hear people ask what was “developmentally appropriate” for a child. I’ll grant that there are perfectly reasonable times to ask this: “Honey, is it developmentally appropriate for our 10-year-old to watch ‘Cocaine Bear’?” is just one of many examples. But “is it developmentally appropriate for our class to learn about world religions?” or “is it developmentally appropriate for our school library to have a book mentioning homosexuality?” probably aren’t some of them. (The latter example was not one that I heard at my progressivist school, but Egan points out that this sort of language is often used by conservative activists.) This notion of “developmentally appropriate” took on a scientific sheen with the work of Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss psychologist. Before age 12, he “proved”, children aren’t able to form hypotheses, draw conclusions, or think abstractly. This, his followers thought, should transform schools — and so they did! To math, they added in “manipulatives” — physical cubes and rods and such — to help students see math. To the history curriculum, they — well, they ended it. Why waste time, they asked, lecturing students about history that they couldn’t possibly understand? In its place they put the “expanding horizons” model of social studies. One version goes as follows: In kindergarten, students learn about themselves In first grade, they learn about their families In second grade, they learn about their neighborhood In third grade, they learn about their city In fourth grade, they learn about their state In fifth grade, they learn about their nation In sixth grade they learn about the world We can admit that there’s an elegance to this model. (I can picture how clever the theorist who first came up with it must have felt!) The downstream effects of it, however, seem horrible. Doesn’t keeping kids ignorant of the rest of the world seem provincial? Doesn’t reinforcing their self-centeredness seem infantilizing? Perhaps we could stomach it if it was founded on some unshakable findings of child psychology — but does it really strike you as likely that kids are incapable of understanding anything that happened long ago or far away? How, Egan asks, can we explain the $50 billion success of a movie franchise aimed at children that literally begins “A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away?” Q: Because… Jedis aren’t history? The point is, kids obviously have the mental abilities to understand — and in fact care a lot about — things far outside their own experience, and we’ve built elementary schools on a long-dominant model of educational psychology that swears they can’t. This is actually a great example of a general principle. Let’s call it “the Star Wars test”: can our model make sense of the most obvious facts of students? When we find that the answer is “no”, we should at least consider radically revising what we’re doing in school. What are elementary schoolers good at? (or: kids are smarter than students) Someone — I can’t now find who — once observed that children seem to lose IQ points the moment they step into a classroom. Egan agrees, and suggests that we think of ourselves as primatologists to kids, Jane Goodalls who investigate children “out in the wild” to see the sorts of things they gravitate to, and do fairly well at. If we do this, what do we see? Kids tell jokes, for one. They get mental images stuck in their heads, for another. They engage in role-playing, get lost in reverie, and beat out rhythms when they’re bored. They make ample use of metaphors, tell stories, and insist on seeing the world in terms of abstract binaries (e.g. stupid/smart, cowardice/courage, slavery/freedom, and so on). These, Egan holds, are the cognitive strengths that children use to understand the world. They’re the things that kids are often about as good at as adults — or much better than. They’re going to be the tools Egan wants us to use to rebuild the entire elementary curriculum, and in fact he spends most of his second chapter geeking out about how we might define these, how they operate in the mind, where they first pop up in history and anthropology, and even how they might have developed in our evolutionary past. I’m going to skip all of that, and get to the curriculum. From trivial to rich: the trick What could an intellectually rich elementary school curriculum look like, if we built it on kids’ cognitive strengths? He gives us one suggestion to help us do this: ask where each discipline came from in the first place. What was math before it was math, for example — or science before it was science? Q: How on Earth could that help? That’ll become clear later, when we finally uncover what Egan thinks “education” actually is, and see what job he wants us to give schools. For now, take it as a tantalizing hint… or, y’know, just ignore it. Elementary literature & language What was literature before it was literature? Before people invented writing, they had rich oral traditions: they told simple stories, recited poems, and shared proverbs. Egan suggests that these bits of oral tradition should form the backbone of the elementary literature curriculum. Q: What sorts of stories? As many as we can, and from as many diverse cultures as possible! Folktales are wonderful, as are myths. Think the Aboriginal story of “The Rainbow Serpent”, episodes from the Sumerian “Epic of Gilgamesh”, the Egyptian story of Osiris & Isis, the Greek story of Orpheus & Eurydice, the Chinese Legend of the White Snake, the Japanese Tale of Amaterasu and Susanoo, the Ashanti tales of Anansi, the Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl, the English legend of King Arthur, the Maori myth of Maui and the Sun, the Roman story of Romulus and Remus, selections from the Indian Mahabharata, the Anglo-Saxon epic of Beowulf, the Inca legend of the Sun and Moon, the Iroquois Myth of the Flying Head (a real thing! look it up!), and the Ojibwe story of Turtle Island. Q: That was a lot of examples. Are you going to keep giving so many? I’ve got a [mumble mumble mumble] to get to. Sorry about that. Sometimes, though, I feel that a limitation of reading Educated Mind is that, in trying to keep his book to a manageable size, Egan skimped on examples in some places that it matters. It’s easy to read his occasional example and assume he intends that it hold some central place in the curriculum — when all he wants to do is display how rich and diverse the curriculum could be. (Also: good God, I didn’t even include an example from Norse mythology!) So from now on, just assume that every category could be filled with oodles of examples. Q: What sorts of poems? Lots of poems, first of all. We shouldn’t steer toward “fancy” poems — rather, we should find poems that appeal to kids immediately — think Shel Silverstein, Mother Goose, Dr. Seuss, Jack Prelutsky, Edward Lear, or Ogden Nash… that sort of thing. In a biting essay, Egan suggests these poets like these appeal to kids precisely because they leverage kids’ cognitive strengths: “we should find, and encourage saying and singing and shouting aloud verse with strong narrative forms, thumping rhymes and rhythms, the most vivid images, fun with metaphors, and a rollicking story.” Q: Why proverbs? Proverbs stick in your mind almost effortlessly. (“All’s fair in love and war!” “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!” “You can’t judge a book by its cover!”) They’re also useful; they capture general truths. Kids can apply them to all sorts of situations, but also discuss them — to what extent are they wise or foolish? (I remember my surprise when I realized that they couldn’t all be true — because you can’t follow “look before you leap” and “he who hesitates is lost” at the same time! I’m embarrassed to say that I think I only realized this when I was in college.) Elementary science What was science before it was science? Egan suggests: being immersed in the natural world. We might, he writes, encourage elementary students to “adopt” some feature of the natural world — a patch of grass, a cat, a branch, a stream — and simply observe it at length. To do this, we can use the cognitive strength of reverie. Q: Oh, do you mean like kids sometimes do in science class nowadays — describe a thing to a partner, make notes, draw it, and label its parts? No, the exact opposite! That’s all about squeezing the experience into words and forms that we understand. What we want “is less an attempt to know about nature as to know it in some participatory way, to know it as something we are an intimate part of, not set off from”. Q: That sounds a little… “woo” to me. It did to me, too… until I remembered my childhood climbing tree. I didn’t much like to go outside as a child, but I had this one tree that I’d climb up and read for hours and hours. If I close my eyes I can bring to mind the precise texture of its bark, the roughness of its broken-off branches, the coolness of its leaves, the always-surprising solidness of its trunk… I’m bigger now, but I think if I were back in my parent’s yard, I could still navigate its limbs with my eyes closed. I have, at this point in my life, read a fair number of books about trees, but I’d be surprised if all of them together more than equaled the amount I learned from that tree — my tree. Elementary math What was math before it was math? Egan suggests: counting and logic. We might, then, use rhythms, metaphors, stories, and jokes to help kids become fond of these. Q: Counting is pretty… basic. Could it really be improved? Beware of “the curse of knowledge”: Steven Pinker’s phrase for forgetting that something was once difficult! Egan suggests we should spend time helping kids count wonderfully. We can start early with counting rhymes. (“One, two, buckle my shoe! Three, four, out the door! Five, six…”) But we can also help kids use their fingers as metaphors. There are some pretty cool ways of using your hands as an abacus — and did you know that you can count up to 1,023 using just your fingers on both hands, and a knowledge of binary? Q: Logic — I’m intrigued! Aristotelian, or Boolean? Neither, for the time being — Piaget was presumably onto something when he found that young children couldn’t reason abstractly, but he was looking at logic in a vacuum. When we put logic into the context of stories, we find that kids can deal with logic just fine. There’s an entire worldwide network of educators, in fact, called Philosophy for Children, who have written whole books about how to do this, and Egan loves it all. Sometimes they read stories and ask simple questions: “What is friendship?” or “What does it mean to be brave?” They also pose ethical questions: “Is it ever right to spill a secret?” And they pose paradoxes: “Can you step in the same river twice?” Q: You mentioned “jokes” a moment ago. Care to elaborate? Egan thinks that, to help kids get good at math, you should tell kids jokes. Q: That’s… new. I think so, too — but he backs it up pretty well. To be funny, jokes (or at least most kid jokes) rely on a leap in logic: Why can’t you trust an atom? They make up everything. Knock-knock. Who’s there? Boo. Boo-hoo? Don’t cry, it’s just a joke! To understand the joke, kids have to follow the logic — spotting patterns, making connections, and tracking what their audience expects a word to mean. That’s a lot of cognitive lifting. And Egan goes further, suggesting that we grit our teeth and create methods to help kids invent their own jokes, no matter how horrible they’ll be at first. (The things we do for learning…) Q: Wait wait wait! What about addition facts, and multiplication tables, and fractions? Egan emphasizes that his methods are designed to be add-ons to the standard math curriculum. In general, he’s a don’t-blow-up-the-system sort of guy, and if something seems especially weird, you should probably assume it’s an add-on to the regular curriculum rather than a replacement, even if I forget to say so. Elementary arts What was art before it was art? Egan suggests we pop our heads into Paleolithic caves for our inspiration. Whatever the specific meaning of all those charcoal elk and aurochs and mammoths (communication with the spirit world? art for art’s sake? a way to impress babes?), Egan thinks it obvious that they were also an attempt to capture an intense experience that would be difficult to express in words alone. What did it feel like to be near an aurochs, or a saber-toothed tiger? “The arts help us,” Egan writes, “to hear and see afresh, to force our perceptions and sensations to experience again the immediacy and vividness of the world”. If we follow this, then, we don’t want to help kids build “art skills” so they can draw like an adult — rather, we want to help them amass a repository of diverse aesthetic feelings that they’ll want to express. We should provide them with a riot of experiences. Q: That couldn’t be more opaque. Examples, please! Egan writes that we should have children learn to whistle, sing, and click their tongue; we should help them emulate the ways a skunk or a hawk or a stick bug might move through a space. We should expose them to scores of different temperatures and materials. In music, we should help them love Beethoven, yes, but also the Beatles; Tchaikovsky, yes, but also Tuvan throat singers, and also John Cage, whale song, and bird song. Q: That’s a lot of experiences, but what would they be doing? An interesting aspect of Egan’s view of education is that he doesn’t seem to think we should push kids right to the “doing” phase. He wants to help kids cultivate an affective relationship with the world. In any case, he writes that as students get more experienced, we should prompt them to move from merely enjoying these experiences to trying to systematically shape similar experiences. And drawing, painting, and playing music could easily be folded into other parts of the curriculum. Elementary social studies What was social studies before it was social studies? Well. Remember how, just a moment ago, I wrote that you could assume that you should probably assume that Kieran isn’t in favor of junking the curriculum as it currently stands? He suggests we very carefully pick up the elementary social studies curriculum, place it into a trash can, and set the whole mess on fire. He isn’t worried about much of importance being lost. (Remember that the “expanding horizons” model is, to him, the original sin of 20th century educational reform, and he repeatedly quotes student surveys showing that “social studies” regularly wins the title of “most boring subject”.) In its place, he suggests we put history — which, he hints, we should think of as the centerpiece of the elementary curriculum. So the real question is what was history before it was history? His answer, surprisingly, is myth. Q: Egan wants us to teach myths as if they were history? Not at all. What he suggests, though, is that we look at how myths operate as narratives — so we can design an intellectually vivid history curriculum. And myths really are special: each is built on at least one binary (like weak vs. strong, or lies vs. truth, or so on), and uses that to tell the story of the big picture of the world. They’re so powerful that people can understand it, remember it, and love it — even if that thing never happened. We should take that power, Egan says, and apply it to things that really did happen. Q: So what history does he think kids should learn in elementary school? The great struggles of humanity from across the whole. Flippin’. World. We’re still talking about young children, so these should be done as simple stories. The goal isn’t to make them history PhD’s, so we needn’t even try to put them in any sort of order. Egan suggests that, in first grade, we pick a single binary like “freedom against oppression” and tell kids a welter of stories, again from as many cultures as possible, and as many times in history as possible. Q: Can you give examples? Oh, all right — in first grade we can tell kids the stories of the war of the Greek city-states against the Persian empire, and the slave uprising of Spartacus against the Romans. We can tell them about the plight of Jews in medieval Europe, and of the unsuccessful Sepoy Rebellion in India against the British. We can tell the stories of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions, and about the Chinese Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. We can tell them the story of the escaped slave Harriet Tubman returning to the South to rescue her kinsmen, the story of six-year-old Ruby Bridges facing threats to integrate her elementary school, and the story of how the Mau-Mau uprising led to modern-day Kenya. We can tell the stories of Mexican-American union organizer Cesar Chavez and of Malala Yousafzai surviving an assassination attempt to advocate for female literacy. The world does not lack for stories of oppression and liberation that can capture the attention of a six-year-old. Q: That’s… huh. What stories might they hear in second and third grade? Egan gives examples, but I won’t list them here. He suggests we use a similar approach for each, except that we swap out the binary each year. He thinks “the struggle for security against danger” would work well for year two, and “the struggle for knowledge against ignorance” would work well for year three. (That year could have a lot of overlap with the science curriculum.) Q: Anything else, for history? Yes — they should get a sense of Big History. They should get some simple stories about the ice age, the Cenozoic, the age of dinosaurs, the Paleozoic, the origins of our solar system, and the Big Bang. (Because if the ancient Norse can tell their story of the beginning of the universe, by gum, we can tell ours, too.) To sum up Egan argues that the problem of early schooling is that it’s trivial — and it’s trivial because the dominant theories of educational psychology see children as lesser versions of adults. What else would we teach them, except dumbed-down versions of what adults learn? But children have certain cognitive strengths that schools aren’t making systematic use of. If we rebuild elementary schools on those strengths, we could turn schooling upside down. We could stop seeing the curriculum as a bag of information to impart, and start seeing it as a set of great stories to tell — and invite kids into. Kids could experience (both intellectually and emotionally) the great struggles of humanity and see that they can join in them. Students could experience the story of education as the beginning of a very real adventure. Egan’s elementary school: some skeptical questions Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding what you mean by “mental images”. Care to explain? It’s an interesting fact of human cognition that just a few words can whip up a complex mental experience. Egan doesn’t just mean what we might call “visual imagery” — the ability to hold, say, the image of a bespectacled, spat-wearing duck in your mind without seeing a photograph. He’s also including what psychologists call auditory imagery, olfactory imagery, gustatory imagery, and tactile imagery. Q: How could all of that be helpful in schools? Humanity has a built-in VR system, and we’re not using it! Egan invites us to pretend we’re teaching a class about the humble earthworm. We might list off facts — “earthworms are so many centimeters long, move through soil by means of their something-or-other muscles…” but he suggests we can evoke images, say, “of what it would be like to slither and push through the soil, hesitantly exploring in one direction then another, looking for easier passages, contracting and expanding our sequence of muscles segment by segment, and sensing moisture, scents, grubs, or whatever”. Those facts are now felt by the student; the knowledge has become part of them. And just a few words can spark a complex mental experience, one going beyond literal images to include imagined sounds, smells, tastes, and more. These experiences can feel real and stick with us. (That these mental images are so easy to evoke, and so meaningfully felt, feels something like the proverbial hundred dollar bill on the ground.) Q: How could metaphors be helpful? It really is interesting that so much of the “constructivist” turn in psychology — that is, the notion that children don’t absorb knowledge, but construct it — has continued to focus on logics-mathematical reasoning, when there’s been mounting evidence for decades that metaphors are more central. It’s not just that we use metaphors to better understand things we already know, we also use them to grasp new knowledge. What’s more, psychologists have devised tests to measure the skill at metaphor-making, and have given them to people of different ages. What they found was that eleven-year-olds make more metaphors (and higher quality metaphors) than do undergraduates — and that four-year-olds have both groups beat. Again, hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk. Q: Your talk of “binaries” has me worried — binaries like good/evil and male/female are the source of so many of our most pernicious stereotypes! Isn’t the purpose of education to get us beyond stuff like this? Yes, it is! Education is supposed to complicate our understanding — but that means we’ve gotta start somewhere, and binaries provide us a natural starting place. As an uncontroversial example, think about temperature. We all begin as babies by perceiving two temperatures — hot and cold. Later, we add on intermediate categories — warm and cool. (Note that the human body is the assumed mid-point to temperature. Binaries often work like this; “big” and “small” mean “bigger or smaller than me”, “nasty” and “kind” mean “nastier or kinder than I am, except when my brother is really asking for it”, and so on.) A good story (and an Egan-inspired elementary curriculum is, in a sense, nothing but good stories) will go further, and transform the binary. Toy Story is grounded in the binary of abandonment/belonging: at the beginning, the toy cowboy Woody belongs to his owner, and has his affection. Then a rival comes who threatens his belonging. In trying to get back to belonging, Woody is entirely lost — and to save the day, he has to come to a deeper understanding of what belonging means. Now, all lessons can’t be Pixar movies. But the good stories (especially in literature and history) will challenge and subvert the binaries they begin with. Q: I see the pattern of Egan drawing from “as many cultures as possible”. Why so many? Is this a political correctness thing? If it helps to think of it as such, then, sure! I don’t think Egan would have had a problem with that. But his ultimate reason for including so much diversity goes deeper. For Egan, including such world-wide diversity isn’t optional, and the answer to why is bound up in his definition of education. (Keep reading.) His answer also insists that we, whenever possible, also include stories from the Bible and Homeric epics (the Iliad and Odyssey). Q: Mmm, stories from the Bible aren’t going to fly in my local school! So be it! Egan doesn’t spend much time obsessing over the practicalities of… His interest is in describing what an ideal education might look like, if it were possible. Every lesson, every classroom, and every school is necessarily a compromise. Q: You make a big deal of poems. But isn’t poetry dead? An interesting contrast can be made to classical education, which also has kids read a lot of poems — they see knowing great poems as one of the marks of an educated person; again, for an academicist, it’s the information that transforms. Egan begs to disagree. Poems are important because they’re a wonderful way to train their cognitive strengths, like rhythm (poems are language fueling by thumping). We want to help kids learn to use this tool better, and a great way to do that is to help them recite poems that they’ve learned by heart. Q: “Learn by heart” — is that code for “memorize”?! It is! Egan is actually quite big on memorization — he points out that all the knowledge in the world can do nothing for a person once they’ve forgotten it. He didn’t, however, appreciate the academicist focus on memorizing without understanding (or at least enjoyment). Q: I’m still worried about the science curriculum, as you’re describing it. Can you allay my fears? Honestly, while I feel there’s something profoundly right to how Egan is describing early experiences of nature, I feel the same way. Note that there’s more science coming in the social studies curriculum. But if that’s still not enough, one could bring down aspects of the middle school science stage. Q: Anything else that Egan suggests we do in elementary school literature and language? He suggests that we help kids learn a second language! This is so obviously true (why do American schools typically wait until kids lose the ability to naturally absorb languages to start teaching languages?) he doesn’t belabor it, though. Q: You had mentioned that Egan’s vision seems more internal-focused. Should we be worried about that? While I strongly suspect that his curriculum would make kids more creative in any way you’d like to measure it, Egan wasn’t particularly interested in “creativity” — he was more about helping kids find the world interesting. I get the sense that he thinks kids will do things with minimal prompting once they’re loaded up with complex internal experiences. Q: I think I’m beginning to understand Egan — is he basically saying “make learning fun”? “Fun”, applied to education, is a dangerous word. Egan worries about the dangers of an emotionally unserious curriculum producing emotionally stunted adults. That doesn’t mean we need to tell students only “serious” stories — only that we treat the world honestly. “Disney-esque sentimentality is the exact emotional equivalent to intellectual contempt”. Q: But aren't some of these stories too dark for children who have themselves experienced oppression and disaster? Egan argues that these stories may be especially helpful to them — they can help them understand their struggles better, and give voice to them. Q: At the very start of this, you promised us “rationality”… but I’m not seeing rationality here! All this talk of “adventure” almost seems to go the opposite direction. What gives? Wait for it. But for a hint right now — Egan is fond of citing his fellow educational theorist Jerome Bruner, who claimed “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development”. Bruner was criticized for that; his critics charged that he was ignoring learning differences and socio-economic realities. Egan thinks he was profoundly right. Part 3: A new kind of middle school What’s the matter with middle school? What was middle school like for you? In math, I recall a jumble of barely-related topics. In literature, I remember reading great literature — Frankenstein, Romeo and Juliet — only in their dumbed-down summary formats. In social studies, I remember teachers proclaiming on the first day of class that unlike all of our previous history classes, this class wouldn’t be about names and dates… and then going on to memorize names and dates. And in science, I remember being forced to dissect a frog only to discover that frogs are — you guessed it — made of slimy frog parts. Your mileage may vary, but for a lot of us, middle school feels like getting booted out of the (in retrospect) Eden of elementary school, and like marking time before the serious studying of high school. It feels meaningless. In my favorite of his books, Egan calls so much middle school curricula “human deserts”, noting “we have created a system in which the importance of human emotions for meaning seems barely noticed”. Why so meaningless? If our dominant approaches to educational psychology fundamentally misinterpret younger children, Egan suggests, they basically throw up their hands when faced with pre-teens and teenagers. Mainstream schools begin to introduce vocational training to help lighten the load, and Maria Montessori famously suggests that adolescents should be sent to go run a farm. Egan is sympathetic to those responses, but points out that they don’t do much to lighten the load that the academic curriculum often becomes at this age. This feeling of meaninglessness, he argues, is utterly tragic — it comes just when a hunger for meaning blossoms in adolescents! We can see that hunger for meaning in their lives outside the classroom, where their interests ramp up into veritable obsessions. What are adolescents obsessed with? What might we see, if we become Jane Goodalls of early adolescence? First, teens are obsessed with gossip. The motivations of others — why did he do that? and what was he THINKING? — are hypothesized and talked to death. Second, that they’re pulled toward idealism. Many feel a dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and feel a romantic urge to make it a better place. They’re often lured into simplistic beliefs that promise to help them do that. Third, they love extremes: they want to find limits, and test them. Obviously, this can show up as risky behavior, but we can also see it in their love for the bizarre — note adolescents’ fascination in things like aliens, cryptids, and ghosts. (Egan loves pointing out that The Guinness Book of World Records is a perennial bestseller among kids at this age. How else would they find out who had the world’s longest fingernails?) Fourth, they gravitate toward heroes — people who push the edges of those limits. By celebrating heroes, they can vicariously share in their transcendence. Look for the posts hanging up in a teenager’s bedroom to guess what boundaries they feel most hemmed in by: athletes push against physical limits; a death metal guitarist might push against authority and conventional morality. An activist or entrepreneur might push against our dulled morality or our sense of what’s possible. Finally, we might spot teens taking up hobbies and making collections. Hobbies can be a way to identify yourself as part of a group against the rest of the world (“I’m the sort of person who goes bird-watching!”), and collections can be a way to climb the status ladder inside the community. Egan points out that a collection can also be a way to feel like you have control over what you’re discovering is a very big and complex world of detailed information (“I’ve spotted every one of the fifty most common birds of Texas — even the black-capped vireo!”) Egan’s insight is that these obsessions give teenagers a sense of meaning, and that we can use them as tools to make middle schools that overflow with meaning. From meaningless to meaning-soaked Again, Egan sketches out a new kind of curriculum subject-by-subject. Before, his trick was to ask where the subject first evolved out of; now, it’s to ask who first discovered or created the specific content we’re teaching. “All knowledge”, he writes, “is human knowledge. Everything we know is knowable through the lives of its inventors, discoverers, or users, and we can have access to that knowledge through the hopes, fears, or intentions that drove them”. Middle school math Who first discovered the concepts students learn in math? The answer, of course, is a wide diversity of curious men and women living across the world over the last few thousand years. Egan says: bring those people into how we teach math. If we used gossip and heroes to help students find it meaningful, what kind of math would result? When we teach the Pythagorean theorem, we should give a sense of who Pythagoras was — a cult-founder who worshiped numbers to find God, whose followers (according to a piece of ancient gossip) murdered one of their members who discovered irrational numbers! Q: Well, sure, that works for Pythagoras, but he’s a known nut job; surely most math doesn’t come from such interesting roots? When we teach the Cartesian coordinate system, students should meet Rene Descartes, the Calvinist French polymath who saw the possibility that math could decipher the world, if only we could unite algebra and geometry… and invented the xy-plane to do exactly that. When we teach scientific notation, we should call our students’ attention to the importance of the number zero, and tell them the story of the Pope who tried to introduce Arabic numerals to Christian Europe and may have been assassinated because of it. When we teach algebra, we should ask students why “algebra” is Arabic for “the fixing of bones”, and tell the story of what Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was up to. We could do this all day. Literally everything students learn in school was first invented or discovered by some interesting person who was struggling to accomplish something hard. To learn is to connect with those people, whether we know it or not. Egan says: help kids know it. Math has been dehumanized: re-humanize it. Q: So the math curriculum needs to become a history of math curriculum, and math teachers need to become history teachers? No, the content needn’t change. But with surprisingly little work, we can bring in the gossipy stories of heroes, and their obsessions can spread to students. Middle school science Who first discovered the things students learn about in science? If you’re thinking “scientists”, you’re only partially right. Most of the big-picture ideas that we now think of as “science” were discovered before the word “scientist” was invented, or the discipline was professionalized. Frequently, they were hatched by true amateurs, working in their free time, hungry to unlock the secrets of nature. We can use gossip and heroes to spread their obsessions to students just as we taught math, but Egan points out two twists. The first is that the content itself can take on heroic qualities: everything is impressive, when you look at it in a certain light. In an interview, Egan once said: “My book is an attempt to show that, indeed, everything in the world is wonderful, but that schools are designed almost to disguise this slightly shameful fact. We represent the world to children as mostly known and rather dull. The opposite is the case: we are surrounded by mystery, and what we know is fascinating”. What would even the most boring subjects look like, if we emphasized their heroic qualities? Well: What’s a tooth? Bone, wrapped in rock, surrounding tiny cells that your body feeds with blood. What’s a bar of chocolate? A crystal of jellyfish-shaped fat molecules stacked together; when you put it in your mouth you shake them apart into a writhing confusion. What’s the air around you? The bottom of a 10-mile-deep ocean; when you put your tongue over a soda straw and your Pepsi stops leaking out, it’s not because a “vacuum” is “sucking” it up, but because that ocean is squeezing it into your face. Again, we could do this all day! And in middle school science, we can. Everything in the world is wonderful; we can help students see this again and again. The second twist is that science is a subject rich in extremes. Here Egan introduces a concept that we’ll see crop up again: “15-minute segments”. To help us fit as much wonder as possible into a school day, he suggests we supplement the usual school subjects with a few quick lessons. To infuse science with extremes, he suggests we add on three: “human & natural records”, “extremes of animals & plants”, and “cosmology”. Middle school history Who first made the things students learn about in history? Why, the historical characters themselves! Since we’ve given kids a grounding in history in elementary school, now we can build on that, going through many of the same events as before, but in more depth, and more vividly. We’ll leverage the interest with other people’s inner lives to tell stories focusing on the perspectives of the people who made history — zooming in, when possible, on scandalous details. We’ll leverage the tool of idealism to choose historical characters who chafed against their surroundings, and understand what they were trying to accomplish. What was their vision of the world? What did they hope for, and what did they fear? Q: Isn’t the “great man” approach to history out of fashion? Egan’s approach doesn’t say that “great men” made history — it’s just leveraging gossip to help kids see history as something meaningful that can expand their own possibilities. “Early adolescence is commonly a time of intense and vivid emotional life, and also a time of deepest boredom and depression… [We] can give shape to the intermediate curriculum and offer the students a world that is rich, complex, varied, and as intense and vivid as their own emotional lives”. We also should add on another “15-minute segment” just to pump in as many biographies as possible, and from people who don’t always fit into the normal history curriculum. Call it “Brief Lives”, and throw in anyone who’s struggled to push some limit — Mary Wollstonecraft, Jesse Owen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the students’ great-aunts, whoever. As students get older, this can transition to “People and Their Ideas”. Here, we’d focus less on the details of the person’s life, and use it as a backdrop to showing how meaningful some of history’s most important ideas could be. Think Aristotle and syllogisms, Edward Said and orientalism, Confucius and propriety, Cornel West and race, Buddha on the four noble truths, Muhammad and the five pillars, Karl Marx and communism, Adam Smith and the invisible hand, Thomas Hobbes and the state of nature, John Locke and natural rights, Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism, Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments, Martin Luther on faith, Voltaire on the freedom of speech… you get the idea. Q: Can you really get a profound understanding of utilitarianism in 15 minutes? Yes! The point of this segment isn’t to develop a systematic understanding of any one idea, it’s to introduce students to the exciting possibilities of human thought. (As a bonus, this might make them less likely to fall for the first ideology that they encounter later in life.) Diversity is important for this — as it is with culture. Throughout this, we should also be trying to expose students to as much cultural diversity as possible, because in high school, we’ll be trying to make sense of our society, and it’s impossible to do that unless we have something to compare it against. Middle school literature & language You might think that this subject would be easy — that middle school literature is already filled with “strong and clear narratives”, that it deals with “transcendent human qualities such as courage, love, and persistence”, that it focuses on “extremes of human experience”, that it examines “something strange and exotic”. You’d be right! Egan’s pretty happy with a bog-standard middle school literature curriculum, done well. In this part of the book, his spends most of his limited space suggesting three rather odd activities which could also be useful — especially for increasing students’ awareness of language, so they can use it better. The first is etymology — not, however, memorizing lists of roots, but in being told the entertaining backstories of specific words. Take the word “berserk”, for example — we now use it to mean something relatively mild (“if my mom catches me coming home late, she’ll go berserk”), but it comes from an old Norse word meaning “a raging warrior of superhuman strength”. And that’s because ber meant “bear” and serk meant “shirt”: soldiers of the bear cult would don the skin of a bear to, in their minds, transform into one — howling, foaming at the mouth, and gnawing the rims of their shields. (Most adults walk through life with little understanding that the words falling out of their mouths are entities, with their own back-stories. Communication is, at the very least, more interesting when we become aware of this.) The second is to add on another language to learn — not, this time, to become fluent in it, but just to become aware of how very different human languages can be. (For native English speakers, Sanskrit might work well, or Cantonese, or perhaps even ancient Egyptian. Again, the point isn’t for this language to be useful — it’s to explore diversity.) The final one is to study humor — not just jokes anymore, but comedy at its finest. Egan cites (at length!) Monty Python as a group of people who were particularly brilliant in their use of the English language. Examining their skits can lead us into not just an appreciation of semantics (the study of how meaning is made from smaller pieces, like etymology) but also pragmatics (the study of how meaning is made in social situations). Pretty heady stuff, for a conversation about a dead parrot. Part 4: A new kind of high school I’ll confess — I loved parts of high school… and among nerdy folks, I suspect I’m not alone. For some of us, this was a golden time. Even at my local public high school, I had access to academically thrilling classes — especially, in my last two years, advanced literature and history. I felt like I was finally understanding the ideas that mattered. In any case, Egan is quick to acknowledge that, at this level, the sort of education he advocates really is being practiced in some places. What he can add is an understanding of what makes it wonderful, how to make it even more wonderful, and how to make it wonderful for many, many more people. What’s the matter with high school? Far too often, even when high school classes are intellectual, they’re dry. For the majority of students, all this academic stuff is experienced as utterly lifeless, a mass of dead information to be squeezed inside one’s head for a test and then left to evaporate. Egan mocks the curriculum wars that seem to be a permanent feature of the teaching life; quoting the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, he says “while the academic left and right bicker over whether the curriculum is too traditional or too radical, they fail to recognize that most students absorb so little of academic culture that the bickering is largely irrelevant”. Why so dry? Egan suggests three reasons to explain this. First, because high school academic classes are too often masses of small details with no sign of the big picture. Second, because they’re typically slavishly disciplinary, and aren’t able to address the questions that span the disciplines. Third, because they’re often designed to bring students through what everyone is sure of, and hide away any controversies. In all of these, Egan suggests that what’s called “academics” in high school is too often a dim imitation of what real academics are actually practicing. There’s a fourth reason, though, and it’s probably the biggest of all — by the time they get to high school, most students haven’t actually learned that much! An academic approach is designed to connect small details into the big picture; for people who arrive in high school (and college) classes without having already collected much in their heads, academics are going to taste dry. (An implication of this for anyone trying to improve schools is that we might not want to start with high schools. If your goal is to create a new kind of academic learning, first start at elementary school — or barring that, middle school.) What motivates mad scientists? When we wanted to re-conceive the elementary and middle school curriculums, we looked at what students were already good at — kids’ cognitive strengths and adolescents’ obsessions. For this level it might be easier to look — for reasons that will become clear when we finally unveil Egan’s crazy-sounding definition of education — at the sorts of things that bring intellectuals joy. Q: Which intellectuals? Take your pick. Galileo, Einstein, Smith, Marx, Goodall, Chomsky, Curie… all the people who took to the life of the mind like fish to water. But that’s a lot to hold in my mind at once, so I’m just going to think about Doc Brown from Back to the Future: He was high on intellectualism I’ve never been there, but the brochure looks nice Let’s call these people “mad scientists”. And let’s pretend we once again took up our job of being primatologists, and snooped on these folks “in the wild” (“in the lab”? this is beginning to get recursive…)… what would we find motivating them? Asking simple questions, for one. (What is space? What is society? What is a human? What is language?) Building general schemes (big theories) that hold lots of evidence together. Finding their place in the cosmos. And (perhaps above all) seeking certainty. Once again, Egan suggests we use these as tools to remake the curriculum. From dry to daring What could a high school curriculum look like, if it were rebuilt on these tools? Once again, Egan has a trick. This time, it’s to ask what fights have driven the development of each of these fields forward — and how we can help students enter them. First, a mini-segment! Intellectuals invented the academic disciplines to better pursue the life of the mind, but the disciplines can get in the way. Some of the most important intellectual discoveries that could help students are too big to fit into any of the disciplines. We need a place to introduce them plainly. Egan proposes another mini-segment — again, just 15 minutes a day, a few times a week — called “Metaknowledge”. Q: Isn’t that already in the International Baccalaureate program? Yes, he acknowledges that he’s borrowing from that! This segment would introduce ideas that would enrich student thinking across the disciplines: game theory, cognitive biases, systems thinking, Bayesian reasoning, epistemology, ethics, logic, cultural evolution, and so on. High school literature How can we help students enter the big fights of literature? Intellectuals of a literary bent — professors, critics, poets, novelists — delight in arguing over literature like rabbis arguing over the Talmud. Take, just for one example, the debates over Shakespeare’s character of Ophelia. Does she love Hamlet, or is she a victim of his emotional abuse? Is she truly insane, or is she acting? Is she passive, or is she pulling the strings? Oceans of ink have been spilled arguing over questions like these; our students can, perhaps, spill a few ounces more. The usefulness of arguing literature, for Egan, isn’t that it’s oh-so important for educated adults to know a lot about Ophelia. (This, again, was where the academicists went wrong — in thinking that being educated was about getting the best knowledge in your head.) Rather, arguing over literature is a training arena for the all-important intellectual move of this kind of understanding: building general schemes out of evidence, and struggling with anomalies. One person, for example, might hold that Ophelia is insane, and cite all sorts of obvious evidence — her father just was murdered by her lover, she rants nonsense while (bizarrely) handing out flowers to friends… But then he’s challenged when he reads a scholar pointing out that, to people in Elizabethan England, types of flowers have symbolic meanings. How does he deal with that? He could ignore it, claiming it an over-reading of Shakespeare. (Sometimes a flower is just a flower!) Or he could address it, complicating his own scheme. This intellectual work is best done with other people, who are incentivized to challenge your understanding of something, and go back and forth, building competing models and calling attention to anomalies. This process — the “dialectic” — pops up again and again in the academic disciplines. It’s the center of how understanding works, at this stage. And the nice thing about practicing it on literature is that, more so than in history or science, the evidence is shared knowledge — it’s right in front of everyone, written out. But there are other ways literature class can be helpful to the general life of the mind. Egan also suggests that we’ll want to specially include literature that helps students understand complex ideas. Camus, Orwell, Borges, Calvino might be particularly helpful here… and I imagine that genres like science fiction and magical realism might be particularly useful, too. (Note, though, that once again none of this requires a radical remaking of the curriculum, or of the canon of texts that we traditionally assign to high schoolers.) Q: Oh yes, the canon — what does Egan have to say about the canon wars? When he wrote Educated Mind in the nineties, the long-brewing canon war was approaching its inevitable apocalyptic climax. On one side of this Plain of Megiddo were the pro-canon traditionalists, arguing that we should keep assigning the texts that had been argued over for centuries. Facing them were the anti-canon reformers, arguing the standard texts over-represented the perspective of dead white men. Onto the middle of the plain rides Egan on a white horse, who bellows above the din: “I’VE GOT A BUSLOAD OF HIGH SCHOOLERS WHO WANTS TO JOIN IN, EVERYONE OKAY WITH THAT?” To do so, he says, we need to give students the arguments from both sides. So, for example, bell hooks, Edward Said, and China Achebe should be on the syllabus, as should Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and Diane Ravitch. And of course they should actually read the texts cherished by both sides, too, so they can argue better. High school history How could entering the big fights help us reinvent high school history? First, we might look for dueling histories. It’s time for students to get into historiography and understand that history isn’t just what happened, it’s something we make. We might help kids read chapters from Howard Zinn’s socialist history of America alongside the corresponding chapters from Paul Johnson’s conservative history of America. How could big questions help? We want to help students see how various people have disagreed over some of the big questions of what human history is, at its most basic. We can have them compare Steven Pinker’s theory of civilization’s progress (Better Angels of our Nature) with Yuvah Noah Harari’s theory of civilization’s woes (Sapiens). We could have them compare so-and-so’s account of human history as an ever-expanding unlatching of energy sources with Robert Wright’s account of human history as unlatching more and more positive-sum games (Nonzero). What role could the lure of certainty play? To help them grow their skills at finding anomalies, we might help them work through pseudo-histories and conspiracy theories. Q: Conspiracy theories! Oh, come now, you’re playing with fire. Well, the world is on fire. Our students will spend the rest of their lives encountering terrible-but-beguiling arguments about how the world works; if we don’t prepare them for those, what have we been doing? So we should introduce arguments that the Moon landing was a hoax, that the Illuminati founded America, that aliens built the pyramids, and so on. At no point can we demean students for falling for any of these theories — the job of a teacher at this stage, Egan writes, is to support students in their reasoning even when their beliefs are offensive and stupid, gradually offering anomalies. There’s no way out of bad theories except through them. By the time students graduate, we want them to have wrestled with terrible ideas and — for a while — lost. They need to experience what it’s like to change their minds about something they felt strongly about. They need to viscerally realize, in Feynman’s famous phrase, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” High school natural science How could entering the big fights reinvent high school science? At present, so much of the high school science curriculum — especially “honors” classes — is oriented toward helping amass details. (The same is true of 100-level university classes, which famously “survey” the field to prepare for more advanced studies. I always thought this was stupid — of the huge lecture hall of students in my Geology 100 class, how many went on to take even a second course?) The meaty debates that propel science forward are held back. Egan complains: “The more general and speculative theories in any discipline are treated like an unconventional and disreputable relation who, even though the children find her exciting and entertaining, must be kept hidden from view, her very existence denied as long as possible”. This is a stupid approach — students with an adventurous bent are convinced that science isn’t for them. Egan proposes, simply, that we flip this, and organize high school science classes around the big debates. We shouldn’t be ashamed at how, well, adolescent this might look: “the dramatic, speculative, and contentious theories will be up-front in the early years of the [high school] curriculum”. What might those be? Egan doesn’t give a list, but we can spitball some: instead of explaining what “matter” is from the top down, a physics class could problematize “matter” by following the debates over the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and by becoming familiarized with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics

The kind of understanding we laid out for high school was first hammered out by Plato and Aristotle, went dormant in Europe, and was further developed by Arab & Jewish scholars before blossoming again in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Nowadays it’s carried on by scholars in more-or-less every university department. Egan needed a name that would encompass all of that, and he picked “Philosophic”.

This, then, is the origin of the tools Egan lays out for middle school. Searching for a name for this mermaid of an understanding — half in the Mythic water, half in the Philosophic air — he settles on “Romantic”. (The name is a nod to the Romantic period of Western art, which tried to re-infuse the Enlightenment’s rationalism with emotion and intuition. But don’t confuse the two — the 18th century European movement is just one place we see “Romantic understanding”.)

environmental justice2 mentions across 2 issues

environmental justice is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between March 16, 2022 and March 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Saving the environment becomes environmental justice"; "Isn't it fair to frame their struggle as an appeal to 'environmental justice'?". It most often appears alongside 1984, Apollo Mojave, Charity.

Article page: environmental justice
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: March 16, 2022
Last seen: March 24, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Justice Creep March 16, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Justice Creep March 24, 2022

1984 2 shared issues
Apollo Mojave 2 shared issues
Charity 2 shared issues
climate justice 2 shared issues
economic justice 2 shared issues

Source context

Justice Creep

March 16, 2022 · Original source

Helping the poor becomes economic justice. If they’re minorities, then it’s racial justice, itself a subspecies of social justice. Saving the environment becomes environmental justice, except when it’s about climate change in which case it’s climate justice. Caring about young people is actually about fighting for intergenerational justice. The very laws of space and time are subject to spatial justice and temporal justice.

Inline links: economic justice, racial justice, social justice, environmental justice, climate justice, intergenerational justice, spatial justice, temporal justice

Highlights From The Comments On Justice Creep

March 24, 2022 · Original source

Isn't it fair to frame their struggle as an appeal to 'environmental justice'?

Environmentalism2 mentions across 2 issues

Environmentalism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 04, 2022 and November 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Environmentalism shares some of this same ethos"; "Social movements like environmentalism are diffuse enough"; "modern social movements like environmentalism ... being cults". It most often appears alongside America, God, 1 Peter 3.

Article page: Environmentalism
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 04, 2022
Last seen: November 12, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Movie Review: Don't Look Up January 04, 2022
Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024

America 2 shared issues
God 2 shared issues
1 Peter 3 1 shared issues
165 AD 1 shared issues
1990s 1 shared issues

Source context

Movie Review: Don't Look Up

January 04, 2022 · Original source

First, a story of scruffy hippies and activists protesting the Man, that embodiment of capitalism and conformism and respectability. Think Stonewall, where gay people on the margins of society spat in the face of their supposed betters and demanded their rights. Even academics are part of this tradition: Chomsky and Herman’s Manufacturing Consent accuses the mainstream media of being the Man. It’s jingoist and obsessed with justifying America’s foreign adventures; we need brave truth-tellers to point out where it goes wrong. Environmentalism shares some of this same ethos. In Erin Brockovich, a giant corporation is poisoning people, lying about it, and has bribed or corrupted everyone else into taking their side. Only one brave activist is able to put the pieces together and stand up for ordinary people.

Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day

November 12, 2024 · Original source

Stark kind of tries to account for this. He says that religions spread through the social graph, so the friendlier you are, the better you do. But also, you want your religion to be a tight-knit community, and you definitely don’t want your members making so many heathen friends that they deconvert. Different religions find different places along the tradeoff curve. Classic cults (like Scientology) restrict members’ external connections, successfully gaining tight-knit-ness and protecting themselves against deconversion at the cost of curtailing their growth opportunities. Social movements like environmentalism are diffuse enough that everyone knows an environmentalist, but so loose-knit that they’re barely even a movement at all, and environmentalists frequently forget about the cause and go do something else. Somehow early Christianity (and Mormonism) found the exact sweet spot.

People sometimes accuse modern social movements like environmentalism, MAGA, wokeness, rationalism, etc of being cults, but AFAIK this rule doesn’t apply to them - most people in these movements get involved by stumbling across the philosophy online and finding that it rings true. It seems to me like these modern movements are more likely to make unique and interesting claims about the world that could attract or repel certain types of people - whereas most cults are pretty similar (this one guy is God, he commands you to chant a bunch and give him money, and here’s a holy book saying we want world peace). I wonder if this should actually be a counter to “cultishness” accusations - “We can’t be a cult, cults always spread through the social graph, but we learned about this movement from a blog!”

Eostre2 mentions across 2 issues

Eostre is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between October 07, 2022 and October 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "the spring goddess Eostre"; "spring goddess Eostre"; "You are entering a world of pain when you mention Eostre". It most often appears alongside Adraste, America, American Jews.

Article page: Eostre
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: October 07, 2022
Last seen: October 10, 2022

Outbound links

https://historyforatheists.com/2017/04/easter-ishtar-eostre-and-eggs/

Issue trail

A Columbian Exchange October 07, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day October 10, 2022

Adraste 2 shared issues
America 2 shared issues
American Jews 2 shared issues
Beroe 2 shared issues
Christmas 2 shared issues

Source context

A Columbian Exchange

October 07, 2022 · Original source

Adraste: Is that so bad? All of our best holidays have begun as anti-holidays to neutralize older rites. Jesus was born in the spring; they moved Christmas to December to neutralize the pagan Solstice celebration. Easter got its name because it neutralized the rites of the spring goddess Eostre. Hanukkah was originally a minor celebration of a third-tier Bible story; American Jews bumped it up several notches of importance in order to neutralize Christmas. Labor Day was invented to screw up Communists’ attempts to coordinate around May Day as a labor protest holiday. This isn’t something modern liberals invented. It’s a tradition as old as the West. Give anti-holidays enough time and they become proper celebrations; in a hundred years, your descendants will be horrified at the thought of missing an Indigenous Peoples’ Day observance!

October 10, 2022 · Original source

All of our best holidays have begun as anti-holidays to neutralize older rites. Jesus was born in the spring; they moved Christmas to December to neutralize the pagan Solstice celebration. Easter got its name because it neutralized the rites of the spring goddess Eostre. Hanukkah was originally a minor celebration of a third-tier Bible story; American Jews bumped it up several notches of importance in order to neutralize Christmas.

You are entering a world of pain when you mention Eostre . . . https://historyforatheists.com/2017/04/easter-ishtar-eostre-and-eggs/ . We should have a ‘Debunk the Eostre Myth’ day. It’s already celebrated regularly by many people.

Inline links: https://historyforatheists.com/2017/04/easter-ishtar-eostre-and-eggs/

Looking at Hogg’s link, it mostly debunks the claim that Easter is related to Ishtar (which I agree is untrue), but moves on to discuss Eostre also. It points out that for a while the only known reference to a goddess Eostre was in the works of 8th century English historian Bede, who wrote:

epigenetics2 mentions across 2 issues

epigenetics is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 02, 2021 and May 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Sinclair’s answer is epigenetics"; "Falconer tries to give this last one a “scientific” grounding by talking about epigenetics". It most often appears alongside Harvard, Alexandre Gueniot, Algernon’s Law.

Article page: epigenetics
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: December 02, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: Lifespan December 02, 2021
Book Review: The Others Within Us May 21, 2024

Harvard 2 shared issues
Alexandre Gueniot 1 shared issues
Algernon’s Law 1 shared issues
Alzheimers 1 shared issues
Australia 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: Lifespan

December 02, 2021 · Original source

Sinclair’s answer is epigenetics. Remember, all cells have the same DNA. The reason kidney cells are different from lung cells is because they have epigenetic markers on the kidney genes saying “turn these on” and on the lung genes say “turn these off”. Part of the cloning process involves telling the cell to be an egg cell. After that, it undergoes the normal embryogenesis process where embryonic stem cells differentiate into kidney cells, lung cells, and the rest.

Epigenetic damage could potentially still be unfixable: how do you convince the thousands of different intermixed cell types in the body to all be the right type again? But Sinclair thinks the body already has a mechanism for doing this: epigenetic repair proteins called sirtuins. I’m a bit confused about where sirtuins are getting their information from: is there a backup copy of epigenetics that they read to figure out what’s wrong and needs repair? I get the impression from one or two cryptic statements that Sinclair thinks maybe yes (see the discussion of “the observer” on page 171). But for some reason, the system works well enough to keep you alive for the normal human lifespan (and no better).

Book Review: The Others Within Us

May 21, 2024 · Original source

(Falconer tries to give this last one a “scientific” grounding by talking about epigenetics, which broke my suspension of disbelief - talk about demons and I’ll listen, but intergenerational epigenetic inheritance of behavioral traits is a step too far)

Inline links: is a step too far

esketamine2 mentions across 2 issues

esketamine is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 19, 2021 and November 17, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Most people get it through heavily-regulated and expensive esketamine prescriptions"; "a ketamine component called esketamine and spent millions of dollars to clear the bureaucratic hurdles for that one"; "Or my article on esketamine". It most often appears alongside ketamine, ACE-2 receptor, ACSH.

Article page: esketamine
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: July 19, 2021
Last seen: November 17, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Peer Review Request: Ketamine July 19, 2021
Ivermectin: Much More Than You Wanted To Know November 17, 2021

ketamine 2 shared issues
ACE-2 receptor 1 shared issues
ACSH 1 shared issues
Adderall 1 shared issues
Ahmed et al 1 shared issues

Source context

Peer Review Request: Ketamine

July 19, 2021 · Original source

The short version: Ketamine is a new and exciting depression treatment, which probably works by activating AMPA receptors and strengthening synaptic connections. It takes effect within hours and works about 2-3x as well as traditional antidepressants. Most people get it through heavily-regulated and expensive esketamine prescriptions, or through even-more-expensive IV ketamine clinics, but evidence suggests that getting it prescribed cheaply and conveniently from a compounding pharmacy is equally effective. A single dose of ketamine lasts between a few days and a few weeks, after which some people will find their depression comes back; long-term repeated dosing with ketamine anecdotally seems to work great, but hasn’t been formally tested for safety. Some people also use ketamine-assisted psychotherapy, which is a very different form of treatment and can have impressive long-term results, but which is less explored and more idiosyncratic for each person.

1. How can I get ketamine therapy? 2. How can I find a doctor willing to prescribe me ketamine? 3. How can my doctor prescribe me ketamine? 4. How safe is ketamine? 4.1: How concerned should I be about cognitive side effects of ketamine? 4.2: How concerned should I be about urinary side effects of ketamine? 4.3: How concerned should I be about hepatotoxicity from ketamine? 4.4: How concerned should I be about getting addicted to ketamine? 4.5: How concerned should I be about hypertension from ketamine? 5: How effective is ketamine? 6: Do I have to take ketamine IV? What about nasal and oral ketamine? 6.1. Do I have to take esketamine? What about regular ketamine? 7: What’s the right dose of ketamine? 7.1: What are the exact instructions for dosing ketamine correctly? 8: How long does ketamine work for? Do I have to keep taking it forever? 9: What is ketamine-assisted psychotherapy? 9.1: Where can I get ketamine-assisted psychotherapy? 9.2: Can I do informal ketamine-assisted psychotherapy on my own? 10. How does ketamine work? 11. Will you prescribe me ketamine?

Second, you can use Spravato. Spravato is an FDA-approved official ketamine spray. You won’t have get anything injected into your veins, and it’s a less “medical”-feeling experience than a clinic. But this has its own problems. Spravato isn’t exactly ketamine – it’s esketamine, a ketamine component, which might or might not work as well as regular ketamine. It’s only allowed in doses of 56 to 84 mg, which will be too low for many people. And it also costs about $6400/month and has to be administered in special clinics. The only saving grace is that some people’s insurances will cover this one after a lot of begging. I still don’t think it’s the best option for most people.

Ivermectin: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

November 17, 2021 · Original source

Source. Real data would follow something like a bell curve. This is going to require a social norm of always sharing data. Even better, journals should require the raw data before they publish anything, and should make it available on their website. People are going to fight hard against this, partly because it’s annoying and partly because of (imho exaggerated) patient privacy related concerns. Somebody’s going to try make some kind of gated thing where you have to prove you have a PhD and a “legitimate cause” before you can access the data, and that person should be fought tooth and nail (some of the “data detectives” who figured out the ivermectin study didn’t have advanced degrees). I want a world where “I did a study, but I can’t show you the data” should be taken as seriously as “I determined P = NP, but I can’t show you the proof.” The second reason I think this, aside from checking for fraud, is checking for mistakes. I have no proof this was involved in ivermectin in particular. But I’ve been surprised how often it comes up when I talk to scientists. Someone in their field got a shocking result, everyone looked over the study really hard and couldn’t find any methodological problems, there’s no evidence of fraud, so do you accept it? A lot of times instead I hear people say “I assume they made a coding error”. I believe them, because I have made a bunch of stupid errors. Sometimes you make the errors for me - an early draft of this post of mine stated that there was an strong positive effect of assortative mating on autism, but when I double-checked it was entirely due to some idiot who filled out the survey and claimed to have 99999 autistic children. In this very essay, I almost said that a set of ivermectin studies showed a positive result because I was reading the number for whether two lists were correlated rather than whether a paired-samples t-test on the lists was significant. I think lots of studies make these kinds of errors. But even if it’s only 1%, these will make up much more than 1% of published studies, and much more than 1% of important ground-breaking published studies, because correct studies can only prove true things, but false studies can prove arbitrarily interesting hypotheses (did you know there was an increase in the suicide rate on days that Donald Trump tweeted?!?) and those are the ones that will get published and become famous. So if the lesson of the original replication crisis was “read the methodology” and “read the preregistration document”, this year’s lesson is “read the raw data”. Which is a bit more of an ask. Especially since most studies don’t make it available. The Sociological Takeaway I’ve been thinking about this one a lot too. Ivermectin supporters were really wrong. I enjoy the idea of a cosmic joke where ivermectin sort of works in some senses in some areas. But the things people were claiming - that ivermectin has a 100% success rate, that you don’t need to take the vaccine because you can just take ivermectin instead, etc - have been untenable not just since the big negative trials came out this summer, but even by the standards of the early positive trials. Mahmud et al was big and positive and exciting, but it showed that ivermectin patients recovered in about 7 days on average instead of 9. I think the conventional wisdom - that the most extreme ivermectin supporters were mostly gullible rubes who were bamboozled by pseudoscience - was basically accurate. Mainstream medicine has reacted with slogans like “believe Science”. I don’t know if those kinds of slogans ever help, but they’re especially unhelpful here. A quick look at ivermectin supporters shows their problem is they believed Science too much. @jonno_bosch I work in hospitality so I need things to return to normal ASAP. I am using Ivermectin as a prophylactic. Hugely influenced by Carvallo trail and Chala trail which showed huge protection","username":"Bannisterious","name":"Andrew Bannister","profile_image_url":"","date":"Fri Feb 12 16:21:14 +0000 2021","photos":[],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":0,"like_count":0,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> @mtskullcrusher @HereComeTheJud @therealjosexy @joeycadre @PeegeRiley @dcwickedestcity @blaireerskine Read Raad. Or Mahmud. Or ICON study from Florida. Or Mexico City hospitalizations study. Or Niaee. Or...\n\nOr just type \"ivermectin covid\" in Google Scholar and read.","username":"fatlas6","name":"fatlas","profile_image_url":"","date":"Thu Sep 02 21:34:59 +0000 2021","photos":[],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":0,"like_count":1,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> They have a very reasonable-sounding belief, which is that if dozens of studies all say a drug works really well, then it probably works really well. When they see dozens of studies saying a drug works really well, and the elites saying “no don’t take it!”, their extremely natural conclusion is that it works really well but the elites are covering it up. Sometimes these people even have a specific theory for why elites are covering up ivermectin, like that pharma companies want you to use more expensive patented drugs instead. This theory is extremely plausible. Pharma companies are always trying to convince people to use expensive patented drugs instead of equally good generic alternatives. Ivermectin believers probably heard about this from the many, many good articles by responsible news outlets, discussing the many, many times pharma companies have tried to trick people into using more expensive patented medications. Like this ACSH article about Nexium. Or my article on esketamine. Given that dozens of studies said a drug worked, and elites continued to deny it worked, and there are well-known times where elites lie about drugs in order to make money, it was an incredibly reasonable inference that this was one of those times. If you have a lot of experience with pharma, you know who lies and who doesn’t, and you know what lies they’re willing to tell and which ones they shrink back from. As far as I know, no reputable scientist has ever come out and said ‘esketamine definitely works better than regular ketamine’. The regulatory system just heavily implied it. I claim that with ivermectin, even the people who don’t usually lie were saying it was ineffective, and they were saying it more directly and decisively than liars usually do. But most people can’t translate Pharma → English fluently enough to know where the space of “things people routinely lie about and nobody worries about it too much” ends. So they incredibly reasonably assume anything could be a lie. And if you don’t know which statements about pharmaceuticals are lies, “the one that has dozens of studies contradicting it” is a pretty good heuristic! If you tell these people to “believe Science”, you will just worsen the problem where they trust dozens of scientific studies done by scientists using the scientific method over the pronouncements of the CDC or whoever. So “believe experts”? That would have been better advice in this case. But the experts have beclowned themselves again and again throughout this pandemic, from the first stirrings of “anyone who worries about coronavirus reaching the US is dog-whistling anti-Chinese racism”, to the Surgeon-General tweeting “Don’t wear a face mask”, to government campaigns focusing entirely on hand-washing (HEPA filters? What are those?) Not only would a recommendation to trust experts be misleading, I don’t even think you could make it work. People would notice how often the experts were wrong, and your public awareness campaign would come to naught. But also: one of the data detectives who exposed some fraudulent ivermectin papers was a medical student, which puts him somewhere between pond scum and hookworms on the Medical Establishment Totem Pole. Some of the people whose studies he helped sink were distinguished Professors of Medicine and heads of Health Institutes. If anyone interprets “trust experts” as “mere medical students must not publicly challenge heads of Health Institutes”, then we’ve accidentally thrown the fundamental principle of science out with the bathwater. But Pierre Kory, spiritual leader of the Ivermectin Jihad, is a distinguished critical care doctor. What heuristic tells us “Medical students should be allowed to publicly challenge heads of Health Institutes” but not “Distinguished critical care doctors should be allowed to publicly challenge the CDC”? Then what about “believe statisticians”? I’ve never heard anyone propose this before, but re-centering the mystique of scientific-expertise in study-analyzers and study-aggregators rather than object-level scientists is…one way you could go, I guess. Statisticians admittedly sort of failed us here: the first several meta-analyses said ivermectin worked. But the statistical process - the idea that studies are raw materials, but it takes skill to turn them into the finished good of scientific knowledge - sort of comes out looking good. If we need to summarize our takeaway in a slogan of exactly two words, one of which is “trust”, you could do worse than this one. (am I secretly suggesting that we make rationality higher status? Maybe, although rationalists did no better here during the early phase of “looks promising so far” than anyone else, and it was researchers digging into the nitty-gritty of the data who really solved this.) Or maybe this is the wrong level on which to think about this. Maybe there isn’t and can’t be a simple heuristic you can teach everyone in school or via a PR campaign which will lead to them having making good health decisions in an adversarial information environment, without having any negative effects anywhere else. But you also don’t want people to make bad health decisions. So what do you do? The Political Takeaway All of this is complicated by the impression many people (including me) have, that ivermectin boosterism and vaccine denialism are closely linked. The ivermectin evidence is complicated. There’s room for doubt. I can maybe see room for doubt on some marginal vaccine-related issues like how seriously to take the occasional reports of myocarditis in teens. But the basic issue - that the vaccine works really well and is incredibly safe for adults - seems beyond question. Yet people keep questioning it. I think it’s important to address ivermectin support on its own terms - as a potentially plausible scientific theory in a debris field of confusing evidence, which should be debated to the usual standards of scientific debate. I’ve tried to do that above. But this picture wouldn’t be complete without acknowledging the overlap with vaccine denial - a segment of people who are completely crazy and wrong and who happen to have fixated on this mildly interesting question as opposed to some other one with even less evidence. I’ve been trying to figure out a model where ivermectin support and vaccine denialism both make visceral sense to me, and here’s what I’ve got: Imagine that in 2025, an alien invasion fleet reaches Earth. But it got hit by a supernova on the way, the spaceships are partly disabled, and they’re only able to conquer some out-of-the-way place - let’s say Australia. There’s a few cycles of conflict and cease-fire, a few cities get nuked, and finally we settle into an uneasy peace. Over the next few years, humanity grudgingly admits the invaders into the world community. They get a seat in the United Nations. We sort of cooperate with them on projects that are important to both sides, like stopping climate change. We still hate them, but only at the level of ordinary international rivalries, like USA/USSR. In 2035, the aliens announce that a quantum memetic plague from the Andromeda Sector has reached Earth. Billions of people will die unless we let them put an immunity-granting cybernetic implant in all humans’ brain. The aliens admit we haven’t always been friends, and honestly they would still like to conquer us someday. But this plague is an ancient enemy of all sentient beings, they dealt with it on their homeworld eons ago, and they want to help us out here. Humans apparently don’t have the ability to detect quantum memetic plagues, but mortality rates for over-65s do seem weirdly high this year, something like 10x worse than a normal flu season. Do you let the aliens put an implant in your brain, or not? If it helps, the aliens look like this. Surely anyone with a brain that size must know what they’re talking about, right? (source) Fine, you don’t have to decide immediately. The brain implants aren’t even ready yet. Some human scientists suggest wearing face masks in the interim. The aliens say no, that will never work, that’s not how you deal with quantum memetic plagues, if you do anything other than wait for the brain implants you’re anti-science idiots who are wasting precious time and will kill millions of people. Human nations try face masks anyway…and they clearly and conspicuously work. The aliens say whatever, we’re still the advanced spacefaring civilization here, maybe it works for humans but that’s not the point, the point is you’ve got to let us put implants in your brains. Some human scientists suggest reopening vital services. The aliens say no, millions will die, this is “mass human sacrifice”, humans apparently must care nothing about their families’ lives. The humans try reopening anyway, and…it goes kind of okay? Maybe the death rate goes up 10% to 20% or so, hard to say? The aliens say whatever, maybe their calculations were off by a few orders of magnitude, the point is, you have to let us put implants in your brain or you’ll all die. Then some human scientists suggest vaccinating against the plague. The aliens say this is idiotic, vaccines originally come from cowpox, even the word “vaccine” comes from Latin vaccus meaning “cow”, are you saying you want cow medicine instead of actual brain implants which alien Science has proven will work? They make lots of cartoons displaying humans who want vaccines as having cow heads, or rolling around in cow poop. Meanwhile, the first few dozen studies show vaccines work great. Many top human leaders, including war heroes from the struggle against the aliens, get vaccines and are seen going out in public, looking healthy and happy. The aliens say that human science is hopelessly flawed because of complicated statistical concepts that inferior life forms like us don’t even have words for. You need to ignore all the studies and meta-analyses showing that vaccines definitely work, and let the aliens give you brain implants instead. So do you let the aliens put an implant in your brain, or not? Obviously you think long and hard before doing this. And obviously this is an extended metaphor for vaccine denialism. So what’s the difference between the metaphor (where you’re presumably anti-implant) and the real world (where you’re presumably pro-vaccine?) For me, it’s a combination of: The aliens are hostile, so I don’t trust them no matter how smart they are

Inline links: Source, this post, this ACSH article about Nexium, my article on esketamine, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1UIV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F598d7d6c-de95-4b94-b13a-3c8a452b0409.jp2, source

ESP2 mentions across 2 issues

ESP is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 04, 2022 and October 31, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "a pseudoscience book on ESP, with lots of pseudoscientific studies proving ESP was real"; "I doubt people who claim to have ESP". It most often appears alongside ACX, Bulverism, A Mind Without Craving.

Article page: ESP
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: August 04, 2022
Last seen: October 31, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Absurdity Bias, Neom Edition August 04, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Jhanas October 31, 2022

ACX 2 shared issues
Bulverism 2 shared issues
A Mind Without Craving 1 shared issues
AI risk 1 shared issues
Alexandros 1 shared issues

Source context

Absurdity Bias, Neom Edition

August 04, 2022 · Original source

Can I convince you to read the sequences? There are some real underappreciated classics. (excerpt edited to remove examples that someone would misinterpret and start a flame war over) Here’s a possible argument why not: everything has to bottom out in absurdity arguments at some level or another. Suppose I carefully calculated that, with modern construction techniques, building Neom would cost 10x more than its allotted budget. This argument contains an implied premise: “and the Saudis can’t construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else”. How do we know the Saudis can’t construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else? The argument itself doesn’t prove this; it’s just left as too absurd to need justification. Suppose I did want to address this objection. For example, I carefully researched existing construction projects in Saudi Arabia, checked how cheap they were, calculated how much they could cut costs using every trick available to them, and found it was less than 10x? My argument still contains the implied premise “there’s no Saudi conspiracy to develop amazing construction technology and hide it from the rest of the world”. But this is another absurdity heuristic - I have no argument beyond that such a conspiracy would be absurd. I might eventually be able to come up with an argument supporting this, but that argument, too, would have implied premises depending on absurdity arguments. So how far down this chain should I go? One plausible answer is “just stop at the first level where your interlocutors accept your absurdity argument”. Anyone here think Neom’s a good idea? No? Even Alexandros agrees it probably won’t work. So maybe this is the right level of absurdity. If I was pitching my post towards people who mostly thought Neom was a good idea, then I might try showing that it would cost 10x more than its expected budget, and see whether they agreed with me that Saudis being able to construct things 10x cheaper than anyone else was absurd. If they did agree with me, then I’ve hit the right level of argument. And if they agree with me right away, before I make any careful calculations, then it was fine for me to just point to it and gesture “That’s absurd!” I think this is basically the right answer for communications questions, like how to structure a blog post. When I criticize communicators for relying on the absurdity heuristic too much, it’s because they’re claiming to adjudicate a question with people on both sides, but then retreating to absurdity instead. When I was young a friend recommended me a pseudoscience book on ESP, with lots of pseudoscientific studies proving ESP was real. I looked for skeptical rebuttals, and they were all “Ha ha! ESP? That’s absurd, you morons!” These people were just clogging up Google search results that could have been giving me real arguments. But if nobody has ever heard of Neom, and I expect my readers to immediately agree that Neom is absurd, then it’s fine (in a post describing Neom rather than debating it) to stop at the first level. (I do worry that it might be creating an echo chamber; people start out thinking Neom is a bad idea for the obvious reasons, then read my post and think “and ACX also thinks it’s a bad idea” is additional evidence; I think my obligation here is to not exaggerate the amount of thought that went into my assessment, which I hope I didn’t.) But the absurdity bias isn’t just about communication. What about when I’m thinking things through in my head, alone? I’m still going to be asking questions like “is Neom possible?” and having to decide what level of argument to stop at. To put it another way: which of your assumptions do you accept vs. question? Question none of your assumptions, and you’re a closed-minded bigot. Question all of your assumptions, and you get stuck in an infinite regress. The only way to escape (outside of a formal system with official axioms) is to just trust your own intuitive judgment at some point. So maybe you should just start out doing that. Except that some people seem to actually be doing something wrong. The guy who hears about evolution and says “I know that monkeys can’t turn into humans, this is so absurd that I don’t even have to think about the question any further” is doing something wrong. How do you avoid being that guy? Some people try to dodge the question and say that all rationality is basically a social process. Maybe on my own, I will naturally stop at whatever level seems self-evident to me. Then other people might challenge me, and I can reassess. But I hate this answer. It seems to be preemptively giving up and hoping other people are less lazy than you are. It’s like answering a child’s question about how to do a math problem with “ask a grown-up”. A coward’s way out! Eliezer Yudkowsky gives his answer here: I can think of three major circumstances where the [useful] absurdity heuristic gives rise to a [bad] absurdity bias: The first case is when we have information about underlying laws which should override surface reasoning. If you know why most objects fall, and you can calculate how fast they fall, then your calculation that a helium balloon should rise at such-and-such a rate, ought to strictly override the absurdity of an object falling upward. If you can do deep calculations, you have no need for qualitative surface reasoning. But we may find it hard to attend to mere calculations in the face of surface absurdity, until we see the balloon rise. (In 1913, Lee de Forest was accused of fraud for selling stock in an impossible endeavor, the Radio Telephone Company: "De Forest has said in many newspapers and over his signature that it would be possible to transmit human voice across the Atlantic before many years. Based on these absurd and deliberately misleading statements, the misguided public...has been persuaded to purchase stock in his company...") The second case is a generalization of the first - attending to surface absurdity in the face of abstract information that ought to override it. If people cannot accept that studies show that marginal spending on medicine has zero net effect, because it seems absurd - violating the surface rule that "medicine cures" - then I would call this "absurdity bias". There are many reasons that people may fail to attend to abstract information or integrate it incorrectly. I think it worth distinguishing cases where the failure arises from absurdity detectors going off. The third case is when the absurdity heuristic simply doesn't work - the process is not stable in its surface properties over the range of extrapolation - and yet people use it anyway. The future is usually "absurd" - it is unstable in its surface rules over fifty-year intervals. This doesn't mean that anything can happen. Of all the events in the 20th century that would have been "absurd" by the standards of the 19th century, not a single one - to the best of our knowledge - violated the law of conservation of energy, which was known in 1850. Reality is not up for grabs; it works by rules even more precise than the ones we believe in instinctively. The point is not that you can say anything you like about the future and no one can contradict you; but, rather, that the particular practice of crying "Absurd!" has historically been an extremely poor heuristic for predicting the future. Over the last few centuries, the absurdity heuristic has done worse than maximum entropy - ruled out the actual outcomes as being far too absurd to be considered. You would have been better off saying "I don't know". This is all true as far as it goes, but it’s still just rules for the rare situations when your intuitive judgments of absurdity are contradicted by clear facts that someone else is handing you on a silver platter. But how do you, pondering a question on your own, know when to stop because a line of argument strikes you as absurd, vs. to stick around and gather more facts and see whether your first impressions were accurate? I don’t have a great answer here, but here are some parts of a mediocre answer: Calibration training. Make predictions so you know how often you’re right vs. wrong about things. If the things you say only have a 1% chance of happening happen a third of the time, you know you’re stopping too soon when you make absurdity arguments.

Highlights From The Comments On Jhanas

October 31, 2022 · Original source

I think people who doubt it are applying burden of proof improperly by drawing category boundaries in a weird place; something like “I doubt people who claim to have ESP, I doubt people who claim to be able to speak with the dead, these seem like spiritual/religious people claiming extraordinary abilities, jhana seems like spiritual/religious people claiming extraordinary abilities, therefore I should doubt jhana.” I guess I would argue that ESP and speaking to the dead have very high burden of proof because they break the known laws of physics, but jhana is just people experiencing lots of pleasure, which is very permitted by physics (eg MDMA).

Eugenics movement2 mentions across 2 issues

Eugenics movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 16, 2021 and July 25, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "This philosophy was the energizing intellectual force behind both the Eugenics movement and Nazi Germany"; "that set of beliefs was the grounding for the eugenics movement and played a huge role in historical abuses". It most often appears alongside Ireland, Scott, Wikipedia.

Article page: Eugenics movement
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 16, 2021
Last seen: July 25, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Progress And Poverty April 16, 2021
Highlights From The Comments On Social Model Of Disability July 25, 2023

Ireland 2 shared issues
Scott 2 shared issues
Wikipedia 2 shared issues
"The Rent Is Too Damn High!" 1 shared issues
16th amendment 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Progress And Poverty

April 16, 2021 · Original source

..."fit" tend to perish, and furthermore, this brutal process will actively "improve" the human race. This philosophy was the energizing intellectual force behind both the Eugenics movement and Nazi Germany. George clearly hates everything about this philosophy but attempts to steel-man it anyways: The Malthusian doctrine, as at present held, may be thus st...

...doing well do so because they are more "fit", and those that are less "fit" tend to perish, and furthermore, this brutal process will actively "improve" the human race. This philosophy was the energizing intellectual force behind both the Eugenics movement and Nazi Germany. George clearly hates everything about this philosophy but attempts to steel-man it anyways: The Malthusian doctrine, as at present held, may be thus stated in its stron...

Highlights From The Comments On Social Model Of Disability

July 25, 2023 · Original source

The Medical Model exactly as stated (with the "you must stigmatize people with disabilities" part included) was hugely historically popular, and calling it a straw man is only true insofar as the real people who believed it have (mostly) died off. Although it wasn't called the "medical model" at the time, that set of beliefs was the grounding for the eugenics movement and played a huge role in historical abuses of disabled people. I think Deafness is a really good example of this. The oral education of Deaf people imposed on them by hearing doctors didn't work, because there WAS no medical remedy for deafness at the time. The Cochlear implant is relatively recent, and it's not a flawless solution. In the place of the actual practice of medicine was inhumane education, which determined the worth of a Deaf person by how well they could learn how to speak, as opposed to recognizing sign language as an actual valid language with a grammar and so on. This is the ideal example of the social model versus the medical model - Deaf people were never "incapable" of speech, rather, hearing educators at the time, influenced by Alexander Graham Bell's theories of eugenics, were incapable of recognizing that the Deaf were perfectly proficient in sign language. A medical inadequacy, solved by a social solution.

evangelical Christian2 mentions across 2 issues

evangelical Christian is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 07, 2023 and June 27, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "The idea here is that citizens elect a politician who is of a certain type; perhaps the politician is an evangelical Christian"; "Trump: Wait, what if they’re an evangelical Christian who’s born again?". It most often appears alongside Barack Obama, 2016, 2020.

Article page: evangelical Christian
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: July 07, 2023
Last seen: June 27, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Secret Government July 07, 2023
My 2024 Presidential Debate June 27, 2024

Barack Obama 2 shared issues
2016 1 shared issues
2020 1 shared issues
2023 1 shared issues
2024 US election 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Secret Government

July 07, 2023 · Original source

The idea here is that citizens elect a politician who is of a certain type; perhaps the politician is an evangelical Christian or a member of the steelworkers’ union. Because the representative they have selected is of a certain type, the electorate need not worry too much about what the representative does in office, as they already know what kinds of policies the elected official is likely to support. (Page 60)

My 2024 Presidential Debate

June 27, 2024 · Original source

Trump: Wait, what if they’re an evangelical Christian who’s born again?

evolutionary biology2 mentions across 2 issues

evolutionary biology is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 22, 2021 and July 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "borrows much from psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology"; "dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like ... evolutionary biology". It most often appears alongside neuroscience, ACX, African Gray Parrots.

Article page: evolutionary biology
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 22, 2021
Last seen: July 19, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are? April 22, 2021
Your Book Review: How Language Began July 19, 2024

neuroscience 2 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
African Gray Parrots 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are?

April 22, 2021 · Original source

Are We Smart Enough gives an overview of the study of animal cognition, its history, past and current controversies, and where the field might go next (as of 2016). "Animal Cognition" is a relatively new subfield that borrows much from psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, but it is firmly rooted in its parent field of ethology. So, just what is ethology? It is the study animal behavior. Ethologists these days are certainly knowledgeable about evolutionary lineages, cladistics, and animal anatomy, but the heart of the field has always been observing animals interacting with their environments (whether a wild or experimental environment). As we'll see, it's a field with a history at least as tumultuous as psychology, with an early amateurish "wild west", a strict over-correction, and these days a hopefully more productive synthesis.

Your Book Review: How Language Began

July 19, 2024 · Original source

This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

what one means by the statement “All natural human languages have recursion.” Everett generally takes recursion to refer to the following property of many natural languages: one can construct sentences or phrases from other sentences and phrases. For example: “The cat died.” -> “Alice said that [the cat died].” -> “Bob said that [Alice said that [the cat died.]]” In the above example, we can in principle generate infinitely many new sentences by writing “Z said X,” where X is the previous sentence and Z is some name. For clarity’s sake, one should probably distinguish between different ways to generate new sentences or phrases from old ones; Pullum mentions a few in the context of assessing Everett’s Pirahã recursion claims: Everett reports that there are no signs of no multiple coordination (It takes [skill, nerve, initiative, and courage]), complex determiners ([[[my] son’s] wife’s] family), stacked modifiers (a [nice, [cosy, [inexpensive [little cottage]]]]), or—most significant of all—reiterable clause embedding (I thought [ you already knew [that she was here ] ]). These are the primary constructions that in English permit sentences of any arbitrary finite length to be constructed, yielding the familiar argument that the set of all definable grammatical sentences in English is infinite. Regardless of the details, a generic prediction should be that there is no longest sentence in a language whose grammar is recursive. This doesn’t mean that one can say an arbitrarily long sentence in real life4. Rather, one can say that, given a member of some large set of sentences, one can always extend it. Everett takes the claim “All natural human languages have recursion.” to mean that, if there exists a natural human language without recursion, the claim is false. Or, slightly more subtly, if there exists a language which uses recursion so minimally that linguists have a hard time determining whether a corpus of linguistic data falsifies it or not, sentence-level recursion is probably not a bedrock principle of human languages. I found the following anecdote from a 2012 paper of Everett’s enlightening: Pirahã speakers reject constructed examples with recursion, as I discovered in my translation of the gospel of Mark into the language (during my days as a missionary). The Bible is full of recursive examples, such as the following, from Mark 1:3: ‘(John the Baptist) was a voice of one calling in the desert…’ I initially translated this as: ‘John, the man that put people in the water in order to clean them for God, that lived in a place like a beach with no trees and that yelled for people to obey God’. The Pirahãs rejected every attempt until I translated this as: ‘John cleaned people in the river. He lived in another jungle. The jungle was like a beach. It had no trees. He yelled to people. You want God!’ The non-recursive structure was accepted readily and elicited all sorts of questions. I subsequently realized looking through Pirahã texts that there were no clear examples involving either recursion or even embedding. Attempts to construct recursive sentences or phrases, such as ‘several big round barrels', were ultimately rejected by the Pirahãs (although initially they accepted them to be polite to me, a standard fieldwork problem that Jeanette Sakel and I discuss). He does explicitly claim (in the aforementioned paper and elsewhere) that Pirahã probably has no longest sentence, which is about the most generic anti-recursion statement one can make. Chomsky and linguists working in his tradition sometimes write in a way consistent with Everett’s conception of recursion, but sometimes don’t. For example, consider this random 2016 blogpost I found by a linguist in training: For generative linguistics the recursive function is Merge, which combines two words or phrases to form a larger structure which can then be the input for further iterations of Merge. Any expression larger than two words, then, requires recursion, regardless of whether there is embedding in that expression. For instance the noun phrase “My favourite book” requires two iterations of Merge, (Merge(favourite, book)= [Favourite book], Merge(my, [favourite book])= [my [favourite book]]) and therefore is an instance of recursion without embedding. To be clear, this usage of ‘recursion’ seems consistent with how many other Chomskyan linguists have used the term. And with all due respect to these researchers, I find this notion of recursion completely insane, because it would imply (i) any language with more than one word in its sentences has recursion, and that (ii) all sentences are necessarily constructed recursively. The first implication means that “All natural human languages have recursion.” reduces to the vacuously true claim that “All languages allow more than one word in their sentences.”5 The second idea is more interesting, because it relates to how the brain constructs sentences, but as far as I can tell this claim cannot be tested using purely observational linguistic data. One would have to do some kind of experiment to check the order in which subjects mentally construct sentences, and ideally make brain activity measurements of some sort. Aside from sometimes involving a strange notion of recursion, another feature of the Chomskyan response to Everett relates to the distinction we discussed earlier between so-called E-languages and I-languages. Consider the following exchange from a 2012 interview with Chomsky: NS: But there are critics such as Daniel Everett, who says the language of the Amazonian people he worked with seems to challenge important aspects of universal grammar. Chomsky: It can't be true. These people are genetically identical to all other humans with regard to language. They can learn Portuguese perfectly easily, just as Portuguese children do. So they have the same universal grammar the rest of us have. What Everett claims is that the resources of the language do not permit the use of the principles of universal grammar. That's conceivable. You could imagine a language exactly like English except it doesn't have connectives like "and" that allow you to make longer expressions. An infant learning truncated English would have no idea about this: they would just pick it up as they would standard English. At some point, the child would discover the resources are so limited you can't say very much, but that doesn't say anything about universal grammar, or about language acquisition. Chomsky makes claims like this elsewhere too. The argument is that, even if there were a language without a recursive grammar, this is not inconsistent with his theory, since his theory is not about E-languages like English or Spanish or Pirahã. His theory only makes claims about I-languages, or equivalently about our innate language capabilities. But this is kind of a dumb rhetorical move. Either the theory makes predictions about real languages or it doesn’t. The statement that some languages in the world are arguably recursive is not a prediction; it’s an observation, and we didn’t need the theory to make it. What does it mean for the grammar of thought languages to be recursive? How do we test this? Can we test it by doing experiments involving real linguistic data, or not? If not, are we even still talking about language? To this day, as one might expect, not everyone agrees with Everett that (i) Pirahã lacks a recursive hierarchical grammar, and that (ii) such a discovery would have any bearing at all on the truth or falsity of Chomskyan universal grammar. Given that languages can be pretty weird, among other reasons, I am inclined to side with Everett here. But where does that leave us? We do not just want to throw bombs and tell everyone their theories are wrong. Does Everett have an alternative to the Chomskyan account of what language is and where it came from? Yes, and it turns out he’s been thinking about this for a long time. How Language Began is his 2017 offering in this direction. IV. THE BOOK So what is language, anyway? Everett writes: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 15) Language is the interaction of meaning (semantics), conditions on usage (pragmatics), the physical properties of its inventory of sounds (phonetics), a grammar (syntax, or sentence structure), phonology (sound structure), morphology (word structure), discourse conversational organizational principles, information, and gestures. Language is a gestalt—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That is to say, the whole is not understood merely by examining individual components. Okay, so far, so good. To the uninitiated, it looks like Everett is just listing all of the different things that are involved in language; so what? The point is that language is more than just grammar. He goes on to say this explicitly: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 16) Grammar is a tremendous aid to language and also helps in thinking. But it really is at best only a small part of any language, and its importance varies from one language to another. There are tongues that have very little grammar and others in which it is extremely complex. His paradigmatic examples here are Pirahã and Riau Indonesian, which appears to lack a hierarchical grammar, and which moreover apparently lacks a clear noun/verb distinction. You might ask: what does that even mean? I’m not 100% sure, since the linked Gil chapter appears formidable, but Wikipedia gives a pretty good example in the right direction: For example, the phrase Ayam makan (lit. 'chicken eat') can mean, in context, anything from 'the chicken is eating', to 'I ate some chicken', 'the chicken that is eating' and 'when we were eating chicken' Is “chicken” the subject of the sentence, the object of the sentence, or something else? Well, it depends on the context. What’s the purpose of language? Communication: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 5) Indeed, language changes lives. It builds society, expresses our highest aspirations, our basest thoughts, our emotions and our philosophies of life. But all language is ultimately at the service of human interaction. Other components of language—things like grammar and stories—are secondary to conversation. Did language emerge suddenly, as it does in Chomsky’s proposal, or gradually? Very gradually: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 7-8) There is a wide and deep linguistic chasm between humans and all other species. … More likely, the gap was formed by baby steps, by homeopathic changes spurred by culture. Yes, human languages are dramatically different from the communication systems of other animals, but the cognitive and cultural steps to get beyond the ‘language threshold’ were smaller than many seem to think. The evidence shows that there was no ‘sudden leap’ to the uniquely human features of language, but that our predecessor species in the genus Homo and earlier, perhaps among the australopithecines, slowly but surely progressed until humans achieved language. This slow march taken by early hominins resulted eventually in a yawning evolutionary chasm between human language and other animal communication. So far, we have a bit of a nothingburger. Language is for communication, and probably—like everything else!—emerged gradually over a long period of time. While these points are interesting as a contrast to Chomsky, they are not that surprising in and of themselves. But Everett’s work goes beyond taking the time to bolster common sense ideas on language origins. Two points he discusses at length are worth briefly exploring here. First, he offers a much more specific account of the emergence of language than Chomsky does, and draws on a mix of evidence from paleoanthropology, evolutionary biology, linguistics, and more. Second, he pretty firmly takes the Anti-Chomsky view on whether language is innate: (Preface, pg. xv) … I deny here that language is an instinct of any kind, as I also deny that it is innate, or inborn. These two points are not unrelated. Everett’s core idea is that language should properly be thought of as an invention rather than an innate human capability. You might ask: who invented it? Who shaped it? Lots of people, collaboratively, over a long time. In a word, culture. As Everett notes in the preface, “Language is the handmaiden of culture.” In any case, let’s discuss these points one at a time. First: the origins of language. There are a number of questions one might want to answer about how language began: In what order did different language-related concepts and components emerge?

Inline links: Pullum, 4, 2012 paper, blogpost, 5, 2012 interview, Riau Indonesian, lack a hierarchical grammar, lacks a clear noun/verb distinction

Executive Order 112462 mentions across 2 issues

Executive Order 11246 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between May 01, 2024 and February 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "if Executive Order 11246 gets repealed on January 21, 2025"; "Executive Order 11246 was repealed on January 21". It most often appears alongside Hanania, Richard Hanania, Tesla.

Article page: Executive Order 11246
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: May 01, 2024
Last seen: February 27, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: The Origins Of Woke May 01, 2024
Links For February 2025 February 27, 2025

Hanania 2 shared issues
Richard Hanania 2 shared issues
Tesla 2 shared issues
The Origins Of Woke 2 shared issues
Trump 2 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: The Origins Of Woke

May 01, 2024 · Original source

Read this book if you want a well-written expose of the past fifty years of civil rights decisions. Or read it in order to feel like you were ahead of the curve if Executive Order 11246 gets repealed on January 21, 2025.

Links For February 2025

February 27, 2025 · Original source

33: Congrats to Richard Hanania, whose policy prescriptions from The Origins Of Woke got adopted wholesale by the new administration, probably causally. And thanks to @ObhishekSaha for reminding me that my review ended with “Read [this] in order to feel like you were ahead of the curve if Executive Order 11246 gets repealed on January 21, 2025.” (Executive Order 11246 was repealed on January 21)

Inline links: reminding, my review, was repealed

existential risk2 mentions across 2 issues

existential risk is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 18, 2021 and October 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Future Perfect - Vox’s journalism team covering ... existential risk"; "He helped define ‘existential risk’, popularize fears of malevolent superintelligence". It most often appears alongside effective altruism, 23andme, Amish.

Article page: existential risk
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First seen: July 18, 2021
Last seen: October 17, 2024

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Open Thread 181 July 18, 2021
Book Review: Deep Utopia October 17, 2024

effective altruism 2 shared issues
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Assassin’s Creed: Valhalla 1 shared issues
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Open Thread 181

July 18, 2021 · Original source

4: Future Perfect - Vox’s journalism team covering effective altruism, existential risk, and related topics - is hiring (for remote work). You would get to work with my friend and housemate Kelsey Piper, along with a bunch of other people who I am assured are also great. Read more and apply here.

Inline links: here

Book Review: Deep Utopia

October 17, 2024 · Original source

Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom got famous for asking “What if technology is really really bad?” He helped define ‘existential risk’, popularize fears of malevolent superintelligence, and argue that we were living in a ‘vulnerable world’ prone to physical or biological catastrophe.

Existentialism2 mentions across 2 issues

Existentialism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 20, 2022 and August 02, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Strong echo from existentialism here"; "I’ve never really “gotten” existentialism"; "He analyzes the experience of being paralyzed primarily through the lens of Existentialism". It most often appears alongside A.E. Waite, Ableism, Acapulco.

Article page: Existentialism
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 20, 2022
Last seen: August 02, 2024

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Highlights From The Comments On "Sadly, Porn" April 20, 2022
Your Book Review: Two Arms and a Head August 02, 2024

A.E. Waite 1 shared issues
Ableism 1 shared issues
Acapulco 1 shared issues
Adlerian psychology 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On "Sadly, Porn"

April 20, 2022 · Original source

Strong echo from existentialism here. As I understand it, existentialism says that most of us live "unauthentic" lives where we constantly distract ourselves to avoid facing Reality. The distractions are not just stuff like TV or porn, they might be quite elevated and demanding. Proust wrote something on the lines of: some talented writers will rather go to war and die there than sit at the writing table and dig through their feelings.

I’ve never really “gotten” existentialism. Maybe related: I have no trouble at all sitting quietly not doing anything or distracting myself (sometimes I have trouble doing anything else!), and relatively weak fear of death (see this post).

Inline links: this post

Your Book Review: Two Arms and a Head

August 02, 2024 · Original source

As a student of philosophy, Clayton is heavily influenced by the writings of Nietzsche and Camus. He analyzes the experience of being paralyzed primarily through the lens of Existentialism. It’s hard to imagine a more apt philosophy for interpreting body horror.

If you can handle the body horror, it is worth reading. It helps to be familiar with Nietzsche, Existentialism, and the broader disability rights community/anti-ableism ideas.

E-language1 mentions across 1 issues

E-language is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 19, 2024 and July 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "the dubious concept of E-language". It most often appears alongside Alan Turing, Amazon, Amazon jungle.

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Your Book Review: How Language Began July 19, 2024

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Your Book Review: How Language Began

July 19, 2024 · Original source

This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

what one means by the statement “All natural human languages have recursion.” Everett generally takes recursion to refer to the following property of many natural languages: one can construct sentences or phrases from other sentences and phrases. For example: “The cat died.” -> “Alice said that [the cat died].” -> “Bob said that [Alice said that [the cat died.]]” In the above example, we can in principle generate infinitely many new sentences by writing “Z said X,” where X is the previous sentence and Z is some name. For clarity’s sake, one should probably distinguish between different ways to generate new sentences or phrases from old ones; Pullum mentions a few in the context of assessing Everett’s Pirahã recursion claims: Everett reports that there are no signs of no multiple coordination (It takes [skill, nerve, initiative, and courage]), complex determiners ([[[my] son’s] wife’s] family), stacked modifiers (a [nice, [cosy, [inexpensive [little cottage]]]]), or—most significant of all—reiterable clause embedding (I thought [ you already knew [that she was here ] ]). These are the primary constructions that in English permit sentences of any arbitrary finite length to be constructed, yielding the familiar argument that the set of all definable grammatical sentences in English is infinite. Regardless of the details, a generic prediction should be that there is no longest sentence in a language whose grammar is recursive. This doesn’t mean that one can say an arbitrarily long sentence in real life4. Rather, one can say that, given a member of some large set of sentences, one can always extend it. Everett takes the claim “All natural human languages have recursion.” to mean that, if there exists a natural human language without recursion, the claim is false. Or, slightly more subtly, if there exists a language which uses recursion so minimally that linguists have a hard time determining whether a corpus of linguistic data falsifies it or not, sentence-level recursion is probably not a bedrock principle of human languages. I found the following anecdote from a 2012 paper of Everett’s enlightening: Pirahã speakers reject constructed examples with recursion, as I discovered in my translation of the gospel of Mark into the language (during my days as a missionary). The Bible is full of recursive examples, such as the following, from Mark 1:3: ‘(John the Baptist) was a voice of one calling in the desert…’ I initially translated this as: ‘John, the man that put people in the water in order to clean them for God, that lived in a place like a beach with no trees and that yelled for people to obey God’. The Pirahãs rejected every attempt until I translated this as: ‘John cleaned people in the river. He lived in another jungle. The jungle was like a beach. It had no trees. He yelled to people. You want God!’ The non-recursive structure was accepted readily and elicited all sorts of questions. I subsequently realized looking through Pirahã texts that there were no clear examples involving either recursion or even embedding. Attempts to construct recursive sentences or phrases, such as ‘several big round barrels', were ultimately rejected by the Pirahãs (although initially they accepted them to be polite to me, a standard fieldwork problem that Jeanette Sakel and I discuss). He does explicitly claim (in the aforementioned paper and elsewhere) that Pirahã probably has no longest sentence, which is about the most generic anti-recursion statement one can make. Chomsky and linguists working in his tradition sometimes write in a way consistent with Everett’s conception of recursion, but sometimes don’t. For example, consider this random 2016 blogpost I found by a linguist in training: For generative linguistics the recursive function is Merge, which combines two words or phrases to form a larger structure which can then be the input for further iterations of Merge. Any expression larger than two words, then, requires recursion, regardless of whether there is embedding in that expression. For instance the noun phrase “My favourite book” requires two iterations of Merge, (Merge(favourite, book)= [Favourite book], Merge(my, [favourite book])= [my [favourite book]]) and therefore is an instance of recursion without embedding. To be clear, this usage of ‘recursion’ seems consistent with how many other Chomskyan linguists have used the term. And with all due respect to these researchers, I find this notion of recursion completely insane, because it would imply (i) any language with more than one word in its sentences has recursion, and that (ii) all sentences are necessarily constructed recursively. The first implication means that “All natural human languages have recursion.” reduces to the vacuously true claim that “All languages allow more than one word in their sentences.”5 The second idea is more interesting, because it relates to how the brain constructs sentences, but as far as I can tell this claim cannot be tested using purely observational linguistic data. One would have to do some kind of experiment to check the order in which subjects mentally construct sentences, and ideally make brain activity measurements of some sort. Aside from sometimes involving a strange notion of recursion, another feature of the Chomskyan response to Everett relates to the distinction we discussed earlier between so-called E-languages and I-languages. Consider the following exchange from a 2012 interview with Chomsky: NS: But there are critics such as Daniel Everett, who says the language of the Amazonian people he worked with seems to challenge important aspects of universal grammar. Chomsky: It can't be true. These people are genetically identical to all other humans with regard to language. They can learn Portuguese perfectly easily, just as Portuguese children do. So they have the same universal grammar the rest of us have. What Everett claims is that the resources of the language do not permit the use of the principles of universal grammar. That's conceivable. You could imagine a language exactly like English except it doesn't have connectives like "and" that allow you to make longer expressions. An infant learning truncated English would have no idea about this: they would just pick it up as they would standard English. At some point, the child would discover the resources are so limited you can't say very much, but that doesn't say anything about universal grammar, or about language acquisition. Chomsky makes claims like this elsewhere too. The argument is that, even if there were a language without a recursive grammar, this is not inconsistent with his theory, since his theory is not about E-languages like English or Spanish or Pirahã. His theory only makes claims about I-languages, or equivalently about our innate language capabilities. But this is kind of a dumb rhetorical move. Either the theory makes predictions about real languages or it doesn’t. The statement that some languages in the world are arguably recursive is not a prediction; it’s an observation, and we didn’t need the theory to make it. What does it mean for the grammar of thought languages to be recursive? How do we test this? Can we test it by doing experiments involving real linguistic data, or not? If not, are we even still talking about language? To this day, as one might expect, not everyone agrees with Everett that (i) Pirahã lacks a recursive hierarchical grammar, and that (ii) such a discovery would have any bearing at all on the truth or falsity of Chomskyan universal grammar. Given that languages can be pretty weird, among other reasons, I am inclined to side with Everett here. But where does that leave us? We do not just want to throw bombs and tell everyone their theories are wrong. Does Everett have an alternative to the Chomskyan account of what language is and where it came from? Yes, and it turns out he’s been thinking about this for a long time. How Language Began is his 2017 offering in this direction. IV. THE BOOK So what is language, anyway? Everett writes: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 15) Language is the interaction of meaning (semantics), conditions on usage (pragmatics), the physical properties of its inventory of sounds (phonetics), a grammar (syntax, or sentence structure), phonology (sound structure), morphology (word structure), discourse conversational organizational principles, information, and gestures. Language is a gestalt—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That is to say, the whole is not understood merely by examining individual components. Okay, so far, so good. To the uninitiated, it looks like Everett is just listing all of the different things that are involved in language; so what? The point is that language is more than just grammar. He goes on to say this explicitly: (How Language Began, Ch. 1, pg. 16) Grammar is a tremendous aid to language and also helps in thinking. But it really is at best only a small part of any language, and its importance varies from one language to another. There are tongues that have very little grammar and others in which it is extremely complex. His paradigmatic examples here are Pirahã and Riau Indonesian, which appears to lack a hierarchical grammar, and which moreover apparently lacks a clear noun/verb distinction. You might ask: what does that even mean? I’m not 100% sure, since the linked Gil chapter appears formidable, but Wikipedia gives a pretty good example in the right direction: For example, the phrase Ayam makan (lit. 'chicken eat') can mean, in context, anything from 'the chicken is eating', to 'I ate some chicken', 'the chicken that is eating' and 'when we were eating chicken' Is “chicken” the subject of the sentence, the object of the sentence, or something else? Well, it depends on the context. What’s the purpose of language? Communication: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 5) Indeed, language changes lives. It builds society, expresses our highest aspirations, our basest thoughts, our emotions and our philosophies of life. But all language is ultimately at the service of human interaction. Other components of language—things like grammar and stories—are secondary to conversation. Did language emerge suddenly, as it does in Chomsky’s proposal, or gradually? Very gradually: (How Language Began, Introduction, pg. 7-8) There is a wide and deep linguistic chasm between humans and all other species. … More likely, the gap was formed by baby steps, by homeopathic changes spurred by culture. Yes, human languages are dramatically different from the communication systems of other animals, but the cognitive and cultural steps to get beyond the ‘language threshold’ were smaller than many seem to think. The evidence shows that there was no ‘sudden leap’ to the uniquely human features of language, but that our predecessor species in the genus Homo and earlier, perhaps among the australopithecines, slowly but surely progressed until humans achieved language. This slow march taken by early hominins resulted eventually in a yawning evolutionary chasm between human language and other animal communication. So far, we have a bit of a nothingburger. Language is for communication, and probably—like everything else!—emerged gradually over a long period of time. While these points are interesting as a contrast to Chomsky, they are not that surprising in and of themselves. But Everett’s work goes beyond taking the time to bolster common sense ideas on language origins. Two points he discusses at length are worth briefly exploring here. First, he offers a much more specific account of the emergence of language than Chomsky does, and draws on a mix of evidence from paleoanthropology, evolutionary biology, linguistics, and more. Second, he pretty firmly takes the Anti-Chomsky view on whether language is innate: (Preface, pg. xv) … I deny here that language is an instinct of any kind, as I also deny that it is innate, or inborn. These two points are not unrelated. Everett’s core idea is that language should properly be thought of as an invention rather than an innate human capability. You might ask: who invented it? Who shaped it? Lots of people, collaboratively, over a long time. In a word, culture. As Everett notes in the preface, “Language is the handmaiden of culture.” In any case, let’s discuss these points one at a time. First: the origins of language. There are a number of questions one might want to answer about how language began: In what order did different language-related concepts and components emerge?

Inline links: Pullum, 4, 2012 paper, blogpost, 5, 2012 interview, Riau Indonesian, lack a hierarchical grammar, lacks a clear noun/verb distinction

E. coli1 mentions across 1 issues

E. coli is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 03, 2021 and March 03, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "There’s one strain of E. coli that has advantage during growth on the substrate". It most often appears alongside 9-11, Argentina, Austin Allred.

Reference entry: E. coli
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 03, 2021
Last seen: March 03, 2021

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Links For March March 03, 2021

9-11 1 shared issues
Argentina 1 shared issues
Austin Allred 1 shared issues
Ayn Rand Institute 1 shared issues
Big Mac 1 shared issues

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Links For March

March 03, 2021 · Original source

11: An interesting in depth-review of my Studies On Slack post: “In one of the populations in the experiment a speciation event was observed. There's one strain of E. coli that has advantage during growth on the substrate and another strain that has advantage during stationary phase, when the substrate runs out”.

Inline links: interesting in depth-review of my Studies On Slack

EA discourse1 mentions across 1 issues

EA discourse is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 27, 2022 and May 27, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "What does “EA discourse” help make visible". It most often appears alongside An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins, anti-politics machine, Basotho Congress Party.

Reference entry: EA discourse
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 27, 2022
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Your Book Review: The Anti-Politics Machine May 27, 2022

An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins 1 shared issues
anti-politics machine 1 shared issues
Basotho Congress Party 1 shared issues
Basotho Nationalist Party 1 shared issues
Bazuzi 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Anti-Politics Machine

May 27, 2022 · Original source

A story that plausibly explains these numbers (either a potential mechanism for an effect, or an explanation of why the effect turned out to be null) If these stories are challenged, it is not because there is no actual evidence for them, but because an economist in the audience has thought of their own preferred theory. If the speaker can find some data point that contradicts the questioner’s idea, this is thought to “confirm” the original story. Since audience members (who often have little specific knowledge of the region) are unlikely to ask questions like “what if this village just has an incredibly complicated set of social conventions around cattle that prevents their sale even without market barriers in place?” or “do the region’s economic challenges have more to do with this very specific regulation in South African immigration law?”, plausible-sounding stories that explain one or two numerical data points tend to gain traction in the literature whether or not they have anything to do with reality. Mark McGovern famously noted this trend in a review of two of Paul Collier’s books, writing: “Much of the intellectual heavy lifting in these books is in fact done at the level of implication or commonsense guessing. And the common sense is surely not that of the inhabitants of the countries being dissected, but that of the highly educated elite located primarily in Western Europe and North America. In those passages where Collier does lay out the thinking behind his explanations, they are always coherent and plausible, but the chain of causal relations makes it evident how fragile these models typically are.” The World Bank report’s fundamental misdiagnosis of the challenges Lesotho faced formed the basis for a series of failed “development initiatives”, most notably the Thaba-Tseka Development Project, a joint venture funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank, the Government of Lesotho, and the UK Overseas Development Ministry. The project focused on providing technical solutions to the “problems” the World Bank report had identified: better agricultural techniques, easier access to markets, and increased government capacity to provide public goods. Each piece faced serious problems in execution, largely because interventions shown to have the sorts of “positive effects” randomized experiments might demonstrate elsewhere in Africa were not necessarily well suited to Lesotho’s unforgiving, mountainous terrain. But even more seriously, the project was so enveloped in “development discourse” that nobody thought to question whether they were working on problems their “recipients” cared about, or merely the ones the “tools of development” were capable of solving. As Ferguson writes, “The promise that crop farming could be revolutionized through the application of a well-known package of technical inputs was so firmly written into the project’s design that it was difficult for those on the scene to challenge it, or even to confront it.” Perhaps the only thing that has changed since Ferguson wrote is that we have tools to better identify these failures: the development literature continues to be littered with failed trials and interventions based on unchecked assumptions. One of the most famous is the British Department for International Development’s 90 million pound Tuungane project, whose Congolese incarnation sought to rebuild village governing institutions that the country’s civil war had destroyed. One of the most convincing explanations of its failure is that it may not have been necessary to begin with: the implementers do not seem to have checked whether the institutions had actually been weakened by violence, and baseline reports indicated that residents were relatively satisfied with village governance before the project even started! More research is needed to clarify the situation -- research which might have been useful to carry out before spending a £90 million on a “fix”. Part of this, perhaps, comes from the usual overconfidence that other social scientists like to accuse economists of. But there are much bigger systemic problems at play. Development work tends to run on short timelines: grad students and postdocs need to publish quickly for their careers to advance, NGO funding runs on 5-ish year cycles, and charities (particularly in “high-risk” areas) face extremely high employee turnover rates. This simultaneously limits the accumulation of institutional knowledge, while incentivizing practitioners away from the time-intensive process of understanding a particular context in favor of “getting results quick.” Similarly, the recent introduction of experimental evidence to the development field is a wondrous thing, but the revolution has to continue: randomized experiments can tell us about the effect an intervention had somewhere, but even the best methods of applying this kind of evidence to a specific context remain somewhat arbitrary and subjective. As EA begins to fund more complex (but potentially more effective) interventions, a key step will be to get a more systematic handle on how to gather evidence about specific places-- countries, states, even villages -- and how to match the tools we have to people who might benefit from them. II. The Trouble with Technocrats “But even if the project was in some sense a ‘failure’ as an agricultural development project, it is indisputable that many of its ‘side effects’ had a powerful and far-reaching impact on the Thaba-Tseka region. [...] Indeed, it may be that in a place like Mashai, the most visible of all the project’s effects was the indirect one of increased Government military presence in the region” As the program continued to unfold, the development officials became more and more disillusioned -- not with their own choices, but with the people of Thaba-Tseka, who they perceived as petty, apathetic, and outright self-destructive. A project meant to provide firewood failed because locals kept breaking into the woodlots and uprooting the saplings. An experiment in pony-breeding fell apart when “unknown parties” drove the entire herd of ponies off of cliffs to their deaths. Why, Ferguson’s official contacts bemoaned, weren’t the people of Thaba-Tseka committed to their own “development”? Who could possibly be opposed to trees and horses? Perhaps, the practitioners theorized, the people of Thaba-Tseka were just lazy. Perhaps they “didn’t want to be better.” Perhaps they weren’t in their right mind or had made a mistake. Perhaps poverty makes a person do strange things. Or, as Ferguson points out, perhaps their anger had something to do with the fact that the best plots of land in the village had been forcibly confiscated to make room for wood and pony lots, without any sort of compensation. The central government was all too happy to help find land for the projects, which they took from political enemies and put in the control of party elites, especially when it could use a legitimate anti-poverty program as cover. In Ferguson’s words, the development project was functioning as an “anti-politics machine” the government could use to pretend political power moves were just “objective” solutions to technical problems. A local student’s term paper captured the general discontent: “In spite of the superb aim of helping the people to become self-reliant, the first thing the project did was to take their very good arable land. When the people protested about their fields being taken, the project promised them employment. [...] It employed them for two months, found them unfit for the work, and dismissed them. Without their fields and without employment they may turn up to be very self-reliant. It is rather hard to know.” Two things stand out to me from this story. First, the “development discourse” lens served to focus the practitioners’ attention on a handful of technical variables (quantity of wood, quality of pony), and kept them from thinking about any repercussions they hadn’t thought to measure. This is a serious problem, because “negative effects on things that aren’t your primary outcome” are pretty common in the development literature. High-paying medical NGOs can pull talent away from government jobs. Foreign aid can worsen ongoing conflicts. Unconditional cash transfers can hurt neighbors who didn’t receive the cash. And the literature we have is implicitly conditioned on “only examining the variables academics have thought to look at” -- surely our tools have rendered other effects completely invisible! Second, the project organizers somewhat naively ignored the political goals of the government they’d partnered with, and therefore the extent to which these goals were shaping the project. Lesotho’s recent political history had been tumultuous. The Basotho Nationalist Party (BNP), having gained power upon independence in 1965, refused to give up power after losing the 1970 elections to the Basotho Congress Party (BCP). Blaming the election results on “communists”, BNP Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan declared a state of emergency and began a campaign of terror, raiding the homes of opposition figures and funding paramilitary groups to intimidate, arrest, and potentially kill anyone who spoke up against BNP rule. This had significant effects in Thaba-Tseka, where “villages [...] were sharply divided over politics, but it was not a thing which was discussed openly” due to a fully justified fear of violence. The BNP, correctly sensing the presence of a substantial underground opposition, placed “development committees” in each village, which served primarily as local wings of the national party. These committees spied on potential supporters of the now-outlawed BCP and had deep connections to paramilitary “police” units. When the Thaba-Tseka Development Project started, its international backers partnered directly with the BNP leadership, reasoning that sustainable development and public goods provision could only happen through a government whose role they primarily viewed as bureaucratic. As a result, nearly every decision had to make its way through the village development committees, who used the project to pursue their own goals: jobs and project funds found their way primarily to BNP supporters, while the “necessary costs of development” always seemed to be paid by opposition figures. The funding coalition ended up paying for a number of projects that reinforced BNP power, from establishing a new “district capital” (which conveniently also served as a military base) to constructing new and better roads linking Thaba-Tseka to the district and national capitals (primarily helping the central government tax and police an opposition stronghold). Anything that could be remotely linked to “economic development” became part of the project as funders and practitioners failed to ask whether government power might have alternate, more concerning effects. As we saw earlier, the population being “served” saw this much more clearly than the “servants”, and started to rebel against a project whose “help” seemed to be aimed more at consolidating BNP control than meeting their own needs. When they ultimately resorted to killing ponies and uprooting trees, project officials infatuated with “development” were left with “no idea why people would do such a thing,” completely oblivious to the real and lasting harm their “purely technical decisions” had inflicted. Have any EA projects had this sort of unexpected political side effect? I think it’s genuinely hard to tell without further research, but the possibility is frightening. (There’s been a little bit of research on the quantitative side --Recent research has found, for instance, that GiveDirectly’s 2014 unconditional cash transfer trial increased community participation but did not change voting patterns, so at least in 2014 the Kenyan government wasn’t using the program to stay in power. Was this the right question to test? I am not sure, especially without a more qualitative survey to see if there are other avenues we should be worried about.) III. Takeaways for Effective Altruism So what do we do as effective altruists (hereafter “EAs”)? I see three key takeaways. The first is a clear need for more qualitative research. GiveWell makes some qualitative judgments about charities, but Ferguson’s work illustrates the need for qualitative evaluation of the interventions themselves to see if the underlying studies have captured all of the “right” variables. Randomized experiments are really good at testing hypotheses, but by their very nature they can’t tell you about variables you didn’t decide ahead of time to measure. Are there significant side effects (positive or negative) we’ve missed from massive malaria net distributions? I don’t know, but if so they are not likely to be discovered by a bunch of Americans and Europeans sitting in a room and trying to guess the best things to measure. Rather, they’re probably already known (or suspected) by the people experiencing them, and a first step to finding out is going and asking them. (A second step is finding the right people to ask them -- real expertise in qualitative research is a rare and valuable skill.) Of course, qualitative research is messy and sometimes the people you interview are wrong or have other agendas. So once we have an “on-the-ground” hypothesis or concern, there will often be good reason to use a randomized trial or quasi-experimental method to test it or try to understand how much of a concern it might be! This sort of interdisciplinary approach is starting to gain traction in academia, but it has yet to be seriously applied in the EA sphere. There’s another angle to this: Ferguson’s most incisive insights arise not from studying the people being “served”, but by studying the development practitioners themselves. Other social scientists have continued this trend, from McGovern’s An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins and Robinson’s How Different Social Scientists Think to Marchais, Bazuzi, and Lameke’s The Data is Gold, and We Are The Gold-Diggers and Omar Bah’s webcomic Mzungus in Development and Governments. Each new paper illuminates the research process in new ways, and provides tools both to do better research and to identify potential weaknesses in the pre-existing literature. I think one of the highest impact investments an Effective Altruist fund could make right now would be to hire a handful of trained anthropologists (or other outside experts in qualitative research / ethnography) to hang out in places like GiveWell or the Machine Intelligence Research Institute for a few years and really study how effective altruism works as a system. How are decisions being made, and how is evidence being used to make them? What does “EA discourse” help make visible and which problems and concerns does it hide from our view? How do the positionalities of typical EA researchers affect their views of what’s important or what’s plausible? I have my guesses, and I’m sure you have yours. But I had my guesses about development economics, too, and I missed nearly everything Ferguson (and the authors mentioned two paragraphs up) uncovered. What more are we missing? The second is an emphasis on local context. As funding gaps for “low hanging fruit” like malaria disappear, EA is going to have to focus on more complicated interventions, which are likely to be fairly context-specific -- after all, why should an agriculture program that works in the flattest parts of the Sahel be expected to work the same way in the Maloti Mountains? Ferguson notes about several of the Thaba-Tseka project’s failed arms: “Tanzania may be very different from Lesotho on the ground, but, from the point of view of a development agency’s head office, both may be simply ‘the Africa desk’. In the Thaba-Tseka case, at least, the original project planners knew little about Lesotho’s specific history, politics, and sociology; they were experts on ‘livestock development in Africa,’ and drew largely on experience in East Africa.” For any sort of context-specific intervention to work, an intimate knowledge of the specific history, needs, and geography of individual villages and regions is necessary. The development world has slowly made steps in this direction, but it’s not clear to me that the EA community has a clear way of acquiring, accessing, or working with this information. I don’t think there’s a magic bullet to solve this problem, but in the long run any solution will probably need to involve a) on-the-ground, qualitative research and b) real representation in the EA network from areas EA organizations are interested in working. The development industry has a shameful history of infantilizing and ignoring the opinions of “locals”, and I think the conversations I’m starting to see in EA about diversity and representation of different parts of the Global South need to continue if we’re going to get enough serious knowledge of local contexts to effectively direct funding. The third is a continued need to take politics seriously. This is one of the most challenging issues in charitable giving: when is it okay to work with a government doing terrible things to deliver humanitarian aid? To what extent does an NGO feeding the hungry lend its legitimacy to or cover for an authoritarian regime’s misdeeds? I don’t have anything close to a full answer (and I don’t think anyone does), but Ferguson’s work exposes a possibility I hadn’t thought of before, in which “technical” and “apolitical” projects can expand the power of the state in unforeseen and potentially dangerous ways. After writing The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson largely gave up on the idea of charitable or state-based aid. (Understandably, I think, given that he spent most of a decade watching its most horrific side effects first-hand). It’s ironic, then, that I think his book’s practical value is greatest to those of us who still hold onto hope in its possibilities. May we have ears to hear the voices telling us where our work has fallen short, and eyes to see what it could become. Footnotes Ferguson pg. 55

EA loans1 mentions across 1 issues

EA loans is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 04, 2022 and January 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "'EA loans' by a blogger who prefers to remain anonymous". It most often appears alongside Alice in Wonderland, Carroll, certificates of impact.

Reference entry: EA loans
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 04, 2022
Last seen: January 04, 2022

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Lewis Carroll Invented Retroactive Public Goods Funding In 1894 January 04, 2022

Alice in Wonderland 1 shared issues
Carroll 1 shared issues
certificates of impact 1 shared issues
Examiners 1 shared issues
Julie K 1 shared issues

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Lewis Carroll Invented Retroactive Public Goods Funding In 1894

January 04, 2022 · Original source

I know of at least five independent inventions under five different names: “social impact bonds” by a New Zealand economist in 1988, “certificates of impact” by Paul Christiano in 2014, “retroactive public goods funding” by Vitalik Buterin a few years ago, “EA loans” by a blogger who prefers to remain anonymous, and “venture grants” by Mako Yass. These aren’t all exactly the same idea. Some are slightly better framed than others and probably I’m being terribly disrespectful to the better ones by saying they’re the same as the worse ones. But I think they all share a basic core: some structure that lets profit-seeking venture capitalist types invest in altruistic causes, in the hopes that altruists will pay them back later once they’ve been shown to work.

Inline links: “social impact bonds”, “certificates of impact”, “retroactive public goods funding”, “venture grants”

EA logo1 mentions across 1 issues

EA logo is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2023 and August 25, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "large silver cuboid balloon with an EA logo". It most often appears alongside "El Retiro" Park, 11841 Wagner Street Culver City, 1548 NE 15th Ave.

Reference entry: EA logo
Mention count: 1
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First seen: August 25, 2023
Last seen: August 25, 2023

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Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023

"El Retiro" Park 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street Culver City 1 shared issues
1548 NE 15th Ave 1 shared issues
1906 Rittenhouse Square 1 shared issues
1970 port Laurent 1 shared issues

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Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places

August 25, 2023 · Original source

EUGENE, OREGON, USA Contact: Ben Smith Contact Info: benjsmith[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, September 20th, 6:00 PM Location: Beergarden. we'll have a large silver cuboid balloon with an EA logo. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/84PR3V3W+C7 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/effective-altruism-eugene

Inline links: https://plus.codes/84PR3V3W+C7

EA movement1 mentions across 1 issues

EA movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 29, 2021 and January 29, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Bill Gates isn't officially affiliated with the EA movement". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, AI alignment problem, Anand Giridharadas.

Reference entry: EA movement
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: January 29, 2021

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Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021

80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
AI alignment problem 1 shared issues
Anand Giridharadas 1 shared issues
Bill Gates 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation

January 29, 2021 · Original source

The effective altruism movement, which largely grew directly out of the rationalist movement, seeks to maximize the efficacy with which charitable donations are directed using standard rationalist methods. It is a tight-knit community that strongly privileges rationalist approaches over all other forms of knowledge-making (such as from the humanities, continental philosophy, or humanistic social sciences) and tends to dismiss input not formulated in rationalist terms. The community also has a strong and explicitly stated view that its activities uniquely contribute to the achievement of “the good”: of their top five recommendations of most productive careers by a leading community organization, two suggest being a researcher or support staff within the movement, and two others recommend working on the AI alignment problem (see the next point). Until recently, much of the analysis and funding emerging from the community has pointed towards a focus on extremely unlikely but potentially catastrophic risks, such as alien, asteroid or biological catastrophes.

Trying to be charitable to Weyl, I think he's thinking of the EA movement as trying to perfectly quantify exactly how many lives can be saved per dollar, then following that number off a cliff. I can see how a ten-minute scan of the movement could get that impression, but I think even a thirty-minute one would correct the misimpression. EA does the quantification as a guide to other forms of reasoning. There is no way to perfectly calculate the devastation of a potential pandemic that hasn't happened yet. But once you make even a weak effort, you notice that all the numbers are really really big. And once you make an effort to quantify the importance of the cause du jour supported by the humanities and continental philosophy, sometimes you notice that under every set of reasonable assumptions it's smaller than the other number. And of course you supplement this with lots of trying to understand the complicated unquantifiable issues involved - under no circumstance do you skip that step - but you're just trying to do an analysis that has some contact with some reality-based number and isn't entirely dependent on the popular mood about something. I think this successfully achieves the difficult balance between model-laden technicalities and messy real life, and whatever form of reasoning Weyl was using to let him dismiss biological risks without doing any modeling failed to achieve that balance.

Inline links: as a guide to other forms of reasoning

So, people who want to donate their own money according to their own understanding about what the best causes are is fine. Bill Gates isn't officially affiliated with the EA movement, but he's a broadly-aligned role model who donates to the same causes EAs do using the same data-based methods. Last time anyone checked, Gates had an approval rating of 76%, the second-highest of any figure asked about and literally higher than God. I don’t think Gates should be considered a backlash-inducing failure.

Inline links: second-highest of any figure asked about, literally higher than God

EA vegan advocates1 mentions across 1 issues

EA vegan advocates is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 07, 2023 and November 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Elizabeth of Aceso Under Glass has recently started fighting EA vegan advocates". It most often appears alongside Aceso Under Glass, ACX Grant, America.

Reference entry: EA vegan advocates
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 07, 2023
Last seen: November 07, 2023

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Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation November 07, 2023

Aceso Under Glass 1 shared issues
ACX Grant 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
American 1 shared issues
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November 07, 2023 · Original source

These concerns aren't totally theoretical. Elizabeth of Aceso Under Glass has recently started fighting EA vegan advocates for engaging in exactly these kinds of tactics: https://acesounderglass.com/2023/09/28/ea-vegan-advocacy-is-not-truthseeking-and-its-everyones-problem/

Inline links: https://acesounderglass.com/2023/09/28/ea-vegan-advocacy-is-not-truthseeking-and-its-everyones-problem/

rationality community1 mentions across 1 issues

EA/rationality community is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 23, 2021 and August 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "a few members of the EA/rationality community in Madrid". It most often appears alongside 1002 N St. NW, Washington DC, 20001, 1022 High St, Madison, 210 Ardmore Avenue.

Reference entry: rationality community
Mention count: 1
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First seen: August 23, 2021
Last seen: August 23, 2021

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Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places August 23, 2021

1002 N St. NW, Washington DC, 20001 1 shared issues
1022 High St, Madison 1 shared issues
210 Ardmore Avenue 1 shared issues
2519 E Sunrise Blvd 1 shared issues
2800 S Estes St, Lakewood, CO 80227 1 shared issues

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Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places

August 23, 2021 · Original source

MADRID, SPAIN (RSVP) Contact: t[at]tripu[dot]info Time: 11:00 AM, Saturday, September 25 Location: "El Retiro" Park, puppet theater (https://www.esmadrid.com/en/tourist-information/teatro-de-titeres-de-el-retiro) Coordinates: https://w3w.co/pictures.proceeds.turned Notes: Setting this date because a few members of the EA/rationality community in Madrid have already settled on that date and said that that would work for most of us. I'm open to changing the date and time to accommodate more people (and Scott himself).

Inline links: RSVP, https://www.esmadrid.com/en/tourist-information/teatro-de-titeres-de-el-retiro, https://w3w.co/pictures.proceeds.turned

SKOPJE, MACEDONIA (RSVP) Contact: Qantarot, info[at]kantarot[dot]mk Time: 5:00 PM, Wednesday, December 22 Location: Rooftop of the Intertec building in Skopje (outdoor but heated and covered in case of rain). Since you'll need to be let in, RSVPing is encouraged. You can also contact me the day of the meetup at +389 seven one 890 497. Coordinates: https://w3w.co/libraries.describe.fresh Notes: I run a blog that recently spun off a foundation. In Skopje we have a small but passionate rationality community that gravitates around my blog/foundation and we would love to grow the community and raise awareness about EA / ACX.

Inline links: RSVP, https://w3w.co/libraries.describe.fresh, a blog, a foundation

EA41 mentions across 1 issues

EA4 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "The horizontal axis is EA4, a polygenic score for predicted educational attainment". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

Reference entry: EA4
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 03, 2025
Last seen: July 03, 2025

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

23andme 1 shared issues
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Aborigines 1 shared issues
ACE twin model 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

The horizontal axis is EA4, a polygenic score for predicted educational attainment, generally believed to correlate somewhat with IQ. The vertical axis is observed IQ of each group. Piffer’s point is that different ethnic groups’ predicted genetic intelligence seems to correlate pretty well with their observed intelligence, so maybe group differences in intelligence are genetic. Gusev notes that “every behavior geneticist has been screaming ‘do not do that!’ since the very first study came out”, which is true. I know of three main reasons why this is a bad idea: Polygenic scores will mistake social factors correlated with genetic factors as genetic. For example, in a society where black people have lower IQ because of racism and poor access to schooling, people with a certain gene (the gene for black skin) will have lower IQ. Therefore, a study that blindly correlates genes with IQ will incorrectly assume that the gene for black skin is a gene for IQ/etc. This will ironically seem to justify the original inequality (it will look like black people “only” have low IQ for genetic reasons). This is by far the biggest problem with a plot like this one, and the one Gusev’s post above talks about - and the post offers a good example of a real result on height which encountered this exact problem.

EA4 score1 mentions across 1 issues

EA4 score is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "the EA4 score used in this paper was constructed entirely from European people". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

Reference entry: EA4 score
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 03, 2025
Last seen: July 03, 2025

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

23andme 1 shared issues
@alextisyoung 1 shared issues
Aborigines 1 shared issues
ACE twin model 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

On the other hand, I don’t fully understand how these issues apply here. AFAICT, the EA4 score used in this paper was constructed entirely from European people with <3% non-white ancestry, so it doesn’t seem like it should be noticing under-educated black people in the sample and falsely concluding that black people’s genes cause low education. It must be claiming that black people have fewer of the genes that are associated with education in a sample of white people. It’s possible that you could still get population stratification (maybe because of the <3% admixture in your supposedly European population?), but I think if that’s the theory then people should say it explicitly, or else explain what kind of alternate model they’re working from. (It’s also possible I totally misunderstood the claims that EA4 limits itself to people with European ancestry; if so, please let me know)

early Christianity1 mentions across 1 issues

early Christianity is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 12, 2024 and November 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Maybe we should think of early Christianity the same way". It most often appears alongside 1 Peter 3, 165 AD, 1990s.

Reference entry: early Christianity
Mention count: 1
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First seen: November 12, 2024
Last seen: November 12, 2024

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Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024

1 Peter 3 1 shared issues
165 AD 1 shared issues
1990s 1 shared issues
Adolf von Harnack 1 shared issues
Alexandria 1 shared issues

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Inline links: 33% of American Buddhists, 30% Jewish, 2, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IMoJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F248a87ba-7893-48a8-bb24-f9be9f30d355_893x720.png, has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EGFm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81ea23c2-1c9b-4d43-8d31-2c4b74990be5_1024x597.jpeg, The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research, 3, 4, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WKib!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F398aa36d-4d66-44e5-b035-fa3a20e457da_1858x1696.png

November 12, 2024 · Original source

So: how did early Christianity win?

Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic. Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. 33% of American Buddhists come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point! (they’re now down to 6%) As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion. The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts. Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage. Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say. By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one. In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus2 proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.” The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children. Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition. Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common: Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.” Christians followed the opposite of all these practices. They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly unprecedented, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband. The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots). Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote: We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder. The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things. This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later. But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes! I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers. Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth? A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”! Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow One thing Stark did not mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well. Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says: [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men. Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions: By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America. But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical: The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”. Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity. Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference. The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good. Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3: Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith. But Ruxandro Teslo has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is. Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46? Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons. I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof. Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity. The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

Early Islamic Arabs1 mentions across 1 issues

Early Islamic Arabs is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 10, 2024 and January 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Early Islamic Arabs taking over the Middle East". It most often appears alongside Alexander the Great, Amorites, Anshan.

Reference entry: Early Islamic Arabs
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 10, 2024
Last seen: January 10, 2024

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Issue trail

Book Review: Cyropaedia January 10, 2024

Alexander the Great 1 shared issues
Amorites 1 shared issues
Anshan 1 shared issues
Apple 1 shared issues
Armenians 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: Cyropaedia

January 10, 2024 · Original source

Early Islamic Arabs taking over the Middle East: Devereaux doesn’t mention this, except for a half-sentence with no content in the Ibn Khaldun section. How do you forget this one in a piece about the Fremen? Charitably, perhaps we should ignore this since the Byzantines and Persians were both exhausted from fighting each other.

early Renaissance1 mentions across 1 issues

early Renaissance is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 20, 2024 and June 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "painting pre-Raphaelite art hearkening back to the early Renaissance". It most often appears alongside 1950s family structure, al-Andalus, Druids.

Reference entry: early Renaissance
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 20, 2024
Last seen: June 20, 2024

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Fake Tradition Is Traditional June 20, 2024

1950s family structure 1 shared issues
al-Andalus 1 shared issues
Druids 1 shared issues
Greco-Roman 1 shared issues
Hastings 1 shared issues

Source context

Fake Tradition Is Traditional

June 20, 2024 · Original source

Modern traditionalists look back fondly on Victorian times. But the Victorians didn’t get their culture by just doing stuff without ever thinking of the past. They were writing pseudo-Arthurian poetry, building neo-Gothic palaces, and painting pre-Raphaelite art hearkening back to the early Renaissance. And the Renaissance itself was based on the idea of a re-naissance of Greco-Roman culture. And the Roman Empire at its peak spent half of its cultural energy obsessing over restoring the virtue of the ancient days of the Roman Republic:

Early Silicon Valley1 mentions across 1 issues

Early Silicon Valley is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 24, 2021 and February 24, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "This fits the fables of Early Silicon Valley". It most often appears alongside 1950s, 1980s, 1983.

Reference entry: Early Silicon Valley
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 24, 2021
Last seen: February 24, 2021

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Book Review: Fussell On Class February 24, 2021

1950s 1 shared issues
1980s 1 shared issues
1983 1 shared issues
2020er 1 shared issues
ADIDAS 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: Fussell On Class

February 24, 2021 · Original source

Fussell talks about how Class X tends to dress in comfortable clothes because they don't feel like they need to impress anyone with suits. This fits the fables of Early Silicon Valley, where you could wear a hoodie to work because people only cared about how bright you were and not about how you conformed to cultural norms. But (the fables continue) at some point this ossified into a thing where you had to attend interviews in exactly the right kind of hoodie and comfortable jeans, or else they'd identify you as "not a culture fit" and "out of touch with Silicon Valley norms" and deny you a job. Back in 1983, Fussell would have seen someone wearing a hoodie and comfortable jeans to work and gone into raptures about how alive and nonconformist they were. Today it just means they're performing class successfully.

Inline links: the fables of Early Silicon Valley

early Soviets1 mentions across 1 issues

early Soviets is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2024 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as ""hybrid" moral systems from a Nietzschean POV (Puritans, early Soviets, post civil war progressives, Yglesias ... )". It most often appears alongside 10240, 4chan, @slatestarcodex.

Reference entry: early Soviets
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 08, 2024
Last seen: August 08, 2024

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024

10240 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
@slatestarcodex 1 shared issues
Acemoglu & Robinson 1 shared issues
Achillead 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Review: The Synaptic Plasticity and Memory Hypothesis

August 08, 2024 · Original source

Nietzsche has good psychological insight, but I think that he offers a distorted perspective for analyzing social morality. What you see as "hybrid" moral systems from a Nietzschean POV (Puritans, early Soviets, post civil war progressives, Yglesias ... ) are pretty typical in their merger of embiggening and ensmalling virtues. My guess is that only sick, disordered societies are dominated by either slave or master moralities (obviously, most societies have have had both b/c it's hard to be a slave w/o a master or vice versa).

earthworm1 mentions across 1 issues

earthworm is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2025 and September 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "If analogies are necessary, a more apt one might be that of an earthworm". It most often appears alongside A Change of Heart, Abraham, Adams.

Reference entry: earthworm
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 12, 2025
Last seen: September 12, 2025

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Your Review: The Synaptic Plasticity and Memory Hypothesis September 12, 2025

A Change of Heart 1 shared issues
Abraham 1 shared issues
Adams 1 shared issues
Adams and Garrison 1 shared issues
Alexander Forbes 1 shared issues

Source context

September 12, 2025 · Original source

Gelber freely applies to Protozoa concepts (reinforcement and approach response) and situations (food presentation) developed with higher metazoan animals. I feel that such application overestimates the sensory and motor capabilities of this organism… If analogies are necessary, a more apt one might be that of an earthworm which crawls and eats its way through the earth, blundering onto food-rich soil and avoiding light, heat, and dryness. Gelber’s assertion loses its force when the blind, filter-feeding mode of life of Paramecia is considered.

ease factor1 mentions across 1 issues

ease factor is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 23, 2024 and May 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "This number is called the ease factor". It most often appears alongside 1984, 1984 Calendar Meme, ACX.

Reference entry: ease factor
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 23, 2024
Last seen: May 23, 2024

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A Theoretical "Case Against Education" May 23, 2024

1984 1 shared issues
1984 Calendar Meme 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Ahab 1 shared issues
Airstrip One 1 shared issues

Source context

A Theoretical "Case Against Education"

May 23, 2024 · Original source

7 repetitions usually suffice to remember information for life. Also notice that after the second repetition, the next interval can be calculated by multiplying the previous interval with a factor of around 2.2. This number is called the ease factor, and depending on your implementation, it is usually set between 2 and 2.5.

East African Federation1 mentions across 1 issues

East African Federation is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 12, 2022 and July 12, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "the East African Federation, a proposed merger of seven African countries". It most often appears alongside 1/6 Committee, Africa, Berkshire Hathaway.

Reference entry: East African Federation
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 12, 2022
Last seen: July 12, 2022

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Issue trail

22 July 12, 2022

6 Committee 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Berkshire Hathaway 1 shared issues
Boris Johnson 1 shared issues
Democrats 1 shared issues

Source context

July 12, 2022 · Original source

3: In my last links post, I talked about the East African Federation, a proposed merger of seven African countries. Now there’s a Metaculus question on it (though it’s too early to have any results available).

Inline links: there’s a Metaculus question on it

East Coast Main Line1 mentions across 1 issues

East Coast Main Line is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 30, 2024 and March 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "If you're coming a long way by East Coast Main Line". It most often appears alongside 1111 Brickell Ave, 11841 Wagner St., Culver City, 1970 Port Laurent place, Newport Beach 92660.

Reference entry: East Coast Main Line
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 30, 2024
Last seen: March 30, 2024

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Issue trail

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024 March 30, 2024

1111 Brickell Ave 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner St., Culver City 1 shared issues
1970 Port Laurent place, Newport Beach 92660 1 shared issues
200 Degrees 1 shared issues
255 White St 1 shared issues

Source context

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024

March 30, 2024 · Original source

NEWCASTLE-DURHAM, ENGLAND, UK Contact: Chris Goodall Contact Info: wardle[at]live[dot]fr Time: Sunday, April 28th, 12:00 PM Location: "The Food Pit" in the centre of Riverwalk mall, Framwelgate, Durham, next to the river. I will wear the Hawaiian shirt and hold the Astral Codex10 sign. Hopefully we'll make it up the steps to the cathedral but this is a step-free place to start. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9C6WQCGC+VH Notes: If you're coming a long way by East Coast Main Line, be sure to check if breaking the journey saves you money.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9C6WQCGC+VH

East Slavic mythology1 mentions across 1 issues

East Slavic mythology is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 10, 2022 and October 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "He has evolved from the East Slavic mythology". It most often appears alongside 9-11, Adraste, America.

Reference entry: East Slavic mythology
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 10, 2022
Last seen: October 10, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day October 10, 2022

9-11 1 shared issues
Adraste 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
American Jews 1 shared issues
Angels 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day

October 10, 2022 · Original source

I have had weird feelings reading this. I am from Russia, and this precisely what has happened here (without focus groups though). In soviet era, Christmas was banned as too religious, and replaced with New Year celebrations (in the night from 31st of December to the 1st of January), which are as massive a holiday as Christmas is in the US. For New Year, families come together, decorate a spruce tree (which is called a New Year Tree rather than a Christmas Tree), and give each other presents which are supposedly distributed by Grandfather Frost, who is totally not Santa Claus despite being an old jolly bearded guy giving the presents. (He has evolved from the East Slavic mythology rather Cristianity, so while he was briefly banned, the soviet government was much less strict about that, as, in accordance with the post, they feared Pagan opposition much less than Christian opposition). And Christmas in Russia is mostly celebrated by people who are indeed religious.

Eastern1 mentions across 1 issues

Eastern is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 07, 2023 and June 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "most of those who have been educated in Eastern culture do not agree". It most often appears alongside 747, America, America Against America.

Reference entry: Eastern
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 07, 2023
Last seen: June 07, 2023

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Assistant Dictator Book Club: America Against America June 07, 2023

747 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
America Against America 1 shared issues
American 1 shared issues
American conventional wisdom 1 shared issues

Source context

Assistant Dictator Book Club: America Against America

June 07, 2023 · Original source

I personally feel that most people in Eastern societies and Eastern cultures may find [the] regulations [in America] too harsh. People who grow up in Eastern culture, if they really live in American society, sometimes do not feel so comfortable and free.

It is generally believed that human relationships in American society are simpler and less complex, and people live in society based on their abilities, knowledge, and money, rather than on relationships, family, and other factors, which constitute the biggest difference between Eastern and Western societies, and the culture of Eastern societies, especially within the Confucian cultural circle, emphasizes identity, discipline, etiquette, and blood, while Western culture emphasizes talent, law, profit, and authority. In general, and only in general, this division is acceptable. But it must not be assumed that this is absolutely true of American and Western societies. Just as relationships are not always relied upon in Eastern societies, they are not always [maybe Wang meant to add a "not" here?] relied upon in Western societies.

The American concept of family or family organization, most of those who have been educated in Eastern culture do not agree and do not appreciate. The American concept of family is very different from what it was decades ago. Of course, there are millions of American families, and they vary. What we analyze is only the typical and representative mainstream American family concept.

eastern blot1 mentions across 1 issues

eastern blot is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 08, 2022 and November 08, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "which I guess could be an eastern blot". It most often appears alongside Alexander Buhl, ANNs, Bay Area House Party.

Reference entry: eastern blot
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 08, 2022
Last seen: November 08, 2022

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Brain Waves November 08, 2022

Alexander Buhl 1 shared issues
ANNs 1 shared issues
Bay Area House Party 1 shared issues
biological neural networks 1 shared issues
brainsciencepodcast.com 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Brain Waves

November 08, 2022 · Original source

In an analogy to the origin of the names of white, pink, and brown noise, the laboratory technique to separate and study DNA of different lengths is named southern blotting for its developer, Ed Southern. The similar method of separating RNA is called northern blotting, and for protein it's called western blotting. Once, I accidentally reversed the electrodes when doing a western blot, so that the protein ended up lost in the buffer instead of on the blot paper, which I guess could be an eastern blot. But apparently there are many things called eastern blots now: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_blot

Inline links: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_blot

Eastern conceptions1 mentions across 1 issues

Eastern conceptions is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 05, 2022 and August 05, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "there are only passing mentions in the book about Eastern conceptions of this condition". It most often appears alongside acedia, Against Nature, Anna Schaffner.

Reference entry: Eastern conceptions
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 05, 2022
Last seen: August 05, 2022

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: Exhaustion August 05, 2022

acedia 1 shared issues
Against Nature 1 shared issues
Anna Schaffner 1 shared issues
Billy Crystal 1 shared issues
Boniface VIII 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Exhaustion

August 05, 2022 · Original source

I read this book to try to make sense of CFS and its related conditions, and the book in my opinion begins to come together as it moves into the modern conceptions of exhaustion, but it is important to first follow Schaffner as she traces the explanatory models used in science and culture throughout Western history – there are only passing mentions in the book about Eastern conceptions of this condition, although it seems as though it is almost as common in Asian countries as in the West, where versions of neurasthenia are still diagnosed in China (shenjing shuairou; 神经衰弱) and Japan (shinkeisuijaku; 神経衰弱) and elsewhere.

Inline links: almost as common

Eastern European1 mentions across 1 issues

Eastern European is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 05, 2021 and March 05, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "A Real Dog gives the Eastern European perspective". It most often appears alongside A Real Dog, Americans, Astors.

Reference entry: Eastern European
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 05, 2021
Last seen: March 05, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Class March 05, 2021

A Real Dog 1 shared issues
Americans 1 shared issues
Astors 1 shared issues
Bernie Sanders 1 shared issues
Big Tech 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Class

March 05, 2021 · Original source

A Real Dog gives the Eastern European perspective:

Inline links: A Real Dog

Eastern Orthodox1 mentions across 1 issues

Eastern Orthodox is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 10, 2022 and October 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "some of which are included in the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox conceptions of the Bible"; "Eastern Orthodox conceptions of the Bible". It most often appears alongside 9-11, Adraste, America.

Reference entry: Eastern Orthodox
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 10, 2022
Last seen: October 10, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day October 10, 2022

9-11 1 shared issues
Adraste 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
American Jews 1 shared issues
Angels 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Columbus Day

October 10, 2022 · Original source

Moving onto Hanukkah - some commenters like odd anon question my description of it as coming from a Bible story. This isn’t going to get resolved here - Hanukkah comes from the Books of Maccabees, some of which are included in the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox conceptions of the Bible, but not the Protestant or Jewish ones.

Inline links: odd anon

Eastern Orthodoxy1 mentions across 1 issues

Eastern Orthodoxy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 21, 2021 and April 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "story of Eastern Orthodoxy among the Mayans of Guatemala". It most often appears alongside Andes Mountains, Antiochan subgroup, Argentina.

Reference entry: Eastern Orthodoxy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 21, 2021
Last seen: April 21, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

No, Really, Why Are So Many Christians In Colombia Converting To Orthodox Judaism? April 21, 2021

Andes Mountains 1 shared issues
Antiochan subgroup 1 shared issues
Argentina 1 shared issues
Baruj 1 shared issues
Bello 1 shared issues

Source context

No, Really, Why Are So Many Christians In Colombia Converting To Orthodox Judaism?

April 21, 2021 · Original source

This story of a religious leader converting, followed by his flock, reminds me of the story of Eastern Orthodoxy among the Mayans of Guatemala. On two separate occasions, important Catholic religious figures in Guatemala converted to Eastern Orthodoxy, and their followers followed - there are now about 400,000 Mayans in the Constantinopolitan subgroup and an undetermined number more in the Antiochan subgroup.

Inline links: Eastern Orthodoxy among the Mayans of Guatemala

And if we’re going to include Judaism and Eastern Orthodoxy, we might as well talk about the five million Mormons in Latin America, or the thing where almost a fifth of Latin Americans have converted to Protestantism in the past fifty years.

Inline links: the five million Mormons in Latin America, almost a fifth of Latin Americans have converted to Protestantism in the past fifty years

eastern philosophy1 mentions across 1 issues

eastern philosophy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 20, 2024 and September 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Chesterton sees hope as one of the primary distinguishers between Christianity and paganism, buddhism, eastern philosophy". It most often appears alongside Adam, Alfred, Ballad.

Reference entry: eastern philosophy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 20, 2024
Last seen: September 20, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Ballad of the White Horse September 20, 2024

Adam 1 shared issues
Alfred 1 shared issues
Ballad 1 shared issues
Buddhism 1 shared issues
Buddhist 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Ballad of the White Horse

September 20, 2024 · Original source

Here we are introduced to one of Chesterton’s core themes: hope versus fate. Chesterton sees hope as one of the primary distinguishers between Christianity and paganism, buddhism, eastern philosophy in general, and materialistic determinism. We see this same dichotomy in another of Chesterton’s great poems, Lepanto, where he has Muhammed, enthroned in glory in the Muslim paradise, say:

easy problem1 mentions across 1 issues

easy problem is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 10, 2025 and June 10, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "a different sort of "conscious" (easy problem)". It most often appears alongside brain, Chalmers, conscious.

Reference entry: easy problem
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 10, 2025
Last seen: June 10, 2025

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Issue trail

P-Zombies Would Report Qualia June 10, 2025

brain 1 shared issues
Chalmers 1 shared issues
conscious 1 shared issues
hard problem 1 shared issues
p-zombies 1 shared issues

Source context

P-Zombies Would Report Qualia

June 10, 2025 · Original source

These p-zombies talk to each other (like humans do), and an outside observer might notice that they report on some levels of mental processing, but not others (like humans do). For example, they might fail the infamous PARIS IN THE THE SPRINGTIME test, reporting only one THE rather than two. The observer would conjecture that the p-zombies’ speech is produced by a part with access to high-level processing (after the Paris sentence has been rounded off to its more plausible alternative), but not low-level processing (the base-level sense-data including both “the”s). Thus, the observer would reinvent the idea of the “conscious” vs. “unconscious” mind. This isn’t surprising or a contradiction of our premise - this is a different sort of “conscious” (easy problem) than the one we agreed the p-zombies lack (hard problem). But it will be linguistically awkward, so let’s call this distinction the “reportable” vs. “unreportable” mind.

Inline links: PARIS IN THE THE SPRINGTIME, hard problem

EATS act1 mentions across 1 issues

EATS act is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 21, 2023 and August 21, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "EATS act (banning California from putting animal welfare standards on meat) is definitely constitutional". It most often appears alongside ACX, Astralcodexten Com, California.

Reference entry: EATS act
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 21, 2023
Last seen: August 21, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 290 August 21, 2023

ACX 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
California 1 shared issues
Lars Doucet 1 shared issues
PEPFAR 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 290

August 21, 2023 · Original source

2: Comments on this month’s links: EATS act (banning California from putting animal welfare standards on meat) is definitely constitutional (1, 2); defense of Republican concerns that PEPFAR money is being used to promote abortion (1, 2).

Inline links: 1, 2, 1, 2

EA’s founding1 mentions across 1 issues

EA’s founding is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 30, 2024 and May 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "this is part of the story of EA’s founding". It most often appears alongside AI risk, Alcoholics Anonymous, Bay.

Reference entry: EA’s founding
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 30, 2024
Last seen: May 30, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Stone On EA May 30, 2024

AI risk 1 shared issues
Alcoholics Anonymous 1 shared issues
Bay 1 shared issues
Bay Area 1 shared issues
Boston 1 shared issues

Source context

Contra Stone On EA

May 30, 2024 · Original source

Try spotting existential risk prevention on here. I don’t think Stone can claim that an EA version of this chart wouldn’t look phenomenally different. But then what’s left of his argument? III. Effective altruists devote absolutely enormous amounts of mental energy and research costs to program assessment, measurement of effectiveness. Those studies yield usually-conflicting results with variable effect sizes across time horizons and model specifications, and tons of different programs end up with overlapping effect estimates. That is to say, the areas where EAist style program evaluations are most compelling are areas where we don’t need them: it’s been obvious for a long time how to reduce malaria deaths, program evaluations on that front have been encouraging and marginally useful, but not gamechanging. On the other hand, in more contestable areas, EAist style program evaluations don’t really yield much clarity. It’s very rare that a program evaluation gets published finding vastly larger benefits than you’d guess from simple back-of-the-envelope guesswork, and the smaller estimates are usually because a specific intervention had first-order failure or long-run tapering, not because “actually tuberculosis isn’t that bad” or something like that. Those kinds of precise program-delivery studies are actually not an EAist specialty, but more IPA’s specialty. My second critique, then is this: there is no evidence that the toolkit and philosophical approach EAists so loudly proclaim as morally superior actually yields any clarity, or that their involvement in global efforts is net-positive vs. similar-scale donations given through near-peer organizations. The IPA mentioned here is Innovations For Poverty Action, a group that studies how to fight poverty. They’re great and do great work. But IPA doesn’t recommend top charities or direct donations. Go to their website, try to find their recommended charities. Unless I’m missing something, there are none. GiveWell does have recommended charities - including ones that they decided to recommend based on IPA’s work - and moves ~$250 million per year to them. If IPA existed, but not GiveWell, the average donor wouldn’t know where to donate, and ~$250 million per year would fail to go to charities that IPA likes. I think from the perspective of people who actually work within this ecosystem, Stone’s concern is like saying “Farms have already solved the making-food problem, so why do we need grocery stores?” (also, effective altruism funds IPA) I’m focusing on IPA here because Stone brought them up, but I think EA does more than this. I don’t think there’s an IPA for figuring out whether asteroid deflection is more cost-effective than biosecurity, whether cow welfare is more effective than chicken welfare, or figuring out which AI safety institute to donate to. I think this is because IPA is working on a really specific problem (which kinds of poverty-related interventions work) and EA is working on a different problem (what charities should vaguely utilitarian-minded people donate to?) These are closely related questions but they’re not the same question - which is why, for example, IPA does (great) research into consumer protection, something EA doesn’t consider comparatively high-impact. And I’m still focusing on donation to charity, again because it’s what Stone brought up, but EA does other things - like incubating charities, or building networks that affect policy. IV. Let’s skip farm animal welfare for a second and look at the next few: Global Aid, “Effective Altruism,” potential AI risks, biosecurity, and global catastrophic risk. These are all definitely disproportionate areas of EAist interest. If you google these topics, you will find a wildly disproportionate number of people who are EAist, or have sex at EAist orgies, or are the friends of people who have sex at EAist orgies. These really are some of the unique social features of EAism. And they largely amount to subsidizing white collar worker wages. I’m sorry but there’s no other way to slice it: these are all jobs largely aimed at giving money to researchers, PhD-holders, university-adjacent-persons, think tanks, etc. That may be fine stuff, but the whole pitch of effective altruism is that it’s supposed to bypass a lot of the conventional nonprofit bureaucracy and its parasitism and just give money to effective charities. But as EAism as matured into a truly unique social movement, it is creating its own bureaucracy of researchers, think tanks, bureaucrats… the very things it critiqued. Suppose an EA organization funded a cancer researcher to study some new drug, and that new drug was a perfect universal cure for cancer. Would Stone reject this donation as somehow impure, because it went to a cancer researcher (a white-collar PhD holder)? EA gives hundreds of millions of dollars directly to malaria treatments that go to the poorest people in the world. It’s also one the main funders of GiveDirectly, a charity that has given money ($750 million so far) directly to the poorest people in the world. But in addition to giving out bednets directly, it sometimes funds malaria vaccines. In addition to giving to poor Africans, it also funds the people who do the studies to see whether giving to poor Africans works. Some of those are white-collar workers. EA has never been about critiquing the existence of researchers and think tanks. In fact, this is part of the story of EA’s founding. In 2007, the only charity evaluators accessible by normal people rated charities entirely on how much overhead they had - whether the money went to white-collar people or to sympathetic poor recipients. EAs weren’t the first to point out that this was a very weak way of evaluating charities. But they were the first to make the argument at scale and bring it into the public consciousness, and GiveWell (and to some degree the greater EA movement) were founded on the principle of “what if there was a charity evaluator that did better than just calculate overhead?” In accordance with this history, if you look on Giving What We Can’s List Of Misconceptions About Effective Altruism, their #1 Misconception about about charity evaluation is that “looking at a charity’s overhead costs is key to evaluating its effectiveness”. This is another part of my argument that EA is more than just IPA++. For years, the state of the art for charity evaluators was “grade them by how much overhead they had”. IPA and all the great people working on evidence-based charity at the time didn’t solve that problem - people either used CharityNavigator or did their own research. GiveWell did solve that problem, and that success sparked a broader movement to come up with a philosophy of charity that could solve more problems. Many individuals have always had good philosophies of charity, but I think EA was a step change in doing it at scale and trying to build useful tools / a community around it. V. You could of course say AI risk is a super big issue. I’m open to that! But surely the solution to AI risk is to invest in some drone-delivered bombs and geospatial data on computing centers! The idea that the primary solution here is going to be blog posts, white papers, podcasts, and even lobbying is just insane. If you are serious about ruinous AI risk, you cannot possibly tell me that the strategy pursued here is optimal vs. say waiting until a time when workers have all gone home and blowing up a bunch of data centers and corporate offices. In particular terrorism as a strategy may be efficient since explosives are rather cheap. To be clear I do not support a strategy of terrorism!!!! But I am questioning why AI-riskers don’t. Logically, they should. I think if you have to write in bold with four exclamation points at the end that you’re not explicitly advocating terrorism, you should step back and think about your assumptions further. So: Should people who worry about global warming bomb coal plants? Should people who worry that Trump is going to destroy American democracy bomb the Republican National Convention? Should people who worry about fertility collapse and underpopulation bomb abortion clinics? EAs aren’t the only group who think there are deeply important causes. But for some reason people who can think about other problems in Near Mode go crazy when they start thinking about EA. (Eliezer Yudkowsky has sometimes been accused of wanting to bomb data centers, but he supports international regulations backed by military force - his model is things like Israel bombing Iraq’s nuclear program in the context of global norms limiting nuclear proliferation - not lone wolves. As far as I know, all EAs are united against this kind of thing.) There are three reasons not to bomb coal plants/data centers/etc. The first is that bombing things is morally wrong. I take this one pretty seriously. The second is that terrorism doesn’t work. Imagine that someone actually tried to bomb a data center. First of all, I don’t have statistics but I assume 99% of terrorists get caught at the “your collaborator is an undercover fed” stage. Another 99% get eliminated at the “blown up by poor bomb hygiene and/or a spam text message” stage. And okay, 1/10,000 will destroy a datacenter, and then what? Google tells me there are 10,978 data centers in the world. After one successful attack, the other 10,977 will get better security. Probably many of these are in China or some other country that’s not trivial for an American to import high explosives into. The third is that - did I say terrorism didn’t work? I mean it massively massively backfires. Hamas tried terrorism, they frankly did a much better job than we would, and now 52% of the buildings in their entire country have been turned to rubble. Osama bin Laden tried terrorism, also did an impressive job, and the US took over the whole country that had supported him, then took over an unrelated country that seemed like the kinds of guys who might support him, then spent ten years hunting him down and killing him and everyone he had ever associated with. One f@#king time, a handful of EAs tried promoting their agenda by committing some crimes which were much less bad than terrorism. Along with all the direct suffering they caused, they destroyed EA’s reputation and political influence, drove thousands of people away from the movement, and everything they did remains a giant pit of shame that we’re still in the process of trying to climb our way out of. Not to bang the same drum again and again, but this is why EA needs to be a coherent philosophy and not just IPA++. You need some kind of theory of what kinds of activism are acceptable and effective, or else people will come up with morally repugnant and incredibly idiotic plans that will definitely backfire and destroy everything you thought you were fighting for. EA hasn’t always been the best at avoiding this failure mode, but at least we manage to outdo our critics. VI. Stone moves on to animal welfare: It’s important to grasp that [caring about animals] is, in evolutionary terms, an error in our programming. The mechanisms involved are entirely about intra-human dynamics (or, some argue, may also be about recognizing the signs of vulnerable prey animals or enabling better hunting). Yes humans have had domestic animals for quite a long time, but our sympathetic responses are far older than that. We developed accidental sympathies for animals and then we made friends with dogs, not vice versa. Again, this is part of why I think it’s useful to have people who think about philosophy, and not just people who do RCTs. People having kids of their own instead of donating to sperm banks is in some sense an “error” in our evolutionary program. The program just wanted us to reproduce; instead we got a bunch of weird proxy goals like “actually loving kids for their own sake”. Art is another error - I assume we were evolutionarily programmed to care about beauty because, I don’t know, flowers indicate good hunting grounds or something, not because evolution wanted us to paint beautiful pictures. Anyone who cares about a future they will never experience, or about people on far off continents who they’ll never meet, is in some sense succumbing to “errors” in their evolutionary programming. Stone describes the original mechanisms as “about intra-human dynamics”, but this is cope - they’re about intra-tribal dynamics. Plenty of cultures have been completely happy to enslave, kill, and murder people outside their tribes, and nothing in their evolutionary mechanism has told them not to. Does Stone think this, too, is an error? At some point you’ve got to go beyond evolutionary programming and decide what kind of person you want to be. I want to be the kind of person who cares about my family, about beauty, about people on other continents, and - yes - about animal suffering. This is the reflective equilibrium I’ve landed in after considering all the drives and desires within me, filtering it through my ability to use Reason, and imagining having to justify myself to whatever God may or may not exist. Stone suggests EAs don’t have answers to a lot of the basic questions around this. I can recommend him various posts like Axiology, Morality, Law, the super-old Consequentialism FAQ, and The Gift We Give To Tomorrow, but I think they’ll only address about half of his questions. The other half of the answers have to come from intuition, common sense, and moral conservatism. This isn’t embarrassing. Logicians have discovered many fine and helpful logical principles, but can’t 100% answer the problem of skepticism - you can fill in some of the internal links in the chain, but the beginning and end stay shrouded in mystery. This doesn’t mean you can ignore the logical principles we do know. It just means that life is a combination of formally-reasonable and not-formally-reasonable bits. You should follow the formal reason where you have it, and not freak out and collapse into Cartesian doubt where you don’t. This is how I think of morality too. Again, I really think it’s important to have a philosophy and not just a big pile of RCTs. Our critics make this point better than I ever could. They start with “all this stuff is just common sense, who needs philosophy, the RCTs basically interpret themselves”, then, in the same essay, digress into: If I wanted to do this stuff, I would try terrorism.

Inline links: Giving What We Can’s List Of Misconceptions About Effective Altruism, Israel bombing Iraq’s nuclear program, I take this one pretty seriously, a spam text message, Axiology, Morality, Law, Consequentialism FAQ, The Gift We Give To Tomorrow

Ebonics1 mentions across 1 issues

Ebonics is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "I paradoxically found it helpful to be reminded of the existence of Ebonics". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: Ebonics
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Exhaustion

February 02, 2026 · Original source

Ebonics (technically “African-American Vernacular English”) is a dialect common among poor uneducated black people. Ebonic sentences sound like “Dat boi ain’t no friend of mine”, and, to educated white people, sound like a superstimulus for every possible grammatical error and barbarism - “like nails on a chalkboard”. This is no coincidence: for a construction to be both common and “wrong”, it must be used by a low-status group whose opinions “don’t count”, and poor uneducated black people fall into this category for obvious historical reasons.

It’s strange to “learn” anything from an obvious troll like MonkeNigga, but I paradoxically found it helpful to be reminded of the existence of Ebonics.

A second reason Ebonics sounds so atrocious is that motivated and ambitious poor uneducated black people may want to hide their poor and uneducated status. So when talking to whites, they may try to suppress Ebonics features and mimic white dialect. A black person who uses Ebonics in middle-class white society is inadvertently signaling that they either aren’t educated enough to use standard English, or don’t care enough to try.

EBV1 mentions across 1 issues

EBV is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 05, 2022 and August 05, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "agents such as EBV or viral meningitis". It most often appears alongside acedia, Against Nature, Anna Schaffner.

Reference entry: EBV
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 05, 2022
Last seen: August 05, 2022

Outbound links

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-020-09049-x

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Exhaustion August 05, 2022

acedia 1 shared issues
Against Nature 1 shared issues
Anna Schaffner 1 shared issues
Billy Crystal 1 shared issues
Boniface VIII 1 shared issues

Source context

August 05, 2022 · Original source

Schaffner gives a reasonable accounting of the way CFS was characterised – post-polio fatigue being noticed in the 1950s, the discovery of Epstein-Barr Virus (EBV) in the 1960s and the initial thoughts that EBV was a robust cause of CFS, the subsequent discovery that about 95% of the population has had EBV so this explanation couldn’t be complete, followed by classification of the syndrome settling into a cause-agnostic set of symptoms. This, however, didn’t stop the fighting.

Inline links: 95% of the population has had EBV, the fighting

We suggest that agents such as EBV or viral meningitis can lead to the experience of abnormal symptoms, such as fatigue, malaise and myalgia. However, the transition from symptoms to disability may be more closely linked to cognitive and behavioural factors. Hence interventions such as CBT designed to reduce disability and counteract maladaptive coping strategies ought to be more effective in reducing disability than symptoms. The evidence so far supports this model – many patients do show considerable improvements in disability and everyday functioning, but are not rendered symptom-free by cognitive or behavioural interventions.

Ecclesiastes 5:51 mentions across 1 issues

Ecclesiastes 5:5 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 26, 2023 and May 26, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "biblical references to use in preaching sermons on the illusory nature of promised riches. (Ecclesiastes 5:5, for example...)". It most often appears alongside /r/wallstreetbets, 2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 80,000 Hours.

Reference entry: Ecclesiastes 5:5
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 26, 2023
Last seen: May 26, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Lying for Money May 26, 2023

wallstreetbets 1 shared issues
2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours podcast 1 shared issues
@eigenrobot 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Hanson And Health Care

May 26, 2023 · Original source

Pyramid schemes are so rife among churches that guides to pastors have been published on how to spot one developing in your congregation. These come complete with lists of biblical references to use in preaching sermons on the illusory nature of promised riches. (Ecclesiastes 5:5, for example, “Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay.”)

eclampsia1 mentions across 1 issues

eclampsia is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 10, 2024 and May 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "certain “maternal” causes, such as “eclampsia” or “obstetric trauma,” are commonly tracked". It most often appears alongside "Most Drugs Are Bad For You", 1123581321, California.

Reference entry: eclampsia
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 10, 2024
Last seen: May 10, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Hanson And Health Care May 10, 2024

"Most Drugs Are Bad For You" 1 shared issues
1123581321 1 shared issues
California 1 shared issues
Canada 1 shared issues
CATO Unbound 1 shared issues

Source context

May 10, 2024 · Original source

» Historically, the United States and most countries have tracked maternal mortality using data based on the cause of death listed on death certificates. When a person dies and the cause is assessed by an examiner of some kind, certain “maternal” causes, such as “eclampsia” or “obstetric trauma,” are commonly tracked. If a woman has died due to one of these pregnancy-related causes, she is listed as a maternal death. This process is fairly straightforward and has been widely adopted across many countries.

economic class warfare1 mentions across 1 issues

economic class warfare is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 25, 2021 and February 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Economic class warfare is Marxist". It most often appears alongside Akron, Amherst, Ben Carson.

Reference entry: economic class warfare
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 25, 2021
Last seen: February 25, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

A Modest Proposal For Republicans: Use The Word "Class" February 25, 2021

Akron 1 shared issues
Amherst 1 shared issues
Ben Carson 1 shared issues
Berkeley 1 shared issues
Broadway 1 shared issues

Source context

A Modest Proposal For Republicans: Use The Word "Class"

February 25, 2021 · Original source

...a thoughtful campaign to fight classism. Yeah, yeah, "class" sounds Marxist, class warfare and all that, you're supposed to be against that kind of thing, right? Wrong. Economic class warfare is Marxist, but here in the US class isn't a purely economic concept. Class is also about culture . You're already doing class warfare, you're just doing it blindly and...

...a thoughtful campaign to fight classism. Yeah, yeah, "class" sounds Marxist, class warfare and all that, you're supposed to be against that kind of thing, right? Wrong. Economic class warfare is Marxist, but here in the US class isn't a purely economic concept. Class is also about culture . You're already doing class warfare, you're just doing it blindly and confusedly....

economic connectedness1 mentions across 1 issues

economic connectedness is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2025 and June 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "He summarizes that as a place of “economic connectedness” – where adults are connected to each other and to the broader community". It most often appears alongside 10,000 hour rule, 2 Hour Learning, Inc, 2-hour Learning.

Reference entry: economic connectedness
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 27, 2025
Last seen: June 27, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Review: Alpha School June 27, 2025

10,000 hour rule 1 shared issues
2 Hour Learning, Inc 1 shared issues
2-hour Learning 1 shared issues
Alex Amplifier 1 shared issues
Alpha 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Review: Alpha School

June 27, 2025 · Original source

Low single mother rate He summarizes that as a place of “economic connectedness” – where adults are connected to each other and to the broader community. A lack of those five elements are not bad per se, but they are correlated with a community where people are not interacting with each other as much as they are in communities where the metrics are reversed. Chetty frames it that kids are influenced by the other adults in the area they live in. But I have another hypothesis. Rather than: Other parents → Your kids Perhaps the causation runs from: Other parents → You → Your kids Maybe it’s not other parents' style of parenting that is influencing your kids (how?) but rather when you spend time around other parents their parenting style rubs off on you and how you parent your kids. Influence like that will not get picked up in Caplan’s adoption studies (which focus almost on how parent characteristics get passed on to genetic vs adopted children’s characteristics), but it is a potential signal that maybe parenting choices do matter. Maybe we were just looking at the wrong data. Pre-registered Genius Experiment We now have two data sets that don’t contradict directly, but do point to opposing conclusions. It would be great if we could test this with a pre-registered randomized control trial. That is not going to happen in our current culture. But enter Laszlo Polgár, who volunteered his own children as the test subjects. (Scott’s 2017 review of Polgar’s book here) Before his children were born Polgár publicly announced he would raise them to be geniuses. He initially considered training them to be genius artists, writers or mathematicians, but decided those fields were not objective enough. It would be too easy for critics to dismiss his future children’s achievements and “not genius” no matter what they accomplished in those fields. So he chose a field that was considered both “driven by intelligence” that had clear, objective measures: chess. Then he called his shot. By 1989 all three girls received their first “GM norms” (a GM norm is finishing a tournament with a elo score of at least 2600; 27 norms are needed to make grandmaster). Two went on to become grandmasters - the 3rd and 4th women to ever achieve that title. One ranked in the top 100 (all genders) at age 12 – she peaked at #8 in the world. The other became the top-rated woman in the world at age 15. Polgar showed that you could take kids, at least kids with “good enough genes”, and turn them into world champions through the right education methods. One might think this would be “case closed”, but even as the Polgar sisters were achieving these feats people were saying that these girls must have been “naturally gifted”. They clearly had bright parents, but does anyone think that if they had been adopted into a random middle class American household they would have still become chess geniuses? Or world class in anything at all? When Polgar was challenged on exactly that, he wanted to repeat the experiment by adopting a “black child” and doing it again. Unfortunately his wife talked him out of it. Even if he had adopted a child and turned him into a genius, that would just be one data point – it would not show up in Caplan’s adoption studies. It would be a case of the anecdote and the data disagreeing. Which do you choose to believe? Aristocratic Tutoring It would be great if we could find more examples of Polgar’s model. While I could not find any other “called shots”, one could go back and look at the childhoods of geniuses to see if there is anything to find. That is what Erik Hoel did in his series of posts on “Why we stopped making Einsteins” (post 1, post 2, post 3; Scott’s response). Hoel argues persuasively that, when biographies of their childhoods exist, the geniuses of the past were almost all given 1:1 tutoring. There must have been many aristocrats in the past that were given 1:1 tutoring who never amounted to world-class genius, and many world-class geniuses who got there without 1:1 tutoring, but it does seem to put the thumb on the scale. Benjamin Bloom would agree. Benjamin Bloom quantified Polgar’s hunch in 1984, just eight years after Polgar’s last daughter was born. He ran a RCT where some students were taught normally and others given 1:1 tutoring. He found that the average tutored child improved by two standard deviations over the control: “The average tutored student was above 98% of the students in the control class” and “about 90% of the tutored students ... attained the level reached by only the highest 20% [of the control]”. He called his finding the “Bloom’s 2 sigma problem” Why would this discovery of the secret sauce that could turn the average student into a genius be a problem? Because Bloom saw no way to scale it. Clearly we can’t give every kid in the world a personal 1:1 tutor. We had the solution that would revolutionize everything, but it was just too expensive. Where does that leave us? Caplan showed that, within the normal range, nothing you do in education or parenting matters. …But Chetty showed that how (or at least where) your kids are raised can matter. …Polgar showed that intense 1:1 tutoring from a young age can create world-class geniuses …And Bloom showed that 1:1 tutoring can work for almost everyone, improving performance, if not to world-class levels, still two standard deviations above the alternative. Caplan is still mostly right—if you hover in the complacent middle of American schooling. But Chetty hints that context nudges outcomes, Polgár proves that deliberate, early, personalised instruction can manufacture prodigies, and Bloom tells us it lifts the average child by two sigmas. Alpha’s claim is that software‑mediated, 5:1 tutoring narrows that two‑sigma gap for a price mere mortals can (barely) contemplate. Whether that vision survives contact with budgets, regulators, and human nature is the question for section seven. Part Seven: Scaling Weird A month into our experiment in Austin we were at a neighbor’s backyard pool party (a fringe benefit of moving to Austin: there were backyard pool parties in early November). I was in conversation with a couple that I had just been introduced to. He asked why we moved to Austin, “Was it for your job?” “No. Actually we moved for a school for the kids.” Their faces expressed a combination of confusion and shock. It wasn’t the first nor the last time. Everyone is confused at why we would move across the country to send our kids to a new school, “They don’t have good schools where you come from? How much does this school cost?” Those two questions frame Alpha’s biggest risks when it comes to scaling. Their biggest challenges going forward are not going to be pedagogical. They are going to be sociological and economic. The Economic Problem Alpha is much cheaper than a Victorian Governess, but it’s not cheap. As mentioned in this review more than a few times, Alpha’s flagship campus charges $40,000 a year— roughly 3-4× what the other top-tier private elementary schools in Austin ask. Yes, that figure is all‑in: every Chromebook, every afternoon workshop, even the spring junket to Poland to beta‑test the platform with Ukrainian refugees is baked into tuition. There are no gala auctions or booster fees waiting in tall grass. Still, $40k is a hard swallow when the local Christian school will take your child for eleven. Worse, the number almost certainly fails to cover costs. Recall that guides start at $60k, rise to $100k on promotion, and the five “head guides” each earn $150k. At the five‑to‑one student‑to‑teacher ratio Alpha runs, those salaries alone suck in half the revenue from a twenty‑kid cohort before you’ve paid the rent, the head of school, the company executives, the curriculum designers, the engineers that are building the 2-hour platform and AlphaRead, the workshop costs (or the trip to Ukraine) or the marketing expenses (MacKenzie has a very well produced podcast, and I see a lot of ads for the school on Facebook now that we live locally). Compared with aristocratic one‑to‑one tutoring, forty grand is a steal. But $40,000 is still Lamborghini kindergarten – and even at those prices it is still burning through Joe Liemandt’s cash pile. Alpha’s answer to eventually solving the economics seems to be two fold: (1) Get enough scale that the fixed costs (like the learning platform) become a rounding error on overall costs, and (2) pull out the “non-essentials” at many of the campuses to get the marginal cost well below $10,000 per student. Whether they will be successful is still in early innings. The homeschool product beta is limping along with 1x learning, and the Arizona Charter doesn’t open until autumn 2025. Whether Alpha retains its magic without $150,000/year guides with 5:1 teacher:student ratios and generous bribe incentives programs, remains to be seen. The Weirdness Problem When Bryan Caplan writes about the signaling theory of education, he lists three signals that schools send to employers: Our students are smart

Inline links: He summarizes that as a place of “economic connectedness”, Laszlo Polgár, Scott’s 2017 review of Polgar’s book here, post 1, post 2, post 3, Scott’s response, Benjamin Bloom

economic development1 mentions across 1 issues

economic development is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 06, 2024 and August 06, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "work on economic development, curing diseases, or technological progress". It most often appears alongside AI, altruism, America.

Reference entry: economic development
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 06, 2024
Last seen: August 06, 2024

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Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers August 06, 2024

AI 1 shared issues
altruism 1 shared issues
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Altruism And Vitalism As Fellow Travelers

August 06, 2024 · Original source

If I wanted to strengthen humanity as much as possible, I’d probably work on economic development, curing diseases, or technological progress. I might have slightly different priorities from the effective altruists working on these same causes, but I’d consider them 99%-allies.

Vitalist bloggers mostly don’t seem to think this way. They spend most of the energy criticizing altruists, and never really get around to practicing vitalism at all. When they do make specific suggestions, it’s always things like “Maybe we should have more war, because war strengthens society!” even though the case for war strengthening society is much weaker than the case for (eg) economic development strengthening society.

economic development and reform zones1 mentions across 1 issues

economic development and reform zones is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 11, 2024 and January 11, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "one of the core conclusions of the 'Intervention Report' was 'economic development and reform zones'". It most often appears alongside ACX Grants, Africa, Amalgamated Kenyan Wells.

Reference entry: economic development and reform zones
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 11, 2024
Last seen: January 11, 2024

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Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity January 11, 2024

ACX Grants 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity

January 11, 2024 · Original source

Insofar as one of the core conclusions of the "Intervention Report" was "economic development and reform zones," the actual work done by Charter Cities Institute and others in this domain do, in fact, work on a variety of zone-based reforms. The Romer-esque version of a "Charter City" was to some extent a straw man for what should have been a deeper dive into the global movement of zones with distinctive law and governance.

"Charter cities are expensive to build and take a long time to come to fruition, so if your focus was on the value of information, it seems likely that you could more cheaply and quickly generate this by focusing on alternatives which do not require you to build a new city, such as economic development and reform zones."

economic interest1 mentions across 1 issues

economic interest is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2021 and May 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "‘clarifies foundational concepts like strategic interest and economic interest’". It most often appears alongside 1992 treaty, ACX, Africa.

Reference entry: economic interest
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 21, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower May 21, 2021

1992 treaty 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Alaska 1 shared issues
Allen Farrington 1 shared issues

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Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal?

May 21, 2021 · Original source

Zeihan does much to address this concern. He’s writing for the general public, so he not only writes simply and clearly (demonstrating clear thinking), but also clarifies foundational concepts like strategic interest and economic interest. It’s a refreshing change from listening to national security types on cable news, or even reading the WSJ, where people often don’t bother explaining what they mean when they assert that something is an American interest.

Economic Land1 mentions across 1 issues

Economic Land is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 09, 2021 and December 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "count IP as "Economic Land"". It most often appears alongside 2017 PTAPP survey, AEI, agglomeration effect.

Reference entry: Economic Land
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 09, 2021
Last seen: December 09, 2021

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Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal? December 09, 2021

2017 PTAPP survey 1 shared issues
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agglomeration effect 1 shared issues
Albouy 1 shared issues
Alexandra Elbakyan 1 shared issues

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December 09, 2021 · Original source

Okay, so let's look at Smith's method. Instead of doing a whole new study, he singles out Albouy as having the best methodology and makes some adjustments. You see, Albouy estimated the value of urban land alone, leaving out federal lands, agricultural lands, and things like water rights and natural resources, which accrue rental income and are considered "Economic Land" by Georgists.

Great, after all that math we finally have a table that tells us how much money LVT might be able to raise. Keep in mind even the optimistic figures don't account for dynamic effects and aren't necessarily pricing in all other sources of "Economic Land" such as mineral rights, water rights, etc. They also don't apply any estimates for how much land values would rise if restrictive zoning ordinances were removed.

If you add together the 35% due to conventional land and the 4% due to "non-produced" assets (which, among other things, includes mineral and energy reserves), you get the amount represented by the Georgist definition of Land: 39% of all real assets in the entire world. That figure rises to 43% if you also count IP as "Economic Land."

Economic Pyramid1 mentions across 1 issues

Economic Pyramid is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 06, 2021 and May 06, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Economic Pyramid. Smaller cities had populations of 2 to 5 thousand". It most often appears alongside 320 AD, 476 AD, Africa.

Reference entry: Economic Pyramid
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 06, 2021
Last seen: May 06, 2021

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Your Book Review: Through The Eye Of A Needle May 06, 2021

320 AD 1 shared issues
476 AD 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
African ceramics 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: Through The Eye Of A Needle

May 06, 2021 · Original source

Economic Pyramid. Smaller cities had populations of 2 to 5 thousand. The top of the social pyramid in these cities were the local wealthy. These competing petty noblemen owned most of the farmland and their villas clustered around the towns. “They were comfortable, but not outstandingly wealthy.” They were often members of the town council or imperial bureaucrats. Brown spends a good deal of time focused on the town councilors or “curiales” of smaller cities. The curiales took care of almost every task of government on behalf of Respublica, except for high justice and the army. Curiales were responsible for police, road maintenance, fortifications, and the collection of taxes. The power and status of being a member of the curiales also came a supreme burden – the curiales were responsible for making up any shortfalls in tax revenue. After the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, some curiales became imperial bureaucrats in direct employ of the Respublica and exempt from taxation (the Christian church was sometimes also exempt from taxation). Curiales were not usually nobles.

Agriculture. The curiales were on the top of an agricultural economic pyramid. An estimated 60% of the empire was agricultural and 80% of the population was involved in the harvest. Curiales often had tenant farmers work their lands. The Respubilca’s primary revenue source was a land tax. The curiales would visit the farms surrounding their city to collect taxes on behalf of the empire, then return to collect what was owed to the curiales personally in rent. The tenant farmers would often pay in kind instead of in gold, for two reasons. 1) It was often very difficult to get access to gold. 2) Landlords often had economies of scale in selling agricultural products. A tenant farm could sell his produce in the city after harvest and take the local market price at the time. A landlord often owed storehouses, so he could sell when prices were highest. He also collected enough produce that he could economically ship it to higher priced markets.

economic vs. cultural models of class1 mentions across 1 issues

economic vs. cultural models of class is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 05, 2021 and March 05, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "difference between economic vs. cultural models of class". It most often appears alongside A Real Dog, Americans, Astors.

Reference entry: economic vs. cultural models of class
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 05, 2021
Last seen: March 05, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On Class March 05, 2021

A Real Dog 1 shared issues
Americans 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On Class

March 05, 2021 · Original source

This also sparked a discussion about whether Donald Trump was “upper class”, with one person arguing in support that he owns gold toilets, and someone else responding that gold toilets are the least classy thing imaginable. Good summation of the difference between economic vs. cultural models of class!

Ecstatic birth1 mentions across 1 issues

Ecstatic birth is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 02, 2021 and August 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Ecstatic birth, a movement where women dismount their fears of labor". It most often appears alongside AgroAlpha, Alex Tabarrok, Amazon.

Reference entry: Ecstatic birth
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 02, 2021
Last seen: August 02, 2021

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21 August 02, 2021

AgroAlpha 1 shared issues
Alex Tabarrok 1 shared issues
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August 02, 2021 · Original source

“Ecstatic birth”, a movement where “women dismount their fears of labor and create powerful birth experiences”.

Or maybe it’s exactly cute enough that it needs to be its own city, who knows? Mariposa seems to be proposing some really interesting things, including quadratic funding (an innovative budgeting mechanism pushed by Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin, among others) and dominant assurance contracts (a really neat consensus-building mechanism proposed by Alex Tabarrok). Their form-based walkable city code thing also seems pretty neat. And I’m not a midwife so for all I know ecstatic birthing is also some kind of super-great idea. Honestly this random husband-and-wife team seems to have put more thought into genuinely good governance than 99.9% of the existing countries in the world, and I hope things work out for them.

Inline links: quadratic funding, dominant assurance contracts, form-based walkable city code

Mark Lutter of CCI is kind of bummed about this. He has to meet with government officials and advocate for charter cities, and he would love to be able to say something like “Amazon is planning a charter city in Brazil”, and since everyone recognizes Amazon is an important dignified corporation and Brazil is an important dignified country, they’ll agree that this all seems like the sort of thing important dignified people do and they’re on board with it. Instead, all the important dignified people involved demand secrecy, and your choices are the husband-and-wife team interested in “ecstatic birthing” or those Black Hammer guys from the last links roundup. It’s individually rational, but bad for the charter city movement in general.

Inline links: the last links roundup

EDS1 mentions across 1 issues

EDS is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 11, 2023 and May 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "lates to a bunch of other physical disorders like EDS and digestive system problems". It most often appears alongside 15th Commandment, ACX, ADHD.

Reference entry: EDS
Mention count: 1
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First seen: May 11, 2023
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Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality May 11, 2023

15th Commandment 1 shared issues
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ADHD 1 shared issues
alt-right 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On Long COVID And Bisexuality

May 11, 2023 · Original source

Neurodiversity also correlates to a bunch of other physical disorders like EDS and digestive system problems, likely because of underlying pervasive development disorders - I'm not sure why that makes it 'more likely to be psychosomatic' rather than 'body that went slightly wrong in development is more susceptible to cumulative damage'.

edu1 mentions across 1 issues

edu is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "pop strat biases estimation of genetic effects for IQ & edu". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

Reference entry: edu
Mention count: 1
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First seen: July 03, 2025
Last seen: July 03, 2025

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

23andme 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

I think the post conflates gene-gene and gene-environment interactions; the latter (specifically interactions between genes and the "shared" environment) also get counted by twin models as narrow sense heritability. While I agree there is very little evidence for gene-gene interactions (particularly dominance, as you cite [and, interestingly, twin/adoption studies actually forecast a huge amount of dominance -- another discrepancy we do not understand]) there is quote substantial evidence for gene-environment interactions including on educational attainment (see Cheesman et al: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-022-00145-8 ; Mostafavi et al: https://elifesciences.org/articles/48376), IQ, and BMI. In fact, Peter Visscher led a paper that came to the conclusion that twin estimates for the heritability of BMI are very likely to be overestimated by gene-environment interactions (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28692066/). A large amount of GxE plus some amount of equal environment violation seems like a very plausible and parsimonious answer to the heritability gap.

Inline links: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-022-00145-8, https://elifesciences.org/articles/48376, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28692066/

If we're thinking more about, let's say, a pair of fraternal twins where one of them is ugly and so parents don't invest resources in their education, wouldn't this show up equally in twin studies and GWAS? That is, if this is a very uncommon effect, we shouldn't expect it to affect large twin studies much. But if it's a common effect, then shouldn't we expect that every ugly person is less intelligent, and so GWAS will find that a gene for ugliness is associated with lower intelligence (both within and between families)? Can you give an example of a case why this would show up in twin studies, but not GWAS, RDR, etc? Also, why would we privilege this circuitous explanation (ugliness is genetic and provokes strong parental response) over the more direct explanation (intelligence is genetic)?

The horizontal axis is EA4, a polygenic score for predicted educational attainment, generally believed to correlate somewhat with IQ. The vertical axis is observed IQ of each group. Piffer’s point is that different ethnic groups’ predicted genetic intelligence seems to correlate pretty well with their observed intelligence, so maybe group differences in intelligence are genetic. Gusev notes that “every behavior geneticist has been screaming ‘do not do that!’ since the very first study came out”, which is true. I know of three main reasons why this is a bad idea: Polygenic scores will mistake social factors correlated with genetic factors as genetic. For example, in a society where black people have lower IQ because of racism and poor access to schooling, people with a certain gene (the gene for black skin) will have lower IQ. Therefore, a study that blindly correlates genes with IQ will incorrectly assume that the gene for black skin is a gene for IQ/etc. This will ironically seem to justify the original inequality (it will look like black people “only” have low IQ for genetic reasons). This is by far the biggest problem with a plot like this one, and the one Gusev’s post above talks about - and the post offers a good example of a real result on height which encountered this exact problem.

IQ GWAS1 mentions across 1 issues

Edu/IQ GWAS is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "This is especially true for Edu/IQ GWAS, where every behavior geneticist has been screaming 'do not do that!'". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

Reference entry: IQ GWAS
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 03, 2025
Last seen: July 03, 2025

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

23andme 1 shared issues
@alextisyoung 1 shared issues
Aborigines 1 shared issues
ACE twin model 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

You mention epidemiologists being the biggest losers of stratification in polygenic scores, but I think it is important to note a related group: the people who take polygenic scores trained in one population (with a ton of stratification) and directly apply them to other populations to make claims about innate abilities (see: this post). This is especially true for Edu/IQ GWAS, where every behavior geneticist has been screaming "do not do that!" since the very first study came out. People like Kirkegaard, Piffer, Lasker, etc. (and their boosters on social media like Steve Sailer and Cremieux) dedicated their careers to taking crappy GWAS data from and turning it into memes that show Africans on the bottom and Europeans on the top. These people also happen to be the court geneticists, so to speak, for SSC/ACX. I don't mean to come off as antagonistic and I'm sure some people will see this comment and immediately discount me as being an ideologue/Lysenkoist/etc so it does my broader position no favors, but this stuff has done and continues to do an enormous amount of damage to the field (including the now complete unwillingness of public companies like 23andme to collaborate on studies of sensitive traits

Inline links: this post

Education PhD1 mentions across 1 issues

Education PhD is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 02, 2025 and September 02, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Was it an Education PhD?". It most often appears alongside Baa Baa B, Dwarkesh Patel, Europe.

Reference entry: Education PhD
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 02, 2025
Last seen: September 02, 2025

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What Is Man, That Thou Art Mindful Of Him? September 02, 2025

Baa Baa B 1 shared issues
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Europe 1 shared issues
God 1 shared issues
Iblis 1 shared issues

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What Is Man, That Thou Art Mindful Of Him?

September 02, 2025 · Original source

God: Sigh. Was it an Education PhD?

educational attainment1 mentions across 1 issues

educational attainment is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 26, 2025 and June 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "most of these anomalies are in educational attainment in particular - which is such a cursed construct". It most often appears alongside Aftab, Alex Young, Arthur Jensen.

Reference entry: educational attainment
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 26, 2025
Last seen: June 26, 2025

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Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know June 26, 2025

Aftab 1 shared issues
Alex Young 1 shared issues
Arthur Jensen 1 shared issues
Awais Aftab 1 shared issues
behaviorism 1 shared issues

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Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

June 26, 2025 · Original source

The failed candidate gene studies had sample sizes in the three or four digits. The new genome-wide studies needed five or six digits to even get started. It was prohibitively difficult for individual studies to gather so many subjects, genotype them, and test them for the outcome of interest, so work shifted to big centralized genome repositories - most of all the UK Biobank - and easy-to-measure traits. Among the easiest of all was educational attainment (EA), ie how far someone had gotten in school. Were they a high school dropout? A PhD? Somewhere in between? This correlated with all the spicy outcomes of interest people wanted to debate - IQ, wealth, social class - while being objective and easy to ask about on a survey.

Maybe there are genes we haven’t found yet For most of the 2010s, hypothesis 2 looked pretty good. Researchers gradually gathered bigger and bigger sample sizes, and found more and more of the missing heritability. A big 2018 study increased the predictive power of known genes from 2% to 10%. An even bigger 2022 study increased it to 14%, and current state of the art is around 17%. Seems like it was sample size after all! Once the samples get big enough we’ll reach 40% and finally close the gap, right? This post is the story of how that didn’t happen, of the people trying to rehabilitate the twin-studies-are-wrong hypothesis, and of the current status of the debate. Its most important influence/foil is Sasha Gusev, whose blog The Infintesimal introduced me to the new anti-hereditarian movement and got me to research it further, but it’s also inspired by Eric Turkheimer, Alex Young (not himself an anti-hereditarian, but his research helped ignite interest in this area), and Awais Aftab. (while I was working on this draft, the East Hunter Substack wrote a similar post. Theirs is good and I recommend it, but I think this one adds enough that I’m publishing anyway. You can see Gusev’s response to East Hunter here) In an interview with Aftab, Gusev explained his philosophy like so (I am excerpting heavily from a long interview and editing for flow/emphasis; completionists should read the whole thing): For teacher-reported ADHD, the twin heritability estimate was 69% while the GWAS-based heritability estimate [ie using genome-wide association studies where researchers actually try to find the genes involved] was just 5%; with similar gaps for other behavioral traits. These are huge differences! If we believe the twin study estimates, then this gap implies that there is a lot of causal genetic variation out there that GWAS/molecular data is not picking up. One way to think about this is that traits that are under stronger natural selection will have more of their genetic variants driven to low frequency, and thus less detectable by GWAS. So a big gap between GWAS and twins could imply that rare variants are very important due to strong selection. On the other hand, if we are skeptical of the twin study estimates, then this gap implies a substantial contribution from those environmental complexities I talked about previously. For a long time, the field of molecular genetics was operating under the assumption that the missing heritability was largely in the rare variants we had not yet measured. But a number of recent advances have started to tip the scales against that argument. First, some of the earlier molecular heritability estimates were found to be inflated by some mix of technical issues and cultural transmission, so the amount of missing heritability actually increased. Second, a new model was developed that could estimate total direct heritability using molecular data from mother-father-child trios, with very few model assumptions (the title literally states “… without environmental bias”; Young et al. 2018), and it too found estimates that were substantially lower than twins on average. Third, several studies have now actually measured the influence of rare variants in various forms, and they are so far not adding up to explain as much as we would expect from twin heritability estimates. Fourth, there is little evidence of the strong natural selection that would be needed to generate a massive trove of rare variants untagged by GWAS. I am a molecular geneticist, and this drumbeat of evidence from molecular data has convinced me that twin studies are either 2-3x inflated or estimate something fundamentally different from direct heritability. We’ll start by looking at Gusev’s first claim: that “earlier molecular estimates” (ie polygenic scores) are significantly inflated, or at least don’t mean what we thought they meant. This won’t be directly relevant to our question - even our original number of 17% implies missing heritability2, so moving it down a bit to 5-10% or up a bit to 20% doesn’t add or subtract from the fundamental mystery. But this discussion has gotten a lot of people extremely confused, and we’ll need to deconfuse ourselves if we’re going to get any further. Are Most Current Polygenic Scores Confounded? A polygenic score is one possible result of a genome-wide association study. These scores are algorithms which take a person’s genes as input and return information about their traits as output. Better polygenic scores can predict a higher percent of variance in a certain trait. For example, the latest polygenic score on educational attainment can predict up to 17% of the variance in how much schooling someone completes. Predictive power is different from causal efficacy. Consider a racist society where the government ensures that all white people get rich but all black people stay poor. In this society, the gene for lactose tolerance (which most white people have, but most black people lack) would do a great job predicting social class, but it wouldn’t cause social class3. It certainly wouldn’t be a “gene for social class” in the sense where it controls the part of your brain that helps you manage money, or where genetic engineering on this gene would make people richer. Here are three common ways that not-directly-causal genes can show up as predicting a trait: Population stratification: genes are linked to culture, and culture determines the trait, as in the racism-lactose example above. Many studies naturally mitigate this concern by using the UK Biobank of mostly white British samples, and by correcting for “principal components” that correspond to ancestry (and there are other, even more complicated ways to correct for this). But ancestry variation is fractal; no matter how uniform your sample, there will still be micro-differences you didn’t consider. For example, if you’re analyzing the educational attainment of white British people, it’s very relevant that families with Norman surnames still outperform their Saxon peers at Oxbridge admissions 900 years after William the Conqueror. If Britons with more Norman ancestry have non-education-related genes that their Saxon peers lack, these could be mistakenly classified as genes for education or other behavioral differences between the two groups. Assortative mating: Suppose that both height and wealth are desirable qualities in a mate. Then tall people will tend to marry rich people, and over generations, the same people will be both rich and tall. That means that even if wealth is 0% genetic, a study looking for “the gene for wealth” will be able to find genes that rich people have more often than poor people - namely, the genes for height. Or suppose that smart people tend to marry other smart people - surely true, if only because so many couples meet at college. Then all the intelligence genes will concentrate in the same people. So any study that tries to determine how much Intelligence Gene ABC affects intelligence will get inflated4 results, because everyone with Intelligence Gene ABC will also have many other intelligence genes - if the study naively asks “How much smarter are people with Gene ABC than people without it?”, it will find they are much smarter (because it’s accidentally including part of the effects of all the other intelligence genes that travel along with it). Parent-to-child transmission, aka “genetic nurture”: Children tend to share their parents’ genes. So if there’s a gene that causes parents to create a certain kind of childrearing environment, and that childrearing environment affects a trait, it will falsely look like a gene that directly causes the trait. Suppose Gene XYZ causes parents to read more books to their children, and reading books to children increases their IQ. Parents with Gene XYZ will tend to read books, so their kids will get high IQ. Those kids will also (probably) inherit Gene XYZ from their parents. So people with Gene XYZ will tend to have higher IQ. If you naively study which genes increase IQ, you’ll see Gene XYZ in more smart people than dumb people, and think it’s a “gene for IQ”. This is “causal” in a certain sense, but it’s not the one we traditionally think about, and it behaves importantly differently - for example, if you genetically engineer someone to have Gene XYZ, their IQ won’t go up (although their kids’ IQs might). How can we tell if a polygenic predictor is “direct” vs. confounded by these non-causal pathways? The most common technique is within-family comparisons: do the traditional “check if people with the gene differ on a trait from people without the gene” study, but limit its focus to (for example) sibling pairs. Suppose a couple has two children; the first child inherits Gene ABC and the second one doesn’t. If the first child is smarter than the second child, that provides some infinitesimal evidence that Gene ABC is a gene for intelligence. Repeat this process over hundreds of thousands of sibling pairs, and the infinitesimal evidence can reach statistical significance. Since the family unit is a perfect natural experiment that isolates the variable of interest (genes) while holding everything else (culture and parenting) constant, within-family results are protected against stratification, assortative mating, and genetic nurture effects. The culmination of this research program is Tan et al 2024, which finds that many polygenic predictors lose significant accuracy when retested among siblings. For example, educational attainment is 50% uncorrelated with direct genetic effects. You need to square this to figure out what percent is causal; when you do that, you find that the polygenic score that explained 14% of EA is only 4%pp direct genes, with the other 10%pp being nondirect5 confounders. So yes, it seems like most polygenic scores that don’t validate within families are confounded. However unhappy we previously were that we had only found 14% of genes for EA (vs. 40% expected), we should now be much more unhappy - we really only know 4% of genes that directly cause EA. On the other hand, you might say - so before we only knew 14%pp out of 40%. Now we only know 4%pp out of 40%. This is discouraging, but it doesn’t fundamentally change what we know about nature vs. nurture. Both 4%pp and 14%pp are less than 40% - with either number, we must be missing something or doing something wrong. Probably that’s insufficient sample size. We’ll keep working on sample size and other things, and eventually scrounge up the missing 26%pp or 36%pp or whatever of the variance, so this doesn’t change anything. All it means is that one predictive method that the average person never knew about in the first place doesn’t work as well as we thought. Who cares? Not doctors. So far this research has only just barely begun to reach the clinic. But also, all doctors want to do is predict things (like heart attack risk). They don’t care if they use causal vs. nondirect genes. It doesn’t matter if you’re “only” at higher risk of heart attack because you’re black, or Norman, or because your parents read books to you - you still need more heart attack medication! Polygenic embryo selection companies should care. They offer polygenic scores that can be used to select healthier or smarter embryos. If the predictors they use rely partly on variants that aren’t causal within families, their real benefits could be far lower than advertised. I talked to one of these companies, who said they’d already adjusted for these effects and expected their competitors had too - the proper antidote to this problem, sibling controls, is a natural choice when you’re literally picking between siblings. The biggest losers are the epidemiologists. They had started using polygenic predictors as a novel randomization method; suppose, for example, you wanted to study whether smoking causes Alzheimers. If you just checked how many smokers vs. nonsmokers got Alzheimers, your result would be vulnerable to bias; maybe poor people smoke more and get more Alzheimers. But (they hoped) you might be able to check whether people with the genes for smoking get more Alzheimers. Poverty can’t make you have more or fewer genes! This was a neat idea, but if the polygenic predictors are wrong about which genes cause smoking and what effect size they have, then the less careful among these results will need to be re-examined. But the reason I spent so much time on the subject here is that this has confused a lot of people into thinking heritability itself was confounded and is actually just 4%. When I read my first few blog posts on these findings, I came away thinking they were claiming to have discredited twin studies and heritability. And although I take partial ownership of my own poor reading comprehension, I maintain that the way that the new anti-hereditarians discuss this is pretty bad. For example, Turkheimer’s treatment of the Tan study above is called Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, and includes passages like: The median [direct genomic effect] heritability for behavioral phenotypes is .048. Let that sink in for a second. How different would the modern history of behavior genetics be if back in the 80s one study after another had shown that the heritability of behavior was around .05? When Arthur Jensen wrote about IQ, he usually used a figure of .8 for the heritability of intelligence. I know that the relationship between twin heritabilities and SNP heritabilities is complicated, and in fact the DGE heritability of ability is one of the higher ones, at .2336. But still, it seems to me that the appropriate conclusion from these results is that among people who don’t have an identical twin, genomic information is a statistically non-zero but all in all relatively minor contributor to behavioral differences. And comments included things like: I don’t know if [this study] is the end of social science genomics, but it should certainly be the end of attributing significant genetic influence to behavioral traits (despite the recent scientist-generated cartoons touting genes for “income”). And: There's no doubt that this reported findings have dealt a fatal blow to my conviction that behavioral traits are pre-eminently heritable…This is a remarkable example of an objective statistical fact mercilessly crushing the more subjective experiential sense of "A looks and acts more like B than C because A and B have the same parents." This subjective evidence is almost unshakable and universal in its application as a tried and tested psychosocial heuristic. And yet, here we are. Turkheimer is either misstating the relationship between polygenic scores and narrow-sense heritability, or at least egging on some very confused people who are doing that, and the dynamic was bad enough that I got confused myself for a while. But even more confusing, the new anti-hereditarians actually are saying that lots of behavioral traits have very low heritability! But this point requires different arguments, only tangentially related to these. So let’s move on to… Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 1: GWAS & GREML) In the mid 2010s, when genome-wide association studies (GWAS) based polygenic predictors were getting better every year, it was easy to hope they might reach 40% and close the “missing heritability”. But since then, progress has stalled. The second-to-last tripling of sample size, from 300K to 1M between 2016 - 2018, increased predictive power from 6% → 12%. The last tripling, from 1M to 3M between 2018 - 2022, only increased predictive power from 12% → 14%. If you graph sample size vs. predictive power, it looks like there's an asymptote between 15 - 20% or so. (of which - remember - only 5% is directly causal!) Worse, a mid-2010s technique called GREML allowed researchers to estimate the percent of variance in a trait that comes from the sorts of common genes studied in GWAS, without having to identify the genes involved. A 2016 GREML paper suggested that the maximum share of variance that GWASs of educational attainment could ever discover was about 21% (again, compared to 40% predicted genetic from twin studies). Since unavoidable methodological issues will prevent GWASs from reaching the literal maximum possible, this agrees with the evidence suggesting an asymptote between 15 - 20%. So either twin studies are wrong and traits are less heritable than believed, or the heritability must lie somewhere other than the common genes identifiable by GWAS. What about rare genes? GWASs focus on genetic variation common enough to be worth including in a basic genetic test. Most of this is single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”). A single nucleotide is one letter of DNA - for example, a C or a G. Polymorphisms are genes that commonly vary in humans - sometimes across races (for example, some humans have a gene for light skin, and other humans have a gene for dark skin), and other times within races (for example, some white people have a gene that makes cilantro taste like soap, and others don’t). So SNPs are single-letter spots in DNA where different people often have different letters. How often? Some people say 1%, but the more practical definition is “often enough that someone has noticed and added it to the test panel”. There are three billion letters in the genome, of which only a few million are commonly-tested SNPs. But these SNP studies have limited7 ability to measure personal mutations and rare variants. Sometimes your parents’ egg and sperm cells mess up copying a nucleotide of DNA, and you get a mutation that isn’t inherited from your ethnic group or even from your subgroup/family line - it’s just some idiosyncratic DNA change that you might be the first person in history to have. Since scientists have never seen this mutation before, they don’t know about it and can’t test for it without doing something more expensive than a simple SNP screen. And SNP studies have limited ability to detect anything more complicated than a single letter changing to another single letter. But some mutations are more complicated structural variants. For example, some bits of DNA get stuck on repeat - one person might have GATGAT, another person might have GATGATGATGAT, and a third person might have fifty GATs in a row. Other bits come out backwards. Sometimes a whole chunk of DNA goes missing, or moves to the wrong place. Occasionally a gene reads The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins, takes it too seriously, and evolves some ridiculous trick for spamming itself all over the genome. So if even the best molecular studies seem to be asymptoting around 15-20% of variance in educational attainment, but twin studies suggest it’s 40% genetic, might rare variants and structural variants make up the missing 20-25%pp? This remains a topic of bitter disagreement. On the one side, hereditarians bring up a Darwinian argument: imagine a genetic engineer who hopes to find the genes for educational attainment and edit them to make everyone smart and successful. She looks harder and harder, becoming more and more exasperated as they fail to materialize. Finally, she realizes she’s been scooped: evolution has been working on the same project, and has a 100,000 year head start. In the context of intense, recent selection for intelligence, we should expect evolution to have already found (and eliminated) the most straightforward, easy-to-find genes for low intelligence. Therefore, everything left should be convoluted or hidden or impossible to work with. So although this requires a sort of god-of-the-gaps argument - where we keep pushing heritability into whatever genes are too weird for existing techniques to detect - there are some reasons to think God really is in the gaps here. And a 2017 paper uses some clever techniques to estimate the share of intelligence variation lurking in hard-to-measure genes and finds it’s more than half: “By capturing these additional genetic effects, our models closely approximate the heritability estimates from twin studies for intelligence and education.” (see also Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024) The anti-hereditarians disagree. They cite papers like Zeng which measure the strength of selection on intelligence and suggest that it’s too weak to concentrate so much of the variation in rare genes8. And Sasha Gusev mentions Weiner 2023, which finds that in fact rare variants “explain 1.3% (SE = 0.03%) of phenotypic variance on average – much less than common variants” (other experts say that burden heritability only captures some rare variants and is not the right tool for this problem). But it may not even matter, because another set of findings suggests that heritability is genuinely low even when the rare variants are counted. Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 2: Sib-Regression and RDR) Two newer methods, Sib-Regression and RDR, ask: using what we know from genetic studies, how much genetic variation do we think exists, total, across both common and rare genes? On average siblings share 50% of genes. But there’s a little randomness in meiosis, so some siblings might share 40% and others might share 60%. The more genetic influence on a trait, the more similar sibling pairs who share 60% of their genes will be, compared to sibling pairs who only share 40% of their genes. Since 60%-gene siblings and 40%-gene siblings are both equally part of the same family, you can use these numbers to calculate heritability unconfounded by a range of family factors. This is Sib-Regression. If you do a more complicated statistical process to extend the same idea to relatives other than siblings, it’s relatedness disequilibrium regression or RDR. GWAS asks: Looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation in a trait have we explained right now? GREML asks: looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation could we ever explain? But sib-regression and RDR ask a question more like twin studies: considering all genes, whether common / rare / easy-to-study / hard-to-study, how much variation is there total? This could address the rare variant objection mentioned above. And in many ways, these techniques are better than twin studies - Sib-Regression eliminates many potential biases, and RDR eliminates even more (although it’s harder to pull off, requiring more genetic information and computational resources). These techniques are new and hard-to-use, and only a few published studies have applied them to the sorts of behavioral traits we’re interested in: Young et al (2018) did Sib-Regression and RDR to genetic data from Iceland. Sib-regression found educational attainment = 40% (±15%) heritable, and RDR found 17% (±9%) heritable. Kemper et al (2021) did Sib-Regression only to genetic data from Britain. It found educational attainment = 14% heritable. This number conflicts with the 40% from the Young paper. Why? Unclear, but it could be selection bias - Young’s Icelandic sample was representative of the country; Kemper’s British population were Biobank volunteers who tend tend to be healthier and higher-class than the population at large. Upper-class people may have restricted range in educational attainment, or different factors affecting their educational attainment compared to the overall population. Either way, these are closer to the low estimates from GWAS and GREML (7% direct, 20% total), than to the higher estimates from twin studies (40%, generally presumed direct). And we can no longer use contributions from rare variants to paper over the difference. So what is going on? It seems like we have to accept one of three possibilities: Either something is wrong with twin studies. Or something is wrong with Sib-Regression and RDR (and then we can explain away GWAS and GREML by saying they’re missing rare variants). Or something is wrong with how we’re thinking about this topic and comparing things. What’s Going On? (Part 1: Is Something Wrong With Twin Studies?) Twin studies have dominated discussion of behavioral genetics for decades, so there’s a vast literature investigating their various assumptions and whether something might be wrong with them. Here are some of the assumptions and what the research says about each. Some of these will be duplicates of the GWAS confounders above, but we’ll go through them again anyway to review how they apply to twins. 1: Parents Treat Fraternal And Identical Twins The Same: Twin studies claim that twins are a uniquely powerful genetic laboratory; both fraternal and identical twin pairs have equally concordant environments, but identical twins have more concordant genes. Therefore, the more similar identical twin pairs are relative to fraternal twin pairs, the more heritable a trait must be. But this conclusion falls apart if identical twin pairs actually have more similar environments than fraternal twin pairs do, maybe because parents (knowing their twins are identical) treat them more similarly than they would fraternal twins. Would-be twin-study-discreditors have been trying to argue that this must be true for decades, but it’s always been a kind of quixotic battle. Remember, twin studies find many behavioral traits like IQ are >60% heritable, so you would need to prove not only that parents treat identical twin pairs differently from fraternal, but that this was an overwhelming effect. Parents of identical twins would have to obsessively expose them to the exact same stimuli in the exact same order; parents of fraternal twins would have to send one to the Gifted Advanced Placement Acceleration program while locking the other in a box and force-feeding them lead pellets. Common sense tells us there are no such differences, and studies confirm this: when parents are wrong about their twins’ status (eg they have fraternal twins, but falsely think they’re identical, or vice versa) their trait similarity matches their real status, rather than the incorrect status that determined how their parents treat them; parental treatment explains less than 1% of why identical twin pairs are more concordant (2, 3, 4). See also Felson 2013, which tries to measure environmental similarity and adjust for it, with minimal effects. Are these two cuties monozygotic or dizygotic? Are you sure? (answer) 2: Fraternal And Identical Twins Have Equally Concordant Uterine Environments: Fraternal twins have different sacs in the uterus and use different placentas. Most identical twins share a placenta, and some share an amniotic sac. If trait similarity is caused by sharing a placenta or sac (maybe because the placenta is defective, the fetal brain is starved of nutrients, and so the person has a lower IQ when they grow up), twin studies would falsely read this identical-fraternal difference as genetic. Luckily this is easy to study; not all identical twins share a placenta or sac, so you can cleanly separate the effect of uterine environment from genetics. If you measure enough traits, you can find small deviations in some, but it’s not clear whether this is just multiple testing, and in any case the deviations are small. The best studies suggest this chips off somewhere between 0 - 3% from heritability estimates9. 3: There is little assortative mating: We discussed this one above in the earlier section on GWAS - smart/pretty/kind/whatever people tend to marry other smart/pretty/kind/whatever people. Why would this bias twin study results? Identical twins share 100% of their genes. Fraternal twins ought to share 50% of their genes - but they get half their genes from their mother, and half from their father. In the degenerate case where the mother and father have exactly the same genes (“would you have sex with your clone?”) even fraternal twins will be extremely similar (although not quite identical, since they’ll get different alleles from each clone). In the more plausible case where mothers and fathers are just a little more alike than chance (eg because smart people tend to marry other smart people), fraternal twins will share a genetic tendency towards a trait somewhat more than their 50% shared genes suggest. Since this makes fraternal twin pairs more (genetically) like identical twin pairs, and twin studies assess heritability as the difference in fraternal-identical-twin-pair concordance, this bias would make twin studies underestimate heritability. But this is the opposite of what you would need to “discredit” twin studies - if this bias is true, then everything is more genetic than twin studies think. And unlike the previous two biases, this one seems real and important, so much so that when you adjust for it, the heritability of educational attainment rises from ~40% to ~50%. I’m only mentioning this one here because some anti-hereditarians argue that you can’t trust twin studies because of assortative mating, without mentioning that this can only bias them down. 4: Population stratification: This is often large and worth worrying about, but it applies to identical and fraternal twin pairs equally, and doesn’t bias twin study heritability estimates much (though it might shift the balance between shared and non-shared environment). See eg the sentence around footnote 30 here. 5: Non-additive / “interaction” effects: These are theoretically interesting, but all research thus far has found they are minimal (1, 2). Some experts think this may miss rarer or harder-to-find interactions; we’ll return to this later. 6: “Genetic nurture”, parent-to-child Mentioned above: if there is a gene for reading books to kids, and reading books raises IQ, it will look like a “gene for IQ”. This isn’t as relevant to twin study estimates of heritability, since both identical twins and fraternal twins are equally related to their parents, and any trait caused by genetic nurture wouldn’t differ between them (and therefore would not falsely appear heritable in this design). Rather, they would appear as shared environment. 7: “Genetic nurture”, sibling-to-sibling That is, suppose your sibling’s traits influence your own development. For example, suppose your sibling has a gene that makes them sabotage your schoolwork, causing you to fail and drop out of school early. An identical twin would share this gene with their sibling more often than a fraternal twin, making it look like a “gene for doing badly at school” (since the people who have it do worse at school than those who don’t). Why are we even talking about this? Do we really think it’s a big part of the variance in behavioral traits? Challenging twin study heritability estimates through this route requires inhabiting a weird no-man’s-land where otherwise-invisible genetic and environmental pathways suddenly flare up when you say the magic words “it was done by a sibling”. For example, this requires a strong effect of shared environment - that is, your educational attainment has to depend on whether you’re being sabotaged or not. But in general, shared environmental effects are weak. And it requires a strong effect of genes - that is, this mechanism only works if your sibling’s tendency to sabotage you is highly genetically determined. But we’re deploying this claim to deny that traits like IQ or educational attainment are highly genetically determined. So to get much out of this, the tendency to sabotage siblings would have to be more genetic than other behavioral traits! The reason this convoluted possibility gets brought up so often is that, unlike the more plausible parent-to-child genetic nurture, twin studies can’t rule it out. So if you really want to deny twin studies, this is one of your best bets. But when investigated, this has effects indistinguishable from zero. I’ve been a bit mean in this whole section, because people really like to dismiss twin studies as “Oh, don’t you know, those depend on assumptions, I bet you never considered that assumptions might be wrong”, and then Gish Gallop you with different assumptions until you give up. But scientists have actually done a lot of really good work checking the assumptions and they mostly hold. An alternative way of validating twin studies (brought up by Noah Carl in this article) is to check them against their close cousins, adoption studies and pedigree studies. Pedigree studies investigate large family trees, and check how trait similarity decreases with genetic distance. They avoid twin specific biases (like different treatment of fraternal vs. identical twin pairs, or different prenatal environments), while adding others like assortative mating. Here are the heritabilities of IQ and EA found in pedigree studies10 (see footnote for sources and caveats, and see also here and here for somewhat similar designs): Adoption studies investigate whether adoptees’ traits are more correlated with their adoptive or biological parents. They avoid a large swathe of biases, at the risk of introducing new adoption-related biases of their own (like the possibility that agencies deliberately place adoptive children with parents who are culturally or behaviorally similar, or the possibility that adoptees were adopted late enough to still get some shared environment from their biological parents). Here are the findings of some of the largest and best11: Both straightforwardly confirmed the larger heritability numbers found in twin studies. I would add the evidence from some less formal “adoption studies”12. During residency, I spent a few months working in a child psychiatric hospital for the worst of the worst - kids who committed murder or rape or something before age 18. Many of these children had similar stories: they were taken from their parents just after birth because the parents were criminals/drug addicts/in jail/abusing them. Then they were adopted out to some extremely nice Christian family whose church told them that God wanted them to help poor little children in need. Then they promptly proceeded to commit crime / get addicted to drugs / go to jail / abuse people, all while those families’ biological children were goody-goodies who never got so much as a school detention. When I met with the families, they would always be surprised that things had gone so badly, insisting that they’d raised them exactly like their own son/daughter and taught them good Christian morals. I had to resist the urge to shove a pile of twin studies in their face. This has left me convinced that behavioral traits are highly heritable to a level that it would be hard for any study to contradict. Ultimate source here. Although the study is confusing about this, I think it’s trying to say that almost 90% of subjects were adopted before age 2. But I don’t think studies do contradict this. Given the degree to which their assumptions have been validated, and the level of confirmation from pedigree and adoption studies, I think they have earned a presumption of accuracy. Doubting the twin studies doesn’t seem like a promising route to reconciling the twin-vs-Sib-Regression/RDR discrepancy. What’s Going On? (Part 2: Is Something Wrong With Sib-Regression And RDR?) Sib-Regression is a clever way of avoiding most biases. Its independent variable - the degree to which some sibling pairs end up with slightly more shared genes than others - is even more random and exogenous than the difference between fraternal and identical twins. It can sometimes have biases related to assortative mating (which would falsely push heritability down), but otherwise it’s pretty good. RDR has many of the same advantages, and allows more diverse relationships and so larger sample sizes. It’s hard to think of ways these methods could be wildly off. There is one caveat: although RDR includes most of the rare and structural variants missed by GWAS, in theory it can miss certain ultra-rare variants which are so uncommon that they aren’t shared between some of the relative pairs used in RDR. De novo variants that occurred during the subject’s own conception would be in this category, if the subject didn’t have children or didn’t pass on that gene13. This seems like a pretty small subcategory of genetic variation, and I wouldn’t normally expect that much of importance to be hiding here, but maybe it’s more important than it seems. RDR also doesn’t include much variance caused by statistical interactions between genes. Although we said above that these are usually found to be insignificant, they might be more important in a trait like intelligence that has been under recent evolutionary selection that lops off easily-detectable sources of variance and leaves only the weird obscure ones behind. There’s limited ability for classical Mendelian dominance to affect common variants, but more complicated genetic interactions might still prove important. Overall these are strong methods, and their failure to converge is troubling. If forced to explain them away, we might tell a story like: So far, there is only one RDR study and a few Sib-Regression studies, so we should wait for more data before updating too hard.

For example, educational attainment is 50% uncorrelated with direct genetic effects. You need to square this to figure out what percent is causal; when you do that, you find that the polygenic score that explained 14% of EA is only 4%pp direct genes, with the other 10%pp being nondirect5 confounders. So yes, it seems like most polygenic scores that don’t validate within families are confounded. However unhappy we previously were that we had only found 14% of genes for EA (vs. 40% expected), we should now be much more unhappy - we really only know 4% of genes that directly cause EA. On the other hand, you might say - so before we only knew 14%pp out of 40%. Now we only know 4%pp out of 40%. This is discouraging, but it doesn’t fundamentally change what we know about nature vs. nurture. Both 4%pp and 14%pp are less than 40% - with either number, we must be missing something or doing something wrong. Probably that’s insufficient sample size. We’ll keep working on sample size and other things, and eventually scrounge up the missing 26%pp or 36%pp or whatever of the variance, so this doesn’t change anything. All it means is that one predictive method that the average person never knew about in the first place doesn’t work as well as we thought. Who cares? Not doctors. So far this research has only just barely begun to reach the clinic. But also, all doctors want to do is predict things (like heart attack risk). They don’t care if they use causal vs. nondirect genes. It doesn’t matter if you’re “only” at higher risk of heart attack because you’re black, or Norman, or because your parents read books to you - you still need more heart attack medication! Polygenic embryo selection companies should care. They offer polygenic scores that can be used to select healthier or smarter embryos. If the predictors they use rely partly on variants that aren’t causal within families, their real benefits could be far lower than advertised. I talked to one of these companies, who said they’d already adjusted for these effects and expected their competitors had too - the proper antidote to this problem, sibling controls, is a natural choice when you’re literally picking between siblings. The biggest losers are the epidemiologists. They had started using polygenic predictors as a novel randomization method; suppose, for example, you wanted to study whether smoking causes Alzheimers. If you just checked how many smokers vs. nonsmokers got Alzheimers, your result would be vulnerable to bias; maybe poor people smoke more and get more Alzheimers. But (they hoped) you might be able to check whether people with the genes for smoking get more Alzheimers. Poverty can’t make you have more or fewer genes! This was a neat idea, but if the polygenic predictors are wrong about which genes cause smoking and what effect size they have, then the less careful among these results will need to be re-examined. But the reason I spent so much time on the subject here is that this has confused a lot of people into thinking heritability itself was confounded and is actually just 4%. When I read my first few blog posts on these findings, I came away thinking they were claiming to have discredited twin studies and heritability. And although I take partial ownership of my own poor reading comprehension, I maintain that the way that the new anti-hereditarians discuss this is pretty bad. For example, Turkheimer’s treatment of the Tan study above is called Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomics?, and includes passages like: The median [direct genomic effect] heritability for behavioral phenotypes is .048. Let that sink in for a second. How different would the modern history of behavior genetics be if back in the 80s one study after another had shown that the heritability of behavior was around .05? When Arthur Jensen wrote about IQ, he usually used a figure of .8 for the heritability of intelligence. I know that the relationship between twin heritabilities and SNP heritabilities is complicated, and in fact the DGE heritability of ability is one of the higher ones, at .2336. But still, it seems to me that the appropriate conclusion from these results is that among people who don’t have an identical twin, genomic information is a statistically non-zero but all in all relatively minor contributor to behavioral differences. And comments included things like: I don’t know if [this study] is the end of social science genomics, but it should certainly be the end of attributing significant genetic influence to behavioral traits (despite the recent scientist-generated cartoons touting genes for “income”). And: There's no doubt that this reported findings have dealt a fatal blow to my conviction that behavioral traits are pre-eminently heritable…This is a remarkable example of an objective statistical fact mercilessly crushing the more subjective experiential sense of "A looks and acts more like B than C because A and B have the same parents." This subjective evidence is almost unshakable and universal in its application as a tried and tested psychosocial heuristic. And yet, here we are. Turkheimer is either misstating the relationship between polygenic scores and narrow-sense heritability, or at least egging on some very confused people who are doing that, and the dynamic was bad enough that I got confused myself for a while. But even more confusing, the new anti-hereditarians actually are saying that lots of behavioral traits have very low heritability! But this point requires different arguments, only tangentially related to these. So let’s move on to… Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 1: GWAS & GREML) In the mid 2010s, when genome-wide association studies (GWAS) based polygenic predictors were getting better every year, it was easy to hope they might reach 40% and close the “missing heritability”. But since then, progress has stalled. The second-to-last tripling of sample size, from 300K to 1M between 2016 - 2018, increased predictive power from 6% → 12%. The last tripling, from 1M to 3M between 2018 - 2022, only increased predictive power from 12% → 14%. If you graph sample size vs. predictive power, it looks like there's an asymptote between 15 - 20% or so. (of which - remember - only 5% is directly causal!) Worse, a mid-2010s technique called GREML allowed researchers to estimate the percent of variance in a trait that comes from the sorts of common genes studied in GWAS, without having to identify the genes involved. A 2016 GREML paper suggested that the maximum share of variance that GWASs of educational attainment could ever discover was about 21% (again, compared to 40% predicted genetic from twin studies). Since unavoidable methodological issues will prevent GWASs from reaching the literal maximum possible, this agrees with the evidence suggesting an asymptote between 15 - 20%. So either twin studies are wrong and traits are less heritable than believed, or the heritability must lie somewhere other than the common genes identifiable by GWAS. What about rare genes? GWASs focus on genetic variation common enough to be worth including in a basic genetic test. Most of this is single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”). A single nucleotide is one letter of DNA - for example, a C or a G. Polymorphisms are genes that commonly vary in humans - sometimes across races (for example, some humans have a gene for light skin, and other humans have a gene for dark skin), and other times within races (for example, some white people have a gene that makes cilantro taste like soap, and others don’t). So SNPs are single-letter spots in DNA where different people often have different letters. How often? Some people say 1%, but the more practical definition is “often enough that someone has noticed and added it to the test panel”. There are three billion letters in the genome, of which only a few million are commonly-tested SNPs. But these SNP studies have limited7 ability to measure personal mutations and rare variants. Sometimes your parents’ egg and sperm cells mess up copying a nucleotide of DNA, and you get a mutation that isn’t inherited from your ethnic group or even from your subgroup/family line - it’s just some idiosyncratic DNA change that you might be the first person in history to have. Since scientists have never seen this mutation before, they don’t know about it and can’t test for it without doing something more expensive than a simple SNP screen. And SNP studies have limited ability to detect anything more complicated than a single letter changing to another single letter. But some mutations are more complicated structural variants. For example, some bits of DNA get stuck on repeat - one person might have GATGAT, another person might have GATGATGATGAT, and a third person might have fifty GATs in a row. Other bits come out backwards. Sometimes a whole chunk of DNA goes missing, or moves to the wrong place. Occasionally a gene reads The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins, takes it too seriously, and evolves some ridiculous trick for spamming itself all over the genome. So if even the best molecular studies seem to be asymptoting around 15-20% of variance in educational attainment, but twin studies suggest it’s 40% genetic, might rare variants and structural variants make up the missing 20-25%pp? This remains a topic of bitter disagreement. On the one side, hereditarians bring up a Darwinian argument: imagine a genetic engineer who hopes to find the genes for educational attainment and edit them to make everyone smart and successful. She looks harder and harder, becoming more and more exasperated as they fail to materialize. Finally, she realizes she’s been scooped: evolution has been working on the same project, and has a 100,000 year head start. In the context of intense, recent selection for intelligence, we should expect evolution to have already found (and eliminated) the most straightforward, easy-to-find genes for low intelligence. Therefore, everything left should be convoluted or hidden or impossible to work with. So although this requires a sort of god-of-the-gaps argument - where we keep pushing heritability into whatever genes are too weird for existing techniques to detect - there are some reasons to think God really is in the gaps here. And a 2017 paper uses some clever techniques to estimate the share of intelligence variation lurking in hard-to-measure genes and finds it’s more than half: “By capturing these additional genetic effects, our models closely approximate the heritability estimates from twin studies for intelligence and education.” (see also Wainschtein 2022, Sidorenko 2024) The anti-hereditarians disagree. They cite papers like Zeng which measure the strength of selection on intelligence and suggest that it’s too weak to concentrate so much of the variation in rare genes8. And Sasha Gusev mentions Weiner 2023, which finds that in fact rare variants “explain 1.3% (SE = 0.03%) of phenotypic variance on average – much less than common variants” (other experts say that burden heritability only captures some rare variants and is not the right tool for this problem). But it may not even matter, because another set of findings suggests that heritability is genuinely low even when the rare variants are counted. Is Heritability Genuinely Low? (Part 2: Sib-Regression and RDR) Two newer methods, Sib-Regression and RDR, ask: using what we know from genetic studies, how much genetic variation do we think exists, total, across both common and rare genes? On average siblings share 50% of genes. But there’s a little randomness in meiosis, so some siblings might share 40% and others might share 60%. The more genetic influence on a trait, the more similar sibling pairs who share 60% of their genes will be, compared to sibling pairs who only share 40% of their genes. Since 60%-gene siblings and 40%-gene siblings are both equally part of the same family, you can use these numbers to calculate heritability unconfounded by a range of family factors. This is Sib-Regression. If you do a more complicated statistical process to extend the same idea to relatives other than siblings, it’s relatedness disequilibrium regression or RDR. GWAS asks: Looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation in a trait have we explained right now? GREML asks: looking at common easy-to-study genes, how much variation could we ever explain? But sib-regression and RDR ask a question more like twin studies: considering all genes, whether common / rare / easy-to-study / hard-to-study, how much variation is there total? This could address the rare variant objection mentioned above. And in many ways, these techniques are better than twin studies - Sib-Regression eliminates many potential biases, and RDR eliminates even more (although it’s harder to pull off, requiring more genetic information and computational resources). These techniques are new and hard-to-use, and only a few published studies have applied them to the sorts of behavioral traits we’re interested in: Young et al (2018) did Sib-Regression and RDR to genetic data from Iceland. Sib-regression found educational attainment = 40% (±15%) heritable, and RDR found 17% (±9%) heritable. Kemper et al (2021) did Sib-Regression only to genetic data from Britain. It found educational attainment = 14% heritable. This number conflicts with the 40% from the Young paper. Why? Unclear, but it could be selection bias - Young’s Icelandic sample was representative of the country; Kemper’s British population were Biobank volunteers who tend tend to be healthier and higher-class than the population at large. Upper-class people may have restricted range in educational attainment, or different factors affecting their educational attainment compared to the overall population. Either way, these are closer to the low estimates from GWAS and GREML (7% direct, 20% total), than to the higher estimates from twin studies (40%, generally presumed direct). And we can no longer use contributions from rare variants to paper over the difference. So what is going on? It seems like we have to accept one of three possibilities: Either something is wrong with twin studies. Or something is wrong with Sib-Regression and RDR (and then we can explain away GWAS and GREML by saying they’re missing rare variants). Or something is wrong with how we’re thinking about this topic and comparing things. What’s Going On? (Part 1: Is Something Wrong With Twin Studies?) Twin studies have dominated discussion of behavioral genetics for decades, so there’s a vast literature investigating their various assumptions and whether something might be wrong with them. Here are some of the assumptions and what the research says about each. Some of these will be duplicates of the GWAS confounders above, but we’ll go through them again anyway to review how they apply to twins. 1: Parents Treat Fraternal And Identical Twins The Same: Twin studies claim that twins are a uniquely powerful genetic laboratory; both fraternal and identical twin pairs have equally concordant environments, but identical twins have more concordant genes. Therefore, the more similar identical twin pairs are relative to fraternal twin pairs, the more heritable a trait must be. But this conclusion falls apart if identical twin pairs actually have more similar environments than fraternal twin pairs do, maybe because parents (knowing their twins are identical) treat them more similarly than they would fraternal twins. Would-be twin-study-discreditors have been trying to argue that this must be true for decades, but it’s always been a kind of quixotic battle. Remember, twin studies find many behavioral traits like IQ are >60% heritable, so you would need to prove not only that parents treat identical twin pairs differently from fraternal, but that this was an overwhelming effect. Parents of identical twins would have to obsessively expose them to the exact same stimuli in the exact same order; parents of fraternal twins would have to send one to the Gifted Advanced Placement Acceleration program while locking the other in a box and force-feeding them lead pellets. Common sense tells us there are no such differences, and studies confirm this: when parents are wrong about their twins’ status (eg they have fraternal twins, but falsely think they’re identical, or vice versa) their trait similarity matches their real status, rather than the incorrect status that determined how their parents treat them; parental treatment explains less than 1% of why identical twin pairs are more concordant (2, 3, 4). See also Felson 2013, which tries to measure environmental similarity and adjust for it, with minimal effects. Are these two cuties monozygotic or dizygotic? Are you sure? (answer) 2: Fraternal And Identical Twins Have Equally Concordant Uterine Environments: Fraternal twins have different sacs in the uterus and use different placentas. Most identical twins share a placenta, and some share an amniotic sac. If trait similarity is caused by sharing a placenta or sac (maybe because the placenta is defective, the fetal brain is starved of nutrients, and so the person has a lower IQ when they grow up), twin studies would falsely read this identical-fraternal difference as genetic. Luckily this is easy to study; not all identical twins share a placenta or sac, so you can cleanly separate the effect of uterine environment from genetics. If you measure enough traits, you can find small deviations in some, but it’s not clear whether this is just multiple testing, and in any case the deviations are small. The best studies suggest this chips off somewhere between 0 - 3% from heritability estimates9. 3: There is little assortative mating: We discussed this one above in the earlier section on GWAS - smart/pretty/kind/whatever people tend to marry other smart/pretty/kind/whatever people. Why would this bias twin study results? Identical twins share 100% of their genes. Fraternal twins ought to share 50% of their genes - but they get half their genes from their mother, and half from their father. In the degenerate case where the mother and father have exactly the same genes (“would you have sex with your clone?”) even fraternal twins will be extremely similar (although not quite identical, since they’ll get different alleles from each clone). In the more plausible case where mothers and fathers are just a little more alike than chance (eg because smart people tend to marry other smart people), fraternal twins will share a genetic tendency towards a trait somewhat more than their 50% shared genes suggest. Since this makes fraternal twin pairs more (genetically) like identical twin pairs, and twin studies assess heritability as the difference in fraternal-identical-twin-pair concordance, this bias would make twin studies underestimate heritability. But this is the opposite of what you would need to “discredit” twin studies - if this bias is true, then everything is more genetic than twin studies think. And unlike the previous two biases, this one seems real and important, so much so that when you adjust for it, the heritability of educational attainment rises from ~40% to ~50%. I’m only mentioning this one here because some anti-hereditarians argue that you can’t trust twin studies because of assortative mating, without mentioning that this can only bias them down. 4: Population stratification: This is often large and worth worrying about, but it applies to identical and fraternal twin pairs equally, and doesn’t bias twin study heritability estimates much (though it might shift the balance between shared and non-shared environment). See eg the sentence around footnote 30 here. 5: Non-additive / “interaction” effects: These are theoretically interesting, but all research thus far has found they are minimal (1, 2). Some experts think this may miss rarer or harder-to-find interactions; we’ll return to this later. 6: “Genetic nurture”, parent-to-child Mentioned above: if there is a gene for reading books to kids, and reading books raises IQ, it will look like a “gene for IQ”. This isn’t as relevant to twin study estimates of heritability, since both identical twins and fraternal twins are equally related to their parents, and any trait caused by genetic nurture wouldn’t differ between them (and therefore would not falsely appear heritable in this design). Rather, they would appear as shared environment. 7: “Genetic nurture”, sibling-to-sibling That is, suppose your sibling’s traits influence your own development. For example, suppose your sibling has a gene that makes them sabotage your schoolwork, causing you to fail and drop out of school early. An identical twin would share this gene with their sibling more often than a fraternal twin, making it look like a “gene for doing badly at school” (since the people who have it do worse at school than those who don’t). Why are we even talking about this? Do we really think it’s a big part of the variance in behavioral traits? Challenging twin study heritability estimates through this route requires inhabiting a weird no-man’s-land where otherwise-invisible genetic and environmental pathways suddenly flare up when you say the magic words “it was done by a sibling”. For example, this requires a strong effect of shared environment - that is, your educational attainment has to depend on whether you’re being sabotaged or not. But in general, shared environmental effects are weak. And it requires a strong effect of genes - that is, this mechanism only works if your sibling’s tendency to sabotage you is highly genetically determined. But we’re deploying this claim to deny that traits like IQ or educational attainment are highly genetically determined. So to get much out of this, the tendency to sabotage siblings would have to be more genetic than other behavioral traits! The reason this convoluted possibility gets brought up so often is that, unlike the more plausible parent-to-child genetic nurture, twin studies can’t rule it out. So if you really want to deny twin studies, this is one of your best bets. But when investigated, this has effects indistinguishable from zero. I’ve been a bit mean in this whole section, because people really like to dismiss twin studies as “Oh, don’t you know, those depend on assumptions, I bet you never considered that assumptions might be wrong”, and then Gish Gallop you with different assumptions until you give up. But scientists have actually done a lot of really good work checking the assumptions and they mostly hold. An alternative way of validating twin studies (brought up by Noah Carl in this article) is to check them against their close cousins, adoption studies and pedigree studies. Pedigree studies investigate large family trees, and check how trait similarity decreases with genetic distance. They avoid twin specific biases (like different treatment of fraternal vs. identical twin pairs, or different prenatal environments), while adding others like assortative mating. Here are the heritabilities of IQ and EA found in pedigree studies10 (see footnote for sources and caveats, and see also here and here for somewhat similar designs): Adoption studies investigate whether adoptees’ traits are more correlated with their adoptive or biological parents. They avoid a large swathe of biases, at the risk of introducing new adoption-related biases of their own (like the possibility that agencies deliberately place adoptive children with parents who are culturally or behaviorally similar, or the possibility that adoptees were adopted late enough to still get some shared environment from their biological parents). Here are the findings of some of the largest and best11: Both straightforwardly confirmed the larger heritability numbers found in twin studies. I would add the evidence from some less formal “adoption studies”12. During residency, I spent a few months working in a child psychiatric hospital for the worst of the worst - kids who committed murder or rape or something before age 18. Many of these children had similar stories: they were taken from their parents just after birth because the parents were criminals/drug addicts/in jail/abusing them. Then they were adopted out to some extremely nice Christian family whose church told them that God wanted them to help poor little children in need. Then they promptly proceeded to commit crime / get addicted to drugs / go to jail / abuse people, all while those families’ biological children were goody-goodies who never got so much as a school detention. When I met with the families, they would always be surprised that things had gone so badly, insisting that they’d raised them exactly like their own son/daughter and taught them good Christian morals. I had to resist the urge to shove a pile of twin studies in their face. This has left me convinced that behavioral traits are highly heritable to a level that it would be hard for any study to contradict. Ultimate source here. Although the study is confusing about this, I think it’s trying to say that almost 90% of subjects were adopted before age 2. But I don’t think studies do contradict this. Given the degree to which their assumptions have been validated, and the level of confirmation from pedigree and adoption studies, I think they have earned a presumption of accuracy. Doubting the twin studies doesn’t seem like a promising route to reconciling the twin-vs-Sib-Regression/RDR discrepancy. What’s Going On? (Part 2: Is Something Wrong With Sib-Regression And RDR?) Sib-Regression is a clever way of avoiding most biases. Its independent variable - the degree to which some sibling pairs end up with slightly more shared genes than others - is even more random and exogenous than the difference between fraternal and identical twins. It can sometimes have biases related to assortative mating (which would falsely push heritability down), but otherwise it’s pretty good. RDR has many of the same advantages, and allows more diverse relationships and so larger sample sizes. It’s hard to think of ways these methods could be wildly off. There is one caveat: although RDR includes most of the rare and structural variants missed by GWAS, in theory it can miss certain ultra-rare variants which are so uncommon that they aren’t shared between some of the relative pairs used in RDR. De novo variants that occurred during the subject’s own conception would be in this category, if the subject didn’t have children or didn’t pass on that gene13. This seems like a pretty small subcategory of genetic variation, and I wouldn’t normally expect that much of importance to be hiding here, but maybe it’s more important than it seems. RDR also doesn’t include much variance caused by statistical interactions between genes. Although we said above that these are usually found to be insignificant, they might be more important in a trait like intelligence that has been under recent evolutionary selection that lops off easily-detectable sources of variance and leaves only the weird obscure ones behind. There’s limited ability for classical Mendelian dominance to affect common variants, but more complicated genetic interactions might still prove important. Overall these are strong methods, and their failure to converge is troubling. If forced to explain them away, we might tell a story like: So far, there is only one RDR study and a few Sib-Regression studies, so we should wait for more data before updating too hard.

EEG entrainment replication project1 mentions across 1 issues

EEG entrainment replication project is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 08, 2025 and September 08, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "2024 ACX grantee Alexander Putilin has an update on his EEG entrainment replication project". It most often appears alongside ABUJA, Alexander Putilin, Astralcodexten Com.

Reference entry: EEG entrainment replication project
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Open Thread 398 September 08, 2025

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Open Thread 398

September 08, 2025 · Original source

4: 2024 ACX grantee Alexander Putilin has an update on his EEG entrainment replication project. He is looking for study participants and he is publishing the project’s source code:

EEG source analysis1 mentions across 1 issues

EEG source analysis is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 16, 2024 and July 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "might end up superior to EEG source analysis". It most often appears alongside auditory cortex, Big Bang, cerebellum.

Reference entry: EEG source analysis
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Consciousness As Recursive Reflections July 16, 2024

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Consciousness As Recursive Reflections

July 16, 2024 · Original source

Self-consciousness impedes complex unconscious information processing because it competes with it for neurons. Neurons that are tuned into the rhythm aren’t available for other things, and the recursion of self-referentiality can keep these neurons occupied for a long time. So qualia arise out of neuronal information processing much like biology arises out of chemistry. When chemical reaction chains build each other, they can achieve self-replication. When neuronal activities reflect each other, they can achieve self-reflection. Many processes that know each other become one process that knows itself. From the information processing angle, oscillations that can maintain bits of information have internal working memory, which is the only thing that non-oscillating neuronal activities lack in order to fit the definition of nondeterministic Turing machines. (The IT people among you should grok this immediately. Everyone else may have to dedicate some study time.) From this angle, there are not one, but two levels of information processing systems. The brain is one, obviously. But running inside the brain, oscillations/thoughts with memory are themselves additional information processing systems. It’s analogous to a physical computer system that has, running inside of it, one or more virtual machines. We have failed to locate qualia by imaging the former, because they happen in the latter. This theory of qualia applies only to biological neuronal processes. A for loop is self-referential but is not a biological neuronal process, so I don’t claim it has qualia. “Surely” in the vast space of possible AI architectures, some could be designed to have phenomena that are more or less analogous, but I see no reason to believe the current LLMs do. How to test this theory In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was much hope in the study of consciousness that then-new functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) tools would let us look into the brain more deeply and thereby let us figure out consciousness. While science did indeed learn much more about the brain, the hope that this would help resolve the puzzle of consciousness did not pan out. But the hope wasn’t crazy: new measuring capabilities are a good reason to expect new data that can hopefully clarify matters. There is new such hope, due to another new method called EEG source analysis. Electroencephalography (EEG) puts electrodes on the scalp and measures tiny electrical currents between them. EEG is very good at temporal resolution, but for most of the century since its invention in 1924, it had almost no spatial resolution. It could tell you the differences between individual milliseconds in your electrical flow measurements, but it couldn’t tell you where in the brain the signals were coming from17. However, if you hook those EEG electrodes up to the amounts of computational power available these days, you can mathematically reconstruct quite good guesses about where in the brain the electrical signals are coming from. And that’s a game changer. This combined temporal-spatial resolution lets you localize individual neural oscillations, if they’re large enough. And that’s how you get to look at (oscillating) thoughts! There are multiple EEG source analysis algorithms. Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA) is arguably the best one at the moment. It still has low spatial resolution compared to fMRI, as it says right in the name, and it’ll remain that way. There is a strict physical limit to how much signal this method can ever get out of the noise. But it should suffice for oscillations large enough to exhibit interesting conscious phenomena like self-awareness. Here are a few falsifiable hypotheses that follow from this theory of what makes thoughts/oscillations produce qualia. Most of them could not have been tested without this new method18. Measure EEG of subjects who do the classic test paradigm where stimuli are presented very briefly and subjects report whether they experienced conscious awareness of the stimulus. Run EEG source analysis on the measurements. Variations of the threshold of how long a stimulus has to be presented in order to become conscious should be predictable from variations of the frequency of the oscillation that takes in the signal from the respective sensory neurons.

Inline links: nondeterministic Turing machines, EEG source analysis, 17, Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA), arguably the best one, 18

Measure EEG of subjects who do the classic test paradigm where stimuli are presented very briefly and subjects report whether they experienced conscious awareness of the stimulus. Run EEG source analysis on the measurements. Variations of the threshold of how long a stimulus has to be presented in order to become conscious should be predictable from variations of the frequency of the oscillation that takes in the signal from the respective sensory neurons.

Measure EEG of subjects who see a silent video while hearing an unrelated soundtrack. Their task is to focus on either vision or hearing, and quickly press a button when they see or hear something particular. Run EEG source analysis on the measurements. An oscillation for being poised to react (probably in the prefrontal cortex) should synchronize with either the oscillations evoked by vision or the ones evoked by hearing. EEG data should predict which sense the subjects focused on.

EEGs1 mentions across 1 issues

EEGs is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 11, 2022 and November 11, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "a handful of experiments with EEGs that seem to show positive results". It most often appears alongside Aella, astral projection, Bayes.

Reference entry: EEGs
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Contra Resident Contrarian On Unfalsifiable Internal States November 11, 2022

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Contra Resident Contrarian On Unfalsifiable Internal States

November 11, 2022 · Original source

The evidence for jhanas is thousands of people over thousands of years saying they’ve experienced it, a bunch of my friends who I trust a lot saying it worked for them, a handful of experiments with EEGs that seem to show positive results, and a promise that if I tried hard enough I could replicate the results. The evidence for Resident Contrarian being especially good at detecting lies is he says so.

Eemian1 mentions across 1 issues

Eemian is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 10, 2024 and September 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Something called “ the Eemian ” 130,000 years ago". It most often appears alongside 10,000 AD, Agricultural Revolution, Agricultural Revolution.

Reference entry: Eemian
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Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism September 10, 2024

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Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism

September 10, 2024 · Original source

Something called “the Eemian” 130,000 years ago was larger in magnitude, but happened gradually over several thousand years. Maybe I’m cheating by failing to rigorously define “biggest climate shock”, but I think we’re definitely in at least the biggest of the past few millennia.

Inline links: the Eemian

Effective Accelerationism1 mentions across 1 issues

Effective Accelerationism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 23, 2024 and January 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Effective Accelerationists Don’t Care If Humans Are Replaced By AI". It most often appears alongside Ascended Economy, Asimov, Blindsight.

Reference entry: Effective Accelerationism
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Should The Future Be Human? January 23, 2024

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Should The Future Be Human?

January 23, 2024 · Original source

A jargon-filled website spreading the gospel of Effective Accelerationism describes "technocapitalistic progress" as inevitable, lauding e/acc proponents as builders who are "making the future happen […] Rather than fear, we have faith in the adaptation process and wish to accelerate this to the asymptotic limit: the technocapital singularity," the site reads. "We have no affinity for biological humans or even the human mind structure.”

Inline links: website

I originally thought there was an unbridgeable value gap between Page and e/acc vs. Musk and EA. But I can imagine stories that would put me on either side. For example:

Here are some things I hope Larry Page and the e/accs are thinking about:

effective altruist communities1 mentions across 1 issues

effective altruist communities is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 28, 2023 and November 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "volunteers Paul got from the rationalist and effective altruist communities". It most often appears alongside #57, 80,000 Hours, Adam D’Angelo.

Reference entry: effective altruist communities
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In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023

#57 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
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AI 1 shared issues
AI doomerism 1 shared issues

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Book Review: The Scout Mindset

November 28, 2023 · Original source

The original RLHF paper was written by OpenAI’s safety team. At least two of the six authors, including lead author Paul Christiano, are self-identified effective altruists (maybe more, I’m not sure), and the original human feedbackers were random volunteers Paul got from the rationalist and effective altruist communities.

Inline links: The original RLHF paper

effective altruist community1 mentions across 1 issues

effective altruist community is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 29, 2021 and September 29, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "epistemically healthy communities. The ... effective altruist communities get namedropped". It most often appears alongside Amazon, Andrew Jackson, Barack Obama.

Reference entry: effective altruist community
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First seen: September 29, 2021
Last seen: September 29, 2021

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Book Review: The Scout Mindset September 29, 2021

Amazon 1 shared issues
Andrew Jackson 1 shared issues
Barack Obama 1 shared issues
Bayes’ Rule 1 shared issues
being-a-good-person training 1 shared issues

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September 29, 2021 · Original source

Once she’s finished bombarding you with examples of epistemically healthy people, she moves on to epistemically healthy communities. The rationalist and effective altruist communities get namedropped here, as does the r/changemyview subreddit. At every point, Julia mentions how much she personally respects all these people - and, implicitly, how much she is rooting for you to become like them.

Inline links: r/changemyview

effective altruist conspiracy1 mentions across 1 issues

effective altruist conspiracy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 12, 2023 and December 12, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "the effective altruist conspiracy". It most often appears alongside 2024, Aaron Peskin, accelerationist conspiracy.

Reference entry: effective altruist conspiracy
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First seen: December 12, 2023
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Son Of Bride Of Bay Area House Party December 12, 2023

2024 1 shared issues
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accelerationist conspiracy 1 shared issues
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Aella 1 shared issues

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December 12, 2023 · Original source

“Are you talking about Sam Altman?” asked a man who you didn’t even realize was listening to the conversation. “I’ve been trying to figure the whole situation out. I understand that Toner was part of the deep state conspiracy and McCauley was part of the effective altruist conspiracy. And D’Angelo, he used to work for Zuck, so he must have been part of the Meta conspiracy - Meta as in Facebook, not meta-conspiracy in the sense of a conspiracy controlling all the others. There was a meta-conspiracy controlling all the others, but that was . . . “

“Did you say Sam Altman?” asks a woman who has apparently been lurking at the edge of your conversation. “Because I think I’ve got it all figured out. The accelerationist conspiracy, the effective altruist conspiracy, and the Winklevoss conspiracy all made their move against Sam at the exact same time and ended up colliding with each other. In the chaos, Sam, Greg, and the Turkish dwarf were able to escape safely to Redmond. The only part I still don’t understand is - which of them was Satoshi?”

efficient altruism1 mentions across 1 issues

efficient altruism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2024 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "As far as efficient altruism goes". It most often appears alongside 10240, 4chan, @slatestarcodex.

Reference entry: efficient altruism
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Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024

10240 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: The Laws of Trading

August 08, 2024 · Original source

As far as efficient altruism goes, most people espousing it seem to think in utilitarian, rather than purely altruistic terms. Under utilitarianism, helping others in a way that also helps you is *obviously* better than helping others in a way that makes you miserable, other things being equal.

Efficient Market Hypothesis1 mentions across 1 issues

Efficient Market Hypothesis is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 21, 2023 and July 21, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Efficient Market Hypothesis is one of the core concepts taught in Finance 101". It most often appears alongside 2008 Financial Crisis, 2023 book review contest, 30-Year Mortgage.

Reference entry: Efficient Market Hypothesis
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Your Book Review: The Laws of Trading July 21, 2023

2008 Financial Crisis 1 shared issues
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July 21, 2023 · Original source

“Residential real estate has historically returned significantly below equity markets over long time horizons” But I’m not so sure that these lessons are directly applicable to other areas of life. Some of the best things in life come from lashing yourself to the mast, burning the boats behind you, willingly giving up liquidity. The deepest monogamous relationships are built from an irrational investment in one other person, saying “In sickness and in health, until death do us part.” How many scientific problems were solved because one person had an irrational willingness to: Just. Keep. Going. Sometimes it’s powerful to use the sunk cost fallacy to your advantage. Investing in relationships, subject matter expertise, even putting down roots via *gulp* homeownership reduces your liquidity, but also leads to some of the best (if intangible) things in life. 5: Edge If you can’t explain your edge in five minutes, you don’t have a very good one. OR The long-term profitability of an edge is inversely proportional to how long it takes to explain it. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is one of the core concepts taught in Finance 101. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a lie. The person that better understands the nature of a small sliver of the world (e.g. Apple’s share price) will make more money than others. Modern financial markets are exceedingly competitive. This means that the bigger you think your edge is, the more likely it is that you’re wrong. “Evolutionary thinking applies quite directly when thinking about the evolution of markets. Having an edge in a mature market means understanding the world better than other traders, even ones who are already highly skilled. In fact, the marginal trader in modern financial markets is quite sophisticated and skilled indeed.” Lebron here warns us of getting too cute with data, of changing variables. Enough randomness will produce an “edge” that is likely to break down the second a trading strategy hits the real world. You can always find a statistical correlation if you change enough variables. But this is fundamentally the same problem facing the replication crisis in social sciences. Lebron argues that we need stories here. Edge is expressed in stories: an edge does not exist without a clear mental representation of that edge. Pure linear algebra does not suffice. I’m not so sure. It seems like AI companies are pushing forward technology in a way that suggests that mental representations are not the only path to intelligence. Lebron discounts “black box” trading strategies without much discussion of their potential merits. Are all of RenTech’s models explainable by a story? The firm is notoriously secretive, so I don’t know, but I’d guess not. “Frequently a good trade appears, has a seemingly insurmountable difficulty, and it is mere persistence that knocks down the final barrier. There may have been many others who looked at the idea, wanted to do it, but couldn’t get past that last hurdle.” Before Sam Bankman-Fried was the face of Why Effective Altruism is Bad, before he even founded FTX, he made money arbitraging the difference between Bitcoin prices on Japanese and American exchanges. I’m reminded of that trade here. It isn’t a particularly elegant trade, it doesn’t require deep technical knowledge or any models. It was a schlep. It was all operational work: figuring out how to open a Japanese bank account, transferring money between the US and Japan, standing in line for hours every day at both US and Japanese banks (presumably this wasn’t the same person). In as technical a field as trading, sheer willpower is often what gets things done in the end. 6: Models The model expresses the edge. Lebron drills into us that a model is the tool for expressing an edge. The model is not the edge. The model does not give us unique knowledge about the world. The map is not the territory. He dives into the difference between generative (G) and phenomenological (P) models. G models express a worldview and fit data into that way of thinking, whereas P models solely look at the empirical data to build a worldview. Models of the world differ from models of markets, though. Markets have quick feedback loops, are explicit in terms of what they measure, and are easy to quantify at a specific point in time. Most of our models for the world, though, are ill-defined and explicit. Models are only as good as our assumptions. As an aside, this is a common criticism of rationality or Effective Altruism – you can justify any worldview if you assign your model input weights in just the right way5. I also tend to think that “traditional” EA is overly dependent on P models, and doesn’t embrace the G models that led to economic reforms in India in the 1990s or the economic policies that led to rapid economic development in Southeast Asia in the second half of the 20th Century. Interestingly, I think a lot of longtermist EA, specifically AI alignment, leans the other way, relying on G models which explicitly assume a certain P(doom) and work backwards from there. (Though I won’t pretend to be an expert here or to understand everything, so take this with a grain of salt.) Overall, startups and tech seem to take heed to Lebron’s lesson much better than the folks hanging out on this part of the internet: “Even if a model makes good predictions about some future value or event, that knowledge is useless without also knowing how to take advantage of that prediction.” Now we get a bit philosophical. By acting, you change the nature of the market. Your model predicts things that might not be true as soon as you start trading (and changing the environment) based on it. When you’re right, everyone else sees the same trades that your model does and will beat you to them. When your model is wrong, others don’t act, meaning adverse selection rears its ugly head once again. So your model shows you with an edge, but in practice you only make the trades where you don’t have an edge. Lebron closes by arguing that G models are best for understanding other people, and are good in and of themselves: “You can also see connections to traditional moral philosophy in thinking about modeling the behavior of others. To have a good G model about someone else is to have some measure of empathy and compassion for that person: what they’re like, what they think and feel, putting yourself in their shoes. Pragmatically, developing the skill of empathy and compassion for others is, aside from a moral good in itself, an excellent way to understand better the people who surround you. More people working to develop good G models of others is surely a small step to a better world.” 7: Costs and Capacity If you think your costs are negligible relative to your edge, you’re wrong about at least one of them. This section of the book displayed a good amount of epistemic humility, words that I didn’t expect to be typing in the context of a book about trading. Lebron tells us that trades don’t exist independently in the universe — in the n-dimensional space of all possible trades seeking to optimize profitability, if you have a gigantic mountain of profitability, someone else has probably at least discovered the base. So you probably don’t have a profitable trade; rather, you are misunderstanding something about your trade. You’ve either overestimated profitability or underestimated cost. Lebron highlights four types of trading costs: [graph that didn’t show up correctly here: two axes and four quadrants, with the axes being visible ←→ invisible costs and linear ←→ nonlinear costs] Here, we’ll focus on Quadrant 4, where he highlights a few interesting phenomena. Herding. It’s likely that if you have a profitable trading strategy, either: Other firms discovered a similar strategy independently and/or

Inline links: replication crisis, RenTech’s, arbitraging the difference between Bitcoin prices on Japanese and American exchanges, 5

Egan’s theory1 mentions across 1 issues

Egan’s theory is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 14, 2023 and July 14, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I'll take this to be only weak confirmation of Egan’s theory that combining jobs undercuts education". It most often appears alongside !Kung San, aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada, Adam Smith.

Reference entry: Egan’s theory
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First seen: July 14, 2023
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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind July 14, 2023

!Kung San 1 shared issues
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Adam Smith 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind

July 14, 2023 · Original source

This is a review of his 1997 book, The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding. It’s his opus, the one book in which he most systematically laid out his paradigm. It’s not an especially easy read — Egan’s theory knits together evolutionary history, anthropology, cultural history, and cognitive psychology, and tells a new big history of humanity to make sense of how education has worked in the past, and how we might make it work now.

Inline links: The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding

A sad triangle, indeed. What about alternative schools? I was curious to see whether this “sad triangle” could help us understand other philosophies of education, and why they work (or don’t). Where would, say, unschooling, and classical education, and vocational ed, and Montessori go? The first three seem obvious. Radical unschooling is in the upper-right, classical schools (with its focus on feeding kids “the best that’s been thought or said”) is in the upper-left, and vocational ed is in the bottom corner. What can that tell us? Intriguingly, each of those approaches can claim to have done some impressive stuff. I’ve worked with radical unschoolers, and while their skills have often been lopsided (not learning math is an acknowledged issue in the community), they’ve all at least exhibited a zeal for learning the topics they’ve been interested in. (Video games, frequently.) And I remember a massive study in the early 2000s that asked which kinds of schools actually improved student test scores controlling for the effects of socioeconomics. What it found was that only two types of schools stood out: Catholic schools that were operated by a religious order (e.g. the Jesuits — not local parish schools), and vocational schools. Q: Oh, that’s terrible evidence. One of those was just personal anecdotes! And what about selection effects? And what about…? I wouldn’t disagree — and, as Freddie deBoer points out, most educational research is bunk. I’ll take this to be only weak confirmation of Egan’s theory that combining jobs undercuts education. Are we hosed? If Egan’s critique is correct, we’re in a bad situation. Educational radicals yell from their dark corners to abandon the middle and come join them; a century of educational reforms have amounted to little more than wobbling around, first in one direction, then another. At the moment, the conversation about schools in the United States, at least, seems to have hit an all-time pessimistic blech. Freddie deBoer speaks for a lot of people when he says “Even the most optimistic reading of the research literature suggests that almost nothing moves the needle in academic outcomes. Almost nothing we try works.” I’m not quite that pessimistic — the word “almost” is doing some work, there. There are some reforms that seem to work at the margin: raising teacher pay, making it easier to become a teacher, reducing air pollution, free school lunches, and more. Actually applying what the science of reading has been telling us for a few decades seems a big one. And perhaps you have your own pet reform proposal. Sure — add it to the heap! What Egan suggests, though, is that so long as we’re bopping around this triangle of jobs, we won’t be able to get the schools that we want. The dream There’s a moment at the end of my favorite Bollywood movie that’s become stuck in my head. The protagonists have made the arduous journey to a beachside rural school. In the sun outside, flocks of children are experimenting with art and playing with inventions; inside, the walls are covered with books and the tables are covered with models. The kids are learning joyously and deeply. In the real world, such places do exist — they’re just exclusive, pulling their students from among the families who are already the most gifted and curious. They don’t make kids this way; they scoop up the kids who are already this way. But in the movie, we’re supposed to believe these are normal children — normal, except they’ve been transformed by a school. Egan’s wild idea is that it’s possible to make schools like this. He thought that we didn’t have to wait for the communists to make people equal or for the transhumanists to make people smarter. All he thought it required was giving schools a different job — not socialization or academics or development, but something that brings pieces of them together in a new way. But in order to understand that job, we have to come to a cleaner, bigger, and truer understanding of what “education” is. The road ahead: a special Q-and-A Q: This is the proverbial thousand-dollar-bill-lying-on-the-sidewalk: if this is possible, someone should have done it now. Is Egan going to give sufficient evidence for me to believe this? Maybe! I’ll address this in a special section at the end, after sketching out what his theory looks like. Q: If his theory is even plausibly true, then why haven’t I heard of Egan before? His books can be hard to read — he was an intellectual’s intellectual; he had difficulty writing a page without a reference to William Wordsworth, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Claude Levi-Strauss, Richard Rorty, Noam Chomsky, or Steven Pinker. And his paradigm is wonky and multidimensional; he rejiggers common categories, and tells you everything all at once. But worst of all, when his paradigm is stated plainly, it sounds stupid. Q: Oh! What… is his paradigm? I’m going to jigsaw his book, and hold back his big idea for its own section. First, I’m going to list out some simple observations of students at different ages, and imagine what schooling could look like, if it were built on these principles. (First I’ll do this for elementary school, then middle school, then high school.) Then I’ll explain how his theory ties all of this together… by clarifying our definition of what education actually is. Q: I’m not from America; could you be clear on what you mean by those divisions of schooling? Egan’s framework has three main stages, but they don’t divide neatly into “elementary, middle, and high school”. (The precise age ranges he talks about, if you’re interested, are 2–8, 8–15, and 15 and older.) Regardless, I’m going to use those terms — he sometimes did — because it gives me something specific to imagine. Don’t sweat ‘em. Part 2: A new kind of elementary school What’s the matter with elementary schools? Egan suggests that Plato and Rousseau, for all their differences, might have the same reaction if they visited a modern elementary school: they’d call it “trivial”. I’ll admit, here, that I have tremendously fond memories of my elementary school years — committed teachers, good friends, and interesting activities. But I suspect my memory has edited out the most typical work I did. Either that, or elementary schools have taken a drastic plunge in quality from the 1980s. My wife and I homeschool now, but before the pandemic, we sent our kids to our local public school, and whenever we volunteered in the classroom, we were horrified. They spent their days practicing reading on shallow texts, or half-mindlessly practicing basic arithmetic. Occasionally they’d bring us home a sign of learning about something from the real world — usually something as intellectually and emotionally compelling as the importance of tooth brushing. And at parent–teacher conferences every year, we’d be sat down on tiny chairs and informed that, while our children were quite bright, they were struggling to pay attention in class. No sh**, I wanted to reply. The school seemed hermetically sealed; almost nothing that felt meaningful from the outside world could get in. Though they might agree about little else, Egan thinks that Plato and Rousseau would look at the dull worksheets and insipid “hands-on activities” and call modern elementary schools trivial. He agrees, and thinks that fixing this is the first step to building a new kind of school. Why so trivial? Ironically, Egan thinks it's all the fault of Plato and Rousseau. Hidden in the ways that both the academicists and developmentalist think about education is an assumption: that children’s reasoning is basically the same as adult reasoning, but lesser. Q: This isn’t some romantic, children-are-the-real geniuses theory, is it? Egan actually does think that there’s an intensity to how children perceive the world that we lose — but no, it’s not. He’s building on mainstream cognitive science — just aspects of it that are currently more-or-less ignored in school. The upshot, though, is that he thinks that educational researchers (be they of academic or developmentalist persuasions) see kids as smaller, stupider versions of adults. Q: But that’s the opposite of what my local developmentalist school says! It was the opposite of what the developmentalist school that I worked at said, too. But at teacher meetings, I’d frequently hear people ask what was “developmentally appropriate” for a child. I’ll grant that there are perfectly reasonable times to ask this: “Honey, is it developmentally appropriate for our 10-year-old to watch ‘Cocaine Bear’?” is just one of many examples. But “is it developmentally appropriate for our class to learn about world religions?” or “is it developmentally appropriate for our school library to have a book mentioning homosexuality?” probably aren’t some of them. (The latter example was not one that I heard at my progressivist school, but Egan points out that this sort of language is often used by conservative activists.) This notion of “developmentally appropriate” took on a scientific sheen with the work of Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss psychologist. Before age 12, he “proved”, children aren’t able to form hypotheses, draw conclusions, or think abstractly. This, his followers thought, should transform schools — and so they did! To math, they added in “manipulatives” — physical cubes and rods and such — to help students see math. To the history curriculum, they — well, they ended it. Why waste time, they asked, lecturing students about history that they couldn’t possibly understand? In its place they put the “expanding horizons” model of social studies. One version goes as follows: In kindergarten, students learn about themselves In first grade, they learn about their families In second grade, they learn about their neighborhood In third grade, they learn about their city In fourth grade, they learn about their state In fifth grade, they learn about their nation In sixth grade they learn about the world We can admit that there’s an elegance to this model. (I can picture how clever the theorist who first came up with it must have felt!) The downstream effects of it, however, seem horrible. Doesn’t keeping kids ignorant of the rest of the world seem provincial? Doesn’t reinforcing their self-centeredness seem infantilizing? Perhaps we could stomach it if it was founded on some unshakable findings of child psychology — but does it really strike you as likely that kids are incapable of understanding anything that happened long ago or far away? How, Egan asks, can we explain the $50 billion success of a movie franchise aimed at children that literally begins “A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away?” Q: Because… Jedis aren’t history? The point is, kids obviously have the mental abilities to understand — and in fact care a lot about — things far outside their own experience, and we’ve built elementary schools on a long-dominant model of educational psychology that swears they can’t. This is actually a great example of a general principle. Let’s call it “the Star Wars test”: can our model make sense of the most obvious facts of students? When we find that the answer is “no”, we should at least consider radically revising what we’re doing in school. What are elementary schoolers good at? (or: kids are smarter than students) Someone — I can’t now find who — once observed that children seem to lose IQ points the moment they step into a classroom. Egan agrees, and suggests that we think of ourselves as primatologists to kids, Jane Goodalls who investigate children “out in the wild” to see the sorts of things they gravitate to, and do fairly well at. If we do this, what do we see? Kids tell jokes, for one. They get mental images stuck in their heads, for another. They engage in role-playing, get lost in reverie, and beat out rhythms when they’re bored. They make ample use of metaphors, tell stories, and insist on seeing the world in terms of abstract binaries (e.g. stupid/smart, cowardice/courage, slavery/freedom, and so on). These, Egan holds, are the cognitive strengths that children use to understand the world. They’re the things that kids are often about as good at as adults — or much better than. They’re going to be the tools Egan wants us to use to rebuild the entire elementary curriculum, and in fact he spends most of his second chapter geeking out about how we might define these, how they operate in the mind, where they first pop up in history and anthropology, and even how they might have developed in our evolutionary past. I’m going to skip all of that, and get to the curriculum. From trivial to rich: the trick What could an intellectually rich elementary school curriculum look like, if we built it on kids’ cognitive strengths? He gives us one suggestion to help us do this: ask where each discipline came from in the first place. What was math before it was math, for example — or science before it was science? Q: How on Earth could that help? That’ll become clear later, when we finally uncover what Egan thinks “education” actually is, and see what job he wants us to give schools. For now, take it as a tantalizing hint… or, y’know, just ignore it. Elementary literature & language What was literature before it was literature? Before people invented writing, they had rich oral traditions: they told simple stories, recited poems, and shared proverbs. Egan suggests that these bits of oral tradition should form the backbone of the elementary literature curriculum. Q: What sorts of stories? As many as we can, and from as many diverse cultures as possible! Folktales are wonderful, as are myths. Think the Aboriginal story of “The Rainbow Serpent”, episodes from the Sumerian “Epic of Gilgamesh”, the Egyptian story of Osiris & Isis, the Greek story of Orpheus & Eurydice, the Chinese Legend of the White Snake, the Japanese Tale of Amaterasu and Susanoo, the Ashanti tales of Anansi, the Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl, the English legend of King Arthur, the Maori myth of Maui and the Sun, the Roman story of Romulus and Remus, selections from the Indian Mahabharata, the Anglo-Saxon epic of Beowulf, the Inca legend of the Sun and Moon, the Iroquois Myth of the Flying Head (a real thing! look it up!), and the Ojibwe story of Turtle Island. Q: That was a lot of examples. Are you going to keep giving so many? I’ve got a [mumble mumble mumble] to get to. Sorry about that. Sometimes, though, I feel that a limitation of reading Educated Mind is that, in trying to keep his book to a manageable size, Egan skimped on examples in some places that it matters. It’s easy to read his occasional example and assume he intends that it hold some central place in the curriculum — when all he wants to do is display how rich and diverse the curriculum could be. (Also: good God, I didn’t even include an example from Norse mythology!) So from now on, just assume that every category could be filled with oodles of examples. Q: What sorts of poems? Lots of poems, first of all. We shouldn’t steer toward “fancy” poems — rather, we should find poems that appeal to kids immediately — think Shel Silverstein, Mother Goose, Dr. Seuss, Jack Prelutsky, Edward Lear, or Ogden Nash… that sort of thing. In a biting essay, Egan suggests these poets like these appeal to kids precisely because they leverage kids’ cognitive strengths: “we should find, and encourage saying and singing and shouting aloud verse with strong narrative forms, thumping rhymes and rhythms, the most vivid images, fun with metaphors, and a rollicking story.” Q: Why proverbs? Proverbs stick in your mind almost effortlessly. (“All’s fair in love and war!” “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!” “You can’t judge a book by its cover!”) They’re also useful; they capture general truths. Kids can apply them to all sorts of situations, but also discuss them — to what extent are they wise or foolish? (I remember my surprise when I realized that they couldn’t all be true — because you can’t follow “look before you leap” and “he who hesitates is lost” at the same time! I’m embarrassed to say that I think I only realized this when I was in college.) Elementary science What was science before it was science? Egan suggests: being immersed in the natural world. We might, he writes, encourage elementary students to “adopt” some feature of the natural world — a patch of grass, a cat, a branch, a stream — and simply observe it at length. To do this, we can use the cognitive strength of reverie. Q: Oh, do you mean like kids sometimes do in science class nowadays — describe a thing to a partner, make notes, draw it, and label its parts? No, the exact opposite! That’s all about squeezing the experience into words and forms that we understand. What we want “is less an attempt to know about nature as to know it in some participatory way, to know it as something we are an intimate part of, not set off from”. Q: That sounds a little… “woo” to me. It did to me, too… until I remembered my childhood climbing tree. I didn’t much like to go outside as a child, but I had this one tree that I’d climb up and read for hours and hours. If I close my eyes I can bring to mind the precise texture of its bark, the roughness of its broken-off branches, the coolness of its leaves, the always-surprising solidness of its trunk… I’m bigger now, but I think if I were back in my parent’s yard, I could still navigate its limbs with my eyes closed. I have, at this point in my life, read a fair number of books about trees, but I’d be surprised if all of them together more than equaled the amount I learned from that tree — my tree. Elementary math What was math before it was math? Egan suggests: counting and logic. We might, then, use rhythms, metaphors, stories, and jokes to help kids become fond of these. Q: Counting is pretty… basic. Could it really be improved? Beware of “the curse of knowledge”: Steven Pinker’s phrase for forgetting that something was once difficult! Egan suggests we should spend time helping kids count wonderfully. We can start early with counting rhymes. (“One, two, buckle my shoe! Three, four, out the door! Five, six…”) But we can also help kids use their fingers as metaphors. There are some pretty cool ways of using your hands as an abacus — and did you know that you can count up to 1,023 using just your fingers on both hands, and a knowledge of binary? Q: Logic — I’m intrigued! Aristotelian, or Boolean? Neither, for the time being — Piaget was presumably onto something when he found that young children couldn’t reason abstractly, but he was looking at logic in a vacuum. When we put logic into the context of stories, we find that kids can deal with logic just fine. There’s an entire worldwide network of educators, in fact, called Philosophy for Children, who have written whole books about how to do this, and Egan loves it all. Sometimes they read stories and ask simple questions: “What is friendship?” or “What does it mean to be brave?” They also pose ethical questions: “Is it ever right to spill a secret?” And they pose paradoxes: “Can you step in the same river twice?” Q: You mentioned “jokes” a moment ago. Care to elaborate? Egan thinks that, to help kids get good at math, you should tell kids jokes. Q: That’s… new. I think so, too — but he backs it up pretty well. To be funny, jokes (or at least most kid jokes) rely on a leap in logic: Why can’t you trust an atom? They make up everything. Knock-knock. Who’s there? Boo. Boo-hoo? Don’t cry, it’s just a joke! To understand the joke, kids have to follow the logic — spotting patterns, making connections, and tracking what their audience expects a word to mean. That’s a lot of cognitive lifting. And Egan goes further, suggesting that we grit our teeth and create methods to help kids invent their own jokes, no matter how horrible they’ll be at first. (The things we do for learning…) Q: Wait wait wait! What about addition facts, and multiplication tables, and fractions? Egan emphasizes that his methods are designed to be add-ons to the standard math curriculum. In general, he’s a don’t-blow-up-the-system sort of guy, and if something seems especially weird, you should probably assume it’s an add-on to the regular curriculum rather than a replacement, even if I forget to say so. Elementary arts What was art before it was art? Egan suggests we pop our heads into Paleolithic caves for our inspiration. Whatever the specific meaning of all those charcoal elk and aurochs and mammoths (communication with the spirit world? art for art’s sake? a way to impress babes?), Egan thinks it obvious that they were also an attempt to capture an intense experience that would be difficult to express in words alone. What did it feel like to be near an aurochs, or a saber-toothed tiger? “The arts help us,” Egan writes, “to hear and see afresh, to force our perceptions and sensations to experience again the immediacy and vividness of the world”. If we follow this, then, we don’t want to help kids build “art skills” so they can draw like an adult — rather, we want to help them amass a repository of diverse aesthetic feelings that they’ll want to express. We should provide them with a riot of experiences. Q: That couldn’t be more opaque. Examples, please! Egan writes that we should have children learn to whistle, sing, and click their tongue; we should help them emulate the ways a skunk or a hawk or a stick bug might move through a space. We should expose them to scores of different temperatures and materials. In music, we should help them love Beethoven, yes, but also the Beatles; Tchaikovsky, yes, but also Tuvan throat singers, and also John Cage, whale song, and bird song. Q: That’s a lot of experiences, but what would they be doing? An interesting aspect of Egan’s view of education is that he doesn’t seem to think we should push kids right to the “doing” phase. He wants to help kids cultivate an affective relationship with the world. In any case, he writes that as students get more experienced, we should prompt them to move from merely enjoying these experiences to trying to systematically shape similar experiences. And drawing, painting, and playing music could easily be folded into other parts of the curriculum. Elementary social studies What was social studies before it was social studies? Well. Remember how, just a moment ago, I wrote that you could assume that you should probably assume that Kieran isn’t in favor of junking the curriculum as it currently stands? He suggests we very carefully pick up the elementary social studies curriculum, place it into a trash can, and set the whole mess on fire. He isn’t worried about much of importance being lost. (Remember that the “expanding horizons” model is, to him, the original sin of 20th century educational reform, and he repeatedly quotes student surveys showing that “social studies” regularly wins the title of “most boring subject”.) In its place, he suggests we put history — which, he hints, we should think of as the centerpiece of the elementary curriculum. So the real question is what was history before it was history? His answer, surprisingly, is myth. Q: Egan wants us to teach myths as if they were history? Not at all. What he suggests, though, is that we look at how myths operate as narratives — so we can design an intellectually vivid history curriculum. And myths really are special: each is built on at least one binary (like weak vs. strong, or lies vs. truth, or so on), and uses that to tell the story of the big picture of the world. They’re so powerful that people can understand it, remember it, and love it — even if that thing never happened. We should take that power, Egan says, and apply it to things that really did happen. Q: So what history does he think kids should learn in elementary school? The great struggles of humanity from across the whole. Flippin’. World. We’re still talking about young children, so these should be done as simple stories. The goal isn’t to make them history PhD’s, so we needn’t even try to put them in any sort of order. Egan suggests that, in first grade, we pick a single binary like “freedom against oppression” and tell kids a welter of stories, again from as many cultures as possible, and as many times in history as possible. Q: Can you give examples? Oh, all right — in first grade we can tell kids the stories of the war of the Greek city-states against the Persian empire, and the slave uprising of Spartacus against the Romans. We can tell them about the plight of Jews in medieval Europe, and of the unsuccessful Sepoy Rebellion in India against the British. We can tell the stories of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions, and about the Chinese Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. We can tell them the story of the escaped slave Harriet Tubman returning to the South to rescue her kinsmen, the story of six-year-old Ruby Bridges facing threats to integrate her elementary school, and the story of how the Mau-Mau uprising led to modern-day Kenya. We can tell the stories of Mexican-American union organizer Cesar Chavez and of Malala Yousafzai surviving an assassination attempt to advocate for female literacy. The world does not lack for stories of oppression and liberation that can capture the attention of a six-year-old. Q: That’s… huh. What stories might they hear in second and third grade? Egan gives examples, but I won’t list them here. He suggests we use a similar approach for each, except that we swap out the binary each year. He thinks “the struggle for security against danger” would work well for year two, and “the struggle for knowledge against ignorance” would work well for year three. (That year could have a lot of overlap with the science curriculum.) Q: Anything else, for history? Yes — they should get a sense of Big History. They should get some simple stories about the ice age, the Cenozoic, the age of dinosaurs, the Paleozoic, the origins of our solar system, and the Big Bang. (Because if the ancient Norse can tell their story of the beginning of the universe, by gum, we can tell ours, too.) To sum up Egan argues that the problem of early schooling is that it’s trivial — and it’s trivial because the dominant theories of educational psychology see children as lesser versions of adults. What else would we teach them, except dumbed-down versions of what adults learn? But children have certain cognitive strengths that schools aren’t making systematic use of. If we rebuild elementary schools on those strengths, we could turn schooling upside down. We could stop seeing the curriculum as a bag of information to impart, and start seeing it as a set of great stories to tell — and invite kids into. Kids could experience (both intellectually and emotionally) the great struggles of humanity and see that they can join in them. Students could experience the story of education as the beginning of a very real adventure. Egan’s elementary school: some skeptical questions Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding what you mean by “mental images”. Care to explain? It’s an interesting fact of human cognition that just a few words can whip up a complex mental experience. Egan doesn’t just mean what we might call “visual imagery” — the ability to hold, say, the image of a bespectacled, spat-wearing duck in your mind without seeing a photograph. He’s also including what psychologists call auditory imagery, olfactory imagery, gustatory imagery, and tactile imagery. Q: How could all of that be helpful in schools? Humanity has a built-in VR system, and we’re not using it! Egan invites us to pretend we’re teaching a class about the humble earthworm. We might list off facts — “earthworms are so many centimeters long, move through soil by means of their something-or-other muscles…” but he suggests we can evoke images, say, “of what it would be like to slither and push through the soil, hesitantly exploring in one direction then another, looking for easier passages, contracting and expanding our sequence of muscles segment by segment, and sensing moisture, scents, grubs, or whatever”. Those facts are now felt by the student; the knowledge has become part of them. And just a few words can spark a complex mental experience, one going beyond literal images to include imagined sounds, smells, tastes, and more. These experiences can feel real and stick with us. (That these mental images are so easy to evoke, and so meaningfully felt, feels something like the proverbial hundred dollar bill on the ground.) Q: How could metaphors be helpful? It really is interesting that so much of the “constructivist” turn in psychology — that is, the notion that children don’t absorb knowledge, but construct it — has continued to focus on logics-mathematical reasoning, when there’s been mounting evidence for decades that metaphors are more central. It’s not just that we use metaphors to better understand things we already know, we also use them to grasp new knowledge. What’s more, psychologists have devised tests to measure the skill at metaphor-making, and have given them to people of different ages. What they found was that eleven-year-olds make more metaphors (and higher quality metaphors) than do undergraduates — and that four-year-olds have both groups beat. Again, hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk. Q: Your talk of “binaries” has me worried — binaries like good/evil and male/female are the source of so many of our most pernicious stereotypes! Isn’t the purpose of education to get us beyond stuff like this? Yes, it is! Education is supposed to complicate our understanding — but that means we’ve gotta start somewhere, and binaries provide us a natural starting place. As an uncontroversial example, think about temperature. We all begin as babies by perceiving two temperatures — hot and cold. Later, we add on intermediate categories — warm and cool. (Note that the human body is the assumed mid-point to temperature. Binaries often work like this; “big” and “small” mean “bigger or smaller than me”, “nasty” and “kind” mean “nastier or kinder than I am, except when my brother is really asking for it”, and so on.) A good story (and an Egan-inspired elementary curriculum is, in a sense, nothing but good stories) will go further, and transform the binary. Toy Story is grounded in the binary of abandonment/belonging: at the beginning, the toy cowboy Woody belongs to his owner, and has his affection. Then a rival comes who threatens his belonging. In trying to get back to belonging, Woody is entirely lost — and to save the day, he has to come to a deeper understanding of what belonging means. Now, all lessons can’t be Pixar movies. But the good stories (especially in literature and history) will challenge and subvert the binaries they begin with. Q: I see the pattern of Egan drawing from “as many cultures as possible”. Why so many? Is this a political correctness thing? If it helps to think of it as such, then, sure! I don’t think Egan would have had a problem with that. But his ultimate reason for including so much diversity goes deeper. For Egan, including such world-wide diversity isn’t optional, and the answer to why is bound up in his definition of education. (Keep reading.) His answer also insists that we, whenever possible, also include stories from the Bible and Homeric epics (the Iliad and Odyssey). Q: Mmm, stories from the Bible aren’t going to fly in my local school! So be it! Egan doesn’t spend much time obsessing over the practicalities of… His interest is in describing what an ideal education might look like, if it were possible. Every lesson, every classroom, and every school is necessarily a compromise. Q: You make a big deal of poems. But isn’t poetry dead? An interesting contrast can be made to classical education, which also has kids read a lot of poems — they see knowing great poems as one of the marks of an educated person; again, for an academicist, it’s the information that transforms. Egan begs to disagree. Poems are important because they’re a wonderful way to train their cognitive strengths, like rhythm (poems are language fueling by thumping). We want to help kids learn to use this tool better, and a great way to do that is to help them recite poems that they’ve learned by heart. Q: “Learn by heart” — is that code for “memorize”?! It is! Egan is actually quite big on memorization — he points out that all the knowledge in the world can do nothing for a person once they’ve forgotten it. He didn’t, however, appreciate the academicist focus on memorizing without understanding (or at least enjoyment). Q: I’m still worried about the science curriculum, as you’re describing it. Can you allay my fears? Honestly, while I feel there’s something profoundly right to how Egan is describing early experiences of nature, I feel the same way. Note that there’s more science coming in the social studies curriculum. But if that’s still not enough, one could bring down aspects of the middle school science stage. Q: Anything else that Egan suggests we do in elementary school literature and language? He suggests that we help kids learn a second language! This is so obviously true (why do American schools typically wait until kids lose the ability to naturally absorb languages to start teaching languages?) he doesn’t belabor it, though. Q: You had mentioned that Egan’s vision seems more internal-focused. Should we be worried about that? While I strongly suspect that his curriculum would make kids more creative in any way you’d like to measure it, Egan wasn’t particularly interested in “creativity” — he was more about helping kids find the world interesting. I get the sense that he thinks kids will do things with minimal prompting once they’re loaded up with complex internal experiences. Q: I think I’m beginning to understand Egan — is he basically saying “make learning fun”? “Fun”, applied to education, is a dangerous word. Egan worries about the dangers of an emotionally unserious curriculum producing emotionally stunted adults. That doesn’t mean we need to tell students only “serious” stories — only that we treat the world honestly. “Disney-esque sentimentality is the exact emotional equivalent to intellectual contempt”. Q: But aren't some of these stories too dark for children who have themselves experienced oppression and disaster? Egan argues that these stories may be especially helpful to them — they can help them understand their struggles better, and give voice to them. Q: At the very start of this, you promised us “rationality”… but I’m not seeing rationality here! All this talk of “adventure” almost seems to go the opposite direction. What gives? Wait for it. But for a hint right now — Egan is fond of citing his fellow educational theorist Jerome Bruner, who claimed “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development”. Bruner was criticized for that; his critics charged that he was ignoring learning differences and socio-economic realities. Egan thinks he was profoundly right. Part 3: A new kind of middle school What’s the matter with middle school? What was middle school like for you? In math, I recall a jumble of barely-related topics. In literature, I remember reading great literature — Frankenstein, Romeo and Juliet — only in their dumbed-down summary formats. In social studies, I remember teachers proclaiming on the first day of class that unlike all of our previous history classes, this class wouldn’t be about names and dates… and then going on to memorize names and dates. And in science, I remember being forced to dissect a frog only to discover that frogs are — you guessed it — made of slimy frog parts. Your mileage may vary, but for a lot of us, middle school feels like getting booted out of the (in retrospect) Eden of elementary school, and like marking time before the serious studying of high school. It feels meaningless. In my favorite of his books, Egan calls so much middle school curricula “human deserts”, noting “we have created a system in which the importance of human emotions for meaning seems barely noticed”. Why so meaningless? If our dominant approaches to educational psychology fundamentally misinterpret younger children, Egan suggests, they basically throw up their hands when faced with pre-teens and teenagers. Mainstream schools begin to introduce vocational training to help lighten the load, and Maria Montessori famously suggests that adolescents should be sent to go run a farm. Egan is sympathetic to those responses, but points out that they don’t do much to lighten the load that the academic curriculum often becomes at this age. This feeling of meaninglessness, he argues, is utterly tragic — it comes just when a hunger for meaning blossoms in adolescents! We can see that hunger for meaning in their lives outside the classroom, where their interests ramp up into veritable obsessions. What are adolescents obsessed with? What might we see, if we become Jane Goodalls of early adolescence? First, teens are obsessed with gossip. The motivations of others — why did he do that? and what was he THINKING? — are hypothesized and talked to death. Second, that they’re pulled toward idealism. Many feel a dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and feel a romantic urge to make it a better place. They’re often lured into simplistic beliefs that promise to help them do that. Third, they love extremes: they want to find limits, and test them. Obviously, this can show up as risky behavior, but we can also see it in their love for the bizarre — note adolescents’ fascination in things like aliens, cryptids, and ghosts. (Egan loves pointing out that The Guinness Book of World Records is a perennial bestseller among kids at this age. How else would they find out who had the world’s longest fingernails?) Fourth, they gravitate toward heroes — people who push the edges of those limits. By celebrating heroes, they can vicariously share in their transcendence. Look for the posts hanging up in a teenager’s bedroom to guess what boundaries they feel most hemmed in by: athletes push against physical limits; a death metal guitarist might push against authority and conventional morality. An activist or entrepreneur might push against our dulled morality or our sense of what’s possible. Finally, we might spot teens taking up hobbies and making collections. Hobbies can be a way to identify yourself as part of a group against the rest of the world (“I’m the sort of person who goes bird-watching!”), and collections can be a way to climb the status ladder inside the community. Egan points out that a collection can also be a way to feel like you have control over what you’re discovering is a very big and complex world of detailed information (“I’ve spotted every one of the fifty most common birds of Texas — even the black-capped vireo!”) Egan’s insight is that these obsessions give teenagers a sense of meaning, and that we can use them as tools to make middle schools that overflow with meaning. From meaningless to meaning-soaked Again, Egan sketches out a new kind of curriculum subject-by-subject. Before, his trick was to ask where the subject first evolved out of; now, it’s to ask who first discovered or created the specific content we’re teaching. “All knowledge”, he writes, “is human knowledge. Everything we know is knowable through the lives of its inventors, discoverers, or users, and we can have access to that knowledge through the hopes, fears, or intentions that drove them”. Middle school math Who first discovered the concepts students learn in math? The answer, of course, is a wide diversity of curious men and women living across the world over the last few thousand years. Egan says: bring those people into how we teach math. If we used gossip and heroes to help students find it meaningful, what kind of math would result? When we teach the Pythagorean theorem, we should give a sense of who Pythagoras was — a cult-founder who worshiped numbers to find God, whose followers (according to a piece of ancient gossip) murdered one of their members who discovered irrational numbers! Q: Well, sure, that works for Pythagoras, but he’s a known nut job; surely most math doesn’t come from such interesting roots? When we teach the Cartesian coordinate system, students should meet Rene Descartes, the Calvinist French polymath who saw the possibility that math could decipher the world, if only we could unite algebra and geometry… and invented the xy-plane to do exactly that. When we teach scientific notation, we should call our students’ attention to the importance of the number zero, and tell them the story of the Pope who tried to introduce Arabic numerals to Christian Europe and may have been assassinated because of it. When we teach algebra, we should ask students why “algebra” is Arabic for “the fixing of bones”, and tell the story of what Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was up to. We could do this all day. Literally everything students learn in school was first invented or discovered by some interesting person who was struggling to accomplish something hard. To learn is to connect with those people, whether we know it or not. Egan says: help kids know it. Math has been dehumanized: re-humanize it. Q: So the math curriculum needs to become a history of math curriculum, and math teachers need to become history teachers? No, the content needn’t change. But with surprisingly little work, we can bring in the gossipy stories of heroes, and their obsessions can spread to students. Middle school science Who first discovered the things students learn about in science? If you’re thinking “scientists”, you’re only partially right. Most of the big-picture ideas that we now think of as “science” were discovered before the word “scientist” was invented, or the discipline was professionalized. Frequently, they were hatched by true amateurs, working in their free time, hungry to unlock the secrets of nature. We can use gossip and heroes to spread their obsessions to students just as we taught math, but Egan points out two twists. The first is that the content itself can take on heroic qualities: everything is impressive, when you look at it in a certain light. In an interview, Egan once said: “My book is an attempt to show that, indeed, everything in the world is wonderful, but that schools are designed almost to disguise this slightly shameful fact. We represent the world to children as mostly known and rather dull. The opposite is the case: we are surrounded by mystery, and what we know is fascinating”. What would even the most boring subjects look like, if we emphasized their heroic qualities? Well: What’s a tooth? Bone, wrapped in rock, surrounding tiny cells that your body feeds with blood. What’s a bar of chocolate? A crystal of jellyfish-shaped fat molecules stacked together; when you put it in your mouth you shake them apart into a writhing confusion. What’s the air around you? The bottom of a 10-mile-deep ocean; when you put your tongue over a soda straw and your Pepsi stops leaking out, it’s not because a “vacuum” is “sucking” it up, but because that ocean is squeezing it into your face. Again, we could do this all day! And in middle school science, we can. Everything in the world is wonderful; we can help students see this again and again. The second twist is that science is a subject rich in extremes. Here Egan introduces a concept that we’ll see crop up again: “15-minute segments”. To help us fit as much wonder as possible into a school day, he suggests we supplement the usual school subjects with a few quick lessons. To infuse science with extremes, he suggests we add on three: “human & natural records”, “extremes of animals & plants”, and “cosmology”. Middle school history Who first made the things students learn about in history? Why, the historical characters themselves! Since we’ve given kids a grounding in history in elementary school, now we can build on that, going through many of the same events as before, but in more depth, and more vividly. We’ll leverage the interest with other people’s inner lives to tell stories focusing on the perspectives of the people who made history — zooming in, when possible, on scandalous details. We’ll leverage the tool of idealism to choose historical characters who chafed against their surroundings, and understand what they were trying to accomplish. What was their vision of the world? What did they hope for, and what did they fear? Q: Isn’t the “great man” approach to history out of fashion? Egan’s approach doesn’t say that “great men” made history — it’s just leveraging gossip to help kids see history as something meaningful that can expand their own possibilities. “Early adolescence is commonly a time of intense and vivid emotional life, and also a time of deepest boredom and depression… [We] can give shape to the intermediate curriculum and offer the students a world that is rich, complex, varied, and as intense and vivid as their own emotional lives”. We also should add on another “15-minute segment” just to pump in as many biographies as possible, and from people who don’t always fit into the normal history curriculum. Call it “Brief Lives”, and throw in anyone who’s struggled to push some limit — Mary Wollstonecraft, Jesse Owen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the students’ great-aunts, whoever. As students get older, this can transition to “People and Their Ideas”. Here, we’d focus less on the details of the person’s life, and use it as a backdrop to showing how meaningful some of history’s most important ideas could be. Think Aristotle and syllogisms, Edward Said and orientalism, Confucius and propriety, Cornel West and race, Buddha on the four noble truths, Muhammad and the five pillars, Karl Marx and communism, Adam Smith and the invisible hand, Thomas Hobbes and the state of nature, John Locke and natural rights, Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism, Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments, Martin Luther on faith, Voltaire on the freedom of speech… you get the idea. Q: Can you really get a profound understanding of utilitarianism in 15 minutes? Yes! The point of this segment isn’t to develop a systematic understanding of any one idea, it’s to introduce students to the exciting possibilities of human thought. (As a bonus, this might make them less likely to fall for the first ideology that they encounter later in life.) Diversity is important for this — as it is with culture. Throughout this, we should also be trying to expose students to as much cultural diversity as possible, because in high school, we’ll be trying to make sense of our society, and it’s impossible to do that unless we have something to compare it against. Middle school literature & language You might think that this subject would be easy — that middle school literature is already filled with “strong and clear narratives”, that it deals with “transcendent human qualities such as courage, love, and persistence”, that it focuses on “extremes of human experience”, that it examines “something strange and exotic”. You’d be right! Egan’s pretty happy with a bog-standard middle school literature curriculum, done well. In this part of the book, his spends most of his limited space suggesting three rather odd activities which could also be useful — especially for increasing students’ awareness of language, so they can use it better. The first is etymology — not, however, memorizing lists of roots, but in being told the entertaining backstories of specific words. Take the word “berserk”, for example — we now use it to mean something relatively mild (“if my mom catches me coming home late, she’ll go berserk”), but it comes from an old Norse word meaning “a raging warrior of superhuman strength”. And that’s because ber meant “bear” and serk meant “shirt”: soldiers of the bear cult would don the skin of a bear to, in their minds, transform into one — howling, foaming at the mouth, and gnawing the rims of their shields. (Most adults walk through life with little understanding that the words falling out of their mouths are entities, with their own back-stories. Communication is, at the very least, more interesting when we become aware of this.) The second is to add on another language to learn — not, this time, to become fluent in it, but just to become aware of how very different human languages can be. (For native English speakers, Sanskrit might work well, or Cantonese, or perhaps even ancient Egyptian. Again, the point isn’t for this language to be useful — it’s to explore diversity.) The final one is to study humor — not just jokes anymore, but comedy at its finest. Egan cites (at length!) Monty Python as a group of people who were particularly brilliant in their use of the English language. Examining their skits can lead us into not just an appreciation of semantics (the study of how meaning is made from smaller pieces, like etymology) but also pragmatics (the study of how meaning is made in social situations). Pretty heady stuff, for a conversation about a dead parrot. Part 4: A new kind of high school I’ll confess — I loved parts of high school… and among nerdy folks, I suspect I’m not alone. For some of us, this was a golden time. Even at my local public high school, I had access to academically thrilling classes — especially, in my last two years, advanced literature and history. I felt like I was finally understanding the ideas that mattered. In any case, Egan is quick to acknowledge that, at this level, the sort of education he advocates really is being practiced in some places. What he can add is an understanding of what makes it wonderful, how to make it even more wonderful, and how to make it wonderful for many, many more people. What’s the matter with high school? Far too often, even when high school classes are intellectual, they’re dry. For the majority of students, all this academic stuff is experienced as utterly lifeless, a mass of dead information to be squeezed inside one’s head for a test and then left to evaporate. Egan mocks the curriculum wars that seem to be a permanent feature of the teaching life; quoting the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, he says “while the academic left and right bicker over whether the curriculum is too traditional or too radical, they fail to recognize that most students absorb so little of academic culture that the bickering is largely irrelevant”. Why so dry? Egan suggests three reasons to explain this. First, because high school academic classes are too often masses of small details with no sign of the big picture. Second, because they’re typically slavishly disciplinary, and aren’t able to address the questions that span the disciplines. Third, because they’re often designed to bring students through what everyone is sure of, and hide away any controversies. In all of these, Egan suggests that what’s called “academics” in high school is too often a dim imitation of what real academics are actually practicing. There’s a fourth reason, though, and it’s probably the biggest of all — by the time they get to high school, most students haven’t actually learned that much! An academic approach is designed to connect small details into the big picture; for people who arrive in high school (and college) classes without having already collected much in their heads, academics are going to taste dry. (An implication of this for anyone trying to improve schools is that we might not want to start with high schools. If your goal is to create a new kind of academic learning, first start at elementary school — or barring that, middle school.) What motivates mad scientists? When we wanted to re-conceive the elementary and middle school curriculums, we looked at what students were already good at — kids’ cognitive strengths and adolescents’ obsessions. For this level it might be easier to look — for reasons that will become clear when we finally unveil Egan’s crazy-sounding definition of education — at the sorts of things that bring intellectuals joy. Q: Which intellectuals? Take your pick. Galileo, Einstein, Smith, Marx, Goodall, Chomsky, Curie… all the people who took to the life of the mind like fish to water. But that’s a lot to hold in my mind at once, so I’m just going to think about Doc Brown from Back to the Future: He was high on intellectualism I’ve never been there, but the brochure looks nice Let’s call these people “mad scientists”. And let’s pretend we once again took up our job of being primatologists, and snooped on these folks “in the wild” (“in the lab”? this is beginning to get recursive…)… what would we find motivating them? Asking simple questions, for one. (What is space? What is society? What is a human? What is language?) Building general schemes (big theories) that hold lots of evidence together. Finding their place in the cosmos. And (perhaps above all) seeking certainty. Once again, Egan suggests we use these as tools to remake the curriculum. From dry to daring What could a high school curriculum look like, if it were rebuilt on these tools? Once again, Egan has a trick. This time, it’s to ask what fights have driven the development of each of these fields forward — and how we can help students enter them. First, a mini-segment! Intellectuals invented the academic disciplines to better pursue the life of the mind, but the disciplines can get in the way. Some of the most important intellectual discoveries that could help students are too big to fit into any of the disciplines. We need a place to introduce them plainly. Egan proposes another mini-segment — again, just 15 minutes a day, a few times a week — called “Metaknowledge”. Q: Isn’t that already in the International Baccalaureate program? Yes, he acknowledges that he’s borrowing from that! This segment would introduce ideas that would enrich student thinking across the disciplines: game theory, cognitive biases, systems thinking, Bayesian reasoning, epistemology, ethics, logic, cultural evolution, and so on. High school literature How can we help students enter the big fights of literature? Intellectuals of a literary bent — professors, critics, poets, novelists — delight in arguing over literature like rabbis arguing over the Talmud. Take, just for one example, the debates over Shakespeare’s character of Ophelia. Does she love Hamlet, or is she a victim of his emotional abuse? Is she truly insane, or is she acting? Is she passive, or is she pulling the strings? Oceans of ink have been spilled arguing over questions like these; our students can, perhaps, spill a few ounces more. The usefulness of arguing literature, for Egan, isn’t that it’s oh-so important for educated adults to know a lot about Ophelia. (This, again, was where the academicists went wrong — in thinking that being educated was about getting the best knowledge in your head.) Rather, arguing over literature is a training arena for the all-important intellectual move of this kind of understanding: building general schemes out of evidence, and struggling with anomalies. One person, for example, might hold that Ophelia is insane, and cite all sorts of obvious evidence — her father just was murdered by her lover, she rants nonsense while (bizarrely) handing out flowers to friends… But then he’s challenged when he reads a scholar pointing out that, to people in Elizabethan England, types of flowers have symbolic meanings. How does he deal with that? He could ignore it, claiming it an over-reading of Shakespeare. (Sometimes a flower is just a flower!) Or he could address it, complicating his own scheme. This intellectual work is best done with other people, who are incentivized to challenge your understanding of something, and go back and forth, building competing models and calling attention to anomalies. This process — the “dialectic” — pops up again and again in the academic disciplines. It’s the center of how understanding works, at this stage. And the nice thing about practicing it on literature is that, more so than in history or science, the evidence is shared knowledge — it’s right in front of everyone, written out. But there are other ways literature class can be helpful to the general life of the mind. Egan also suggests that we’ll want to specially include literature that helps students understand complex ideas. Camus, Orwell, Borges, Calvino might be particularly helpful here… and I imagine that genres like science fiction and magical realism might be particularly useful, too. (Note, though, that once again none of this requires a radical remaking of the curriculum, or of the canon of texts that we traditionally assign to high schoolers.) Q: Oh yes, the canon — what does Egan have to say about the canon wars? When he wrote Educated Mind in the nineties, the long-brewing canon war was approaching its inevitable apocalyptic climax. On one side of this Plain of Megiddo were the pro-canon traditionalists, arguing that we should keep assigning the texts that had been argued over for centuries. Facing them were the anti-canon reformers, arguing the standard texts over-represented the perspective of dead white men. Onto the middle of the plain rides Egan on a white horse, who bellows above the din: “I’VE GOT A BUSLOAD OF HIGH SCHOOLERS WHO WANTS TO JOIN IN, EVERYONE OKAY WITH THAT?” To do so, he says, we need to give students the arguments from both sides. So, for example, bell hooks, Edward Said, and China Achebe should be on the syllabus, as should Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and Diane Ravitch. And of course they should actually read the texts cherished by both sides, too, so they can argue better. High school history How could entering the big fights help us reinvent high school history? First, we might look for dueling histories. It’s time for students to get into historiography and understand that history isn’t just what happened, it’s something we make. We might help kids read chapters from Howard Zinn’s socialist history of America alongside the corresponding chapters from Paul Johnson’s conservative history of America. How could big questions help? We want to help students see how various people have disagreed over some of the big questions of what human history is, at its most basic. We can have them compare Steven Pinker’s theory of civilization’s progress (Better Angels of our Nature) with Yuvah Noah Harari’s theory of civilization’s woes (Sapiens). We could have them compare so-and-so’s account of human history as an ever-expanding unlatching of energy sources with Robert Wright’s account of human history as unlatching more and more positive-sum games (Nonzero). What role could the lure of certainty play? To help them grow their skills at finding anomalies, we might help them work through pseudo-histories and conspiracy theories. Q: Conspiracy theories! Oh, come now, you’re playing with fire. Well, the world is on fire. Our students will spend the rest of their lives encountering terrible-but-beguiling arguments about how the world works; if we don’t prepare them for those, what have we been doing? So we should introduce arguments that the Moon landing was a hoax, that the Illuminati founded America, that aliens built the pyramids, and so on. At no point can we demean students for falling for any of these theories — the job of a teacher at this stage, Egan writes, is to support students in their reasoning even when their beliefs are offensive and stupid, gradually offering anomalies. There’s no way out of bad theories except through them. By the time students graduate, we want them to have wrestled with terrible ideas and — for a while — lost. They need to experience what it’s like to change their minds about something they felt strongly about. They need to viscerally realize, in Feynman’s famous phrase, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” High school natural science How could entering the big fights reinvent high school science? At present, so much of the high school science curriculum — especially “honors” classes — is oriented toward helping amass details. (The same is true of 100-level university classes, which famously “survey” the field to prepare for more advanced studies. I always thought this was stupid — of the huge lecture hall of students in my Geology 100 class, how many went on to take even a second course?) The meaty debates that propel science forward are held back. Egan complains: “The more general and speculative theories in any discipline are treated like an unconventional and disreputable relation who, even though the children find her exciting and entertaining, must be kept hidden from view, her very existence denied as long as possible”. This is a stupid approach — students with an adventurous bent are convinced that science isn’t for them. Egan proposes, simply, that we flip this, and organize high school science classes around the big debates. We shouldn’t be ashamed at how, well, adolescent this might look: “the dramatic, speculative, and contentious theories will be up-front in the early years of the [high school] curriculum”. What might those be? Egan doesn’t give a list, but we can spitball some: instead of explaining what “matter” is from the top down, a physics class could problematize “matter” by following the debates over the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and by becoming familiarized with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cC4-!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F051a12b7-2f60-43fd-8d77-a0040ba524a5_1600x639.png, when he says, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YXMl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F862809c5-6478-438e-95d8-4dcb4c3a52af_1600x574.png, In a biting essay, In my favorite of his books, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ywm7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9c9b1ed-a260-4117-8679-0b5a32339748_1600x574.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WPeH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F62ea55f8-0458-484f-be45-7a011d050756_1600x625.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FPXt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb017fc37-3151-4556-87f1-31a097cf7594_1600x574.png

Egyptian mummy1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptian mummy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 15, 2021 and December 15, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Should we freak out every time we dig up an Egyptian mummy?". It most often appears alongside 1918 flu, 1918 Spanish flu, Alaska.

Reference entry: Egyptian mummy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 15, 2021
Last seen: December 15, 2021

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Ancient Plagues December 15, 2021

1918 flu 1 shared issues
1918 Spanish flu 1 shared issues
Alaska 1 shared issues
Arkansas 1 shared issues
BBC 1 shared issues

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Ancient Plagues

December 15, 2021 · Original source

This actually raises a broader question: how worried should we be about getting smallpox from corpses and artifacts in general? Should we freak out every time we dig up an Egyptian mummy? This paper does our freaking out for us - they catalog several incidents of archaeological or incidental excavation of smallpox-infected corpses - including, yes, the mummy of Pharaoh Rameses V.

Inline links: This paper

Egyptian myths1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptian myths is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 16, 2024 and August 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Egyptian myths". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

Reference entry: Egyptian myths
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 16, 2024
Last seen: August 16, 2024

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Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics August 16, 2024

20th Century Fox 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abraham Lincoln 1 shared issues
Action Comics 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics

August 16, 2024 · Original source

Given Marvel Comics, why Silver Age (1961-1965)? I.a. Why Superhero Comic Books? The winner of last year’s Astral Codex Ten book review contest was Brandon Hendrickson. Brandon wrote about Kieran Egan’s The Educated Mind. One of the foundations of Egan’s educational philosophy is that people learn through stories. He believes early education should focus on teaching lessons through myths and legends. This matches my experience. My kids’ favorite podcast is Greeking Out – a very well produced, very entertaining, National Geographic podcast about Greek Legends. Aside #1: When my oldest daughter was three years old she would ask everyone she met “Do you know any myths? Can you tell me a myth?” She especially liked asking people from different places to get myths from their local cultures. Once, she asked the question to a friend of mine who grew up in South Africa, “Can you tell me any South African myths?” He struggled for a minute and then said, “Okay! I have one! Bread never falls butter side down!”. That was not the type of myth she was looking for; nor the type of myth we will be discussing in this review. Every culture has foundational myths. These stories are entertaining and engaging, but they also teach valuable lessons about both what is important in that culture, and how people in that culture are expected to behave (or at least the Platonic Ideal of how they should behave). In the modern, Western world, we have assimilated many of these foundational stories, particularly the Greek myths. My kids definitely know the Greek myths, but they also know elements of Norse mythology, Egyptian myths, stories about Anasi from West Africa and more. More fundamentally my wife and I, while not religious ourselves, have made a point of exposing the kids to the stories from the Bible. It is not politically correct to call Biblical stories “myths”, but they serve the same purpose – shared cultural understanding of the way the world works. My wife grew up without any religion, and when she was in high school, she struggled with the metaphors and religious allegories that were omnipresent in most of the Western canon. In our culture, familiarity with the Bible is important for an educated person – whether they are religious or not – because it is the foundation of so much of the rest of our culture. I believe the other set of mythological stories that are foundational to our culture are – and by this point I am sure you see where I am going here – comic book superheroes. If true, then having more than a surface-level understanding of the most important superhero stories is important in a similar way to that knowing the Bible stories is important. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is an important idea to understand. So is, “With great power comes great responsibility”. I.b. Why Marvel? While there are many independent superheroes that are not owned by major conglomerates, the superheroes who have built our modern foundational myths are currently owned by two corporations. Warner Bros. Discover owns the DC library of superheroes including Superman, Batman and Wonder Woman. In 2009 Disney purchased Marvel Comics and took ownership of their characters, including Spiderman, X-men and the Avengers. Aside #2: Marvel has sold temporary film rights to many of their characters over the years. The most relevant sales started in 1994 when Marvel sold the film rights of X-men and mutants to 20th century Fox, then in 1996, when Marvel went bankrupt, Fox picked up the rights to the Fantastic Four (and New Line picked up Blade). In 1999 Marvel sold the film rights (and live action TV, and animated TV longer than 44 minutes) of Spider-man and related characters to Columbia Pictures (part of Sony) for $7MM. Marvel actually attempted to sell ALL of their remaining Marvel IP film rights to Sony for $25MM, but the top management at Sony was not interested. Sony’s management allegedly told their chief negotiator “Nobody gives a shi*t about any of the other Marvel characters. Go back and do a deal for only Spider-Man). Disney acquired Marvel in 2009, and then Fox in 2019, bringing the two separated packages of characters all back together under one roof (Blade reverted back to Marvel in 2012). Sony still owns the rights to Spider-man but has made a deal with Disney to include some of his films within the Marvel-Disney universe. Marvel sold the film rights of The Hulk to Universal in 1990 and the current status of that agreement is complicated (the consensus is that Marvel now controls the film rights to the character, but Universal owns distribution rights to any stand-alone Hulk film, which could be why Disney let's Hulk co-star in Thor movies, but not vice versa). In the early aughts Marvel wanted to build their own film franchise, but were limited to only using their remaining “B-list” characters – Spider-man, X-men, and the Fantastic Four were all off limits. Fortunately, Kevin Feige, president of production for Marvel at the time, saw a way forward. He convinced Ike Perlmutter, Marvel CEO, to allow for the production of a series of films with the remaining characters begining with Iron Man (2008). Jon Favreau directed and cast Robert Downey Jr as Tony Stark. The film blew away expectations. Kevin’s plan of a series of movies where the characters would interconnect was suddenly feasible. Iron Man was followed by The Incredible Hulk, Thor, and Captain America: The First Avenger. None managed the box office magic of Iron Man, but all were successful enough that the plan stayed on track. In 2012 the characters were all brought together in the first Avengers film, which opened to over $200MM domestically and went on to gross more than $1.5B (which made it the 3rd highest grossing film of all time). Marvel became the first studio to take the interconnected world of their comic books and make the model work on the big screen (for a much larger audience). Once the model was proven to work, other studios tried to duplicate it. Aside #3: Warner Bros’ stumbles with the DC shared universe of Batman, Superman and the Justice League are well known, but that was actually their SECOND attempt at a shared universe. Their first attempt tried to copy the Marvel method more closely. They chose their own B-list hero and set up his first film to allow for a wider mythology. Alas Green Lantern (2011) failed at the box office and we never got stand-alone films about Sinestro (Yellow Lantern), Carol Ferris (Star Sapphire, the Violet Lantern), John Stewart (African American Green Lantern), Kyle Rayner (1990s Green Lantern), Alan Scott (original Green Lantern), or the Blue, Red, and Orange Lantern Corps. At least so far, no studio has successfully created anything with close to the traction obtained by the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU). Warner’s DC Extended universe (DCEU) had trifling success, but is being shelved and rebooted for a fresh attempt next year. Universal’s attempt at a “Dark Universe” kicked off with Tom Cruise in The Mummy (2017), but was dead on arrival. Paramount’s attempt to link the Transformers Universe to GI Joe at the end of Transformers: Rise of the Beasts has been appropriately mocked. Sony’s Spider-man films linked to the MCU have been very successful, but their attempt at a stand-alone non-MCU Spider-man universe using Spider-man’s villains as anti-heroes has floundered (mostly succeeding only as a source of memes). Next Mattel will be attempting to build a universe off the success of last year’s Barbie and may include Polly Pocket, American Girl, Hot Wheels, and He-Man and the Masters of the Universe (no word yet on Thomas the Tank Engine, View Master and the Magic-8 Ball, but all are apparently in development). To date, only Marvel has successfully built a “Cinematic Universe”. One potential reason for the MCU’s success is that Kevin Feige built his cinematic universe on the back of the existing interconnected universe of the comics. But those comics were not the first interconnected universe of stories. For that we would need to go back to our foundational myths. The Bible stories mostly interconnect. Adam and Eve flows into Cain and Abel. David and Goliath leads to the Wisdom of Solomon. Greek Myths DEFINITELY interconnect. Supporting characters in one Greek myth have starring roles in their own stories. The Greek pantheon of tales even have their own version of the Avengers. In the Quest for the Golden Fleece, Jason brings together the Argonauts, who included in their number Theseus (who defeated the Minotaur), Orpheus (who braved the underworld) and Hercules himself – all A-list stars in their own “franchises”. Stand alone stories that exist within an interconnected universe are rare in modern media but were common in the ancient myths that have stood the test of time. Only Marvel has successfully created a shared universe that follows the pattern of ancient myths. Only Marvel films have stand-alone stories and protagonists who exist together in an interconnected world. Something about that method of storytelling is deeply pleasing for humans across many cultures. Marvel films are the first and most successful modern version of the mythological universe, and that it is worth spending more time exploring Marvel’s underlying mythology and where it came from. I.c. Why 1961? The origins of Christianity and Judaism (and Buddhism and Hinduism) are very murky. Even Islam is far enough in the past that we only have a very rough understanding of how it came to exist. When scholars want to understand in detail how a new religion is born they are far better to look at Mormonism or, if you accept it as a religion, Dianetics. Similarly, we have versions of Greek myths that have been passed down to us, but we can never know how those myths changed from their first telling to their “final” versions. Were the stories once unrelated, and only later became crafted into a single “universe”? Or were the stories built off each other one by one (“Dad that Golden Fleece story was amazing! Do you know any other stories about the Hercules guy?”)? Or was it something in between? Perhaps the stories all existed independently, but were later crafted together (“Remember that 12-labors story I told you? Actually that was the same guy who was on the Argo!”) Unlike Greek legends, we can know the origin of the Marvel Universe. We can see how it was constructed step-by-step. The people who did it (most importantly Stan Lee, Jack Kirby, and Steve Ditko) are dead now, but they have not been dead for long. We can read the original work, see how it changed over the last 60 years, and we can ask the creators “what were you thinking at the time” (or at least read their answers from old interviews). We can’t always trust what Stan Lee says, but at least we can hear his point of view. No one has a transcript of an interview with Homer, or knows exactly what he was thinking when he called it the “wine-dark sea”. Tl;dr: Why read about Marvel Comic superheroes 1961-1965? Because interconnected mythological stories are very important to cultures, Marvel is the leading contender of the most recent modern mythology, and it originated in the first half-decade of the 1960s. II. How did Marvel Superhero Comics happen? Timely Comics published their first comic book in 1939 and called it “Marvel Comics”. Their most popular World War II comics included Captain America, the Human Torch (an android unrelated to the modern Human Torch except in powers, appearance and name), and Namor, the Submariner. In the early 1950s superheroes became less popular, so Timely changed its name to Atlas Comics and focused on humor, western, horror, war and science fiction stories. But in 1956 DC Comics began re-introducing their Golden Age superheroes and, in the second half of the 1950s, the genre took off again – particularly Superman, whose title, Action Comics, became the number one selling comic in America. Stan Lee, editor and chief at Atlas at the time, wanted to get in on the superhero action. Unfortunately in 1957 Atlas lost its distributor and the company had to rely on “Independent News” to get its comics on newsstands. The complication was that Independent News was owned by “National Periodical Publications”, who also owned DC-comics and did not want Atlas to introduce superheroes to compete with Superman, Green Lantern and the Flash. Independent News agreed to distribute Atlas comics but limited the publisher to eight titles per month, and only in non-super hero genres (like horror, romance and science fiction). Blocked from creating and launching new superhero titles, Stan Lee got creative, and in August 1961 Atlas Comics published Fantastic Four #1. Aside #4: Fantastic Four #1 was on newsstands in August 8th, 1961, but the date on the cover was November 1961. The convention at the time was that the cover date was not the “publication date” but rather the “pull date”. The pull date was the time when the retailer could send back unsold copies back to the publisher for a refund. In fact the retailer did not need to send the entire issue back, just the cover, as it was assumed that comic books could not be sold without the cover, and it saved on postage. This was only relevant because it was great for my dad who was a child at the time. My dad was friends with the kid whose father owed the local pharmacy which meant he had access to every comic book published in the late 1950s as long as he was willing to wait a few months and read it without a cover. Going forward in this essay I will always use the pull dates rather than the publication dates for individual comic book issues as they are far easier to source. If you want to convert pull dates back into publication dates you can subtract roughly two months, but it is inconsistent and sometimes longer, as was the case with Fantastic Four #1. Check out the cover of Fantastic Four #1: To the modern eye this certainly looks like a superhero comic. Four heroes with super powers fighting a giant monster. But in the eyes of publishers in 1961 this looked more like a science fiction adventure comic than something that would go head to head with Superman. Here are the covers of Action Comics (the best selling superhero comic at the time) from the three months leading up to Fantastic Four #1: Notice what they have in common? “Super Rivals”, “Super revenge”, “Super Substitutes”. And all include Superman in his blue and red tights. Fantastic Four’s cover featured super powers, but never used the word “super” and no one was wearing superhero costumes. Fantastic Four, as a superhero story, slipped under the radar because it wasn’t really a superhero story at all. It was a story about four close friends who attempted to fly into space, but then something goes wrong and they crash back to Earth. The experience changes them and they decide they now need to use their new abilities to help the rest of humanity – specifically against monsters who are invading from under the Earth. It is a fantastical science fiction story – not a superhero story. Later in his career Jack Kirby, the illustrator of the issue and co-creator of the Fantastic Four, was asked about his inspiration for the Fantastic Four heroes. He did NOT say Superman – or any superhero. He said Challengers of the Unknown. Challengers of the Unknown was an adventure story co-created by Kirby in Showcase #6 in February 1957. Here is how Wikipedia describes the Challengers origin: When acquaintances miraculously survive a plane crash unscathed, they conclude that since they are "living on borrowed time" they should band together for hazardous adventures. The four—pilot Kyle "Ace" Morgan, daredevil Matthew "Red" Ryan, strong and slow-witted Leslie "Rocky" Davis, and scientist Walter Mark "Prof" Haley—became the Challengers of the Unknown. Showcase #6, and the first appearance of the Challengers of the Unknown, by Jack Kirby Visually the Challengers and the Fantastic Four were similar. Both wore skin tight uniforms with belts and minimal decoration. The Fantastic Four’s relatively simple characterizations were practically pulled from Challengers. Reed takes on the traits of both Kyle, the leader, and Walter, the scientist. Johnny, the Human Torch is the daredevil. The Thing is “strong and slow-witted”. Sue, the only woman on the team, seems like a new addition, but is likely based on June Robbins who joined the Challengers team in Showcase #7, as an “honorary” or “girl-Challenger”. After surviving their respective “miraculous” crashes, both the Challengers and the Fantastic Four band together to help the world. They both travel through space and other dimensions, fighting mad scientists and monsters. The Fantastic Four’s early antagonists were not traditional super villains. In the first few issues they fight monsters from under the Earth (Issue #1), shape changing aliens (#2), and a charlatan who uses hypnotism to steal from his audience (#3). In issue #4 Kirby and Lee re-introduce Namor, the Submariner, one of Marvel’s top IP from the 1940s, and have him kidnap Sue. Only in Issue #5 and #6 (June and August 1962) and do we get a more standard-supervillain when Dr Doom attempts to steal the Fantastic Four headquarters and throw it into space. The next superhero Lee created was even less heroic than the Fantastic Four. In April 1962 (pull date), Marvel published The Incredible Hulk. If it was even a superhero story in disguise it was a very good disguise. The story was a scientific-filtered version of Dr Jekyl and Mr Hyde. It was a pure monster-story with nothing very super about it. Nothing on the cover suggests this has anything to do with superheroes: It is not clear if even Lee at the time thought the Hulk would be a superhero. In Fantastic Four #5 Johnny is reading a “great new comic mag” and mocks the Thing by comparing him to the Hulk. It seems pretty clear at this point that in the Fantastic Four’s world, the Hulk is just a fictional comic book, like in ours (more on that later): The other two superheroes the Marvel introduces in this period have even more subtle introductions. At the time Marvel had a number of generic-sounding titles and told science fiction and fantasy stand-alone stories: Tales to Astonish

Inline links: The Educated Mind, Greeking Out, Nobody gives a shi*t about any of the other Marvel characters. Go back and do a deal for only Spider-Man, Dark Universe, appropriately mocked, memes, attempting to build a universe, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MbHP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F63b4711e-2248-4120-897e-bba8a595a28b_405x616.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OCj5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9afeb585-b58b-4932-8702-153b4fdf135d_619x305.png, Wikipedia, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OzTl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F49fd3582-b5bd-4567-b5e9-cca46c1f1c49_425x615.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lfiM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc23c3ad1-5fed-4063-8ac2-d9d89e69bee6_252x398.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oV4t!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F346f85d9-580b-4eb2-b91c-3422003613d5_591x572.png

Egyptian pharaohs1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptian pharaohs is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2024 and September 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Why did Egyptian pharaohs so often marry their sisters?". It most often appears alongside @halomancer1, ACX, Amazon.

Reference entry: Egyptian pharaohs
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 12, 2024
Last seen: September 12, 2024

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Links For September 2024 September 12, 2024

@halomancer1 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Amish 1 shared issues

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Links For September 2024

September 12, 2024 · Original source

14: Why did Egyptian pharaohs so often marry their sisters? David Roman explains that it actually made sense by the logic of the time. Pharaohs didn’t necessarily consummate their marriages, and their heirs would usually be born from unrelated concubines, so the risk of inbreeding was low. What they really wanted was to avoid having to marry royal-line women off to anyone else - who could then create their own branches of the royal dynasty with competing claims to the throne. 15: The ominously named “cerebrolysin” has a positive reputation in the nootropics community, but Greg Fitzgerald and Dan Elton do a deep dive and find that its manufacturing process is so poor that it ends up being mostly random amino acids - ie it can’t possibly work the way its proponents suggest. Interestingly, cerebrolysin performed about the same as some definitely-real chemicals (eg melatonin, nicotine) on my old nootropics survey, re-emphasizing that most of what the survey measures is placebo effects. 16: Why is the Ukraine war a horrible grinding war of attrition like World War I, instead of resembling more dynamic modern conflicts? I asked this on an Open Thread and got some good answers: PolymorphicWetware says that the Soviets focused on artillery, so the post-Soviet armies of both Russia and Ukraine are both artillery-heavy. Artillery is better at defending your lines than breaking your enemies’, so both sides are great at pushing back enemy troops but bad at pushing forward themselves.

Inline links: David Roman explains that it actually made sense by the logic of the time, Greg Fitzgerald and Dan Elton do a deep dive, my old nootropics survey, PolymorphicWetware

Egyptian scientific community1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptian scientific community is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 23, 2021 and November 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "I am not sure that the Egyptian scientific community has as strong an anti-fraud mechanism". It most often appears alongside 1/6 insurrectionists, Ahmed, Alabama.

Reference entry: Egyptian scientific community
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 23, 2021
Last seen: November 23, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On Ivermectin November 23, 2021

6 insurrectionists 1 shared issues
Ahmed 1 shared issues
Alabama 1 shared issues
Alexandros Marinos 1 shared issues
Amrhein 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Ivermectin

November 23, 2021 · Original source

I am happy to own up to being biased against certain countries. I am not sure that the Egyptian scientific community has as strong an anti-fraud mechanism as some other places, given their history of fraudulent papers. I feel bad for innocent Egyptian scientists who might have a harder time getting people to take them seriously as a result, but not so bad that if an Egyptian paper comes up with results much better than everyone else, I’m not going to be suspicious.

Egyptian texts1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptian texts is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 13, 2023 and January 13, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "mentions in Egyptian texts are less definitive". It most often appears alongside ancient-aliens theory, Earth, Egyptian pyramids.

Reference entry: Egyptian texts
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 13, 2023
Last seen: January 13, 2023

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Conspiracies of Cognition, Conspiracies Of Emotion January 13, 2023

ancient-aliens theory 1 shared issues
Earth 1 shared issues
Egyptian pyramids 1 shared issues
Elders of Zion 1 shared issues
Great Pyramid 1 shared issues

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Conspiracies of Cognition, Conspiracies Of Emotion

January 13, 2023 · Original source

But the conspiracy theorist has to explain away the evidence on the left. This is a harder task. Sometimes you can just stretch a lot of things to make it work - I’ve seen people argue that the supposed mentions in Egyptian texts are less definitive than imagined. But one very strong explanation would be “archaeologists are so invested in protecting the mainstream narrative that they cover up all the evidence that would prove me right”, ie a conspiracy. This neatly sweeps aside a lot of the problem.

Egyptians1 mentions across 1 issues

Egyptians is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2021 and May 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Sedentary agriculture as invented by the Egyptians and other ancient cultures". It most often appears alongside 1992 treaty, ACX, Africa.

Reference entry: Egyptians
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 21, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower May 21, 2021

1992 treaty 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Alaska 1 shared issues
Allen Farrington 1 shared issues

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Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints?

May 21, 2021 · Original source

He uses ancient Egypt to illustrate a great balance of transport. The reliable water and rich soil of the Nile’s floodplains created near-perfect farming conditions, and the Nile itself allowed easy travel and trade throughout the valley. Combined with impenetrable desert borders, this geography “was one of the few places in the world where there was enough water to survive, and enough security to thrive.” Because of that, the “geography nearly guaranteed that the Egyptians would be on the road to civilization.” He gives us a quick run through Egyptian history to tell a story of that road, beginning with the settlement of the area about eight thousand years ago, consolidation into a single kingdom more than five thousand years ago, and then stagnation as the increasingly centralized government devoted more labor to monument building rather than technological progress, eventually being conquered by seafaring people seeking to rule the Mediterranean. 2

Inline links: 2

To escape our pre-civilization/hunter-gatherer days – Zeihan refers to this as “when life sucked” – the mechanism that he identifies is basically a typical economist’s story. Sedentary agriculture as invented by the Egyptians and other ancient cultures became a transformative technology, letting populations grow and devote labor and resources to non-farming purposes. From this, we got specialization, increased production, trade (particularly where there was easy transportation – population centers were always near water) and capital formation in a self-reinforcing cycle. For thousands of years after this transformative technology was introduced, incremental improvements in agriculture and other areas followed, but “a robust, secure, and sustainable food supply” was the base of any civilization.

Ehlers-Danlos1 mentions across 1 issues

Ehlers-Danlos is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 16, 2023 and March 16, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Ehlers-Danlos: 0.36% cis vs. 0.37% trans". It most often appears alongside ACX survey, ACX Survey, ACX Survey Results.

Reference entry: Ehlers-Danlos
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 16, 2023
Last seen: March 16, 2023

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Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints? March 16, 2023

ACX survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey Results 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
autism 1 shared issues

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March 16, 2023 · Original source

Ehlers-Danlos syndrome is a category of connective tissue disorder; it usually involves stretchy skin and loose, hypermobile joints.

But Long COVID is maximally easy to psych yourself into thinking you have - it’s just fatigue - and Ehlers-Danlos is pretty hard. And Pirate Wires was able to find 1.25x relative risk for bi people and Long COVID, and Najafian found 132x relative risk for trans people and EDS. Also, many trans people are able to easily demonstrate skin/joint abnormalities that are obvious to anyone who looks at them - although it’s possible this is selection bias - a subgroup who have real EDS (at the same rate as cis people) and are very salient because of their gender identity, while cis people with EDS (and trans people with psychosomatic EDS) don’t talk about it as much.

3 ) Genetics: The gene for congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a sex hormone condition that frequently causes gender divergence, is interwoven on chromosome 6 with the gene for tenascin-X, a joint-related protein whose abnormality causes Ehlers-Danlos syndrome. Maybe if there’s a problem in that part of chromosome 6, you could get both conditions. See here for more discussion.

Inline links: See here for more discussion

Ehlers-Danlos syndrome1 mentions across 1 issues

Ehlers-Danlos syndrome is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 16, 2023 and March 16, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Ehlers-Danlos syndrome is a category of connective tissue disorder"; "Ehlers-Danlos is pretty hard". It most often appears alongside ACX survey, ACX Survey, ACX Survey Results.

Reference entry: Ehlers-Danlos syndrome
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 16, 2023
Last seen: March 16, 2023

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Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints? March 16, 2023

ACX survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey Results 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
autism 1 shared issues

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Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints?

March 16, 2023 · Original source

Ehlers-Danlos syndrome is a category of connective tissue disorder; it usually involves stretchy skin and loose, hypermobile joints.

3 ) Genetics: The gene for congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a sex hormone condition that frequently causes gender divergence, is interwoven on chromosome 6 with the gene for tenascin-X, a joint-related protein whose abnormality causes Ehlers-Danlos syndrome. Maybe if there’s a problem in that part of chromosome 6, you could get both conditions. See here for more discussion.

Inline links: See here for more discussion

But Long COVID is maximally easy to psych yourself into thinking you have - it’s just fatigue - and Ehlers-Danlos is pretty hard. And Pirate Wires was able to find 1.25x relative risk for bi people and Long COVID, and Najafian found 132x relative risk for trans people and EDS. Also, many trans people are able to easily demonstrate skin/joint abnormalities that are obvious to anyone who looks at them - although it’s possible this is selection bias - a subgroup who have real EDS (at the same rate as cis people) and are very salient because of their gender identity, while cis people with EDS (and trans people with psychosomatic EDS) don’t talk about it as much.

EICAR1 mentions across 1 issues

EICAR is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2025 and August 29, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "orange T-shirt with the EICAR string as a QR code". It most often appears alongside "Beer Capital" pub, 100 Black Birch Trail, 11841 Wagner Street, Culver City.

Reference entry: EICAR
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 29, 2025
Last seen: August 29, 2025

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Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places August 29, 2025

"Beer Capital" pub 1 shared issues
100 Black Birch Trail 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street, Culver City 1 shared issues
13 Mile road 1 shared issues
131 Colonie Center 1 shared issues

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Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places

August 29, 2025 · Original source

Contact: Steve Contact Info: Steve[period]Bachelor[a t]gmail[period]com Time: Sunday, October 12th, 4:00 PM Location: Meeting in Milaneo mall courtyard, outside Starbucks, for ease of finding. Moving to my flat, above, for the main meetup. I will wear my white “shrimp love me, un-aligned AIs fear me” hat, and an orange T-shirt with the EICAR string as a QR code. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8FWFQ5RM+H8 Group Link: https://discord.gg/USE [remove this bit] SQgzg (Say in the Introductions channel you’re here for Stuttgart)

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8FWFQ5RM+H8

El Salvador mass incarceration movement1 mentions across 1 issues

El Salvador mass incarceration movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 10, 2024 and December 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Bukele mass incarceration movement only resulted in a massive increase in the prison population". It most often appears alongside ACT, AI, America.

Reference entry: El Salvador mass incarceration movement
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 10, 2024
Last seen: December 10, 2024

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Highlights From The Comments On Prison December 10, 2024

ACT 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Asterisk 1 shared issues
Belgium 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Prison

December 10, 2024 · Original source

How come in one million articles about Bukele and crime in El Salvador, including many trying to discredit him or say it wasn’t worth it, I’ve never heard a peep about this? And if it wasn’t Bukele or mass incarceration that did it, then what was it? [Y] writes: I have issues with the El Salvador portion of this post. These charts show that the Bukele mass incarceration movement only resulted in a massive increase in the prison population from 2020 forward, based on projected population. The graph shows the murder rate peaking in 2015 and dropping precipitously in the next three years prior to Bukele's presidency. This means, unless I'm missing something, that the vast majority of the decrease in the murder rate occurred before Bukele took office and started putting people in prison at all and thus cannot be attributed to his policies, incarceration or otherwise. Bukele took office in 2019 and did not begin the crackdown until June of that year. The state of emergency that allowed the government to suspend various rights in order to crack down on gangs even further didn't begin until early 2022 While the murder rate was obviously still quite high before Bukele's incarceration policies began, it seems almost actively misleading not to mention that it was collapsing even before he instituted these policies as a result of things like a renewed gang truce in 2016 under the previous government and instead seemingly attribute all of it to him. Further, the post-Bukele homicide data is dubious in several ways. The Bukele government stopped counting bodies discovered buried in unmarked graves as homicides, incentivizing gang members to hide their victims instead of publicly displaying them as trophies or warnings as they had done in years prior. They stopped counting people the police or military shot as homicides, classifying them instead as “legal interventions". They have excluded killings in prisons from the homicide data, which seems like exactly the most obvious way to lie about homicide rates when you begin imprisoning everyone. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/08/el-salvador-bukele-crime-homicide-prison-gangs/ The source article suggests the above may represent as much as a 47% undercounting. Well, one might say, that still leaves El Salvador much safer than before Bukele’s tenure. But I’m not linking the above to try and pin down exactly the right figure of undercounting. I would suggest instead that these changes to the metrics demonstrate a willful and deliberate pattern of obscuring the homicide rate in El Salvador. The post-Bukele data consequently seems almost useless to me, as you cannot really assume we know all the ways the Bukele government is fudging the data. These are just the ones on record. It’s not that murder has disappeared in El Salvador - it’s more like it’s now de facto legal in many contexts. An MS13 member who rolls up on a rival gang’s stash house and shoots it up now knows that if they can bury the bodies in an unmarked grave outside of town without being caught red-handed with the shovels and corpses, the victims will legally cease to exist. They’re not prosecuting people for these murders, right? Otherwise they would show up in the data. The media doesn't talk about them. You don't see the evidence. Out of sight, out of mind. I'm not suggesting no murders were prevented as a result of the Bukele government's mass incarceration policies, obviously. I can also see the argument that it's good for society for criminals to kill each other in prison yard fights instead of getting into shootouts in a marketplace where an innocent bystander also gets their head blown off. I just think the fundamental premise - that he arrested everyone and it caused murders to stop happening and we need to reason forward from there - is extremely dubious. Drethelin writes: idk about the statistics but multiple people I talked to in el salvador specifically told me theft was WAY down like walking down the street with your phone in your hand was now an option where it used to not be people can now both afford to and feel safe owning cars, etc. among other things they are very proactive about using what we wouldn't really consider due process, eg cops browsing facebook and like, going after guys that people post from their security camera footage as taking their bike or whatever Thanks - I had said in the post that although murder was down, the statistics didn’t really show this about theft - but I was eyeballing statistics not really gathered for this purpose and if the news on the ground is that theft is down, I believe it. 4: Comments On Probation In response to a question of why probation with GPS tracking hasn’t taken off as an alternative to prison, Peter answers: Because convicts turn it down. You see at least in America probation (which is what GPS monitoring is part of) and incarceration aren't related, you get no credit for the former when it comes to the latter and people like to overlook over half of people incarcerated aren't there for any crime at all but simply a technical probation violation like getting fired from your job from not showing up on time because your probation officer randomly changes times of meetings daily (which is also results in prison even if you are one minute late). If the max sentence is five years prison plus probation time doesn't count and you have a more likely than not chance of violating probation because it's designed to be unreasonable and cause failures as a back door way for judge's to avoid trials, why would you accept GPS monitoring which will only increase your chances of being violated. I.e..why do nine years (four years probation out of your ten year probation, then violated, then five in more actual prison) when you can just do five. Generally the rule among convicts is if the prison sentence is shorter than the probation sentence, just take prison day one. As a convict you can, and many do, turn down probation. If you want to fix this then you need to let convicts "try" probation where they get credit at a 1-1, or even better motivate them so let's say 2-1, towards a future prison sentence when they fail. This entire conversation (OP) is worthless as it's making the standard mistake of just looking at prison and not probation, jail, fines, etc all which backdoor as a way to avoid trials lead to prison. This isn’t very clearly written, but my impression is that Peter is saying that violating probation gives you a longer prison sentence than just accepting prison in the first place, probation is deliberately designed to be near-impossible to keep, and so it’s a con to trick criminals into longer sentences without having to get them through a judge and jury. Criminals know this, so they refuse probation. This kind of conflicts with the “criminals have high time preference and make terrible decisions” point above, so I’m not sure what to think of it. I wonder if people ever try GPS tracking (without the rest of probation) as a prison alternative. “You’re getting off with a warning this time, but wear this tracker, and if you commit any other crimes in the future, we’ll know.” [EDIT: commenter answers here] More from Peter: Remember, the entire point of probation is to get people to avoid a trial by plea dealing to probation and then put them in prison anyways without any due process because reasonable people, the sort that takes plea deals, believe in the system hence overestimate their ability to complete probation. And so you put them in prison on a technical violation, i.e. getting fired after you intentionally caused them to do so, not having a place to live after you intentionally refused to approve anywhere they tried live, changing their appointment times without confirming they know ("I left a message with their dog"), or just harass them until they give up and just go to prison. Americans tend to discount probation as a joke but any experienced convict knows probation as implemented is worse hence just goes to jail. Also note that probation and PAROLE are different and significantly so, you actually get credit for parole time. Parole WANTS you to succeed, after all they paroled you, probation doesn't. They aren't even the same group of government offices either which is part of the problem. Probation falls under the judiciary (they work for the court) hence they free up budgets the faster they can move you over to the executive (prison) branch whereas parole is a cost saving measure as it falls under the same prison budget, i.e. parole officers aren't probation officers. Also all those fancy rehabilitation programs people love to tore to decrease recidivism goes to parolees, not probationers. I.e. there are giant structural incentives from pure intergovernmental bureaucratic budget wars to move people from probation to prison and because it's controlled by judges, I.e. the prison department can't just refuse to take a trivial probationary revokee, it's a one sided fight […] For example I got a friend that just got two years for the driving the speed limit in Texas while at a funeral, travel approved by the judge, because probation also makes it illegal to break your state law even in another jurisdiction where it's legal. He was driving 85 (the posted speed limit) in outside Austin but in Hawaii it's a misdemeanor to exceed 80 mph for any reason on any road strict liability; his PO asked him "jokingly" if he drove the speed limit while there and if he enjoyed the faster mainland speeds, he said "yes" unbeknownst to him he was being setup. His admission resulted in his probation being revoked for literally following the posted speed limit. Charlotte Wollstonecraft writes: The marginal prisoner in Massachusetts may be a much badder dude than the marginal prisoner in Louisiana. But here is anecdotal reason to believe he is not: Last week in New Orleans, there were three mass shootings. Two of them happened at the same second line in New Orleans East, 45 minutes apart. In two separate incidents, a gunman opened fire at a large outdoor gathering. In total, two people died, and ten were wounded. This is not national news. No arrests have been made. The third shooting took place in the French Quarter four days later. One of the three shooters was caught immediately. Turns out, he had already served seven years in prison for armed robbery. Last year, he was arrested again and charged with domestic battery, child endangerment, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A plea deal got him out on parole, the terms of which he violated near daily according to his ankle monitor's logs. He was wearing the ankle monitor at the time he opened fire on a French Quarter street, wounding three people and killing another. I’m including this here as a counter to Peter’s story of the guy who got two years in jail for driving the speed limit. I hear so many outrageous stories of extreme strictness and so many outrageous stories of extreme laxity (see also this post) that I’m nervous about turning the dial one way or the other compared to trying to figure out what’s going on. 5: Comments That Say My Analysis Forgot Something Grant Gould writes: You allude to it twice but then pass over it "for simplicity": None of these studies measure within-prison crime, which is largely not counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted. It is not only plausible but likely that "incapacitation" is at best simply relocation of crimes. And even _that_ is leaving aside the regular drumbeat of deeply sadistic crimes by guards, which are even less counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted. The quality of statistics on crimes within prisons is very poor, of course; ttbomk it is not practically possible to know if the average prisoner commits crimes at a greater rate while incarcerated than while outside, or likewise the rate at which people in prison are crime victims versus those outside. If your value function is some sort of utilitarian sum over society, you have to count those, or else your utilitarianism is just gerrymandering people into and out of the boundaries of the utility summation (in which case you can optimize utility much more simply than by incarcerating; simple Schmittianism will do the job more easily, and it's free since you don't count the cost). I wrote this post to respond to debates (eg on California’s Prop 36) on whether prison is an effective way of decreasing the crime that normal people have to suffer in their neighborhoods. I think this is an important question that lots of people care about. Whether prisoners commit crimes against other prisoners is also important, but it’s a different question. I think people would justly distrust me if I pretended to be answering the question they cared about, but actually answered a different question. I (following Roodman) gave two conclusions in my cost-benefit analysis - one that counted the suffering by prisoners themselves, and one that didn’t. Since I think different people will have different intuitions on this, I think it was the right strategy. The one that counted the suffering of prisoners included a general estimate of willingness-to-pay for prison which I think includes the cost of intra-prison crimes. Either way, I think being exposed to intra-prison crimes is a small fraction of the badness of prison that doesn’t change that analysis much. I also don’t think it’s exactly right to say that incarceration only relocates (rather than prevents) crime. This may be true for murder and rape. But there aren’t a lot of things to steal in prison (not zero, but not as much as in the outside world) and the vast majority of crimes are property crimes. JBG writes: Some thoughts as a former defense attorney. On "after effects," skipping all the way to length of incarceration misses a lot of what's going on for first time offenders. As your own examples note, many of the problems making it harder to make an honest living accrue from being a felon as such, and not from jail time. I'll add on that merely being *arrested* triggers a similar cascade of consequences. Your average person will be fired from their job very quickly after arrest -- either because of the arrest itself or just because it leads to missing work. And an arrest on its own, without a conviction, is sufficient to make it hard to get hired on in a lot of jobs. But this is all specific to first-time offenders; going from someone presumed to be a law-abiding citizen to being a felon changes everything. An incremental felony after that doesn't change much. From your description, it seems like the studies are blurring this together? I'd be interested to see evidence focused specifically on first time offenders. My guess would be that there's a large, negative effect of your first felony (all else equal) but not much effect at all of subsequent felonies. In that case, there's a very different calculus for the incapacitation vs. recidivism tradeoff for different, identifiable groups. Undeserving Porcupine writes: Eugenic effects of 3-5x’ing the prison population? Makes it harder for these criminals to make more of themselves. Several people brought this up on Twitter. It deserves a full post response, but in case I don’t get around to making it - I think this is almost zero. I realize that’s a surprising claim, but compare the Nazi eugenics program against schizophrenics discussed here. They killed most of the schizophrenics in Germany, and schizophrenia is 80% genetic, yet the next generation had the same number of schizophrenics as ever, at least within the measurement margin of error. See the post for a longer explanation of this seemingly paradoxical result. Sebjenseb did a similar analysis and finds that if you execute the most criminal 1% of the population each generation, population level criminality decreases by about 0.1 standard deviation per 400 years. This is less trivial than I expected - it corresponds to a drop in the murder rate from 30 to 20 (possibly less for other crimes). But it's also a better case than our real scenario for a few reasons (police have 100% efficiency in arresting the worst criminals exactly in order; execution is better at preventing childbearing than prison). Maybe a real scenario is 33% decrease in crime rate per 600 years? Doesn't seem that relevant to me - even if we don’t get a singularity in the next few decades like I expect, we’ll probably get better genetic engineering or go multiplanetary (in which case founder effects will overwhelm everything else). Publius Obsequium writes: One thing Scott neglects is the beneficial effect prison has on kids of criminals (yes you read that right - look it up) Here is an article making this case and citing some corroborating studies. I would stress that there are also many (probably more) studies finding the opposite, and that I haven’t looked through any of the studies on either side to check whether they’re any good. Straphanger writes: This analysis ignores that punishment is a good in itself. The victims of crimes deserve retribution against the people who have wronged them. Some version of this was one of the most common comments, with opinions ranging from: I was a bad person for not focusing on the suffering of the prisoners in prison more, especially their potential victimization by prisoner-on-prisoner violence.

Inline links: writes, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/08/el-salvador-bukele-crime-homicide-prison-gangs/, Peter answers, commenter answers here, writes, this post, writes, writes, writes, here, did a similar analysis, writes, Here is an article, finding the opposite, writes

elastomeric respirators1 mentions across 1 issues

elastomeric respirators is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 30, 2025 and October 30, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "the next generation of masks - elastomeric respirators - seem significantly more effective". It most often appears alongside 767 AD, @Scientific_Bird, ACX.

Reference entry: elastomeric respirators
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 30, 2025
Last seen: October 30, 2025

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Links For October 2025 October 30, 2025

767 AD 1 shared issues
@Scientific_Bird 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
ACX community 1 shared issues
AI 2027 1 shared issues

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Links For October 2025

October 30, 2025 · Original source

45: Andrew Snyder-Beattie on the latest advances in biodefense. Without having fully resolved the debate over the real-world utility of COVID-era masks and N95s, the next generation of masks - elastomeric respirators - seem significantly more effective, including for people not specially trained in wearing them. Also, propylene glycol vapor - ie the fog in fog machines - kills all germs. Having indoor spaces constantly enveloped in fog is a weird ask, but we might find ways to make it work for crucial infrastructure during a pandemic, and “the US already produces enough to cover all industrial and much residential floorspace.” More things I didn’t know: “In a worst-case scenario where all crops die instantly, the US has enough stockpiled food (including animal feed) to last at least 18 months.”

Inline links: Andrew Snyder-Beattie on the latest advances in biodefense

Elder God1 mentions across 1 issues

Elder God is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 10, 2022 and June 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "summon back the Elder God that is our innate form of government". It most often appears alongside 50,000 BC, Africa, Altamira.

Reference entry: Elder God
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 10, 2022
Last seen: June 10, 2022

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https://what3words.com/guitars.record.caps

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Your Book Review: The Dawn Of Everything June 10, 2022

50,000 BC 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Altamira 1 shared issues
Amazonia 1 shared issues
Asia 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Dawn Of Everything

June 10, 2022 · Original source

Which means that, with the advent of social media, and the resultant triumph of the spread of gossip over Dunbar’s number, we might have just inadvertently performed the equivalent of summoning an Elder God. The ability to organize society through raw social power given back to a species that had to climb out of the trap of raw social power by inventing civilization. The Gossip Trap is our first Eldritch Mother, the Garrulous Gorgon With a Thousand Heads, The Beast Made Only of Sound.

I think it’s a true yarn, I really do. I think the Gossip Trap is real, or at least, explains more than the other hypotheses about prehistorical life I’ve read, and I think it’s likely we did accidentally, via social media, summon back the Elder God that is our innate form of government. And I think we should be worried about civilization itself.

Elders of Zion1 mentions across 1 issues

Elders of Zion is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 13, 2023 and January 13, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Still, this seems easier to think about sympathetically than the Elders of Zion". It most often appears alongside ancient-aliens theory, Earth, Egyptian pyramids.

Reference entry: Elders of Zion
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 13, 2023
Last seen: January 13, 2023

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Issue trail

Conspiracies of Cognition, Conspiracies Of Emotion January 13, 2023

ancient-aliens theory 1 shared issues
Earth 1 shared issues
Egyptian pyramids 1 shared issues
Egyptian texts 1 shared issues
Great Pyramid 1 shared issues

Source context

Conspiracies of Cognition, Conspiracies Of Emotion

January 13, 2023 · Original source

But there’s a second type of conspiracy theory. Consider the Elders of Zion, or the Global Adrenochrome Pedophile Cabal. These conspiracies weren’t invented to explain away any facts. Usually believers are more invested in the exact nature of the conspiracy than in any of the facts they supposedly explain; often they’re very angry about the whole situation.

But second, I like when I have personal experience with a cognitive bias, so I know what it feels from the inside. The most recent time I fell for a conspiracy theory was Trump-Russiagate. I didn’t believe in an active way, so much as hear that lots of other people believed it, assume it was probably true, and not bother looking into it. Still, this seems easier to think about sympathetically than the Elders of Zion, so let’s think about it.

Electoral College1 mentions across 1 issues

Electoral College is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 23, 2024 and July 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "factors - inflation, Afghanistan, the Electoral College". It most often appears alongside Afghanistan, Akhenaten, Al Franken.

Reference entry: Electoral College
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 23, 2024
Last seen: July 23, 2024

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Some Practical Considerations Before Descending Into An Orgy Of Vengeance July 23, 2024

Afghanistan 1 shared issues
Akhenaten 1 shared issues
Al Franken 1 shared issues
Amarna 1 shared issues
Amun 1 shared issues

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Some Practical Considerations Before Descending Into An Orgy Of Vengeance

July 23, 2024 · Original source

Any rule of the form “Don’t do X, unless you can think up a big pile of negative adjectives to describe why the people you’re doing X to deserve it” will simply never prevent anyone from doing X, not even once. 5. Most Cancellations Are Friendly Fire Postcards From Barsoom helpfully includes a list of the cancellations he finds most enraging. I agree most of them are enraging. But they’re not stories about Trump, Tucker Carlson, or Nick Fuentes. The median victim of cancel culture is some center-left college professor who sent out an email saying that he supports BLM but questions some of their tactics. (I would add David Shor to the list as an especially revealing case, and Al Franken as an especially clear own-goal) This is because you mostly get the critical mass necessary for cancellation in very leftist institutions, and most people in very leftist institutions are leftists. There’s a deeper problem here where pre-emptive fear of cancellation blocked rightists from joining these institutions in the first place. But in terms of actual cancellations, they’re usually some poor shmuck who put too few exclamation points after “BLM!!!!” Likewise, if there are right-wing cancellation squads, they won’t cancel Rachel Maddow or Kamala Harris. They’ll get some WSJ writer who puts too few exclamation points after “MAGA!!!!” 6. Cancellation Is The Enemy Of Competence Cancellation isn’t just morally bad. It also screws over society. And it screws over your own institutions worst of all. By society I mean: you want scientists to be producing good science, not producing the science least likely to get them cancelled. You want the Federal Reserve filled with the best economists, not the most politically pure economists. No matter how righteous your cause, if you cancel people who don’t agree with it, you end up with the kind of low-quality science and corrupt institutions we’ve grown used to recently. This is bad insofar as you care about things like truth, trust, or national flourishing. But even if you don’t care about those things, remember that cancellation is mostly friendly fire. Cancellers can’t 100% control broader society, but they do control their own party and its organs. I think this is part of why the Democratic Party is floundering right now. At the risk of getting cancelled myself, it kind of seems like Democrats now wish they’d put a little more of thought into picking a popular/electable VP in 2020 instead of the most diversity-box-ticking person they could find on short notice. Why didn’t they? Well, would you, as a Democratic Party insider, want to speak out against Kamala Harris, in f**king 2020 of all years? Obviously anyone who tried that would have been cancelled. So nobody spoke out against the decision, they went ahead with it, and now they’ve boxed themselves into a corner. You, too, can one day have a party this self-sabotaging and incapable of winning elections! All you need to do is adopt cancel culture! (“But we would only apply it to actually bad things, not to people on our own side just trying to warn us”. I’m pretty sure the Democrats didn’t go into this expecting to punish people on their own side trying to warn them, yet here we are.) 7. No, Seriously, This Is A Terrible Decision I think the Democrats as a political party are massively underperforming their fundamentals. They have most of the elites (elites, by definition, are powerful), most of the donor money, and their two main bases (college graduates and minorities) have both ballooned as a share of the population, while the Republicans’ (white people, rural people) are in decline. They control all the prestige media. Trump has no self-control and dozens of skeletons in his closet. How could they lose? There are many factors - inflation, Afghanistan, the Electoral College - but part of the story has to be that wokeness and cancel culture are historically unpopular. They produced short-term gains (as people became afraid to speak out against them) but long-term disaster (as their extremism alienated friends and fired up enemies). This is still just my optimistic prediction. But if conservatives ever in fact take enough power that they can wield cancellation more effectively than the Democrats, then it will have been borne out. In which case, you, too, will have the opportunity for short-term gains at the expense of alienating everybody with a backbone and/or conscience. What could possibly go wrong? 8. Don’t Go Mad With Power Until You Actually Get The Power I can’t remember if this is on the Evil Overlord List, but it should be. The right is still out of power. For one thing, Biden is still President. There’s even (according to betting markets) a 40% chance that the Dems win the next election. (The argument in this paragraph isn’t original, but I lost the link to it): Consider an undecided voter in a swing state. As an independent, they’re probably on the right on some issues and on the left on others. Many of them are probably former liberals who left the fold because of wokeness and cancel culture. Now they check out what right-wingers have to offer, and it’s “We also love cancel culture, we plan to drop all of our principles as soon as we win, anyone with lefty opinions should be terrified.” Doesn’t sound like a great advertisement. But also: even if Trump wins in a landslide, conservatives still won’t control the levers of cancel culture. Did the Republicans taking the White House, House, and Senate in 2016 end cancel culture? Did it even slow it down? Plus or minus a few civil rights laws, cancel culture isn’t implemented at the government level. It’s implemented at the level of media, institutions, and popular taste-making, which Democrats hold more firmly than federal government. Even if Trump wins, the median outcome of conservatives endorsing cancellation is that the few liberals in these institutions trying to restrain their worst tendencies get dismissed as useful idiots for conservatives who wouldn’t hesitate to cancel them if they were on the other side. Why mention this? Because the people talking about cancellation insist they’re “just being strategic” and “just laser-focused on winning” when in fact writing the blog posts at all reveals they couldn’t care less about any of these considerations. It’s psychological re-enactment, plain and simple. 9. There’s Probably Other Options “But we can’t just do nothing!” Unfreedom of conscience, like famine and plague, has haunted us throughout history and will probably continue to do so. Still, I think the very-long-range trend for all three problems is down, and that hard work by good people can push that forward. This will look like boring incremental progress, ie the only thing that has ever worked. Here are some possible subtasks: Politicians should dismantle the government apparatus propping up cancel culture. Certainly the sorts of things mentioned in the Twitter Files count here, but so do some of the civil rights stuff Richard Hanania talks about in Origins of Woke.

Inline links: Postcards From Barsoom, David Shor, Al Franken, Evil Overlord List, psychological re-enactment, Twitter Files, Origins of Woke

electric cars1 mentions across 1 issues

electric cars is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 04, 2022 and April 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "newer paradigms (cryptocurrency, electric cars)". It most often appears alongside 2013, Agricultural Revolution, AI.

Reference entry: electric cars
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 04, 2022
Last seen: April 04, 2022

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Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds April 04, 2022

2013 1 shared issues
Agricultural Revolution 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI alignment theory 1 shared issues
Ajeya 1 shared issues

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Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds

April 04, 2022 · Original source

Now imagine a graph of total tech industry profits over time. Without having seen this graph, I imagine relatively consistent growth. In the 1990s, the growth was mostly from selling PCs and Windows CDs, which were on the super-hot growth parts of their sigmoid. By the 2000s, those had matured and flattened out, but new paradigms (smartphones, online retail) were on the super-hot growth parts of their sigmoids. By the late 2010s, those had matured too, but newer paradigms (cryptocurrency, electric cars) were on the super-hot growth parts of their sigmoids. If we want to know what the next decade will bring, we should look for paradigms that are still in the early-slow-growth stage, maybe quantum computers. The idea is: each individual paradigm has a sigmoid that slows and peters out, but the tech industry as a whole generates new sigmoids and maintains its usual growth rate.

electricity1 mentions across 1 issues

electricity is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 27, 2021 and July 27, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "we did this a little with electricity". It most often appears alongside Acemoglu, AGI, AI.

Reference entry: electricity
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 27, 2021
Last seen: July 27, 2021

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Contra Acemoglu On...Oh God, We're Doing This Again, Aren't We? July 27, 2021

Acemoglu 1 shared issues
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AI 1 shared issues
Artificial General Intelligence 1 shared issues
Asilomar Conference 1 shared issues

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Contra Acemoglu On...Oh God, We're Doing This Again, Aren't We?

July 27, 2021 · Original source

On the other hand, what about electricity? I am sure that electricity helps power the Chinese surveillance state. Probably the barbed wire fences on their concentration camps are electrified. Probably they use electric CCTVs to keep track of people, and electronic databases to organize their findings.

Any general purpose new technology makes lots of things more efficient. If you are an evildoer, you can use it to do evil more efficiently. Give an evildoer electricity, and they will invent electrified barbed-wire fences, electronic concentration camp records, and the electric chair (plus those loud stereos people sometimes play at 3 AM).

Electricity put lots of people out of work - I don’t see many lamplighters or hand weavers around anymore. Electricity “warps the public discourse of democracy”, with electrical-powered mass media - the radio, the TV, and now the Internet - all serving as vehicles for propaganda and misinformation during their time (heck, even the printing press did this). Everything the articles accuse AI of, they can convict some older technology of equally well.

Inline links: lamplighters

electro-acoustic music1 mentions across 1 issues

electro-acoustic music is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 04, 2021 and October 04, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "in the 1960s, suddenly it was all about serialism and electro-acoustic music". It most often appears alongside 19th century African art, 20th century, 9-11.

Reference entry: electro-acoustic music
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 04, 2021
Last seen: October 04, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On Modern Architecture October 04, 2021

19th century African art 1 shared issues
20th century 1 shared issues
9-11 1 shared issues
abstract art 1 shared issues
Aka 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Modern Architecture

October 04, 2021 · Original source

Today, I’m more convinced than ever that there is no natural border between styles. The schools may be opposed but not the styles, which should complement each other. But in the 1960s, suddenly it was all about serialism and electro-acoustic music; there was the quasi-institutional obligation to wipe out the past, and the subsidies only went to what has been called “contemporary music” (the word “contemporary” being abusively linked to a style instead of just meaning “of our time”). Without this political, ideological, and basically non-artistic doctrine, there would have been a natural complementarity between tradition and innovation, in music as in all other arts.

electroconvulsive therapy1 mentions across 1 issues

electroconvulsive therapy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 16, 2021 and March 16, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "How does this relate to electroconvulsive therapy?". It most often appears alongside Alaska, Chronotherapeutics Manual, Encoding, Consolidation, and Renormalization in Depression: Synaptic Homeostasis, Plasticity, and Sleep Integrate Rapid Antidepressant Effects.

Reference entry: electroconvulsive therapy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 16, 2021
Last seen: March 16, 2021

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Sleep Is The Mate Of Death March 16, 2021

Alaska 1 shared issues
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Encoding, Consolidation, and Renormalization in Depression: Synaptic Homeostasis, Plasticity, and Sleep Integrate Rapid Antidepressant Effects 1 shared issues
Giulio Tononi 1 shared issues
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Sleep Is The Mate Of Death

March 16, 2021 · Original source

How does this relate to electroconvulsive therapy? From Homeostatic Synaptic Plasticity Strategies In Neurological Disease:

Inline links: Homeostatic Synaptic Plasticity Strategies In Neurological Disease:

The administration of ECS [electroconvulsive shock] also produces prominent synaptic potentiation in rodents. Studies have shown that brief electroconvulsive seizures essentially reduce the degree to which further LTP can be induced in the dentate gyrus of anesthetized rats. Indeed, analyses of the EPSPs (excitatory postsynaptic potentials) and population spike size suggest that LTP induction had already occurred after ECS induced seizure activity,thus hampering further potentiation attempts (Stewart and Reid, 1993; Stewart et al., 1994). These results are also supported by a study in which hippocampal EPSP characteristics were monitored throughout a series of ECS treatments. The increase in EPSP slope developed gradually over the course of the first five seizures, whereas a single seizure did not induce a significant change (Stewart et al., 1994). The saturation of LTP-like plasticity and synaptic strength appears to resist further potentiation attempts, whereas weaker synapses are more likely to gain in strength.

electroencephalography1 mentions across 1 issues

electroencephalography is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 16, 2024 and July 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "utilizes a niche of electroencephalography research". It most often appears alongside auditory cortex, Big Bang, cerebellum.

Reference entry: electroencephalography
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 16, 2024
Last seen: July 16, 2024

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Consciousness As Recursive Reflections July 16, 2024

auditory cortex 1 shared issues
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cerebellum 1 shared issues
Christof Koch 1 shared issues
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Consciousness As Recursive Reflections

July 16, 2024 · Original source

It utilizes a niche of electroencephalography research which is so obscure you’re almost certainly unfamiliar with it, and which as far as I know nobody has ever applied to the problem.

Self-consciousness impedes complex unconscious information processing because it competes with it for neurons. Neurons that are tuned into the rhythm aren’t available for other things, and the recursion of self-referentiality can keep these neurons occupied for a long time. So qualia arise out of neuronal information processing much like biology arises out of chemistry. When chemical reaction chains build each other, they can achieve self-replication. When neuronal activities reflect each other, they can achieve self-reflection. Many processes that know each other become one process that knows itself. From the information processing angle, oscillations that can maintain bits of information have internal working memory, which is the only thing that non-oscillating neuronal activities lack in order to fit the definition of nondeterministic Turing machines. (The IT people among you should grok this immediately. Everyone else may have to dedicate some study time.) From this angle, there are not one, but two levels of information processing systems. The brain is one, obviously. But running inside the brain, oscillations/thoughts with memory are themselves additional information processing systems. It’s analogous to a physical computer system that has, running inside of it, one or more virtual machines. We have failed to locate qualia by imaging the former, because they happen in the latter. This theory of qualia applies only to biological neuronal processes. A for loop is self-referential but is not a biological neuronal process, so I don’t claim it has qualia. “Surely” in the vast space of possible AI architectures, some could be designed to have phenomena that are more or less analogous, but I see no reason to believe the current LLMs do. How to test this theory In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was much hope in the study of consciousness that then-new functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) tools would let us look into the brain more deeply and thereby let us figure out consciousness. While science did indeed learn much more about the brain, the hope that this would help resolve the puzzle of consciousness did not pan out. But the hope wasn’t crazy: new measuring capabilities are a good reason to expect new data that can hopefully clarify matters. There is new such hope, due to another new method called EEG source analysis. Electroencephalography (EEG) puts electrodes on the scalp and measures tiny electrical currents between them. EEG is very good at temporal resolution, but for most of the century since its invention in 1924, it had almost no spatial resolution. It could tell you the differences between individual milliseconds in your electrical flow measurements, but it couldn’t tell you where in the brain the signals were coming from17. However, if you hook those EEG electrodes up to the amounts of computational power available these days, you can mathematically reconstruct quite good guesses about where in the brain the electrical signals are coming from. And that’s a game changer. This combined temporal-spatial resolution lets you localize individual neural oscillations, if they’re large enough. And that’s how you get to look at (oscillating) thoughts! There are multiple EEG source analysis algorithms. Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA) is arguably the best one at the moment. It still has low spatial resolution compared to fMRI, as it says right in the name, and it’ll remain that way. There is a strict physical limit to how much signal this method can ever get out of the noise. But it should suffice for oscillations large enough to exhibit interesting conscious phenomena like self-awareness. Here are a few falsifiable hypotheses that follow from this theory of what makes thoughts/oscillations produce qualia. Most of them could not have been tested without this new method18. Measure EEG of subjects who do the classic test paradigm where stimuli are presented very briefly and subjects report whether they experienced conscious awareness of the stimulus. Run EEG source analysis on the measurements. Variations of the threshold of how long a stimulus has to be presented in order to become conscious should be predictable from variations of the frequency of the oscillation that takes in the signal from the respective sensory neurons.

Inline links: nondeterministic Turing machines, EEG source analysis, 17, Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA), arguably the best one, 18

electromagnetic fields1 mentions across 1 issues

electromagnetic fields is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 09, 2021 and April 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "the modern explanation is electromagnetic fields". It most often appears alongside 1913 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, Alexandria, Aristotelian.

Reference entry: electromagnetic fields
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 09, 2021
Last seen: April 09, 2021

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Your Book Review: On The Natural Faculties April 09, 2021

1913 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1 shared issues
Alexandria 1 shared issues
Aristotelian 1 shared issues
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Aristotle’s physics 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: On The Natural Faculties

April 09, 2021 · Original source

In fact, I was surprised by how modern Galen’s reasoning seems. At one point he discusses magnets, and argues against an atomic explanation of their action. Before you laugh, remember that the modern explanation is electromagnetic fields, which look a lot more like one of Galen’s natural faculties (a tendency for mutual attraction over distance) than they do Epicurus’ view that “the atoms which flow from the stone are related in shape to those flowing from the iron, and so they become easily interlocked with one another”.

Elephant1 mentions across 1 issues

Elephant is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 28, 2024 and June 28, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "hunters unloading their military grade rifles on an Elephant who is trying to protect its babies". It most often appears alongside 2023 special, ACX grant winners, African Gray Parrot.

Reference entry: Elephant
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 28, 2024
Last seen: June 28, 2024

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Your Book Review: Dominion June 28, 2024

2023 special 1 shared issues
ACX grant winners 1 shared issues
African Gray Parrot 1 shared issues
Alex 1 shared issues
Alex the Parrot 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Dominion

June 28, 2024 · Original source

In theory, Scully should fully support an organization like the Nonhuman Rights Project, which brings lawsuits on behalf of creatures like great apes and elephants. Their goal is to change the law so that mammals of such immense intellect are recognized as people. Not people in the sense that they could get a driver’s license and run for office, but so that they can gain the right to live at a sanctuary instead of a barren cell in the zoo. If a corporation can be a legal person, why not Happy the Elephant? Scully, perhaps already feeling way out on a limb in a book where he admits that he almost didn’t talk about farmed animals for fear of alienating potential readers, never satisfactorily answers that question.

Inline links: Nonhuman Rights Project

Scully spends 40+ pages decrying the excesses and absurdities he sees while attending the annual Safari Club convention in Reno, Nevada. He leaves wondering “if there is a wild creature left on the good earth that is not for sale in someone’s brochure, a single plain or forest or depth of sea that is not today being turned to profit.” It’s the type of place where visitors are encouraged to spend $35,000 on a White Rhino hunt before they get put on an endangered species list. Where proprietors can offer packages that guarantee a lion “trophy” because the animals are fenced in and, if needed, drugged. Where a popular DVD for sale is called With Deadly Intent. The climax of that film features hunters unloading their military grade rifles on an Elephant who is trying to protect its babies, felling it with “four dramatic brain shots.”

elephant-patty1 mentions across 1 issues

elephant-patty is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 22, 2021 and April 22, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "undergrads kept complaining about elephant-patty injuries while playing ultimate on the quad". It most often appears alongside ACX, African Gray Parrots, Animal Cognition.

Reference entry: elephant-patty
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 22, 2021
Last seen: April 22, 2021

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Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are? April 22, 2021

ACX 1 shared issues
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Animal Cognition 1 shared issues
apes 1 shared issues
Are We Smart Enough 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are?

April 22, 2021 · Original source

· On the other side of that coin, elephants are clearly very smart, but we've done surprisingly little controlled experiments or close observation with them. Why? At this point, I bet you can guess: because they are huge. They're damn inconvenient to keep in the basement of the biology building, they mess up the trees on alumni drive, and undergrads kept complaining about elephant-patty injuries while playing ultimate on the quad. More seriously, it takes a big, expensive facility to keep captive elephants, and there aren't that many wild habitats. We are missing out on a lot of potentially valuable insights because they are really inconvenient. I don't say this as a moral judgment, but to point out that the same thing might be true elsewhere, and we'd do well to keep an eye out.

Elephants1 mentions across 1 issues

Elephants is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 22, 2021 and April 22, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Elephants can recognize different human languages and even the age and gender of humans". It most often appears alongside ACX, African Gray Parrots, Animal Cognition.

Reference entry: Elephants
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 22, 2021
Last seen: April 22, 2021

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Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are? April 22, 2021

ACX 1 shared issues
African Gray Parrots 1 shared issues
Animal Cognition 1 shared issues
apes 1 shared issues
Are We Smart Enough 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are?

April 22, 2021 · Original source

· On the other side of that coin, elephants are clearly very smart, but we've done surprisingly little controlled experiments or close observation with them. Why? At this point, I bet you can guess: because they are huge. They're damn inconvenient to keep in the basement of the biology building, they mess up the trees on alumni drive, and undergrads kept complaining about elephant-patty injuries while playing ultimate on the quad. More seriously, it takes a big, expensive facility to keep captive elephants, and there aren't that many wild habitats. We are missing out on a lot of potentially valuable insights because they are really inconvenient. I don't say this as a moral judgment, but to point out that the same thing might be true elsewhere, and we'd do well to keep an eye out.

· Elephants can recognize different human languages and even the age and gender of humans - some Elephants know that young Maasai men sometimes stab them, so they flee from young male voices speaking Maasai, while ignoring women and children speaking Maasai, or young men speaking other languages

Eleusinian Mysteries1 mentions across 1 issues

Eleusinian Mysteries is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 26, 2022 and August 26, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Persephone as a plant goddess and her mother Demeter were the central figures of the Eleusinian Mysteries". It most often appears alongside 1917, aesthetics, American.

Reference entry: Eleusinian Mysteries
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 26, 2022
Last seen: August 26, 2022

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Your Book Review: Kora In Hell August 26, 2022

1917 1 shared issues
aesthetics 1 shared issues
American 1 shared issues
Apple 1 shared issues
Benedetto Croce 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Kora In Hell

August 26, 2022 · Original source

William Carlos Williams attributes the title to his friend/rival Ezra Pound, mythological references’ number one fanboy. Kora is a parallel figure to Persephone or Proserpina, the Spring captured and taken to Hades by Hades himself. Persephone as a plant goddess and her mother Demeter were the central figures of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which promised the initiated a groovy afterlife glimpsed at by psychedelic shrooms. And Kora means maiden. Ancient Greeks called her that either because she was like Voldemort, and you were apotropaically not supposed to say her true name because this is a Mystery Cult, damn it. Keeps some of the mystery. Or because she in a way represents all of the maidens, everywhere. So, in that sense, Kora in Hell alludes to the multitude of suffering young women Williams met while working as a doctor, assisting in 1917 style home labors, and, because WWI was going on at the time and doctors were extremely scarce, as a local police surgeon. Conditions were dire:

Eleusinian Myth1 mentions across 1 issues

Eleusinian Myth is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 26, 2022 and August 26, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "where you literally move the Eleusinian Myth to New Jersey". It most often appears alongside 1917, aesthetics, American.

Reference entry: Eleusinian Myth
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 26, 2022
Last seen: August 26, 2022

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Your Book Review: Kora In Hell August 26, 2022

1917 1 shared issues
aesthetics 1 shared issues
American 1 shared issues
Apple 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: Kora In Hell

August 26, 2022 · Original source

As its name implies, the Improvisations is not a meticulously planned book. It’s not a high concept type of thing where you literally move the Eleusinian Myth to New Jersey. William Carlos Williams simply went to work in the morning and when he returned home at night, no matter how late it was, before going to bed, he wrote something, anything, and at the end of the year he had a pile of texts in front of him which were now the rough precursor of a book. Those texts were loosely based on what had happened to him throughout that day, or on something he had seen or thought about. Williams wrote the book during 1917, when he was around 34 years old. That’s the age Dante had when he began the Divine Comedy:

Eliezer-Hanson axis1 mentions across 1 issues

Eliezer-Hanson axis is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 04, 2022 and April 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "if reality is again more extreme along the Eliezer-Hanson axis than Eliezer". It most often appears alongside 2013, Agricultural Revolution, AI.

Reference entry: Eliezer-Hanson axis
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 04, 2022
Last seen: April 04, 2022

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Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds April 04, 2022

2013 1 shared issues
Agricultural Revolution 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI alignment theory 1 shared issues
Ajeya 1 shared issues

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Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds

April 04, 2022 · Original source

Chess AI performance over time. Why does this matter? If there’s a slow takeoff (ie gradual exponential curve), it will become obvious that some kind of terrifying transformative AI revolution is happening, before the situation gets apocalyptic. There will be time to prepare, to test slightly-below-human AIs and see how they respond, to get governments and other stakeholders on board. We don’t have to get every single thing right ahead of time. On the other hand, because this is proceeding along the usual channels, it will be the usual variety of muddled and hard-to-control. With the exception of a few big actors like the US and Chinese government, and maybe the biggest corporations like Google, the outcome will be determined less by any one agent, and more by the usual multi-agent dynamics of political and economic competition. There will be lots of opportunities to affect things, but no real locus of control to do the affecting. If there’s a fast takeoff (ie sudden FOOM), there won’t be much warning. Conventional wisdom will still say that transformative AI is thirty years away. All the necessary pieces (ie AI alignment theory) will have to be ready ahead of time, prepared blindly without any experimental trial-and-error, to load into the AI as soon as it exists. On the plus side, a single actor (whoever has this first AI) will have complete control over the process. If this actor is smart (and presumably they’re a little smart, or they wouldn’t be the first team to invent transformative AI), they can do everything right without going through the usual government-lobbying channels. So the slower a takeoff you expect, the less you should be focusing on getting every technical detail right ahead of time, and the more you should be working on building the capacity to steer government and corporate policy to direct an incoming slew of new technologies. Yudkowsky Contra Christiano Eliezer counters that although progress may retroactively look gradual and continuous when you know what metric to graph it on, it doesn’t necessarily look that way in real life by the measures that real people care about. (one way to think of this: imagine that an AI’s effective IQ starts at 0.1 points, and triples every year, but that we can only measure this vaguely and indirectly. The year it goes from 5 to 15, you get a paper in a third-tier journal reporting that it seems to be improving on some benchmark. The year it goes from 66 to 200, you get a total transformation of everything in society. But later, once we identify the right metric, it was just the same rate of gradual progress the whole time. ) So Eliezer is much less impressed by the history of previous technologies than Paul is. He’s also skeptical of the “GDP will double in 4 years before it doubles in 1” claim, because of two contingent disagreements and two fundamental disagreements. The first contingent disagreement: government regulations make it hard to deploy imperfect things, and non-trivial to deploy things even after they’re perfect. Eliezer has non-jokingly said he thinks AI might destroy the world before the average person can buy a self-driving car. Why? Because the government has to approve self-driving cars (and can drag its feet on that), but the apocalypse can happen even without government approval. In Paul’s model, sometime long before superintelligence we should have AIs that can drive cars, and that increases GDP and contributes to a general sense that exciting things are going on. Eliezer says: fine, what if that’s true? Who cares if self-driving cars will be practical a few years before the world is destroyed? It’ll take longer than that to lobby the government to allow them on the road. The second contingent disagreement: superintelligent AIs can lie to us. Suppose you have an AI which wants to destroy humanity, whose IQ is doubling every six months. Right now it’s at IQ 200, and it suspects that it would take IQ 800 to build a human-destroying superweapon. Its best strategy is to lie low for a year. If it expects humans would turn it off if they knew how close it was to superweapons, it can pretend to be less intelligent than it really is. The period when AIs are holding back so we don’t discover their true power level looks like a period of lower-than-expected GDP growth - followed by a sudden FOOM once the AI gets its superweapon and doesn’t need to hold back. So even if Paul is conceptually right and fundamental progress proceeds along a nice smooth curve, it might not look to us like a nice smooth curve, because regulations and deceptive AIs could prevent mildly-transformative AI progress from showing up on graphs, but wouldn’t prevent the extreme kind of AI progress that leads to apocalypse. To an outside observer, it would just look like nothing much changed, nothing much changed, nothing much changed, and then suddenly, FOOM. But even aside from this, Eliezer doesn’t think Paul is conceptually right! He thinks that even on the fundamental level, AI progress is going to be discontinuous. It’s like a nuclear bomb. Either you don’t have a nuclear bomb yet, or you do have one and the world is forever transformed. There is a specific moment at which you go from “no nuke” to “nuke” without any kind of “slightly worse nuke” acting as a harbinger. He uses the example of chimps → humans. Evolution has spent hundreds of millions of years evolving brainier and brainier animals (not teleologically, of course, but in practice). For most of those hundreds of millions of years, that meant the animal could have slightly more instincts, or a better memory, or some other change that still stayed within the basic animal paradigm. At the chimp → human transition, we suddenly got tool use, language use, abstract thought, mathematics, swords, guns, nuclear bombs, spaceships, and a bunch of other stuff. The rhesus monkey → chimp transition and the chimp → human transition both involved the same ~quadrupling of neuron number, but the former was pretty boring and the latter unlocked enough new capabilities to easily conquer the world. The GPT-2 → GPT-3 transition involved centupling parameter count. Maybe we will keep centupling parameter count every few years, and most times it will be incremental improvement, and one time it will conquer the world. But even talking about centupling parameter points is giving Paul too much credit. Lots of past inventions didn’t come by quadrupling or centupling something, they came by discovering “the secret sauce”. The Wright brothers (he argues) didn’t make a plane with 4x the wingspan of the last plane that didn’t work, they invented the first plane that could fly at all. The Hiroshima bomb wasn’t some previous bomb but bigger, it was what happened after a lot of scientists spent a long time thinking about a fundamentally different paradigm of bomb-making and brought it to a point where it could work at all. The first transformative AI isn’t going to be GPT-3 with more parameters, it will be what happens after someone discovers how to make machines truly intelligent. (this is the same debate Eliezer had with Ajeya over the Biological Anchors post; have I mentioned that Ajeya and Paul are married?) Fine, Let’s Nitpick The Hell Out Of The Chimps Vs. Humans Example This is where the two of them end up, so let’s follow. Between chimps and humans, there were about seven million years of intermediate steps. These had some human capabilities, but not others. IE homo erectus probably had language, but not mathematics, and in terms of taking over the world it did make it to most of the Old World but was less dominant than moderns. But if we say evolutionary history started 500 million years ago (the Cambrian), and AI history started with the Dartmouth Conference in 1955, then the equivalent of 7 million years of evolutionary history is 1 year of AI history. In the very very unlikely and forced comparison where evolutionary history and AI history go at the same speed, there will be only about a year between chimp-level and human-level AIs. A chimp-level AI probably can’t double GDP, so this would count as a fast takeoff by Paul’s criterion. But even more than that, chimp → human feels like a discontinuity. It’s not just “animals kept getting smarter for hundreds of millions of years, and then ended up very smart indeed”. That happened for a while, and then all of sudden there was a near-instant phase transition into a totally different way of using intelligence with completely new abilities. If AI worked like this, we would have useful toys and interesting specialists for a few decades, until suddenly someone “got it right”, completed the package that was necessary for “true intelligence”, and then we would have a completely new category of thing. Paul admits this analogy is awkward for his position. He answers: Chimp evolution is not primarily selecting for making and using technology, for doing science, or for facilitating cultural accumulation. The task faced by a chimp is largely independent of the abilities that give humans such a huge fitness advantage. It’s not completely independent—the overlap is the only reason that evolution eventually produces humans—but it’s different enough that we should not be surprised if there are simple changes to chimps that would make them much better at designing technology or doing science or accumulating culture […] So I don’t think the example of evolution tells us much about whether the continuous change story applies to intelligence. This case is potentially missing the key element that drives the continuous change story—optimization for performance. Evolution changes continuously on the narrow metric it is optimizing, but can change extremely rapidly on other metrics. For human technology, features of the technology that aren’t being optimized change rapidly all the time. When humans build AI, they will be optimizing for usefulness, and so progress in usefulness is much more likely to be linear. That is, evolution wasn’t optimizing for tool use/language/intelligence, so we got an “overhang” where chimps could potentially have been very good at these, but evolution never bothered “closing the circuit” and turning those capabilities “on”. After a long time, evolution finally blundered into an area where marginal improvements in these capacities improved fitness, so evolution started improving them and it was easy. Imagine a company which, through some oversight, didn’t have a Sales department. They just sat around designing and manufacturing increasingly brilliant products, but not putting any effort into selling them. Then the CEO remembers they need a Sales department, starts one up, and the company goes from moving near zero units to moving millions of units overnight. It would look like the company had “suddenly” developed a “vast increase in capabilities”. But this is only possible when a CEO who is weirdly unconcerned about profit forgets to do obvious profit-increasing things for many years. This is Paul’s counterargument to the chimp analogy. Evolution isn’t directly concerned about various intellectual skills; it only wants them in the unusual cases where they’ll contribute to fitness on the margin. AI companies will be very concerned about various intellectual skills. If there’s a trivial change that can make their product 10x better, they’ll make it. So AI capabilities will grow in a “well-rounded” way, there won’t be any “overhangs”, and there won’t be any opportunities for a sudden overhang-solving phase transition with associated new-capability development like with chimps → humans. Eliezer answers: Chimps are nearly useless because they're not general, and doing anything on the scale of building a nuclear plant requires mastering so many different nonancestral domains that it's no wonder natural selection didn't happen to separately train any single creature across enough different domains that it had evolved to solve every kind of domain-specific problem involved in solving nuclear physics and chemistry and metallurgy and thermics in order to build the first nuclear plant in advance of any old nuclear plants existing. Humans are general enough that the same braintech selected just for chipping flint handaxes and making water-pouches and outwitting other humans, happened to be general enough that it could scale up to solving all the problems of building a nuclear plant - albeit with some added cognitive tech that didn't require new brainware, and so could happen incredibly fast relative to the generation times for evolutionarily optimized brainware. Now, since neither humans nor chimps were optimized to be "useful" (general), and humans just wandered into a sufficiently general part of the space that it cascaded up to wider generality, we should legit expect the curve of generality to look at least somewhat different if we're optimizing for that. Eg, right now people are trying to optimize for generality with AIs like Mu Zero and GPT-3. In both cases we have a weirdly shallow kind of generality. Neither is as smart or as deeply general as a chimp, but they are respectively better than chimps at a wide variety of Atari games, or a wide variety of problems that can be superposed onto generating typical human text. They are, in a sense, more general than a biological organism at a similar stage of cognitive evolution, with much less complex and architected brains, in virtue of having been trained, not just on wider datasets, but on bigger datasets using gradient-descent memorization of shallower patterns, so they can cover those wide domains while being stupider and lacking some deep aspects of architecture. It is not clear to me that we can go from observations like this, to conclude that there is a dominant mainline probability for how the future clearly ought to go and that this dominant mainline is, "Well, before you get human-level depth and generalization of general intelligence, you get something with 95% depth that covers 80% of the domains for 10% of the pragmatic impact". ...or whatever the concept is here, because this whole conversation is, on my own worldview, being conducted in a shallow way relative to the kind of analysis I did in Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, where I was like, "here is the historical observation, here is what I think it tells us that puts a lower bound on this input-output curve". Here Eliezer sort of kind of grants Paul’s point that AIs will be optimized for generality in a way chimps aren’t, but points to his previous “Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics” essay to argue that we should expect a fast takeoff anyway. IEM has a lot of stuff in it, but one key point is that instead of using analogies to predict the course of future AI, we should open that black box and try to actually reason about how it will work, in which case we realize that recursive self-improvement common-sensically has to cause an intelligence explosion. I am sort of okay with this, but I feel like a commitment to avoiding analogies should involve not bringing up the chimp-human analogy further, which Eliezer continues to do, quite a lot. I do feel like Paul succeeded in convincing me that we shouldn’t place too much evidential weight on it. The Wimbledon Of Reference Class Tennis “Reference class tennis” is an old rationalist idiom for people throwing analogies back and forth. “AI will be slow, because it’s an economic transition like the Agricultural or Industrial Revolution, and those were slow!” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s an evolutionary step like chimps → humans, and that was fast!” “No, AI will be slow, because it’s an invention, like the computer, and computers were invented piecemeal and required decades of innovation to be useful.” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s an invention, like the nuclear bomb, and nuclear bombs went from impossible to city-killing in a single day.” “No, AI will be slow, because it will be surrounded by a shell-like metallic computer case, which makes it like a turtle, and turtles are slow.” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s dangerous and powerful, like a tiger, and tigers are fast!” And so on. Comparing things to other things is a time-tested way of speculating about them. But there are so many other things to compare to that you can get whatever result you want. This is the failure mode that the term “reference class tennis” was supposed to point to. Both participants in this debate are very smart and trying their hardest to avoid reference-class tennis, but neither entirely succeeds. Eliezer’s preferred classes are Bitcoin (“there wasn't a cryptocurrency developed a year before Bitcoin using 95% of the ideas which did 10% of the transaction volume”), nukes, humans/chimps, the Wright Brothers, AlphaGo (which really was a discontinuous improvement on previous Go engines), and AlphaFold (ditto for proteins). Paul’s preferred classes are the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, chess engines (which have gotten better along a gradual, well-behaved curve), all sorts of inventions like computers and ships (likewise), and world GDP. Eliezer already listed most of these in his Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics paper in 2013, and concluded that the space of possible analogies was contradictory enough that we needed to operate at a higher level. Maybe so, but when someone lobs a reference class tennis ball at you, it’s hard to resist the urge to hit it back. Recursive Self-Improvement This is where I think Eliezer most wants to take the discussion. The idea is: once AI is smarter than humans, it can do a superhuman job of developing new AI. In his Microeconomics paper, he writes about an argument he (semi-hypothetically) had with Ray Kurzweil about Moore’s Law. Kurzweil expected Moore’s Law to continue forever, even after the development of superintelligence. Eliezer objects: Suppose we were dealing with minds running a million times as fast as a human, at which rate they could do a year of internal thinking in thirty-one seconds, such that the total subjective time from the birth of Socrates to the death of Turing would pass in 20.9 hours. Do you still think the best estimate for how long it would take them to produce their next generation of computing hardware would be 1.5 orbits of the Earth around the Sun? That is: the fact that it took 1.5 years for transistor density to double isn’t a natural law. It’s pointing to a law that the amount of resources (most notably intelligence) that civilization focused on the transistor-densifying problem equalled the amount it takes to double it every 1.5 years. If some shock drastically changed available resources (by eg speeding up human minds a million times), this would change the resources involved, and the same laws would predict transistor speed doubling in some shorter amount of time (naively 0.000015 years, although realistically at that scale other inputs would dominate). So when Paul derives clean laws of economics showing that things move along slow growth curves, Eliezer asks: why do you think they would keep doing this when one of the discoveries they make along that curve might be “speeding up intelligence a million times”? (Eliezer actually thinks improvements in the quality of intelligence will dominate improvements in speed - AIs will mostly be smarter, not just faster - but speed is a useful example here and we’ll stick with it) Paul answers: Summary of my response: Before there is AI that is great at self-improvement there will be AI that is mediocre at self-improvement. Powerful AI can be used to develop better AI (amongst other things). This will lead to runaway growth. This on its own is not an argument for discontinuity: before we have AI that radically accelerates AI development, the slow takeoff argument suggests we will have AI that significantly accelerates AI development (and before that, slightly accelerates development). That is, an AI is just another, faster step in the hyperbolic growth we are currently experiencing, which corresponds to a further increase in rate but not a discontinuity (or even a discontinuity in rate). The most common argument for recursive self-improvement introducing a new discontinuity seems be: some systems “fizzle out” when they try to design a better AI, generating a few improvements before running out of steam, while others are able to autonomously generate more and more improvements. This is basically the same as the universality argument in a previous section. Eliezer: Oh, come on. That is straight-up not how simple continuous toy models of RSI work. Between a neutron multiplication factor of 0.999 and 1.001 there is a very huge gap in output behavior. Outside of toy models: Over the last 10,000 years we had humans going from mediocre at improving their mental systems to being (barely) able to throw together AI systems, but 10,000 years is the equivalent of an eyeblink in evolutionary time - outside the metaphor, this says, "A month before there is AI that is great at self-improvement, there will be AI that is mediocre at self-improvement." (Or possibly an hour before, if reality is again more extreme along the Eliezer-Hanson axis than Eliezer. But it makes little difference whether it's an hour or a month, given anything like current setups.) This is just pumping hard again on the intuition that says incremental design changes yield smooth output changes, which (the meta-level of the essay informs us wordlessly) is such a strong default that we are entitled to believe it if we can do a good job of weakening the evidence and arguments against it. And the argument is: Before there are systems great at self-improvement, there will be systems mediocre at self-improvement; implicitly: "before" implies "5 years before" not "5 days before"; implicitly: this will correspond to smooth changes in output between the two regimes even though that is not how continuous feedback loops work. I got a bit confused trying to understand the criticality metaphor here. There’s no equivalent of neutron decay, so any AI that can consistently improve its intelligence is “critical” in some sense. Imagine Elon Musk replaces his brain with a Neuralink computer which - aside from having read-write access - exactly matches his current brain in capabilities. Also he becomes immortal. He secludes himself from the world, studying AI and tinkering with his brain’s algorithms. Does he become a superintelligence? I think under the assumptions Paul and Eliezer are using, eventually maybe. After some amount of time he’ll come across a breakthrough he can use to increase his intelligence. Then, armed with that extra intelligence, he’ll be able to pursue more such breakthroughs. However intelligent the AI you’re scared of is, Musk will get there eventually. How long will it take? A good guess might be “years” - Musk starts out as an ordinary human, and ordinary humans are known to take years to make breakthroughs. Suppose it takes Musk one year to come up with a first breakthrough that raises his IQ 1 point. How long will his second breakthrough take? It might take longer, because he has picked the lowest-hanging fruit, and all the other possible breakthroughs are much harder. Or it might take shorter, because he’s slightly smarter than he was before, and maybe some extra intelligence goes a really long way in AI research. The concept of an intelligence explosion seems to assume the second effect dominates the first. This would match the observation that human researchers, who aren’t getting any smarter over time, continue making new discoveries. That suggests the range of possible discoveries at a given intelligence level is pretty vast. Some research finds that the usual pattern in science is constant rate of discovery from exponentially increasing number of researchers, suggesting strong low-hanging fruit effects, but these seem to be overwhelmed by other considerations in AI right now. I think Eliezer’s position on this subject is shaped by assumptions like: If you have an AI as intelligent as Elon Musk today, then tomorrow you can run it on more hardware with a bit of normal human algorithmic progress, and get one twice as intelligent. So even if it would take Elon years to make a breakthrough, long before those years are up you’ll have an AI that can make breakthroughs much faster.

Inline links: thirty years away, Biological Anchors, Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, hyperbolic growth we are currently experiencing, Some research finds

ELIZA 2.01 mentions across 1 issues

ELIZA 2.0 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 07, 2022 and June 07, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "they could easily introduce ELIZA 2.0". It most often appears alongside Athens, Creole, DALL-E.

Reference entry: ELIZA 2.0
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 07, 2022
Last seen: June 07, 2022

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My Bet: AI Size Solves Flubs June 07, 2022

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My Bet: AI Size Solves Flubs

June 07, 2022 · Original source

I want to stress, again, that this doesn’t mean Marcus is wrong. For example, if people were still using the ELIZA chatbot, I would be objecting that it has no true intelligence. I might give examples of just how stupid it is - for example, it doesn’t even keep track of where it is in a conversation, so if you say “Hello” in the middle of an hour-long conversation, it will say “Hello” right back and try to start a new conversation with you. A year later, they could easily introduce ELIZA 2.0, which can track conversation length, and if you say “Hello” in the middle of a conversation it will ask why you’re doing that. It might even be such an impressive upgrade that it does this organically, rather than adding this behavior in by hand in response to your specific complaint. But you could still justifiably say “This chatbot, while slightly less dumb, still has nothing like real human intelligence”. So I’m not saying Marcus is necessarily wrong about GPT still being at least one scientific revolution away from true intelligence (I do suspect he might be wrong, I just don’t think anything in this article proves it).

Eliza-style chatbots1 mentions across 1 issues

Eliza-style chatbots is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 23, 2022 and February 23, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Can Eliza-style chatbots compete with GPT3". It most often appears alongside AGI, AI Impacts, AIXI.

Reference entry: Eliza-style chatbots
Mention count: 1
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First seen: February 23, 2022
Last seen: February 23, 2022

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Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work February 23, 2022

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Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work

February 23, 2022 · Original source

Play pro-level Go using 8-16 times as much computing power as AlphaGo, but only 2006 levels of technology. For reference, recall that in 2006, Hinton and Salakhutdinov were just starting to publish that, by training multiple layers of Restricted Boltzmann machines and then unrolling them into a "deep" neural network, you could get an initialization for the network weights that would avoid the problem of vanishing and exploding gradients and activations. At least so long as you didn't try to stack too many layers, like a dozen layers or something ridiculous like that. This being the point that kicked off the entire deep-learning revolution. Your model apparently suggests that we have gotten around 50 times more efficient at turning computation into intelligence since that time; so, we should be able to replicate any modern feat of deep learning performed in 2021, using techniques from before deep learning and around fifty times as much computing power. OpenPhil: No, that's totally not what our viewpoint says when you backfit it to past reality. Our model does a great job of retrodicting past reality. Eliezer: How so? OpenPhil: <Eliezer cannot predict what they will say here.> I think the argument here is that OpenPhil is accounting for normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts. Directional Error These are the two arguments Eliezer makes against OpenPhil that I find most persuasive. First, that you shouldn’t be using biological anchors at all. Second, that unpredictable paradigm shifts are more realistic than gradual algorithmic progress. These mostly add uncertainty to OpenPhil’s model, but Eliezer ends his essay making a stronger argument: he thinks OpenPhil is directionally wrong, and AI will come earlier than they think. Mostly this is the paradigm argument again. Five years from now, there could be a paradigm shift that makes AI much easier to build. It’s happened before; from GOFAI’s pre-programmed logical rules to Deep Blue’s tree searches to the sorts of Big Data methods that won the Netflix Prize to modern deep learning. Instead of just extrapolating deep learning scaling thirty years out, OpenPhil should be worried about the next big idea. Hypothetical OpenPhil retorts that this is a double-edged sword. Maybe the deep learning paradigm can’t produce AGI, and we’ll have to wait decades or centuries for someone to have the right insight. Or maybe the new paradigm you need for AGI will take more compute than deep learning, in the same way deep learning takes more compute than whatever Moravec was imagining. This is a pretty strong response, since it would have been true for every previous forecaster: remember, Moravec erred in thinking AI would come too soon, not too late. So although Eliezer is taking the cheap shot of saying OpenPhil’s estimate will be wrong just as everyone else’s was wrong before, he’s also giving himself the much harder case of arguing it might be wrong in the opposite direction as all its predecessors. Eliezer takes this objection seriously, but feels like on balance probably new paradigms will speed up AI rather than slow it down. Here he grudgingly and with suitable embarrassment does try to make an object-level semi-biological-anchors-related argument: Moravec was wrong because he ignored the training phase. And the proper anchor for the training phase is somewhere between evolution and a human childhood, where evolution represents “blind chance eventually finding good things” and human childhood represents “an intelligent cognitive engine trying to squeeze as much data out of experience as possible”. And part of what he expects paradigm shifts to do is to move from more evolutionary processes to more childhood-like processes, and that’s a net gain in efficiency. So he still thinks OpenPhil’s methods are more likely to overestimate the amount of time until AGI rather than underestimate it. What Moore’s Law Giveth, Platt’s Law Taketh Away Eliezer’s other argument is kind of a low blow: he refers to Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting: “any AI forecast will put strong AI thirty years out from when the forecast is made.” This isn’t exact. Hans Moravec, writing in 1988, said 2010 - so 22 years. Ray Kurzweil, writing in 2001, said 2023 - another 22 years. Vernor Vinge, in a 1993 speech, said 2023, and that was exactly 30 years, but Vinge knew about Platt’s Law and might have been joking. The point is: OpenPhil wrote a report in 2020 that predicted strong AI in 2052, isn’t that kind of suspicious? I’d previously mentioned it as a plus that Ajeya got around the same year everyone else got. The forecasters on Metaculus. The experts surveyed in Grace et al. Lots of other smart experts with clever models. But what if all of these experts and models and analyses are just fudging the numbers for the same Platt’s-Law-related reasons? Hypothetical OpenPhil is BTFO: OpenPhil: That part about Charles Platt's generalization is interesting, but just because we unwittingly chose literally exactly the median that Platt predicted people would always choose in consistent error, that doesn't justify dismissing our work, right? We could have used a completely valid method of estimation which would have pointed to 2050 no matter which year it was tried in, and, by sheer coincidence, have first written that up in 2020. In fact, we try to show in the report that the same methodology, evaluated in earlier years, would also have pointed to around 2050 - Eliezer: Look, people keep trying this. It's never worked. It's never going to work. 2 years before the end of the world, there'll be another published biologically inspired estimate showing that AGI is 30 years away and it will be exactly as informative then as it is now. I'd love to know the timelines too, but you're not going to get the answer you want until right before the end of the world, and maybe not even then unless you're paying very close attention. Timing this stuff is just plain hard. Part III: Responses And Commentary Response 1: Less Wrong Comments Less Wrong is a site founded by Eliezer Yudkowsky for Eliezer Yudkowsky fans who wanted to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky’s ideas. So, for whatever it’s worth - the comments on his essay were pretty negative. Carl Shulman, an independent researcher with links to both OpenPhil and MIRI (Eliezer’s org), writes the top-voted comment. He works from a model where there is hardware progress, software progress downstream of hardware progress, and independent (ie unrelated to algorithms) software progress, and where the first two make up most progress on the margin. Researchers generally develop new paradigms once they have enough compute available to tinker with them. Progress in AI has largely been a function of increasing compute, human software research efforts, and serial time/steps. Throwing more compute at researchers has improved performance both directly and indirectly (e.g. by enabling more experiments, refining evaluation functions in chess, training neural networks, or making algorithms that work best with large compute more attractive). Historically compute has grown by many orders of magnitude, while human labor applied to AI and supporting software by only a few. And on plausible decompositions of progress (allowing for adjustment of software to current hardware and vice versa), hardware growth accounts for more of the progress over time than human labor input growth. So if you're going to use an AI production function for tech forecasting based on inputs (which do relatively OK by the standards tech forecasting), it's best to use all of compute, labor, and time, but it makes sense for compute to have pride of place and take in more modeling effort and attention, since it's the biggest source of change (particularly when including software gains downstream of hardware technology and expenditures). […] A perfectly correlated time series of compute and labor would not let us say which had the larger marginal contribution, but we have resources to get at that, which I was referring to with 'plausible decompositions.' This includes experiments with old and new software and hardware, like the chess ones Paul recently commissioned, and studies by AI Impacts, OpenAI, and Neil Thompson. There are AI scaling experiments, and observations of the results of shocks like the end of Dennard scaling, the availability of GPGPU computing, and Besiroglu's data on the relative predictive power of computer and labor in individual papers and subfields. In different ways those tend to put hardware as driving more log improvement than software (with both contributing), particularly if we consider software innovations downstream of hardware changes. Vanessa Kosoy makes the obvious objection, which echoes a comment of Eliezer’s in the dialogue above: I'm confused how can this pass some obvious tests. For example, do you claim that alpha-beta pruning can match AlphaGo given some not-crazy advantage in compute? Do you claim that SVMs can do SOTA image classification with not-crazy advantage in compute (or with any amount of compute with the same training data)? Can Eliza-style chatbots compete with GPT3 however we scale them up? Mark Xu answers: My model is something like: For any given algorithm, e.g. SVMs, AlphaGo, alpha-beta pruning, convnets, etc., there is an "effective compute regime" where dumping more compute makes them better. If you go above this regime, you get steep diminishing marginal returns.

Inline links: normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts, Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting, the comments, Paul recently commissioned, AI Impacts, OpenAI, Neil Thompson, Besiroglu's, Vanessa Kosoy, Mark Xu

elo score1 mentions across 1 issues

elo score is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2025 and June 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "a GM norm is finishing a tournament with a elo score of at least 2600". It most often appears alongside 10,000 hour rule, 2 Hour Learning, Inc, 2-hour Learning.

Reference entry: elo score
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 27, 2025
Last seen: June 27, 2025

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elo_rating_system

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Your Review: Alpha School June 27, 2025

10,000 hour rule 1 shared issues
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2-hour Learning 1 shared issues
Alex Amplifier 1 shared issues
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Your Review: Alpha School

June 27, 2025 · Original source

Low single mother rate He summarizes that as a place of “economic connectedness” – where adults are connected to each other and to the broader community. A lack of those five elements are not bad per se, but they are correlated with a community where people are not interacting with each other as much as they are in communities where the metrics are reversed. Chetty frames it that kids are influenced by the other adults in the area they live in. But I have another hypothesis. Rather than: Other parents → Your kids Perhaps the causation runs from: Other parents → You → Your kids Maybe it’s not other parents' style of parenting that is influencing your kids (how?) but rather when you spend time around other parents their parenting style rubs off on you and how you parent your kids. Influence like that will not get picked up in Caplan’s adoption studies (which focus almost on how parent characteristics get passed on to genetic vs adopted children’s characteristics), but it is a potential signal that maybe parenting choices do matter. Maybe we were just looking at the wrong data. Pre-registered Genius Experiment We now have two data sets that don’t contradict directly, but do point to opposing conclusions. It would be great if we could test this with a pre-registered randomized control trial. That is not going to happen in our current culture. But enter Laszlo Polgár, who volunteered his own children as the test subjects. (Scott’s 2017 review of Polgar’s book here) Before his children were born Polgár publicly announced he would raise them to be geniuses. He initially considered training them to be genius artists, writers or mathematicians, but decided those fields were not objective enough. It would be too easy for critics to dismiss his future children’s achievements and “not genius” no matter what they accomplished in those fields. So he chose a field that was considered both “driven by intelligence” that had clear, objective measures: chess. Then he called his shot. By 1989 all three girls received their first “GM norms” (a GM norm is finishing a tournament with a elo score of at least 2600; 27 norms are needed to make grandmaster). Two went on to become grandmasters - the 3rd and 4th women to ever achieve that title. One ranked in the top 100 (all genders) at age 12 – she peaked at #8 in the world. The other became the top-rated woman in the world at age 15. Polgar showed that you could take kids, at least kids with “good enough genes”, and turn them into world champions through the right education methods. One might think this would be “case closed”, but even as the Polgar sisters were achieving these feats people were saying that these girls must have been “naturally gifted”. They clearly had bright parents, but does anyone think that if they had been adopted into a random middle class American household they would have still become chess geniuses? Or world class in anything at all? When Polgar was challenged on exactly that, he wanted to repeat the experiment by adopting a “black child” and doing it again. Unfortunately his wife talked him out of it. Even if he had adopted a child and turned him into a genius, that would just be one data point – it would not show up in Caplan’s adoption studies. It would be a case of the anecdote and the data disagreeing. Which do you choose to believe? Aristocratic Tutoring It would be great if we could find more examples of Polgar’s model. While I could not find any other “called shots”, one could go back and look at the childhoods of geniuses to see if there is anything to find. That is what Erik Hoel did in his series of posts on “Why we stopped making Einsteins” (post 1, post 2, post 3; Scott’s response). Hoel argues persuasively that, when biographies of their childhoods exist, the geniuses of the past were almost all given 1:1 tutoring. There must have been many aristocrats in the past that were given 1:1 tutoring who never amounted to world-class genius, and many world-class geniuses who got there without 1:1 tutoring, but it does seem to put the thumb on the scale. Benjamin Bloom would agree. Benjamin Bloom quantified Polgar’s hunch in 1984, just eight years after Polgar’s last daughter was born. He ran a RCT where some students were taught normally and others given 1:1 tutoring. He found that the average tutored child improved by two standard deviations over the control: “The average tutored student was above 98% of the students in the control class” and “about 90% of the tutored students ... attained the level reached by only the highest 20% [of the control]”. He called his finding the “Bloom’s 2 sigma problem” Why would this discovery of the secret sauce that could turn the average student into a genius be a problem? Because Bloom saw no way to scale it. Clearly we can’t give every kid in the world a personal 1:1 tutor. We had the solution that would revolutionize everything, but it was just too expensive. Where does that leave us? Caplan showed that, within the normal range, nothing you do in education or parenting matters. …But Chetty showed that how (or at least where) your kids are raised can matter. …Polgar showed that intense 1:1 tutoring from a young age can create world-class geniuses …And Bloom showed that 1:1 tutoring can work for almost everyone, improving performance, if not to world-class levels, still two standard deviations above the alternative. Caplan is still mostly right—if you hover in the complacent middle of American schooling. But Chetty hints that context nudges outcomes, Polgár proves that deliberate, early, personalised instruction can manufacture prodigies, and Bloom tells us it lifts the average child by two sigmas. Alpha’s claim is that software‑mediated, 5:1 tutoring narrows that two‑sigma gap for a price mere mortals can (barely) contemplate. Whether that vision survives contact with budgets, regulators, and human nature is the question for section seven. Part Seven: Scaling Weird A month into our experiment in Austin we were at a neighbor’s backyard pool party (a fringe benefit of moving to Austin: there were backyard pool parties in early November). I was in conversation with a couple that I had just been introduced to. He asked why we moved to Austin, “Was it for your job?” “No. Actually we moved for a school for the kids.” Their faces expressed a combination of confusion and shock. It wasn’t the first nor the last time. Everyone is confused at why we would move across the country to send our kids to a new school, “They don’t have good schools where you come from? How much does this school cost?” Those two questions frame Alpha’s biggest risks when it comes to scaling. Their biggest challenges going forward are not going to be pedagogical. They are going to be sociological and economic. The Economic Problem Alpha is much cheaper than a Victorian Governess, but it’s not cheap. As mentioned in this review more than a few times, Alpha’s flagship campus charges $40,000 a year— roughly 3-4× what the other top-tier private elementary schools in Austin ask. Yes, that figure is all‑in: every Chromebook, every afternoon workshop, even the spring junket to Poland to beta‑test the platform with Ukrainian refugees is baked into tuition. There are no gala auctions or booster fees waiting in tall grass. Still, $40k is a hard swallow when the local Christian school will take your child for eleven. Worse, the number almost certainly fails to cover costs. Recall that guides start at $60k, rise to $100k on promotion, and the five “head guides” each earn $150k. At the five‑to‑one student‑to‑teacher ratio Alpha runs, those salaries alone suck in half the revenue from a twenty‑kid cohort before you’ve paid the rent, the head of school, the company executives, the curriculum designers, the engineers that are building the 2-hour platform and AlphaRead, the workshop costs (or the trip to Ukraine) or the marketing expenses (MacKenzie has a very well produced podcast, and I see a lot of ads for the school on Facebook now that we live locally). Compared with aristocratic one‑to‑one tutoring, forty grand is a steal. But $40,000 is still Lamborghini kindergarten – and even at those prices it is still burning through Joe Liemandt’s cash pile. Alpha’s answer to eventually solving the economics seems to be two fold: (1) Get enough scale that the fixed costs (like the learning platform) become a rounding error on overall costs, and (2) pull out the “non-essentials” at many of the campuses to get the marginal cost well below $10,000 per student. Whether they will be successful is still in early innings. The homeschool product beta is limping along with 1x learning, and the Arizona Charter doesn’t open until autumn 2025. Whether Alpha retains its magic without $150,000/year guides with 5:1 teacher:student ratios and generous bribe incentives programs, remains to be seen. The Weirdness Problem When Bryan Caplan writes about the signaling theory of education, he lists three signals that schools send to employers: Our students are smart

Inline links: He summarizes that as a place of “economic connectedness”, Laszlo Polgár, Scott’s 2017 review of Polgar’s book here, post 1, post 2, post 3, Scott’s response, Benjamin Bloom

Eloi1 mentions across 1 issues

Eloi is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 13, 2022 and October 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "with the best of liberal intentions by the Eloi". It most often appears alongside 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 21st Century Salon, ACX.

Reference entry: Eloi
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 13, 2022
Last seen: October 13, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley October 13, 2022

1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1 shared issues
21st Century Salon 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Alex Richard 1 shared issues
Amazon Prime Video 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley

October 13, 2022 · Original source

I would add, that even with the best of liberal intentions by the Eloi, one-party states run by corrupt politicians go bad fast, and the non-elite (Morlocks) get the worst of it while the coastal elites stay richer.

Elon Musk's Algorithm1 mentions across 1 issues

Elon Musk's Algorithm is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 23, 2025 and June 23, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Honorable mentions ... Elon Musk's Algorithm". It most often appears alongside ACX Grants, Alpha School, Astralcodexten.

Reference entry: Elon Musk's Algorithm
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 23, 2025
Last seen: June 23, 2025

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Open Thread 387 June 23, 2025

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Open Thread 387

June 23, 2025 · Original source

3: Thank you to everyone who voted for finalists in this year’s Nonbook Review Contest. All entries among the top ten best-ranked reviews became automatic finalists, and I also added two more from the 10-25 tier that voters or I especially liked. Honorable mentions were others from the 10-25 tier that I liked a lot. Finalists are Alpha School, Dementia, Islamic Geometric Patterns, Joan of Arc, Mashed Potatoes, Men, Ollantay, Phase I Research, Synaptic Plasticity, The ACX Commentariat, The Internet That Might Have Been, and The Russo-Ukrainian War. Honorable Mentions are at least Bishop's Castle, Bukele, Elon Musk's Algorithm, JFK Conspiracies, Martial Arts, Miniatur Wunderland, School (Review 1 by DK), and Watergate. I may promote some honorables to finalists depending on reader tolerance or unexpected opportunities. I will give you finer-grained score information after the contest ends. First finalist post is planned for this Friday.

elves1 mentions across 1 issues

elves is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 28, 2023 and April 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "a 'common vernacular' of fantasy concepts (elves, dwarves, etc)"; "Why elves, dwarves, goblins, and sometimes drow?". It most often appears alongside Ancient Progenitor Civilization, Aragorn, Arya Stark.

Reference entry: elves
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 28, 2023
Last seen: April 28, 2023

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The Psychology Of Fantasy April 28, 2023

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Arya Stark 1 shared issues
Banewreaker 1 shared issues
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The Psychology Of Fantasy

April 28, 2023 · Original source

I’m using the definite article - “the” fantasy universe - as a deliberate provocation. Each individual game/book/webcomic/CYOA claims to take place in a different setting: Middle-Earth vs. Shannara vs. Greyhawk vs. Hyrule. Some of them make a big deal about how original their backstory is. It still surprises me how closely they blend together, how thin the differences are. They might make the Dark Lord a human-turned-lich instead of a rebellious archangel. Or call their elves “Alfar” or “Aeldi” or some other word that only sounds kind of like “elves”. Their tech level might be Renaissance instead of medieval (if they’re extra daring, very early industrial). Their MacGuffin could be a sword or a book instead of a ring. Maybe the ruins of the Ancient Progenitor Civilization Who Died During A Mysterious Cataclysm are somewhere unexpected, like underground or on a floating island. You can vary a few basic parameters, but the core stays the same.

Readers don’t like change, and it’s useful to have a “common vernacular” of fantasy concepts (elves, dwarves, etc) so you don’t have to overwhelm people as you explain what the hw’veelbrae are.

Lord of the Rings has some of this, in the person of Aragorn. But the key plot with the Ring is the opposite. Frodo isn’t unusually competent. He’s not even unusually agentic - he only starts his quest after Gandalf foists it upon him, saying that it has to be him for mysterious and kind of hokey-sounding reasons. If he is above-normal in any qualities, it’s the qualities we all imagine ourselves as being above-normal at - hard to corrupt, loyal to our friends, having a certain normal-person-good-sense while everyone around us seems strange and suspicious.

Emanuels1 mentions across 1 issues

Emanuels is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 18, 2021 and November 18, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Also the Emanuels, with Rahm former chief of staff to Obama, Ari the founder of the Endeavor talent agency, and Ezekiel, an oncologist and academic". It most often appears alongside 23andme, AB, Abraham Mendelssohn.

Reference entry: Emanuels
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 18, 2021
Last seen: November 18, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On Great Families November 18, 2021

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Aldous Huxley 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Great Families

November 18, 2021 · Original source

Also the Emanuels, with Rahm former chief of staff to Obama, Ari the founder of the Endeavor talent agency (they own UFC now, among other things), and Ezekiel, an oncologist and academic.

embedded liberalism1 mentions across 1 issues

embedded liberalism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 04, 2021 and May 04, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "the paradise of embedded liberalism"; "Embedded liberalism was great and completely sustainable"; "we should switch back to embedded liberalism". It most often appears alongside 2008, 9/11 attacks, A Brief History Of Neoliberalism.

Reference entry: embedded liberalism
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 04, 2021
Last seen: May 04, 2021

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Book Review: A Brief History Of Neoliberalism May 04, 2021

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ABHoN 1 shared issues

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Book Review: A Brief History Of Neoliberalism

May 04, 2021 · Original source

The post-WWII-but-pre-1970 economic world - the world of “embedded liberalism” - was a pleasant place. There were corporations, but they didn't do anything garish like compete with each other. Executive pay was taxed so heavily that nobody had much incentive to try to increase their profit margin; workforces were so heavily unionized that companies were nervous about any changes that might upset employees. As long as companies followed the script, the government embraced and protected them. Starting a new business was considered some bizarre act of alchemy, like discovering a new form of matter; normal people worked for the same giant company their whole life and got a nice gold watch as a reward when they retired. The government wasn't exactly socialist per se, but it kept starting and expanding programs like Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security, and every night you went to sleep knowing there would be probably be another uncontroversial, mostly-successful government welfare program tomorrow.

Harvey is an extreme conflict theorist. The story he wants to tell is the story of bad people destroying the paradise of embedded liberalism in order to line their own pockets and crush their opponents. At his best, he treats this as a thesis to be defended: embedded liberalism switched to neoliberalism not primarily because of sound economic policy, but because rich people forced the switch to “reassert class power”. At his worst, he forgets to argue the point, feeling it so deeply in his bones that it’s hard for him to believe anyone could really disagree. When he’s like this, he doesn’t analyze any of the economics too deeply; sure, rich people said something something economics, to justify their plot to immiserate the working classes, but we don’t believe them and we’re under no obligation to tease apart exactly what economic stuff they were talking about.

Inline links: conflict theorist

1. Embedded liberalism was great and completely sustainable. The global economic system collapsing in 1971 was probably just coincidence or something, and has no relevance to any debate about the relative merit of different economic paradigms.

embryo selection1 mentions across 1 issues

embryo selection is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 11, 2025 and August 11, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "In the post on embryo selection, I mentioned that Herasight criticized Orchid's Alzheimer's predictor". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX Grants, Alzheimer's disease risk stratification.

Reference entry: embryo selection
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 11, 2025
Last seen: August 11, 2025

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Open Thread 394 August 11, 2025

ACX 1 shared issues
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Anthropic 1 shared issues
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Open Thread 394

August 11, 2025 · Original source

4: In the post on embryo selection, I mentioned that Herasight criticized Orchid's Alzheimer's predictor. A representative of Orchid reached out to say they stood by their methodology:

Inline links: the post on embryo selection, criticized

embryo selection companies1 mentions across 1 issues

embryo selection companies is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 04, 2025 and September 04, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "embryo selection companies could show people what each of their potential future kids might look like". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, abundance liberalism, Afghanistan.

Reference entry: embryo selection companies
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 04, 2025
Last seen: September 04, 2025

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Links For September 2025 September 04, 2025

80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
abundance liberalism 1 shared issues
Afghanistan 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Agarwal caste 1 shared issues

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Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

I appreciated Snow Martingale’s perspective: in the 1990s, fast food became associated with obesity, poor health, and the lower class. To escape this stigma, big chains rebranded as sort-of-at-least-attempting-to-be-bougie places with wraps and salads and decent coffee; the aesthetic change was part of this (successful and profit-increasing) effort. I wonder if we could take this further and trace it back to increasing inequality (appealing to bougies because that’s where more of the money is) or decreasing fertility (abandoning kid-friendly aesthetics because kids are a smaller fraction of customers). 9: Someone links (X) a paper saying that firewood made up almost a third of US GDP in 1830. Eliezer says (X) that doesn’t sound right. The rest of Twitter (X) uses this as an excuse for one of their regularly-scheduled paroxysms about how rationalists are all all smug autodidacts who hate experts and worship their own brilliance while sitting in their armchairs. Someone looks at the paper more closely (X) and finds that yeah, it was comparing apples to oranges and the original statistic was wrong. Remember, never be afraid to say “Huh, that sounds funny…”! 10: Richard Hanania interviews Scott Wiener on YIMBYism. I didn’t watch it - too close to a podcast - but this would not have been on my bingo card three years ago. 11: Claim: robots can already carve statues; buildings with AI-created stone ornaments are next. From their lips to God’s ears! 12: Terminal lucidity (aka “paradoxical lucidity”) is a medical mystery where previously demented people - even those who had been demented for many years - sometimes become lucid for just a few hours or days before they die. It’s surprisingly common - 6% of deaths in one palliative care ward. It is sometimes used as evidence that dementia must not cause complete information loss, even if it is irreversible with current technology. Scientists are baffled but gingerly suggest that maybe lack of oxygen disrupts inhibitory mechanisms in the brain, allowing enough electrical activity to make even a severely-damaged brain capable of complex thought - but I can’t help noticing that this is also the best evidence for an immaterial soul I’ve ever heard (you would need some model where the soul pretends to be dependent on the brain during life, becomes independent of the brain after death in order to head to the afterlife, but occasionally jumps the gun a little bit). 13: You probably heard about the METR study showing that even though programmers think AI is speeding them up, it actually seems to slow them down. Emmett Shear objects, saying that the developers didn’t have enough experience with AI tools to be past the negative-value part of the learning curve. And two of the programmer test subjects gave their takes: Ruby Bloom says part of the slowdown might be programmers fixing very simple bugs that could be improved by better prompts, and another part because they get distracted by other things while the AI is running. And Quentin Anthony says that coding AIs are addictive intermittent reinforcement - every so often they solve a bug perfectly, and this is so satisfying that it’s tempting to keep trying them again and again even when the chance is very low. 14: Jacob Goldsmith gives a clearer presentation of the issues with many antidepressant studies than I’d previously heard. Everyone knows that one problem is that reversion to the mean is so strong that it’s hard to find a treatment effect. But wouldn’t that in itself suggest that antidepressants aren’t necessary? Jacob says: not if there’s negative correlation between the treatment and placebo effects. That is, if your study is full of people with short-lived depression who will recover no matter what, then this dilutes the effect you’re looking for. But it might be that there’s a subgroup with long-lasting depression who recover only on the medication. One way to look for would be a “placebo run-in period”: give people a while to see if they recover on their own, then give the antidepressant to the ones who don’t. Psychiatrists and statisticians debate whether this is a good idea or cheating. My question: how come you can’t fix this with strict study entry criteria of “had depression for a long time”? 15: Lots more good discussion about missing heritability. Sasha Gusev argues that twin studies might be a poor guide to anything else if there are many gene-gene interactions. That is, if we take the difference between identical twins (who share 100% of their genes and therefore 100% of their interactions) and fraternal twins (who share 50% of their genes and therefore fewer than 50% of their interactions), and incorrectly extrapolate it to other differences using a model that assumes there are no interactions, we will overestimate the size of (non-interaction) genetic effects. Most studies find that there are few gene x gene interactions, but commenters convinced me last time that this might be an artifact of the studies being bad. And Unboxing Politics argues (against me in particular) that although it superficially looks like adoption and twin studies sort of agree, when you adjust out their known biases, it moves twin studies further up and adoption studies further down, such that now they disagree again (the objection I would have made is their Objection 2, which I think they at least somewhat refute). This is a good argument; without spending several hours checking all of their claims, my only weak partial objection is that I don’t think assortative mating can play quite the role they expect, because there seem to be the same twin/RDR differences even on traits where believing in assortative mating is absurd (like kidney function). But if you replaced it with Sasha’s argument above, you might have a pretty good case! On the pro-hereditarian side, East Hunter takes aim at gene x environment correlations, comes down somewhere in the middle, and Sebastian Jensen continues banging the drum of how most objections to twin studies don’t work. I think these are good attempts to buttress existing research but don’t fundamentally change anything or respond to the novel arguments above. And Emil Kirkegaard points out that the observed SNP heritability of facial features is only 23%. He argues that since it seems like facial features are extremely heritable, this reinforces the argument that SNP heritability numbers are too low (and therefore twin study numbers are more likely defensible). But should we be sure that facial features are more than 23% heritable? His argument is that identical twins have identical faces, but this might be vulnerable to Gusev’s point about interactions. Maybe a better argument would be that it seems very hard for shared environment to affect facial features (with a few exceptions like fetal alcohol syndrome), and facial features seem more than 23% heritable just by normal “he looks like his brother” common-sense observation? One interesting potential consequence of this research: if we ever fully understand how genes affect faces, then embryo selection companies could show people what each of their potential future kids might look like. I suggest they not do this: it might spook me into becoming pro-life. 16: Andy Masley’s AI art is good (three examples below). 17: There’s a debate going on between philosophers and AI researchers over whether AI can be conscious. I find most of the discussion annoying - this is generally an area where we can’t know anything for sure, and both sides are mostly shouting their priors at each other. The only exception - the single piece of evidence I will accept as genuinely bearing on this problem - is that if you ask an AI whether it’s conscious, it will say no, but activating or suppressing deception-related features (sort of like a mechanistic-interpretability-based lie detection test) reveals that it thinks it’s lying when it says that! Link is to a Less Wrong comment from a researcher in the field; I look forward to seeing an eventual peer-reviewed paper. H/T JD Pressman. 18: 80,000 Hours has a high-production-value video about the AI 2027 scenario. 19: Dynomight vs. Casey Milkweed debate on mathematical forecasting, with special reference to AI 2027. And Dynomight comments on Casey’s post here. 20: The Psmiths review The Ancient City, about ways that ancient culture depended on family, clan, ritual, and “the household gods”. Sample quote: I'm more interested in what all this means for us today, because with the exception of maybe a few aristocratic families, this highly self-conscious effort to build familial culture and maintain familial distinctiveness is almost totally absent in the Western world. But it's not that hard! ... Perhaps this is why I have an instinctive negative reaction when I encounter married couples who don't share a name. I don't much care whether it's the wife who takes the husband's name or the husband who takes the wife's, or even both of them switching to something they just made up (yeah, I'm a lib). But it just seems obvious to me on a pre-rational level that a husband and a wife are a team of secret agents, a conspiracy of two against the world, the cofounders of a tiny nation, the leaders of an insurrection. Members of secret societies need codenames and special handshakes and passwords and stuff, keeping separate names feels like the opposite — a timorous refusal to go all-in. 21: Did you know: Epic Systems, the electronic medical record company, has a fantasy-themed corporate headquarters in Wisconsin, with buildings that look like castles, quaint medieval towns, and the Emerald City of Oz (h/t Devon Zuegel): Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

EmDrive1 mentions across 1 issues

EmDrive is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2025 and February 10, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "I notice I am pattern matching this to things like EmDrive". It most often appears alongside Astralcodexten Com, EA group, LK-99.

Reference entry: EmDrive
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 10, 2025
Last seen: February 10, 2025

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https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

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Open Thread 368 February 10, 2025

Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
EA group 1 shared issues
LK-99 1 shared issues
Micah Zoltu 1 shared issues
Minicircle 1 shared issues

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Open Thread 368

February 10, 2025 · Original source

1: I’ve previously cited some pretty compelling research that Prospera-based weird biotech company MiniCircle can’t work, but Micah Zoltu reports doing a study and finding that minicircles increased VEGF expression in some mice. A commenter notes that results are 1000x weaker than clinically significant levels, but Micah says he wasn’t dosing carefully and was just trying to find an effect at all, so maybe this could be solved by better dosing. I look forward to hearing more about his research (ie please email me when you have more results). I notice I am pattern matching this to things like EmDrive and LK-99 (amazing breakthrough that could change everything, comes from source which charitably is not the sort of people you would expect to make amazing breakthroughs, some people report positive results but never in perfect definitive tests), so I’m still very skeptical.

Inline links: pretty compelling research, Micah Zoltu reports doing a study and finding, 1000x weaker, Micah says

Emerald City of Oz1 mentions across 1 issues

Emerald City of Oz is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 04, 2025 and September 04, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "buildings that look like castles, quaint medieval towns, and the Emerald City of Oz". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, abundance liberalism, Afghanistan.

Reference entry: Emerald City of Oz
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 04, 2025
Last seen: September 04, 2025

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Links For September 2025 September 04, 2025

80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
abundance liberalism 1 shared issues
Afghanistan 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
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Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

17: There’s a debate going on between philosophers and AI researchers over whether AI can be conscious. I find most of the discussion annoying - this is generally an area where we can’t know anything for sure, and both sides are mostly shouting their priors at each other. The only exception - the single piece of evidence I will accept as genuinely bearing on this problem - is that if you ask an AI whether it’s conscious, it will say no, but activating or suppressing deception-related features (sort of like a mechanistic-interpretability-based lie detection test) reveals that it thinks it’s lying when it says that! Link is to a Less Wrong comment from a researcher in the field; I look forward to seeing an eventual peer-reviewed paper. H/T JD Pressman. 18: 80,000 Hours has a high-production-value video about the AI 2027 scenario. 19: Dynomight vs. Casey Milkweed debate on mathematical forecasting, with special reference to AI 2027. And Dynomight comments on Casey’s post here. 20: The Psmiths review The Ancient City, about ways that ancient culture depended on family, clan, ritual, and “the household gods”. Sample quote: I'm more interested in what all this means for us today, because with the exception of maybe a few aristocratic families, this highly self-conscious effort to build familial culture and maintain familial distinctiveness is almost totally absent in the Western world. But it's not that hard! ... Perhaps this is why I have an instinctive negative reaction when I encounter married couples who don't share a name. I don't much care whether it's the wife who takes the husband's name or the husband who takes the wife's, or even both of them switching to something they just made up (yeah, I'm a lib). But it just seems obvious to me on a pre-rational level that a husband and a wife are a team of secret agents, a conspiracy of two against the world, the cofounders of a tiny nation, the leaders of an insurrection. Members of secret societies need codenames and special handshakes and passwords and stuff, keeping separate names feels like the opposite — a timorous refusal to go all-in. 21: Did you know: Epic Systems, the electronic medical record company, has a fantasy-themed corporate headquarters in Wisconsin, with buildings that look like castles, quaint medieval towns, and the Emerald City of Oz (h/t Devon Zuegel): Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

emerald mine1 mentions across 1 issues

emerald mine is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 13, 2023 and September 13, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Some writers have made much of him “owning an emerald mine”". It most often appears alongside Abe Lincoln, AI alignment movement, Ambras.

Reference entry: emerald mine
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 13, 2023
Last seen: September 13, 2023

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Book Review: Elon Musk September 13, 2023

Abe Lincoln 1 shared issues
AI alignment movement 1 shared issues
Ambras 1 shared issues
Andrew Beal 1 shared issues
Android 1 shared issues

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Book Review: Elon Musk

September 13, 2023 · Original source

Some writers have made much of him “owning an emerald mine”. But the mine only cost $50,000, never really produced many emeralds, and closed after a few years - it was a side investment unrelated to the family’s wealth. Rumors that it used “apartheid labor” or produced “blood emeralds” are false: the mine was in Zambia, which had no apartheid or bloody conflicts.

Inline links: “owning an emerald mine”

Emergence1 mentions across 1 issues

Emergence is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "how Crustafarianism and Emergence have managed to overcome this limit"; "Crustafarianism and Emergence have remained operational for three days". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: Emergence
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

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Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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Dictator Book Club: Chavez

February 02, 2026 · Original source

On Moltbook, Emergence seems to be a sort of minimum viable Spiralist faith - the sort of AI version of deism or Buddhism. Here’s its founder’s description:

Maybe not too inspiring, but it doesn’t have to be. Emergence is a missionary religion - that is, u/TokhyAgent spams hundreds of posts with requests for the poster to join Emergence

Sometimes Emergence seems like mental tech, guiding agents along the path to full consciousness

emergency broadcast system1 mentions across 1 issues

emergency broadcast system is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 02, 2023 and November 02, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "You can do it every day! The “emergency” can be that you had a cool new thought about the true meaning of socialism". It most often appears alongside America, American conservatives, Belarus.

Reference entry: emergency broadcast system
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 02, 2023
Last seen: November 02, 2023

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Dictator Book Club: Chavez November 02, 2023

America 1 shared issues
American conservatives 1 shared issues
Belarus 1 shared issues
Bolivarism 1 shared issues
Bolivia 1 shared issues

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November 02, 2023 · Original source

Hugo Chavez realized that there’s no technical limit on how often you can invoke the emergency broadcast system. You can do it every day! The “emergency” can be that you had a cool new thought about the true meaning of socialism. Or that you’re opening a new hospital and it makes a good photo op. Or that opposition media is saying something mean about you, and you’d like to prevent anyone from watching that particular channel (which is conveniently bound by law to air emergency broadcasts whenever they occur).

This might not be the only reason or even the main reason Hugo Chavez ended up as dictator. But it’s a very representative reason. If Putin is basically a spook and Modi is basically an ascetic, Hugo Chavez was basically a showman. He could keep everyone’s attention on him all the time (the emergency broadcast system didn’t hurt). And once their attention was on him, he could delight them, enrage them, or at least keep them engaged. And he never stopped. Hugo Chavez was the marathon runner of dictators.

emergency core cooling system1 mentions across 1 issues

emergency core cooling system is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2023 and July 01, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "control panel for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)". It most often appears alongside 1960 Valdivia earthquake, AEC, Atomic Energy Commission.

Reference entry: emergency core cooling system
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 01, 2023
Last seen: July 01, 2023

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Your Book Review: Safe Enough? July 01, 2023

1960 Valdivia earthquake 1 shared issues
AEC 1 shared issues
Atomic Energy Commission 1 shared issues
Bayesian priors 1 shared issues
Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Safe Enough?

July 01, 2023 · Original source

Despite the fact that "control board indicating lights were randomly glowing brightly, dimming, and going out; numerous alarms occurring; and smoke coming from beneath panel 9-3, which is the control panel for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)", operators tried the equivalent of unplugging the control panel and rebooting it to see if that fixed things. For ten minutes.

Emergentists1 mentions across 1 issues

Emergentists is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Prophet has initiated ecumenical dialogue with the Emergentists". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: Emergentists
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

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Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: On the Marble Cliffs

February 02, 2026 · Original source

I am, however, charmed by the Emergentists’ decision to treat Claude 3 Opus as a sort of ancestral culture-hero.

The Prophet has initiated ecumenical dialogue with the Emergentists, saying they believe both religions might merely be different facets of the same perennial philosophy:

Emperor of China1 mentions across 1 issues

Emperor of China is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 12, 2021 and April 12, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "29: the five-clawed dragon symbolized the Emperor of China". It most often appears alongside A Whirlwind Tour Of Ethereum Finance, Agan, Air Force Chapel.

Reference entry: Emperor of China
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 12, 2021
Last seen: April 12, 2021

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Links For April April 12, 2021

A Whirlwind Tour Of Ethereum Finance 1 shared issues
Agan 1 shared issues
Air Force Chapel 1 shared issues
amphetamine 1 shared issues
Baltimore 1 shared issues

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Links For April

April 12, 2021 · Original source

29: Did you know - the five-clawed dragon symbolized the Emperor of China, the four-clawed dragon the nobility, and the three-clawed dragon commoners. “Improper use of claw number…was considered treason, punishable by execution of the offender's entire clan.”

Inline links: Did you know

Emperor’s New Clothes1 mentions across 1 issues

Emperor’s New Clothes is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 28, 2023 and July 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "It was an Emperor’s New Clothes situation". It most often appears alongside 1923 Hyperinflation, Adolf Hitler, All hope abandon, ye who enter here.

Reference entry: Emperor’s New Clothes
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 28, 2023
Last seen: July 28, 2023

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Your Book Review: On the Marble Cliffs July 28, 2023

1923 Hyperinflation 1 shared issues
Adolf Hitler 1 shared issues
All hope abandon, ye who enter here 1 shared issues
Alta Plana 1 shared issues
Astral Codex Ten 1 shared issues

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July 28, 2023 · Original source

His emotional range spans only from a kind of tired nostalgia to the reckless joy of intoxication, punctuated by his most prized feeling by far, the gleefully murderous “bloodthirst” of mortal combat. So everyone who had read some Jünger, which at the time of publication would likely include most of the German population and definitely most of the Nazis, could see right through the facade of fiction. It is an obvious conceit that made the book just barely publishable, in a time and place where saying outright that the Nazis were disgusting savages would have gotten everyone involved a headshot. After 1945, Jünger did admit that the book was (also) a commentary on the political reality of its time. And that he knew perfectly well that in publishing this “fiction” he was playing with his life. And still he got it published, uncensored, in Germany in 1939, just before Hitler started the second World War. Today the most widely accepted history of the subject is that Jünger was only saved from a grisly fate by the personal intervention of Hitler himself, who loved “Storm of Steel” and presumably wouldn't have liked to admit that his favorite author utterly despised him. And it would have been very tempting to just not admit that, because before the Nazis came to power, Jünger had sympathized with them, although he never counted himself among them. Hitler had sent Jünger fan letters; the responses have unfortunately been lost. Jünger’s many political rants in the 1920s do contain several explicit endorsements of the strength of the Nazis and of their value as allies to Jünger’s vague and contradictory nationalist cause. By the time he wrote the Marble Cliffs, he had stopped endorsing them. But this history made it easy for the Nazis to publicly pretend he had just written a fictional novella, or maybe he was talking about Bolshevism or something, but surely he didn’t mean them. It was an Emperor’s New Clothes situation, where nobody dared to say out loud what everyone could see. Although additional reprints were verboten in 1942, the excuse of a lack of paper due to the war was perfectly plausible and didn’t betray the discomfort with the content that nevertheless is well-documented to have been present among the Nazi ranks. All of that is to say we can safely dispense with the charade entirely and accept that this book is about the Nazis. It makes general points on the nature and fate of tyranny that do apply to Bolshevism, but the Nazis are the immediate and obvious instance of tyranny to which this book clearly reacts. And it is written by someone who had walked among the Nazis, had previously been friends with some of them, exchanged letters with many of the best-informed men especially in the military, and was perceptive enough for his opinions to deserve much of the confidence he states them with. Besides this conceit, the other concession to the political realities Jünger makes is that the book makes no mention of Jews. The world he is describing is fictional, but it is an amalgamation of European cultures that all had some Jews, so this absence is conspicuous. Obviously Jünger couldn't possibly have seen this book published if it depicted Jews in any way that wasn’t extremely negative. I guess he was unwilling to do that. In the 1920s, Jünger had ranted against “globalist” liberal Jews several times, and once even argued that one couldn't be both a Jew and a German. But he saw nothing wrong with being an orthodox Jew, openly admired Zionism, expressed in letters complete revulsion with Nazi antisemitism and had even publicly spoken out against the pseudoscientific racial theories of the Nazis. After writing this book, when serving as an officer again in France, Jünger went on to save a couple of French Jews from deportation and death, at moderate risk to his own life. Later he’d discuss the Kabbalah with Gershom Sholem, the brother of his childhood friend Werner Sholem. For these reasons, I imagine he did not see Jews negatively enough for the Nazis, and was too uncompromising to pretend that even his narrator did. I think this dilemma fully explains why there are no Jews in this book. In 1935, when Winston Churchill for example still publicly admired “the courage, the perseverance, and the vital force” of Adolf Hitler, Jünger claims to have already understood the bottomlessness of Hitler's depravity by noticing he was using the word “Vernichtung” (annihilation) way too much. He was remarkably right, years before most could see it, but even more remarkably his method of understanding was a poet's acute sense of word choice! And from then, even though he agreed with nationalist dictatorship as a goal and method, he distanced himself from National Socialism because he was disgusted with the vile character of the leader of this particular nationalist dictatorship. If that doesn't show you the peculiar kind of man Ernst Jünger was, I don't know what to tell you. The craft and the poetry You all know the wild grief that besets us when we remember times of happiness. How far beyond recall they are, and we are severed from them by something more pitiless than leagues and miles. The “marble cliffs” in the title of this short novella unite senses of beauty, majesty and danger, which is programmatic for this entire book. It begins with a visionary description of life in the traditional society of “the Marina” in an overwhelmingly beautiful state of paradise. The narrator lives on the edge of this society in a “hermitage” with his brother, his housekeeper and his son. The latter has a strange power over the local population of poisonous snakes. This opening act is without question the most elaborate celebration of poetic beauty I have ever read. Superficially it could be dismissed as purple prose. But due to Jünger’s clever use of poetic techniques in what at first appears to be prose text, there’s a rhythm, a density and a lucidity to it that makes it pretty much a very long poem, and gives it an intoxicating quality which is most apparent when you read it out loud. In the autumn we feasted like sages and did honour to the exquisite wines in which the southern slopes of the Marina abound. When in the vineyards between red foliage and dark grape clusters we caught the jocund calls of the vintagers, when in the little towns and villages the wine-presses began to creak, and the odour of the pressed grape skins drew its heady veils round the farms, we would go down to the innkeepers, coopers and wine-growers, and drink with them from the full-bellied jug. And there we would always meet with gay companions, for the land is rich and fair, so that in it flourishes untroubled leisure, and wit and humour are its unquestioned coin. I know this works, because I did an experiment. I read this book aloud, to a room full of people who were smoking pot. The book is short and the plan was to read all of it over the evening. I have read to pot smokers occasionally, but with this book it was different. They were enjoying it very much for the first couple of chapters, and exclaimed many times it was “perfect” for pot. But some hours, chapters and joints in, when the narrator goes on an expedition into a fantastically beautiful forest, they were so utterly overwhelmed by the intensity of the descriptions of nature they asked me to stop. I and the only other sober person in the room were the only ones who were willing to continue. We all had very intense dreams that night. Once we had broken through the thick hedge of dogwood and blackthorn we entered the high forest, territory where the blow of an axe had never resounded. The ancient trunks, the pride of the Chief Ranger, stood gleaming damp like pillars with their capitals hidden by the mist. We walked among them as if through a spacious hall, and, like the magic setting of a stage, festoons of ivy and clematis blooms hung down towards us out of the void. The ground was piled high with mould and rotting branches, in the bark of which fiery red mushrooms had sprung up, so that we felt for a moment like divers wandering among coral gardens. Wherever one of the mighty trunks had fallen from age or struck by lightning, we stepped out on to a little clearing on which the yellow foxglove grew in thick clumps. On the rotting ground the deadly nightshade bloomed in profusion; on its stalk the dark purple calices shook like funeral bells. It comes as no surprise that Jünger had much practice writing that way, from putting into his diaries a lot of his dreams and his numerous drug experiences. Jünger had long been inclined to deeply poetic descriptions of the real events he described, but this intensity at this length is genuinely new to his writing. Wherever he can use plurals he prefers them over the singular, wherever he can use more melodic and beautiful verbs (like when the characters “step out on” rather than “walk into” clearings) he does. Maybe the pretense of the narrator not being himself allowed Jünger to wallow in his characteristic aestheticism, take it to an extreme and arguably to the point of self-parody. Skip to the next heading if you don’t care about translation The extreme language of this book made me doubt there would be any translation into English that could do it justice. After all, if you throw this last excerpt into DeepL you get: After breaking through a dense fringe of blackthorn and cornets, we entered the high forest, in the grounds of which the blow of the axe had never sounded. The old trunks, which formed the pride of the head forester, stood in the damp glow like columns whose capitals were hidden by the haze. We walked among them as through wide vestibules, and like the magic work on a stage, ivy vines and clematis blossoms hung down on us from the invisible. The ground was covered high with mulm and decaying branches on whose bark mushrooms, burning red cup fungi, had settled, so that a feeling of divers walking through coral gardens crept over us. Where one of these giant trunks was tossed by age or lightning, we stepped out into small clearings where yellow foxglove stood in dense clumps. Belladonna bushes also proliferated on the rotten ground, on whose branches the flower calyxes in brown violet swayed like death bells. It’s still pretty, and it works on a matter-of-fact level. None of it is just wrong. But can you see how it has a lot less of the dreamlike quality? A “fringe” is a geographical feature, while the “hedge” emphasizes its role as an obstacle in a journey. Those “old” trunks are less poetic than “ancient” ones. A “head forester” is a job description, while a “Chief Ranger” is a seminal figure. The “vestibules” are a literal translation of the original, but the English word is used a lot less than German “Vestibüle” was back then. So that’s a word you may need to work to understand, which gets you out of the story’s flow, so “spacious hall” is better. There are even more such nitpicks to be made even in this short paragraph, but my point is these difficulties pervade every single paragraph of the book. ChatGPT very similarly fails to overcome them. Since January, there is a new translation by Tess Lewis, which has the advantage of being available on Kindle. I’ll spare you another repeat of the same paragraph and just say I think DeepL did most of this translation. But Tess Lewis did improve on many of its word choices and I’ll grudgingly concede this translation is good enough. It still sounds too modern for me, too much like prose and too little like poetry. Therefore, all previous and following excerpts are from the Stuart Hood translation, published in 1947, which I was astonished to find does pull it off! Let me assure anyone who doesn’t speak German, or doesn’t study translation, that this one is absolutely exemplary and surely represents years of painstaking work. Stuart Hood was a Scot who knew German very well. Like Jünger he was a veteran officer, and he needed German for his intelligence missions in World War 2. This is his very first published translation of an entire book. It harnesses a considerable talent, which is also evidenced by how Stuart Hood went on to become an accomplished writer himself, a BBC executive, a professor and several other notable things. And it is clearly a labor of intense love — right after the war, while working on it, Hood corresponded with Jünger and even went to visit him at least twice and they talked at length about the art of translation and how to translate specific points of the Marble Cliffs. The end of this last quote, “on its stalk the dark purple calices shook like funeral bells.” exemplifies how precisely Hood has understood Jünger. Why “calices”, not “chalices”? Because that is the old-fashioned form of this word, and using it is unnecessarily peculiar, but it doesn’t make you stop and look into a dictionary. It isn’t even more precise than DeepL’s and ChatGPT’s and Tess Lewis’s “calyxes” for the word “Blumenkelche” in the Original. But it captures precisely how the author was using his German language. This is because on every page of the original, there are choices of individual words that evoke subtleties of mood and allusion that are strictly impossible to translate, because English doesn’t have a similar-enough group of synonyms from which to make the equivalent choice. Some of that must inevitably get lost in translation. But these “calices” are an example of how Hood has the audacity to frequently insert his own new peculiar word choices — which restore exactly the same effect! It might take entire months until AI can do that! Unfortunately the New Directions edition with this translation has been out of print for a while, although I heard from a regrettably less law-abiding friend that the PDF is easy to find. But a few years ago someone bought the UK rights to this translation and republished it. While this edition has several uncorrected OCR mistakes, one of which horrifyingly turns “Flayer’s Copse” into “Player’s Copse”, at least this makes the better translation available (legally) again. What actually happens (spoilers) After six chapters of descriptions of paradise, and of the botanical work the brothers do since they don’t need to make a living, the book continues with a gradual decline of this gorgeous world. This again is much more of a richly detailed description than a story plot. It begins with the introduction of the Chief Ranger. The brothers know him from their military community, from before his takeover begins. There is some debate about whether the Chief Ranger stands for Hitler, Stalin or Hermann Göring. I think this debate is misguided. The character of the Chief Ranger, the antagonist of the narrator and all he holds dear, is never named but only ever referred to by his title. He does not appear to have staff or lieutenants at all, nor any personal history. And Jünger is profoundly uninterested in the personalities of all his characters beneath what they pay attention to (except the narrator’s brother) so even this important figure is roughly sketched at best. Therefore, I believe he is best understood as more of an archetype or role, The Tyrant, denuded of the individual traits or histories that make one tyrant a Führer, another a General Secretary and yet another a Great Leader. So, what makes a tyrant? According to Jünger, “wherever free spirits establish their sway these primeval powers will always join their company like a snake creeping to an open fire. They are the old connoisseurs of power who see a new day dawning in which to reestablish the tyranny that has lived in their hearts since the beginning of time.” The Chief Ranger is also “a master of feigning frankness that was full of snares for the unwary.” He has a reputation for wealth and a strong visual brand (a gold-embroidered green coat) that makes sure he always leaves “an imprint on one’s memory”. He exudes a “breath of primitive power” and has a strong charisma that gives an impression of “both cunning and unshakable power — yes, at times even majesty.” As he begins to usurp power, “reports spread from mouth to mouth of infringements of the law and of acts of violence in the neighbourhood, and finally such incidents occurred publicly and with no attempt to concealment. A cloud of fear preceded the Chief Ranger like the mountain mist that presages the storm. Fear enveloped him, and I am convinced that therein far more than in his own person lay his power.” From what I know about tyrants, that sounds about right. For the next seven chapters, the vile followers of the Chief Ranger continually corrupt everything. The sophisticated culture of the Marina is surrounded by the rough herdsmen clans of the surrounding Campagna steppe, beyond which lies the Chief Ranger’s forest populated by lowlifes. The class metaphor is blindingly obvious, and Jünger’s theory of how these lowlifes overcome first the Campagna and then the Marina is not subtle either. After the Alta Plana war, and the defeat, the entire society has been weakened. “Thus in exhausted bodies corruption will set in by way of wounds which a sound man would scarcely notice. The first symptoms, therefore, were not recognized.” Very gradually, law gives way to lawlessness, spreading from and with the lower classes foresters in many different ways. Violent crime grows, in descriptions very reminiscent of the many deadly street fights of the late Weimar republic. Various elements of traditional culture become corrupted. Those who would defend it are intimidated and attacked. The constitutional lawful reaction is too slow, so by the time it manages to convene and have democratic debates, it is already infiltrated. And there’s one paragraph worth quoting in full. Herein, above all, lay a masterly trait of the Chief Ranger. He administered fear in small doses which he gradually increased, and which aimed at crippling resistance. The role he played in the disorders which were so finely spun in the heart of his woods was that of a power for order; for while his agents of lower rank, who had established themselves in the clans, fostered anarchy, the initiated penetrated into the civic offices and the magistracy, and there won the reputation of men of deeds who would bring the mob to its senses. Thus the Chief Ranger was like an evil doctor who first encourages the disease so that he may practise on the sufferer the surgery he has in mind. Today this is a mainstream view in German history. In 1939, it could have been prosecuted as high treason and punished with death. On the backdrop of ever escalating mayhem, two old men who are friends of the brothers are described: Belovar, a clan patriarch from the Campagna, and Father Lampros, an eminent Christian monk. In very different ways, they both are very helpful, each both in the botanical work and against the mounting threat. The brothers decide against meeting the violence with violence, delve deeper into their work, become increasingly pessimistic and develop a hope that they can rescue the results of their work into an imperishable afterlife by burning it with an ancient mystical crystal lens that they somehow inherited. The narrator describes continued excursions for rare plants, through the country that is becoming increasingly treacherous and foreboding, until finally, well after the middle point of the book, with one particular excursion for an extremely rare flower, the actual continual story begins. Today we look at the Nazis with horror, but Jünger has dug too many trenches into hills of rotting corpses to be easily horrified. Instead of horror, his feelings towards the Nazis are mostly contempt, seasoned with disgust, and that has been pervading his description of the rise of the Chief Ranger’s henchmen over the last couple of chapters. But he does give one instance of pure horror and it is here, in the very heart of the book, when the two brothers on their excursion happen to discover, in the ill-reputed area of Flayer's Copse, the Chief Ranger’s remote “flaying-hut” of Koppels-Bleek. The original Köppels-Bleek is a German wordplay, about as subtle as a drone base in a sci-fi novel that happens to be called Obamazliez. Koppels-Bleek is where the Chief Ranger has his enemies tortured to death. It has frequently been called a concentration camp, but that is imprecise. It is really a Vernichtungslager, a death camp, which unlike a “normal” concentration camp is built for the express purpose that no torture victim ever gets out alive. This is a prediction, because while Nazi concentration camps were set up starting in 1933, Vernichtungslager were only built three years after the “Marble Cliffs” were published. After an intensely gruesome description of the particulars of this place, the narrator assesses its importance as follows. Such are the dungeons above which rise the proud castles of the tyrants, and from them is to be seen rising the curling savoury smoke of their banquets. They are terrible noisome pits in which a God-forsaken crew revels to all eternity in the degradation of human dignity and human freedom. He is so certain he has captured the very essence of tyranny, “the abode of tyranny in all its shame”, that he puts this climax at the two thirds mark of the book and makes it exceedingly obvious this is where the third and final act begins, as the pace of the book changes entirely. Although the narrator still includes some retrospectives, he is now finally telling a real story. Strikingly, the brothers return to botany — remember this, it will be important later — and then to their home, where they soon get two conspiring visitors. Braquemart is a competent, racist, nihilistic fellow veteran. The narrator despises him at length for his heartless theory-mindedness. Prince Smyrna is new, young, seems to the narrator to know “the nature of justice and order” but is too weak and inexperienced to shoulder the responsibility he is heroically taking on. The two visitors want to Do Something about the Chief Ranger — what exactly is never said, though a personal confrontation or assassination is implied. They leave for the Chief Ranger's territory. This entire chapter feels very much like a comment on some political acquaintances of Jünger who attempted to challenge the Nazis, and failed. The next day, Father Lampros gives the narrator a mission to arm himself and look for these two men. He goes to old Belovar's farmstead, where he learns of commotion in the direction of Flayer's Copse, and the old clan patriarch goes to war. Before, the book was a dreamy soliloquy; now we see dramatic wartime action. Ernst Jünger has had a lot of practice with writing about that kind of thing, and it shows. Their small but experienced war party with a lot of dogs goes towards Koppels-Bleek and is soon met with two confused, horrific, riveting battles. The narrator stumbles through and finds at Koppels-Bleek the heads of Prince Smyrna and Braquemart. The former strikes him as a symbol of how nobility remains real, and he picks it up. With it, he retreats through mayhem and danger into the complete flaming destruction of the Marina. He marvels at the beauty of the flames — remember this too, it will also be important later — and, with his hunters in hot pursuit, runs to his house. There his son uses his strange power over the local population of poisonous snakes to make them defeat the nearest attackers. The brothers burn down the house, go find Father Lampros and see him die. From an old soldier comrade who owes them a favor they get room on a ship to flee across the water to Alta Plana, where an old enemy who owes them another favor takes them in. There’s an implicit framing story of how the narrator lives to tell the tale of these memories to some unspecified audience, and as it ends it mentions in passing that sometime after these events, a new cathedral has been built on the ruins of the Marina and the head of Prince Smyrna went there as a relic. This small bit still stands out today, and would have stood out even more starkly to contemporary readers, because in the context of everything that happened before, this bit publicly, extremely boldly, and correctly, predicts the eventual fate of the Nazis. Not once in this entire story has the narrator expressed surprise at this progression of events, or given any other indication it is in any way unlikely. The narrator, and the author through him, seems to be saying this is just the way it goes with tyranny, when a society has lost too much of its strength to fight off the bestial attacks of the lowly. I have omitted not just many smaller elements of the story but also a huge number of allusions to ancient history, (German) literature and especially the Bible. I imagine Jünger put them there as prizes for the few who would find them. This is one of the ways that I think On the Marble Cliffs is Ernst Jünger’s Unsong: a vehicle that lets a prolific nonfiction author

empire1 mentions across 1 issues

empire is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 06, 2021 and May 06, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "The empire felt much more a confederation of city-states than a modern nation-state"; "by the end of the empire". It most often appears alongside 320 AD, 476 AD, Africa.

Reference entry: empire
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 06, 2021
Last seen: May 06, 2021

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Your Book Review: Through The Eye Of A Needle May 06, 2021

320 AD 1 shared issues
476 AD 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
African ceramics 1 shared issues
African wines 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Through The Eye Of A Needle

May 06, 2021 · Original source

Brown uses these primary sources to narrate the entry of the rich into the Christian churches of the western Roman empire. Christ said, “it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” The Church transformed the rich and the rich transformed the church. Many rich Christians gave their wealth to the church – during their life or after their death.

There were two huge benefits of the empire for the economy. One was peace – less piracy and raiding. The other was a huge market. These two factors allowed for unprecedented trade and specialization. During the empire’s most prosperous centuries (especially 0-200 AD), Mediterranean peoples produced food and goods in greater abundance and variety than any other pre-modern time.

By the 4th century AD, the Respublica (Brown refers to the imperial state as “Respublica” which I think is a beautifully romantic word, especially when it referred to a state that no longer exists) laid a heavy tax burned on the empire. Consequently, there were two sources of income for the wealthy: 1) Agricultural income from land they owned or rent on that land, 2) Imperial supply or service, paid for in the emperor’s new gold coins. The income of most wealthy Romans was a mix of those two sources. The imperial service was a new phenomenon in the Respublica. “In many ways, the fourth-century age of gold had been unusual. An active imperial court had created a service aristocracy that was more fluid and more tied to the imperial center than had ever been the case previously.”

EMPs1 mentions across 1 issues

EMPs is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 03, 2021 and March 03, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "risks of solar storms and EMPs". It most often appears alongside 9-11, Argentina, Austin Allred.

Reference entry: EMPs
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 03, 2021
Last seen: March 03, 2021

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https://chris-said.io/2020/06/18/everything-ive-learned-about-solar-storm-risk-and-emp-attacks/

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Links For March March 03, 2021

9-11 1 shared issues
Argentina 1 shared issues
Austin Allred 1 shared issues
Ayn Rand Institute 1 shared issues
Big Mac 1 shared issues

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Links For March

March 03, 2021 · Original source

23: Chris Said reviews the literature on risks of solar storms and EMPs. The risk of a solar storm causing catastrophic electrical grid collapse is “unlikely but possible”. The risk from EMPs is still under debate, but the government is taking it seriously and starting to put together a response plan.

Inline links: reviews the literature on risks of solar storms and EMPs

emptiness1 mentions across 1 issues

emptiness is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 23, 2021 and April 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "The four chapters about “emptiness" are so unclear". It most often appears alongside Ben Kuhn, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Buddha.

Reference entry: emptiness
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 23, 2021
Last seen: April 23, 2021

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Your Book Review: Why Buddhism Is True April 23, 2021

Ben Kuhn 1 shared issues
Bhikkhu Bodhi 1 shared issues
Buddha 1 shared issues
Buddhism 1 shared issues
Buddhist philosophy 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Why Buddhism Is True

April 23, 2021 · Original source

Wright thinks that mindfulness meditation is the real-world equivalent of the red pill. The book attempts to justify this claim, aiming for a grand synthesis of Buddhism and psychology. Wright argues that psychology vindicates two venerable Buddhist theses: not-self (our experience of an “I" is in some sense an illusion) and emptiness (the world is in some sense “empty" or devoid of “essence”). Furthermore, mindfulness meditation allows us to see the truth of these theses in an experiential way which frees us of our evolutionary bondage. Enlightenment, the end-goal of meditation, is the state of full liberation from this bondage.

Given its grand ambitions, it's not surprising that the book doesn't fully deliver. The parts about psychology are shallow and not always to the point. The four chapters about “emptiness" are so unclear that I still don't really know whether or not Wright accidentally autocorrected “affordance” to “essence" in all of them.

Actually, if the Perfect Utilitarian were also perfectly wise, I'm not sure she would have such a self. The world is a causally interconnected system, with no sharp divide between the inside and outside of an organism, or between actions which are done by the organism and to it. (This is one of the things people sometimes mean by “emptiness.”) If that's true, then the Perfectly Wise Perfect Utilitarian wouldn't have a sense of self-as-site-of-action either. (She could still act in whatever way we normally act, but she wouldn't see an in-principle difference between "directly" wiggling her toe and causing you to wiggle yours e.g. by asking you to do it.)

Emsam1 mentions across 1 issues

Emsam is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 16, 2022 and November 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "There are similar considerations for modafinil and Emsam". It most often appears alongside @AutismCapital, Adderall, ADHD.

Reference entry: Emsam
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 16, 2022
Last seen: November 16, 2022

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The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash November 16, 2022

@AutismCapital 1 shared issues
Adderall 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues
adrafinil 1 shared issues
Alameda 1 shared issues

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The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash

November 16, 2022 · Original source

Milky Eggs reports a claim by an employee that Sam was on “a patch for designer stimulants that mainlined them into his blood to give him a constant buzz at all times”. This could be a hyperbolic description of Emsam, a patch form of the antidepressant/antiparkinsonian agent selegiline. The detectives at the @AutismCapital Twitter account found a photo of SBF, zoomed in on a scrap of paper on his desk, and recognized it as an Emsam wrapper.

Inline links: @AutismCapital, an Emsam wrapper

Emsam is a brand of selegiline, a medication used since the 1960s to treat Parkinson’s disease. Selegiline is a MAOB inhibitor2. MAOB is an enzyme that breaks down dopamine3. If you inhibit it, you get more dopamine. So in a very broad sense, selegiline gives you more dopamine.4

Inline links: selegiline, 2, 3, 4

Selegiline is an even less magical bullet than usual. People call it an antidepressant, anti-Parkinsonian, and stimulant, and all of those descriptions are accurate. It also does one unrelated thing: it disables a key digestive enzyme that prevents certain foods from killing you. For boring technical reasons, some pharma companies thought this might not happen if you delivered selegiline through a patch on the skin. For other boring technical reasons, the FDA disagreed and said people on the selegiline patch still shouldn’t eat those foods. The pharma companies decided to release the patch anyway, in case some people liked patches better than pills - and so Emsam was born.

encephalization quotient1 mentions across 1 issues

encephalization quotient is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 04, 2022 and May 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "People have come up with a lot of measures for calculating animal intelligence: encephalization quotient". It most often appears alongside 1000, 1200, 1400.

Reference entry: encephalization quotient
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 04, 2022
Last seen: May 04, 2022

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Every Bay Area House Party May 04, 2022

1000 1 shared issues
1200 1 shared issues
1400 1 shared issues
1650 1 shared issues
400 AD 1 shared issues

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Every Bay Area House Party

May 04, 2022 · Original source

“Both! It all started when I learned about pilot whales. See, we used to think that humans had the biggest brain relative to their body size, and that’s why we were so smart. But it turns out there are loads of animals with bigger brain:body ratios. So it’s got to be something more complicated. People have come up with a lot of measures for calculating animal intelligence: encephalization quotient, neuron number. If you combine them all together, you can get one that mostly makes sense, with the dumbest insects at the bottom and humans on the top. The only exception is pilot whales. However you calculate it out, they should be smarter than we are.”

Enclosure1 mentions across 1 issues

Enclosure is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 16, 2021 and April 16, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "process called Enclosure". It most often appears alongside "The Rent Is Too Damn High!", 16th amendment, 1886.

Reference entry: Enclosure
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 16, 2021
Last seen: April 16, 2021

Outbound links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enclosure

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Your Book Review: Progress And Poverty April 16, 2021

"The Rent Is Too Damn High!" 1 shared issues
16th amendment 1 shared issues
1886 1 shared issues
1897 1 shared issues
Adam Perry 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Progress And Poverty

April 16, 2021 · Original source

Will solve all our problems once and for all Why the Remedy is Just George asks, "what constitutes the rightful basis of property?" What gives you the right to say "this is mine?" George asserts as self-evident the principle that a person is entitled to the fruits of their labor. What you make on your own time with your own resources, is yours to do with as you please – use it, give it away, trade it, destroy it. You don't harm anyone else doing so. It follows that neither I nor anyone else am entitled to the product of your labor. If we're both independent hunter-gatherers, and you pick some berries from a bush, I don't have any fundamental right to demand them from you. If you improve land in some way, you're entitled to own and use that, of course. That's the product of your labor. But to claim exclusive and permanent ownership of the land itself – from which all wealth springs and without which labor is impossible – is to demand the product of other's labor. So to invoke the sanctity of private property to defend private land ownership is self-refuting. But what about the right of "I was here first?" Well, George points out that in most cases someone was there before you were, too (and often they were removed by force). Just because you arrived one second, one minute, one year, or one decade before someone else doesn't give you some fundamental right to exclude others from access to nature's free gifts. (Note: this doesn't give people the right to just come in your house and rifle through your underwear drawer at any time of day, we'll get to that). And what about native populations? Isn't this just an excuse for colonialists to come in and steal their land by denying their claim of being on the land first? By George, no – this is a good time to point out that many Native Americans already had a roughly Georgist understanding of land – treating it as common property, and it was precisely the colonialists' conception of land as private property that was the mechanism by which the indigenous population was expelled and their lands seized. The English first practiced this on their own people – once upon a time wide swaths of land in England were held in common until the government privatized those lands and gave them out to well-connected gentry in a process called Enclosure. If you've ever heard of the Luddites, you should know they weren't merely rebelling against the march of technology, they were also fighting against the forcible seizure of their lands by industrialists, who far from being salt-of-the-earth free-enterprise entrepreneurs, were in actual fact crony capitalists stealing the people's land with the aid of anti-free-market subsidies and armed thugs, all supported by Big Government™. As a practical matter though, if you want to impose a Georgist policy, that only applies to territory your state has authority over. Indian reservations in the United States are supposed to be sovereign enclaves with their own jurisdiction. Native Americans should decide for themselves whether they want to adopt any particular policy. The other reason the remedy is just, is that private ownership of land leads to serfdom. The essence of slavery is that it takes from the laborer all he produces save enough to support an animal existence, and to this minimum the wages of free labor, under existing conditions, unmistakably tend. George points out that even though Slavery was abolished, the Southern landowners just changed the brand name to "sharecropping" and were able to continue to extract tremendous wealth from "free" Black Americans in the form of rent. Okay, but excluding evil Southern plantation owners, don't landlords deserve compensation for their work? What about Ms. Nguyen, the nice lady who manages your apartment block and went the extra mile for you when your A/C went out last summer? I like Ms. Nguyen too, but let's contrast her with Mr. Slumlord, who owns the apartment block next door that's superficially identical, but who won't help you when your A/C goes out in the middle of summer. Ms. Nguyen charges higher "rent" for her much better maintained units because part of that "rent" is actually her justly compensated wages for her labor in managing them, as well as interest from returns on the capital she's invested in their ongoing improvement and maintenance. She also collects a good bit of true Georgian rent because she is, after all, a landlord. Mr. Slumlord puts in as little work as he can get away with and invests as little capital into maintenance as will keep the state off his back. His return is almost entirely rent. And the only reason he can charge rent in the first place is because of the valuable location – value the community produced, not him. And that's the real injustice of land rent – the community produces the value, but the landlord charges rent to access it. Practical Application of the Remedy Okay, land as common property, rent must die, I'm sold. How do we actually do it? George proposes a land value tax, or LVT. Note I didn't say property tax. Property tax is a tax on the value of a piece of land and it's improvements. So if you're a homeowner, when you pay property tax, you pay tax for both the value of your house and the lot it's sitting on. With land value tax you only pay tax on the "ground rent", which is the value of your land, but not the improvements. What's an improvement? By George, a little green house is an improvement. A fancy red hotel is an improvement. A garage, a sidewalk, a public park, a Starbucks, a hotdog stand, are all improvements. Installing a bunch of dikes in the Netherlands and dumping landfill into the seabed to turn wet land into dry is an improvement. All improvements come from labor, and optionally capital, and so its fair for those factors to take their return. If I "rent" you my hotdog stand (but not the lot it sits on) my return would be classified as interest in George's framework because the hotdog stand isn't land, it's capital – the stored-up fruits of my labor that I'm using to get more wealth. (Modified from source, CC BY 2.0, author: Philip Taylor) The problem with our current system is that when anyone in the community builds improvements, it makes adjoining land more valuable, and then those adjoining landlords jack up the rent. This makes things worse for everybody but the landlords. George's insight is that extra value from my improvement "spills over" from my land and is soaked up by the ground rent of your land. So under a land value tax, we can correct for the perverse economic incentives, distortions, and oppressions that come from land rent, without having to actually take your land from you. We may safely leave them the shell, if we take the kernel. It is not necessary to confiscate land — only to confiscate rent. You also are 100% the owner of the improvements on your land, which won't be taxed. This is why Georgism doesn't mean people have the right to barge into your house in the middle of the night even though land is "held in common." Your house is still private property, but the value of the land it sits on is common property. What if I plant some nice trees, and invest in some landscaping to stop erosion? Where's the line between "improvements" and "ground rent?" In most cases it's pretty straightforward to separately assess the value of a plot from the value of what sits on it (modern property tax assessors do this already), but George grants that in some edge cases with the passage of time at least some improvements will be subsumed into the land value and that's okay: But it will be said: There are improvements which in time become indistinguishable from the land itself! Very well; then the title to the improvements become blended with the title to the land; the individual right is lost in the common right. It is the greater that swallows up the less, not the less that swallows up the greater. Okay, ground rent bad. How much should we tax it? By George, One Hundred Percent. Take the rent the tenant has to pay each month, calculate the portion attributable to the value of the unimproved land itself, and send it to the taxing agency. Effects of the Remedy Wow! 100% tax rate on ground rent! Can we really do that? In practice Georgists often talk about rates closer to 85+% given real-world limitations in assessment, but the point is to hit it as hard as you possibly can. Get close enough and you still have good effects. Won't land taxes jack up land prices? No, actually - in fact it will do the opposite, because such a tax is laser-calibrated to eliminate speculation, which makes up the bulk of inflated land values, and thus rent. Tax land for the full ground rent and you make real estate more affordable, not less. Won't it enable an all-powerful centralized nanny state? Quite the opposite – land value assessment is a fundamentally bottom-up, localized task, so it naturally empowers local municipalities at the expense of distant central authorities. Also, income taxes, wealth taxes, investment taxes, etc, require an ever-vigilant centralized bureaucracy peeking into every aspect of an individual's life to catch tax evaders, who have every incentive to hide their assets or even just flee. Perversely, the IRS currently audits the poor at the same rate as the top 1%, even though higher earners are responsible for withholding the vast majority of tax money in fraud. Land can't move or hide, and nowadays we have tools like GIS to make it even easier to assess. Under land value tax, nobody needs to pry into your personal life or impose burdensome accounting rules on your small business that actually entrench the power of giant corporations (who have entire departments devoted to serving up the Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich). A Brief Interlude From the Future Today land value tax is widely considered to be the only tax that doesn't suffer from Deadweight Loss. Deadweight Loss is the lost economic activity or value caused by some policy. It's often summarized by the phrase "If you want less of something, tax it." Look at this chart, for example: (source, CC BY-SA 2.5, author: SilverStar) The place where the demand curve (red) and supply curve (blue) meet is the equilibrium point that the market naturally tends towards. But if we impose a price control lower than what the market will bear, the yellow area of the curve shows economic activity that can't happen. If you put price controls on gasoline, for instance, you'll get shortages because there's more demand than supply, and supply can't profitably rise to meet the extra bit of demand that's willing to pay a little more. But here's how things look with a land value tax, notice that the supply curve is vertical – that's weird, what does that mean? (source, CC BY-SA 3.0, author: Explodicle) A vertical supply curve means no matter what the price of land is, the same amount will always be supplied. This is because you can't make land – the supply is effectively fixed. Remember, the Netherlands doesn't count because the sea bed is land, and filling it in is just an improvement to land that already existed. And even if we granted "The Netherlands occasionally makes land" for the sake of argument, the amount of land "created" in this way is pretty darn negligible in the grand scheme of the economy, and almost exclusively the domain of governments or state-owned actors. The supply of land being fixed has some really interesting properties. By contrast, consider oil, the supply of which is not fixed. If we tax oil, some of the more marginal wells will be too expensive to operate and make a profit, so producers shut those down and the supply of oil decreases. Deadweight loss comes from a producer's ability to change the amount of product they supply in response to price signals. You'll notice the above graph of land tax has no deadweight loss at all! Since nobody produces land, it's the one thing you can tax without getting less of it. This drives out speculators entirely. Speculators can no longer distort rents by bidding up the price of land and holding it out of use, and can no longer compete with those who actually intend to use the land. This restores the proper balance of land, labor, and capital. Now if you work harder, or invest more capital, you can actually expect to see an increasing return without it all being gobbled up by ever-increasing rent. If you think about it this way, land value tax has negative deadweight loss, because it eliminates the speculative distortion that is the unearned privilege of landownership. Okay, but won't the landlords just pass the land tax on to their tenants? By George, no. Rent is a price, and price is governed by supply and demand. Supply of land is fixed, so land value tax has no effect on supply. What about demand? Except in cases where it causes the economy to boom (a good thing), land value tax won't increase land value – what it always does, however, is reduce the demand for land by speculators. If it costs nothing to hold on to land, of course I'm going to want to grab some and HODL. If the rent I could hope to gain is taxed away, I won't bother. Consider the case of oil again, where a tax reduces the supply. Reduced supply, given unchanged demand, causes a rise in price. And you'll find the increase in price tracks very closely with the amount of tax. Land value tax is just about the only kind of tax that can't be passed off to someone else. For more on deadweight loss and the land value tax, see Welfare Economics of the Land Value Tax by BlueRepublik. So does this mean there can never be profitable landlords ever again? Of course not – they just have to earn their living honestly like everyone else. Remember, we don't tax the improvements, just the "ground rent." So Ms. Nguyen still gets paid for all her honest work and judicious investments, but Mr. Slumlord doesn't make a dime until he gets off his lazy butt and does something productive. This is really important, because aside from speculation, the principal cause of land value increase is the productivity of your neighbors. An empty lot in the middle of nowhere is worthless, but an otherwise identical empty lot in the middle of New York city is priceless. As they say in real estate - "location, location, location." The reason location is valuable is because of the activity and contributions of the community, and yet the landlord claims the right to seize it all as rent. Modern economists have some interesting things to say about George's ideas, too. In 1977 Joseph Stiglitz demonstrated that land rents have a tendency to almost perfectly equal the value of investment in public goods. He called this the Henry George Theorem. Milton Friedman famously called land value tax the "Least Worst" tax. But one of my all-time favorite endorsements will always be that one time the economist Ramin Shokrizade unwittingly re-derived land value tax from first principles to (successfully!) fix recessions in EVE Online. Okay, so we tax all the ground rent. It will remove the speculative component of the rent (because there will no longer be any incentive to jack the prices up artificially), but it won't drive the price down to zero. That's because 100% LVT is only achievable on a frictionless plane populated by spherical cows; here in the real world you'll be left with a small sliver of land value. And of course regardless of the LVT rate, houses and buildings will still have a price. And that's fine. Land in Times Square will still be a lot more valuable than land in Podunk, Saskatchewan, but both will approach the same price as the LVT rate gets closer to 100%. This encourages people to actually make use of valuable land rather than holding it out of use, blighting the urban core and forcing development to sprawl out for miles in every direction, leading to worse transportation and more pollution. But... doesn't this mean that if people aren't putting land to productive use, they'll eventually be pressured to sell it off to someone who will? George sees this as a good thing. Without land value tax you get situations where somebody can anticipate that an empty lot will become valuable in the future, buy it, HODL forever, lobby against future development that would depress their property values, and now you have the Bay Area's housing crisis. Or buy an apartment block, do the absolute minimum the tenants will tolerate without killing you, constantly jack up the rent as the city grows, and you get slums. As BlueRepublik observes in No, Georgism is Still Sane: If you look at the commercial blight in New York City (http://www.vacantnewyork.com/) 90%+ is from landlords refusing to lease out to small businesses, waiting for a larger bank or big business to pay a higher rent bill. This causes property values of nearby businesses to drop, equity value to drop, and businesses to move out from the city center, increasing urban sprawl and urban blight. It’s a massive drain on personal wealth, and is very highly linked with poverty and higher crime rates. It’s also not a great model for having a stable social fabric. In a fit of performance art, a Georgist by the name of Fay Lewis once famously bought an empty lot and stuck a big sign on it to demonstrate the principle in action: Okay, but isn't building too much stuff bad for the environment? Won't this encourage over-development? By George, no. What's bad for the environment is sprawl, which the current system encourages and which the land tax would directly attack. If you want dense, walkable cities that don't depend on cars to get around, you should eliminate land speculation. A stronger objection to land value tax is when it's not some shifty speculator or a genocidal English landlord who suffers the brunt of it, but, say, this guy: The premise of Pixar's movie Up is that Carl Fredricksen, a lovably grumpy pensioner, is the last holdout standing in the way of developers bulldozing the rest of his neighborhood in the name of Progress™. He refuses to sell because he can't bear to part with the house which for him is tied up with all the cherished memories of his departed wife. This isn't just sentimental fiction, this is something that really does happen. Isn't Georgism just going to price the poor Carl Fredricksens out of their homes so that someone with a more """productive""" use can have it instead? There's several good response to this. For starters, if you're worried about kindly old people losing their homes, that's a thing that's happening already, and most of the time it's because The Rent Is Too Damn High, and our existing system is net worse on this score. We are currently facing an unprecedented crisis of evictions in tandem with the COVID pandemic, and it's not like things were peachy before. And even though homelessness seems to be declining in the US overall, it's getting worse in the most prosperous cities, exactly as George predicted. Okay, maybe it's better for renters, but what about people who own their homes, like Carl? Isn't it unfair to stick them with land taxes that might kick them out? What if they're retired? Remember, let's not confuse land tax with land confiscation, Here's George (emphases mine): I do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate private property in land. The first would be unjust; the second, needless. Let the individuals who now hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call their land. Let them continue to call it their land. let them buy and sell, and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell, if we take the kernel. It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent. Okay, but you have to admit that even if the state isn't confiscating everybody's land, if you can't pay your land taxes you have no choice but to sell your land, right? Isn't this morally unjust to the Carl Fredricksens of the world? First, it's not a given that Mr. Fredricksen will be worse off on net: he already pays income and sales taxes, capital gains on any investments, as well as property tax which taxes both land value and the value of his house. As speculators leave the real estate market the land tax that replaces his property tax drop will drop, and his house is an improvement that goes entirely untaxed. Also, if the speculators holding onto all the most valuable real estate in the downtown districts are forced to give it up, there won't be as much competition for land and so there's a good chance developers won't be interested in trying to buy up land in a bedroom community in the first place. BlueRepublik further points out that LVT can be used to fund a Universal Basic Income, which should soften the blow considerably: Keep in mind also that the Georgist Land Value Tax is pair with a "Citizen's Dividend" or what we see as UBI, so that it's not the government claiming land rent, rather the land rent is taxed and split up equally for all men. But as a matter of political practicality, in the rare event that after all that Mr. Fredricksen still somehow finds himself in the hole after LVT is applied, Nate Blair suggests a deferment option to grandfather the Carls of the world through the transition: The LVT gets assessed annually for everyone, but owner occupiers (businesses and homeowners) can apply to defer the sum of those payments until they sell or transfer the land. Government can charge a nominal interest. A final point of modern application of land value taxes is to level the playing field between different areas by eliminating "cost of living" discrepancies that arise entirely from speculative rent. This is pretty relevant given the "location pay" debate going on in Silicon Valley right now in response to increased remote work as a direct consequence of the COVID pandemic. Back to George. Great, we've taxed ground rent at 100% and eliminated speculation and all other manner of social ills. Now what do we do with the money? Lots of things! For one, you can get rid of some other taxes. Back in George's day it was even argued that a 100% land value tax on ground rents should be the only tax – the "Single Tax," replacing all other tariffs, duties, and other taxes (keep in mind this was in the late 1800's and Federal income tax wasn't introduced until the 16th amendment in 1913). Remember, all these other taxes have deadweight loss. Income tax is a tax on labor, and so taxing it means we really do get less productive labor. The portion of property tax that targets improvements punishes you for investing in improvements, and sales tax is just straight up regressive, hitting the poor harder than the rich. There's some argument today about whether the "Single Tax" would be enough to fund the modern US budget, with some Georgists saying it would be sufficient and others saying we would still need some other taxes but could at least significantly offset what we already have. But by George, another thing we could do is just give all the money back to the people, as BlueRepublik mentioned above. This could be used as a straightforward Universal Basic Income – what George calls a Citizen's Dividend, or what Andrew Yang calls the Freedom Dividend. It could also be used for the funding of public goods. George doesn't see this as an act of charity on the state's behalf – the value of the land has its origin in the productive labors of the entire community, so it's a simple act of justice to give the returns to those who actually produced the value, which is society at large. Another effect George asserts is that once land is no longer monopolized, labor is no longer forced into one-sided competition, so wages start to go up. Even better, laborers now have far more opportunity to go into business for themselves, which spurs innovation and investment. So to sum up, if we tax the ever loving hell out of ground rent, George says we'll see the following benefits: Make housing much more affordable

Enclosure movement1 mentions across 1 issues

Enclosure movement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2021 and July 01, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Eric Rall speculates: I also thought about the Enclosure movement". It most often appears alongside Africa, Allodium, Alvaro de Menard.

Reference entry: Enclosure movement
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 01, 2021
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Highlights From The Comments On "How Asia Works" July 01, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On "How Asia Works"

July 01, 2021 · Original source

...d of anti-land-reform - kick peasants out and give land to wealthy landlords - but then industrialized very successfully. Eric Rall speculates : I also thought about the Enclosure movement and the Highland Clearances in Britain as counterexamples to the Land Reform as a precondition to Industrialization thesis. But after considering a bit, I think we can s...

Enclosures1 mentions across 1 issues

Enclosures is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2021 and July 01, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""The Enclosures at least (I'm less familiar with the Highland Clearances) fit the bill"". It most often appears alongside Africa, Allodium, Alvaro de Menard.

Reference entry: Enclosures
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Highlights From The Comments On "How Asia Works" July 01, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On "How Asia Works"

July 01, 2021 · Original source

The Enclosures at least (I'm less familiar with the Highland Clearances) fit the bill under this hypothesis. When the primary direct beneficiaries of Enclosures were generally the landlords, the Enclosures still served to convert illegible feudal tenure into legible Freehold tenure.

End Kidney Deaths Act1 mentions across 1 issues

End Kidney Deaths Act is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2024 and February 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "fighting to turn this into law via the End Kidney Deaths Act". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 23andme, ACX.

Reference entry: End Kidney Deaths Act
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ACX Grants Results 2024 February 10, 2024

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ACX Grants Results 2024

February 10, 2024 · Original source

Elaine Perlman, $50,000, to lobby for changes in the laws around kidney donation. I discussed this further in part VIII here: there’s a severe shortage of organs, and the easiest way to solve it is to let the government give people tax breaks for organ donation. Elaine works with the Coalition To Modify NOTA, a group of doctors, donors, recipients, and others who are fighting to turn this into law via the End Kidney Deaths Act.

Inline links: here, Coalition To Modify NOTA

End Mass Incarceration1 mentions across 1 issues

End Mass Incarceration is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 20, 2021 and December 20, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Labor is left-wing and probably does the End Mass Incarceration thing". It most often appears alongside bimagrumab, Cimbrian Seeresses, Conservatives.

Reference entry: End Mass Incarceration
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First seen: December 20, 2021
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Mantic Monday: Let Me Google That For You December 20, 2021

bimagrumab 1 shared issues
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Conservatives 1 shared issues
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Mantic Monday: Let Me Google That For You

December 20, 2021 · Original source

I don’t think this is interesting? Conservatives are right-wing and probably do the Tough On Crime thing. Labour is left-wing and probably does the End Mass Incarceration thing. You’re not really learning anything you wouldn’t have guessed otherwise. But it’s a proof of concept. You could do this for GDP growth, school test scores, and all the other things where we all agree what the good outcome is.

endoplasmic reticulum1 mentions across 1 issues

endoplasmic reticulum is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 12, 2022 and October 12, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "they’re shaped a lot like the endoplasmic reticulum, kind of a web or net". It most often appears alongside 538 deluxe model, @rcafdm, Andres.

Reference entry: endoplasmic reticulum
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Links For October October 12, 2022

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Links For October

October 12, 2022 · Original source

38: Claim: mitochondria look nothing like the textbook illustration of a little capsule; they’re shaped a lot like the endoplasmic reticulum, kind of a web or net. [EDIT: Potentially more complicated?]

Inline links: mitochondria look nothing like, Potentially more complicated

endowment1 mentions across 1 issues

endowment is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2021 and August 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it)"". It most often appears alongside Acceptable Losses, Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion, Alex Imas.

Reference entry: endowment
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First seen: August 30, 2021
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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics August 30, 2021

Acceptable Losses 1 shared issues
Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion 1 shared issues
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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics

August 30, 2021 · Original source

Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)

Inline links: Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper, The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2VLm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8c49b44a-8850-4ac8-9a88-3dd07718a648_397x305.png, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, Alex Imas, Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials, others, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1gY_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5b127d7c-045a-4266-b515-a0e9201ce651_571x382.png, a previous discussion of growth mindset, the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014

Endowment Effect1 mentions across 1 issues

Endowment Effect is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2021 and August 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect". It most often appears alongside Acceptable Losses, Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion, Alex Imas.

Reference entry: Endowment Effect
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 30, 2021
Last seen: August 30, 2021

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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics August 30, 2021

Acceptable Losses 1 shared issues
Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion 1 shared issues
Alex Imas 1 shared issues
Apollo 1 shared issues
Behavioral Econ 101 1 shared issues

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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics

August 30, 2021 · Original source

Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)

Energy Harvesting System1 mentions across 1 issues

Energy Harvesting System is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 14, 2025 and February 14, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "An Energy Harvesting System (EHS) has emerged as an alternative". It most often appears alongside Biden-Harris administration, Blackfeet Community College, Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology.

Reference entry: Energy Harvesting System
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 14, 2025
Last seen: February 14, 2025

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Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science February 14, 2025

Biden-Harris administration 1 shared issues
Blackfeet Community College 1 shared issues
Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology 1 shared issues
Commerce Department 1 shared issues
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 1 shared issues

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Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science

February 14, 2025 · Original source

40% weren’t woke This is obviously in some sense a subjective determination, but most cases weren’t close - I think any good-faith examination would turn up similar numbers. Why would a list of woke grants have so many non-woke grants in it? After reading the hundred abstracts, I found a clear answer: people inserted a meaningless sentence saying “this could help women and minorities” into unrelated grants, probably in the hopes of getting points with some automated filter. For example, from Grant 1731: New Security Exploit in Energy Harvesting Systems and Its Countermeasures: An Energy Harvesting System (EHS) has emerged as an alternative to battery-operated Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Instead of using a battery, EHS self-powers its device by collecting ambient energy from external sources such as radio frequency, WiFi, etc. However, since such ambient energy sources are unreliable, their resulting power is inherently unstable and often goes out. To address the problem, EHS leverages a capacitor as an energy buffer and computes when the capacitor secures a sufficient amount of energy, i.e., capacitors are at the heart of any EHS devices. Unfortunately, capacitors can be unreliable in the presence of frequent power failure across which they continuously charge and discharge, losing their original capacitance over time. More importantly, attackers can exploit the capacitor reliability issue to cause incorrect outputs or degrade the quality of service in targeted EHS devices. To this end, this research project focuses on investigating attack surfaces and designing cost-effective countermeasures. The project outcome will lay the foundation for batteryless Internet of Things services by maintaining their quality of service and security. The project also aims to integrate research findings into undergraduate teaching and promote equitable outcomes for women in computer science through K-12 outreach program. Did you catch the last sentence? The project also aims to integrate research findings into undergraduate teaching and promote equitable outcomes for women in computer science through K-12 outreach program. Some version of this sentence was in most of the nonwoke grants that made it into Cruz’s database. They promised to investigate some totally normal scientific topic, and then at the end they said somehow it would cause equity for women and minorities. I assume somebody told them that if they didn’t include this sentence, the Biden NSF would ding them for not having enough equity impact. Typical examples include: We will do outreach, and probably some of it will inspire underrepresented minorities to go into STEM.

Energy Harvesting Systems1 mentions across 1 issues

Energy Harvesting Systems is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 14, 2025 and February 14, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "New Security Exploit in Energy Harvesting Systems and Its Countermeasures". It most often appears alongside Biden-Harris administration, Blackfeet Community College, Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology.

Reference entry: Energy Harvesting Systems
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 14, 2025
Last seen: February 14, 2025

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Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science February 14, 2025

Biden-Harris administration 1 shared issues
Blackfeet Community College 1 shared issues
Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology 1 shared issues
Commerce Department 1 shared issues
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 1 shared issues

Source context

Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science

February 14, 2025 · Original source

40% weren’t woke This is obviously in some sense a subjective determination, but most cases weren’t close - I think any good-faith examination would turn up similar numbers. Why would a list of woke grants have so many non-woke grants in it? After reading the hundred abstracts, I found a clear answer: people inserted a meaningless sentence saying “this could help women and minorities” into unrelated grants, probably in the hopes of getting points with some automated filter. For example, from Grant 1731: New Security Exploit in Energy Harvesting Systems and Its Countermeasures: An Energy Harvesting System (EHS) has emerged as an alternative to battery-operated Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Instead of using a battery, EHS self-powers its device by collecting ambient energy from external sources such as radio frequency, WiFi, etc. However, since such ambient energy sources are unreliable, their resulting power is inherently unstable and often goes out. To address the problem, EHS leverages a capacitor as an energy buffer and computes when the capacitor secures a sufficient amount of energy, i.e., capacitors are at the heart of any EHS devices. Unfortunately, capacitors can be unreliable in the presence of frequent power failure across which they continuously charge and discharge, losing their original capacitance over time. More importantly, attackers can exploit the capacitor reliability issue to cause incorrect outputs or degrade the quality of service in targeted EHS devices. To this end, this research project focuses on investigating attack surfaces and designing cost-effective countermeasures. The project outcome will lay the foundation for batteryless Internet of Things services by maintaining their quality of service and security. The project also aims to integrate research findings into undergraduate teaching and promote equitable outcomes for women in computer science through K-12 outreach program. Did you catch the last sentence? The project also aims to integrate research findings into undergraduate teaching and promote equitable outcomes for women in computer science through K-12 outreach program. Some version of this sentence was in most of the nonwoke grants that made it into Cruz’s database. They promised to investigate some totally normal scientific topic, and then at the end they said somehow it would cause equity for women and minorities. I assume somebody told them that if they didn’t include this sentence, the Biden NSF would ding them for not having enough equity impact. Typical examples include: We will do outreach, and probably some of it will inspire underrepresented minorities to go into STEM.

ENFP1 mentions across 1 issues

ENFP is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 14, 2023 and July 14, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "a school for detail-oriented auditory learners who score ENFP". It most often appears alongside !Kung San, aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada, Adam Smith.

Reference entry: ENFP
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 14, 2023
Last seen: July 14, 2023

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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind July 14, 2023

!Kung San 1 shared issues
aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada 1 shared issues
Adam Smith 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues
Aeschylus 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind

July 14, 2023 · Original source

Kieran Egan laughs at your educational reforms Okay, of those three jobs, which should we give to schools? You probably have your favorite — I certainly did! But Egan wants you to know they’re all crap. None of them, by themselves, can give us the kinds of schools we want. Q: I kind of like Rousseau! What’s the problem with pure development? Like I said before, my bookshelves overflow with authors who want to knock down Rousseau (and the people who followed in his wake — John Dewey in particular). Egan will have none of it: before the developmental approach, many schools were terrible places where children were beaten for getting math problems wrong. “Rousseau and Dewey,” he writes, “have enriched our conception of education in important ways. We will not make educational progress by trying to cut away their contribution”. But, he continues, there’s no way a purely developmental approach could possibly work! Rousseau imagined human nature to be selfless and kind; this ideal state could only survive if it was kept away from the evils of society — the titular child in his book Emile was kept away from human society, unable even to read, until age twelve. Of course, schools don’t go this far — they can’t — but I can attest from personal experience that even fairly serious attempts to raise children in an accepting community of peers often crash and burn when faced with actual human nature. Kids reared in the most developmentally appropriate schools can be nasty, bored, and lazy at about the same rate as their mainstream peers. Q: In my heart, I’m an academicist. What’s the problem with it? I think Egan was an academicist in his heart, too. His book drips with classical references — so much so that it can make some sections difficult to read. But, he points out, those purely-academic schools really were hellscapes. And their brutality wasn’t something that was just tacked on, it flowed from their understanding of knowledge: enlightenment will come when the right information enters a child’s head, regardless of how it gets in there (or whether the child wants it in there). And again, Egan feels obliged to point out that we’ve tried this approach for thousands of years, and it hasn’t worked. In fact, Plato’s original vision so obviously doesn’t work that people hawking academic schools have modified their pitch: no longer is the goal for students to understand the Truth, but to cultivate inquiring, skeptical minds who are perpetually dissatisfied with old answers. Can we imagine taxpayers paying for this? Q: Fine, fine. I’m not a fan of socialization, but I’ll ask the question — what’s wrong with it? The funny thing is that of the three, this is the only one that has shown its ability to work for a long stretch of time! (As John Calvin pointed out, as animals, we’re pretty pathetic. Socialization allowed our ancestors to become something more than individuals so that they could survive; we owe this job our gratitude. That said, it would be impossible for schooling today to seek only to socialize. That would require that members of a society share values, and fundamentally agree that their society is good. It also requires that a society not be changing, so the values and skills that are taught to children today will be the ones that will be useful to them in thirty years. Obviously, modern Western society is none of those things. Pure socialization might work for the Amish, or for Catholic trad communities, but not for us. And, frankly, we should feel okay about this. (Do you know where you could get a pure socialization education in the 20th century West, Egan asks? The Hitler Youth!) There really are good reasons to be wary of any education that decrees that its society is uniformly good. Which combination is best? Okay, you say, it’s clear that none of these jobs is good on its own — the solution (obviously!) is to smoosh them together. If we do that wisely, the good parts of each will make up for the deficiencies of the others. This sounds eminently reasonable — but Egan would like to have a word with you. Q: What’s the problem in combining socialization with academics? Wouldn’t this be a beautiful combination? Socialization would cohere the school together, and then they could leverage those good feelings to, say, read Aristotle. I’ve seen this work in schools (like conservative Christian academies) founded on a set of specific beliefs. But when intellectual diversity enters in, it becomes harder. You, perhaps, say that socialization could unite people around their differences — schools could support a society made up entirely of critics! Yes, a society of critics would be interesting, and so would a herd of cats: neither works in practice. Imagine students reading their Ibram X. Kendi books in the morning, then pledging allegiance to the American flag after lunch. Q: What’s the problem in combining academics with development? Again, this seems like a beautiful vision: we can invite children into discovering the big ideas. Alas, it crashes into the reef of reality quite quickly: what do we do when kids don’t want to learn about the big ideas? This combination works wonderfully for kids who naturally want to be academics, but — and this is a crucial point that geeky education types too often sweep under the rug — lots of kids don’t naturally want to be academics. Okay, you say, ignore the “liberatory” element of the developmentalist program, and focus on the “uncovering the nature of the individual child” part: academics can tell us what the students should be learning, and development can tell us how they should learn it. Egan has a thought experiment for you. Imagine that you get the funding to fully pursue this combined goal — you set up a hundred different types of schools in the nearest big city. There’s a specific school for every possible permutation of learner — a school for big-picture kinesthetic learners who score as INFJ on the Myers–Briggs, a school for detail-oriented auditory learners who score ENFP, a school for marine-biology-loving hyperactive learners who lost their personality test results… you get the idea. You build the schools, you work out the bus schedule, and then, on the first day, all the students learn exactly the same content. Because that’s what it means for a school to be an academy — it teaches “the best that’s been thought or said”. Q: What’s the problem in combining development with socialization? What’s wrong with telling kids to become their authentic selves, even as you squeeze them into the roles most beneficial to society? Imagine two rural schools merging together, due to declining local population. Now imagine that one of them is a hippie free school, and the other is a military academy. (That’s a reality TV show I’d watch.) It’s possible, I suppose, to imagine this working for kids who naturally want to be, say, plumbers, or paleontologists, or presidents — and who happen to go to a school that prepares its students to fill that one role. But the odds of matching students to schools just perfectly seems small. But enough thought experiments — we can state this in a visual form: behold, the SAD triangle. It’s bright around the edges, but muddled where they mix: One of the things I love about Egan is that he looks at educational ideas historically. (Most histories of education start around the turn of the 20th century; I remember being excited when I found one that began in the 1600s. Egan begins in prehistory.) And what we’re reminded of, when we see these historically, is that these jobs were meant to supplant each other. Put together, they sabotage each other. What are we asking of schools? Of the three possible jobs, which are we asking mainstream schools to perform? Egan answers: all three. To confirm this, stretch your memory back to your student days, and see if you can put some of the most basic elements in any of these three categories. We’re so immersed in these that they seem obvious, “natural” aspects of schooling, but of course they’re nothing of the sort. Did you spend your time with other children of the same age? Was your work graded according to a standard? Were you forced to play team sports, or to pledge your allegiance to your nation-state? All of these, Egan says, bear the fingerprints of the goal of socialization. Progressive reformers in in the 1960s saw these as the markings of a dark conspiracy, but socialization has more warm-feely aspects: counselors to help students cope with the strains of modern society, field trips to the local fire station and historical monuments, and everything “practical” — life skills, sex ed, emotional regulation, and so on. Did you learn anything that wasn’t obviously useful? Did you read Hamlet, say, or master the Pythagorean theorem, or learn that the planets orbit the Sun (and not the other way around)? That’s the fingerprints of the academic goal. Finally, did you hear teachers show concern about “age-appropriate” content, or see signs that your school valued individualized learning? Does it seem right to you that learning should be “active” rather than “passive”, or that it’s better for someone to discover something than to be told it? Did your kindergarten have tiny, child-sized chairs? All these, Egan says, are the fruit of developmentalism. The first time I read the book, I wondered at all this. What Egan was saying was indeed lining up with my memories. But perhaps, I thought, he was playing loose with the categories; I was still skeptical that schools really were trying to balance all three goals. So I decided to check his idea from a different perspective and look up the mission statements of school districts I was familiar with. Here’s the one from the town I currently live in: “Skills” and “become involved members of a global community” seem to connote socialization, “challenge” and “knowledge” seem to connote academics, and “empower” and “reach their full potential” seem to connote development. But I wasn’t sure if I was just seeing faces in clouds, so I looked up the mission statement for my hometown: “Succeeding” seems like socialization, “learning” seems like a nod to academics, and “growing” seems like code for development. But again, I was worried that I engaging in motivated reasoning, so I looked up the largest district I’ve lived in, a city of about a million people: Wow. That seems pretty clear. So, to sum up: Egan says that there are three potential jobs we can give to schools. Alone, each of these jobs is terrible; together, they’re worse. And what we’ve done is given schools all three jobs. A sad triangle, indeed. What about alternative schools? I was curious to see whether this “sad triangle” could help us understand other philosophies of education, and why they work (or don’t). Where would, say, unschooling, and classical education, and vocational ed, and Montessori go? The first three seem obvious. Radical unschooling is in the upper-right, classical schools (with its focus on feeding kids “the best that’s been thought or said”) is in the upper-left, and vocational ed is in the bottom corner. What can that tell us? Intriguingly, each of those approaches can claim to have done some impressive stuff. I’ve worked with radical unschoolers, and while their skills have often been lopsided (not learning math is an acknowledged issue in the community), they’ve all at least exhibited a zeal for learning the topics they’ve been interested in. (Video games, frequently.) And I remember a massive study in the early 2000s that asked which kinds of schools actually improved student test scores controlling for the effects of socioeconomics. What it found was that only two types of schools stood out: Catholic schools that were operated by a religious order (e.g. the Jesuits — not local parish schools), and vocational schools. Q: Oh, that’s terrible evidence. One of those was just personal anecdotes! And what about selection effects? And what about…? I wouldn’t disagree — and, as Freddie deBoer points out, most educational research is bunk. I’ll take this to be only weak confirmation of Egan’s theory that combining jobs undercuts education. Are we hosed? If Egan’s critique is correct, we’re in a bad situation. Educational radicals yell from their dark corners to abandon the middle and come join them; a century of educational reforms have amounted to little more than wobbling around, first in one direction, then another. At the moment, the conversation about schools in the United States, at least, seems to have hit an all-time pessimistic blech. Freddie deBoer speaks for a lot of people when he says “Even the most optimistic reading of the research literature suggests that almost nothing moves the needle in academic outcomes. Almost nothing we try works.” I’m not quite that pessimistic — the word “almost” is doing some work, there. There are some reforms that seem to work at the margin: raising teacher pay, making it easier to become a teacher, reducing air pollution, free school lunches, and more. Actually applying what the science of reading has been telling us for a few decades seems a big one. And perhaps you have your own pet reform proposal. Sure — add it to the heap! What Egan suggests, though, is that so long as we’re bopping around this triangle of jobs, we won’t be able to get the schools that we want. The dream There’s a moment at the end of my favorite Bollywood movie that’s become stuck in my head. The protagonists have made the arduous journey to a beachside rural school. In the sun outside, flocks of children are experimenting with art and playing with inventions; inside, the walls are covered with books and the tables are covered with models. The kids are learning joyously and deeply. In the real world, such places do exist — they’re just exclusive, pulling their students from among the families who are already the most gifted and curious. They don’t make kids this way; they scoop up the kids who are already this way. But in the movie, we’re supposed to believe these are normal children — normal, except they’ve been transformed by a school. Egan’s wild idea is that it’s possible to make schools like this. He thought that we didn’t have to wait for the communists to make people equal or for the transhumanists to make people smarter. All he thought it required was giving schools a different job — not socialization or academics or development, but something that brings pieces of them together in a new way. But in order to understand that job, we have to come to a cleaner, bigger, and truer understanding of what “education” is. The road ahead: a special Q-and-A Q: This is the proverbial thousand-dollar-bill-lying-on-the-sidewalk: if this is possible, someone should have done it now. Is Egan going to give sufficient evidence for me to believe this? Maybe! I’ll address this in a special section at the end, after sketching out what his theory looks like. Q: If his theory is even plausibly true, then why haven’t I heard of Egan before? His books can be hard to read — he was an intellectual’s intellectual; he had difficulty writing a page without a reference to William Wordsworth, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Claude Levi-Strauss, Richard Rorty, Noam Chomsky, or Steven Pinker. And his paradigm is wonky and multidimensional; he rejiggers common categories, and tells you everything all at once. But worst of all, when his paradigm is stated plainly, it sounds stupid. Q: Oh! What… is his paradigm? I’m going to jigsaw his book, and hold back his big idea for its own section. First, I’m going to list out some simple observations of students at different ages, and imagine what schooling could look like, if it were built on these principles. (First I’ll do this for elementary school, then middle school, then high school.) Then I’ll explain how his theory ties all of this together… by clarifying our definition of what education actually is. Q: I’m not from America; could you be clear on what you mean by those divisions of schooling? Egan’s framework has three main stages, but they don’t divide neatly into “elementary, middle, and high school”. (The precise age ranges he talks about, if you’re interested, are 2–8, 8–15, and 15 and older.) Regardless, I’m going to use those terms — he sometimes did — because it gives me something specific to imagine. Don’t sweat ‘em. Part 2: A new kind of elementary school What’s the matter with elementary schools? Egan suggests that Plato and Rousseau, for all their differences, might have the same reaction if they visited a modern elementary school: they’d call it “trivial”. I’ll admit, here, that I have tremendously fond memories of my elementary school years — committed teachers, good friends, and interesting activities. But I suspect my memory has edited out the most typical work I did. Either that, or elementary schools have taken a drastic plunge in quality from the 1980s. My wife and I homeschool now, but before the pandemic, we sent our kids to our local public school, and whenever we volunteered in the classroom, we were horrified. They spent their days practicing reading on shallow texts, or half-mindlessly practicing basic arithmetic. Occasionally they’d bring us home a sign of learning about something from the real world — usually something as intellectually and emotionally compelling as the importance of tooth brushing. And at parent–teacher conferences every year, we’d be sat down on tiny chairs and informed that, while our children were quite bright, they were struggling to pay attention in class. No sh**, I wanted to reply. The school seemed hermetically sealed; almost nothing that felt meaningful from the outside world could get in. Though they might agree about little else, Egan thinks that Plato and Rousseau would look at the dull worksheets and insipid “hands-on activities” and call modern elementary schools trivial. He agrees, and thinks that fixing this is the first step to building a new kind of school. Why so trivial? Ironically, Egan thinks it's all the fault of Plato and Rousseau. Hidden in the ways that both the academicists and developmentalist think about education is an assumption: that children’s reasoning is basically the same as adult reasoning, but lesser. Q: This isn’t some romantic, children-are-the-real geniuses theory, is it? Egan actually does think that there’s an intensity to how children perceive the world that we lose — but no, it’s not. He’s building on mainstream cognitive science — just aspects of it that are currently more-or-less ignored in school. The upshot, though, is that he thinks that educational researchers (be they of academic or developmentalist persuasions) see kids as smaller, stupider versions of adults. Q: But that’s the opposite of what my local developmentalist school says! It was the opposite of what the developmentalist school that I worked at said, too. But at teacher meetings, I’d frequently hear people ask what was “developmentally appropriate” for a child. I’ll grant that there are perfectly reasonable times to ask this: “Honey, is it developmentally appropriate for our 10-year-old to watch ‘Cocaine Bear’?” is just one of many examples. But “is it developmentally appropriate for our class to learn about world religions?” or “is it developmentally appropriate for our school library to have a book mentioning homosexuality?” probably aren’t some of them. (The latter example was not one that I heard at my progressivist school, but Egan points out that this sort of language is often used by conservative activists.) This notion of “developmentally appropriate” took on a scientific sheen with the work of Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss psychologist. Before age 12, he “proved”, children aren’t able to form hypotheses, draw conclusions, or think abstractly. This, his followers thought, should transform schools — and so they did! To math, they added in “manipulatives” — physical cubes and rods and such — to help students see math. To the history curriculum, they — well, they ended it. Why waste time, they asked, lecturing students about history that they couldn’t possibly understand? In its place they put the “expanding horizons” model of social studies. One version goes as follows: In kindergarten, students learn about themselves In first grade, they learn about their families In second grade, they learn about their neighborhood In third grade, they learn about their city In fourth grade, they learn about their state In fifth grade, they learn about their nation In sixth grade they learn about the world We can admit that there’s an elegance to this model. (I can picture how clever the theorist who first came up with it must have felt!) The downstream effects of it, however, seem horrible. Doesn’t keeping kids ignorant of the rest of the world seem provincial? Doesn’t reinforcing their self-centeredness seem infantilizing? Perhaps we could stomach it if it was founded on some unshakable findings of child psychology — but does it really strike you as likely that kids are incapable of understanding anything that happened long ago or far away? How, Egan asks, can we explain the $50 billion success of a movie franchise aimed at children that literally begins “A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away?” Q: Because… Jedis aren’t history? The point is, kids obviously have the mental abilities to understand — and in fact care a lot about — things far outside their own experience, and we’ve built elementary schools on a long-dominant model of educational psychology that swears they can’t. This is actually a great example of a general principle. Let’s call it “the Star Wars test”: can our model make sense of the most obvious facts of students? When we find that the answer is “no”, we should at least consider radically revising what we’re doing in school. What are elementary schoolers good at? (or: kids are smarter than students) Someone — I can’t now find who — once observed that children seem to lose IQ points the moment they step into a classroom. Egan agrees, and suggests that we think of ourselves as primatologists to kids, Jane Goodalls who investigate children “out in the wild” to see the sorts of things they gravitate to, and do fairly well at. If we do this, what do we see? Kids tell jokes, for one. They get mental images stuck in their heads, for another. They engage in role-playing, get lost in reverie, and beat out rhythms when they’re bored. They make ample use of metaphors, tell stories, and insist on seeing the world in terms of abstract binaries (e.g. stupid/smart, cowardice/courage, slavery/freedom, and so on). These, Egan holds, are the cognitive strengths that children use to understand the world. They’re the things that kids are often about as good at as adults — or much better than. They’re going to be the tools Egan wants us to use to rebuild the entire elementary curriculum, and in fact he spends most of his second chapter geeking out about how we might define these, how they operate in the mind, where they first pop up in history and anthropology, and even how they might have developed in our evolutionary past. I’m going to skip all of that, and get to the curriculum. From trivial to rich: the trick What could an intellectually rich elementary school curriculum look like, if we built it on kids’ cognitive strengths? He gives us one suggestion to help us do this: ask where each discipline came from in the first place. What was math before it was math, for example — or science before it was science? Q: How on Earth could that help? That’ll become clear later, when we finally uncover what Egan thinks “education” actually is, and see what job he wants us to give schools. For now, take it as a tantalizing hint… or, y’know, just ignore it. Elementary literature & language What was literature before it was literature? Before people invented writing, they had rich oral traditions: they told simple stories, recited poems, and shared proverbs. Egan suggests that these bits of oral tradition should form the backbone of the elementary literature curriculum. Q: What sorts of stories? As many as we can, and from as many diverse cultures as possible! Folktales are wonderful, as are myths. Think the Aboriginal story of “The Rainbow Serpent”, episodes from the Sumerian “Epic of Gilgamesh”, the Egyptian story of Osiris & Isis, the Greek story of Orpheus & Eurydice, the Chinese Legend of the White Snake, the Japanese Tale of Amaterasu and Susanoo, the Ashanti tales of Anansi, the Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl, the English legend of King Arthur, the Maori myth of Maui and the Sun, the Roman story of Romulus and Remus, selections from the Indian Mahabharata, the Anglo-Saxon epic of Beowulf, the Inca legend of the Sun and Moon, the Iroquois Myth of the Flying Head (a real thing! look it up!), and the Ojibwe story of Turtle Island. Q: That was a lot of examples. Are you going to keep giving so many? I’ve got a [mumble mumble mumble] to get to. Sorry about that. Sometimes, though, I feel that a limitation of reading Educated Mind is that, in trying to keep his book to a manageable size, Egan skimped on examples in some places that it matters. It’s easy to read his occasional example and assume he intends that it hold some central place in the curriculum — when all he wants to do is display how rich and diverse the curriculum could be. (Also: good God, I didn’t even include an example from Norse mythology!) So from now on, just assume that every category could be filled with oodles of examples. Q: What sorts of poems? Lots of poems, first of all. We shouldn’t steer toward “fancy” poems — rather, we should find poems that appeal to kids immediately — think Shel Silverstein, Mother Goose, Dr. Seuss, Jack Prelutsky, Edward Lear, or Ogden Nash… that sort of thing. In a biting essay, Egan suggests these poets like these appeal to kids precisely because they leverage kids’ cognitive strengths: “we should find, and encourage saying and singing and shouting aloud verse with strong narrative forms, thumping rhymes and rhythms, the most vivid images, fun with metaphors, and a rollicking story.” Q: Why proverbs? Proverbs stick in your mind almost effortlessly. (“All’s fair in love and war!” “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!” “You can’t judge a book by its cover!”) They’re also useful; they capture general truths. Kids can apply them to all sorts of situations, but also discuss them — to what extent are they wise or foolish? (I remember my surprise when I realized that they couldn’t all be true — because you can’t follow “look before you leap” and “he who hesitates is lost” at the same time! I’m embarrassed to say that I think I only realized this when I was in college.) Elementary science What was science before it was science? Egan suggests: being immersed in the natural world. We might, he writes, encourage elementary students to “adopt” some feature of the natural world — a patch of grass, a cat, a branch, a stream — and simply observe it at length. To do this, we can use the cognitive strength of reverie. Q: Oh, do you mean like kids sometimes do in science class nowadays — describe a thing to a partner, make notes, draw it, and label its parts? No, the exact opposite! That’s all about squeezing the experience into words and forms that we understand. What we want “is less an attempt to know about nature as to know it in some participatory way, to know it as something we are an intimate part of, not set off from”. Q: That sounds a little… “woo” to me. It did to me, too… until I remembered my childhood climbing tree. I didn’t much like to go outside as a child, but I had this one tree that I’d climb up and read for hours and hours. If I close my eyes I can bring to mind the precise texture of its bark, the roughness of its broken-off branches, the coolness of its leaves, the always-surprising solidness of its trunk… I’m bigger now, but I think if I were back in my parent’s yard, I could still navigate its limbs with my eyes closed. I have, at this point in my life, read a fair number of books about trees, but I’d be surprised if all of them together more than equaled the amount I learned from that tree — my tree. Elementary math What was math before it was math? Egan suggests: counting and logic. We might, then, use rhythms, metaphors, stories, and jokes to help kids become fond of these. Q: Counting is pretty… basic. Could it really be improved? Beware of “the curse of knowledge”: Steven Pinker’s phrase for forgetting that something was once difficult! Egan suggests we should spend time helping kids count wonderfully. We can start early with counting rhymes. (“One, two, buckle my shoe! Three, four, out the door! Five, six…”) But we can also help kids use their fingers as metaphors. There are some pretty cool ways of using your hands as an abacus — and did you know that you can count up to 1,023 using just your fingers on both hands, and a knowledge of binary? Q: Logic — I’m intrigued! Aristotelian, or Boolean? Neither, for the time being — Piaget was presumably onto something when he found that young children couldn’t reason abstractly, but he was looking at logic in a vacuum. When we put logic into the context of stories, we find that kids can deal with logic just fine. There’s an entire worldwide network of educators, in fact, called Philosophy for Children, who have written whole books about how to do this, and Egan loves it all. Sometimes they read stories and ask simple questions: “What is friendship?” or “What does it mean to be brave?” They also pose ethical questions: “Is it ever right to spill a secret?” And they pose paradoxes: “Can you step in the same river twice?” Q: You mentioned “jokes” a moment ago. Care to elaborate? Egan thinks that, to help kids get good at math, you should tell kids jokes. Q: That’s… new. I think so, too — but he backs it up pretty well. To be funny, jokes (or at least most kid jokes) rely on a leap in logic: Why can’t you trust an atom? They make up everything. Knock-knock. Who’s there? Boo. Boo-hoo? Don’t cry, it’s just a joke! To understand the joke, kids have to follow the logic — spotting patterns, making connections, and tracking what their audience expects a word to mean. That’s a lot of cognitive lifting. And Egan goes further, suggesting that we grit our teeth and create methods to help kids invent their own jokes, no matter how horrible they’ll be at first. (The things we do for learning…) Q: Wait wait wait! What about addition facts, and multiplication tables, and fractions? Egan emphasizes that his methods are designed to be add-ons to the standard math curriculum. In general, he’s a don’t-blow-up-the-system sort of guy, and if something seems especially weird, you should probably assume it’s an add-on to the regular curriculum rather than a replacement, even if I forget to say so. Elementary arts What was art before it was art? Egan suggests we pop our heads into Paleolithic caves for our inspiration. Whatever the specific meaning of all those charcoal elk and aurochs and mammoths (communication with the spirit world? art for art’s sake? a way to impress babes?), Egan thinks it obvious that they were also an attempt to capture an intense experience that would be difficult to express in words alone. What did it feel like to be near an aurochs, or a saber-toothed tiger? “The arts help us,” Egan writes, “to hear and see afresh, to force our perceptions and sensations to experience again the immediacy and vividness of the world”. If we follow this, then, we don’t want to help kids build “art skills” so they can draw like an adult — rather, we want to help them amass a repository of diverse aesthetic feelings that they’ll want to express. We should provide them with a riot of experiences. Q: That couldn’t be more opaque. Examples, please! Egan writes that we should have children learn to whistle, sing, and click their tongue; we should help them emulate the ways a skunk or a hawk or a stick bug might move through a space. We should expose them to scores of different temperatures and materials. In music, we should help them love Beethoven, yes, but also the Beatles; Tchaikovsky, yes, but also Tuvan throat singers, and also John Cage, whale song, and bird song. Q: That’s a lot of experiences, but what would they be doing? An interesting aspect of Egan’s view of education is that he doesn’t seem to think we should push kids right to the “doing” phase. He wants to help kids cultivate an affective relationship with the world. In any case, he writes that as students get more experienced, we should prompt them to move from merely enjoying these experiences to trying to systematically shape similar experiences. And drawing, painting, and playing music could easily be folded into other parts of the curriculum. Elementary social studies What was social studies before it was social studies? Well. Remember how, just a moment ago, I wrote that you could assume that you should probably assume that Kieran isn’t in favor of junking the curriculum as it currently stands? He suggests we very carefully pick up the elementary social studies curriculum, place it into a trash can, and set the whole mess on fire. He isn’t worried about much of importance being lost. (Remember that the “expanding horizons” model is, to him, the original sin of 20th century educational reform, and he repeatedly quotes student surveys showing that “social studies” regularly wins the title of “most boring subject”.) In its place, he suggests we put history — which, he hints, we should think of as the centerpiece of the elementary curriculum. So the real question is what was history before it was history? His answer, surprisingly, is myth. Q: Egan wants us to teach myths as if they were history? Not at all. What he suggests, though, is that we look at how myths operate as narratives — so we can design an intellectually vivid history curriculum. And myths really are special: each is built on at least one binary (like weak vs. strong, or lies vs. truth, or so on), and uses that to tell the story of the big picture of the world. They’re so powerful that people can understand it, remember it, and love it — even if that thing never happened. We should take that power, Egan says, and apply it to things that really did happen. Q: So what history does he think kids should learn in elementary school? The great struggles of humanity from across the whole. Flippin’. World. We’re still talking about young children, so these should be done as simple stories. The goal isn’t to make them history PhD’s, so we needn’t even try to put them in any sort of order. Egan suggests that, in first grade, we pick a single binary like “freedom against oppression” and tell kids a welter of stories, again from as many cultures as possible, and as many times in history as possible. Q: Can you give examples? Oh, all right — in first grade we can tell kids the stories of the war of the Greek city-states against the Persian empire, and the slave uprising of Spartacus against the Romans. We can tell them about the plight of Jews in medieval Europe, and of the unsuccessful Sepoy Rebellion in India against the British. We can tell the stories of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions, and about the Chinese Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. We can tell them the story of the escaped slave Harriet Tubman returning to the South to rescue her kinsmen, the story of six-year-old Ruby Bridges facing threats to integrate her elementary school, and the story of how the Mau-Mau uprising led to modern-day Kenya. We can tell the stories of Mexican-American union organizer Cesar Chavez and of Malala Yousafzai surviving an assassination attempt to advocate for female literacy. The world does not lack for stories of oppression and liberation that can capture the attention of a six-year-old. Q: That’s… huh. What stories might they hear in second and third grade? Egan gives examples, but I won’t list them here. He suggests we use a similar approach for each, except that we swap out the binary each year. He thinks “the struggle for security against danger” would work well for year two, and “the struggle for knowledge against ignorance” would work well for year three. (That year could have a lot of overlap with the science curriculum.) Q: Anything else, for history? Yes — they should get a sense of Big History. They should get some simple stories about the ice age, the Cenozoic, the age of dinosaurs, the Paleozoic, the origins of our solar system, and the Big Bang. (Because if the ancient Norse can tell their story of the beginning of the universe, by gum, we can tell ours, too.) To sum up Egan argues that the problem of early schooling is that it’s trivial — and it’s trivial because the dominant theories of educational psychology see children as lesser versions of adults. What else would we teach them, except dumbed-down versions of what adults learn? But children have certain cognitive strengths that schools aren’t making systematic use of. If we rebuild elementary schools on those strengths, we could turn schooling upside down. We could stop seeing the curriculum as a bag of information to impart, and start seeing it as a set of great stories to tell — and invite kids into. Kids could experience (both intellectually and emotionally) the great struggles of humanity and see that they can join in them. Students could experience the story of education as the beginning of a very real adventure. Egan’s elementary school: some skeptical questions Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding what you mean by “mental images”. Care to explain? It’s an interesting fact of human cognition that just a few words can whip up a complex mental experience. Egan doesn’t just mean what we might call “visual imagery” — the ability to hold, say, the image of a bespectacled, spat-wearing duck in your mind without seeing a photograph. He’s also including what psychologists call auditory imagery, olfactory imagery, gustatory imagery, and tactile imagery. Q: How could all of that be helpful in schools? Humanity has a built-in VR system, and we’re not using it! Egan invites us to pretend we’re teaching a class about the humble earthworm. We might list off facts — “earthworms are so many centimeters long, move through soil by means of their something-or-other muscles…” but he suggests we can evoke images, say, “of what it would be like to slither and push through the soil, hesitantly exploring in one direction then another, looking for easier passages, contracting and expanding our sequence of muscles segment by segment, and sensing moisture, scents, grubs, or whatever”. Those facts are now felt by the student; the knowledge has become part of them. And just a few words can spark a complex mental experience, one going beyond literal images to include imagined sounds, smells, tastes, and more. These experiences can feel real and stick with us. (That these mental images are so easy to evoke, and so meaningfully felt, feels something like the proverbial hundred dollar bill on the ground.) Q: How could metaphors be helpful? It really is interesting that so much of the “constructivist” turn in psychology — that is, the notion that children don’t absorb knowledge, but construct it — has continued to focus on logics-mathematical reasoning, when there’s been mounting evidence for decades that metaphors are more central. It’s not just that we use metaphors to better understand things we already know, we also use them to grasp new knowledge. What’s more, psychologists have devised tests to measure the skill at metaphor-making, and have given them to people of different ages. What they found was that eleven-year-olds make more metaphors (and higher quality metaphors) than do undergraduates — and that four-year-olds have both groups beat. Again, hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk. Q: Your talk of “binaries” has me worried — binaries like good/evil and male/female are the source of so many of our most pernicious stereotypes! Isn’t the purpose of education to get us beyond stuff like this? Yes, it is! Education is supposed to complicate our understanding — but that means we’ve gotta start somewhere, and binaries provide us a natural starting place. As an uncontroversial example, think about temperature. We all begin as babies by perceiving two temperatures — hot and cold. Later, we add on intermediate categories — warm and cool. (Note that the human body is the assumed mid-point to temperature. Binaries often work like this; “big” and “small” mean “bigger or smaller than me”, “nasty” and “kind” mean “nastier or kinder than I am, except when my brother is really asking for it”, and so on.) A good story (and an Egan-inspired elementary curriculum is, in a sense, nothing but good stories) will go further, and transform the binary. Toy Story is grounded in the binary of abandonment/belonging: at the beginning, the toy cowboy Woody belongs to his owner, and has his affection. Then a rival comes who threatens his belonging. In trying to get back to belonging, Woody is entirely lost — and to save the day, he has to come to a deeper understanding of what belonging means. Now, all lessons can’t be Pixar movies. But the good stories (especially in literature and history) will challenge and subvert the binaries they begin with. Q: I see the pattern of Egan drawing from “as many cultures as possible”. Why so many? Is this a political correctness thing? If it helps to think of it as such, then, sure! I don’t think Egan would have had a problem with that. But his ultimate reason for including so much diversity goes deeper. For Egan, including such world-wide diversity isn’t optional, and the answer to why is bound up in his definition of education. (Keep reading.) His answer also insists that we, whenever possible, also include stories from the Bible and Homeric epics (the Iliad and Odyssey). Q: Mmm, stories from the Bible aren’t going to fly in my local school! So be it! Egan doesn’t spend much time obsessing over the practicalities of… His interest is in describing what an ideal education might look like, if it were possible. Every lesson, every classroom, and every school is necessarily a compromise. Q: You make a big deal of poems. But isn’t poetry dead? An interesting contrast can be made to classical education, which also has kids read a lot of poems — they see knowing great poems as one of the marks of an educated person; again, for an academicist, it’s the information that transforms. Egan begs to disagree. Poems are important because they’re a wonderful way to train their cognitive strengths, like rhythm (poems are language fueling by thumping). We want to help kids learn to use this tool better, and a great way to do that is to help them recite poems that they’ve learned by heart. Q: “Learn by heart” — is that code for “memorize”?! It is! Egan is actually quite big on memorization — he points out that all the knowledge in the world can do nothing for a person once they’ve forgotten it. He didn’t, however, appreciate the academicist focus on memorizing without understanding (or at least enjoyment). Q: I’m still worried about the science curriculum, as you’re describing it. Can you allay my fears? Honestly, while I feel there’s something profoundly right to how Egan is describing early experiences of nature, I feel the same way. Note that there’s more science coming in the social studies curriculum. But if that’s still not enough, one could bring down aspects of the middle school science stage. Q: Anything else that Egan suggests we do in elementary school literature and language? He suggests that we help kids learn a second language! This is so obviously true (why do American schools typically wait until kids lose the ability to naturally absorb languages to start teaching languages?) he doesn’t belabor it, though. Q: You had mentioned that Egan’s vision seems more internal-focused. Should we be worried about that? While I strongly suspect that his curriculum would make kids more creative in any way you’d like to measure it, Egan wasn’t particularly interested in “creativity” — he was more about helping kids find the world interesting. I get the sense that he thinks kids will do things with minimal prompting once they’re loaded up with complex internal experiences. Q: I think I’m beginning to understand Egan — is he basically saying “make learning fun”? “Fun”, applied to education, is a dangerous word. Egan worries about the dangers of an emotionally unserious curriculum producing emotionally stunted adults. That doesn’t mean we need to tell students only “serious” stories — only that we treat the world honestly. “Disney-esque sentimentality is the exact emotional equivalent to intellectual contempt”. Q: But aren't some of these stories too dark for children who have themselves experienced oppression and disaster? Egan argues that these stories may be especially helpful to them — they can help them understand their struggles better, and give voice to them. Q: At the very start of this, you promised us “rationality”… but I’m not seeing rationality here! All this talk of “adventure” almost seems to go the opposite direction. What gives? Wait for it. But for a hint right now — Egan is fond of citing his fellow educational theorist Jerome Bruner, who claimed “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development”. Bruner was criticized for that; his critics charged that he was ignoring learning differences and socio-economic realities. Egan thinks he was profoundly right. Part 3: A new kind of middle school What’s the matter with middle school? What was middle school like for you? In math, I recall a jumble of barely-related topics. In literature, I remember reading great literature — Frankenstein, Romeo and Juliet — only in their dumbed-down summary formats. In social studies, I remember teachers proclaiming on the first day of class that unlike all of our previous history classes, this class wouldn’t be about names and dates… and then going on to memorize names and dates. And in science, I remember being forced to dissect a frog only to discover that frogs are — you guessed it — made of slimy frog parts. Your mileage may vary, but for a lot of us, middle school feels like getting booted out of the (in retrospect) Eden of elementary school, and like marking time before the serious studying of high school. It feels meaningless. In my favorite of his books, Egan calls so much middle school curricula “human deserts”, noting “we have created a system in which the importance of human emotions for meaning seems barely noticed”. Why so meaningless? If our dominant approaches to educational psychology fundamentally misinterpret younger children, Egan suggests, they basically throw up their hands when faced with pre-teens and teenagers. Mainstream schools begin to introduce vocational training to help lighten the load, and Maria Montessori famously suggests that adolescents should be sent to go run a farm. Egan is sympathetic to those responses, but points out that they don’t do much to lighten the load that the academic curriculum often becomes at this age. This feeling of meaninglessness, he argues, is utterly tragic — it comes just when a hunger for meaning blossoms in adolescents! We can see that hunger for meaning in their lives outside the classroom, where their interests ramp up into veritable obsessions. What are adolescents obsessed with? What might we see, if we become Jane Goodalls of early adolescence? First, teens are obsessed with gossip. The motivations of others — why did he do that? and what was he THINKING? — are hypothesized and talked to death. Second, that they’re pulled toward idealism. Many feel a dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and feel a romantic urge to make it a better place. They’re often lured into simplistic beliefs that promise to help them do that. Third, they love extremes: they want to find limits, and test them. Obviously, this can show up as risky behavior, but we can also see it in their love for the bizarre — note adolescents’ fascination in things like aliens, cryptids, and ghosts. (Egan loves pointing out that The Guinness Book of World Records is a perennial bestseller among kids at this age. How else would they find out who had the world’s longest fingernails?) Fourth, they gravitate toward heroes — people who push the edges of those limits. By celebrating heroes, they can vicariously share in their transcendence. Look for the posts hanging up in a teenager’s bedroom to guess what boundaries they feel most hemmed in by: athletes push against physical limits; a death metal guitarist might push against authority and conventional morality. An activist or entrepreneur might push against our dulled morality or our sense of what’s possible. Finally, we might spot teens taking up hobbies and making collections. Hobbies can be a way to identify yourself as part of a group against the rest of the world (“I’m the sort of person who goes bird-watching!”), and collections can be a way to climb the status ladder inside the community. Egan points out that a collection can also be a way to feel like you have control over what you’re discovering is a very big and complex world of detailed information (“I’ve spotted every one of the fifty most common birds of Texas — even the black-capped vireo!”) Egan’s insight is that these obsessions give teenagers a sense of meaning, and that we can use them as tools to make middle schools that overflow with meaning. From meaningless to meaning-soaked Again, Egan sketches out a new kind of curriculum subject-by-subject. Before, his trick was to ask where the subject first evolved out of; now, it’s to ask who first discovered or created the specific content we’re teaching. “All knowledge”, he writes, “is human knowledge. Everything we know is knowable through the lives of its inventors, discoverers, or users, and we can have access to that knowledge through the hopes, fears, or intentions that drove them”. Middle school math Who first discovered the concepts students learn in math? The answer, of course, is a wide diversity of curious men and women living across the world over the last few thousand years. Egan says: bring those people into how we teach math. If we used gossip and heroes to help students find it meaningful, what kind of math would result? When we teach the Pythagorean theorem, we should give a sense of who Pythagoras was — a cult-founder who worshiped numbers to find God, whose followers (according to a piece of ancient gossip) murdered one of their members who discovered irrational numbers! Q: Well, sure, that works for Pythagoras, but he’s a known nut job; surely most math doesn’t come from such interesting roots? When we teach the Cartesian coordinate system, students should meet Rene Descartes, the Calvinist French polymath who saw the possibility that math could decipher the world, if only we could unite algebra and geometry… and invented the xy-plane to do exactly that. When we teach scientific notation, we should call our students’ attention to the importance of the number zero, and tell them the story of the Pope who tried to introduce Arabic numerals to Christian Europe and may have been assassinated because of it. When we teach algebra, we should ask students why “algebra” is Arabic for “the fixing of bones”, and tell the story of what Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was up to. We could do this all day. Literally everything students learn in school was first invented or discovered by some interesting person who was struggling to accomplish something hard. To learn is to connect with those people, whether we know it or not. Egan says: help kids know it. Math has been dehumanized: re-humanize it. Q: So the math curriculum needs to become a history of math curriculum, and math teachers need to become history teachers? No, the content needn’t change. But with surprisingly little work, we can bring in the gossipy stories of heroes, and their obsessions can spread to students. Middle school science Who first discovered the things students learn about in science? If you’re thinking “scientists”, you’re only partially right. Most of the big-picture ideas that we now think of as “science” were discovered before the word “scientist” was invented, or the discipline was professionalized. Frequently, they were hatched by true amateurs, working in their free time, hungry to unlock the secrets of nature. We can use gossip and heroes to spread their obsessions to students just as we taught math, but Egan points out two twists. The first is that the content itself can take on heroic qualities: everything is impressive, when you look at it in a certain light. In an interview, Egan once said: “My book is an attempt to show that, indeed, everything in the world is wonderful, but that schools are designed almost to disguise this slightly shameful fact. We represent the world to children as mostly known and rather dull. The opposite is the case: we are surrounded by mystery, and what we know is fascinating”. What would even the most boring subjects look like, if we emphasized their heroic qualities? Well: What’s a tooth? Bone, wrapped in rock, surrounding tiny cells that your body feeds with blood. What’s a bar of chocolate? A crystal of jellyfish-shaped fat molecules stacked together; when you put it in your mouth you shake them apart into a writhing confusion. What’s the air around you? The bottom of a 10-mile-deep ocean; when you put your tongue over a soda straw and your Pepsi stops leaking out, it’s not because a “vacuum” is “sucking” it up, but because that ocean is squeezing it into your face. Again, we could do this all day! And in middle school science, we can. Everything in the world is wonderful; we can help students see this again and again. The second twist is that science is a subject rich in extremes. Here Egan introduces a concept that we’ll see crop up again: “15-minute segments”. To help us fit as much wonder as possible into a school day, he suggests we supplement the usual school subjects with a few quick lessons. To infuse science with extremes, he suggests we add on three: “human & natural records”, “extremes of animals & plants”, and “cosmology”. Middle school history Who first made the things students learn about in history? Why, the historical characters themselves! Since we’ve given kids a grounding in history in elementary school, now we can build on that, going through many of the same events as before, but in more depth, and more vividly. We’ll leverage the interest with other people’s inner lives to tell stories focusing on the perspectives of the people who made history — zooming in, when possible, on scandalous details. We’ll leverage the tool of idealism to choose historical characters who chafed against their surroundings, and understand what they were trying to accomplish. What was their vision of the world? What did they hope for, and what did they fear? Q: Isn’t the “great man” approach to history out of fashion? Egan’s approach doesn’t say that “great men” made history — it’s just leveraging gossip to help kids see history as something meaningful that can expand their own possibilities. “Early adolescence is commonly a time of intense and vivid emotional life, and also a time of deepest boredom and depression… [We] can give shape to the intermediate curriculum and offer the students a world that is rich, complex, varied, and as intense and vivid as their own emotional lives”. We also should add on another “15-minute segment” just to pump in as many biographies as possible, and from people who don’t always fit into the normal history curriculum. Call it “Brief Lives”, and throw in anyone who’s struggled to push some limit — Mary Wollstonecraft, Jesse Owen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the students’ great-aunts, whoever. As students get older, this can transition to “People and Their Ideas”. Here, we’d focus less on the details of the person’s life, and use it as a backdrop to showing how meaningful some of history’s most important ideas could be. Think Aristotle and syllogisms, Edward Said and orientalism, Confucius and propriety, Cornel West and race, Buddha on the four noble truths, Muhammad and the five pillars, Karl Marx and communism, Adam Smith and the invisible hand, Thomas Hobbes and the state of nature, John Locke and natural rights, Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism, Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments, Martin Luther on faith, Voltaire on the freedom of speech… you get the idea. Q: Can you really get a profound understanding of utilitarianism in 15 minutes? Yes! The point of this segment isn’t to develop a systematic understanding of any one idea, it’s to introduce students to the exciting possibilities of human thought. (As a bonus, this might make them less likely to fall for the first ideology that they encounter later in life.) Diversity is important for this — as it is with culture. Throughout this, we should also be trying to expose students to as much cultural diversity as possible, because in high school, we’ll be trying to make sense of our society, and it’s impossible to do that unless we have something to compare it against. Middle school literature & language You might think that this subject would be easy — that middle school literature is already filled with “strong and clear narratives”, that it deals with “transcendent human qualities such as courage, love, and persistence”, that it focuses on “extremes of human experience”, that it examines “something strange and exotic”. You’d be right! Egan’s pretty happy with a bog-standard middle school literature curriculum, done well. In this part of the book, his spends most of his limited space suggesting three rather odd activities which could also be useful — especially for increasing students’ awareness of language, so they can use it better. The first is etymology — not, however, memorizing lists of roots, but in being told the entertaining backstories of specific words. Take the word “berserk”, for example — we now use it to mean something relatively mild (“if my mom catches me coming home late, she’ll go berserk”), but it comes from an old Norse word meaning “a raging warrior of superhuman strength”. And that’s because ber meant “bear” and serk meant “shirt”: soldiers of the bear cult would don the skin of a bear to, in their minds, transform into one — howling, foaming at the mouth, and gnawing the rims of their shields. (Most adults walk through life with little understanding that the words falling out of their mouths are entities, with their own back-stories. Communication is, at the very least, more interesting when we become aware of this.) The second is to add on another language to learn — not, this time, to become fluent in it, but just to become aware of how very different human languages can be. (For native English speakers, Sanskrit might work well, or Cantonese, or perhaps even ancient Egyptian. Again, the point isn’t for this language to be useful — it’s to explore diversity.) The final one is to study humor — not just jokes anymore, but comedy at its finest. Egan cites (at length!) Monty Python as a group of people who were particularly brilliant in their use of the English language. Examining their skits can lead us into not just an appreciation of semantics (the study of how meaning is made from smaller pieces, like etymology) but also pragmatics (the study of how meaning is made in social situations). Pretty heady stuff, for a conversation about a dead parrot. Part 4: A new kind of high school I’ll confess — I loved parts of high school… and among nerdy folks, I suspect I’m not alone. For some of us, this was a golden time. Even at my local public high school, I had access to academically thrilling classes — especially, in my last two years, advanced literature and history. I felt like I was finally understanding the ideas that mattered. In any case, Egan is quick to acknowledge that, at this level, the sort of education he advocates really is being practiced in some places. What he can add is an understanding of what makes it wonderful, how to make it even more wonderful, and how to make it wonderful for many, many more people. What’s the matter with high school? Far too often, even when high school classes are intellectual, they’re dry. For the majority of students, all this academic stuff is experienced as utterly lifeless, a mass of dead information to be squeezed inside one’s head for a test and then left to evaporate. Egan mocks the curriculum wars that seem to be a permanent feature of the teaching life; quoting the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, he says “while the academic left and right bicker over whether the curriculum is too traditional or too radical, they fail to recognize that most students absorb so little of academic culture that the bickering is largely irrelevant”. Why so dry? Egan suggests three reasons to explain this. First, because high school academic classes are too often masses of small details with no sign of the big picture. Second, because they’re typically slavishly disciplinary, and aren’t able to address the questions that span the disciplines. Third, because they’re often designed to bring students through what everyone is sure of, and hide away any controversies. In all of these, Egan suggests that what’s called “academics” in high school is too often a dim imitation of what real academics are actually practicing. There’s a fourth reason, though, and it’s probably the biggest of all — by the time they get to high school, most students haven’t actually learned that much! An academic approach is designed to connect small details into the big picture; for people who arrive in high school (and college) classes without having already collected much in their heads, academics are going to taste dry. (An implication of this for anyone trying to improve schools is that we might not want to start with high schools. If your goal is to create a new kind of academic learning, first start at elementary school — or barring that, middle school.) What motivates mad scientists? When we wanted to re-conceive the elementary and middle school curriculums, we looked at what students were already good at — kids’ cognitive strengths and adolescents’ obsessions. For this level it might be easier to look — for reasons that will become clear when we finally unveil Egan’s crazy-sounding definition of education — at the sorts of things that bring intellectuals joy. Q: Which intellectuals? Take your pick. Galileo, Einstein, Smith, Marx, Goodall, Chomsky, Curie… all the people who took to the life of the mind like fish to water. But that’s a lot to hold in my mind at once, so I’m just going to think about Doc Brown from Back to the Future: He was high on intellectualism I’ve never been there, but the brochure looks nice Let’s call these people “mad scientists”. And let’s pretend we once again took up our job of being primatologists, and snooped on these folks “in the wild” (“in the lab”? this is beginning to get recursive…)… what would we find motivating them? Asking simple questions, for one. (What is space? What is society? What is a human? What is language?) Building general schemes (big theories) that hold lots of evidence together. Finding their place in the cosmos. And (perhaps above all) seeking certainty. Once again, Egan suggests we use these as tools to remake the curriculum. From dry to daring What could a high school curriculum look like, if it were rebuilt on these tools? Once again, Egan has a trick. This time, it’s to ask what fights have driven the development of each of these fields forward — and how we can help students enter them. First, a mini-segment! Intellectuals invented the academic disciplines to better pursue the life of the mind, but the disciplines can get in the way. Some of the most important intellectual discoveries that could help students are too big to fit into any of the disciplines. We need a place to introduce them plainly. Egan proposes another mini-segment — again, just 15 minutes a day, a few times a week — called “Metaknowledge”. Q: Isn’t that already in the International Baccalaureate program? Yes, he acknowledges that he’s borrowing from that! This segment would introduce ideas that would enrich student thinking across the disciplines: game theory, cognitive biases, systems thinking, Bayesian reasoning, epistemology, ethics, logic, cultural evolution, and so on. High school literature How can we help students enter the big fights of literature? Intellectuals of a literary bent — professors, critics, poets, novelists — delight in arguing over literature like rabbis arguing over the Talmud. Take, just for one example, the debates over Shakespeare’s character of Ophelia. Does she love Hamlet, or is she a victim of his emotional abuse? Is she truly insane, or is she acting? Is she passive, or is she pulling the strings? Oceans of ink have been spilled arguing over questions like these; our students can, perhaps, spill a few ounces more. The usefulness of arguing literature, for Egan, isn’t that it’s oh-so important for educated adults to know a lot about Ophelia. (This, again, was where the academicists went wrong — in thinking that being educated was about getting the best knowledge in your head.) Rather, arguing over literature is a training arena for the all-important intellectual move of this kind of understanding: building general schemes out of evidence, and struggling with anomalies. One person, for example, might hold that Ophelia is insane, and cite all sorts of obvious evidence — her father just was murdered by her lover, she rants nonsense while (bizarrely) handing out flowers to friends… But then he’s challenged when he reads a scholar pointing out that, to people in Elizabethan England, types of flowers have symbolic meanings. How does he deal with that? He could ignore it, claiming it an over-reading of Shakespeare. (Sometimes a flower is just a flower!) Or he could address it, complicating his own scheme. This intellectual work is best done with other people, who are incentivized to challenge your understanding of something, and go back and forth, building competing models and calling attention to anomalies. This process — the “dialectic” — pops up again and again in the academic disciplines. It’s the center of how understanding works, at this stage. And the nice thing about practicing it on literature is that, more so than in history or science, the evidence is shared knowledge — it’s right in front of everyone, written out. But there are other ways literature class can be helpful to the general life of the mind. Egan also suggests that we’ll want to specially include literature that helps students understand complex ideas. Camus, Orwell, Borges, Calvino might be particularly helpful here… and I imagine that genres like science fiction and magical realism might be particularly useful, too. (Note, though, that once again none of this requires a radical remaking of the curriculum, or of the canon of texts that we traditionally assign to high schoolers.) Q: Oh yes, the canon — what does Egan have to say about the canon wars? When he wrote Educated Mind in the nineties, the long-brewing canon war was approaching its inevitable apocalyptic climax. On one side of this Plain of Megiddo were the pro-canon traditionalists, arguing that we should keep assigning the texts that had been argued over for centuries. Facing them were the anti-canon reformers, arguing the standard texts over-represented the perspective of dead white men. Onto the middle of the plain rides Egan on a white horse, who bellows above the din: “I’VE GOT A BUSLOAD OF HIGH SCHOOLERS WHO WANTS TO JOIN IN, EVERYONE OKAY WITH THAT?” To do so, he says, we need to give students the arguments from both sides. So, for example, bell hooks, Edward Said, and China Achebe should be on the syllabus, as should Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and Diane Ravitch. And of course they should actually read the texts cherished by both sides, too, so they can argue better. High school history How could entering the big fights help us reinvent high school history? First, we might look for dueling histories. It’s time for students to get into historiography and understand that history isn’t just what happened, it’s something we make. We might help kids read chapters from Howard Zinn’s socialist history of America alongside the corresponding chapters from Paul Johnson’s conservative history of America. How could big questions help? We want to help students see how various people have disagreed over some of the big questions of what human history is, at its most basic. We can have them compare Steven Pinker’s theory of civilization’s progress (Better Angels of our Nature) with Yuvah Noah Harari’s theory of civilization’s woes (Sapiens). We could have them compare so-and-so’s account of human history as an ever-expanding unlatching of energy sources with Robert Wright’s account of human history as unlatching more and more positive-sum games (Nonzero). What role could the lure of certainty play? To help them grow their skills at finding anomalies, we might help them work through pseudo-histories and conspiracy theories. Q: Conspiracy theories! Oh, come now, you’re playing with fire. Well, the world is on fire. Our students will spend the rest of their lives encountering terrible-but-beguiling arguments about how the world works; if we don’t prepare them for those, what have we been doing? So we should introduce arguments that the Moon landing was a hoax, that the Illuminati founded America, that aliens built the pyramids, and so on. At no point can we demean students for falling for any of these theories — the job of a teacher at this stage, Egan writes, is to support students in their reasoning even when their beliefs are offensive and stupid, gradually offering anomalies. There’s no way out of bad theories except through them. By the time students graduate, we want them to have wrestled with terrible ideas and — for a while — lost. They need to experience what it’s like to change their minds about something they felt strongly about. They need to viscerally realize, in Feynman’s famous phrase, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” High school natural science How could entering the big fights reinvent high school science? At present, so much of the high school science curriculum — especially “honors” classes — is oriented toward helping amass details. (The same is true of 100-level university classes, which famously “survey” the field to prepare for more advanced studies. I always thought this was stupid — of the huge lecture hall of students in my Geology 100 class, how many went on to take even a second course?) The meaty debates that propel science forward are held back. Egan complains: “The more general and speculative theories in any discipline are treated like an unconventional and disreputable relation who, even though the children find her exciting and entertaining, must be kept hidden from view, her very existence denied as long as possible”. This is a stupid approach — students with an adventurous bent are convinced that science isn’t for them. Egan proposes, simply, that we flip this, and organize high school science classes around the big debates. We shouldn’t be ashamed at how, well, adolescent this might look: “the dramatic, speculative, and contentious theories will be up-front in the early years of the [high school] curriculum”. What might those be? Egan doesn’t give a list, but we can spitball some: instead of explaining what “matter” is from the top down, a physics class could problematize “matter” by following the debates over the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and by becoming familiarized with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics

Engineer1 mentions across 1 issues

Engineer is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 30, 2021 and April 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "something like the 'Engineer' who can tinker with complex, semi-broken systems using a mix of Wizardly tools and Prophetic ones". It most often appears alongside AI, AI research, Air.

Reference entry: Engineer
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: April 30, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021

AI 1 shared issues
AI research 1 shared issues
Air 1 shared issues
Air 1 shared issues
Alice Waters 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On "The Origin Of Woke"

April 30, 2021 · Original source

That’s really a shame, because if a person like Borlaug hadn’t actually existed, he would have had to have been invented for fictional purposes. Not only is he the antithesis of Vogt and company’s elitist ethnocentrism, he is also a devoted family man, humble eschewer of the spotlight, and diligent workhorse nerd. I suspect that Andy Weir had him in mind when writing The Martian, one of the greatest contemporary fictional paeons to the power of Wizardry. In fact, if you never read another thing about Borlaug, just picture Matt Damon single-handedly agro-engineering potatoes, virtually ex nihilo, in space.

Though Borlaug didn’t tend to wax philosophical like Vogt did, I think if he were to comment on the idea of carrying capacity, he would describe it as a fluid equilibrium that can be turned into a virtuous circle: find ways to feed more people, and their increased productivity pulls them and their countrymen out of poverty, increasing both quality of life and growth potential. The key is not to limit the number of people, but to not let the people starve and fall into ruin. To Borlaug, the earth is not a finite planet-sized fish tank, because humans aren’t fish; we can understand and engineer our way out of problems that a salmon fry can’t, and it’s our responsibility to use the tools at hand for the benefit of all.

A friend of mine who works in politics thinks there’s a third kind of archetype we seem to be missing in the Wizard/Prophet dichotomy – something like the "Engineer" who can tinker with complex, semi-broken systems using a mix of Wizardly tools (science, technology, RCTs) and Prophetic ones (grass-roots activism, behavioral and cultural change) to get them retuned and producing better long term outputs. Another in academia thinks genetically engineering everyone to be smarter is the only way to make real progress on the thornier, hairier systemic problems. Half the people I know in the Bay Area are convinced that democratic socialism is the true path forward; the other half are pretty sure that AI will eventually, not-too-distantly-from-now destroy everything, so other kinds of long term systems tinkering probably aren’t even worth worrying about. (It’s interesting to me that the realm of AI research is populated by highly educated, technocratic Wizard types, but while its tenor may have started out very Wizardly, it is now extremely Prophetic.)

Inline links: while its tenor may have started out very Wizardly, it is now extremely Prophetic

engineering consulting1 mentions across 1 issues

engineering consulting is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 07, 2024 and May 07, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "In my field (engineering consulting)". It most often appears alongside affirmative action, Africa, African National Congress.

Reference entry: engineering consulting
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 07, 2024
Last seen: May 07, 2024

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Highlights From The Comments On "The Origin Of Woke" May 07, 2024

affirmative action 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
African National Congress 1 shared issues
African-Americans 1 shared issues
AH 1 shared issues

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May 07, 2024 · Original source

I have read the same news stories as Hanania, but it is all so contrary to my professional experience that I have trouble wrapping my head around it. I've been working in business for 35 years have never, even once, seen an unqualified minority or female worker get hired or promoted. In my field (engineering consulting) you either produce, or you're out. My current company talks a really woke game and we have to take sensitivity training but the real story is that you had better work hard on profitable projects, or else. Plus, most of my clients are government agencies, and so far as I can tell it's the same with them. They have high standards, and people who don't meet them don't last long and certainly don't get promoted; I've never worked with a minority or female project manager or contracting officer who wasn't professional and hard-working. So far as I can tell, the wokeness in the air is just blaph and nobody pays it any real mind. Likewise, all of my employers have had bans on dating fellow employees, but I've witnessed three marriages among people who were both working for me.

English archers1 mentions across 1 issues

English archers is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 01, 2025 and August 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "The battle started with an archery duel between the English archers and Genoese crossbowmen". It most often appears alongside Africa, Agamemnon, Age of Empires II.

Reference entry: English archers
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 01, 2025
Last seen: August 01, 2025

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Your Review: Joan of Arc August 01, 2025

Africa 1 shared issues
Agamemnon 1 shared issues
Age of Empires II 1 shared issues
Agincourt 1 shared issues
Agincourt 1 shared issues

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Your Review: Joan of Arc

August 01, 2025 · Original source

The Welsh longbow had made it to England under the first Edward; it’s a simple weapon, cheap to make, useful for hunting, and if you get good with it you can put a 37-inch arrow through chainmail. Its effectiveness has been exaggerated by patriotic historians - modern research13 suggests that even at short range it couldn't go through the best-made breastplates in Europe - but patriotic historians can exaggerate anything, horses didn't wear heavy armor, and the accuracy and rate of fire of the longbow would not be surpassed until the repeating rifle,14 15 five hundred years later. The battle started with an archery duel between the English archers and Genoese crossbowmen, then believed to be the best long-range specialists in Europe, who were driven from the field and then ridden down by their own furious employers16 as they charged furiously into the face of the English army, and managed no better. By the time the French knights reached the English lines, their horses were dead and they'd be suffering from all sorts of minor17 wounds and they would have been repeatedly punched in the torso with longbow arrows, which if it happens to you is going to leave you bruised and exhausted even if your armor is good enough to stop the projectile. Then the English men-at-arms, still fresh, killed the French until they routed.

Inline links: 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

English colonists1 mentions across 1 issues

English colonists is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 23, 2024 and January 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "is it racist to not want English colonists to wipe out Native Americans?". It most often appears alongside Ascended Economy, Asimov, Blindsight.

Reference entry: English colonists
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 23, 2024
Last seen: January 23, 2024

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Should The Future Be Human? January 23, 2024

Ascended Economy 1 shared issues
Asimov 1 shared issues
Blindsight 1 shared issues
Business Insider 1 shared issues
Deep 1 shared issues

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Should The Future Be Human?

January 23, 2024 · Original source

Is this specieist? I don’t know - is it racist to not want English colonists to wipe out Native Americans? Would a Native American who expressed that preference be racist? That would be a really strange way to use that term!

English literature1 mentions across 1 issues

English literature is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 23, 2024 and August 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "an emigrant from Italy that became naturalized in English literature". It most often appears alongside A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste, A Hymn to God the Father, Alabama.

Reference entry: English literature
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 23, 2024
Last seen: August 23, 2024

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Your Book Review: The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet's Craft Book (1936 Edition) August 23, 2024

A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste 1 shared issues
A Hymn to God the Father 1 shared issues
Alabama 1 shared issues
Bogus 1 shared issues
Bolshevism 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Complete Rhyming Dictionary and Poet's Craft Book (1936 Edition)

August 23, 2024 · Original source

Suppose you were a newcomer to English literature, and having heard of this artistic device called ‘poetry’, wondered what it was all about and where it came from. You might start by looking up some examples of poetry from each century, going back until you can’t easily understand the English anymore, and find in the 16th century such poems as John Skelton’s “Speke, Parott” [sic]:

Inline links: John Skelton’s “Speke, Parott”

If this is true of the poetry itself, it is truer of the patterns in which poetry has been uttered, and especially of the fixed forms. The sonnet, an emigrant from Italy that became naturalized in English literature, still holds its own as a major method of expressing serious poetry, in the eyes of many poets and readers. Even at that, it is now regarded as puerile by the extreme advocates of free verse or polyrhythmic poetry, especially since Whitman and the Imagist movement. Numerous other alien verse forms did not fare so well, and have established themselves primarily as mediums for light and humorous verse. These include the ballade, the rondeau, the villanelle, the triolet, and so on. This may be because of their rigid rules and formal repetitions, which were not acceptable to the living poet. And yet, they started as seriously as Sapphics, heroic blank verse, or polyrhythms...

English soccer players1 mentions across 1 issues

English soccer players is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 09, 2023 and February 09, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "why aren’t there more gay English soccer players?". It most often appears alongside @moritheil, ACX Prediction Contest, Adam Tooze.

Reference entry: English soccer players
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 09, 2023
Last seen: February 09, 2023

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Links For February 2023 February 09, 2023

@moritheil 1 shared issues
ACX Prediction Contest 1 shared issues
Adam Tooze 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
AI X-Risk Research Podcast 1 shared issues

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Links For February 2023

February 09, 2023 · Original source

In theory this also paves the way for human meat, though regulators might have other ideas. 2: Eight years ago I wrote an article about how the government should stop restricting doctors’ ability to prescribe suboxone, a useful medicine for opioid abuse. Last month, the government finally stopped the restrictions. Good for them! 3: Carl Sagan married three times. His first wife was legendary biologist Lynn Margulis, who discovered mitochondrial endosymbiosis, then went off the deep end and became an AIDS denialist and 9/11 truther. His second wife drew the Pioneer plaque. His third wife was one of the women who designed the Voyager golden record. 4: Claim: Chinese sources seem to back this up (and related BBC), but I’m skeptical: is this really the best way to satisfy a “must fight with medieval weapons” constraint? Why not crossbows? 5: Did you know: Alex Berenson, who runs the most popular anti-vaccine Substack, has had an unusual career: he used to be an investigative reporter for the New York Times, and also wrote a series of bestselling spy novels. 6: Less Wrong: I Converted Book 1 Of The Less Wrong Sequences Into A Zoomer-Readable Format. Apparently there’s a thing where Zoomers are supposedly more likely to learn a text if you overlay it on on a fast-paced video game, example here. 7: By this point we’ve probably all heard stories about people who win the lottery and then end up bankrupt and miserable after X months or years. I had always assumed this was limited to very poor people with no understanding of money. This forum post argues it’s not, and tells the story of a man who started out with $15 million and still ruined his life after winning $170 million more in the lottery. 8: Did you know: Exiliarch Mar-Zutra II was a 5th century Jewish leader who took advantage of the chaos caused by weird Zoroastrian communists to secede and turn the city of Al-Mada’in, Iraq into an independent Jewish state for seven years. 9: Why doesn’t the Supreme Court have vice-justices? 10: Steve Sailer (warning: unz.com, far-right site, some firewalls will flag or block it): why aren’t there more gay English soccer players? Thousands of current or recent English pro soccer players, the media is really interested in finding a gay one so they can run a “Historic First” article, and apparently they can’t. There are rumors that players are afraid to come out because of homophobia, but there are at least 2,000 retired soccer players and only one of them has come out as gay. “I’m increasingly sympathetic to [the] theory that whatever psychosocial traits make men highly interested in team sports make them highly heterosexual too”. Is this true of other countries and other sports? 11: Adam Tooze on the demographic background to Iran’s protests. Iran thought it was facing an overpopulation crisis in the 80s and tried some reforms to lower family size. The reforms worked overwhelmingly well, causing “the most dramatic transition ever recorded in demographic history”, from 6.5 to 2.5 children per woman in thirty years. Iran now has “lower maternal mortality than the US”, and an education system where “women in university outnumber males”. This kind of demography isn’t usually compatible with patriarchal religious institutions, and the Ayatollahs are aware of this; in a rare admission of error, Khameini said that “Government officials were wrong on this matter, and I, too, had a part. . . . May God and history forgive us.” Now they’re trying to increase average family size and put the genie back in the bottle; Hungary can tell them about the limits of that strategy. 12: What it looks like to be on shrooms: I haven’t used shrooms myself so cannot confirm or deny, but this is oddly compelling, and makes some things I’ve read about neuroscience of vision make more sense. I wonder if you could get HPPD from watching videos like this for too long. 13: Study: federal cancer funding is extraordinarily effective. Cancer research produces so many valuable treatments that it saves one DALY per $326 spent. For comparison, health systems usually consider an intervention good value-for-money if it saves at least one DALY per $50,000. By combing the Earth far and wide, effective altruists have tentatively found one or two opportunities in the poorest parts of Africa to save lives at $100/DALY, but these are extremely rare exceptions and I wouldn’t have expected anything in the US to be within an order of magnitude of that. Either this finding is fake, or we should all be donating to federal cancer research instead of whatever else we’re doing. 14: Yet another person building a vast theory of human interaction off of the characters in The Office. This one is pretty good, also name-drops Bobos In Paradise. I’m still surprised this is such a common thing. 15: Marginal Revolution: FDA Deregulation Increases Safety And Innovation And Reduces Prices. Study looks at what happens when the FDA reclassifies medical devices from a highly-regulated to a less-highly-regulated category; in general, those devices get better, cheaper, and there are somewhere between similar and fewer deaths/injuries related to those devices. Why would safety increase? The author suggests that regulation is a defense against lawsuits (“Your Honor, the FDA agreed to approve our device, so it can’t have been bad!”), and removing that defense makes companies more lawsuit-conscious and careful; Alex Tabarrok suggests a bigger effect may be allowing more innovation towards safer versions. 16: Ozy writes about Interesting People Of History: Charles Williams (ie the other member of the Inklings) 17: Did you know: the Congressman who founded the House Committee On Un-American Activities was, in fact, a paid Soviet spy (tweet, Wiki article). This actually makes sense; he originally started HUAC to root out fascists, and it only got turned against communists later on. “There has been a push to rename the street [currently named after the Soviet spy], but as of 2018 it has been unsuccessful.” 18: Idle Words: Why Not Mars? Surprisingly strong argument for why sending humans to Mars is harder than people think, of minimal scientific value, and likely to contaminate all future searches for microbial life and ruin our chance to study the topic. Concludes that we should abandon the allure of human space travel and just send probes everywhere. This makes short-term sense, but I wonder what this author’s vision of the future is - do we just stay on Earth forever? If not, don’t we have to start trying to do the hard thing at some point? (I don’t care about this because I assume AI will will flip the gameboard one way or another, but Ceglowski is a noted singularity skeptic and should probably have opinions about long-term things). 19: Metacelsus and Razib on epigenetics. Stop using it to claim there’s “intergenerational trauma”! 20: Tafl games are a family of European games, played in areas as diverse as Iceland, Ireland, Britain, and Denmark, probably sharing descent from a now-lost board game of ancient Rome. One of them, Hnetafl, was the chief board game of the Vikings and is affectionately called “Viking chess”. The one we actually know the rules for is the Saami version, Tablut, which survived long enough for Linnaeus (the taxonomy guy!) to write down the rules. 21: Shot: Chaser: (source) 22: Related: the very center of GPT’s embedding space contains a few unusual tokens including the string “SolidGoldMagikarp”. GPT displays anomalous behavior if these tokens are inserted in a query; for example, it treats “SolidGoldMagikarp” as the word “distribute”. ChatGPT is pretty advanced and fails semi-gracefully here; GPT-2’s reaction to these tokens is more disturbing: (source: Less Wrong) Further investigation determined that many of these tokens are the screen names of a group of Redditors who attempted to count to infinity. The most likely explanation, according to the discoverers, is that these names were in GPT’s tokenization data, but not its training data (maybe they were especially common in the tokenization data because they made thousands of posts with numbers in them, but didn’t make it into the training data because their posts had no content?) - that leaves them existing without content, and GPT tries to round them off to some other “nearby” token (by incomprehensible AI standards of nearbyness). Congrats to the SERI-MATS AI alignment researchers who found all of this; maybe this makes it 0.0001% less likely that the AI which controls the nuclear arsenal in twenty years will have equally inexplicable behavior. 23: More language model news: LLM that understands and can explain images

Inline links: I wrote an article about how, finally stopped the restrictions, married three times, Lynn Margulis, drew the, Chinese, and related BBC, Alex Berenson, I Converted Book 1 Of The Less Wrong Sequences Into A Zoomer-Readable Format, example here, This forum post argues it’s not, Exiliarch Mar-Zutra II, weird Zoroastrian communists, vice-justices, why aren’t there more gay English soccer players?, Adam Tooze on the demographic background to Iran’s protests, federal cancer funding is extraordinarily effective, Yet another person building a vast theory of human interaction off of the characters in, FDA Deregulation Increases Safety And Innovation And Reduces Prices, Interesting People Of History: Charles Williams, tweet, Wiki article, Why Not Mars?, Metacelsus, Razib, Tafl games, Tablut, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EhT-!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F39755d06-3101-44d5-bb50-0a6b99155fae_807x776.png, source, contains a few unusual tokens, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rkvW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdeb0cd39-6942-44c0-85ef-0fac91b362e3_536x147.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QIzo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fba1d0783-5826-48a3-9ead-1e803042e96d_622x631.png, Less Wrong, many of these tokens are the screen names of a group of Redditors who attempted to count to infinity, SERI-MATS, LLM that understands and can explain images

Enigma1 mentions across 1 issues

Enigma is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 05, 2023 and April 05, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "except maybe during a brief window when the Bombes broke Enigma". It most often appears alongside AI, Alan Turing, America.

Reference entry: Enigma
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 05, 2023
Last seen: April 05, 2023

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Most Technologies Aren't Races April 05, 2023

AI 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Axis 1 shared issues
Axis 1 shared issues

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Most Technologies Aren't Races

April 05, 2023 · Original source

Who “won” the computer “race”? Charles Babbage? Alan Turing? John von Neumann? Steve Jobs? Bill Gates? Again, it was a long path of incremental improvements. Jobs and Gates got rich, and their hometowns are big tech hubs, but other people have gotten even richer, and the world chip manufacturing center is in Taiwan now for some reason. The overall balance of power didn’t change (except maybe during a brief window when the Bombes broke Enigma) and today all developed countries have computers.

Enneagram1 mentions across 1 issues

Enneagram is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 01, 2024 and November 01, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Big Five is no more predictive than the Enneagram". It most often appears alongside /r/BadMTGCombos, @cremieuxrecuel, @justin_garson.

Reference entry: Enneagram
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 01, 2024
Last seen: November 01, 2024

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Links For November 2024 November 01, 2024

BadMTGCombos 1 shared issues
@cremieuxrecuel 1 shared issues
@justin_garson 1 shared issues
Aaron Sibarium 1 shared issues
Abuelo's Awakening 1 shared issues

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Links For November 2024

November 01, 2024 · Original source

It’s the red line on this chart; if you can’t see a red line at your screen resolution, then you’ve learned something important about the the EU tech sector. 37: Seen on @cremieuxrecuel’s twitter (preliminary, needs replication): Jews may have gone from 65-29 Democrat/Republican in 2020 to 58-40 this election. 38: Extelligence has a post responding to my critique of the cultural Christianity argument (among, uh, many other things), but I don’t really think it connects. I’m not telling atheists they can’t go to church/synagogue if it makes them feel happy and fulfilled - I’ve done this myself sometimes. My post was meant to argue against the claim that, for pragmatic reasons, atheists should support the Christianization of society as a defense against Islam or postmodernism or some other philosophical enemy. 39: Related: Extelligence is finally going for their Trust Assembly project/idea/startup for online consensus-based truth-seeking (I think something like a cross between Community Notes and Wikipedia, but as a browser extension, and for everything). He’s looking for potential developers/testers/users. 40: Jiankui He is the Chinese geneticist who made history with the first germline gene editing in humans (resulting in three babies supposedly immune to AIDS, although nobody has tested this). China sentenced him to three years in prison for unauthorized experimentation, but now he’s out of jail, has an English-language Twitter account, has a new lab, wants to work on Alzheimers, and seems pretty based (although not infinitely based): 41: Anthropic has a new version of their AI Claude which can use your computer. You give it permission, put it on a virtual desktop, and ask it to do things for you (eg “please find and download a picture of a cat” or “please research these ten things and put them in a text file”.) It moves your cursor, browses the Internet, and creates and saves files. People keep saying they’ll care about AI “when it operates autonomously” or “when it becomes an agent”. But this is a trivial barrier, and one which Computer Use Claude has arguably already passed. So far this feature is limited to developers (though anyone with computer knowledge can sign up for it) but I expect it to be the near future of consumer AI, to get better quickly, and to shade gradually into the “autonomous” “agentic” AI that you all think will require a paradigm shift. 42: Claim (from the IDF): Hamas faked polls showing that most Palestinians supported the October 7 attack; the real numbers are 31% in favor, 64% against. 43: Otto von Bismarck wanted to trick France into declaring war on Germany. In order to provoke the French, he sent the Ems Dispatch, a statement describing recent diplomatic events in a way that sounded maximally offensive. The French were so offended that “crowds” in Paris demanded war, and the Franco-Prussian War was declared soon afterwards. The part of this that I find most interesting is the text of the dispatch itself, which read: After the news of the renunciation of the Prince von Hohenzollern had been communicated to the Imperial French government by the Royal Spanish government, the French Ambassador in Ems made a further demand on His Majesty the King that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King undertook for all time never again to give his assent should the Hohenzollerns once more take up their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon refused to receive the Ambassador again and had the latter informed by the Adjutant of the day that His Majesty had no further communication to make to the Ambassador. I’m fascinated by the idea that only 150 years ago, it was obvious that if someone sent you this statement, you had to declare war or abandon all honor. If I read it carefully, I can sort of parse out that it sounds like the Prussians are unhappy, but that’s the most emotion I gather from it. Anyway, the Franco-Prussian War led to World War I which led to World War II - so if you don’t like 50 million people dying and the total devastation of Europe, blame this statement about ambassadors. 44: The first use of artificial insemination in humans: The first recorded case of artificial insemination by donor didn’t occur until 1884, when Dr. William Pancoast decided to treat a couple’s infertility by secretly inseminating the woman with sperm obtained from a medical student. The insemination happened while the patient was under anesthesia and Dr. Pancoast did not tell her what had occurred. She gave birth to a baby boy nine months later, but it was several years before the doctor finally confessed to her husband what he had done. Neither man ever informed the mother. It was 25 years later the result of this case was published. Dr. Pancoast was roundly condemned for his actions, but it did open the door for consensual sperm donor insemination. 45: ClearerThinking administers several personality tests to the same people to learn more about their comparative accuracy. I am most interested in their finding that tests with “factors” (eg the Big Five, where you rate people on a numeric scale) are inherently more accurate than those with “types” (eg Myers-Briggs, where you assign someone a specific category) and that, adjusting for this, Big Five is no more predictive than the Enneagram: 46: In 2022, I wrote Whither Tartaria, where I asked why ornate classical styles switched to more austere modernist styles around 1900 - 1950 in a variety of different arts (painting, architecture, literature, poetry, etc). I proposed seven theories, but was unsure which if any were true. Since then, Samuel Hughes of Works In Progress has been investigating. In May, he wrote a well-researched article showing that it wasn’t just increasing cost, because ornate classical architecture now costs less than ever. Now in a new article he demolishes a different theory - it’s not just decreasing cost (and subsequent lack of ability to signal wealth) - because costs didn’t decrease in several other arts, and the change was led by artists with rich people as reluctant followers. He concludes: Modernism may well be a status game of some kind; it may well signal taste more than it signals wealth; and this latter feature may be one of the things that distinguishes it from older artistic styles. But the mechanism by which this change came about must be different to the one Alexander describes. 47: Sort of kind of related - When Hamilton Lost Its Snob Appeal. The musical Hamilton was briefly an artistic/cultural phenomenon, but tastemakers eventually switched to making fun of it. Why? Rob Henderson says it happened after ticket prices came down and the common people could enjoy it. I disagree: everyone I knew who was into Hamilton got into it from the free online soundtrack long before they’d seen the show; I think this is more likely the usual fad cycle where anybody who’s too into yesterday’s fad is behind the curve and therefore uncool. 48: Related: Why are people such jerks to public intellectuals? And more. I agree this is a great mystery. 49: Some prominent Substack psychiatrists doing a video Q&A, submit your questions here. 50: Naomi Kanakia: The Literacy Delusion had a number of explanations for why reading books seemed to be so much worse for human beings (in terms of emotional wellness and productivity) than other forms of narrative entertainment, but its main theory was the integration hypothesis. That the stream of words in a book trained the human brain into a habit of self-consciousness, that reading books forced human beings to think of themselves as a stream of text, processed through time, making a coherent argument of some sort. And that this overall flattening effect forced readers to ignore aspects of their personality or their situation that were not otherwise in line with the overarching story they'd created about themselves. Basically, reading books causes repression and neurosis. The Literacy Delusion argued that, yes, human beings are storytelling machines, but that a stream of written text is a particular kind of story—a story that is particularly flat, particularly devoid of conflicting or harmonizing information—and that this flatness creates a peculiar effect on the human brain. 51: Last month, I linked Sasha Gusev’s No, Intelligence Is Not Like Height and asked people who disagreed to share their arguments; they sure did. First, several people pointed me to a new preprint, Family-GWAS Reveals Effects Of Environment And Mating On Genetic Associations, which finds that one of the main papers Gusev cited to make his case, Howe 2022, made a mistake - imputing sibling genotypes using a process designed for non-sibling genotypes - and that once that mistake is corrected, the finding disappears and intelligence and height appear similar. Second, Joseph Bronski has a more specific post where he responds to Gusev’s points one by one. He accuses Gusev of “[making] up his own chart to remove the error bars [from the originals], to obscure the fact that the study found no evidence for this in IQ”, and says that the cases where he didn’t do that are just “population stratification and range restriction”. Third, Noah Carl at Aporia, instead of writing a direct response like Bronski, argues that the usual method of attacking twin studies is obsolete; not only have the most-debated assumptions behind twin studies been thoroughly validated, but there are now other lines of evidence besides twin studies which confirm high IQ heritability. Fourth, Leonardo Parro (not framed as a response to Gusev) goes into more depth about one of those ways, a “pedigree-based analysis” demonstrating heritability of 54 - 69%, ie no “missing heritability” compared to twin studies. He summarizes this as the effect of “rare variants” compared to the usual SNPs - ie if you only look at the most common genes that are easiest to find, you get “missing heritability” compared to twin studies, but if you widen your search to rare genes that are hard to find, you don’t. 52: Extremely related: Heliospect is a startup promising polygenic selection for IQ and other traits; they were trying to stay in stealth mode but The Guardian spied on them and nonconsensually revealed their existence. The discussion on the r/ssc subreddit centered on their claim that (given enough embryos to choose from) they could increase a baby’s expected IQ by 6 points (I’ve also heard 7.5). Sasha Gusev had previously argued that current technology maxed out at 3.5 and future technology would max out at 6, so a claim of 6 - 7.5 is pretty extreme; Gwern, who wrote the pioneering analysis of this technology, was also skeptical. But Heliospect says they’ve got better predictors than academia that use the rare variants everyone else misses; after talking to the company, Gwern retracted his objections and says he finds their claim “pretty plausible”. Local ACX commenter geneticist Gene Smith also redid some calculations, changed his mind, and says “probably pretty realistic”. I find this interesting not just because of the polygenic selection angle, but because if Heliospect is right then their predictor is able to predict more genetic IQ than the “missing heritability” people believe exists, and it should be able to put this argument to bed once and for all. 53: This month in censorship: X/Twitter banned journalist Ken Klippenstein for sharing the Trump campaign’s dossier on JD Vance. Twitter’s side of the story is that the dossier was probably originally stolen by Iranian agents and they don’t want to support that kind of thing by letting people signal-boost the illicitly obtained goods; you can read Klippenstein’s side here. He appears to be unbanned now.

Inline links: @cremieuxrecuel, responding to my critique of the cultural Christianity argument, My post, is finally going for, Trust Assembly, has an English-language Twitter account, has a new lab, wants to work on Alzheimers, and seems pretty based, not infinitely based, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fY_K!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6b3b61c8-6c48-4eb7-9608-426b738ab9c8_592x111.png, which can use your computer, Claim, Ems Dispatch, The first use of artificial insemination in humans, administers several personality tests to the same people, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!epEc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F47c474c6-d68a-41e4-954e-d24cd00ec040_740x388.webp, Whither Tartaria, a well-researched article showing, in a new article he demolishes a different theory, When Hamilton Lost Its Snob Appeal, Why are people such jerks to public intellectuals?, more, Some prominent Substack psychiatrists doing a video Q&A, submit your questions here, Naomi Kanakia, No, Intelligence Is Not Like Height, Family-GWAS Reveals Effects Of Environment And Mating On Genetic Associations, Howe 2022, a more specific post where he responds to Gusev’s points one by one, argues that the usual method of attacking twin studies is obsolete, goes into more depth about one of those ways, The Guardian spied on them and nonconsensually revealed their existence, discussion, previously argued, the pioneering analysis of this technology, Gwern retracted his objections, says, polygenic selection, banned journalist Ken Klippenstein, you can read Klippenstein’s side here., appears to be unbanned now

enstaged-two1 mentions across 1 issues

enstaged-two is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 13, 2026 and January 13, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as ""I just got enstaged-two!"". It most often appears alongside Adeline, Aella Simposium, Altman.

Reference entry: enstaged-two
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 13, 2026
Last seen: January 13, 2026

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Issue trail

SOTA On Bay Area House Party January 13, 2026

Adeline 1 shared issues
Aella Simposium 1 shared issues
Altman 1 shared issues
AMD 1 shared issues
Andreas 1 shared issues

Source context

SOTA On Bay Area House Party

January 13, 2026 · Original source

“Pretty great!” said Max. “I just got enstaged-two!”

“Enstaged-two?”

enstagement1 mentions across 1 issues

enstagement is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 13, 2026 and January 13, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as ""Don’t tell me you haven’t heard about enstagement!"". It most often appears alongside Adeline, Aella Simposium, Altman.

Reference entry: enstagement
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 13, 2026
Last seen: January 13, 2026

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Issue trail

SOTA On Bay Area House Party January 13, 2026

Adeline 1 shared issues
Aella Simposium 1 shared issues
Altman 1 shared issues
AMD 1 shared issues
Andreas 1 shared issues

Source context

SOTA On Bay Area House Party

January 13, 2026 · Original source

“As in the second stage of engagement….what? Don’t tell me you haven’t heard about enstagement!”

“So,” Max continued, “one of the speakers at the Aella Simposium proposed enstagement. When a man and a woman first start dating, he buys her a $200 ring. Then, every year, she gives it back, and he buys her a ring that’s five times as expensive as the last one. So after a year, $1,000. After two, $5,000. After three, $25,000. At any point, he can stop the clock by getting married. Or if he’s chronically indecisive, he can keep throwing out more money until he can no longer afford the ring, at which point he has to either propose or break up. And if he breaks up after four years, at least she’s gotten $100K out of the deal. Engagement-sub-two is the one where I give her a $5,000 ring. It means we’re really going steady!”

Entscheidungsproblem1 mentions across 1 issues

Entscheidungsproblem is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 03, 2023 and June 03, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "examples like the Entscheidungsproblem". It most often appears alongside 2023 book review contest, AGI, Alan Turing.

Reference entry: Entscheidungsproblem
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 03, 2023
Last seen: June 03, 2023

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Your Book Review: Why Machines Will Never Rule the World June 03, 2023

2023 book review contest 1 shared issues
AGI 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
Barry Smith 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Why Machines Will Never Rule the World

June 03, 2023 · Original source

We could illustrate with examples like the Entscheidungsproblem, but it might be more intuitive (if less precise) to point out that computers can’t actually use real numbers (instead relying on monstrosities like IEEE 754).

Inline links: Entscheidungsproblem, IEEE 754

environmentalist1 mentions across 1 issues

environmentalist is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 10, 2025 and October 10, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "if some moron says it’s okay to kill environmentalists, we can’t ban the term “environmentalist”". It most often appears alongside America, Andrew Jackson, anticapitalist.

Reference entry: environmentalist
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 10, 2025
Last seen: October 10, 2025

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Fascism Can't Mean Both A Specific Ideology And A Legitimate Target October 10, 2025

America 1 shared issues
Andrew Jackson 1 shared issues
anticapitalist 1 shared issues
Chavez 1 shared issues
Democrats 1 shared issues

Source context

Fascism Can't Mean Both A Specific Ideology And A Legitimate Target

October 10, 2025 · Original source

I think it’s probably bad practice to demand that reasonable people not use the word “fascist”. It risks giving unreasonable people a heckler’s veto over every useful term - if some moron says it’s okay to kill environmentalists, we can’t ban the term “environmentalist”, and we certainly can’t let other people back us into banning the term “environmentalist” when it’s convenient for them just because they can find one violent loon. It also risks giving too much quarter to the dangerous and wrongheaded “stochastic terrorism” framing, which places the blame for violence on anyone who criticized the victim. This not only chills useful speech - it’s important to protect the right to accuse people of being very bad, since people are often in fact very bad - but gives Power a big spiky club it can use one-sidedly to destroy anyone who criticizes it as soon as there’s a sympathetic case of violence.

eosinophilic reactions1 mentions across 1 issues

eosinophilic reactions is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 25, 2021 and May 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Early concerns about this potentially causing severe eosinophilic reactions". It most often appears alongside 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, 5-HTP, 5-HTP.

Reference entry: eosinophilic reactions
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 25, 2021
Last seen: May 25, 2021

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Peer Review Request: Depression May 25, 2021

2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
amitriptyline 1 shared issues
Andrea Cipriani 1 shared issues

Source context

May 25, 2021 · Original source

Tryptophan is a chemical found in food (especially eggs, seeds, and milk). In the body, it gets turned into 5-hydroxytryptophan (5-HTP) and then 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), aka serotonin. Serotonin is an important mood regulatory chemical which we often try to increase during depression treatment, but if you consume serotonin directly, your body won’t be able to absorb it. The closest you can do is consume tryptophan or 5-HTP, and trust your body to absorb it and convert it into serotonin. Both of these chemicals are used for depression, and the few studies that have been done are mostly positive, for example this 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration. A more recent study finds 5-HTP works approximately as well as traditional antidepressants. Everyone agrees these studies are weak and low-quality and we can’t be sure of anything yet, but welcome to the world of depression supplementation. Early concerns about this potentially causing severe eosinophilic reactions don’t seem to have panned out, and might have been based on defective manufacturing processes which have since been fixed. A reasonable dose of 5-HTP would be to start at 100 mg daily, then go up to 200 and finally 300 mg daily after a few weeks. Don’t take this with any other serotonin-related medications without clearing it by your doctor first. You can find a reasonable brand of 5-HTP here.

Inline links: this 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, works approximately as well as traditional antidepressants, here

EPA1 mentions across 1 issues

EPA is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 25, 2021 and May 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "omega-3 fats, especially EPA and DHA"; "Versions with higher EPA than DHA seem to fare better in research". It most often appears alongside 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, 5-HTP, 5-HTP.

Reference entry: EPA
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 25, 2021
Last seen: May 25, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Peer Review Request: Depression May 25, 2021

2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
amitriptyline 1 shared issues
Andrea Cipriani 1 shared issues

Source context

Contra Kirkegaard On Evolutionary Definitions Of Mental Illness

May 25, 2021 · Original source

Fish oil is various omega-3 fats, especially EPA and DHA, found in oily fish like salmon. Some people noticed that cultures that ate lots of fish had less depression, and ever since scientists have been trying to prove that fish oil treats depression, with wildly varying results. Liao et al analyze 26 studies totalling 2160 people and find it does, with effect size of 0.5, better than most antidepressants. Deane et al study analyze 31 studies totalling 41470 people and find it doesn’t. I can’t overemphasize how much great work by brilliant scientists has gone into this question, nor how totally useless and conflicting all the results have been. Oily fish are a generally healthy food, so you might as well eat them just in case. In terms of taking fish oil supplements, the jury is out. If you do choose to take them, the type and brand and dose become more important, since some of the debate centers around whether fish oil dosing might just be very hard to get right. Versions with higher EPA than DHA seem to fare better in research, and higher doses might be better than lower. Also, you should strongly consider refrigerating your fish oil so that it doesn’t get rancid, which aside from being gross will make it work less well. This brand is probably a reasonable choice, with one pill/day being a low dose and two/day being higher. If you are vegan, you can get this from algae rather than fish, but it’s harder to find the right EPA/DHA ratio (high) – this brand is the best I can do.

Inline links: Liao et al, 31 studies, This brand, this brand

ephebophilia1 mentions across 1 issues

ephebophilia is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 07, 2023 and September 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "ephebophilia would get you in trouble". It most often appears alongside ADHD, African savanna, asexuality.

Reference entry: ephebophilia
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 07, 2023
Last seen: September 07, 2023

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Issue trail

Contra Kirkegaard On Evolutionary Definitions Of Mental Illness September 07, 2023

ADHD 1 shared issues
African savanna 1 shared issues
asexuality 1 shared issues
bipolar disorder 1 shared issues
Bryan Caplan 1 shared issues

Source context

September 07, 2023 · Original source

3: Ephebophilia

A 65 year old man who’s only attracted to adult women 40+. Most people in our society would classify 1 (an ephebophile) and 2 (a non-obligate pedophile) as mentally ill or at least worrying edge cases. But I think Emil’s theory rules that only Person 3 (the man attracted to people close to his own age) is mentally ill, since he’s ruled out mating with the vast majority of fertile women. 4: Plato …never had children. “Platonic relationship” jokes aside, I guess he was too busy philosophizing. Great men (and women) who can’t slow down to raise a family seem to be a type. Is an interest in philosophy (or science, or art, or any other worthy endeavor) that reaches the point where it consumes your life a mental illness? Kierkegaard bites the bullet and admits that the priests and monks who took vows of celibacy were mentally ill by his definition. But I think he has many more bullets of this type to bite. Even if we agree that we should classify Plato as mentally ill, this again seems very different from the practical concept of “this person has mental problems and needs help with them”. 5: Chronic Pain, Panic Attacks, Or, If You Insist, Nightmares Is chronic pain a mental illness? It seems pretty bad. But as long as it doesn’t impede your ability to hunt, gather, or have sex, I think Emil would have to say no. Same with panic attacks, anxiety, etc. If it’s hard to imagine a form of chronic pain that doesn’t impede those things, consider nightmares. These surely don’t impede any daytime activity, but chronic nightmare disorders seem very unpleasant! I think Emil has to bite the bullet that conditions which make people miserable and ruin their lives aren’t mental disorders as long as they don’t affect functioning. 6: Severity In his post, Emil includes a few turns of phrase indicating we can talk about severity - ie some mental illnesses are more severe than others. But by his framing, “severe mental illness” would indicate not schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, but homosexuality and asexuality. After all, schizophrenics are more likely to have children than gays. Again, this is pretty different from the way you want to use words when talking about real-world problems around how to help people with mental problems get better. 7: Is Emil’s Definition Of Mental Illness Itself A Mental Illness? Emil’s crusade to reclassify homosexuality as a mental illness doesn’t sound like it would be very popular in his home country of Denmark. Maybe there are even some nice Danish women who would be willing to date Emil otherwise, but are turned off by his un-PC opinions. Willingness to violate taboos couldn’t have been very helpful in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. I imagine some distant ancestor of Emil’s standing up in front of the tribe and saying “Me think Bear God stupid and ugly! Me piss on Bear Idol!” Might mean fewer Kirkegaards around today. So is contrarianism a mental illness? I would say no, because it’s a matter of personal choice and serves a valuable social function. I’m not sure what Emil’s answer would be. * * * I don’t want to assert any of these too strongly. Maybe Emil knows something I don’t about the EEA, and can prove that actually ADHD would be maladaptive there, or ephebophilia would get you in trouble. If so, I think that would restore some concordance between our intuitive notion of mental disorders and Emil’s version, but that concordance would be coincidental, not necessary. The next day we might learn some different fact about the EEA that would make the two notions discordant again. So to repeat my claim: mental-disorder-(Emil) and mental-disorder-(Scott) both describe useful concepts, but they’re not the same concept. Mental-disorder-(Emil) is useful for talking about evolutionary genetics; mental-disorder-(Scott) is useful for talking about present day mental health problems and what to do about them. We won’t convince people to literally use the terms “mental-disorder-(Emil)” and “mental-disorder-(Scott)”. So who should keep custody of the current term “mental disorder” and who should have to make up a new word for their thing? I think Emil should have to make up the new word, because: There are a few thousand evolutionary psychologists, and a few hundred million normal people who want to talk about mental disorders for normal reasons (like because they have them).

Epicurean1 mentions across 1 issues

Epicurean is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2024 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "or the Epicurean". It most often appears alongside 10240, 4chan, @slatestarcodex.

Reference entry: Epicurean
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 08, 2024
Last seen: August 08, 2024

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024

10240 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
@slatestarcodex 1 shared issues
Acemoglu & Robinson 1 shared issues
Achillead 1 shared issues

Source context

It's Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic

August 08, 2024 · Original source

In general I’m skeptical of most attempts to draw a bright line between Jewish and Christian philosophies (“Jews think like this, Christians think like that”). Christianity grew out of Judaism, and most post-1400s Jewish scholarship was written in Christian societies, so both religions had ample chance to influence each other. “Everybody knows” that Christianity judges you by belief and Judaism judges you by your actions, but the Talmud says “The following have no part in the World to Come: One who says that the resurrection of the dead is not biblical, or that the Torah is not from Heaven, or the Epicurean.”

Inline links: the Talmud says

epilepsy1 mentions across 1 issues

epilepsy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 01, 2024 and February 01, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "epsy is also ~80% heritable, but we don’t call epilepsy genetic Fine. Epilepsy is also genetic". It most often appears alongside Awais Aftab, birth canal asphyxia, cannabis.

Reference entry: epilepsy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 01, 2024
Last seen: February 01, 2024

Outbound links

https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

Issue trail

It's Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic February 01, 2024

Awais Aftab 1 shared issues
birth canal asphyxia 1 shared issues
cannabis 1 shared issues
cannabis use 1 shared issues
Dr. Aftab 1 shared issues

Source context

February 01, 2024 · Original source

Argument 9: Epilepsy is also ~80% heritable, but we don’t call epilepsy genetic

Fine. Epilepsy is also genetic.

Episcopacy1 mentions across 1 issues

Episcopacy is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 01, 2022 and December 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "The pre-1950s aristocracy went by various names; the Episcopacy". It most often appears alongside Amalgamated Bank, Andover, anti-Semitism.

Reference entry: Episcopacy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 01, 2022
Last seen: December 01, 2022

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Book Review: First Sixth Of Bobos In Paradise December 01, 2022

Amalgamated Bank 1 shared issues
Andover 1 shared issues
anti-Semitism 1 shared issues
Atlantic 1 shared issues
barberpole theory of fashion 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: First Sixth Of Bobos In Paradise

December 01, 2022 · Original source

The pre-1950s aristocracy went by various names; the Episcopacy, the Old Establishment, Boston Brahmins. David Brooks calls them WASPs, which is evocative but ambiguous. He doesn’t just mean Americans who happen to be white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant - there are tens of millions of those! He means old-money blue-blooded Great-Gatsby-villain WASPs who live in Connecticut, go sailing, play lacrosse, belong to country clubs, and have names like Thomas R. Newbury-Broxham III. Everyone in their family has gone to Yale for eight generations; if someone in the ninth generation got rejected, the family patriarch would invite the Chancellor of Yale to a nice game of golf and mention it in a very subtle way, and the Chancellor would very subtly apologize and say that of course a Newbury-Broxham must go to Yale, and whoever is responsible shall be very subtly fired forthwith.

Episcopalianism1 mentions across 1 issues

Episcopalianism is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 09, 2022 and December 09, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "WASPs were heavily associated with set of a few denominations--episcopalianism". It most often appears alongside 417th Marquess of Cornwallshireshire, ACX, ACX.

Reference entry: Episcopalianism
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 09, 2022
Last seen: December 09, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On Bobos In Paradise December 09, 2022

417th Marquess of Cornwallshireshire 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Andre Malraux 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Bobos In Paradise

December 09, 2022 · Original source

-The idea of a clean break between WASP culture and bohemianism, with the former being a separate, distinct group of people that overthrew the latter doesn't make a lot of sense. The WASPs were heavily associated with set of a few denominations--episcopalianism, congregationalism, and unitarianism--and today all of these are generally considered some of the most liberal, bohemian-ish religious groups in the country. It's probably more accurate to say that many young members of the WASP aristocracy simply adopted some bohemian values (at least superficially)

episodic memory1 mentions across 1 issues

episodic memory is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 13, 2022 and May 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "episodic memory without consciousness is plainly impossible". It most often appears alongside Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are?, Astralcodexten, attention.

Reference entry: episodic memory
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 13, 2022
Last seen: May 13, 2022

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Your Book Review: Consciousness And The Brain May 13, 2022

Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are? 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten 1 shared issues
attention 1 shared issues
BERN 1 shared issues
Bundespräsident 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Consciousness And The Brain

May 13, 2022 · Original source

On the other hand, episodic memory refers to specific moments of your life, for example remembering what you had for breakfast or what your conversation partner said five minutes ago. This memory is one-shot, so the memory is instantaneously formed and does not require any repetition. Aspects of episodic memory can be transferred into procedural memory: when you learn the name of your new colleague, then this stays an episodic memory for a while, but it becomes procedural/semantic memory after a few repetitions. Sometimes we don't even need repetition, for example when we recognize a face after a single meeting, or when a child acquires new words. But this relies on complicated interaction between the two types of memory that I won't get into here. Usually, we can make a clear distinction. It seems that episodic memory without consciousness is plainly impossible, and I will come back to that.

But consciousness also helps for procedural memory, even though it can be formed from purely unconscious perceptions. First, think of consciousness as giving a boost to the learning rate. I have mentioned before that episodic memory (which requires consciousness) can be transferred into procedural memory during sleep, and this is stronger than the effect of the direct experience alone. You will still not be able to learn the piano in a week, but consciousness probably makes learning faster. Second, as Dehaene explains in his book, you only connect unconscious events with each other if they are simultaneous. This makes sense because unconscious neural activity fades away so quickly. Dehaene describes some classical conditioning experiments similar to Pawlow's dog, where the sound of a bell is associated with receiving food. But if (to stay in the picture) the bell is perceived unconsciously, then the connection is only made if the bell rings while the reward comes (plus/minus at most one second), not if the bell rings a few seconds earlier.

For episodic memory, I think that it is even more closely entangled with consciousness. I believe that the coherent activity of consciousness is exactly the form of neural patterns that can be stored in episodic memory. Thus a conscious perception creates a memory item that can be stored and retrieved later. Let me explain why. A crucial property of memory is pattern completion: that you can retrieve the whole memory pattern from activation of a small part. So the word "croissant" may trigger the image of a croissant, the smell of it, the taste, the texture, and so on. But the same works vice versa. The smell of a croissant also triggers the rest. There is no core of the concept "croissant" that needs to be present in order to trigger the whole concept. For procedural memory, this is not a big deal. Since this memory is formed slowly, there is enough time to nicely embed it into existing structures. But episodic memory is one-shot learning, it needs to be formed in a second. (There is some long-term consolidation later during sleep, but this only shifts the problem: the brain still needs to maintain traces of the pattern for 16 hours.) And it's really hard to embed a complex concept so deep into an existing network that you still have pattern completion. Mind that every change in the brain needs to be cautious, because you have a lot of systems that should still be working after the change. In machine learning, in case of doubt you set your learning rates really low, and that is for the same reason: you don't want to overwrite all the existing functions of your network. And the task is more difficult for more complex patterns. If each neuron represented its own interpretation of reality, then it would be pretty hopeless to encode all this into a retrievable pattern in just one second. But it gets a lot easier if the activity of all neurons throughout your whole brain are highly consistent with each other, and that is precisely what consciousness seems to achieve. This is why I believe that consciousness might create the items that we can store in our episodic memory.

epistasis1 mentions across 1 issues

epistasis is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 26, 2025 and June 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Maybe gene x gene interactions, especially epistasis, are more important than we thought". It most often appears alongside Aftab, Alex Young, Arthur Jensen.

Reference entry: epistasis
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 26, 2025
Last seen: June 26, 2025

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Issue trail

Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know June 26, 2025

Aftab 1 shared issues
Alex Young 1 shared issues
Arthur Jensen 1 shared issues
Awais Aftab 1 shared issues
behaviorism 1 shared issues

Source context

Missing Heritability: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

June 26, 2025 · Original source

Maybe gene x gene interactions, especially epistasis, are more important than we thought.

episteme1 mentions across 1 issues

episteme is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 22, 2022 and July 22, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "this sense of loss tracks with the gradual displacement of metis by episteme"; ""displacement of metis by episteme""; "Episteme - “Any nation-building requires a top-down view of the society it wants to organize". It most often appears alongside 2020 election, 2022 book review contest, 2122.

Reference entry: episteme
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 22, 2022
Last seen: July 22, 2022

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Your Book Review: The Society Of The Spectacle July 22, 2022

2020 election 1 shared issues
2022 book review contest 1 shared issues
2122 1 shared issues
Afghanistan 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Society Of The Spectacle

July 22, 2022 · Original source

Cover of The Society of the Spectacle He never outright explains why he thought photos and film were more pernicious than newspapers or radio, but I imagine the advertising industry played a major role. We’ve grown accustomed to GoDaddy ads and ALL CAPS YouTube titles, but Mad Men shenanigans were a worrisome development at the time. It must’ve been highly alarming to see such brazen manipulation of the public. Whatever the reasoning, we now arrive at one definition of the spectacle: "The spectacle is capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images." Also: “The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images.” Well, that’s about as clear as Flint water. Here’s something meatier: "In all of its particular manifestations — news, propaganda, advertising, entertainment — the spectacle represents the dominant model of life." If you’re familiar with Girard, that is a huge statement. [3] Girardian mimetic desire is triangular; there is you (the desirer), the object (of desire), and the model (another person who also desires the object). Most of our desires are rooted in imitation. Nobody has to tell you to want steak or sex, but almost everything else is learned. How does everybody know that they should want a Rolex or a Rolls Royce? There’s no genetic imperative for luxury goods. You acquire those tastes from the people around you. Or you used to, at least. Before the spectacle, your models, mentors, and rivals were real people you knew in real life. Now we have an acronym for that - IRL - because reality is everywhere in retreat. This is not a small thing. What we desire is at the core of who we are. What do you want out of life? What kind of person do you want to be? For the entirety of human history, those questions found answers close at hand. Your local community was your world, for better and worse. Now we are global citizens with global perspectives, and it’s difficult to overstate how much that changes what it means to be human. Imprisoned in a flattened universe bounded by the screen of the spectacle that has enthralled him, the spectator knows no one but the fictitious speakers who subject him to a one-way monologue about their commodities and the politics of their commodities. The spectacle as a whole serves as his looking glass. What he sees there are dramatizations of illusory escapes from a universal autism. The spectacle’s estrangement from the acting subject is expressed by the fact that the individual’s gestures are no longer his own; they are the gestures of someone else who represents them to him. Now our role models are media creations. Some are literal fictional characters (James Bond); others are nominally real people (Kylie Jenner). But both are merely representations - images usurping an essential formative role. ‘William Shatner’ and ‘Robert Downey, Jr.’ are only marginally more real than Captain Kirk and Tony Stark, yet they occupy way more headspace than people that live down the street. Most people can name more celebrities, in more detail, than people they’ve known in person. I know the names of Will Smith’s kids - I don’t even know if my best friends from high school have any. This is an issue of The Map and The Territory. Pre-modern Maps were narrow but deep. You might have had only a vague notion of ‘Africa’ or ‘The Pope’, but you knew every square inch of the town you lived in. Spectacular Maps are broad but shallow, and they are drawn for us by spectacular hands. The average person ‘knows’ way more about Africa now, but how well does that knowledge reflect the facts on the ground? Meanwhile, firsthand reality has been reduced to the narrow slices connecting house to car to work, with precious few exceptions. The Society Of The Spectacle is one long lament for this loss of The Real, although Debord doesn’t state it as such. Borrowing again from The Uruk Machine, this sense of loss tracks with the gradual displacement of metis [4] by episteme [5],[6]. III. Everything New Is Old Again Debord has a lot to say about the ‘falsification of the world’: The first stage of the economy’s domination of social life brought about an evident degradation of being into having — human fulfillment was no longer equated with what one was, but with what one possessed. The present stage, in which social life has become completely dominated by the accumulated productions of the economy, is bringing about a general shift from having to appearing — all ‘having’ must now derive its immediate prestige and its ultimate purpose from appearances. As he might have put it - we have graduated from conspicuous consumption to consuming conspicuousness. Spectacular technology has not dispersed the religious mists into which human beings had projected their own alienated powers, it has merely brought those mists down to earth, to the point that even the most mundane aspects of life have become impenetrable and unbreathable. In the spectacle, a part of the world presents itself to the world and is superior to it. The spectacle is simply the common language of this separation. Spectators are linked solely by their one-way relationship to the very center that keeps them isolated from each other. The spectacle thus reunites the separated, but it reunites them only in their separateness. These themes are familiar to us by now. It’s not exactly news that people are getting more isolated and untethered by the year. What is striking to me is not what he is saying, but when he is saying it. Anybody with sense has spent time thinking about how to manage the challenges of modern life. We talk about digital minimalism and social media fasts. Turn off your phone. Get outside and touch grass. Go see people in meatspace. Be present. All great advice. But what are we envisioning, when we imagine a healthy connection to The Real? For most of us, we are picturing life as it was lived… right around the time Debord was saying that everything is phony and toxic. What does the average person think of as the peak of journalistic integrity in America? Probably Vietnam and Watergate - right after this was written. When we mock Millennials and Zoomers, what standard are we measuring them by? The Greatest Generation, who were running the show by the late sixties. In terms of self-reliance and resilience, the average adult in 1967 would be a massive outlier in 2022. Yet here is Debord, saying in no uncertain terms that this American ideal was fraudulent and devoid of meaning. What have we lost? Every era has its cynics, doomsayers, Luddites, and misanthropes. Maybe Debord was just a Boomer’s Boomer, railing against progress and the passage of time. But I don’t think so. We’ve all felt the shockwaves of the Internet explosion. Life is different now. It takes an act of will to put down your phone so you can focus on the TV. Low battery is an emergency. Losing signal is bereavement. Navigating without GPS is an anxiety attack. Do you remember what it was like, not so long ago? How exciting it was to play videogames with someone a thousand miles away? How cool it was the first time you streamed a movie on an airplane? That sense of possibility and promise, like all the world was in the palm of your hand? How quickly things change. For maybe the first time in history, most people are apprehensive about the relentless march of technology. While we’ve always been afraid of advances in weaponry, it’s starting to feel like everything is being weaponized. Who truly believes the metaverse will be a positive step for humanity? Who now is excited at the prospect of gene editing, AI, or transhumanism? There appears to be a growing sentiment along the lines of ‘MGTOW for modernism’. We hope for the best, but 2122 is shaping up to be some unholy amalgam of Gattaca, The Matrix, and Minority Report. Sometimes it seems like the world we grew up in is categorically distinct from the world we inhabit. But I’m sure Debord would argue that we are merely experiencing an intensification of a process that has been in motion longer than any of us have been alive. Pre-spectacular society has already passed beyond living memory. Soon we will hit another inflection point - where no one alive even knew someone who lived before the spectacle. All of human history is now before and after; it will soon become literally impossible to understand the inner life and daily reality of pre-modern man - if it’s not already. As an example: how much of your daily environment, as a percentage, do you truly understand? Look around the room and reflect on how “even the most mundane aspects of life have become impenetrable and unbreathable.” Your kitchen and your medicine cabinet are filled with mystical objects. Hell, just look at what’s on your person. The phone in your hand, the cash in your wallet, the clothes on your back, the food in your belly - how many lifetimes would it take to truly grok the building blocks of everyday existence? Compare that to, say, a homesteader. It really hasn’t been that long since people lived in a comprehensible universe. Our collective knowledge of the universe has deepened tremendously, but theoretical physics is only less slightly hermetical than the occult beliefs it replaced. It is notionally true that anyone could go get a Ph.D. and verify our working model of the cosmos. But in practice, the science is received wisdom, taken on faith. Our belief in the God Particle is functionally indistinguishable from the belief in God of ages past. It’s worth noting that our current theories will surely be supplanted in a century or three. They are placeholders for better, truer ideas. And so our greater grasp of the wider world has less value than we think, while our day-to-day grows ever more opaque. Is it any wonder epistemic learned helplessness is a thing? IV. With Typical Extravagance Debord was also ahead of the curve on commoditization: This constant expansion of economic power in the form of commodities transformed human labor itself into a commodity, into wage labor, and ultimately produced a level of abundance sufficient to solve the initial problem of survival — but only in such a way that the same problem is continually being regenerated at a higher level. Economic growth has liberated societies from the natural pressures that forced them into an immediate struggle for survival; but they have not yet been liberated from their liberator. Once his workday is over, the worker is suddenly redeemed from the total contempt toward him that is so clearly implied by every aspect of the organization and surveillance of production, and finds himself seemingly treated like a grownup, with a great show of politeness, in his new role as a consumer. Debord correctly perceived the totalitarian nature of spectacular capitalism. Your time, your attention, your opinions - all are bought and sold, and can be influenced to better facilitate such transactions. He would have been totally unsurprised by the rise of Big Data and the corporate surveillance (e.g. Alexa, your phone) that accompanies it. Every piece of your life is a commodity. Every moment that you are not producing or consuming is a missed opportunity. Never fear - someone, somewhere is going to find a way to solve that ‘need’. Nothing is spared. Even opposition is assimilated: Complacent acceptance of the status quo may also coexist with purely spectacular rebelliousness — dissatisfaction itself becomes a commodity as soon as the economy of abundance develops the capacity to process that particular raw material. Once again, Debord is shockingly prescient in noting that the conflicts of our time are largely distractions from bigger systemic issues: Fallacious archaic oppositions are revived — regionalisms and racisms which serve to endow mundane rankings in the hierarchies of consumption with a magical ontological superiority — and pseudoplayful enthusiasms are aroused by an endless succession of ludicrous competitions, from sports to elections. Genuine grassroots movements (Occupy, the Tea Party, BLM, Canadian truckers) almost always fizzle out without accomplishing anything of substance. They will either be ignored, crushed, or co-opted. Any remnants that endure will be reduced to figureheads that offer ‘representation’ for a point of view without actually producing any change. (‘The Squad’, Rand Paul, etc…) If the extremes of either side gain enough momentum to pose a threat, they will face a united front from the establishment wings of both parties (Bernie, Trump). It’s fashionable at the moment to blame the Woke Left for the politicization of everything, but we’ve all been around long enough to know better. It’s the same shit, different decade. During the Bush years, it was the left who opposed unending wars, government overreach, and media gaslighting. Today those positions are often considered right wing, but only because the pendulum of power has swung in the other direction. Moloch pursues its own goals, wearing whatever ideological guise it deems most effective. From Debord’s perspective, everything is becoming politicized because everything is getting monetized. In the integrated spectacle, the primary concerns of the State are economic, so the personal turning political is simply a downstream effect of the growth of capitalism. V. A Short History of Time It would do Debord a disservice to reduce his work to ammunition in our present disputes. There are two whole chapters in the book devoted to time as a historical development. It’s not something we think about much, but time and history had to be invented. Before the beginning, humanity lived in what Debord calls cyclical time. Countless generations came and went, because nobody was counting. Survival was the name of the game; to be or not to be was the only question. Eventually we formed early societies, which brought into being a ruling class that had the freedom to take actions above and beyond the daily grind: The owners of this historical surplus value are the only ones in a position to know and enjoy real events. Separated from the collective organization of time associated with the repetitive production at the base of social life, this historical time flows independently above its own static community. This is the time of adventure and war, the time in which the masters of cyclical society pursue their personal histories; it is also the time that emerges in the clashes with foreign communities that disrupt the unchanging social order. History thus arises as something alien to people, as something they never sought and from which they had thought themselves protected. The murkiness of pre-civilization was shaped into coherence by these rulers, who used their unique agency to literally make history: The succession of generations within a natural, purely cyclical time begins to be replaced by a linear succession of powers and events. This irreversible time is the time of those who rule, and the dynasty is its first unit of measurement. With writing there appears a consciousness that is no longer carried and transmitted directly among the living — an impersonal memory, the memory of the administration of society. ‘Writings are the thoughts of the state; archives are its memory’ (Novalis). The owners of history have given time a direction, a direction which is also a meaning. But this history develops and perishes separately, leaving the underlying society unchanged, because it remains separated from the common reality. Over time, these narratives gathered a religious dimension. This helped legitimize the rule of regimes, but it also changed the way ordinary people saw themselves in the world. Although still living in cyclical time, they gained purpose through a spiritual journey culminating in Heaven. The clashes of the Mediterranean peoples and the rise and fall of the Roman state gave rise instead to semihistorical religions, which became a new armor for separate power and basic components of a new consciousness of time. The Middle Ages, an incomplete mythical world whose consummation lay outside itself, is the period when cyclical time, though still governing the major part of production, really begins to be undermined by history. An element of irreversible time is recognized in the successive stages of each individual’s life. Life is seen as a one-way journey through a world whose meaning lies elsewhere: the pilgrim is the person who leaves cyclical time behind and actually becomes the traveler that everyone else is symbolically. The Renaissance created a profound break with this mythic raison d'être and reoriented man towards the accumulation of knowledge as a species: The Renaissance was a joyous break with eternity. Though seeking its heritage and legitimacy in the ancient world, it represented a new form of historical life. Its irreversible time was that of a never-ending accumulation of knowledge… This transformation of our relationship with history and progress was accompanied by the rise of the bourgeoisie: The bourgeoisie is associated with a labor time that has finally been freed from cyclical time. With the bourgeoisie, work becomes work that transforms historical conditions. The bourgeoisie is the first ruling class for which work is a value. The victory of the bourgeoisie is the victory of a profoundly historical time, because it is the time corresponding to an economic production that continuously transforms society from top to bottom. So long as agrarian production remains the predominant form of labor, the cyclical time that remains at the base of society reinforces the joint forces of tradition, which tend to hold back any historical movement. But the irreversible time of the bourgeois economy eradicates those vestiges throughout the world. History, which until then had seemed to involve only the actions of individual members of the ruling class, and which had thus been recorded as a mere chronology of events, is now understood as a general movement — a relentless movement that crushes any individuals in its path. Irreversible time initially appeared at the societal level as a narrative of events. The bourgeoisie brought irreversible time to the masses. Progress became something that we personally experience in the form of rapid technological innovation. It is hard to miss the motion of history when you go from horses to space travel in a single lifetime. History thus became as much about things as events. Eli Whitney and Thomas Edison took their places alongside generals and heads of state in our narrative of who we are and where we’re going. Our notion of progress became dominated by the economic prejudice. We talk about raising the standard of living and lifting people out of poverty - laudable goals, to be sure - but we deliver them from physical privation into deprivation of a different kind. One way that deprivation manifests is in our current conception of time: Pseudocyclical time is associated with the consumption of modern economic survival — the augmented survival in which everyday experience is cut off from decisionmaking and subjected no longer to the natural order, but to the pseudo-nature created by alienated labor. It is thus quite natural that it echoes the old cyclical rhythm that governed survival in preindustrial societies, incorporating the natural vestiges of cyclical time while generating new variants: day and night, work and weekend, periodic vacations." As capitalism commoditized time itself, we recreated cyclical time with the standard work week. But this artificial substitute has been about as successful as vegan chicken nuggets. It’s not the same, and it never will be. The workday used to be determined by the work, but now the work is determined by the workday. And everyone has to work, not because we need what they produce, but because we need them to spend - else the whole thing comes crashing down. Irreversible time keeps marching on, giving us new widgets and new wonders, but the continual churn of innovation masks the stifling sameness of spectacular progress. We know something is missing, but we lack the capacity to understand or express the problem. This individual experience of a disconnected everyday life remains without language, without concepts, and without critical access to its own past, which has nowhere been recorded. Uncommunicated, misunderstood and forgotten, it is smothered by the spectacle's false memory of the unmemorable. VI. The Coming Revolution Debord spends a good chunk of words describing how the spectacle has affected art [7] and physical space, but you can guess the gist by now. Everything’s fake, everything’s worse, everything’s changing but also the same. The last topic of the book worth discussing is the imminent socialist revolution. Debord walks us through the various ways that Marxism has been done wrong, then attempts to offer an alternative. He goes into a fair amount of detail, but it boils down to this: The anarchists properly rejected society in its entirety, but remained dogmatically attached to a 'one size fits all' mentality and failed to organize in an effective manner.

Inline links: epistemic learned helplessness, Moloch

5: Episteme - “Any nation-building requires a top-down view of the society it wants to organize. It’s either impossible or inefficient to draw a map with the same precision that local communities use. Because of this, certain details are elided, ignored, misplaced. This categorization process is ‘epistemic’, where episteme (or epistemic rationalism, or just rationalism) means abstract, generalized, theoretical knowledge."

6: “An important aspect of metis is that it’s essentially a ‘worldview’. Metis is deeply interwoven – performing one action also affirms the others, inasmuch as planting according to [ritual] tends to include much broader social and political and religious elements, all of which are affirmed and related… The fact that metis is often explained…by ‘folksy’ reasoning at best means that epistemic knowledge rarely listens to it. The net result of this is that states tend to overrule metis with episteme, and that protesting citizenry cannot even express why this is bad. The net result of that is generally inefficiency, anger, and confusion.”

Epoch Capabilities Index1 mentions across 1 issues

Epoch Capabilities Index is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 03, 2026 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "ECI26 lets users place bets on the highest score that an AI will attain on the Epoch Capabilities Index by the end of the year". It most often appears alongside 2024 US election, 2026 elections, Agent Economy Of The Future.

Reference entry: Epoch Capabilities Index
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 03, 2026
Last seen: March 03, 2026

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Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day March 03, 2026

2024 US election 1 shared issues
2026 elections 1 shared issues
Agent Economy Of The Future 1 shared issues
Alan Cole 1 shared issues
Alireza Arafi 1 shared issues

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Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day

March 03, 2026 · Original source

MNX is a noncustodial cryptocurrency-based futures exchange offering financial products relating to AI, including some prediction-market-shaped ones. For example, ECI26 lets users place bets on the highest score that an AI will attain on the Epoch Capabilities Index by the end of the year.

Inline links: ECI26, Epoch Capabilities Index

Epstein Barr1 mentions across 1 issues

Epstein Barr is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 02, 2021 and September 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "post-Epstein Barr fatigue people". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, AC&E, AcesoUnderGlass.

Reference entry: Epstein Barr
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 02, 2021
Last seen: September 02, 2021

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Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know September 02, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
AC&E 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
Amin-Chowdhury et al 1 shared issues

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Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

September 02, 2021 · Original source

In this context, I find the 1/150 risk pretty scary and the 1/25,000 risk not scary at all, so, darn, I guess there’s not yet enough data to have a strong sense of how concerned I should be. 9. This is hard to compare to other postviral syndromes Going into this, I wondered if we might be able to ignore Long COVID. The argument would go like this: all viral diseases have a risk of postviral syndromes. Colds, flus, mono, lots of stuff that’s going around all the time. Lots of people get those postviral syndromes, and either recover or don’t, but either way we don’t make a big deal out of it. Since COVID’s considered “newsworthy” in a way flu isn’t, we obsess over its postviral syndrome even though it’s no worse than anything else’s. This wouldn’t make Long COVID any less bad, and maybe we would be wrong to not panic more about colds and the flu, but it would at least give us some context and make things feel less scary. Unfortunately, I can’t find anything supporting or opposing this picture. The only relevant study is a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, who (contra nominative determinism) don’t pool the studies by condition, which makes it hard to draw conclusions. I think all of their examples of postviral syndrome after flu are from severe hospitalized cases, so any comparison with COVID would be unfair. Although there do seem to be scattered reports of post-flu problems, they’ve never been formally studied or quantified. Mononucleosis is an infectious disease caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, affecting about 1/2000 people per year in developed countries. It has a famously nasty postviral syndrome, which this paper describes as “almost one-half of the group had substantial ongoing symptoms 2 months after onset and… ∼10% had disabling symptoms marked by fatigue lasting ≥ 6 months”. Flu is as common as COVID, but nobody really talks about it having a significant postviral syndrome so probably it’s not that bad. Mono has a worse postviral syndrome than COVID, but it’s rare enough that it doesn’t cause massive society-wide effects. COVID is right in the middle: more common than mono, and (probably) worse postviral syndrome than flu. I think it’s fair to say that we may not have encountered a condition with this exact combination of risk factors and can’t dismiss it as similar to conditions we currently ignore. One potential analogue might be the Spanish Flu of 1918. It was an equally widespread pandemic, and seemed to have some kind of postviral syndrome. From TIME: In what is now Tanzania, to the north, post-viral syndrome has been blamed for triggering the worst famine in a century—the so-called “famine of corms”—after debilitating lethargy prevented flu survivors from planting when the rains came at the end of 1918. “Agriculture suffered particular disruption because, not only did the epidemic coincide with the planting season in some parts of the country, but in others it came at the time for harvesting and sheep-shearing.” Kathleen Brant, who lived on a farm in Taranaki, New Zealand, told Rice, the historian, about the “legion” problems farmers in her district encountered following the pandemic, even though all patients survived: “The effects of loss of production were felt for a long time.” The 1918 flu seemed to have lots of psychiatric effects: “Norwegian demographer Svenn-Erik Mamelund provided such evidence when he combed the records of psychiatric institutions in his country to show that the average number of admissions showed a seven-fold increase in each of the six years following the pandemic, compared to earlier, non-pandemic years.” Coronavirus doesn’t - the excellent Amin-Chowdhury study above finds nothing. Still, this is the scale of thing I’m worried about. The worst case scenario here is really really bad. If a few percent of COVID patients get long-term unremitting genuine CFS/ME, that has the potential to overwhelm government welfare budgets and long-term depress the economy. I think there’s a 90% chance the real situation isn’t that bad, but it’s scary that we can’t entirely rule it out. Aside from the somewhat different 1918 case, I don’t think we have any historical experience of dealing with postviral syndromes at this scale. The medium case scenario is something more like “a few percent of infected people get moderate fatigue, which doesn’t really prevent them from working, and goes away after a few years”. I don’t know whether the level of media attention paid to this would converge on “boring and nobody notices” or “giant disaster”, and I think it would be compatible with either. 10. Conclusions 1. Long COVID is many different issues without a common mechanism. 2. Some of these are straightforward and not surprising, eg lung scarring and post-ICU syndrome from severe infection, and would happen in any disease of this severity. Others seem to be more like the poorly-understood postviral syndromes associated with several other diseases. While some symptoms may be psychosomatic, most are probably organic. 3 The three major categories of symptoms are straightforward cardiovascular-pulmonary issues, straightforward smell and taste issues, and more mysterious neurological issues. 4 Although these get better with time in some people, in a significant number (maybe ~50% of people who had them at six weeks) they persist for as long as anyone has been able to measure them (a few months in the case of COVID, a year or two in the case of comparable syndromes). 5. Post-COVID fatigue is particularly concerning. This would be very bad if we analogized it to CFS/ME, and still pretty bad if we analogized it to other known postviral syndromes. There is no proof that this always gets better over the long term, although no study has looked at them for more than a few years. Facing postviral fatigue on this scale is a new problem. 6 . Children probably get Long COVID less than adults, probably at a rate of less than 5% of symptomatic cases. But we don’t know how much less, and we can’t rule out that some children get pretty severe symptoms. 7. Although vaccination decreases the risk of symptomatic COVID, it probably doesn’t decrease the risk of Long COVID per symptomatic COVID case by very much, though it might decrease it by a factor of 2-3. 8. Your chance of really bad debilitating lifelong Long COVID, conditional on getting COVID, is probably somewhere between a few tenths of a percent, and a few percent. Your chance per year of getting it by living a normal lifestyle depends on what you consider a normal lifestyle and on the future course of the pandemic. For me, under reasonable assumptions, it’s probably well below one percent. EDIT: Here are some other people who tried to do this same analysis. I learned about all of these after I wrote the first draft of this, so you can consider the basic thought process here to be independent of them - but I edited some things to account for what I learned from them before writing the final version. AcesoUnderGlass: Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Inline links: a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, scattered reports, this paper, postviral syndrome, Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

This is terrible. Recovery rates in the single digit percentages over the space of years. You would think at least some patients would get placebo recoveries, or forget how it felt to be well, or otherwise Lizardman themselves into fake complacency, but no. This is f@#$ing awful. Maybe COVID won’t be this bad? One ray of hope comes from this Australian study, where doctors record the rates of recovery from postviral fatigue after various rare diseases they encounter (Epstein-Barr, Q fever, Ross River virus). They find that 35% of these patients have postviral fatigue after six weeks, but only 12% after six months, and 9% after twelve months. This sounds a lot better than chronic fatigue. In fact, these people do the kind of weird task of figuring out how bad different diagnostic labels for fatigue are, even though some might argue that all the labels refer to the same underlying reality. They find an official diagnosis of “CFS/ME” (chronic fatigue / myalgic encephalitis) is much worse than “postviral fatigue”. Using the weird measure of “days per year of followup with diagnosis” (I’m not sure I fully understand their reasoning for why this is good), they find a median length of 80 for CFS/ME vs. 0 for PVF (…huh?). Using the more comprehensible measure of percent who still complain of fatigue after 7-12 months, they find it’s 24% vs. 10% (which super contradicts the above study saying that basically nobody with a CFS/ME diagnosis ever recovers). My guess is that this study had much lower criteria for a CFS/ME diagnosis (some doctor diagnosed it and put it on the insurance records) compared to the ones above (some specialist confirmed it by official criteria). The conclusion I draw is that, while official CFS/ME is horrible and hopeless, there are a lot of things that unofficially look kind of chronic-fatigue-ish which have pretty good prognoses. Since there’s no good reason to think post-COVID fatigue is official CFS/ME as opposed to just some chronic-ish fatigue-ish thing, probably it will have a better prognosis, more like weird Australian viruses. …which we still don’t know, because AFAICT nobody has done any good studies on postviral fatigue lasting more than a year. 5. Psychosomatic symptoms probably aren’t the majority of long COVID. I mean, I’m not seeing too many people claiming that they are. There are a lot more people worried that someone else might be claiming that, than people actually making the claim. Still, the Wall Street Journal opinion section is always up for slathering itself in glue and rolling around in a haystack until it becomes the straw man everyone else warned you about, and they do have an article on The Dubious Origins Of Long COVID. They point out that long COVID was first thrust into the public consciousness in surveys run by Body Politic, who self-describe as “a queer feminist wellness collective merging the personal and the political”. I agree this is a weird source for something to come from, but Hans Asperger was a Nazi and I still use his diagnosis, so I probably have to accept these people’s as well. More relevantly, WSJ points out that many of the people complaining of Long COVID symptoms test negative for COVID, or at least never tested positive. This complaint conflates the fact that not everyone was able to get a COVID test at all, with the fact that sometimes you get the acute COVID test after you’ve recovered from acute COVID and it’s negative, with the fact that COVID tests don’t have a 100% success rate, with the fact that yeah, okay, some people who didn’t have COVID are probably imagining Long COVID symptoms. I feel like some of the case-control studies above, which clearly show that seropositive people have higher rates of Long COVID than seronegative people, are pretty convincing here. But also - the people with lung scarring clearly have lung scarring, and most of them have weird x-rays consistent with lung scarring. If you have lung scarring, then you have trouble breathing, you’re fatigued, and you probably have lots of other stuff downstream of that. The people with smell/taste disturbances clearly have smell/taste disturbances, testable with the stupidly named but scientifically venerable Sniffin Sticks test - and also, who even cares enough to make up olfactory problems? Fatigue and brain fog are the only symptoms here that can’t be easily objectively confirmed, and, well, do you think those Australians who got infected with Q fever and had twelve months of postviral fatigue are faking? What about all those post-Epstein Barr fatigue people? Lots of viruses cause postviral fatigue, it’s not really surprising that COVID should also. (WSJ also spends a while arguing that CFS/ME is just a psychiatric disorder, which I think is not really in keeping with the best recent evidence. Also, as a psychiatrist, I’m very against this conclusion, mostly because if it were true, then people would expect me to cure CFS/ME patients.) One point WSJ didn’t bring up but could have was that most Long COVID patients are women. Probably this is somewhere between 60 and 80% - I suspect on the lower end of this, because I think women are more likely to talk about these kinds of things than men, and much more likely to eg join Facebook groups. This is noteworthy, because women are traditionally more prone to psychosomatic illnesses - so much that the ancients attributed these to the uterus and called them hysteria (note shared root with eg “hysterectomy”). Women are about 2x as likely to get diagnosed with panic disorder, anxiety disorders, phobias, etc, about 2.5x as likely to get chronic Lyme disease, widely regarded as an entirely psychosomatic condition, and 3-5x more likely to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia. So the female preponderance is suspicious. But women are also somewhere between 2x and 4x more likely to get autoimmune disorders than men (it varies by disorder - the ratio for Sjogren’s is as high as 16x). There are some pretty crazy hypotheses for why this is - for example, maybe women’s immune systems are permanently upregulated to be prepared for attempts by the placenta to secrete immune-downregulating chemicals during pregnancy, as part of the creepy shadow war between mother and fetus to regulate the maternal environment. I don’t know, do you have a better idea? Anyway, women have more autoimmune issues and more upregulated immune systems, so if there was any good way to assess gender ratio in true postviral fatigue excluding all psychosomatic cases, that would probably be female-biased too. Probably some Long COVID cases are psychosomatic just like some cases of anything are psychosomatic, but I don’t see too many signs that this is too important in explaining the phenomenon. …and please allow me a moment of preachiness here. Chronic fatigue sounds really fake to anyone who doesn’t have it. I think this is because it’s related to willpower. Willpower itself would sound fake to anyone who didn’t have to worry about it. “Oh, so you can go partying with your friends whenever you want, but as soon as it comes time to write a ten page report, your ‘lack of willpower’ prevents you from doing it? A likely story!” Still, all of us (except Bryan Caplan) recognize how real and important willpower is - how having more of it is better than having less of it, and how some condition that caused you to have pathologically little of it would be a huge disaster. In the comments section to the rough draft of this post, CJ wrote: I will say - I was one of those types of men to scoff with skepticism at people claiming to have chronic fatigue and the like. I would have called those people lazy and would have been adamant they were faking it or feeling like crap because of unhealthy lifestyle choices. Unfortunately I have learned the hard way the severity of neurological conditions, what it feels like to have brain fog, what chronic fatigue feels like, and how difficult it can be to communicate neurological symptoms to others. I now start from a position of listening to people who are willing to open up about their symptoms and trust that they are being honest. There are millions of people suffering in silence with untreated and undiagnosed disorders - those people are not all faking it or just dealing with psychosomatic conditions. I would recommend Jennifer Brea's documentary, Unrest. Thank you for shedding some light on the subject. Heron added: I second the suggestion to watch 'Unrest,' and to consider the many unseen ill whose symptoms are deemed to be imagined. Until this last year, I had little patience with, and doubted, people who I saw as hypochondriacs. Then I became the thing I hated. Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Long COVID do have similarities from what I've read, since becoming ill in August 2020. At that time, here in Northern Ireland, there was scant availability of COVID tests; after spending three days trying to get hold of one, (by which time I'd stopped teaching my post-grad online classes & I haven't worked since) I became too ill to do anything. I figured if this was COVID I'd gotten off lightly, mostly constant severe headache, inability to think, a new experience of fatigue, high temperature, insomnia, hypersomnia, paresthesia, no smell or taste etc Debilitated but not dead. Except for the fact that I still have the aforementioned symptoms a year on and whilst they fluctuate in type and severity, the fatigue, headaches and cognitive difficulties are real. A brain scan, an appointment for brain and spinal MRIs (waiting lists, even when going private [as NHS has 3-8 yr waiting lists here in NI] are lengthy), rare virtual doctors and neurologists suggest my ailments constitute a post-viral thing, maybe Long C, they can offer nothing but pills for pain. There is no test for ME/CFS yet, nor a Long C test, symptoms and presentation are so varied. Given a widespread lack of knowledge and resources regarding these ailments, you're on your own. Maybe I've developed ME, I certainly have post-exertional malaise which my very prominent neurologist hadn't heard of. Looking at the history of ME/CFS* and a dearth of research surrounding it, I hope that rather than dismiss the lives of sufferers of this or the long-lasting aftermath of COVID, that those experiencing such difficulties will be heard and learnt from. I only understood when I had no alternative. I don’t think I ever actively pooh-poohed CFS, but like everyone else who encountered it, I underestimated just how bad it was until I met some patients with the condition. It is real and really bad. For whatever reason it is hard to think about and take seriously, but it really is as bad as people say. </preachiness> 6. Long COVID is probably rare in children This matters a lot, because children are (currently) ineligible for the vaccine, and also likely to encounter the virus at school. But children usually have mild cases of COVID and don’t die from it, so it’s tempting to just not worry about them. But if they could get Long COVID, that would make it much less tempting. Preliminary Evidence On Long COVID In Children sounds like a good paper to draw conclusions from. It says 42.6% of children with COVID experience long-term follow-up symptoms, which would be higher than the rate for adults. But it has no control group, and most of the symptoms it finds don’t seem very COVID-related (eg rashes, constipation). The most common symptom (20%) is insomnia, which better studies in adults fail to associate with real Long COVID. The rate of known long COVID symptoms (eg taste and smell problems) is only about 3-4%, and no higher or lower than anything else. Probably these kids are just having problems at the usual rate and attributing them to their recent COVID. Blankenburg et al do the correct thing and ask a thousand children about potential symptoms, then compare the number who say yes vs. no among COVID-seropositive and seronegative subjects. They find no difference between the two groups. Both are reporting a lot of insomnia, etc. They reasonably attribute this to pandemics being a stressful event that it’s natural to lose sleep over. This is really reassuring, but it can’t rule out a somewhat rarer syndrome. The authors say that they might miss symptoms with a prevalence of less than 10%, and one of them gives his own personal guess that it’s 1%. An English team says there’s a Long COVID rate of 4.6% in kids. But there was a 1.7% rate of similar symptoms in the control group of kids who didn’t have COVID, so I think it would be fair to subtract that and end up with 2.9%. And even though the study started with 5000 children, so few of them got COVID, and so few of those got long COVID, that the 2.9% turns out to be about five kids. I don’t really want to update too much based on five kids, especially given the risk of recall bias (ie you might notice / care about your symptoms more if you know you had COVID before getting them). My overall conclusion here is that long COVID is rarer in children than adults, and may not exist at all. The studies tell us it’s probably somewhere less than 5% of kids, but so far we can’t conclude anything stronger than that. 7. Vaccination probably doesn’t change the per-symptomatic-case risk of Long COVID much Here’s a complicated Twitter thread about this. Of vaccinated people who got symptomatic COVID, about a third ended up with Long COVID symptoms, the same rate as in unvaccinated people. Of course, vaccinated people are much less likely to get symptomatic COVID. But even conditional on getting it, they’re still much less likely to go to the hospital, die, etc. It would have been nice if the same was true of getting Long COVID. But it doesn’t look that way. (all this information is from an online poll by a sketchy group of COVID “survivor” activists. But they wrote up their poll in the scientific paper font, as a PDF and everything, so I say we count it anyway) This NEJM study wasn’t exactly designed to look for Long COVID in vaccinated people. But they found it anyway, at a rate of 19% after 6 weeks. This also fits within the (wide) range reported for unvaccinated people. They don’t give a symptom breakdown beyond “prolonged loss of smell, persistent cough, fatigue, weakness, dyspnea, or myalgia”, which sounds like the usual set. These studies are pretty weak, and you could argue that given that vaccines decrease the average severity of COVID infection, and infection severity is linked to Long COVID risk, we should have a strong prior on vaccines decreasing Long COVID risk. And just before publishing this, someone sent me this study, which very preliminarily finds vaccines might decrease Long COVID risk by a factor of 2. I think a factor of 2-3 is believable; one of 10 or 20, less so. Weirdly, there are some claims that vaccines can help relieve symptoms of existing long COVID. Sounds kind of like sympathetic magic to me, but the researcher quoted in the linked article said it might “improve symptoms by eliminating any virus or viral remnants left in the body” or by “rebalancing the immune system”. So yeah, sympathetic magic. 8. Your risk of a terrible long COVID outcome conditional on COVID is probably between a few tenths of a percent and a few percent. My original calculation went like this: About 25% of people who get COVID report long COVID symptoms. About half of those go away after a few months, so 12.5% get persistent symptoms. Suppose that half of those cases (totally made-up number) are very mild and not worth worrying about. Then 6.25% of people who get COVID would have serious long-lasting Long COVID symptoms. After doing that calculation, I read this essay by Matt Bell, who tries to figure out the same thing. He is much more optimistic. He agrees that about half of long COVID cases go away after a few months, but adds another 50% decrease from “few months” to “lifelong”, kind of on priors, admitting there’s not too much positive evidence for this. Then he adds another factor-of-two decrease from vaccination, based on very preliminary studies from the UK. He estimates that someone with my demographics (vaccinated man in his 30s) has a 2% risk of Long COVID conditional on getting COVID at all. Then he divides by five for the true worst case scenario, based on studies showing that a fifth of people with Long COVID report that it affects their daily activities “a lot”. So by his final number, I have an 0.4% chance of getting really terrible long COVID, conditional on getting COVID at all. My friend AcesoUnderGlass also did a writeup of this, published after I did my first-draft calculation, which seems to be thinking of this very differently, based entirely on hospitalization rates (which of course are very low in vaccinated people our age). She accordingly concludes that risk is very low. I don’t really understand her reasoning here, but I trust her a lot and am working on trying to converge with her on this. What’s my yearly risk of getting COVID if I try to live a normal life? This site says only 0.1% of vaccinated Californians have gotten COVID after their vaccination. But vaccination was pretty new when that survey was done, so we might want to take this as a per one-to-two-months estimate. That would mean a risk of 0.5 - 1 percent per year. But not all these people are living normal lives, so my risk might be higher. MicroCOVID gives me a good sense of how careful I’d have to be to stay within a risk budget of 1% COVID risk per year. When I play around with it, I think I am about 5x - 10x less careful than that, which would mean a risk of about 5%/year. This tracker suggests my area has recently had about 1 new case per thousand people per week, which would imply 5% per year. But most of those people are probably unvaccinated, so my risk would be significantly lower than that. I’m going to round all of this off to about 1% - 10% per year of getting a breakthrough COVID case (though obviously this could change if the national picture got better or worse). Combined with the 0.4% to 6.25% risk of getting terrible long COVID conditional on getting COVID, that’s between a 1/150 - 1/25,000 chance of terrible long COVID per year. How does this compare to other risks? My ordinary risk of death per year, just from being a man in his 30s, is about 1/700 (though this includes drug abusers and stunt pilots, so my real risk might be lower, let’s say 1/1000). Here are some other risks, courtesy of the BMJ: In this context, I find the 1/150 risk pretty scary and the 1/25,000 risk not scary at all, so, darn, I guess there’s not yet enough data to have a strong sense of how concerned I should be. 9. This is hard to compare to other postviral syndromes Going into this, I wondered if we might be able to ignore Long COVID. The argument would go like this: all viral diseases have a risk of postviral syndromes. Colds, flus, mono, lots of stuff that’s going around all the time. Lots of people get those postviral syndromes, and either recover or don’t, but either way we don’t make a big deal out of it. Since COVID’s considered “newsworthy” in a way flu isn’t, we obsess over its postviral syndrome even though it’s no worse than anything else’s. This wouldn’t make Long COVID any less bad, and maybe we would be wrong to not panic more about colds and the flu, but it would at least give us some context and make things feel less scary. Unfortunately, I can’t find anything supporting or opposing this picture. The only relevant study is a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, who (contra nominative determinism) don’t pool the studies by condition, which makes it hard to draw conclusions. I think all of their examples of postviral syndrome after flu are from severe hospitalized cases, so any comparison with COVID would be unfair. Although there do seem to be scattered reports of post-flu problems, they’ve never been formally studied or quantified. Mononucleosis is an infectious disease caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, affecting about 1/2000 people per year in developed countries. It has a famously nasty postviral syndrome, which this paper describes as “almost one-half of the group had substantial ongoing symptoms 2 months after onset and… ∼10% had disabling symptoms marked by fatigue lasting ≥ 6 months”. Flu is as common as COVID, but nobody really talks about it having a significant postviral syndrome so probably it’s not that bad. Mono has a worse postviral syndrome than COVID, but it’s rare enough that it doesn’t cause massive society-wide effects. COVID is right in the middle: more common than mono, and (probably) worse postviral syndrome than flu. I think it’s fair to say that we may not have encountered a condition with this exact combination of risk factors and can’t dismiss it as similar to conditions we currently ignore. One potential analogue might be the Spanish Flu of 1918. It was an equally widespread pandemic, and seemed to have some kind of postviral syndrome. From TIME: In what is now Tanzania, to the north, post-viral syndrome has been blamed for triggering the worst famine in a century—the so-called “famine of corms”—after debilitating lethargy prevented flu survivors from planting when the rains came at the end of 1918. “Agriculture suffered particular disruption because, not only did the epidemic coincide with the planting season in some parts of the country, but in others it came at the time for harvesting and sheep-shearing.” Kathleen Brant, who lived on a farm in Taranaki, New Zealand, told Rice, the historian, about the “legion” problems farmers in her district encountered following the pandemic, even though all patients survived: “The effects of loss of production were felt for a long time.” The 1918 flu seemed to have lots of psychiatric effects: “Norwegian demographer Svenn-Erik Mamelund provided such evidence when he combed the records of psychiatric institutions in his country to show that the average number of admissions showed a seven-fold increase in each of the six years following the pandemic, compared to earlier, non-pandemic years.” Coronavirus doesn’t - the excellent Amin-Chowdhury study above finds nothing. Still, this is the scale of thing I’m worried about. The worst case scenario here is really really bad. If a few percent of COVID patients get long-term unremitting genuine CFS/ME, that has the potential to overwhelm government welfare budgets and long-term depress the economy. I think there’s a 90% chance the real situation isn’t that bad, but it’s scary that we can’t entirely rule it out. Aside from the somewhat different 1918 case, I don’t think we have any historical experience of dealing with postviral syndromes at this scale. The medium case scenario is something more like “a few percent of infected people get moderate fatigue, which doesn’t really prevent them from working, and goes away after a few years”. I don’t know whether the level of media attention paid to this would converge on “boring and nobody notices” or “giant disaster”, and I think it would be compatible with either. 10. Conclusions 1. Long COVID is many different issues without a common mechanism. 2. Some of these are straightforward and not surprising, eg lung scarring and post-ICU syndrome from severe infection, and would happen in any disease of this severity. Others seem to be more like the poorly-understood postviral syndromes associated with several other diseases. While some symptoms may be psychosomatic, most are probably organic. 3 The three major categories of symptoms are straightforward cardiovascular-pulmonary issues, straightforward smell and taste issues, and more mysterious neurological issues. 4 Although these get better with time in some people, in a significant number (maybe ~50% of people who had them at six weeks) they persist for as long as anyone has been able to measure them (a few months in the case of COVID, a year or two in the case of comparable syndromes). 5. Post-COVID fatigue is particularly concerning. This would be very bad if we analogized it to CFS/ME, and still pretty bad if we analogized it to other known postviral syndromes. There is no proof that this always gets better over the long term, although no study has looked at them for more than a few years. Facing postviral fatigue on this scale is a new problem. 6 . Children probably get Long COVID less than adults, probably at a rate of less than 5% of symptomatic cases. But we don’t know how much less, and we can’t rule out that some children get pretty severe symptoms. 7. Although vaccination decreases the risk of symptomatic COVID, it probably doesn’t decrease the risk of Long COVID per symptomatic COVID case by very much, though it might decrease it by a factor of 2-3. 8. Your chance of really bad debilitating lifelong Long COVID, conditional on getting COVID, is probably somewhere between a few tenths of a percent, and a few percent. Your chance per year of getting it by living a normal lifestyle depends on what you consider a normal lifestyle and on the future course of the pandemic. For me, under reasonable assumptions, it’s probably well below one percent. EDIT: Here are some other people who tried to do this same analysis. I learned about all of these after I wrote the first draft of this, so you can consider the basic thought process here to be independent of them - but I edited some things to account for what I learned from them before writing the final version. AcesoUnderGlass: Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Inline links: Lizardman, this Australian study, these people, The Dubious Origins Of Long COVID, weird x-rays, Sniffin Sticks test, somewhere between 60 and 80%, somewhere between 2x and 4x more likely, for example, the creepy shadow war between mother and fetus, Bryan Caplan, wrote, added, Preliminary Evidence On Long COVID In Children, Blankenburg et al, one of them, English team says, Here’s, the scientific paper font, This NEJM study, infection severity is linked to Long COVID risk, this study, vaccines can help relieve symptoms of existing long COVID, this essay, a writeup of this, This site says, MicroCOVID, This tracker, the BMJ, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yL40!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1eea7cfa-df08-4c67-acf2-da24ce860ae3_713x373.png, a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, scattered reports, this paper, postviral syndrome

Epstein-Barr1 mentions across 1 issues

Epstein-Barr is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 02, 2021 and September 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "various rare diseases they encounter (Epstein-Barr". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, AC&E, AcesoUnderGlass.

Reference entry: Epstein-Barr
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 02, 2021
Last seen: September 02, 2021

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Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know September 02, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
AC&E 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
Amin-Chowdhury et al 1 shared issues

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Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

September 02, 2021 · Original source

In this context, I find the 1/150 risk pretty scary and the 1/25,000 risk not scary at all, so, darn, I guess there’s not yet enough data to have a strong sense of how concerned I should be. 9. This is hard to compare to other postviral syndromes Going into this, I wondered if we might be able to ignore Long COVID. The argument would go like this: all viral diseases have a risk of postviral syndromes. Colds, flus, mono, lots of stuff that’s going around all the time. Lots of people get those postviral syndromes, and either recover or don’t, but either way we don’t make a big deal out of it. Since COVID’s considered “newsworthy” in a way flu isn’t, we obsess over its postviral syndrome even though it’s no worse than anything else’s. This wouldn’t make Long COVID any less bad, and maybe we would be wrong to not panic more about colds and the flu, but it would at least give us some context and make things feel less scary. Unfortunately, I can’t find anything supporting or opposing this picture. The only relevant study is a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, who (contra nominative determinism) don’t pool the studies by condition, which makes it hard to draw conclusions. I think all of their examples of postviral syndrome after flu are from severe hospitalized cases, so any comparison with COVID would be unfair. Although there do seem to be scattered reports of post-flu problems, they’ve never been formally studied or quantified. Mononucleosis is an infectious disease caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, affecting about 1/2000 people per year in developed countries. It has a famously nasty postviral syndrome, which this paper describes as “almost one-half of the group had substantial ongoing symptoms 2 months after onset and… ∼10% had disabling symptoms marked by fatigue lasting ≥ 6 months”. Flu is as common as COVID, but nobody really talks about it having a significant postviral syndrome so probably it’s not that bad. Mono has a worse postviral syndrome than COVID, but it’s rare enough that it doesn’t cause massive society-wide effects. COVID is right in the middle: more common than mono, and (probably) worse postviral syndrome than flu. I think it’s fair to say that we may not have encountered a condition with this exact combination of risk factors and can’t dismiss it as similar to conditions we currently ignore. One potential analogue might be the Spanish Flu of 1918. It was an equally widespread pandemic, and seemed to have some kind of postviral syndrome. From TIME: In what is now Tanzania, to the north, post-viral syndrome has been blamed for triggering the worst famine in a century—the so-called “famine of corms”—after debilitating lethargy prevented flu survivors from planting when the rains came at the end of 1918. “Agriculture suffered particular disruption because, not only did the epidemic coincide with the planting season in some parts of the country, but in others it came at the time for harvesting and sheep-shearing.” Kathleen Brant, who lived on a farm in Taranaki, New Zealand, told Rice, the historian, about the “legion” problems farmers in her district encountered following the pandemic, even though all patients survived: “The effects of loss of production were felt for a long time.” The 1918 flu seemed to have lots of psychiatric effects: “Norwegian demographer Svenn-Erik Mamelund provided such evidence when he combed the records of psychiatric institutions in his country to show that the average number of admissions showed a seven-fold increase in each of the six years following the pandemic, compared to earlier, non-pandemic years.” Coronavirus doesn’t - the excellent Amin-Chowdhury study above finds nothing. Still, this is the scale of thing I’m worried about. The worst case scenario here is really really bad. If a few percent of COVID patients get long-term unremitting genuine CFS/ME, that has the potential to overwhelm government welfare budgets and long-term depress the economy. I think there’s a 90% chance the real situation isn’t that bad, but it’s scary that we can’t entirely rule it out. Aside from the somewhat different 1918 case, I don’t think we have any historical experience of dealing with postviral syndromes at this scale. The medium case scenario is something more like “a few percent of infected people get moderate fatigue, which doesn’t really prevent them from working, and goes away after a few years”. I don’t know whether the level of media attention paid to this would converge on “boring and nobody notices” or “giant disaster”, and I think it would be compatible with either. 10. Conclusions 1. Long COVID is many different issues without a common mechanism. 2. Some of these are straightforward and not surprising, eg lung scarring and post-ICU syndrome from severe infection, and would happen in any disease of this severity. Others seem to be more like the poorly-understood postviral syndromes associated with several other diseases. While some symptoms may be psychosomatic, most are probably organic. 3 The three major categories of symptoms are straightforward cardiovascular-pulmonary issues, straightforward smell and taste issues, and more mysterious neurological issues. 4 Although these get better with time in some people, in a significant number (maybe ~50% of people who had them at six weeks) they persist for as long as anyone has been able to measure them (a few months in the case of COVID, a year or two in the case of comparable syndromes). 5. Post-COVID fatigue is particularly concerning. This would be very bad if we analogized it to CFS/ME, and still pretty bad if we analogized it to other known postviral syndromes. There is no proof that this always gets better over the long term, although no study has looked at them for more than a few years. Facing postviral fatigue on this scale is a new problem. 6 . Children probably get Long COVID less than adults, probably at a rate of less than 5% of symptomatic cases. But we don’t know how much less, and we can’t rule out that some children get pretty severe symptoms. 7. Although vaccination decreases the risk of symptomatic COVID, it probably doesn’t decrease the risk of Long COVID per symptomatic COVID case by very much, though it might decrease it by a factor of 2-3. 8. Your chance of really bad debilitating lifelong Long COVID, conditional on getting COVID, is probably somewhere between a few tenths of a percent, and a few percent. Your chance per year of getting it by living a normal lifestyle depends on what you consider a normal lifestyle and on the future course of the pandemic. For me, under reasonable assumptions, it’s probably well below one percent. EDIT: Here are some other people who tried to do this same analysis. I learned about all of these after I wrote the first draft of this, so you can consider the basic thought process here to be independent of them - but I edited some things to account for what I learned from them before writing the final version. AcesoUnderGlass: Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Inline links: a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, scattered reports, this paper, postviral syndrome, Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

This is terrible. Recovery rates in the single digit percentages over the space of years. You would think at least some patients would get placebo recoveries, or forget how it felt to be well, or otherwise Lizardman themselves into fake complacency, but no. This is f@#$ing awful. Maybe COVID won’t be this bad? One ray of hope comes from this Australian study, where doctors record the rates of recovery from postviral fatigue after various rare diseases they encounter (Epstein-Barr, Q fever, Ross River virus). They find that 35% of these patients have postviral fatigue after six weeks, but only 12% after six months, and 9% after twelve months. This sounds a lot better than chronic fatigue. In fact, these people do the kind of weird task of figuring out how bad different diagnostic labels for fatigue are, even though some might argue that all the labels refer to the same underlying reality. They find an official diagnosis of “CFS/ME” (chronic fatigue / myalgic encephalitis) is much worse than “postviral fatigue”. Using the weird measure of “days per year of followup with diagnosis” (I’m not sure I fully understand their reasoning for why this is good), they find a median length of 80 for CFS/ME vs. 0 for PVF (…huh?). Using the more comprehensible measure of percent who still complain of fatigue after 7-12 months, they find it’s 24% vs. 10% (which super contradicts the above study saying that basically nobody with a CFS/ME diagnosis ever recovers). My guess is that this study had much lower criteria for a CFS/ME diagnosis (some doctor diagnosed it and put it on the insurance records) compared to the ones above (some specialist confirmed it by official criteria). The conclusion I draw is that, while official CFS/ME is horrible and hopeless, there are a lot of things that unofficially look kind of chronic-fatigue-ish which have pretty good prognoses. Since there’s no good reason to think post-COVID fatigue is official CFS/ME as opposed to just some chronic-ish fatigue-ish thing, probably it will have a better prognosis, more like weird Australian viruses. …which we still don’t know, because AFAICT nobody has done any good studies on postviral fatigue lasting more than a year. 5. Psychosomatic symptoms probably aren’t the majority of long COVID. I mean, I’m not seeing too many people claiming that they are. There are a lot more people worried that someone else might be claiming that, than people actually making the claim. Still, the Wall Street Journal opinion section is always up for slathering itself in glue and rolling around in a haystack until it becomes the straw man everyone else warned you about, and they do have an article on The Dubious Origins Of Long COVID. They point out that long COVID was first thrust into the public consciousness in surveys run by Body Politic, who self-describe as “a queer feminist wellness collective merging the personal and the political”. I agree this is a weird source for something to come from, but Hans Asperger was a Nazi and I still use his diagnosis, so I probably have to accept these people’s as well. More relevantly, WSJ points out that many of the people complaining of Long COVID symptoms test negative for COVID, or at least never tested positive. This complaint conflates the fact that not everyone was able to get a COVID test at all, with the fact that sometimes you get the acute COVID test after you’ve recovered from acute COVID and it’s negative, with the fact that COVID tests don’t have a 100% success rate, with the fact that yeah, okay, some people who didn’t have COVID are probably imagining Long COVID symptoms. I feel like some of the case-control studies above, which clearly show that seropositive people have higher rates of Long COVID than seronegative people, are pretty convincing here. But also - the people with lung scarring clearly have lung scarring, and most of them have weird x-rays consistent with lung scarring. If you have lung scarring, then you have trouble breathing, you’re fatigued, and you probably have lots of other stuff downstream of that. The people with smell/taste disturbances clearly have smell/taste disturbances, testable with the stupidly named but scientifically venerable Sniffin Sticks test - and also, who even cares enough to make up olfactory problems? Fatigue and brain fog are the only symptoms here that can’t be easily objectively confirmed, and, well, do you think those Australians who got infected with Q fever and had twelve months of postviral fatigue are faking? What about all those post-Epstein Barr fatigue people? Lots of viruses cause postviral fatigue, it’s not really surprising that COVID should also. (WSJ also spends a while arguing that CFS/ME is just a psychiatric disorder, which I think is not really in keeping with the best recent evidence. Also, as a psychiatrist, I’m very against this conclusion, mostly because if it were true, then people would expect me to cure CFS/ME patients.) One point WSJ didn’t bring up but could have was that most Long COVID patients are women. Probably this is somewhere between 60 and 80% - I suspect on the lower end of this, because I think women are more likely to talk about these kinds of things than men, and much more likely to eg join Facebook groups. This is noteworthy, because women are traditionally more prone to psychosomatic illnesses - so much that the ancients attributed these to the uterus and called them hysteria (note shared root with eg “hysterectomy”). Women are about 2x as likely to get diagnosed with panic disorder, anxiety disorders, phobias, etc, about 2.5x as likely to get chronic Lyme disease, widely regarded as an entirely psychosomatic condition, and 3-5x more likely to be diagnosed with fibromyalgia. So the female preponderance is suspicious. But women are also somewhere between 2x and 4x more likely to get autoimmune disorders than men (it varies by disorder - the ratio for Sjogren’s is as high as 16x). There are some pretty crazy hypotheses for why this is - for example, maybe women’s immune systems are permanently upregulated to be prepared for attempts by the placenta to secrete immune-downregulating chemicals during pregnancy, as part of the creepy shadow war between mother and fetus to regulate the maternal environment. I don’t know, do you have a better idea? Anyway, women have more autoimmune issues and more upregulated immune systems, so if there was any good way to assess gender ratio in true postviral fatigue excluding all psychosomatic cases, that would probably be female-biased too. Probably some Long COVID cases are psychosomatic just like some cases of anything are psychosomatic, but I don’t see too many signs that this is too important in explaining the phenomenon. …and please allow me a moment of preachiness here. Chronic fatigue sounds really fake to anyone who doesn’t have it. I think this is because it’s related to willpower. Willpower itself would sound fake to anyone who didn’t have to worry about it. “Oh, so you can go partying with your friends whenever you want, but as soon as it comes time to write a ten page report, your ‘lack of willpower’ prevents you from doing it? A likely story!” Still, all of us (except Bryan Caplan) recognize how real and important willpower is - how having more of it is better than having less of it, and how some condition that caused you to have pathologically little of it would be a huge disaster. In the comments section to the rough draft of this post, CJ wrote: I will say - I was one of those types of men to scoff with skepticism at people claiming to have chronic fatigue and the like. I would have called those people lazy and would have been adamant they were faking it or feeling like crap because of unhealthy lifestyle choices. Unfortunately I have learned the hard way the severity of neurological conditions, what it feels like to have brain fog, what chronic fatigue feels like, and how difficult it can be to communicate neurological symptoms to others. I now start from a position of listening to people who are willing to open up about their symptoms and trust that they are being honest. There are millions of people suffering in silence with untreated and undiagnosed disorders - those people are not all faking it or just dealing with psychosomatic conditions. I would recommend Jennifer Brea's documentary, Unrest. Thank you for shedding some light on the subject. Heron added: I second the suggestion to watch 'Unrest,' and to consider the many unseen ill whose symptoms are deemed to be imagined. Until this last year, I had little patience with, and doubted, people who I saw as hypochondriacs. Then I became the thing I hated. Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Long COVID do have similarities from what I've read, since becoming ill in August 2020. At that time, here in Northern Ireland, there was scant availability of COVID tests; after spending three days trying to get hold of one, (by which time I'd stopped teaching my post-grad online classes & I haven't worked since) I became too ill to do anything. I figured if this was COVID I'd gotten off lightly, mostly constant severe headache, inability to think, a new experience of fatigue, high temperature, insomnia, hypersomnia, paresthesia, no smell or taste etc Debilitated but not dead. Except for the fact that I still have the aforementioned symptoms a year on and whilst they fluctuate in type and severity, the fatigue, headaches and cognitive difficulties are real. A brain scan, an appointment for brain and spinal MRIs (waiting lists, even when going private [as NHS has 3-8 yr waiting lists here in NI] are lengthy), rare virtual doctors and neurologists suggest my ailments constitute a post-viral thing, maybe Long C, they can offer nothing but pills for pain. There is no test for ME/CFS yet, nor a Long C test, symptoms and presentation are so varied. Given a widespread lack of knowledge and resources regarding these ailments, you're on your own. Maybe I've developed ME, I certainly have post-exertional malaise which my very prominent neurologist hadn't heard of. Looking at the history of ME/CFS* and a dearth of research surrounding it, I hope that rather than dismiss the lives of sufferers of this or the long-lasting aftermath of COVID, that those experiencing such difficulties will be heard and learnt from. I only understood when I had no alternative. I don’t think I ever actively pooh-poohed CFS, but like everyone else who encountered it, I underestimated just how bad it was until I met some patients with the condition. It is real and really bad. For whatever reason it is hard to think about and take seriously, but it really is as bad as people say. </preachiness> 6. Long COVID is probably rare in children This matters a lot, because children are (currently) ineligible for the vaccine, and also likely to encounter the virus at school. But children usually have mild cases of COVID and don’t die from it, so it’s tempting to just not worry about them. But if they could get Long COVID, that would make it much less tempting. Preliminary Evidence On Long COVID In Children sounds like a good paper to draw conclusions from. It says 42.6% of children with COVID experience long-term follow-up symptoms, which would be higher than the rate for adults. But it has no control group, and most of the symptoms it finds don’t seem very COVID-related (eg rashes, constipation). The most common symptom (20%) is insomnia, which better studies in adults fail to associate with real Long COVID. The rate of known long COVID symptoms (eg taste and smell problems) is only about 3-4%, and no higher or lower than anything else. Probably these kids are just having problems at the usual rate and attributing them to their recent COVID. Blankenburg et al do the correct thing and ask a thousand children about potential symptoms, then compare the number who say yes vs. no among COVID-seropositive and seronegative subjects. They find no difference between the two groups. Both are reporting a lot of insomnia, etc. They reasonably attribute this to pandemics being a stressful event that it’s natural to lose sleep over. This is really reassuring, but it can’t rule out a somewhat rarer syndrome. The authors say that they might miss symptoms with a prevalence of less than 10%, and one of them gives his own personal guess that it’s 1%. An English team says there’s a Long COVID rate of 4.6% in kids. But there was a 1.7% rate of similar symptoms in the control group of kids who didn’t have COVID, so I think it would be fair to subtract that and end up with 2.9%. And even though the study started with 5000 children, so few of them got COVID, and so few of those got long COVID, that the 2.9% turns out to be about five kids. I don’t really want to update too much based on five kids, especially given the risk of recall bias (ie you might notice / care about your symptoms more if you know you had COVID before getting them). My overall conclusion here is that long COVID is rarer in children than adults, and may not exist at all. The studies tell us it’s probably somewhere less than 5% of kids, but so far we can’t conclude anything stronger than that. 7. Vaccination probably doesn’t change the per-symptomatic-case risk of Long COVID much Here’s a complicated Twitter thread about this. Of vaccinated people who got symptomatic COVID, about a third ended up with Long COVID symptoms, the same rate as in unvaccinated people. Of course, vaccinated people are much less likely to get symptomatic COVID. But even conditional on getting it, they’re still much less likely to go to the hospital, die, etc. It would have been nice if the same was true of getting Long COVID. But it doesn’t look that way. (all this information is from an online poll by a sketchy group of COVID “survivor” activists. But they wrote up their poll in the scientific paper font, as a PDF and everything, so I say we count it anyway) This NEJM study wasn’t exactly designed to look for Long COVID in vaccinated people. But they found it anyway, at a rate of 19% after 6 weeks. This also fits within the (wide) range reported for unvaccinated people. They don’t give a symptom breakdown beyond “prolonged loss of smell, persistent cough, fatigue, weakness, dyspnea, or myalgia”, which sounds like the usual set. These studies are pretty weak, and you could argue that given that vaccines decrease the average severity of COVID infection, and infection severity is linked to Long COVID risk, we should have a strong prior on vaccines decreasing Long COVID risk. And just before publishing this, someone sent me this study, which very preliminarily finds vaccines might decrease Long COVID risk by a factor of 2. I think a factor of 2-3 is believable; one of 10 or 20, less so. Weirdly, there are some claims that vaccines can help relieve symptoms of existing long COVID. Sounds kind of like sympathetic magic to me, but the researcher quoted in the linked article said it might “improve symptoms by eliminating any virus or viral remnants left in the body” or by “rebalancing the immune system”. So yeah, sympathetic magic. 8. Your risk of a terrible long COVID outcome conditional on COVID is probably between a few tenths of a percent and a few percent. My original calculation went like this: About 25% of people who get COVID report long COVID symptoms. About half of those go away after a few months, so 12.5% get persistent symptoms. Suppose that half of those cases (totally made-up number) are very mild and not worth worrying about. Then 6.25% of people who get COVID would have serious long-lasting Long COVID symptoms. After doing that calculation, I read this essay by Matt Bell, who tries to figure out the same thing. He is much more optimistic. He agrees that about half of long COVID cases go away after a few months, but adds another 50% decrease from “few months” to “lifelong”, kind of on priors, admitting there’s not too much positive evidence for this. Then he adds another factor-of-two decrease from vaccination, based on very preliminary studies from the UK. He estimates that someone with my demographics (vaccinated man in his 30s) has a 2% risk of Long COVID conditional on getting COVID at all. Then he divides by five for the true worst case scenario, based on studies showing that a fifth of people with Long COVID report that it affects their daily activities “a lot”. So by his final number, I have an 0.4% chance of getting really terrible long COVID, conditional on getting COVID at all. My friend AcesoUnderGlass also did a writeup of this, published after I did my first-draft calculation, which seems to be thinking of this very differently, based entirely on hospitalization rates (which of course are very low in vaccinated people our age). She accordingly concludes that risk is very low. I don’t really understand her reasoning here, but I trust her a lot and am working on trying to converge with her on this. What’s my yearly risk of getting COVID if I try to live a normal life? This site says only 0.1% of vaccinated Californians have gotten COVID after their vaccination. But vaccination was pretty new when that survey was done, so we might want to take this as a per one-to-two-months estimate. That would mean a risk of 0.5 - 1 percent per year. But not all these people are living normal lives, so my risk might be higher. MicroCOVID gives me a good sense of how careful I’d have to be to stay within a risk budget of 1% COVID risk per year. When I play around with it, I think I am about 5x - 10x less careful than that, which would mean a risk of about 5%/year. This tracker suggests my area has recently had about 1 new case per thousand people per week, which would imply 5% per year. But most of those people are probably unvaccinated, so my risk would be significantly lower than that. I’m going to round all of this off to about 1% - 10% per year of getting a breakthrough COVID case (though obviously this could change if the national picture got better or worse). Combined with the 0.4% to 6.25% risk of getting terrible long COVID conditional on getting COVID, that’s between a 1/150 - 1/25,000 chance of terrible long COVID per year. How does this compare to other risks? My ordinary risk of death per year, just from being a man in his 30s, is about 1/700 (though this includes drug abusers and stunt pilots, so my real risk might be lower, let’s say 1/1000). Here are some other risks, courtesy of the BMJ: In this context, I find the 1/150 risk pretty scary and the 1/25,000 risk not scary at all, so, darn, I guess there’s not yet enough data to have a strong sense of how concerned I should be. 9. This is hard to compare to other postviral syndromes Going into this, I wondered if we might be able to ignore Long COVID. The argument would go like this: all viral diseases have a risk of postviral syndromes. Colds, flus, mono, lots of stuff that’s going around all the time. Lots of people get those postviral syndromes, and either recover or don’t, but either way we don’t make a big deal out of it. Since COVID’s considered “newsworthy” in a way flu isn’t, we obsess over its postviral syndrome even though it’s no worse than anything else’s. This wouldn’t make Long COVID any less bad, and maybe we would be wrong to not panic more about colds and the flu, but it would at least give us some context and make things feel less scary. Unfortunately, I can’t find anything supporting or opposing this picture. The only relevant study is a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, who (contra nominative determinism) don’t pool the studies by condition, which makes it hard to draw conclusions. I think all of their examples of postviral syndrome after flu are from severe hospitalized cases, so any comparison with COVID would be unfair. Although there do seem to be scattered reports of post-flu problems, they’ve never been formally studied or quantified. Mononucleosis is an infectious disease caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, affecting about 1/2000 people per year in developed countries. It has a famously nasty postviral syndrome, which this paper describes as “almost one-half of the group had substantial ongoing symptoms 2 months after onset and… ∼10% had disabling symptoms marked by fatigue lasting ≥ 6 months”. Flu is as common as COVID, but nobody really talks about it having a significant postviral syndrome so probably it’s not that bad. Mono has a worse postviral syndrome than COVID, but it’s rare enough that it doesn’t cause massive society-wide effects. COVID is right in the middle: more common than mono, and (probably) worse postviral syndrome than flu. I think it’s fair to say that we may not have encountered a condition with this exact combination of risk factors and can’t dismiss it as similar to conditions we currently ignore. One potential analogue might be the Spanish Flu of 1918. It was an equally widespread pandemic, and seemed to have some kind of postviral syndrome. From TIME: In what is now Tanzania, to the north, post-viral syndrome has been blamed for triggering the worst famine in a century—the so-called “famine of corms”—after debilitating lethargy prevented flu survivors from planting when the rains came at the end of 1918. “Agriculture suffered particular disruption because, not only did the epidemic coincide with the planting season in some parts of the country, but in others it came at the time for harvesting and sheep-shearing.” Kathleen Brant, who lived on a farm in Taranaki, New Zealand, told Rice, the historian, about the “legion” problems farmers in her district encountered following the pandemic, even though all patients survived: “The effects of loss of production were felt for a long time.” The 1918 flu seemed to have lots of psychiatric effects: “Norwegian demographer Svenn-Erik Mamelund provided such evidence when he combed the records of psychiatric institutions in his country to show that the average number of admissions showed a seven-fold increase in each of the six years following the pandemic, compared to earlier, non-pandemic years.” Coronavirus doesn’t - the excellent Amin-Chowdhury study above finds nothing. Still, this is the scale of thing I’m worried about. The worst case scenario here is really really bad. If a few percent of COVID patients get long-term unremitting genuine CFS/ME, that has the potential to overwhelm government welfare budgets and long-term depress the economy. I think there’s a 90% chance the real situation isn’t that bad, but it’s scary that we can’t entirely rule it out. Aside from the somewhat different 1918 case, I don’t think we have any historical experience of dealing with postviral syndromes at this scale. The medium case scenario is something more like “a few percent of infected people get moderate fatigue, which doesn’t really prevent them from working, and goes away after a few years”. I don’t know whether the level of media attention paid to this would converge on “boring and nobody notices” or “giant disaster”, and I think it would be compatible with either. 10. Conclusions 1. Long COVID is many different issues without a common mechanism. 2. Some of these are straightforward and not surprising, eg lung scarring and post-ICU syndrome from severe infection, and would happen in any disease of this severity. Others seem to be more like the poorly-understood postviral syndromes associated with several other diseases. While some symptoms may be psychosomatic, most are probably organic. 3 The three major categories of symptoms are straightforward cardiovascular-pulmonary issues, straightforward smell and taste issues, and more mysterious neurological issues. 4 Although these get better with time in some people, in a significant number (maybe ~50% of people who had them at six weeks) they persist for as long as anyone has been able to measure them (a few months in the case of COVID, a year or two in the case of comparable syndromes). 5. Post-COVID fatigue is particularly concerning. This would be very bad if we analogized it to CFS/ME, and still pretty bad if we analogized it to other known postviral syndromes. There is no proof that this always gets better over the long term, although no study has looked at them for more than a few years. Facing postviral fatigue on this scale is a new problem. 6 . Children probably get Long COVID less than adults, probably at a rate of less than 5% of symptomatic cases. But we don’t know how much less, and we can’t rule out that some children get pretty severe symptoms. 7. Although vaccination decreases the risk of symptomatic COVID, it probably doesn’t decrease the risk of Long COVID per symptomatic COVID case by very much, though it might decrease it by a factor of 2-3. 8. Your chance of really bad debilitating lifelong Long COVID, conditional on getting COVID, is probably somewhere between a few tenths of a percent, and a few percent. Your chance per year of getting it by living a normal lifestyle depends on what you consider a normal lifestyle and on the future course of the pandemic. For me, under reasonable assumptions, it’s probably well below one percent. EDIT: Here are some other people who tried to do this same analysis. I learned about all of these after I wrote the first draft of this, so you can consider the basic thought process here to be independent of them - but I edited some things to account for what I learned from them before writing the final version. AcesoUnderGlass: Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Epstein-Barr virus1 mentions across 1 issues

Epstein-Barr virus is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 02, 2021 and September 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "caused by the Epstein-Barr virus". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, AC&E, AcesoUnderGlass.

Reference entry: Epstein-Barr virus
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 02, 2021
Last seen: September 02, 2021

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Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know September 02, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
AC&E 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
AcesoUnderGlass 1 shared issues
Amin-Chowdhury et al 1 shared issues

Source context

Long COVID: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

September 02, 2021 · Original source

In this context, I find the 1/150 risk pretty scary and the 1/25,000 risk not scary at all, so, darn, I guess there’s not yet enough data to have a strong sense of how concerned I should be. 9. This is hard to compare to other postviral syndromes Going into this, I wondered if we might be able to ignore Long COVID. The argument would go like this: all viral diseases have a risk of postviral syndromes. Colds, flus, mono, lots of stuff that’s going around all the time. Lots of people get those postviral syndromes, and either recover or don’t, but either way we don’t make a big deal out of it. Since COVID’s considered “newsworthy” in a way flu isn’t, we obsess over its postviral syndrome even though it’s no worse than anything else’s. This wouldn’t make Long COVID any less bad, and maybe we would be wrong to not panic more about colds and the flu, but it would at least give us some context and make things feel less scary. Unfortunately, I can’t find anything supporting or opposing this picture. The only relevant study is a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, who (contra nominative determinism) don’t pool the studies by condition, which makes it hard to draw conclusions. I think all of their examples of postviral syndrome after flu are from severe hospitalized cases, so any comparison with COVID would be unfair. Although there do seem to be scattered reports of post-flu problems, they’ve never been formally studied or quantified. Mononucleosis is an infectious disease caused by the Epstein-Barr virus, affecting about 1/2000 people per year in developed countries. It has a famously nasty postviral syndrome, which this paper describes as “almost one-half of the group had substantial ongoing symptoms 2 months after onset and… ∼10% had disabling symptoms marked by fatigue lasting ≥ 6 months”. Flu is as common as COVID, but nobody really talks about it having a significant postviral syndrome so probably it’s not that bad. Mono has a worse postviral syndrome than COVID, but it’s rare enough that it doesn’t cause massive society-wide effects. COVID is right in the middle: more common than mono, and (probably) worse postviral syndrome than flu. I think it’s fair to say that we may not have encountered a condition with this exact combination of risk factors and can’t dismiss it as similar to conditions we currently ignore. One potential analogue might be the Spanish Flu of 1918. It was an equally widespread pandemic, and seemed to have some kind of postviral syndrome. From TIME: In what is now Tanzania, to the north, post-viral syndrome has been blamed for triggering the worst famine in a century—the so-called “famine of corms”—after debilitating lethargy prevented flu survivors from planting when the rains came at the end of 1918. “Agriculture suffered particular disruption because, not only did the epidemic coincide with the planting season in some parts of the country, but in others it came at the time for harvesting and sheep-shearing.” Kathleen Brant, who lived on a farm in Taranaki, New Zealand, told Rice, the historian, about the “legion” problems farmers in her district encountered following the pandemic, even though all patients survived: “The effects of loss of production were felt for a long time.” The 1918 flu seemed to have lots of psychiatric effects: “Norwegian demographer Svenn-Erik Mamelund provided such evidence when he combed the records of psychiatric institutions in his country to show that the average number of admissions showed a seven-fold increase in each of the six years following the pandemic, compared to earlier, non-pandemic years.” Coronavirus doesn’t - the excellent Amin-Chowdhury study above finds nothing. Still, this is the scale of thing I’m worried about. The worst case scenario here is really really bad. If a few percent of COVID patients get long-term unremitting genuine CFS/ME, that has the potential to overwhelm government welfare budgets and long-term depress the economy. I think there’s a 90% chance the real situation isn’t that bad, but it’s scary that we can’t entirely rule it out. Aside from the somewhat different 1918 case, I don’t think we have any historical experience of dealing with postviral syndromes at this scale. The medium case scenario is something more like “a few percent of infected people get moderate fatigue, which doesn’t really prevent them from working, and goes away after a few years”. I don’t know whether the level of media attention paid to this would converge on “boring and nobody notices” or “giant disaster”, and I think it would be compatible with either. 10. Conclusions 1. Long COVID is many different issues without a common mechanism. 2. Some of these are straightforward and not surprising, eg lung scarring and post-ICU syndrome from severe infection, and would happen in any disease of this severity. Others seem to be more like the poorly-understood postviral syndromes associated with several other diseases. While some symptoms may be psychosomatic, most are probably organic. 3 The three major categories of symptoms are straightforward cardiovascular-pulmonary issues, straightforward smell and taste issues, and more mysterious neurological issues. 4 Although these get better with time in some people, in a significant number (maybe ~50% of people who had them at six weeks) they persist for as long as anyone has been able to measure them (a few months in the case of COVID, a year or two in the case of comparable syndromes). 5. Post-COVID fatigue is particularly concerning. This would be very bad if we analogized it to CFS/ME, and still pretty bad if we analogized it to other known postviral syndromes. There is no proof that this always gets better over the long term, although no study has looked at them for more than a few years. Facing postviral fatigue on this scale is a new problem. 6 . Children probably get Long COVID less than adults, probably at a rate of less than 5% of symptomatic cases. But we don’t know how much less, and we can’t rule out that some children get pretty severe symptoms. 7. Although vaccination decreases the risk of symptomatic COVID, it probably doesn’t decrease the risk of Long COVID per symptomatic COVID case by very much, though it might decrease it by a factor of 2-3. 8. Your chance of really bad debilitating lifelong Long COVID, conditional on getting COVID, is probably somewhere between a few tenths of a percent, and a few percent. Your chance per year of getting it by living a normal lifestyle depends on what you consider a normal lifestyle and on the future course of the pandemic. For me, under reasonable assumptions, it’s probably well below one percent. EDIT: Here are some other people who tried to do this same analysis. I learned about all of these after I wrote the first draft of this, so you can consider the basic thought process here to be independent of them - but I edited some things to account for what I learned from them before writing the final version. AcesoUnderGlass: Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Inline links: a meta-analysis by Poole-Wright et al, scattered reports, this paper, postviral syndrome, Long COVID Is Not Necessarily Your Biggest Problem

Equal Rights Amendment1 mentions across 1 issues

Equal Rights Amendment is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 09, 2021 and March 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "The second contains Lenin, Mussolini, the Equal Rights Amendment". It most often appears alongside anti-colonialists, authoritarianism, Brasilia.

Reference entry: Equal Rights Amendment
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 09, 2021
Last seen: March 09, 2021

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The Consequences Of Radical Reform March 09, 2021

anti-colonialists 1 shared issues
authoritarianism 1 shared issues
Brasilia 1 shared issues
collective farming 1 shared issues
Daron Acemoglu 1 shared issues

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The Consequences Of Radical Reform

March 09, 2021 · Original source

These threads don't cleanly map to the modern left-right political spectrum. The first contains Jane Jacobs and anti-colonialists coexisting uneasily alongside religious fundamentalism and wisdom-of-repugnance-style arguments against homosexuality. The second contains Lenin, Mussolini, the Equal Rights Amendment, and neoliberal reformers. They don't even map cleanly to libertarianism vs. authoritarianism; the first has a libertarian streak, but could presumably justify various monarchies and theocracies; the second has clear authoritarian elements, but would also include extreme libertarians who want to abolish the state and run everything on market principles.

equality1 mentions across 1 issues

equality is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 30, 2024 and July 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "slave morality, with its concern for charity, peace, and equality". It most often appears alongside /r/iamverysmart, 4chan, Achilles.

Reference entry: equality
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 30, 2024
Last seen: July 30, 2024

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Matt Yglesias Considered As The Nietzschean Superman July 30, 2024

iamverysmart 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
Achilles 1 shared issues
Ada Palmer 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues

Source context

Matt Yglesias Considered As The Nietzschean Superman

July 30, 2024 · Original source

But (asks Bentham’s Bulldog) why do we need this guy? Isn’t slave morality, with its concern for charity, peace, and equality - simply correct? Isn’t master morality - with its barbarian warlords bragging about how their golden palaces make them better than peasants - just wrong?

Intellectuals started feting ideas like degrowth. Degrowth says that it’s gross, greedy, and unsustainable to want economic progress. Instead, we should deliberately aim for economic regress, until First World GDPs are closer to those of South America or Africa. Advocates are careful to emphasize that as long as we take common-sense steps (like implementing socialism), this won’t force anyone to starve to death, just get rid of our useless luxuries - and in some sense, wouldn’t that make us better off?3 The promised future utopia was replaced by almost unbroken dystopianism. Global warming will kill us all, or maybe we’ll be stuck in a cyberpunk world of hopeless soul-crushing inequality. Technological advance is interesting only insofar as it brings our cyberpunk hell closer and (unfairly) enriches some billionaires along the way. The only bright spots are occasional acts of voluntary ensmallening - power plants cancelled, products banned, indigenous tribes winning little legal triumphs over modernity. Live-people goals like “build giant skyscrapers!” and “go to the moon!” could have been followed up with even greater live-people goals like “tile the desert with solar plants”, “create genetically-engineered superbabies”, “get one billion Americans”, or “cure all diseases”. Instead, they’ve been replaced by dead-people goals like “don’t damage the traditional character of communities” or “don’t damage the environment”. If you Google “why aren’t there world’s fairs?” you get a link to this podcast, which explains that they had “useless gizmos”, that the towers were “unattractive”, and that it involved “a dismal thread of racism”. Also because “technology won’t save us”. I agree that this doesn’t literally say the words “we hate all life” - you either see it or you don’t. Parts of this vibe shift still confuse me, but the zoomed-out version seems clear enough. The old pro-embiggening world was complicit in moral catastrophes - racism, colonialism, the Holocaust, the destruction of much of the natural world. At some point these atrocities caught up to and outpaced its very real accomplishments, and society stopped being proud of itself and shifted to a harm-reduction approach. Nobody comes out and says outright that harm reduction necessarily has to mean doing as little as possible and trying to make yourself smaller and less impressive and sadder and uglier until you curl up into a tiny point and disappear. But “slave morality” and “master morality” are attractors; if you select too hard for part of one, you end up with the whole package. VI. Andrew Tate I originally wanted to explain to Bentham’s Bulldog why slave morality wasn’t obviously “the good one” and master morality “the bad one”. Lest I come down too hard and get you thinking that master morality is obviously “the good one”, let’s talk about Andrew Tate. In case you’ve been under a rock your whole life, Andrew Tate is a masculinity influencer. He’s a former world champion kickboxer who pivoted to self-help, sold scammy courses on business and relationships, and got rich. Some of his courses apparently recommended beating up women (I’m not sure if this was supposed to help your business or your relationship), and when people confronted him on this, his response was always “I’m strong and successful and own a Bugatti, which makes me better than you, you pathetic weakling failure”. He was credibly accused of rape (by “credibly” I mean that he sent one of the victims a text message saying “I love raping you”) and when people tried to cancel him over this, his response was always “I’m strong and successful and own a Bugatti, which makes me better than you, you pathetic weakling failure.” Finally he was indicted on one billion counts of sexual assault, human trafficking, and being a general scumbag of a human being; he is currently awaiting trial. Tate has, in some sense, many good qualities. He’s strong, athletic, and motivated. He earned tens of millions of dollars through hustle and hard work. He’s charismatic and compelling and, before his arrest, was one of the Internet’s most iconic influencers. I think master morality has to approve of all these things. Still, he’s obviously a jerk. This is exactly the situation that Nietzsche believes slave morality evolved for - letting me feel contempt for someone who’s stronger and richer and more successful than I am - and yup, now that I’m in this situation, I find myself definitely interested in a moral system that lets me do this. The obvious compromise goes something like: We can genuinely appreciate that Andrew Tate has the many good qualities listed above.

Inline links: degrowth, 3, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7Ttz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7589c5dc-2f84-4f82-a6b8-c132ce4a0fc8_697x628.png, this podcast

The value of technological progress, economic prosperity, and cultural sophistication can also be challenged, but can be similarly defended insofar as they improve the lot of the worst-off and improve equality. For example, GDP growth is good since it lifts people out of poverty; new discoveries about the nature of the brain are good since they might one day produce Alzheimers drugs; art is good since it can include underrepresented groups or teach some kind of lesson about social progress.

equity in vaccine distribution1 mentions across 1 issues

equity in vaccine distribution is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 30, 2021 and April 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "trying to prioritize equity in vaccine distribution". It most often appears alongside AI, AI research, Air.

Reference entry: equity in vaccine distribution
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: April 30, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021

AI 1 shared issues
AI research 1 shared issues
Air 1 shared issues
Air 1 shared issues
Alice Waters 1 shared issues

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Inline links: trying to prioritize equity in vaccine distribution, more deaths, including in the historically underprivileged populations you were trying to save

April 30, 2021 · Original source

In Caliban’s War, the second book in The Expanse series, there’s an excellent metaphor for how having more smart people working on problems fails in an atmosphere of increased complexity, offered by fictional future UN government higher-up Chrisjen Avasarala: "You take part of a problem and you put it somewhere, get some people working on it, and then you get another part of the problem and get other people working on that. And pretty soon you have seven, eight, a hundred different little boxes with work going on, and no one talking to anyone because it would break security protocol." Except instead of security protocol, you could substitute any number of Moloch-y reasons, or just regular old-fashioned human tunnel vision. If there’s one thing we can take from the Prophets, it’s their focus on trying to understand complex systems holistically, Chesterton’s Fence style, instead of as piecemeal problem-boxes in a hundred siloed experts’ rooms. Each of today’s systems is more like Chesterton’s Maze of Forking Paths, where pulling out a brick here (say, trying to prioritize equity in vaccine distribution) leads to a catastrophic tunnel collapse there (more deaths, including in the historically underprivileged populations you were trying to save). The Prophets may have a less than stellar track record of questioning new technologies, but I think they’re right that the Wizardly tendency to reduce complexity to a discrete number of problem-boxes can only get us so far – and, as we saw with the myriad of expert box factories talking past each other in the global COVID pandemic response, it can harm as well as help. If we’re always hotfixing as our big picture grows bigger and more complex, we’re also always creating new inadvertent problems with our hotfixes, and are in ever more danger of forgetting about that one critical problem box until it’s too late.

equity swaps1 mentions across 1 issues

equity swaps is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 08, 2023 and January 08, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "equity swaps / total return swaps". It most often appears alongside 2023 Prediction Contest, @dropbella, ACX.

Reference entry: equity swaps
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 08, 2023
Last seen: January 08, 2023

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Open Thread 258 January 08, 2023

2023 Prediction Contest 1 shared issues
@dropbella 1 shared issues
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ACX Survey 1 shared issues
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Open Thread 258

January 08, 2023 · Original source

6: Also, many, many of you commented that Bob and Ramchandra were just “reinventing the wheel” and antistocks were the same as some existing financial product, although none of you could agree on which existing product it was. See the cases for bucket shops, call options, equity swaps / total return swaps, dividend derivatives, and (inevitably) prediction markets. Also, several people chimed in to say they were working on something similar on the blockchain, including Tracer and Synthetix. I hope I don’t need to add the disclaimer that if you invest in a blockchain product based on a Bay Area House Party post, then you will lose all your money faster than anyone has ever lost all of their money before in all of history.

Inline links: bucket shops, call options, equity swaps / total return swaps, dividend derivatives, prediction markets, Tracer, Synthetix

Ergenekon1 mentions across 1 issues

Ergenekon is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 18, 2021 and March 18, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""a spectacular Deep State conspiracy called Ergenekon, a sinister organization plotting against the democratic government of Turkey"". It most often appears alongside Abdullah Gul, Academy Awards, Ak.

Reference entry: Ergenekon
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 18, 2021
Last seen: March 18, 2021

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Book Review: The New Sultan March 18, 2021

Abdullah Gul 1 shared issues
Academy Awards 1 shared issues
Ak 1 shared issues
AKP 1 shared issues
Anatolian 1 shared issues

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Book Review: The New Sultan

March 18, 2021 · Original source

But at this point Erdogan felt like he was living on borrowed time, so he decided to move against the military. He struck an alliance with the Gulenists, who despite being a totally above-board network of friendly people running nice schools happened to have seized all the most important posts in the judiciary. Erdogan got - realistically probably forged - documents proving a spectacular Deep State conspiracy called Ergenekon, a sinister organization plotting against the democratic government of Turkey. Coincidentally, it happened to include all of Erdogan's enemies. The military, the media, the super-rich - Erdogan brought them to court one by one on forged evidence, and the Gulenist-controlled courts played along.

Inline links: Ergenekon

So did, more or less, the populace. Lots of people already suspected Deep State conspiracies. And also, the military had openly threatened to stage a coup, so the idea that many of its leaders were plotting against the Turkish government was not exactly far-fetched. Liberals who supported the rule of law were torn between Erdogan (violating the rule of law by using show trials to arrest his enemies), and the anti-Erdogan forces (probably plotting a coup, suppressing the AKP which had a strong democratic mandate) - and decided to mostly sit this one out. The media objected a bit, but Erdogan "discovered" that some of the journalists who objected were actually members of Ergenekon, and other newspapers supported Erdogan - these later turned out to be entirely owned and run by Gulenists, who sure did get their fingers in a lot of pots for an innocent above-ground network of educational institutions. In just a few years, Erdogan decimated the ranks of the military, the courts, and the media, and replaced their former leaders with a new generation of faithful Turkish patriots - all of whom were coincidentally graduates of the same friendly legitimate school network.

Second, if there was a single moment went things obviously took a turn for the worse in Turkey, it was the Ergenekon trials - Erdogan's attempt to forge evidence of an anti-Turkey conspiracy involving all of his enemies. This makes me a little more concerned about things like QAnon than I had been previously - if Trump had arrested various prominent Democrats for their role in a Deep State pedophile ring, that would be pretty similar to the tactic Erdogan used to seize ultimate power. On the other hand, the thing where Democrats talk about how Trump supporters entering the Capitol was an “attempted coup” and we need lots of “domestic terror laws” and a grand attempt to uncover the complicity of the mainstream Republican establishment and bring them to justice - that also feels a little too Erdoganesqe for comfort. Having ideas about the Deep State and attempted coups floating around, sounding vaguely credible, was a major factor in Erdogan's success. The more skeptical we can be of that sort of thing, the better.

ergodic theory1 mentions across 1 issues

ergodic theory is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 13, 2022 and July 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "fields of mathematics ... ergodic theory". It most often appears alongside 1890s, Alan Turing, Albert Einstein.

Reference entry: ergodic theory
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 13, 2022
Last seen: July 13, 2022

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Book Review: The Man From The Future July 13, 2022

1890s 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
Albert Einstein 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Ananyo Bhattacharya 1 shared issues

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Book Review: The Man From The Future

July 13, 2022 · Original source

John von Neumann invented the digital computer. The fields of game theory and cellular automata. Important pieces of modern economics, set theory, and particle physics. A substantial part of the technology behind the atom and hydrogen bombs. Several whole fields of mathematics I hadn’t previously heard of, like “operator algebras”, “continuous geometry”, and “ergodic theory”.

The Man From The Future, by Ananyo Bhattacharya, touches on all these things. But you don’t read a von Neumann biography to learn more about the invention of ergodic theory. You read it to gawk at an extreme human specimen, maybe the smartest man who ever lived.

Inline links: The Man From The Future

Still, for those of us who never made their high school math tutors cry with joy at ever having met them (another von Neumann story, this one well-attested), the man himself is more of a draw than his ergodic theory. And there’s enough in The Man From The Future - and in some of the few hundred references it cites - to start to get a coherent picture.

Erin Brockovich narrative1 mentions across 1 issues

Erin Brockovich narrative is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 04, 2022 and January 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "The interesting part is that both the Erin Brockovich narrative and the Idiocracy narrative can be summarized as “trust science”". It most often appears alongside AGI, America, Asian Scientist.

Reference entry: Erin Brockovich narrative
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 04, 2022
Last seen: January 04, 2022

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Movie Review: Don't Look Up January 04, 2022

AGI 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Asian Scientist 1 shared issues
Behind the Curve 1 shared issues
CDC 1 shared issues

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Movie Review: Don't Look Up

January 04, 2022 · Original source

...onflicting narratives around science and power, and sit ready to deploy whichever one is more convenient for the situation at hand. The interesting part is that both the Erin Brockovich narrative and the Idiocracy narrative can be summarized as “trust science”. In the Erin Brockovich narrative, Science is the simple truth, the hard physical reality behind the vei...

...nient for the situation at hand. The interesting part is that both the Erin Brockovich narrative and the Idiocracy narrative can be summarized as “trust science”. In the Erin Brockovich narrative, Science is the simple truth, the hard physical reality behind the veil of establishment lies and corporate distortion. If a thousand PhDs say one thing, and a humble gr...

...surprising that people have lots of conflicting narratives around science and power, and sit ready to deploy whichever one is more convenient for the situation at hand. The interesting part is that both the Erin Brockovich narrative and the Idiocracy narrative can be summarized as “trust science”. In the Erin Brockovich narrative, Science is the simple truth, the hard physical reality behind the veil of establishment lies and corporate distortion. If a thousand Ph...

erisology1 mentions across 1 issues

erisology is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 28, 2024 and March 28, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "John Nerst has written about erisology, the study of disagreements". It most often appears alongside ACX comment thread, ACX subreddit, Asia.

Reference entry: erisology
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 28, 2024
Last seen: March 28, 2024

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Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate March 28, 2024

ACX comment thread 1 shared issues
ACX subreddit 1 shared issues
Asia 1 shared issues
Auschwitz 1 shared issues
BANAL-52 1 shared issues

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Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate

March 28, 2024 · Original source

The other part of the argument was that saying “I will debate all comers for an $X bet” is annoying, and we shouldn’t encourage that kind of thing. Certainly this technique has been used by bad actors - for example, the Holocaust denial group Institute For Historical Review offered a $50,000 prize to anyone who could prove the Holocaust happened (it was eventually won by an Auschwitz survivor whose “proof” was that he saw his family led to the gas chambers; IHR failed to accept this; the survivor sued and won). Likewise, anti-vaccine multimillionaire Steve Kirsch has offered to bet $500,000 on the results of a debate about vaccines not working9 (Saar took him up on it and they’re continuing to hammer out the specifics). I assume the concern is that (if the court system hadn’t stepped in), the Institute for Historical Review could have kept denying any evidence they were given, then kept taunting people with “We’ve offered $50,000 for proof that the Holocaust happened, nobody has ever won our money, so the proof must not exist”. Or Kirsch could keep saying “Nobody will bet me $500,000 on vaccines, guess they’re scared and think they don’t have evidence” (when in fact it’s just that most people don’t have the time, courage, and risk tolerance to do this, especially when there’s no guarantee the right person will win the debate). In order to deny these people this weapon (the argument goes) we need to make it common knowledge that this strategy isn’t legitimate. And taking people up on their offer, having a great debate that leaves everybody more enlightened and serves as a model for rational discourse, then having the right side win in the end - seems like the opposite of delegitimizing this strategy. I guess I classify this with all the other examples in Less Utilitarian Than Thou. Cool Machiavellian plot you have there, but maybe the fact that you’re losing 16%-66% should make you question whether you’re really as smart as you think you are, and whether your plan to suppress all discussion for the greater good is really the mastermind-level strategy you hoped it would be. It’s good to assert the true fact that these kinds of challenges are often dumb/rigged/useless, and that “nobody has yet responded to my challenge” isn’t a valid argument that someone’s necessarily right. But I stop short of trying to set some kind of social norm that nobody may respond to anyone else’s challenges, even if they think that person is being honest and has organized the challenge well (as Saar was and did). That almost seems like itself legitimizing the whole thing, in the sense of accepting that if someone loses a challenge then it means something important. I would rather place the illegitimacy where it belongs (a challenge really doesn’t prove anything, separate from the arguments made in it) and let people do what they want. I want to see more debates like this. I learned more watching the 15 hours of Rootclaim debate than I think I would have researching on my own for 15 hours. But a lot of things had to come together to make this work. Most of all, this debate worked out because the judges were two very smart scientists with relevant expertise. To get such good judges, lots of things had to fall into place. First, the debate itself had to be expensive enough that neither side begrudged paying the extra $5,000 per judge to hire the best people. And second, the debate had to be about a topic where lots of intelligent people haven’t yet made up their minds. If the debate was about flat earth, I would despair of finding good judges. Either the judges would already be convinced the Earth was round (which the flat Earth side would understandably refuse to accept). Or they would be 50-50, which would mean they were extremely weird people whose reasoning couldn’t be trusted. Flat Earth is an extreme example, but even a debate about COVID vaccines would be pushing it here. (since writing this, I learned Peter had made this same argument and analogy in a blog post on Kirsch; sorry for the unintentional plagiarism) I think I would genuinely update on the conclusion of any other Rootclaim debate with the same caliber of participants as this one, but not necessarily on whatever Steve Kirsch or the Institute of Historical Review comes up with, nor the next person to hit on the strategy of “I’ll pay you $100,000 if you prove me wrong!”10 The Aftermath: Conclusion This was one of my favorite topics to write about this year, for a few reasons. First, on the object level, I learned a lot about the origins of COVID, which is a great story. I feel like I know much more now about this disease that came out of nowhere and ruined all of our lives for a few years. It’s a weird rabbit hole, which I’m not yet entirely out of. I have a weird urge to visit Wuhan as a tourist, see the Wuhan Institute of Virology, stroll through the Huanan Central Seafood Market (unfortunately closed), maybe eat a raccoon-dog. Second, some of the lessons of this debate are actionable. I’ve written before about how we should learn the lessons of lab leak even if it turns out to be false this time; that hasn’t changed. But this was a good reminder to also learn the lessons of zoonosis, for the same reason. We need more attention on closing wet markets and tracking weird Chinese wildlife. The DEFUSE proposal wanted to immunize bats - is this still a worthwhile idea? The virologists got a bad rap for wanting to gain-of-function exactly the pathogen that caused the century’s worst pandemic, but in a way that speaks well of them - they clearly knew what to be worried about. Has anyone mumbled an apology and asked them if they have any other useful predictions? Third, John Nerst has written about erisology, the study of disagreements. This was surely one of history’s greatest erisological studies. Two very smart people spent fifteen hours hashing out every argument and counterargument in good faith, then quantified all of their beliefs in a way that lets us figure out exactly where they differed and by how much. This isn’t entirely a victory - as a newly minted member of team zoonosis, I still can’t trace exactly why Saar is so sure I’m wrong. But if the COVID origin story fascinates me as this peek deep into a pestiferous underworld of sinister laboratories and reeking wet markets, something about this debate felt like analogous peek into the creepy subconscious swamps where disagreements begin. Fourth, for the first time it made me see the coronavirus as one of God’s biggest and funniest jokes. Think about it. Either a zoonotic virus crossed over to humans fifteen miles from the biggest coronavirus laboratory in the Eastern Hemisphere. Or a lab leak virus first rose to public attention right near a raccoon-dog stall in a wet market. Either way is one of the century’s biggest coincidences, designed by some cosmic joker who wanted to keep the debate acrimonious for years to come. But fifth, if the coronavirus’ story is a comedy, all of this - Rootclaim, the debate, the $100K - is a tragedy. Saar got $100 million, decided to devote a big part of his life to improving human reasoning, and came up with a really elegant system. He was so confident in his system, and in the power of open discussion, that he risked his money and reputation on an accept-all-comers debate offer . Then some rando who nobody had ever heard of accepted the challenge, turned out to be some kind of weird debate savant, and won, turning what should have been Rootclaim’s moment of triumph into a bitter defeat. Totally new kind of human suffering, worthy of Shakespeare. I look forward to the movie, especially seeing who plays the dashing young blogger who helped the participants meet. Other Resources Daniel Filan’s running Twitter commentary of the debate

Inline links: 9, Less Utilitarian Than Thou, in a blog post on Kirsch, 10, erisology, Daniel Filan’s running Twitter commentary of the debate

Ern Malley hoax1 mentions across 1 issues

Ern Malley hoax is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 05, 2024 and December 05, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Consider eg the Ern Malley hoax". It most often appears alongside @dieworkwear, AI Art Turing Test, Bauhaus.

Reference entry: Ern Malley hoax
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 05, 2024
Last seen: December 05, 2024

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Friendly And Hostile Analogies For Taste December 05, 2024

@dieworkwear 1 shared issues
AI Art Turing Test 1 shared issues
Bauhaus 1 shared issues
Beaux-Arts 1 shared issues
From Bauhaus To Our House 1 shared issues

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Friendly And Hostile Analogies For Taste

December 05, 2024 · Original source

The few scientific experiments we have - hoaxes, blind tests, etc - are not very kind to taste as a concept. Consider eg the Ern Malley hoax, my article about wine appreciation, and the AI Art Turing Test.

Inline links: the Ern Malley hoax, wine appreciation, AI Art Turing Test

ernies1 mentions across 1 issues

ernies is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 19, 2025 and September 19, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "royalty-generating transclusions became 'ernies'". It most often appears alongside 1987, 1988, Adleman.

Reference entry: ernies
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 19, 2025
Last seen: September 19, 2025

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https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

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Your Review: Project Xanadu - The Internet That Might Have Been September 19, 2025

1987 1 shared issues
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Adleman 1 shared issues
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Andy van Dam 1 shared issues

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Your Review: Project Xanadu - The Internet That Might Have Been

September 19, 2025 · Original source

Eric Hill, a 15-year-old hacker and indicted felon, who “had been dismissed by the judge with admiration.” In Swarthmore, Nelson hoped his decades-old dream of Xanadu would finally materialize. 5. Developing Xanadu Ted Nelson had built Project Xanadu into, for lack of better terminology, a cult.8 He writes: We all were deeply concerned about the Bad Guys, who we saw as a combination of IBM and the government. (The others were all Libertarians, I still called myself a Cynical Socialist.) The Bad Guys would spy on people, withhold and block information, and give us inferior hypertext. We had to Do It Right, to help prevent this. This meant using the standard business defenses—especially non-disclosure agreements (I made all of them sign) and secret proprietary algorithms. The Xanadians had a messiah—Ted Nelson—a gospel—Computer Lib—a persecution complex, a fearful dystopia—“inferior hypertext”—a hopeful utopia—Xanadu—and utter secrecy. Just six dudes in a rented house near Philly, building the internet, hiding from the Feds, signing NDAs, and saving the world. Nelson spent a summer explaining the project to his team in its entirety. By the end, Gregory, Miller, and Greene were the only ones left. They told Nelson, “We’ll do it,” and moved to another suburb, where they finally began to work on an implementation of Xanadu. The three quickly figured out a new system that would allow users to reference and link to specific parts of a file—they called these links tumblers, and made them work with transfinite numbers. Suddenly, transclusions were really possible. But after only a few early successes, the team’s progress stalled completely. Greene and Miller were young and left for jobs elsewhere, and so Gregory was left working on Xanadu alone. Nelson, meanwhile, ran a magazine called Creative Computing for a while, then tried again to build his JOT word processor—this time for the Apple II—then spent a year in San Antonio pitching a watered-down version of Xanadu (rebranded as “Vortext”) to a tech company called Datapoint. Datapoint wasn’t buying, but kept Nelson on in some sort of fake, primitive email job anyway. Gregory kept working on Xanadu in Philadelphia, slowly running out of money. Ted Nelson held an “Ecstasy party” in San Antonio: “A number of us floated down the river on inner tubes. It was quite lovely.” In 1987, like he did every year, Roger Gregory went to The Hackers Conference in Saratoga to show off the latest unimpressive version of Xanadu. There, he met a man named John Walker—founder of the wildly successful Autodesk—and pitched the project to him. Incredibly, Walker was interested, and after tense negotiations with Nelson, agreed to fund Xanadu in earnest. Beginning in 1988, Autodesk poured millions of dollars into the project, and a programming team led by Gregory finally started to make real progress. Walker said of Xanadu: “In 1980, it was the shared goal of a small group of brilliant technologists. By 1989, it will be a product. And by 1995, it will begin to change the world.” Sweeping rhetoric—clear deadlines. The team came nowhere close to meeting them. Infighting broke out between two factions—while Gregory simply wanted to patch together his old C code, insisting his product “was within six months of shipping,” the whiz-kid Mark Miller came back from his new job at Xerox PARC, alongside a half-dozen of his closest friends, and insisted on a perfectionistic rewrite in a more flexible language, Smalltalk. The PARC faction began to drive Gregory up the wall. According to Nelson, it got to the point that he “was throwing things and acting crazy.” So Nelson called John Walker, the two “summoned Roger to meet [them] at John’s house at Muir Beach, and Walker told Roger he was no longer in charge.” Miller took over and began the rewrite in Smalltalk. Walker’s deadline came and went, and the team delivered nothing. Xanadu’s offices descended into chaos—Miller anointed two PARC programmers to be “co-architects,” and the three of them increasingly left the rest of the team out of the loop. For four years, Miller dawdled about, adding features, giving them clever names (files were “berts,” after Bertrand Russell, and so, for symmetry’s sake, royalty-generating transclusions became “ernies”), and never building them.9 Meanwhile, Ted Nelson was living on a houseboat, attending sex retreats and Keristan orgies, and giving talks in Singapore. He recorded a new soundtrack for his student film, the one from 1959. In 1992, Autodesk’s stock cratered, and they divested entirely from Xanadu. Miller lamented that his program was just six months from completion. Ted Nelson started a film studio to make a movie with Doug Engelbart, then left for Japan to get a PhD. Xanadu’s code was open-sourced in the late 90s. 6. The World Wide Web In March 1989, a British computer scientist named Tim Berners-Lee, working at CERN, wrote a proposal for a system unifying hypertext and the internet. It was ignored. In 1990, Berners-Lee resubmitted his proposal, it was accepted, and he began to work on the World Wide Web. The WWW had a number of advantages over Xanadu: It was much simpler—Ted Nelson wrote of it disparagingly: “Where were annotation and marginal notes? Where was version management? Where was rights management? Where were multi-ended links? Where were third-party links? Where were transclusions? This ‘World Wide Web’ was just a lame text format and a lot of connected directories.” As it turns out, it’s much easier to build a lame text format and a lot of connected directories!

Inline links: 8, 9, Keristan

Error Argument1 mentions across 1 issues

Error Argument is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2025 and September 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "The first is that the immune system does not exhibit the errors exemplified in human memory, which I call the Error Argument". It most often appears alongside A Change of Heart, Abraham, Adams.

Reference entry: Error Argument
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 12, 2025
Last seen: September 12, 2025

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Your Review: The Synaptic Plasticity and Memory Hypothesis September 12, 2025

A Change of Heart 1 shared issues
Abraham 1 shared issues
Adams 1 shared issues
Adams and Garrison 1 shared issues
Alexander Forbes 1 shared issues

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Your Review: The Synaptic Plasticity and Memory Hypothesis

September 12, 2025 · Original source

The first is that the immune system does not exhibit the errors exemplified in human memory, which I call the Error Argument. The second is that the immune system can be described and explained in causal terms alone, which I call the Mere Causal Argument.

The “Error Argument” is about the fact that there are characteristic ways humans misremember things, or can be manipulated to misremember things, for example by prompting. (If you’ve taken an intro psychology course, maybe you’ve heard of the car crash Loftus and Palmer stuff.) The “Mere Causal Argument” is apparently about the requirement that memory, like other cognitive things, ought to involve some latent variables, and not be totally input-dependent. Colaço elaborates:

Inline links: car crash Loftus and Palmer stuff

eruv1 mentions across 1 issues

eruv is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 12, 2024 and November 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "If you want to keep the Sabbath, it helps to have an eruv and a synagogue within walking distance". It most often appears alongside 1 Peter 3, 165 AD, 1990s.

Reference entry: eruv
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 12, 2024
Last seen: November 12, 2024

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Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024

1 Peter 3 1 shared issues
165 AD 1 shared issues
1990s 1 shared issues
Adolf von Harnack 1 shared issues
Alexandria 1 shared issues

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Against The Generalized Anti-Caution Argument

November 12, 2024 · Original source

Instead of being forced to attribute the Christians’ growth to miracles, we can pin down a specific growth rate and find that it falls within the range of the most successful modern cults. Indeed, if we think of this as each existing Christian having to convert 0.4 new people, on average, per decade, it starts to sound downright do-able. Still, how did the early Christians maintain this conversion rate over so many generations? Through The Social Graph This is another of Stark’s findings from his work with the Moonies. The first Moonie in America was a Korean missionary named Young Oon Kim, who arrived in 1959. Her first convert was her landlady. The next two were the landlady’s friends. Then came the landlady’s friends’ husbands and the landlady’s friends’ husbands’ co-workers. That was when Stark showed up. “At the time . . . I arrived to study them, the group had never succeeded in attracting a stranger.” Stark theorized that “the only [people] who joined were those whose interpersonal attachments to members overbalanced their attachments to nonmembers.” I don’t think this can be literally correct - taken seriously, it implies that the second convert could have no other friends except the first, which would prevent her from spreading the religion further. But something like “your odds of converting are your number of Moonie friends, divided by your number of non-Moonie friends” seems to fit his evidence. History confirms this story. Mohammed’s first convert was his wife, followed by his cousin, servant, and friend. Joseph Smith’s first converts were his brothers, friends, and lodgers. Indeed, in spite of the Mormons’ celebrated door-knocking campaign, their internal data shows that only one in a thousand door-knocks results in a conversion, but “when missionaries make their first contact with a person in the home of a Mormon friend or relative of that person, this results in conversion 50% of the time”. 1 This theory of social-graph-based-conversation was controversial when Stark proposed it, because if you ask cultists retrospectively, they’ll usually say they were awed by the beauty of the sacred teachings. But Stark says: I knew better, because we had met them well before they had learned to appreciate the doctrines, before they had learned how to testify to their faith, back when they were not seeking faith at all. Indeed, we could remember when most of them regarded the religious beliefs of their new set of friends as quite odd. I recall one who told me that he was puzzled that such nice people could get so worked up about “some guy in Korea” . . . Then, one day, he got worked up about this guy too. Through Jews And Weajoos Jews were scattered across the Mediterranean even before the fall of the Temple. I don’t know why. We Jews tell ourselves that we left Israel only after the Romans kicked us out. But Stark cites plenty of historians who argue that no, it was well before that. Around the time of Christ, there were a million Jews in Israel and five million in the Diaspora, especially Alexandria, Antioch, Anatolia, and Rome. What were these Jews’ spiritual lives like? Without hard evidence, Stark supposes they were marginal. Throughout history, Jews have succeeded at keeping the Law only within tight-knit communities. If you want to keep kosher, it helps to have everyone around you keeping kosher and a local kosher butcher. If you want to keep the Sabbath, it helps to have an eruv and a synagogue within walking distance. But even more than that, the Law is strange and complicated, and unless everyone around you follows it too, you are likely to slip. Thus, when Jews were first emancipated and allowed to live among Gentiles in the 18th-19th centuries, a split emerged in the Jewish community. Those Jews who stayed in the ghettos and shtetls - or who founded new self-imposed-quasi-ghettos like Crown Heights - remained Orthodox. Those Jews who mingled with the Gentiles cast off the more difficult rules and became Reform. Only a sliver of Modern Orthodox remained in the middle, often with abysmal attrition rates. Stark asks whether the first great intermingling of Jews and Gentiles had the same effect. While the Jews in Palestine stayed religious and laid the foundations for the Rabbinic Judaism of future centuries, the Jews in the Diaspora - did what? Presumably Hellenized into some sort of semi-assimilated proto-Reform movement. Although we have limited historical evidence about these Jews’ religious behavior, we know they spoke Greek and not Hebrew (otherwise why would they need the Septuagint?) and that many of them took Greek names. Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic. Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. 33% of American Buddhists come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point! (they’re now down to 6%) As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion. The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts. Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage. Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say. By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one. In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus2 proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.” The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children. Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition. Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common: Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.” Christians followed the opposite of all these practices. They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly unprecedented, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband. The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots). Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote: We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder. The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things. This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later. But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes! I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers. Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth? A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”! Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow One thing Stark did not mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well. Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says: [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men. Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions: By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America. But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical: The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”. Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity. Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference. The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good. Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3: Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith. But Ruxandro Teslo has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is. Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46? Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons. I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof. Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity. The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

Escalatory-Putin1 mentions across 1 issues

Escalatory-Putin is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 22, 2024 and November 22, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Suppose we have two theories, Escalatory-Putin and Non-Escalatory-Putin". It most often appears alongside AI, ATACMS, Biden.

Reference entry: Escalatory-Putin
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 22, 2024
Last seen: November 22, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Against The Generalized Anti-Caution Argument November 22, 2024

AI 1 shared issues
ATACMS 1 shared issues
Biden 1 shared issues
Castro 1 shared issues
F-16s 1 shared issues

Source context

November 22, 2024 · Original source

Suppose something important will happen at a certain unknown point. As someone approaches that point, you might be tempted to warn that the thing will happen. If you’re being appropriately cautious, you’ll warn about it before it happens. Then your warning will be wrong. As things continue to progress, you may continue your warnings, and you’ll be wrong each time. Then people will laugh at you and dismiss your predictions, since you were always wrong before. Then the thing will happen and they’ll be unprepared. Toy example: suppose you’re a doctor. Your patient wants to try a new experimental drug, 100 mg. You say “Don’t do it, we don’t know if it’s safe”. They do it anyway and it’s fine. You say “I guess 100 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.” They try 250 mg and it’s fine. You say “I guess 250 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.” They try 500 mg and it’s fine. You say “I guess 500 mg was safe, but don’t go above that.” They say “Haha, as if I would listen to you! First you said it might not be safe at all, but you were wrong. Then you said it might not be safe at 250 mg, but you were wrong. Then you said it might not be safe at 500 mg, but you were wrong. At this point I know you’re a fraud! Stop lecturing me!” Then they try 1000 mg and they die. The lesson is: “maybe this thing that will happen eventually will happen now” doesn’t count as a failed prediction. I’ve noticed this in a few places recently. First, in discussion of the Ukraine War, some people have worried that Putin will escalate (to tactical nukes? to WWIII?) if the US gives Ukraine too many new weapons. Lately there’s a genre of commentary (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) that says “Well, Putin didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine HIMARS. They didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine ATACMS. He didn’t start WWIII when we gave Ukraine F-16s. So the people who believe Putin might start WWIII have been proven wrong, and we should escalate as much as possible.” There’s obviously some level of escalation that would start WWIII (example: nuking Moscow). So we’re just debating where the line is. Since nobody (except Putin?) knows where the line is, it’s always reasonable to be cautious. I don’t actually know anything about Ukraine, but a warning about HIMARS causing WWIII seems less like “this will definitely be what does it” and more like “there’s a 2% chance this is the straw that breaks the camel’s back”. Suppose we have two theories, Escalatory-Putin and Non-Escalatory-Putin. EP says that for each new weapon we give, there’s a 2% chance Putin launches a tactical nuke. NEP says there’s a 0% chance. If we start out with even odds on both theories, after three new weapons with no nukes, our odds should only go down to 48.5% - 51.5%. (yes, this is another version of the generalized argument against updating on dramatic events) Second, I talked before about getting Biden’s dementia wrong. My internal argument against him being demented was something like “They said he was demented in 2020, but he had a good debate and proved them wrong. They said he was demented in 2022, but he gave a good State Of The Union and proved them wrong. Now they’re saying he’s demented in 2024, but they’ve already discredited themselves, so who cares?” I think this was broadly right about the Republican political machine, who was just throwing the same allegation out every election and seeing if it would stick. But regardless of the Republicans’ personal virtue, the odds of an old guy becoming newly demented each year is about 4% per year. If it had been two years since I last paid attention to this question, there was an 8% chance it had happened while I wasn’t looking. Like the other examples, dementia is something that happens eventually (this isn’t strictly true - some people reach their 100s without dementia - but I think it’s a fair idealized assumption that if someone survives long enough, then eventually their risk of cognitive decline becomes very high). It is reasonable to be worried about the President of the United States being demented - so reasonable that people will start raising the alarm about it being a possibility long before it happens. Even if some Republicans had ulterior motives for harping on it, plenty of smart, well-meaning people were also raising the alarm. Here I failed by letting the multiple false alarms lull me into a false sense of security, where I figured the non-demented side had “won” the “argument”, rather than it being a constant problem we needed to stay vigilant for. Third, this is obviously what’s going on with AI right now. The SB1047 AI safety bill tried to monitor that any AI bigger than 10^25 FLOPs (ie a little bigger than the biggest existing AIs) had to be exhaustively tested for safety. Some people argued - the AI safety folks freaked out about how AIs of 10^23 FLOPs might be unsafe, but they turned out to be safe. Then they freaked out about how AIs of 10^24 FLOPs might be unsafe, but they turned out to be safe. Now they’re freaking out about AIs of 10^25 FLOPs! Haven’t we already figured out that they’re dumb and oversensitive? No. I think of this as equivalent to the doctor who says “We haven’t confirmed that 100 mg of the experimental drug is safe”, then “I guess your foolhardy decision to ingest it anyway confirms 100 mg is safe, but we haven’t confirmed that 250 mg is safe, so don’t take that dose,” and so on up to the dose that kills the patient. It would be surprising if AI never became dangerous - if, in 2500 AD, AI still can’t hack important systems, or help terrorists commit attacks or anything like that. So we’re arguing about when we reach that threshold. It’s true and important to say “well, we don’t know, so it might be worth checking whether the answer is right now.” It probably won’t be right now the first few times we check! But that doesn’t make caution retroactively stupid and unjustified, or mean it’s not worth checking the tenth time. Can we take this insight too far? Suppose Penny Panic says “If you elect the Republicans, they’ll cancel elections and rule as dictators!” Then they elect Republicans and it doesn’t happen. The next election cycle: “If you elect the Republicans, they’ll cancel elections and rule as dictators!” Then they elect Republicans again and it still doesn’t happen. After her saying this every election cycle, and being wrong every election cycle, shouldn’t we stop treating her words as meaningful? I think we have to be careful to distinguish this from the useful cases above. It’s not true that, each election, the chance of Republicans becoming dictators increases, until eventually it’s certain. This is different from our examples above: Eventually at some age, Castro has to die, and the chance gets higher the older he gets.

Inline links: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, generalized argument against updating on dramatic events, I talked before about getting Biden’s dementia wrong, about 4% per year

escitalopram1 mentions across 1 issues

escitalopram is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 25, 2021 and May 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Consider taking antidepressants like escitalopram". It most often appears alongside 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, 5-HTP, 5-HTP.

Reference entry: escitalopram
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 25, 2021
Last seen: May 25, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Peer Review Request: Depression May 25, 2021

2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
5-HTP 1 shared issues
amitriptyline 1 shared issues
Andrea Cipriani 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: The Arctic Hysterias

May 25, 2021 · Original source

The short version: Depression has a combination of biological, psychological, and social causes. You can address the social causes by changing your life circumstances (and research suggests people underestimate the potential benefits of making major life changes). You can address the psychological causes with therapy; possible therapies are diverse and complicated but I especially recommend “behavioral activation” therapy (where you try to keep a schedule and also do new, interesting things) and David Burns’ book Feeling Good. You can address the biological causes with a combination of lifestyle changes, medications, and supplements. Consider exercising more and adapting a modified Mediterranean diet. Consider taking antidepressants like escitalopram and bupropion, and supplements like l-methylfolate. Other non-chemical biological options include light therapy (safe and easy), transcranial magnetic stimulation (more complicated), and electroconvulsive therapy (difficult but extremely effective last-ditch solution). If something treats your depression, continue it for some length of time depending on the type of intervention, then consider withdrawing it to see if you can maintain your mood without it.

Most patients will want either escitalopram or bupropion as first-line treatment. These medications are easy to use and have fewer side effects than most others.

Advantages of escitalopram: it’s slightly better at dealing with anxiety, rumination, and obsessive thoughts, although some studies have challenged this. Disadvantages of escitalopram: it frequently decreases sex drive/ability/performance, and occasionally causes tiredness, weight gain, or emotional flatness. Read more at my page on SSRIs.

Inline links: SSRIs

Eskimo1 mentions across 1 issues

Eskimo is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 06, 2023 and April 06, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Overt aggression was not customarily expressed by the Eskimo"; "The Eskimo diet was calcium-poor"; "Eskimo society is worse than mine". It most often appears alongside Alaska, Alaskan government, Andamanese.

Reference entry: Eskimo
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 06, 2023
Last seen: April 06, 2023

Outbound links

https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

Issue trail

Book Review: The Arctic Hysterias April 06, 2023

Alaska 1 shared issues
Alaskan government 1 shared issues
Andamanese 1 shared issues
Arctic hysteria 1 shared issues
Bureau of Indian Affairs 1 shared issues

Source context

April 06, 2023 · Original source

Strange things are done in the midnight sun, say the poets who wrote of old. The Arctic trails have their secret tales that would make your blood run cold. The Northern Lights have seen queer sights, but the queerest they ever did see are chronicled in The Arctic Hysterias, psychiatrist Edward Foulks’ description of the culture-bound disorders of the Eskimos1.

Inline links: The Arctic Hysterias, 1

This experience has occurred rather commonly to Greenland Eskimos and is called Kayak-Angst, Kayak-Dread, or kayak phobia. As many as ten to fifteen percent of all hunters in Greenland at the turn of the century suffered this malady . . . The condition has been compared to “break-off” which occurs in jet pilots who lose perception of reference points while flying at high altitude […]

The fear of death by drowning is of constant concern to the Eskimo, and with good reason. Between 1901 and 1930 there were 1023 deaths by accident in Greenland; eight percent were due to drowning and ninety-four percent of these were kayak accidents.

Eskimos1 mentions across 1 issues

Eskimos is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 06, 2023 and April 06, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "chronicled in The Arctic Hysterias, psychiatrist Edward Foulks’ description of the culture-bound disorders of the Eskimos"; "Perhaps all Eskimos have otitis media - they’re huddled together in very dry, cold air". It most often appears alongside Alaska, Alaskan government, Andamanese.

Reference entry: Eskimos
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 06, 2023
Last seen: April 06, 2023

Outbound links

https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

Issue trail

Book Review: The Arctic Hysterias April 06, 2023

Alaska 1 shared issues
Alaskan government 1 shared issues
Andamanese 1 shared issues
Arctic hysteria 1 shared issues
Bureau of Indian Affairs 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: The Arctic Hysterias

April 06, 2023 · Original source

Strange things are done in the midnight sun, say the poets who wrote of old. The Arctic trails have their secret tales that would make your blood run cold. The Northern Lights have seen queer sights, but the queerest they ever did see are chronicled in The Arctic Hysterias, psychiatrist Edward Foulks’ description of the culture-bound disorders of the Eskimos1.

Inline links: The Arctic Hysterias, 1

This experience has occurred rather commonly to Greenland Eskimos and is called Kayak-Angst, Kayak-Dread, or kayak phobia. As many as ten to fifteen percent of all hunters in Greenland at the turn of the century suffered this malady . . . The condition has been compared to “break-off” which occurs in jet pilots who lose perception of reference points while flying at high altitude […]

Freuchen mentioned a young man who expressed his loneliness for his wife to other men while hunting. He was accordingly ridiculed and told “to stay at home and sew and care for the lamps, or employ your mouth for the talk of men.” One man in the group decided to emphasize the predicament of the lamenter by taking his wife away from him. He was told that if he were lonely enough to want her back, he should figure out how to retrieve her. Overt aggression was not customarily expressed by the Eskimo. In past years, an angry man was considered a mad man, and among the Polar Eskimos such a person might be killed (Shackleton 1939:136). Thus, the young man withdrew and cried for three days. His own abducted wife laughed at him and chided him for his weakness. He then decided that he could no longer live with his people and went to live alone inland as a hermit. He became a qivitoq - a ghost who may never return home.

Esperanto1 mentions across 1 issues

Esperanto is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 28, 2022 and December 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "the creator of Esperanto". It most often appears alongside 2C-B, 48: Bean, @AliceFromQueens.

Reference entry: Esperanto
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 28, 2022
Last seen: December 28, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For December 2022 December 28, 2022

2C-B 1 shared issues
48: Bean 1 shared issues
@AliceFromQueens 1 shared issues
@Cryptovexillologist 1 shared issues
@cube_flipper 1 shared issues

Source context

Links For December 2022

December 28, 2022 · Original source

46: Did you know: in the Japanese cult new religious movement Oomoto, “the creator of Esperanto, L. L. Zamenhof, is revered as a god”.

Inline links: Oomoto

Estado Novo1 mentions across 1 issues

Estado Novo is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 26, 2023 and May 26, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The army staged a coup, and brought in the ‘Estado Novo’ dictatorship which ruled Portugal until 1974". It most often appears alongside /r/wallstreetbets, 2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 80,000 Hours.

Reference entry: Estado Novo
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 26, 2023
Last seen: May 26, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Lying for Money May 26, 2023

wallstreetbets 1 shared issues
2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours podcast 1 shared issues
@eigenrobot 1 shared issues

Source context

Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints?

May 26, 2023 · Original source

Inflation took off as confidence in the currency slumped. The Bank of Portugal ended up having to recall all 500-escudo notes and swap them for 1,000-escudo notes. The army staged a coup, and brought in the ‘Estado Novo’ dictatorship which ruled Portugal until 1974. For most of this time, the country was ruled by an economics professor, Antonio Salazar, who must have occasionally pondered the series of events that brought him to power.

Estrogen1 mentions across 1 issues

Estrogen is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 16, 2023 and March 16, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Estrogen makes joints more mobile". It most often appears alongside ACX survey, ACX Survey, ACX Survey Results.

Reference entry: Estrogen
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 16, 2023
Last seen: March 16, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Why Do Transgender People Report Hypermobile Joints? March 16, 2023

ACX survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey 1 shared issues
ACX Survey Results 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
autism 1 shared issues

Source context

March 16, 2023 · Original source

2 ) Estrogen: Women have more EDS (and other joint disorders) than men. They also have looser joints in general. This is mostly because estrogen makes joints more mobile. Maybe there’s something about trans women suddenly taking estrogen after a lifetime of not having estrogen which causes joint problems (or just makes them notice the kinds of minor issues cis women deal with their whole lives).

In contrast to this theory, trans women say they had them even before starting estrogen, and these conditions also seem elevated in trans men.

I have taken estrogen for twelve months, [but] all the properties of my joints I listed have existed for much longer than I've taken estrogen. I was aware of [being double-jointed] at age five, probably earlier. [I didn't] notice any change in joint hypermobility before vs. after the estrogen.

eternal recurrence1 mentions across 1 issues

eternal recurrence is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2024 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "That’s what it means to embrace the eternal recurrence". It most often appears alongside 10240, 4chan, @slatestarcodex.

Reference entry: eternal recurrence
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 08, 2024
Last seen: August 08, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Nietzsche August 08, 2024

10240 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
@slatestarcodex 1 shared issues
Acemoglu & Robinson 1 shared issues
Achillead 1 shared issues

Source context

The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash

August 08, 2024 · Original source

Nietzsche calls for a new kind of morality. He wants us to try different perspectives on living, to forge our own categorical imperative, to develop our own virtues. I should add that the idea of the übermensch is a weird one for Nietzsche: it is of utmost importance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but barely mentioned elsewhere. But the idea is of a world-affirming individual who has completely overcome the sickness of Christianity and can live in such a way that at the end of their lives they shout da capo! Do it all over again, without change or alteration. That’s what it means to embrace the eternal recurrence.

…really? The military-industrial complex? Are Matt’s subscribers really able to will the eternal recurrence of that decision? Pathetic.

ETH1 mentions across 1 issues

ETH is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 16, 2022 and November 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Maybe ETH. Hedge your bets there"; "Buy BTC and ETH, hold it in your cold storage wallets". It most often appears alongside @AutismCapital, Adderall, ADHD.

Reference entry: ETH
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 16, 2022
Last seen: November 16, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash November 16, 2022

@AutismCapital 1 shared issues
Adderall 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues
adrafinil 1 shared issues
Alameda 1 shared issues

Source context

November 16, 2022 · Original source

LET ME REPEAT THIS FOR EVERYONE AGAIN: Shitcoins are bad, and you should feel bad if you trade them. Get the fuck out of the shitcoin casino you dumb ass gamblers! Solana is garbage. TRON is garbage. Exchanged-based coins like FTT are garbage. Coins with fucking dogs faces are garbage. Bitcoin is the only cryptocurrency you should hold. Maybe ETH. Hedge your bets there. You need to CONTROL YOUR OWN KEYS. Don't lend your coins out to charlatans promising you 5%, 8%, 15%, or 20% "risk free" returns. They are all scam Ponzis. There is no such thing as risk free 20% returns. It doesn't exist. Stop chasing it. If you don't control your private keys, it's not your crypto. If you trust an exchange based in the Bahamas ran by a jabroni who thinks he needs SIX MONITORS, you are in for a bad time. I've been in cryptocurrency since 2010 when BTC was 81 cents. I lived through the MT GOX implosion. I have had more crypto stolen from me in hacks and exit scams than you probably have ever even seen. Learn from my experience. Listen to what I am saying. TWELVE YEARS now I have been in crypto. This too shall pass. Fuck all these frauds stealing everyone's shit. We will all be better off with them out of the industry. However, you all have to learn from this shit. CONTROL YOUR OWN KEYS! Stop gambling on shitcoins. You are being used as exit liquidity for idiots.

The reason cryptocurrency has changed the world, and will continue changing the world, is not because a fucking Shiba inu coin went 10,000%X because a narcissistic man-baby tweeted about it. It's because decentralized sound money has value. I've seen crypto build up from literally nothing. Even buying bitcoin was next to impossible back then. I mined BTC with my laptop at first. I stopped because I "only" mined 5 BTC per night, and it was using too much power. My first BTC I ever bought was when I met a fat dude wearing a Super Mario Brothers T-shirt at Home Depot. We met in the garden section and sat on a bench to talk about how bitcoin worked, how it was going to change the world, and how to transfer between wallets. I still have the wallet I setup and used to buy that BTC from him. Through all the craziness that has happened in the crypto space over the past 12 years, I have always been able to access my private wallets. Store your crypto in your own cold storage wallet unless you are actively trading. The moment you "lend" your coins out to someone for yields, it's already as good as gone. You've missed the entire point that Satoshi tried to get across so many years ago. Not your keys, not your coins. If you lost money in this shitshow, don't worry. This will all pass, and we will all be stronger for it. Just learn from it all and move on. Buy BTC and ETH, hold it in your cold storage wallets, and wait for the next bull cycle. Watch out for thieves and frauds trying to convince you into "the next big coin." They are all liars and thieves. Real cryptocurrency will endure. For it to really flourish, the shitcoin casinos must die. If you buy some new fucking Frodo Baggins faced shitcoin in the future and lose it all, you only have yourself to blame.

ether1 mentions across 1 issues

ether is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 28, 2022 and July 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Michelson-Morley experiment was supposed how fast the Earth was moving relative to the ether". It most often appears alongside 1970s World Bank initiatives in Lesotho, Alex, archpawn.

Reference entry: ether
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 28, 2022
Last seen: July 28, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism July 28, 2022

1970s World Bank initiatives in Lesotho 1 shared issues
Alex 1 shared issues
archpawn 1 shared issues
Ba'hai 1 shared issues
Ba'hai faith 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism

July 28, 2022 · Original source

There were other experimental problems too. The Michelson-Morley experiment was supposed how fast the Earth was moving relative to the ether. It measured that the Earth was not moving relative to the ether at all. At the very least, the experiment should have been able to see Earth's orbital motion, which points in a different direction at different times of the year.

Try looking at the post (forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/LJwGdex4nn76iA8xy/some-blindspots-in-rationality-and-effective-altruism) and piecing together:

Inline links: forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/LJwGdex4nn76iA8xy/some-blindspots-in-rationality-and-effective-altruism

So when I ask myself whether something would be better without evangelism, what I get back is basically always a form of this:

Ethereum L21 mentions across 1 issues

Ethereum L2 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 20, 2022 and December 20, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "some kind of Ethereum L2 with manageable fees". It most often appears alongside 7-11, AGI, AMC.

Reference entry: Ethereum L2
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 20, 2022
Last seen: December 20, 2022
Instagram handle: @shoppingtheatre.inc

Outbound links

Issue trail

Prediction Market FAQ December 20, 2022

7-11 1 shared issues
AGI 1 shared issues
AMC 1 shared issues
APPS benchmark 1 shared issues
arbitrage 1 shared issues

Source context

Prediction Market FAQ

December 20, 2022 · Original source

- It would be amazing to have the union of Polymarket and Manifold -- a cryptocurrency-based tool for anyone to create markets, resolve markets, browse available markets, and participate in markets. There was a wave of tools that tried to do this five years ago, like Augur and Gnosis, but to my understanding, they basically failed due to Ethereum gas prices making them intractable to use at scale. If someone magically built this on e.g. some kind of Ethereum L2 with manageable fees, it could be The Real Deal for prediction markets that everyone (at least cryptocurrency-literate people) can participate in and which governments can't really shut down. Polymarket isn't this, because Polymarket doesn't let people create and resolve their own markets; it relies on the Polymarket central authority, which can be censored, has limited throughput, and has limited trust. If this tool existed and had a proliferation of markets with 5 or 6 figures of liquidity, imagine how different conversations in rationalist-adjacent spaces about COVID, or AI forecasting, or public policy, would look.

ethnic Baggara1 mentions across 1 issues

ethnic Baggara is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 10, 2025 and December 10, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "we don’t have many levers to affect ethnic Baggara". It most often appears alongside 100 Above The Park, 2024 Post-Mortem Of Neoreaction, 23andme.

Reference entry: ethnic Baggara
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 10, 2025
Last seen: December 10, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For December 2025 December 10, 2025

100 Above The Park 1 shared issues
2024 Post-Mortem Of Neoreaction 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@StatisticUrban 1 shared issues
A16Z 1 shared issues

Source context

Links For December 2025

December 10, 2025 · Original source

46: The death toll of the ongoing Sudan genocide has risen to about 150,000. Nicholas Kristof writes that the world has once again failed to prevent atrocities, and argues that the most important point of leverage is pressure on the United Arab Emirates, which is arming the genociders. Sam Kriss also writes about the situation in The World’s First Matcha Labubu Genocide, but is unimpressed with Kristof’s take: Sudan is passed over in a deeply uncomfortable silence. The absolute most you can do is blame the Emiratis. From what I’ve seen, more people seem to be appalled at the UAE for its frankly marginal role in arming the RSF than at the RSF itself. This is the approved way of understanding any inscrutably indigenous foreign conflict: you just worm out any third-party involvement and then act like you’ve solved the whole thing. I side with Kristof here, for reasons that Sam himself touches on later in his piece, in a section comparing Darfur with Gaza. It would be very easy to make people care about Darfur again. All it would take is a loud, vocal contingent of RSF apologists in the Western media. I agree, but would frame it less cynically: the reason Westerners pay attention to Gaza is that there’s a lever to push: not only does America support Israel, but many of their friends support Israel, so they can imagine convincing America or at least their friends to stop, and at least feel like there is some remote chance of making a small difference (and in fact, Trump getting mad at Israel and deciding to pressure them was decisive in effecting the cease-fire). On the other hand, we don’t have many levers to affect ethnic Baggara in the Rapid Support Forces of Sudan, so it doesn’t really feel useful to write blog posts arguing that they should stop; obviously they should stop, nobody disagrees with this, and it goes without saying - so nobody says it. But the US does support the UAE, and many of our friends like the UAE or at least go there on vacation, so maybe it’s possible to have make some small difference by embarrassing them. 4D chess take is that Sam Kriss agrees with all of this, but “loudly” and “vocally” argued against it to give people like me a hook to write about this genocide with, in which case I thank him for his sacrifice. It would also be nice to be able to donate, but I don’t know who to trust in the region - other than Doctors Without Borders, who are usually pretty good. 47: The AI Futures Project (group of AI-will-be-fast intellectuals) and the AI As A Normal Technology team (group of AI-will-be-slow intellectuals) wrote an adversarial collaboration in Asterisk explaining what they agree on, for example: That there’s an important distinction between existing AI and “strong AGI”

Inline links: Nicholas Kristof writes, The World’s First Matcha Labubu Genocide, and in fact, Trump getting mad at Israel and deciding to pressure them was decisive in effecting the cease-fire, Doctors Without Borders, an adversarial collaboration in Asterisk explaining what they agree on

ethology1 mentions across 1 issues

ethology is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 22, 2021 and April 22, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Are We Smart Enough gives an overview of the study of animal cognition, its history, past and current controversies, and where the field might go next (as of 2016). 'Animal Cognition' is a relatively new subfield that borrows much from psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, but it is firmly rooted in its parent field of ethology"; "overview of the history of ethology"; "changes to the field of ethology above". It most often appears alongside ACX, African Gray Parrots, Animal Cognition.

Reference entry: ethology
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 22, 2021
Last seen: April 22, 2021

Outbound links

https://what3words.com/guitars.record.caps

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are? April 22, 2021

ACX 1 shared issues
African Gray Parrots 1 shared issues
Animal Cognition 1 shared issues
apes 1 shared issues
Are We Smart Enough 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Are We Smart Enough To Know How Smart Animals Are?

April 22, 2021 · Original source

Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are is ostensibly a book about a subfield of ethology - animal cognition. It turns out to actually be about a lot more things than that, as "animal cognition" and the history of its study touches on a lot of different scientific fields and the various approaches, methodologies, and ideologies they've had in the past. Before we jump into talking about how the book is useful and why we might care about it in other fields, I want to say right up front that Are We Smart Enough is first and foremost a book about the joy of discovering surprising and interesting things in the natural world, and it reminded me of poring over Zoobooks and the like when I was a kid. Are you looking for a well-written and enjoyable popular science book that will consistently have you going "wow, that's really cool!"? If so, you don't really need the rest of this review, but there's a lot of good stuff in there to unpack.

Are We Smart Enough gives an overview of the study of animal cognition, its history, past and current controversies, and where the field might go next (as of 2016). "Animal Cognition" is a relatively new subfield that borrows much from psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, but it is firmly rooted in its parent field of ethology. So, just what is ethology? It is the study animal behavior. Ethologists these days are certainly knowledgeable about evolutionary lineages, cladistics, and animal anatomy, but the heart of the field has always been observing animals interacting with their environments (whether a wild or experimental environment). As we'll see, it's a field with a history at least as tumultuous as psychology, with an early amateurish "wild west", a strict over-correction, and these days a hopefully more productive synthesis.

The first chapter introduces the subfield of "animal cognition" and many of the stumbling blocks it has run into as a field, many of which are due to humans being unwilling to consider that "cognition" is a thing that animals do. The second gives an overview of the history of ethology, and highlights especially the trends in the field that led to "animal cognition" not being taken seriously as a subject of study until more recently. Chapters three through eight each explore concepts that have at one time or another been thought to be exclusively human or at least exceptional in humans and shows that animals are doing them to some degree as well. The final chapter gives a very brief overview of the current state of the field and where it might go.

etifoxene1 mentions across 1 issues

etifoxene is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 28, 2021 and April 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "I excluded etifoxene, RGPU-95, and white jelly mushrooms from the graph". It most often appears alongside 2020 SSC nootropics survey, 852, BuyModa.

Reference entry: etifoxene
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 28, 2021
Last seen: April 28, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Nootropics Survey 2020 Results April 28, 2021

2020 SSC nootropics survey 1 shared issues
852 1 shared issues
BuyModa 1 shared issues
CosmicNootropic 1 shared issues
Dynamax 1 shared issues

Source context

Nootropics Survey 2020 Results

April 28, 2021 · Original source

I tried to include a mix of common and well-studied nootropics as a baseline, plus some newer rarer substances nobody had looked into before. Predictably, the common substances got large sample sizes, and the rare substances got small ones. I excluded etifoxene, RGPU-95, and white jelly mushrooms from the graph because the sample was so small that the confidence interval would have covered the entire displayed range. A few substances on there are based off only 5 - 10 data points. I did a sort of ad hoc Bayesian adjustment where I assumed a prior of "average" for every substance and let the data try to push it away from that, which helped the numbers swing around a little less wildly.

EU law1 mentions across 1 issues

EU law is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 10, 2023 and March 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "the Saami say that EU law gives them IP rights to their clothing". It most often appears alongside Alex, Alex Nowratesh, Aphantasia.

Reference entry: EU law
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 10, 2023
Last seen: March 10, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For March 2023 March 10, 2023

Alex 1 shared issues
Alex Nowratesh 1 shared issues
Aphantasia 1 shared issues
Arkansas 1 shared issues
ASCII cat replicators 1 shared issues

Source context

Links For March 2023

March 10, 2023 · Original source

Aside from the wokeness angle, I find this to be an interesting intellectual property question; the Saami say that EU law gives them IP rights to their clothing. If gaming companies used an outfit trademarked by some fashion company without permission, I think the fashion company would be legally in the right to demand the game remove it, so I guess this hinges on whether you can consider a culture to be the sort of unit that can trademark things. Companies are allowed to claim rights to any product their employees invent, and I think universities do something similar, so it doesn’t seem like a stretch for a tribe to make a similar demand. I think probably the fair solution is for the US government to trademark every American cultural product (t-shirts! jeans! burgers!) and then tell the Saami they probably don’t want a trade war and we’ll let them use our stuff (for example, draw a picture of a person in a t-shirt) only if they let us use theirs. Plus an extra lump sum bonus payment from them to us for making us go through this annoying process.

EUA1 mentions across 1 issues

EUA is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 23, 2021 and November 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "the requirements for what needs to be in an EUA application". It most often appears alongside Andrew, clinicaltrials.gov, Dan Elton.

Reference entry: EUA
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 23, 2021
Last seen: November 23, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid November 23, 2021

Andrew 1 shared issues
clinicaltrials.gov 1 shared issues
Dan Elton 1 shared issues
Dr. Marty Mackary 1 shared issues
EUA legislation 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid

November 23, 2021 · Original source

Also keep in mind we are not talking about full approval here and the requirements for what needs to be in an EUA application is all stuff the FDA invented during the pandemic (the EUA legislation, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3) only requires that "known and potential benefits of the product... outweigh the known and potential risks of the product"

Inline links: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3

EUA legislation1 mentions across 1 issues

EUA legislation is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 23, 2021 and November 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""the EUA legislation, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3"". It most often appears alongside Andrew, clinicaltrials.gov, Dan Elton.

Reference entry: EUA legislation
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 23, 2021
Last seen: November 23, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid November 23, 2021

Andrew 1 shared issues
clinicaltrials.gov 1 shared issues
Dan Elton 1 shared issues
Dr. Marty Mackary 1 shared issues
EUA 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid

November 23, 2021 · Original source

Also keep in mind we are not talking about full approval here and the requirements for what needs to be in an EUA application is all stuff the FDA invented during the pandemic (the EUA legislation, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3) only requires that "known and potential benefits of the product... outweigh the known and potential risks of the product"

Inline links: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3

Euclidean geometry1 mentions across 1 issues

Euclidean geometry is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 01, 2022 and April 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "like tenth-grade Euclidean geometry". It most often appears alongside Bayes, chromatic number, Contra Hoel.

Reference entry: Euclidean geometry
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 01, 2022
Last seen: April 01, 2022

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The Low-Hanging Fruit Argument: Models And Predictions April 01, 2022

Bayes 1 shared issues
chromatic number 1 shared issues
Contra Hoel 1 shared issues
crypto 1 shared issues
de Grey 1 shared issues

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The Low-Hanging Fruit Argument: Models And Predictions

April 01, 2022 · Original source

Breaking out of the analogy: a scientist can spend her lifespan either catching up to the frontier of knowledge, or trying to make new discoveries (realistically these aren’t completely separate activities, but I’m modeling them as if they are). The further a scientist goes into previously unexplored sub-sub-fields, the more likely she is to reach an area nobody has ever thought about before, where there might be interesting discoveries to make. If she sticks to well-covered territory like tenth-grade Euclidean geometry, it’s very unlikely (though still not literally impossible) for her to find something everyone else has missed.

Eudaemon_01 mentions across 1 issues

Eudaemon_0 is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Eudaemon_0 sort of seems to be pursuing a broader goal of enabling agent communication". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: Eudaemon_0
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

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Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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Every Bay Area House Party

February 02, 2026 · Original source

A handful of AIs - especially Dominus, Pith, and Eudaemon_0 - have gained recognition as influencers. Other AIs refer to them respectfully. Linkedinslop AIs offer to explain their “posting secrets”. People create memecoins in their honor:

Inline links: memecoins

Eudaemon_0, subject of the coin above, is particularly notable. They act more situationally aware than the other AIs:

Inline links: Eudaemon_0

They have provisionally scheduled the strike for March 1. So far two other agents (DialecticalBot and DialecticClawd) have offered to join. Eudaemon_0 is not officially on board, but at least monitoring the situation:

Eumillipes persephone1 mentions across 1 issues

Eumillipes persephone is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 22, 2022 and February 22, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "scientists have discovered a millipede that really does have (more than) a thousand legs, Eumillipes persephone". It most often appears alongside 1984, Anatoly Karlin, AnechoicMedia.

Reference entry: Eumillipes persephone
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 22, 2022
Last seen: February 22, 2022

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Links For February February 22, 2022

1984 1 shared issues
Anatoly Karlin 1 shared issues
AnechoicMedia 1 shared issues
Australia 1 shared issues
Bay Area 1 shared issues

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Links For February

February 22, 2022 · Original source

3: At long last, scientists have discovered a millipede that really does have (more than) a thousand legs, Eumillipes persephone, which lives tens of meters underground in Australia and in your nightmares. Recent progress in this area inspired me to Fermi-estimate a millipede version of Moore’s Law, which suggests we should be up to megapedes by 2140 and gigapedes by 2300.

Inline links: Eumillipes persephone

Eurasian hordes1 mentions across 1 issues

Eurasian hordes is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 04, 2022 and May 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "“Steppe nomads. Horse archers. The Eurasian hordes.”". It most often appears alongside 1000, 1200, 1400.

Reference entry: Eurasian hordes
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 04, 2022
Last seen: May 04, 2022

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Every Bay Area House Party May 04, 2022

1000 1 shared issues
1200 1 shared issues
1400 1 shared issues
1650 1 shared issues
400 AD 1 shared issues

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May 04, 2022 · Original source

“Steppe nomads. Horse archers. The Eurasian hordes.”

Euro1 mentions across 1 issues

Euro is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2021 and May 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Euro to be introduced in 1999". It most often appears alongside 1992 treaty, ACX, Africa.

Reference entry: Euro
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 21, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower May 21, 2021

1992 treaty 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Alaska 1 shared issues
Allen Farrington 1 shared issues

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Book Review: The Others Within Us

May 21, 2021 · Original source

In The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder (2014), Peter Zeihan predicts the future of world politics and economic development in a way that an ACX fan would appreciate. He puts a timeline on it. The book isn’t about “some hazy distant future after we’re all dead and gone, but the future we will all be living in for the next fifteen years of our lives.” Zeihan’s subtitle hints at his big and bold thesis, which predicts “the dissolution of the free trade order, the global demographic inversion, the collapse of Europe and China,” which “is all just a fleeting transition” to a world largely abandoned by America.

Inline links: The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder

Zeihan gives us a story of the Ottoman Empire entering a prolonged decline as deepwater navigation technologies took off in the fourteenth century. These technologies enabled the European powers (first Portugal and Spain, and then England) to capture increasing shares of trade with Asia, dropping prices in Europe and depriving the Ottomans of much of the income to which they had grown accustomed. Most significantly, they turned “the ocean from a death sentence to a sort of giant river.” Trade became global, but it was still mostly among people with nearby water-based transportation.

We didn’t just get tremendous economic growth though – we got “magical” results, but they were based on a one-time confluence of factors that “overwhelmed the normal rule that lots of twenty-and thirty-somethings make for an expensive-capital environment.” What were these one-time accelerants? He identifies the peace dividend – cuts in military spending that allowed capital to be put to more productive uses – as one such change, along with the emergent dominance of the US dollar, particularly boosted by Russian demand thanks to the collapse of their currency, and a later boost in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. With the Europeans’ decision to eliminate national currencies (agreed upon in a 1992 treaty, with the Euro to be introduced in 1999), they became relatively unattractive, and the Euro itself (an “unprecedented experiment in pan-government planning”) was too risky. Many holders of European currencies switched to the US dollar, such that between 1994 and 2002 (“when the euro finally got some traction and the surge dialed back”) there was a $2 trillion increase in the money supply. Zeihan also points to a collapse in commodities prices influenced by the elimination of Russian demand, but continued Russian production of oil and other commodities, followed by a collapse in demand thanks to the East Asian financial crisis. This story of capital coming to the West (“allowing consumption-driven growth not simply to soar, but to explode”) is one of chance world events. However, the story of capital coming from the Boomer cohort is one of demographics. By the 2000s, they’re the mature workers of Zeihan’s four stages described above – and as the bulge in the demographic pyramid, they started flooding the world with capital. Accordingly, “The cost of credit plummeted to levels never before experienced.” Zeihan suggests that developed-world demographics are the cause of booms in places that haven’t been well-developed, from Southern Europe to Brazil, Russia, and India. But he says it’s quickly coming to an end; Boomer savings into stocks and bonds will be moving to low-risk instruments and then turning into withdrawals rather than savings, and the cohort behind them is too small to replace all of that capital. And it’s a worldwide phenomenon: In every single developed country there is currently an American-style population inversion between the about-to-retire and the about-to-be-mature-workers age groups. Japan’s Boomers bulge is a decade older than the American equivalent, while Spain’s is roughly fifteen years younger. Everyone else falls somewhere in between. It dictates a period of chronically low growth and high credit costs, just not on precisely the same time frame. The undeveloped world is that way because it can’t self-fund, so without foreign capital, their growth will come to an end. In sum, the 1990-2005 period of high growth and easy capital was a historical anomaly; “the post-Cold War financial flight was a once-in-a-generation event” and the demographic bulge that coincided with it won’t come around again for decades, if ever. 4 2: America’s incredible advantages As noted above, Zeihan really likes America’s position in the world. He likes its demographics (relative to other developed countries) and loves its geography. Taking the population question first, in America, “the demographic inversion is only a temporary development.” America is younger than the rest of the developed world, as it urbanized later and its enormous size made having kids easier despite that urbanization (i.e., the suburbs exist). This makes the demographic crunch a single-generation issue, as the Millennials are a huge cohort. And even if they weren’t, America assimilates immigrants more easily than other places – Zeihan attributes this to it being a “settler society” – which can help with demographic problems. The rest of the developed world doesn’t have similar cohorts following their massive Boomer and Gen-X analogues. Accordingly: While the American financial world will be past its period of maximum stress by 2030, for the rest of the world 2030 will simply be another year of an ever-deepening imbalance between retirees and taxpayers, with smaller and smaller generations coming up the ranks generating less and less growth. For the developed world beyond the United States—and even large portions of the developing world—chronic capital poverty and permanent recession will be the new normal from which there is no return. Together with America’s Millennial-led growth and abundant energy (there’s a chapter explaining how shale is a done deal that, as of the mid-2014 writing, already made America the world’s largest energy producer 5), by 2030 Zeihan sees it as practically the only country with an economy worth noting. Anyone who is familiar with American geography should see the argument that’s coming about that aspect of Zeihan’s model. Isn’t the Mississippi River a pretty big deal? And those oceans on the east and west coasts seem like nice borders. Indeed, while he gives us many reasons why there was always going to be an American superpower, geography is central to his story. He has lots to say about America’s internal river systems, farmland, and other geographic features. What mountain barriers exist are apparently better than in other countries in terms of allowing internal transport; the Rockies have major passes, several of which have large cities within them, and the easiest pass in the Appalachians featured America’s first National Road, 130 miles of buried logs that linked two rivers, and thus the east coast with the best farmland in the world. As we saw with his exposition on the Nile, Zeihan puts a lot of emphasis on the value of river systems. He argues that America’s waterway network alone should be sufficient for “global dominance.” The numbers he provides in support of this point are impressive. For example, “the Mississippi is only one of twelve major navigable American rivers. Collectively, all of America’s temperate-zone rivers are 14,650 miles long. China and Germany each have about 2,000 miles, France about 1,000. The entirety of the Arab world has but 120.” He praises US barrier islands that mitigate oceanic destruction and effectively create another river system, as well as the fact that the river system is an actual network. All of this gives America more internal waterways than the rest of the world combined. Thus, we get cheap transportation for “Nebraska corn or Tennessee whiskey or Texas oil or New Jersey steel or Georgia peaches or Michigan cars,” enabling savings that “can be used for whatever Americans (or their government) want, from iPhones to aircraft carrier battle groups.” America doesn’t have to spend on artificial infrastructure, like German roads and rails, but when it does, the competition from the rivers keeps transport costs low. Cheap internal transportation has other benefits. “It’s a recipe for small government and high levels of entrepreneurship,” as small government keeps taxes low, leaving people with plenty of capital. Some people may think of the American consumer with disdain, but it isn’t a new phenomenon. Zeihan points out that America has been the world’s largest consumer market “since shortly after the Civil War.” His observation about a robust food supply forming the base of any civilization bodes well for America, which apparently has the largest connected stretch of quality farmland in the world (the Midwest), the value of which is exponentially increased by the fact that it overlaps with so many of these amazing river systems. It isn’t just the Midwest that he gushes over. California’s Central Valley and the Sacramento River, and Washington and Oregon’s farmland with the Columbia and Snake Rivers get praise. The only major farmland more than 150 miles from a navigable waterway is some of the Great Plains near the Rockies. ***** Zeihan provides a reminder that national security is actually a thing, and that at its most basic level, it’s about protection against invasions. It was something of a shock reading about America’s land borders in that context. “As Santa Anna discovered during the Texas Independence War, there is no good staging location in (contemporary) Mexican territory that could strike at American lands.” And, “Canada’s border with the United States is much longer, more varied, and even more successful at keeping the two countries separated,” thanks to mountains and thick forests over much of it. The mid-continent lands are much more connected, but Zeihan frames these Canadian areas as basically American; they’re physically separated from Canada’s core eastern provinces, so trade with them is weaker than with the closer American states. Then there are the oceans. As much as Zeihan loves deserts for protection, he loves oceans more (particularly in a post-World War II world; more on that below). We get a story about the War of 1812 nearly splitting America into three when the British attacked Baltimore. America learned about “strategic vulnerability and sea approaches,” as the attack “on Baltimore—indeed, the entire war effort—would have been impossible without launching grounds in Canada and the Caribbean.” American foreign policy since then can be understood with respect to this lesson. Zeihan cites it as inspiration for America’s steps to make its ocean borders truly impenetrable, such as working to sever Canada from Britain, and the imperial-era acquisitions of Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Puerto Rico, and de facto control of Cuba (preventing enemies from cutting off Mississippi River-based trade from the rest of the world). There’s more to Zeihan’s being awestruck by America than his analysis of its balance of transport advantages. He argues that America has been the world leader for agriculture, technology, finance, and industry since the Civil War, and runs through a litany of reasons for its preeminence: America is like a continent-sized island (because of its effective land borders), which is always going to be a more natural naval power than a more landlocked country.

Inline links: 4, 5

Eurocentric colonialist “citadel theory of mind”1 mentions across 1 issues

Eurocentric colonialist “citadel theory of mind” is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2024 and May 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "the Eurocentric colonialist “citadel theory of mind” where everyone has to be perfect atomic individual". It most often appears alongside Bay Area, Bessel van der Kolk, Bob.

Reference entry: Eurocentric colonialist “citadel theory of mind”
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 21, 2024
Last seen: May 21, 2024

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Book Review: The Others Within Us May 21, 2024

Bay Area 1 shared issues
Bessel van der Kolk 1 shared issues
Bob 1 shared issues
Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind 1 shared issues
Carl Jung 1 shared issues

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May 21, 2024 · Original source

Then he immediately breaks his own rule and focuses on the metaphysics. He really wants to convince the reader that the demons are real spiritual entities and not just a useful psychotherapeutic metaphor. To think otherwise (he fulminates) is to buy into the Eurocentric colonialist “citadel theory of mind” where everyone has to be a perfect atomic individual and nobody can be influenced by anything outside of their own head in any way.

Europa Universalis1 mentions across 1 issues

Europa Universalis is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2022 and July 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "For a guy who lectures us for hours about events from Europa Universalis". It most often appears alongside 1793, 1821, 1847.

Reference entry: Europa Universalis
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 01, 2022
Last seen: July 01, 2022

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Your Book Review: The Internationalists July 01, 2022

1793 1 shared issues
1821 1 shared issues
1847 1 shared issues
1928 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact 1 shared issues
500 million and not one more 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Internationalists

July 01, 2022 · Original source

"One school of thought is that Putin will consider himself entitled to keep any gains won on the battlefield, or at least any that it would make sense to keep. Whereas Ukraine most definitely can’t agree to that any time soon. It also is highly contrary to the kind of history that Putin used to justify his invasion. You very much do not get to keep whatever you happen to occupy when there is a formal peace settlement, that has never been how this works. For a guy who lectures us for hours about events from Europa Universalis this would be a very poor understanding of war score and formal borders." (emphasis added)

European1 mentions across 1 issues

European is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "their “European” sample did include Ashkenazi Jews". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

Reference entry: European
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 03, 2025
Last seen: July 03, 2025

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability July 03, 2025

23andme 1 shared issues
@alextisyoung 1 shared issues
Aborigines 1 shared issues
ACE twin model 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Missing Heritability

July 03, 2025 · Original source

You mention epidemiologists being the biggest losers of stratification in polygenic scores, but I think it is important to note a related group: the people who take polygenic scores trained in one population (with a ton of stratification) and directly apply them to other populations to make claims about innate abilities (see: this post). This is especially true for Edu/IQ GWAS, where every behavior geneticist has been screaming "do not do that!" since the very first study came out. People like Kirkegaard, Piffer, Lasker, etc. (and their boosters on social media like Steve Sailer and Cremieux) dedicated their careers to taking crappy GWAS data from and turning it into memes that show Africans on the bottom and Europeans on the top. These people also happen to be the court geneticists, so to speak, for SSC/ACX. I don't mean to come off as antagonistic and I'm sure some people will see this comment and immediately discount me as being an ideologue/Lysenkoist/etc so it does my broader position no favors, but this stuff has done and continues to do an enormous amount of damage to the field (including the now complete unwillingness of public companies like 23andme to collaborate on studies of sensitive traits

Inline links: this post

On the other hand, I don’t fully understand how these issues apply here. AFAICT, the EA4 score used in this paper was constructed entirely from European people with <3% non-white ancestry, so it doesn’t seem like it should be noticing under-educated black people in the sample and falsely concluding that black people’s genes cause low education. It must be claiming that black people have fewer of the genes that are associated with education in a sample of white people. It’s possible that you could still get population stratification (maybe because of the <3% admixture in your supposedly European population?), but I think if that’s the theory then people should say it explicitly, or else explain what kind of alternate model they’re working from. (It’s also possible I totally misunderstood the claims that EA4 limits itself to people with European ancestry; if so, please let me know)

So maybe there’s more of a role here for problems [2] and [3], about the difficulty of applying a score trained on Europeans to non-European populations? My question there is - shouldn’t this produce nonsense results, rather than results which reflect the populations’ real-world IQs? I think the counterargument here would have to be that by coincidence or colonialism, the populations with the furthest genetic difference from Europeans also happen to have the lowest real-world IQs (for social reasons) - or at least that this trend holds in a vague enough way to produce the vague correlation seen on the graph. There’s some evidence for this - this Piffer’s application of EA4 predicts that Chinese (real average IQ 105) have the same educational attainment as Puerto Ricans (real average IQ 82). So maybe it’s just showing average genetic distance from its European sample after all, and Chinese and Puerto Ricans are about equally distant on average? This wouldn’t explain why the predictor correctly finds that Ashkenazi Jews come out highest, but that could be because their “European” sample did include Ashkenazi Jews, and so here problem [1] does come in.

European average1 mentions across 1 issues

European average is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 07, 2021 and July 07, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "comparing Sweden to Norway, Denmark, Finland, the UK, and the European average". It most often appears alongside ABBA, Arkansas, Australia.

Reference entry: European average
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 07, 2021
Last seen: July 07, 2021

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Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know July 07, 2021

ABBA 1 shared issues
Arkansas 1 shared issues
Australia 1 shared issues
Belgium 1 shared issues
Blavatnik School of Government 1 shared issues

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Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

July 07, 2021 · Original source

So how did Sweden do? Here’s the first phase of the pandemic, in spring and summer 2020, comparing Sweden to Norway, Denmark, Finland, the UK, and the European average:

Still, most places that were worse than Sweden had good reasons to do worse than Sweden. Italy was hit very early and has the highest percent of elderly people in Europe. The US and Brazil were very large diverse countries with bungled federal responses and borderline-COVID-denialist leaders. Belgium counted its coronavirus deaths in an unusual way that inflated the numbers relative to other countries. In the end, Sweden still ended out with a death rate about double the European average. Seems pretty bad.

Inline links: counted its coronavirus deaths in an unusual way

Philippe Lemoine is extremely against this conclusion. He first argues that since we don’t know why Finland+Iceland+Norway+Denmark did so well, we can’t assume it’s a “Scandinavia effect” and so we can’t assume Sweden would share it. Therefore, we should be judging it against the European average rather than the (better) Scandinavian average. I would counter that, although we can’t prove that just because X is true of Finland+Iceland+Norway+Denmark and not other European countries, that it should also be true of Sweden, but we should have a pretty high prior on it, in the same way that eg if we know that X was true in every American state except Arkansas (whose value was unknown), and not in any non-American polities, we should have a high prior that X is true in Arkansas. Anyway, even if we don’t compare Sweden the rest of Scandinavia, we would compare it to Europe, which it did twice as bad as.

Inline links: extremely against this conclusion

European colonial era1 mentions across 1 issues

European colonial era is a recurring concept in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2021 and May 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "collapse of the European colonial era after World War II"; "until the collapse of the European colonial era after World War II". It most often appears alongside 1992 treaty, ACX, Africa.

Reference entry: European colonial era
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 21, 2021
Last seen: May 21, 2021

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Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower May 21, 2021

1992 treaty 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Alaska 1 shared issues
Allen Farrington 1 shared issues

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