Manifold Markets

Article

Manifold Markets is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 35 times across 35 issues between February 01, 2022 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as “Manifold Markets is still alive and active: 30%”; “Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy”; “And the team behind Manifold Markets (ACX grant recipient) want me to announce that they’re officially open!“. It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Manifold, Polymarket.

Metadata

  • Category: Organizations
  • Mention count: 35
  • Issue count: 35
  • First seen: February 01, 2022
  • Last seen: March 03, 2026

Appears In

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

February 01, 2022 · Original source
PREDICTION MARKETS 88. No new real-money prediction market becomes bigger than Polymarket: 70% 89. Manifold Markets is still alive and active: 30% 90. New legal US real-money prediction market at least half as big as Kalshi: 5% 91. New illegal but easy-to-use market satisfying the above: 20% 92. I post my scores on these predictions before 2/1/23: 80%
February 07, 2022 · Original source
Easy to create your own subsidized markets “Real money” should be self-explanatory. Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice, but so far they’re limited to a small group of enthusiasts playing in their spare time. I value them both, but neither is the killer app that makes prediction markets as central to everyday life as stock markets or polls or whatever. “Easy to use” is kind of self-explanatory, but with some caveats. A big part of ease-of-use is liquidity; you can get that from a big user base or from clever deployment of automated market makers. A market that requires crypto knowledge is harder to use than one that doesn’t; one that’s inaccessible from the US is harder to use than one that isn’t. Also all the normal things like UI and search. “Easy to create your own markets” is where we’ve gotten stuck so far. Prediction markets are absolutely on top of questions about whether Donald Trump will win various elections. This is a solved problem. What I really wanted last year (and would have subsidized!) was a market about whether Alameda County, California, would permit indoor gatherings of 50 people on January 8th 2022 (ie would I be forced to cancel my wedding). But I also would have appreciated the ability to put a few questions to prediction markets before starting my psychiatry practice, or my grants program, or any of a dozen other things I did. A friend has gone further, and half-jokingly said they want to create conditional prediction markets about whether they’re compatible with various women in our friend group, to be paid out six months after the first date. Some of these applications are attempts to route around the principal-agent problem. Maybe I have some question about whether a certain grant would succeed, I’m not sure who to ask, and even if someone gives me a “Bob Smith, Grant Evaluator” business card, I don’t know if he’s any good. A prediction market takes all the pain out of searching for information - if I subsidize it enough, it’ll attract people with the relevant skill set who will solve my problem for me. Probably some of these ideas wouldn’t work, but probably other ideas I can’t even think of now would. I don’t know what the killer app for prediction markets will be. But we’re not going to find out unless people can create their own subsidized markets and play around. Polymarket took some baby steps towards this before the settlement: they had a Discord server where anyone could propose questions, and a lot of those questions became markets. But they still had to be general interest, not “let Alice’s five friends predict her dating life”. And there’s a big difference between “talk it over with company representatives on a Discord server” and “press a button”. Imagine if you could only tweet by emailing Jack Dorsey and convincing him that your comment was a good thing to have on Twitter. Even if Jack had good judgment and approved most requests, this would be a long way from the limbic system < — > Send Tweet loop that real Twitter users know and love. I asked some people in the business why they won’t do this. They said most people are bad at writing good resolution criteria. They don’t want their employees to get stuck resolving incredibly dumb questions about people’s dating lives, hunting down inaccessible or conflicting information, and making a bunch of people mad whichever way they decide. As far as I can tell, Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy. But Manifold is US-based and can’t use real money, so there’s still no way to subsidize a market effectively. (This is why I’m pessimistic about Kalshi. They could potentially do a lot of good in the “will Afghanistan collapse?” types of markets the Nobel laureates want, though even there I think some of their betting limits will give them trouble - $25,000 is good money, but not quite good enough to incentivize founding the prediction market equivalent of a Wall Street trading firm. But even if they solve this, I can’t imagine the regulators giving them permission to host “will this grant work out?” or “how will my dating life go?” markets; it’s just too weird, and the CFTC is too conservative. I don’t know, maybe their connections will come through and pull it off, but I don’t even know if they’re ambitious enough to want this, and I hate having to rely on one organization.) Right now my hopes are, in ascending order of likelihood: Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.
Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.
February 13, 2022 · Original source
2: And the team behind Manifold Markets (ACX grant recipient) want me to announce that they’re officially open!
This has been kind of surreal for me, because I haven’t seen much about them in the usual prediction market news, but lots of friends from outside the forecasting space have gotten involved. A writing circle I know are betting with each other about who will finish their stories when. A housemate opened a market into whether she’ll get pregnant, and another housemate who helps with childcare is buying shares “as a hedge”. I’m feeling pretty good about my claim last week that easy market creation would open up hitherto unexplored territories. TFW you learn the market says 85% chance your friend hooks up with your ex 3: Related: ACX Grants recipient Nuno Sempere somehow got grant money of his own and is giving out $10K in prediction market related microgrants. Apply here if interested.
TFW you learn the market says 85% chance your friend hooks up with your ex 3: Related: ACX Grants recipient Nuno Sempere somehow got grant money of his own and is giving out $10K in prediction market related microgrants. Apply here if interested.
March 14, 2022 · Original source
4: Also last month, I suggested Manifold Markets have a loan feature to help boost investment in long-term markets. They’ve since added this feature: your first $M20 will automatically be a zero-interest loan.
1: Taosumer reviews my Prediction Market Cube and asks why I don’t have “decentralized” on there as a desideratum. My answer: decentralization is great, but for me it cashes out in “ease of use” - specifically, it’s easy to use it because the government hasn’t shut it down or banned you. Or as “real money” - the reason Manifold isn’t real-money is because they’re centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore need to obey laws. Or as “easy to create market” - the reason Kalshi doesn’t let you create markets is partly because it’s centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore needs to limit markets to things regulators like. I agree that, because of those second order effects, decentralization is crucial and needs to be pursued more, and I agree that it’s a tragedy that [whatever happened to Augur] happened to Augur.
5: Related: I’m testing Manifold as a knowledge-generation device. If you want to help, go bet in the market about how I’ll rank interventions in an upcoming updated version of the Biodeterminists’ Guide To Pregnancy.
March 28, 2022 · Original source
Austin, a co-founder of Manifold Markets (formerly Mantic Markets) asks the market what he’ll decide on this technical question. This does two things:
Niels Bohr supposedly said that “prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”. So why not predict the past and present instead? Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.
Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.
August 16, 2022 · Original source
What’s the catch? Offer not open to US citizens - a vexing, problematic negation. And you need to have a Solana wallet, own crypto, and know how to use it. And there’s not a lot of volume so far. But otherwise, no catch. This is just a really good new thing. Think of it as Manifold Markets, but with real money (and 10x harder to use).
The community consensus so far seems to be to try to avoid Kalshi as long as it can. There are some good real-money prediction markets open to non-Americans: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, and Insight Prediction, although Americans will find visits prohibited nationally, and I would never recommend violating precepts negligently. You could also try play-money markets like Manifold, or market-adjacent forecasting sites like Metaculus.
Finally, there’s a claim that Aristotle, the for-profit company involved with PredictIt, might try to move into the fully-regulated-prediction-market space and compete with Kalshi. I’m posting this as an encouragement for you to click on it and bet, not as a final word about the probability - there are only four bets so far! This might actually be a good move; Kalshi had to spend lots of blood and sweat and money getting the CFTC to approve a prediction market, but now that there’s a precedent it’ll be easier for the next entrant. And the Kalshi-haters might support a competitor out of pure spite. This would be almost unfair: Kalshi would have done all the hard work, get forced into unethical business practices to make back the money it sacrificed, and then someone else could free-ride with a spotless reputation.
October 18, 2022 · Original source
The Manifold Markets team, along with Nuno Sempere, Linch Zhang, Ozzie Gooen, and other rationalist/EA forecasters.
First of all, thanks to the Substack team for making Manifold Markets embed easily in Substack! Taking advantage of their hard work:
Sources: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen The lowest forecaster is higher than the highest pollster! Taking 538 as an example, forecasters range from 5 pp higher (Manifold) to 17 pp higher (PredictIt). Tournaments and real-money markets tend to give higher numbers than play-money sites. I would go with 47% on this one, based on the convergence between GJO, CSPI, and Polymarket. CFTC vs. PredictIt (and everyone else), Part II The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the US agency regulating prediction markets. In August, they told PredictIt (the biggest political prediction market) to shut down, effective in February. Now a motley group of stakeholders are suing the CFTC for a stay of execution. Plaintiffs include: 2 professors using the site as “a source of data for research”
November 04, 2022 · Original source
33: SD’s Neutrino Research (5/10) SD says his neutrino thesis is going well, and he is applying for graduate programs in neutrino physics. 34: User-Created Prediction Markets (9/10) Manifold Markets wanted to create a new prediction market platform where anyone could post questions. They’ve since pivoted to play money and raised $2.4 million in grants and seed funding, with about 10,000 different markets and 300 daily average users. I and many of my friends visit their site daily or at least weekly, and I often link them on Mantic Mondays. They have deals going with the Salem Center at University of Texas, Clearer Thinking, and various EA groups.
30: Writing Forecasting Questions For EA Organizations (6/10) Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.
November 30, 2022 · Original source
I think those numbers might be "over one year", and they could stay on it longer than a year. I was kind of lazy just asserting “drugs might get better”, but I think the upcoming CagriSema combination and AMG-133 are good examples of how this might play out. Max Görlitz has done the proper thing and made Manifold markets for each of my predictions - see here, here, here, here, and here. Despite the problems with prediction markets for decades in the future, the “will obesity be cut in half by 2050” one seems popular: 5. Do You Have To Stay On Semaglutide Forever Or Else Gain The Weight Back? Biff_Ditt writes: I saw on the 1 year follow-up to the STEP-1 trial that most of the participants gained all of their lost weight back. Biff is probably thinking of Weight Regain And Cardiometabolic Effects After Withdrawal Of Semaglutide, which finds people gained back 2/3 of the lost weight after a year. The graph looks like it’s in the process of plateauing but not quite there, so I don’t know if we should expect them to regain the other third later. This matches what I would expect from my understanding of other diets and weight loss drugs. Still, some people disagree. Maximum Liberty writes: Anecdote is not the singular of data, but my better half lost 25 pounds on it, then had to get off it for reasons unrelated to the drug. She has not regained the weight yet -- and consistently eats less now that she had for years. So in at least one case, the drug helped with a successful change in eating habits. Lauren Thomas writes: So there's been a lot of research on dieting and losing weight, etc., and one of the things that has been found is that your body has a "set" point weight wise that it will try REALLY hard to return you to. If you lose weight, your body will slow its metabolism until you return to that weight. If you gain weight, your body will rev up metabolism. That's why you might gain 10 lbs over Christmas and then lose it in January without purposefully trying to lose weight. (this is all in the short term, ofc, as people do tend to naturally gain weight as they age). This seems to imply that semaglutide would need to be taken forever. However, there seems to be an important caveat: you *can* reset your set point, it just takes a long time at the new weight. When most people go on diets and lose weight, they end up regaining the new weight quite quickly after they "end" their diet, so they don't have a chance to reset their set point. Speaking from personal experience, I had kind of an accidental natural experiment with this: I once lost 40 lbs over the course of a year and a half, where I began with a very strict low carb diet that very very slowly trailed off to a normal diet, mostly because I got progressively more tired of being on the low carb diet. So by the time I had gotten back to my normal diet, I had been losing weight for a long time. I ended up regaining 10 lbs of the weight, but no more, and am still ~30 lbs below my peak even today (5 years later). Something like this has been my experience with dieting too so far. And something like set point reset has to exist in order to explain things like why so many obese people fail to lose weight after they start eating healthy, and maybe other things like anorexia. And maybe it works for some people. Still, the evidence suggests that most people who stop semaglutide will regain the weight, at least for the protocol used in the study. Maybe some other protocol that had them on it for more than a year would have done better? 6. Personal Anecdotes Edgehopper writes: I couldn’t get Wegovy at a reasonable price when it was approved, and then Novo Nordisk started having huge supply chain problems with their injectors. Fortunately, Eli Lilly’s coupon for Mounjaro was less restrictive at first, though they’ve had to crack down as they have trouble meeting demand for both off-label weight loss use and for the approved T2D use. I am what the doctors call “morbidly obese,” and it’s been more effective than anything else I’ve ever tried. Down about 35 lbs in the first three months, and unlike with other diets I’ve tried, I’m not feeling miserable or hungry all the time. Assuming there aren’t scary side-effects in the future, these really are miracle drugs. I do expect the price to come down relatively quickly due to competition, which is a good thing. Education Realist (blog) writes: I am on Mounjaro, and have been for four months. Lost 20 pounds so far, and I'm not yet on full dosage. Occasional mild nausea but real issue for me is....tiredness. Not fatigue or exhaustion. I'm a former insomniac who can now hit the sack at 9:00 and sleep happily to 6 am, which is insanely weird. I have been trying to lose weight for 6 years, and for most of that time been in a 20 pound range that is 100 pounds over what someone of my height should weigh. I've eaten 1500 calories a day and not lost a pound, have to drop to 1100 to lose weight verrry slowly (that's with intermittent fasting and low carbs, around 50 grams). Last year before Mounjaro I started intermittent fasting and lost 20 pounds very quickly and then stopped cold. I do not have eating issues. I don't binge. I cut out the "four white foods" six years ago because I learned that I do better on meat and cheese and vegetables than I do on pasta or bread or potatoes and vegetables. I put on weight despite walking two and in some cases four miles a day, which I can do easily. I am ridiculously healthy and do not have an obesity diagnosis. Stone cold normal readings in A1c, glucose, cholestrol. My doctor sent me to an endocrinologist after I lost 20 pounds and then stopped cold despite the same behavior (which I still do today) because she agreed I might be insulin resistant. Endocrinologist shrugged, said it's multifactorial, but agreed that anyone with my numbers, appearance, and obvious good health was clearly doing everything right and put me on Mounjaro with no further questions. Diagnosis: insulin resistance. My insurance pays around $500 but I'm on the $25 coupon. I didn't change a single thing about my eating habits and lost ten pounds in 2 months on the low dosage. Higher dosages have finally reduced my appetite somewhat, but my endocrinologist and I have decided to stop the increases at 12.5 (15 is the top) and then maybe even reduce, since my appetite is decreasing but the weight loss rate is constant. Because I lost weight doing the same behavior and no drop, I'm quite convinced that something far different than appetite suppressing is also going on (fwiw, I was on phentarmine back in the day and liked it fine). Mounjaro is supposed to increase insulin production and reduce the liver's sugar production, although what that means I dunno. I have no idea what's up with obesity but the idea that it's all about cutting intake and exercise is just stupid. I should have been losing weight for all of the past six years and haven't. Plenty of people eat healthily and are still obese. We're probably the descendants of famine survivors. Anyway, I wrote about it here: https://educationrealist.wordpress.com/2022/10/09/weight-loss-and-mounjaro Eliezer Yudkowsky writes: I tried semaglutide and it did nothing to slow rate of weight gain, just produced stomach upset, going up to 2.4mg injectable. I know one other person trying semaglutide and they reported something similar. I wonder if they played some clever games with their choice of patients. My expectation of how the news goes here is a whole lot of people who try semaglutide, maybe after fighting really hard to get on it, and find that it does nothing. That said, I know at least one friend of a friend, if not a friend per se, who claims that semaglutide was their miracle drug. So maybe still worth that hard fight, even if I'm guessing that the real proportion who get nothing out of it will prove to be over 50% in real populations. Further fun fact: Semaglutide comes heavily recommended with diet and exercise and many stern injunctions about that! The actual insert sheet includes a graph for how much weight people lose with and without "lifestyle interventions" added. The two graphs are roughly the same. Lan writes: I wonder about the adoption of the medication, though. I took victoza (=saxenda, but approved for diabetes) and the absence of the desire to eat lead to some unforeseen lifestyle side effects. Given that 5 almonds made me full for the day, I was not interested in having dinner with the family or going out with friends. There is the reality that some restaurants would probably not be happy if you only ordered the smallest appetizer. In addition, alcohol was also very difficult, because the drug slows down gastric emptying and your stomach ends up absorbing alcohol for hours. I got really, really drunk for an entire night from a single glass of wine once. Before taking this drug I had not fully appreciated how much of one's (social) life revolves around food; lunch break with colleagues, dinner with family or friends, drinks on the weekend, a sweet treat, snacks and a movie etc. But once I was not interested in food anymore, combined with the tiredness that comes with eating little, a lot of those activities also lost their appeal. (On the upside, I slept like a log.) Walter Sobchak, Esq writes: I have been taking Wegovy for 14 months. When I began I weighed 275 lbs and my BMI was 39.9. I have hypertension, albeit well controlled by medicines. Diet and exercise phaaahhh. I could eat faster than I could exercise. And no, I eat very little fast food and little candy and soda. I worked with my doctor to be prescribed Wegovy. It was only approved by the FDA in June 2021. My doctor was reluctant because he was unfamiliar with the class of compounds. He does not like to prescribe off label so he was not willing to to start me on Ozempic. But, the FDA solved that problem. I knew to ask for the drug because my daughter was pre-diabetic and had been put on Metformin and Ozempic. She lost 100 lbs. in 2019 and 2020. I started on Wegovy in September 2021. I now weigh 220 and my BMI is 31.5. That represents a 20% reduction in my original weight. 220 was my original goal. To get a BMI under 30 I would have to be under 209. I doubt that I will get there. I am back in 40 in. trousers which I had not been able to wear in 30 years. 220 was my original goal. I have had no major side effects other than constipation. Even that is a little hard to tease out. I am on 7 Rx drugs and at least 5 of them are constipating. I have been pounding Metamucil and Colace for years. I have been able to fill my prescriptions using a GoodRx coupon at $1328 for a box with 4 injectors. A year requires 13 boxes. The total cost for 15 boxes has been about $20,000. I can afford it and it has been worth while. I call it a bargain, the best I've ever had. I understand that it still way too expensive for the American health care system to afford. But given the bonanza size of the market. There will be lots of competition starting with the Lilly's tirzepatide. There are several other pharma's with GLP-1 agonists in development. I am sure that the cost will come down. My doctor tells me that I can expect to stay on semaglutide for the long term. He is proposing that I switch to Ozempic 2 mg for maintenance as I can buy that for less than $1,000 for a four dose pen. My only sadness is that semaglutide wasn't invented 40 years ago when i would have saved me from a lot of damage. But, I am grateful that it exists now and that it has helped my daughter so much. Also from Walter, and I was wondering about this: I was very concerned with the injections before I started Wegovy. My experience is that the injector is fast and almost painless. My pharmacist was important because he showed me how to do it correctly before I started. 7. Tangents That I Find Tedious, But Other People Apparently Really Want To Debate Why can’t people just diet and exercise? (142 comments)
December 05, 2022 · Original source
1: I was supposed to post this last time, forgot, and edited it in later, but I’ll put it in again this time for those of you who missed it - ACX Grantee Manifold Markets is looking for new investors after some recent growth. If interested, email austin@manifold.markets for more details. Product sample below:
December 20, 2022 · Original source
when you’re not sure which of many competing experts to trust, you should trust a prediction market instead of any of them Going through these claims one by one: 3.1: Why expect all prediction markets to agree with each other? Either all prediction markets agree with each other, or you can get rich quick: Suppose prediction markets disagreed. For example, suppose the RNC ran an Official Republican Prediction Market that said there was only a 10% chance Democrats would win the next election, and a 90% chance Republicans would. And suppose the DNC ran an Official Democrat Prediction Market that made the opposite prediction: 90% chance Democrats, 10% chance Republicans. Then you could buy a share of “Democrats will win” from the Republican market for 10 cents, plus a share of “Republicans will win” from the Democrat market for 10 cents, and be guaranteed to make $1 when one party or the other wins. You have turned 20 cents into a guaranteed $1. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This is just what financial experts call “arbitrage”. You may notice that in finance, people always give specific prices for things like shares of stock, barrels of oil, or Bitcoins. People say things like “Google stock is up to $300”, but never “Google stock is up to $300 on the NYSE, but down to $200 on NASDAQ”. If that was true, people would buy it on NASDAQ, sell it on NYSE, make $100 in free money, and get rich quick. In ideal situations, arbitrage forces everybody everywhere to agree on the same price for a financial instrument. Prediction markets turn claims about truth into financial instruments in a way which forces everybody everywhere to agree on how likely the claim is to be true. 3.2: Why expect prediction markets to be hard for special interests to manipulate? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt, or you can get rich quick. Argument: Suppose a prediction market was currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt. For example, suppose there is a prediction market for whether the sun will rise tomorrow. The true probability is obviously 100%, corresponding to a cost of $1.00. But suppose some special interest who wanted to trick people into believing the sun would not rise successfully spent money to bid the market down to only 10%. This means that you can buy, for $0.10, a share which pays $1 if the sun rises tomorrow. In other words, you can dectuple your money for free. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This may sound complicated in theory, but it plays out straightforwardly in real life. As a test, I tried to manipulate the market on whether Austin Chen, founder of Manifold Markets, would be charged with a felony. There’s no reason to think he should be, so the price started at 5%. I spent $200 in Manifold’s play money bidding it up to 95%. Within an hour, other investors noticed the mispricing and corrected it back down to 5% again. 3.3: Why expect prediction markets to be free from bias? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of bias, or you can get rich quick. The argument: Suppose all smart people, including you, know that there is an 80% chance that the Democrats’ economic plan will create new jobs. But suppose that Republicans, because of their partisan biases, refuse to believe it, and say there is only a 40% chance. And suppose the Republicans set up their own prediction market where they bid the price of a share down to $0.40. You can, of course, go on this prediction market, buy shares for $0.40, and double your money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I already described how something like this happens on PredictIt (a non-ideal prediction market that you can only make a few hundred dollars in expectation by correcting), and that I do in fact make a few hundred dollars every election season. 3.4: Why should I believe a prediction market’s consensus over my own opinion? This is the same argument as “the prediction market will always be at least as accurate as the top expert” only with you in the place of the top expert. Either prediction markets are at least as smart as you are, or you can get rich quick. The argument here is the same as “at least as smart as the smartest expert” argument in 2, except replacing “the smartest expert” with “you”. But just to lay it out explicitly: Suppose you were smarter than some prediction market. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I like this because it’s a good empirical test, and one that many people have tried. If you think you’re smarter than the prediction markets, bet on them and see what happens! I think most people will find that (over the long run) they lose money, and eventually this will cure them of their delusion that they can beat the markets. A few people might find that (over the long run) they do win money, just as a few people (eg Warren Buffett) can consistently win money on the stock market. Hopefully those people will quit their day jobs and become full-time prediction market traders. They’ll become multimillionaires, and their hard work will ensure that prediction markets stay more accurate than the rest of us. 3.5: Why should I believe that a prediction market makes good decisions about which of many competing experts to trust? Suppose you accept that a prediction market will always be at least as accurate as some well-known expert (eg Nate Silver). But what if you’re not sure who the real experts are? Or what if there are many experts, all saying different things, and nobody knows who to trust? In this case, a prediction market will always be at least as good as any other source (including you) at telling good experts from bad, or at figuring out which of many good experts is the best. By this point you should be able to predict the argument, but for completeness’ sake: Suppose you were better than the prediction market at determining which of many competing experts to trust, or how to aggregate the pronouncements of many experts into a single authoritative opinion. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. To ground this in a real example, suppose there is some new virus which might or might not spread to the United States. A Harvard professor of epidemiology says there’s a 70% chance it will spread, a Yale professor of epidemiology says there’s an 90% chance it will spread, and a guy in a tinfoil hat on Infowars says there’s a 0% chance it will spread because it’s all a fake government plot. If I knew nothing else about this situation, I would probably think there’s about an 80% chance the virus will spread. I trust the Harvard and Yale professors equally much, and the tinfoil hat guy not at all. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 10%, because most people trusted the tinfoil hat guy. I would want to buy YES shares until the price got up to 80%, because in expectation I would octuple my money. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 70%. Now I wouldn’t be sure whether the prediction market was dumber than me (believed tinfoil hat guy) or smarter than me (they know a lot about epidemiology - or about the credibility of specific experts - and have decided to trust the Harvard professor over the Yale professor). Maybe I could improve on this. If I knew things about epidemiology, I could read over both professors’ arguments and try to figure out if one was better than the other. If I knew things about academia, I could pick over both professors’ resumes and see whether the Harvard professor seemed more distinguished or had more respect in her own field than the Yale professor. In the end, I might decide the prediction market was right to price it at 70% (in which case I wouldn’t do anything), or that actually both experts seemed equally expert (in which case I might bid it up to 80%), or that actually the Yale epidemiologist was better (in which case I might bid it up to 90%). 3.5.1: Isn’t it weird to give non-experts (like prediction market investors) the final judgment in which of two experts is right? Yes, but I don’t think this is avoidable. If there were no such thing as prediction markets, and the Harvard epidemiologist said 70%, and the Yale epidemiologist said 90%, and the tinfoil hat guy said 0%, and for some reason it mattered a lot to you which of these was true - then you would still have to make that decision. If there’s some extremely authoritative source who can make the decision for you - let’s say the World Health Organization says “after reviewing all experts’ arguments, we believe that the final probability is 75%” - then great! Either: The WHO is clearly the most trustworthy source - in which case we go back to the Nate Silver situation where the prediction market should be just as accurate as it is.
Operate using play-money only. Here Manifold is the leader. You could also think of superforecasting tournaments like Metaculus as a version of this. I claim that the main reason prediction markets haven’t fulfilled their potential and become a major pillar of worldwide decision-making is that none of these solutions are really adequate. For whatever reason, most people interested in prediction markets are American, so Polymarket has a limited userbase. The regulators are pretty harsh, so the companies that strike deals to get exemptions usually have to trade away most of their functionality. Kalshi can only ask a few specific regulator-approved questions; the limits are so harsh that they’re not even allowed to predict elections. Play-money prediction markets like Manifold are a lot of fun, but there’s a limit to how much work people will do to earn play money. I want a world where the people who are best at correcting mispricings in prediction markets can make full-time jobs out of it, and where there are prediction market equivalents of Goldman Sachs where hundreds of brilliant people work together with cut-throat efficiency to find mispricings the moment they appear. Play money won’t get us there. Real money prediction markets tend to have between four- and six-digit (very occasionally seven-digit) volumes on most questions. Play money prediction markets have between one- and four-digit numbers of traders on most questions. Most big prediction markets are usually within 10% of each other and the best outside experts, but not always within 1%. Traditional financial markets are usually within 1% of each other, so I think this is because the prediction markets are still too small to have sub-1% accuracy. I hope that as they grow bigger they can reach this milestone. 7. What can I do to help promote prediction markets? If you’re an ordinary person with no special expertise or skills, I think the best thing you can do is create a Manifold Markets account, bet on topics that are interesting to you, and create markets for any interesting topics that don’t have one yet. I think this could be helpful for a few reasons: It’s hard to really understand prediction markets until you’ve played a few yourself.
Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al. Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected. By "unified" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of "introspection" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.) Resolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public. Even this isn’t perfect (which models are “the equivalent of” a 1:8 scale Ferrari 312?), but in practice once you get to this level of details people mostly stop worrying about this. Another method (mostly associated with Manifold) is to just leave it up to human judgment - specifically, the judgment of the person who made the market. For example, I could make a market in “By 2050, will there be an AI which Scott Alexander thinks qualifies as ‘human-level’?” This will force market participants to price in the risk that I have bad judgment or act dishonestly. But perhaps these risks are small. For example, I might say elsewhere what I think qualifies as “human-level” AI, or you might think human-level AI will be so obvious when it comes that I will definitely agree with you about it. As for honesty, this could be enforced either legally or by reputation. Someone who has resolved their past 100 prediction markets honestly will probably resolve this one honestly too, especially if they get paid to do so and will never get customers again if they lie. When we invest on the normal stock market, we trust that our brokers / the NYSE / etc won’t run off with our money, and this trust is usually well-deserved. Even when we make an online purchase, we trust that the store we’re sending our money to won’t steal it and refuse to send us the product. It would be an exaggeration to say that trust is a solved problem, but evidence from Manifold suggests that most people price in a <1% chance that well-known market makers with good reputation resolve dishonestly. If prediction markets got big enough, they could spawn trusted “resolution companies” who individual markets and market-makers could outsource their resolution to, for a fee. If these companies were ever dishonest, they would lose all their business from then on, so they would probably be as honest as other businesses like your broker / the NYSE / various online stores / etc. 4.7.1: Isn’t a lot of the “crisis of trust” around questions that might never have clear future answers? For example, consider the debate around whether Donald Trump is a Russian agent. Maybe no proof will ever come out either way. Or maybe some evidence will appear that seems to prove one side or the other, but people will continue to deny it for political reasons, and the problem of resolving the prediction market will be just as hard as the problem of answering the original question. Indeed, prediction markets aren’t very good at this, and are only fully trustworthy on questions where the true answer will eventually become apparent. Still, they might not be completely useless. For example, if you’re worried about Trump being a Russian agent because you expect him to pursue pro-Russia policies, you can start markets in whether he pursues those policies. Or you can start a conditional market (see 5.1) on whether, if Russia ever releases its past intelligence data many years from now, the data confirm/disconfirm that Trump was an agent. See Part 5 for other clever ways you might try to address this problem. 4.8: “Meme stocks” like Gamestop and AMC sometimes remain mispriced indefinitely. How do we know this won’t happen with prediction markets? Meme stocks are a type of Ponzi. It’s “reasonable” to buy Gamestop at some inflated price, because - who knows? - someone else might buy it at an even more inflated price tomorrow. And this can keep going arbitrarily long, or at least long enough for you to get out with a profit. Unlike meme stocks, prediction markets have a clear resolution date. If you’re predicting who will win the next election, the market will go to 100% or 0% after the election finishes. No matter how many memes there were, you wouldn’t buy a share in “the Democrats will win the election” for 99% the day before Election Day if you knew they would definitely lose. But that means prediction markets should be accurately priced the day before Election Day, which means you shouldn’t buy at an inaccurate price two days before Election Day, and so on. I can’t say for sure that no prediction market will ever get mispriced for meme reasons, but they should be much more robust against meme mispricings than the stock market. And even the stock market doesn’t have too many meme stocks. 4.9: How do prediction markets deal with outcomes in the far future? Suppose there is a question “who will win the 2100 election?” Currently it says 25% Democrats, 75% Republicans, and I believe it should be 50-50 (we’ll ignore third parties, or the possibility of America not existing in 2100, for now). So if I bet on the market, I can (in expectation) double my money. But there are many better ways to double your money by 2100. For example, if the stock market grows 4% per year, I should expect any money invested in the stock market to multiply by 20x in 2100. So just doubling it in a prediction market is a bad option. Realistically, this means prediction markets won’t work well for far-future events. These might be a better match for forecaster tournaments or some other structure, where we get the forecaster track records through present events, then use those track records weighting their far-future predictions (see also 5.5). There are already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events. But if you really wanted to use a prediction market, you could theoretically solve this by putting investors’ money in index funds while they waited. Then the winner would get their (and the losers’) original deposits and investment profits, and it would go back to being a better option than investing in index funds directly. In practice this seems complicated and I wouldn’t expect it to work. 4.9.1: What about predicting things that would make it impossible or pointless to win money, like human extinction? Again, these questions probably aren’t great matches for prediction markets, and you should use forecasting tournaments or some other method (see also 5.5). If you really wanted, you might be able to make it work in theory through a mechanism sort of like this one. 5. What are some clever uses for prediction markets? Here’s a non-exhaustive list: 5.1: Conditional prediction markets / decision markets Suppose the government is trying to decide whether to throw its weight behind Vaccine A or Vaccine B for some deadly disease. There are some experts behind both, both sets of experts accuse the other of being in the pay of pharmaceutical companies, and decision-makers don’t know who to trust. They might make two prediction markets, like: If we decide to go with Vaccine A, will at least X people die from the disease?
February 24, 2023 · Original source
I still dream of running an ACX Grants round using impact certificates, but I want to run a lower-stakes test of the technology first. In conjunction with the Manifold Markets team, we’re announcing the Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants, a $20,000 grants round for forecasting projects.
A: This is Astral Codex Ten, a blog about various science / technology / philosophy / politics issues, which sometimes does grants rounds and projects like this one. I think I have a good reputation of paying for things I say I am going to pay for, see for example last year’s ACX Grants. Manifold Markets is a company that runs a prediction market website and is generally interested in unusual market structures solving social problems. We’re co-sponsoring this impact market in order to test impact markets as a charitable funding mechanism.
Go to Manifold’s impact market site, Manifund, who have kindly agreed to handle the technology side of this.
March 03, 2023 · Original source
To test this new model, ACX and the Manifold Markets team are running a prototype mini-grants round for forecasting projects. Thanks to everyone who submitted a proposal.
The deadline for further project submissions is tonight, so get them in now if you have them! 3: Manifold continues to approve accredited investors. If you’re an accredited investor (approximately: you make $200K+ per year, or have $1MM net worth), and you feel like you understand impact markets, you’re welcome to participate in the investment phase. 4: …which is starting now! Bid for equity on projects that you expect to succeed - and in six months when I give them retroactive grants, those grants will go to you in proportion to how much equity you hold. Some restrictions apply, see original post for details. The auctions say they’re closing March 8th, but we’re running a little behind schedule and might keep them open until March 12th instead. 5: You can also ignore everything we’re doing and use Manifund’s impact market for any other kind of charitable project you want. Keep in mind that there is no guarantee that we or anyone else will ever retroactively fund these, and you’re kind of operating on blind faith here. Two people are already trying this: Feel free to buy or trade equity in these projects, but remember that nobody including me has any story for why they might ever make money, and this would be a strange thing to do from a profit-maximizing perspective. 6: Current planned schedule (may change quickly) is: Tonight: Deadline for project submissions
April 25, 2023 · Original source
Nikos Bosse compares Metaculus’ performance to its “competitor” Manifold Markets, and finds that overall Metaculus was more accurate:
The mean Brier score was 0.084 for Metaculus and 0.107 for Manifold. This difference was significant using a paired test. Metaculus was ahead of Manifold on 75% of the questions (48 out of 64).
Does this mean that forecasting tournaments are better than prediction markets? Some past studies have provided very tentative evidence in that direction, but this one probably doesn’t - many more people use Metaculus than Manifold, and Nikos didn’t control for number of forecasters.
May 14, 2023 · Original source
4: Manifold Markets and Charity Entrepreneurship are hosting a tournament (top prize $1000) to see if prediction markets can help select among charity ideas. See here (and press the Read More button) for more.
August 01, 2023 · Original source
Jacob Cohen describes himself as the president of his school’s forecasting club. I think we’re going to be all right. Manifest 2023 Manifold Markets is sponsoring Manifest, an “inaugural forecasting & prediction market conference”, to be held at the Rose Garden Inn, Berkeley, California the weekend of September 22. Their website is short on details, but listed speakers and guests of honor are: …now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change
…now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change
Sinclair Chen. Sinclair works at Manifold; she can be spotted at most Bay Area ACX meetups. I didn’t realize the degree to which she goes hard: “CFTC, if you are reading this, know that there is blood on your hands.” This is not exactly the message I would have written. But I think, as the Catholics like to say, that it comes from a vice which is the excess or perversion of a divine virtue, and I appreciate her for being the sort of person who’s like this, sort of.
September 11, 2023 · Original source
2: Manifold Markets wants me to remind you that this is approximately your last chance to sign up for Manifest, their forecasting and prediction market conference in Berkeley, CA. Guests will include Nate Silver, Robin Hanson, Aella, Zvi, and the CEOs of Kalshi, Manifold, and Polymarket. I’m still figuring out if I can make it but I’ll try my best.
October 09, 2023 · Original source
Last March we (ACX and Manifold Markets) did a test run of an impact market, a novel way of running charitable grants. You can read the details at the links, but it’s basically a VC ecosystem for charity: profit-seeking investors fund promising projects and grantmakers buy credit for successes from the investors. To test it out, we promised at least $20,000 in retroactive grants for forecasting-related projects, and intrepid guinea-pig investors funded 18 projects they thought we might want to buy.
Enjoy the public goods we’ve produced. The Crystal Ballin’ Podcast has one episode and is hoping to make more (as are their competitors, the Market Manipulation Podcast). OPTIC is looking for participants and volunteers. You can still use Manifolio to make Kelly bets, the Telegram bot for Telegram-based prediction markets, and the browser extension to see what Manifold markets people are betting on. And although it’s not technically one of ours, I still like The Base Rate Times.
Over the past six months, founders have worked on their projects. Some collapsed, losing their investors all their money. Others flourished, shooting up in value far beyond investor predictions. We got five judges (including me) to assess the final value of each of the 18 projects. Their results mostly determine what I will be offering investors for their impact certificates (see caveats below). They are: We’ll be buying back impact certs at the value on the MEDIAN column - so, for example, we’ll pay $300 for 100% of the certs for the Crystal Ballin’ Podcast.
October 16, 2023 · Original source
The Rationalist revival has put wind into the sails of start-ups like Manifold Markets, which was initially funded by a grant program run by Astral Codex Ten, a Rationalist blog that has promoted prediction markets. (It also received $1 million from the FTX Future Fund, the philanthropic arm of the bankrupt crypto exchange whose founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, is a fan of prediction markets.)
5: The New York Times recently published an article about the Manifest prediction market conference. I think it’s overall very good, and appreciate the care that the reporter put in to understanding the ideas (plus the frankly majestic picture of the Manifold co-founders). I do want to correct one paragraph, though:
I think a natural reading of this sentence is that Astral Codex Ten received $1 million from the FTX Future Fund. Some people who read the article said they understood it this way and thought I took FTX money. I didn’t. The article meant to say that Manifold did.
November 28, 2023 · Original source
Sparked a renaissance in forecasting, including major roles in creating, funding, and/or staffing Metaculus, Manifold Markets, and the Forecasting Research Institute.
December 08, 2023 · Original source
This year we’re partnering with Manifund, the charity arm of Manifold Markets, who will be handling the administrative/infrastructure side of things.
If you want to join these four institutions as a potential final oracular funder of impact certificates, see this document and email rachel@manifund.org. If you want to invest in impact certificates, I’ll give you more information on the ACX Grants version later, and you can look over the existing impact certs while you’re waiting.
January 18, 2024 · Original source
35: Prediction site Manifold Markets is running a $30,000 Community Fund based on impact certificates. If you want to make something cool for the Manifold community, you can run an impact funding round, and then they’ll pay you out of the $30,000 if it’s good.
19: If Manifold is too social for you, there’s also Fatebook, a site where you can record your personal predictions and auto-judge calibration/accuracy/etc. For example, Predict Your Year here. Also available for Discord/Slack.
February 10, 2024 · Original source
Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, which will handle getting everyone their money and run the upcoming impact market. Thanks especially to Austin Chen, Rachel Weinberg, and Saul Munn.
Here I’m leaning heavily into my experience funding Manifold last time around. The lesson I’m currently taking away from that is that having multiple platforms working on an important problem is less like splitting the party, and more like buying multiple lottery tickets for getting the exact right combination factors that lets something become successful. I hope I’m not over-updating on one dramatic event here, but I’m still very new to grant-making and I don’t have that many data points to learn from!
March 04, 2024 · Original source
2: Last year Manifold Markets held a prediction market conference/festival, Manifest, in Berkeley. I thought it was a lot of fun. They’re going to do it again this year, June 7 to 9th, you can get tickets here, cheaper early bird tickets ($249) are first come, first serve.
March 05, 2024 · Original source
Manifold Markets: Manifold, a popular play money prediction market site, kindly agreed to open markets into our fifty questions so we could compare them to participants. The markets got between 80 and 1500 participants, average around 150. Their forecast, had it been a contestant, would have placed in the 89th percentile. This would be good for an individual, but it’s surprisingly bad for an aggregation method - in fact, it’s worse than taking the median of a randomly selected group of 150 participants! The market mechanism seems to be subtracting value! Someone might want to double-check this.
I began by collecting data from Manifold Markets for these questions. I then compared those forecasts to the forecasts of superforecasters in the blind data, subset to those who had given forecasts on the S&P500 and Bitcoin questions that were reasonably consistent with the efficiency of markets; I subset to those who forecasted between 30% and 80% for the probability that the S&P500 and Bitcoin would increase during 2023, which were the only reasonable predictions by the time blind mode ended in mid-January. I then used my own judgment to tweak forecasts where I strongly disagreed with the prediction markets and the superforecasters (for example, I was more than 15 percentage points away from the average of Manifold Markets and the efficient-market-believing superforecasters on questions 17, 19, 21, 30, 34, and 50). I paid especially close attention to questions where late-breaking news made the superforecasters' forecasts less relevant (and I downweighted their forecasts on those questions accordingly).
Participant aggregate: This is the “wisdom of crowds” one. If you average the guess of every participant (eg if someone says 80% chance Biden leads, and another says 90% chance, then you go with 85%), you usually do better than the vast majority of individuals. In this case, the aggregate was 95th percentile, beating out superforecasters and Manifold.
April 28, 2024 · Original source
4: Manifold Markets wants to pivot from play-money prediction markets to real-ish money via a loophole that allows certain kinds of gambling-like activity. In the process, they’re devaluing mana (as available for charitable donations) by a factor of ten as of May 1. If you want to donate your mana to charity, do it before then. [EDIT: Delayed until 5/15, and with other considerations)
May 13, 2024 · Original source
Statements by two dissenting CFTC commissioners (1, 2) on why they oppose. Pivotal Act Manifold Markets says they’re pivoting to a new model combining play money points and real-money gambling. Manifold may be a beloved local fixture, but their growth and revenue aren’t too impressive: In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.
Probably no effect on Manifold’s pivot, see below.
In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.
August 19, 2024 · Original source
5: Manifold Markets is looking for a backend engineer. See here (I know it doesn’t look like a job advertisement, but scroll down, it is) for more.
November 05, 2024 · Original source
3: Manifold Markets is hosting an election night party (or mourning vigil, depending) in Berkeley, go here for details.
Iranian nukes more likely under Trump (49.5%) than Harris (45%) All of these involve foreign policy going worse under Trump than Harris. Is this unfair? Even Trump’s supporters would agree he is less interested in funding Ukrainian resistance than Harris; Metaculus’ numbers here seem in line with this. Harris is more likely to continue deals where Iran gets sanctions relief / money in exchange for not going nuclear. Whether or not you agree with Trump that those deals are extortionary and unfair, it makes sense that Iran is more likely to go nuclear if those deals are discontinued. But this is also a small effect and could be noise. The Taiwan numbers are the least convincing, but seem to be based off of arguments like the ones here: Trump has said that Taiwan should “pay for” defense, and generally been skeptical of foreign entanglements. And here’s Manifold’s version of the same thing: Polymarket’s Wild Ride On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.
It also serves as yet another point in favor of non-real-money forecasts like Metaculus, Nate Silver, and Manifold, all three of which agreed with each other while disagreeing with the big real-money markets like Polymarket, Smarkets, and Betfair. In theory we can’t say which group (real money vs. no money) was right. In practice, we know that Polymarket was mostly skewed by one giant bet, that there wasn’t nearly enough pro-Trump news to explain the movement, and that past disagreements have usually resolved in favor of the no-money markets. I’m as surprised as anyone to learn this (especially since Manifold is so close to a money market that a lot of explanations for real-money markets’ failure ought to affect them too), but it does seem to be a consistent feature of these things.
February 27, 2025 · Original source
48: Manifold Markets cofounder James Grugett has founded a new company, Codebuff, in the bustling LLM-wrapper-for-coding space. Some discussion here (X) including from James (X) on whether the new Claude 3.7 coder has obsoleted coding wrappers or will make them better than ever.
31: Related: this is all fun to think about, but very early polling for the 2028 Democratic primary suggests that by far the #1 candidate is . . . Kamala Harris at 37%, beating Mayor Pete, Gavin, and AOC with 11%, 9%, and 7% respectively. I know you’re not supposed to take early polls like this seriously in terms of who will actually win, but can you take them seriously as a guide to whether people have learned any lessons / no longer love losing? Maybe this is all just name recognition? Also, significant chance that Harris runs for (and wins) the California governorship in 2026.
June 18, 2025 · Original source
Helped create Manifold Markets, a prediction market site with thousands of satisfied users, whose various spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community.
No update this time, but from last cycle: “Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.”
Manifold is the largest social prediction market platform with over 150k user‑created markets and more than 30 million trades. Our markets have been featured here on ACX, in the NYT, Nate Silver’s latest book, and countless Substacks, podcasts, and tweets. Forecasters, journalists, researchers, and casual users alike use Manifold to get accurate real-time odds on everything from elections to AI timelines to personal drama.
July 24, 2025 · Original source
The program is conducted in partnership with Manifund, a charity spinoff of Manifold Markets, who handle the administrative/infrastructure side of things.
October 13, 2025 · Original source
Second, the Manifund team. Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, handled our funds, disbursement, infrastructure, and miscellaneous coding needs. Special thanks to Austin Chen for taking point on this.
Charlie Molthrop, $5K, for “normie-friendly prediction market interfaces”. Charlie has already made some tools for visualizing Manifold and Polymarket results; for example, a bot that tweets sudden dramatic changes on important Manifold questions.
Elaine Perlman, $94K, to continue lobbying for kidney donation incentives. Elaine works with Waitlist Zero and the Coalition To Modify NOTA to promote the End Kidney Deaths Act, which offers valuable tax credits to kidney donors. They estimate this bill could save 100,000 lives over the next decade, and save the government $50 billion/year (dialysis is very expensive, Medicare currently covers it, and transplantees would no longer need it). Since our previous grant last year, the EKDA has been cosponsored by 29 members of Congress, discussed in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and profiled in the LA Times. The prediction markets are down to only 25% chance it gets passed this year, but I’m optimistic about 2026 - 2027
March 02, 2026 · Original source
1: ACX Grantee Stephen Grugett (of Manifold Markets) wants me to announce his latest project: MNX, “a decentralized futures exchange targeting sophisticated traders and focused on the AI economy”. It’s a real-money platform where traders who want to hedge their AI plays can bet on benchmark progress, compute prices, etc. Announcement here, testnet here.
March 03, 2026 · Original source
Stephen Grugett and Ian Philips of Manifold Markets have announced a new project, MNX.
Partly it’s because Anthropic seems likely to win on appeal. Hegseth has said the government will keep using Anthropic for the next six months (undermining his case that they’re a national security risk) and has signed a substantially similar contract with OpenAI (undermining his case that their contract terms were unworkable). The prediction markets think the courts will be sympathetic: But even in the 28% of timelines where the designation sticks, things don’t seem so bad. Secretary of War Hegseth originally tweeted that:
The lawyers who weighed in seem to think that Anthropic’s interpretation of the law is correct, and Secretary Hegseth’s interpretation confused. In some situations, this might be cold comfort - how much does it help to be right about the law when the government is wrong? But in this case, it probably helps a lot. Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are all big Anthropic investors - each owns about a 10% stake - and have multi-billion dollar AI compute contracts. Together, the three tech giants must have at least $100 billion riding on Anthropic’s success. They also have good administration connections and great lobbyists, and even Hegseth isn’t stupid enough to pick fights with them all at once. So probably they send their lobbyists to have a talk with Hegseth about what the “supply chain risk” designation actually entails, Hegseth enforces the letter of the law, and Anthropic is barely affected. At least this is the story the prediction markets are going with: In this best-case scenario, Anthropic’s downside is losing some government contracts that made up ~5% of its business, plus some other Department-of-War-contractor contracts that probably add up to another ~5%.