Peru
Article
Peru is a recurring place in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 11 times across 11 issues between April 30, 2021 and August 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as “a report on the guano-producing bird population in Peru”; “alone with the guano-producing birds on the desolate coast of Peru”; “Vogt was tasked with studying in Peru before synthetic fertilizer became the cheap and obvious solution”. It most often appears alongside India, Mexico, Argentina.
Metadata
- Category: Places
- Mention count: 11
- Issue count: 11
- First seen: April 30, 2021
- Last seen: August 22, 2025
Appears In
- Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet
- Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower
- Your Book Review: Where’s My Flying Car?
- Open Thread 176
- Your Book Review: Why Nations Fail
- Dictator Book Club: Chavez
- Links For April 2024
- How Often Do Men Think About Rome?
- ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates
- Your Review: My Father’s Instant Mashed Potatoes
- Your Review: Ollantay
Related Pages
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- India (5 shared issues)
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- Mexico (5 shared issues)
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- Argentina (4 shared issues)
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- Brazil (4 shared issues)
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- United States (4 shared issues)
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- Africa (3 shared issues)
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- America (3 shared issues)
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- Astralcodexten Com (3 shared issues)
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- California (3 shared issues)
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- Canada (3 shared issues)
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- China (3 shared issues)
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- Italy (3 shared issues)
External Links
Source Context
Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.
The big shift Vogt makes to his contemporaries’ flavor of environmentalism is to turn from the specifics of racism, classism, and eugenics to generalized misanthropy. His subsequent writings – a report on the guano-producing bird population in Peru, surveys of ecology across South America, and especially his best-selling book Road to Survival – borrow from his predecessors’ racist-tinged doom-heralding and expand on it by chastising all humans, rich and poor, white and non-white alike. According to Mann, Vogt argues that "consumption driven by capitalism and rising human numbers is the ultimate cause of most of the world’s ecological problems, and only dramatic reductions in human fertility and economic activity will prevent a worldwide calamity." Crucial to this is the concept of "carrying capacity" – the idea that the earth has a fixed capacity to support human and animal life.
The problem with the concept of carrying capacity – impossible to define or know when we’ve surpassed, until after the proverbial moment when killing one mosquito or dovekie too many plunges us into everlasting fire and brimstone – is that it seems mostly like a mood affiliation thing. Consider this: when you look out at the bird feeder hanging in your backyard (Bay Area people living in closets, use your imagination here), do you see a blissful symbiotic coexistence of the human world and nature, with humans generously giving of our growth-accumulated abundance to help the birds flourish? Or do you see a dystopian struggle where innocent creatures pushed to the brink of death by our traffic and pesticides and housecats must rely on meager scraps for survival? There isn’t really a right view here, I don’t think, just a predilection for seeing what matches your intuition and telling a story about it. Given the life story Mann depicts for Vogt, it’s not hard to see why he would lean toward the pessimistic take. From the childhood marred by a philandering father who left his family in a cloud of scandal and ruin, to the adult life spent stumbling from one bourgeois non-occupation (theater critic, bird watcher, government mole rooting out Nazis in South America) to the next, to the childlessness and divorce, Vogt seems happiest when he is away from any humans, whether tromping through pre-suburbanized Long Island, or alone with the guano-producing birds on the desolate coast of Peru. Were he to live in an age of Facebook and Twitter, he would definitely be that guy reposting memes that COVID is finally letting our planet "heal."
Inline links: mood affiliation
In "Earth," Mann focuses on the problem of how to continue to scale food production to meet the needs of an exponentially growing population. The Wizards already have quite a few impressive wins under their belt: in addition to Borlaug’s wheat, rice, and maize, there’s also creating synthetic fertilizer, which reduced the world’s reliance on natural but limited stocks of nitrogen-rich resources (like guano, which Vogt was tasked with studying in Peru before synthetic fertilizer became the cheap and obvious solution). For the future, the Wizards look to upgrade staple food crops to C4 photosynthesis (a more efficient way for plants to distinguish between hydrogen and carbon dioxide, requiring less water and nitrogen for the same yield). At the time Mann was writing The Wizard and the Prophet, C4 was still considered a whacky moonshot, but more recently it’s looking like we’re getting closer to making it happen. The Prophets, meanwhile, decry genetically modifying food as an abomination (despite, or maybe because of, the unyielding reassurance from scientists that it’s perfectly safe), insist that synthetic fertilizer used in industrial farming irreparably damages soil (the evidence for this claim seems mixed, though what most researchers appear to agree on is that the higher per-acre yield of synthetic fertilizer means less land needed for farming and thus less overall harm to the environment) and propose to feed the world with... local, organic farming? Years ago, I remember watching the first season of "America’s Next Top Model," at the time the most interesting study of class divides in America. One of the contestants was a smart upper-class medical student. The sickest shade one of the other contestants, a Bible-thumping blue-collar Southern girl, thought to throw at her was asking what kind of pizza she liked and following it up with a sneering "... organic?" I think that, more than reams of evidence that Alice Waters style organic proselytizing does little to solve world hunger, pretty well sums up the rebuttal to this Prophet argument. Anti-GMO scaremongering aside, humanity seems pretty content to live off industrial globalized agriculture if it means pizza isn’t $50 a pop and only available to a rarefied population of coastal elites.
Inline links: C4 photosynthesis, we’re getting closer to making it happen, unyielding reassurance from scientists that it’s perfectly safe, higher per-acre yield of synthetic fertilizer means less land needed for farming and thus less overall harm to the environment, reams of evidence that Alice Waters style organic proselytizing does little to solve world hunger
The second half of The Accidental Superpower is filled with Zeihan’s predictions about what happens if the big thesis is right. Some states will fail, as they don’t have what’s needed to survive (Syria, Greece, Libya). Some will decentralize, as they’re in the same boat, just not as hard up (Russia, China). Some will merely decline, as they have some capacity to address challenges (Brazil, India, Canada). Some will cope (UK, France, Peru, Philippines). A few will join the US as “masters of the chaos,” as they have favorable geographies and other advantages (Australia, Argentina, Angola, Turkey, Indonesia, Uzbekistan).
Flying cars didn’t have the same issues; they were being developed privately. But regulation doomed them. Harold Pitcairn was almost successful in developing a flying car, but then in World War II the government nationalized his helicopter patents (they promised to give them back after the war, but reneged) and he spent the rest of his life in court. He won, 17 years after his death. Bruce Hallock had a promising design, but he sold a plane to a missionary group in Peru and was arrested as an “arms trafficker”. Robert Fulton had a successful prototype, “however, Fulton’s financial backers had become discouraged with the seemingly endless expense of meeting government production standards, and they withdrew their support.” Molt Taylor “was actually in serious negotiations with Ford as late as 1975 to have the Aerocar mass-produced. The monkeywrench was thrown into the negotiations by the FAA and the DOT. Taylor already had an airworthiness certificate for the Aerocar, granted by the CAA (predecessor of the FAA) after a delay of 7 years from its first flight. He claims that the agencies turned thumbs down on the Aerocar ‘because everybody would have one, and we couldn’t handle the [air] traffic.’ Airplane regulation has only gotten stricter: “The entire F.A.R. / A.I.M., which every airman is responsible for knowing, is 1085 pages long. At least it was in 2013; a new one comes out every year.” So in the end, we have none of these technologies. No flying cars, even though they were prototyped almost a hundred years ago. Some nuclear energy, but crippled, aged, feared, and hated. 3D printing, but no nanotech. No level 5. Because the state needs legibility, and progress is not legible. The bureaucratic incentives are to calcify. If no one does anything new, no one will do anything wrong. Hall:
4: Comments of the week were on Drug Users Use A Lot Of Drugs, where many people pointed out that cocaine works this way too. Coca tea is an over-the-counter stimulant in Peru, which Zach describes as "so smooth, so much less 'buzzy' than with caffeine, that it seems criminal it's not legal in the US", and Harry Deuchar calculates that the average coca tea drinker in Peru might get about 4 mg of cocaine, whereas the average addict gets about 900 mg a day. This helps put a lot of things in perspective for me, like how Coca-Cola used to have cocaine in it - probably this was completely reasonable and a fine choice! (this last sentence is so not medical advice)
Inline links: Zach describes, Harry Deuchar
Even if correct, it is much less interesting and useful than it appears. Epistemic status: I have a decade-old PhD in economics (not in the field of economic growth) and a handful of peer-reviewed papers in moderately-ranked journals. I'm not claiming to make any original technical points, or to give a comprehensive evaluation of the economic growth literature. My criticisms are largely straight from the authors' own mouths. 1. What is this book about? Why is it not very good? Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) argue that countries are rich or poor because of their political institutions, not culture, geography or policy ignorance. I'll do this as much as possible in AR’s own words. Why Nations Fail was written during the Arab Spring, so the preface begins with Egypt. Some stress that Egypt’s poverty is determined primarily by its geography, by the fact that the country is mostly a desert and lacks adequate rainfall, and that its soils and climate do not allow productive agriculture1. Others instead point to cultural attributes ... Egyptians, they argue, lack the same sort of work ethic and cultural traits that have allowed others to prosper, and instead have accepted Islamic beliefs that are inconsistent with economic success. A third approach, the one dominant among economists and policy pundits, is based on the notion that the rulers of Egypt simply don’t know what is needed to make their country prosperous, and have followed incorrect policies and strategies in the past. Unsurprisingly, those other economists and policy pundits turn out to be wrong and the authors turn out to be right. In this book we’ll argue that the Egyptians in Tahrir Square, not most academics and commentators, have the right idea. In fact, Egypt is poor precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that have organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass of people. And the Egyptian lesson turns out to be general. Whether it is North Korea, Sierra Leone, or Zimbabwe, we’ll show that poor countries are poor for the same reason that Egypt is poor. Countries such as Great Britain and the United States became rich because their citizens overthrew the elites who controlled power and created a society where political rights were much more broadly distributed, where the government was accountable and responsive to citizens, and where the great mass of people could take advantage of economic opportunities. What are “institutions” anyway? (The economic and political kind, not the prison and mental hospital kind.) Basically, AR mean politics. The word "institutions" occurs over 1000 times in Why Nations Fail2. I'll just focus on how AR use it without worrying about the dictionary, different schools of economics, or other social sciences. They begin with what institutions do rather than what they are. Nogales, Arizona, is in the United States. Its inhabitants have access to the economic institutions of the United States, which enable them to choose their occupations freely, acquire schooling and skills, and encourage their employers to invest in the best technology, which leads to higher wages for them. They also have access to political institutions that allow them to take part in the democratic process, to elect their representatives, and replace them if they misbehave. The word is used dozens more times before ARattempt a more general definition. Each society functions with a set of economic and political rules created and enforced by the state and the citizens collectively. Economic institutions shape economic incentives: the incentives to become educated, to save and invest, to innovate and adopt new technologies, and so on. It is the political process that determines what economic institutions people live under, and it is the political institutions that determine how this process works. So while economic and political institutions can be separated, it is the political institutions that matter in the long run. The good kind of institutions that lead to economic growth are "inclusive", as opposed to "extractive". To be inclusive, economic institutions must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers. ... such rights must exist for the majority of people in society. Political pluralism is necessary, but not sufficient without a strong centralised state. ... political institutions that distribute power broadly in society and subject it to constraints are pluralistic. ... the key to understanding why South Korea and the United States have inclusive economic institutions is not just their pluralistic political institutions but also their sufficiently centralized and powerful states. A telling contrast is with the East African nation of Somalia. I am still a bit hazy as to the relative importance of de jure written rules versus the de facto struggle for power. AR are somewhat circular: Politics is the process by which a society chooses the rules that will govern it. Politics surrounds institutions ... When there is conflict over institutions, what happens depends on which people or group wins out in the game of politics ... The political institutions of a society are a key determinant of the outcome of this game. They are the rules that govern incentives in politics. But overall, you could just say ‘politics’ and not be too far off. AR do this themselves occasionally. South Korea ended up with very different economic institutions than the North because different people with different interests and objectives made the decisions about how to structure society. In other words, South Korea had different politics. AR's academic reputation is based on statistical analysis, but Why Nations Fail tries to do narrative history, IMHO not very well. When Jeffrey Sachs reviewed the book, he complained: They never define their key variables with precision, present any quantitative data or classifications based on those definitions, or offer even a single table, figure, or regression line to demonstrate the relationships that they contend underpin all economic history. Instead, they present a stream of assertions and anecdotes about the inclusive or extractive nature of this or that institution. AR replied baldly: Sachs ... argues that we provide no evidence. Right, we do not in the book. But that’s because a book for a general audience is not the right forum for presenting academic research, and we spent many years of our lives precisely on writing academic papers providing exactly the sort of evidence. ... So yes, we don’t provide the econometric evidence in the book, which isn’t of course the right place to do it, but econometric evidence is abundantly loud in the way it speaks on these topics. So, don't expect Why Nations Fail to be an accessible explanation of AR's academic work, which is what I was hoping for when I first read it. What do they spend over 500 pages on then? Well, after the preface, there's fifteen chapters of, as Sachs says, "assertions and anecdotes". Not just about "the inclusive or extractive nature of this or that institution", to be fair, but how institutions can change at "critical junctures" such as the Black Death or colonisation, and why it can be in elites’ interests to block economic innovation if it threatens their power, so that growth under extractive institutions is unlikely to be sustained. These chapters are not particularly good – I found them poorly organised and repetitive – but not particularly bad, if you are willing to accept the underlying premise that institutions are the main determinant of economic growth. Cumulatively they have an effect similar to the Old Testament, if you are willing to accept the underlying premise that the fortunes of the nation of Israel are determined by the LORD. Only the second chapter, ‘Theories that Don't Work’, makes a sustained argument against alternative theories. Geography is disposed of by noting the stark differences at the US-Mexican, North-South Korean and East-West German borders, and the reversal of fortune by which the present day US and Canada only became richer than Mexico, Central and South America following European colonisation. Culture is hand-waved away with the assertion that institutions determine the any relevant cultural behaviours, not the other way around, referring to the same border examples, the rapid catch up of Catholic Europe despite Weber's Protestant Ethic, the malign influence of the European and Ottoman empires on Africa, the range of outcomes within the former British Empire, and the more European population of Argentina and Uruguay versus the US and Canada, or of Columbia versus Ecuador and Peru. Not a bad list of anecdotes, but one could equally well point to the cross-border success of Ashkenazi Jews, overseas Chinese, or Baltic and Volga Germans. Ignorance is simply dismissed with the assertion that "if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies." Various good and bad policy changes are explained as the result of political pressures rather than improved knowledge. The implication seems to be that good policies are so obvious they don’t require expert knowledge or advice, or that the experts never get it wrong. This appears most implausible in the debate over socialism and economic planning. Writing off the entire Communist experience as simply another elite trying to preserve its power feels inadequate, especially considering that some distinguished bourgeois economists thought central planning was a plausible road to riches until quite late in the day. Genetics or race is not mentioned, but would presumably attract the same counterexamples as geography and culture. Another theory AR do not discuss is crude exploitation: while colonial empires are excoriated, it is for setting up persistent extractive political institutions rather than for a direct theft of resources. The prosperity of white-owned South African farms next to poverty-stricken Bantustans is explained by the better quality of the institutions available to whites under apartheid, not relative population densities and land quality. For the rest of the book, I'll just list a few nitpicks to signal I read the whole thing and know a bit of history, but feel free to skip this – the real evidence for AR's thesis is in their academic papers, and I'll discuss those in the next section. I think AR overrate the importance of the Glorious Revolution, to the point of claiming it "created the rule of law" – after all, Parliament had already deposed and executed a king, then brought back the king’s son on their own terms after a decade of republican government. No less a luminary than Edmund Burke asserted "The Revolution was made to preserve our ancient indisputable laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our only security for law and liberty." Also, strong signs of British economic uniqueness – the abnormal growth of London and reliance on coal as a fuel – predated 1688.
Inline links: 1, 2, dictionary, schools, economics, social sciences, reviewed, replied, Protestant Ethic, planning, distinguished, bourgeois, Glorious Revolution, Edmund Burke, predated
But Chavez stayed the same overly serious, overdramatic young person as always. And his hero-worshipping tendencies found a new target: Simon Bolivar, the Great Liberator, the man who had first won Latin America its freedom from Spain. Comandante seems confused exactly how Chavez ended up so left-wing. Bolivar-worship was par for the course, but most military recruits took it in a conservative direction. It can only say that Chavez met some left-wing activists, and visited Peru when it was making its own left turn. Still, it seems that pretty early, Chavez had come up with an unorthodox fusion of Bolivarism and communism, mixed with a sense of personal destiny. A diary entry from 1977, addressed to Bolivar, said:
21: Updates from ACX grantees: antiparasitic drug oxfendazole has been approved for Phase 2 trials (ie trials in humans) in Peru. And Dr. Roy and his citizen drinking water surveillance project have published a paper discussing some of their work over the past decade.
Was in Peru, compared Inca empire to Romans.
These studies support our clinical work, following successful completion of two Phase I studies. We are presently collaborators on three Phase II efficacy studies taking place in Peru on three different parasitic diseases, an approach to ascertain the range (in terms of disease and dose) of oxfendazole’s efficacy.
Trichuris trichiura - Funded by NIH and conducted in the Peruvian Amazon by the Peruvian nonprofit Asociación Benéfica PRISMA, this field trial is the first clinical study of oxfendazole’s efficacy in human patients. This clinical trial has been live since the fall of 2024. ODG is a collaborator in this study and will have full access to the study results to support the development of oxfendazole. (NCT04713787)
Potatoes were domesticated several millennia ago at the dawn of agriculture in the rugged highlands near Lake Titicaca in modern-day Peru. Their origins lie in a wild family of tiny, bitter, pockmarked solanum roots, so full of glycoalkaloids that when foraged they had to be eaten alongside clay to soak up their toxins. From this paltry stock of nightshades, archaic peoples of the Andes gradually husbanded generous, nutritious, mild tubers that would remain the staple of the region’s foodways through several successive civilizations.
Ollantay is a three-act play written in Quechua, an indigenous language of the South American Andes. It was first performed in Peru around 1775. Since the mid-1800s it’s been performed more often, and nowadays it’s pretty easy to find some company in Peru doing it. If nothing else, it’s popular in Peruvian high schools as a way to get students to connect with Quechua history. It’s not a particularly long play; a full performance of Ollantay takes around an hour.1
Inline links: 1
When Ollantay was first performed, Peru was around two hundred years removed from Pizarro’s apocalyptic conquest. The population was finally starting to recover, so that in 1770 it sat at around 1.2 million people. The vast majority of those 1.2 million people were indigenous,3 and the vast majority of those 1.2 million people did not have great lives. Peru was oriented almost exclusively towards extracting mineral wealth from the mountains and moving it to Spain.
Inline links: 3
Peru was divided into around fifty provinces called corregimientos, each of which was run by a single corregidor. The corregidor held a monopoly on trade with all the Indians in his province, and he was also in charge of collecting taxes. If that sounds like a position which lends itself pretty easily to corruption and abuse, that’s because it was; the corregidores were uniformly fabulously wealthy and fabulously hated. And in addition to having to pay taxes, all the Indians were obligated to provide free labor to factories and public works projects - public works projects which were used not to improve living conditions of the Indians or provide them with roads between their villages, but to enable moving silver from the mines in the mountains down to the coast for shipping abroad. The Spanish crown expected that around 15% of the population of a district should be providing free labor at any given time. The actual number was usually much higher.
Backlinks
- ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates
- Andes
- Concepts: I
- Dictator Book Club: Chavez
- How Often Do Men Think About Rome?
- Inca empire
- Links For April 2024
- Midwest
- Open Thread 176
- oxfendazole
- People: P
- Peter Zeihan
- Places: A
- Places: P
- Your Book Review: The Accidental Superpower
- Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet
- Your Book Review: Where’s My Flying Car?
- Your Book Review: Why Nations Fail
- Your Review: My Father’s Instant Mashed Potatoes
- Your Review: Ollantay