Astral Codex Ten

Emil Kierkegaard

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Emil Kierkegaard

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Emil Kierkegaard is a recurring person in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between February 22, 2022 and July 24, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as “Emil Kierkegaard on the flimsy evidence for exercise as a depression treatment”; “34: Emil Kierkegaard and Meng Hu on the claim that education increases IQ”; “Emil Kierkegaard has a summary explaining the possible statistical missteps”. It most often appears alongside China, California, facebook.

Metadata

  • Category: People
  • Mention count: 6
  • Issue count: 6
  • First seen: February 22, 2022
  • Last seen: July 24, 2024

Appears In

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

Links For February
February 22, 2022 · Original source
38: Emil Kierkegaard on the flimsy evidence for exercise as a depression treatment.
Inline links: the flimsy evidence for exercise as a depression treatment
Links For December 2022
December 28, 2022 · Original source
34: Emil Kierkegaard and Meng Hu on the claim that education increases IQ. Summary: it increases your score on IQ tests and your performance on various tasks, but this is one of the times you have to be really nitpicky about the difference between “IQ test score”, “intelligence”, and “g”.
Inline links: Emil Kierkegaard, Meng Hu
Links For March 2023
March 10, 2023 · Original source
23: Please stop citing that Swedish study purporting to show that IQ stops mattering after the 90th percentile or whatever! Emil Kierkegaard has a summary explaining the possible statistical missteps, and Cremieux has more information here and (buried in the middle) here.
Inline links: Emil Kierkegaard has a summary, here, here
Sure, Whatever, Let's Try Another Contra Caplan On Mental Illness
June 29, 2023 · Original source
Left: my position. Right: my position, “rounded off” to Caplan'’s position In particular, he claims I am FORCED to either accept that all mental illnesses are just “preferences” and so not illnesses at all, or as posited in a response by Emil Kierkegaard, that homosexuality is a mental illness and therefore bad. You will not be surprised to learn that I don’t think of myself as secretly admitting this, or forced into doing anything. II. Bryan mentions how I have already addressed his fork with a much more in-detail discussion of how we classify something as a disease or not at this link, to which I would add this post as fleshing out the same framework. Put simply, declaring something a “disease” is a complex category-boundary-drawing issue that combines facts and values, just like all category-boundary-drawing issues. I said that it’s a political question whether or not you classify homosexuality as an illness. Caplan thinks of this as some sort of incredibly deep concession. But it’s a political question whether or not to classify any condition, including physical conditions, as illnesses. It’s just that the political question is usually very easy. This shouldn’t be surprising - most political questions are easy! “Should we set every tree in the United States on fire, then dump the entire Strategic Uranium Reserve in the Mississippi River?” - this is a political question, in the sense that you could propose it for a vote and people would have to form an opinion on it. It doesn’t show up on C-SPAN because it doesn’t satisfy anybody’s values. It’s a political fight where one side has a constituency of zero. In the same way, “is cancer a disease?” is a political question. Maybe cancer makes you cough up blood and die. Basically everyone is against this, so it’s easy to condemn it and agree that doing it is worse than not doing it. If for some reason there were some strong political constituency in favor of coughing up blood and dying, who thought were were unfairly stigmatizing this wonderful prosocial activity, then we would have to have a political fight about it. This fight would have to involve comparing values (eg being against death) rather than comparing facts (eg cancer is caused by a mutation in such and such a gene).1 (see also: The Tails Coming Apart As Metaphor For Life and Ambijectivity. Categories often contain a simple region where they operate perfectly and where it would be perverse to consider them a political question even though they sort of are, and a more complex region where they start to break down and we have to agree on some final border) Is Down Syndrome a disease? It often causes poor health and low IQ; I’m pretty against both of these things, so I would say yes. Still, there are a bunch of people who argue it isn’t, maybe because they don’t care what your health or IQ is, or because they think stigmatizes Down Syndrome patients. I think these people are wrong, but only in the same way that I think people who support the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or who hate free speech, are wrong: they have bad values, they’re against human flourishing, they’re on the wrong side of a political question. Is depression an illness? It causes you to be miserable and not be able to do most of the things you want to do. Same story. I can’t imagine anyone being in favor of this, and I hope there’s a broad base of support to continue classifying it as an illness - but it’s a value judgment. Caplan says okay, maybe sometimes in some ways the category boundary drawing is hard, but he proposes a bright-line rule: No preference is a disease. No matter how bizarre or horrible (or common or wonderful). Diseases are constraints, not preferences. Part of my frustration with Caplan is that I feel like I have proven this constraint/preference distinction incoherent and misleading again and again over the course of our “debate” and he’s never responded. He just keeps saying “but the constraint/preference distinction!” For the sake of completeness, I’ll give my summary of what he thinks the distinction is, plus four of what I consider to be the strongest counterarguments. My interpretation of Bryan’s theory (I’m putting this in a quote block to specify I’m devil’s-advocating it, but this is my summary and not his): If we think like behaviorists, all we can really see about mental illnesses are unusual behaviors. For example, a depressed person stays in bed all day and doesn’t work. An alcoholic drinks himself to death. A psychotic person runs out in the street naked claiming to be God. These seem like choices. You can imagine the depressed person choosing to throw parties and work hard instead. You can imagine the alcoholic choosing to throw out his beer and never drinking again. You can imagine the psychotic person choosing to put on his clothes and act normally. In fact, if you put a gun to the alcoholic’s head and threatened to shoot him if he ever drank again, probably he would stop drinking. Therefore, we should model these conditions as unusual preferences/choices, not as diseases. The hallmark of a disease is a constraint, something you cannot “choose” to overcome, something you couldn’t overcome even with a gun to your head. For example, a paralyzed person cannot choose to walk no matter how hard she wants to, or how dire the consequences for not walking. Therefore, paralysis is an unusual constraint, and depression is an unusual preference. We may choose (for political reasons) to stigmatize certain unusual preferences. Maybe the people who have them will choose (for signaling reasons) to cooperate in their own stigmatization. But realistically these are just completely voluntary preferences. If we don’t like them, we should ask the people who have them to choose differently, instead of treating them as diseased. My counterarguments: — 1: Counterargument From Physical Illness, Part I The simple preference/constraint model clearly doesn’t describe mental illness very well. But it’s actually much worse than that. It doesn’t even describe physical illness. Consider a migraine. If we think like behaviorists, all we can really say about migraines is that someone locks themselves in a dark room, clutches their head, and says “oww oww oww” a lot. If we put a gun to a migraneur’s head and threatened to kill them if they didn’t go to a loud party, they would grudgingly go to the party. So clearly (says a hypothetical version of Caplan, whose answers I must rely on because the real Caplan has never addressed this objection) migraine headaches are a preference, not a disease! Some people just like locking themselves in dark rooms, clutching their head, and saying “oww oww oww” a lot! If other people call this a “disorder”, they’re choosing to stigmatize migraineurs; if migraineurs agree it’s a disorder, they’re just trying to escape responsibility for their antisocial choices. You could say the same about many - maybe most - physical diseases. Why not say that chronic pain is just a preference for grimacing a lot? That itchy rashes are just a preference for scratching yourself a lot? That colds are just a preference for lying in bed and blowing your nose a lot? (I believe most people with colds could get up, go to work, and avoid blowing their noses, if their lives depended on it). Or we could stop thinking like behaviorists, a philosophy which nobody has taken seriously since the 1970s. Once we agree that people are allowed to have internal states, and that the rest of us are allowed to acknowledge those internal states, the paradox disappears. We can agree that the essence of migraine headaches is pain, especially pain in response to strong sensations. The essence of itchy rashes is a feeling of itchiness, which is relieved when we scratch it. The essence of colds is feeling unwell and ugh and wanting to stay in bed and having unpleasant congestion in your nasal passages. None of these particularly change your preferences. Both I (never had a migraine) and the average migraineur have a preference for not having our head be in terrible pain. But the migraineur needs to avoid bright lights in order to satisfy this preference, and I don’t. So she very reasonably avoids bright lights. Once we’ve admitted this, it’s natural to also admit that depression involves negative emotions and low energy, that alcoholism involves a craving to drink alcohol, and that psychosis involves disturbed reasoning processes which make running out in the street naked claiming to be God seem like a good idea (all with other preferences intact). This is more parsimonious than Caplan’s theory, better matches the testimony of the mentally and physically ill themselves, and doesn’t require the mentally ill to be running some 4D-chess-style network of lies (such that actually the psychotic person’s reasoning is completely normal and they’ve just managed to perfectly trick everyone into thinking that it isn’t and tell a perfectly consistent story all the time and stick with their deception even when it presents an extreme threat to their life and freedom). — 2: Counterargument From Gradients Preferences and constraints naturally shade into each other. Let me give three examples. Example 1: I am a mediocre runner, able to run about 5 km before getting tired and stopping. One day, at exactly the 5 km mark, a demon appears before me, and says it will kill me unless I run another 1 km. I’m pretty upset by this, but I gather all my willpower, try really hard, and manage to run another 1 km. Then the demon appears again and says haha, I was just joking last time, but now I’ll really kill you if you don’t run another 1 km. For some reason I’m gullible, I believe it, and even though I am in extreme pain I make a herculean effort and run another 1 km. Again the demon appears and makes the same threat, and this time I say sorry, I really can’t run another inch, guess I’ll die. The demon says okay, new threat, it will kill me and my entire family horribly if I don’t run another 0.1 km, but give me $1 million if I do. I call upon some kind of reserve of courage worthy of the heroes of old, put one foot in front of the other, and make it a final 0.1 km before stopping. Again, the demon says haha, fooled you, you need to run another 0.1 km. I try this, collapse, and await my impending death. Do we argue that I had a simple preference again running 6, 7, and 7.1 km, but that my inability to run 7.2 km was a true constraint? It seems obvious that my difficulty running 7.1 km is of the same type as my difficulty running 7.2 km, and it just passed some threshold where I couldn’t do it anymore no matter how much it mattered. Example 2: The demon puts a dimmer switch on my leg nerves. When it’s at 100%, I have totally normal movement. When it’s at 0%, I’m paralyzed from the waist down. At 25%, I can sort of kind of walk in extreme pain. The demon threatens to kill me unless I succeed, so I shamble a short distance. Then the demon turns the switch down to 24% and threatens me again; I try my best, but fail. I think Caplan would have to say that at every level up to 25%, I simply have a preference against walking, which is fine and voluntary and my own fault and not a disease in any way. Then at 24%, it suddenly becomes a constraint inflicted on me by an outside agency and which I deserve sympathy for. Instead, I would rather describe things that make an action difficult and unpleasant as in some sense real constraints. When the dimmer switch is at 25%, I have an external constraint making walking difficult and unpleasant, although I can overcome this and do it anyway with a strong enough incentive. When the switch is at 24%, it’s become so difficult that no incentive can make me do it. There’s no qualitative boundary, just a quantitative one. Example 3: Try to hold your breath as long as you can (please don’t go overboard and hold it so long you pass out). If your experience is like mine, at each moment you’ll feel like - given a slight exercise of willpower - you could choose to hold your breath one more second if you so desired. But if your experience is like mine, you will also find that no amount of love or money could make you hold your breath successfully for (let’s say) three minutes.2 Is there a point where not wanting to hold your breath any longer switches from a preference to a constraint? Or have you discovered a place, in the dark moments just before suffocation, where these concepts lose all meaning? — 3: Counterargument From Physical Illness, Part II Caplan claims that mental illnesses involve preferences and physical illnesses involve constraints. But a second’s thought reveals this is not actually true, even if you accept the whole preference-constraint dichotomy Consider cancer. Cancer involves some constraints; for example, it might kill you, and you cannot choose to live instead, even if someone put a gun to your head and demanded it3. But until that happens, it mostly looks like preferences. People with cancer might stay in bed, saying they feel too sick and weak to get up and do things. But if you threatened them with a gun, they could probably get up and do things. People with cancer might refuse to eat, saying they feel too nauseous and have no appetite. But if you threatened them with a gun, they could probably get down some food. Meanwhile, plenty of mental illnesses include constraints. One of the diagnostic criteria for depression is cognitive and memory problems; people with these problems cannot choose to remember things better, even with a gun to their head. Many people with psychosis cannot speak or reason normally, even if you put a gun to their head and ask them how a healthy person would answer a question. People having panic attacks cannot choose to have a normal heartbeat, or to stop shaking or sweating. Depression and anxiety are both associated with insomnia; try to will yourself to sleep and you’ll sleep less, not more. Both physical and mental illnesses are complex bundles of preferences and constraints, which shouldn’t be surprising given that preference vs. constraint is an oversimplified distinction that breaks down outside its legitimate domain. — 4: Counter-Argument From The Gun-To-The-Head Test Actually Not Working A depressed person may not be able to get out of bed or live a normal life. This might get so bad that they decide to commit suicide by shooting themselves in the head. Confronted with a choice between living a normal life, or a gunshot to the head, they have chosen the gunshot4. It appears that they have passed the gun-to-the-head test that Caplan loves so much. I feel bad including this one, because Caplan can fairly object that this is just another preference. Maybe depressed people completely voluntarily choose to lie in bed for a few years while falsely claiming to be miserable and then shoot themselves in the head, and all of this is a perfectly free choice that they are happy with. I cannot disprove this, only point out how unparsimonious it is. Maybe a better example is when a psychotic person attacks the cops, the cops order him to stop or else they’ll shoot him, the psychotic person continues attacking them (eg because he believes he’s invincible) and then the police go ahead and shoot him. Again, Caplan could say that this is just a preference for attacking cops and then being killed. But in that case he should stop touting the “gun to the head test” as meaningful. Rather, he should admit that his theory is completely unfalsifiable - no matter what actions a mentally ill person does, what tests they pass or fail, he can just say they had a preference for doing whatever they did. In fact, at this point I don’t see why he even has to acknowledge the existence of constraints at all. One might as well claim that a paralyzed person could walk if they wanted, but chooses not to. III. I think Caplan is groping towards something like the following criticism: Suppose we simplify depression to “person lies in bed and doesn’t do anything all day”. Caplan’s model treats this as “depressed person has preference to lie in bed”. My model treats this as “depressed person has an abnormal mental/emotional/motivational state that makes it difficult and unpleasant for them to not lie in bed”. Now we consider a gay person. Caplan’s model treats this as “person has a preference to be gay”. Wouldn’t my model have to treat this as . . . person has abnormal mental/emotional/motivational state that makes it difficult and unpleasant for them to be heterosexual? In some sense this is true. We could imagine some very religious man from the 1950s who really wants to be straight, marry a woman, and raise a family. But due to some hormonal disturbance, he feels a very strong urge to have sex with men. How is this different from (let’s say) depression-secondary-to-hypothyroidism, where some person really wants to live a normal life, but instead, due to a hormonal disturbance, feels unable to do anything but lie in bed? It doesn’t seem that different to me. It also doesn’t seem that different from a straight guy who wishes he were gay (maybe for LGBTQ cred, or because it would make it much easier to find partners) but feels a very strong urge to have sex with women. So does that mean that depression is “just a preference”? I don’t think so, because none of these scenarios seem that different from the person with the migraine either! I think the preference/constraint dichotomy is a bad way to think about about this whole class of things. I think all of the following things shade into each other: A migraine. You could think of this as a preference for sitting in a dark room and saying “ow ow ow” - or as an internal state of head pain.
Inline links: as posited in a response by Emil Kierkegaard, this link, this post, 1, The Tails Coming Apart As Metaphor For Life, Ambijectivity, 2, 3, you’ll sleep, 4
Links For August 2023
August 09, 2023 · Original source
30: Men seem to have higher variance on a wide variety of traits (both biochemical, like cholesterol level, and socially interesting, like intelligence) compared to females (the Greater Male Variability Hypothesis). One common explanation is that men have only one X chromosome, compared to women’s two, so any unusual genes on the X chromosome get “averaged out” in women but not in men. An obvious question is whether the fraction of genes on the X chromosome is enough to explain the magnitude of greater male variability. Emil Kierkegaard does a simulation and says no, suggesting that evolution must be actively selecting for male variability somehow. I appreciate this work, but also appreciate the work showing greater female variability in animal species where the male has two of the same chromosome, suggesting that it is chromosome-based after all. I don’t know how to square these two findings.
Inline links: Emil Kierkegaard does a simulation and says no, the work
Links for July 2024
July 24, 2024 · Original source
25: Emil Kierkegaard: It Doesn’t Matter Whether Refugees Are In The Same Classroom. Large, precise study finds that even though refugees themselves do poorly in school, there is no negative effect on native children from having lots of refugees in their class. This probably implies minimal effects from classmates even within native-born children (ie you shouldn’t worry that sending your kid to a school with bad students will make them do worse), although I guess you could argue that maybe refugees are so culturally distinct that they don’t transmit social influence the same way co-ethnic kids would. I’m usually down for “lol, everything is genetic” style findings, but I’m confused because I thought I remembered pretty convincing evidence that having disruptive kids in a class is very harmful for everyone else’s learning. Maybe the refugees do poorly but are no more likely to be disruptive, so classmate effects from disruptive kids are still on the table?
Inline links: It Doesn’t Matter Whether Refugees Are In The Same Classroom