Astral Codex Ten

Stephen Grugett

14 min read

Stephen Grugett

Article

Stephen Grugett is a recurring person in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 5 times across 5 issues between December 28, 2021 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as “James Grugett, Stephen Grugett and Austin Chen, $20,000, for a new prediction market”; “Stephen Grugett talks about technical issues around how prediction markets work”; “Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett”. It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Kalshi, Manifold.

Metadata

  • Category: People
  • Mention count: 5
  • Issue count: 5
  • First seen: December 28, 2021
  • Last seen: March 03, 2026

Appears In

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

ACX Grants Results
December 28, 2021 · Original source
James Grugett, Stephen Grugett and Austin Chen, $20,000, for a new prediction market. If every existing prediction market is Lawful Good, this team proposes the Chaotic Evil version: anyone can submit a question, questions can be arbitrarily subjective, and the resolution is decided by the submitter, no appeal allowed. And the submitter/decider gets a small cut (1%?) of the money traded on the question. I honestly have no idea how this would play out. Certainly it would incentivize lots of people to write lots of great questions and promote them widely. It sort of incentivizes a strategy of always deciding fairly so you get a good reputation and more people use your questions - but also sort of a strategy of doing that for a while to build up credibility before betraying people, making false rulings, and stealing all their crypto (of course it's crypto). The part I'm most fascinated by is the idea of not-necessarily-super-objective resolution criteria - we could have markets in things like "Will the Democrats' agenda succeed [according to Scott]?" They think a clear use case is minor Internet celebrities using their brand to make and shill markets related to their interests, since these people at least have some reputational reasons not to take the money and run. They have a play-money beta version up at https://mantic.markets/
Inline links: https://mantic.markets/
23
October 31, 2023 · Original source
Stephen Grugett talks about technical issues around how prediction markets work (eg automated market makers) and how to build bots for them.
Inline links: technical issues around how prediction markets work
24
May 13, 2024 · Original source
(I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.
Inline links: leaving the site, Manifund, report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F-e7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F679c34d2-766f-41bd-ae75-b036bcdb06f9_1456x849.webp, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JSEn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9c315554-fca5-4dc5-ac9a-d531b4ce7534_883x519.png, forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”, Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup, Cultivate Labs, choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas, here, superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk, here, @Grayden, here, here, “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here
Open Thread 423
March 02, 2026 · Original source
1: ACX Grantee Stephen Grugett (of Manifold Markets) wants me to announce his latest project: MNX, “a decentralized futures exchange targeting sophisticated traders and focused on the AI economy”. It’s a real-money platform where traders who want to hedge their AI plays can bet on benchmark progress, compute prices, etc. Announcement here, testnet here.
Inline links: MNX, here
Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day
March 03, 2026 · Original source
Stephen Grugett and Ian Philips of Manifold Markets have announced a new project, MNX.
Inline links: MNX
(the other technological sea change is that this is possible at all. Five years ago, cryptocurrency prediction markets were too complicated. In the late 2010s, a group called Augur raised $5 million for the project but never managed to create usable software. FTX flirted with prediction-like contracts but never got them off the ground even with all their billions. Polymarket was the first to really solve this, making $10 billion in the process, but even they were barely usable in the early days. But Stephen’s making MNX with his own money and a team of 1-2 people. He benefits partly from the vibecoding revolution, and partly from all of the billions of dollars spent on improving cryptocurrency rails - MNX uses the stablecoin USDC).