Organizations: M

The Passage Of Polymarket

December 28, 2021 · Original source

Nathan Young, $5,000, to fund his continued work writing Metaculus questions and trying to build bridges between the forecasting and effective altruist communities. Nathan is a Metaculus moderator, the author of a prediction market blog I've used as a source before, and has useful connections with people who might be convinced to use formal forecasting methods for their organizations. This grant is a vote of confidence in him to continue this work, and another part of my effort to fund more forecasting infrastructure. You can read his newsletter, the UK Policy Forecast, here. If you have suggestions for forecasting questions he asks that you DM him on twitter or add them to this open Google doc.

Inline links: here, DM him on twitter, this open Google doc

February 07, 2022 · Original source

Easy to create your own subsidized markets “Real money” should be self-explanatory. Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice, but so far they’re limited to a small group of enthusiasts playing in their spare time. I value them both, but neither is the killer app that makes prediction markets as central to everyday life as stock markets or polls or whatever. “Easy to use” is kind of self-explanatory, but with some caveats. A big part of ease-of-use is liquidity; you can get that from a big user base or from clever deployment of automated market makers. A market that requires crypto knowledge is harder to use than one that doesn’t; one that’s inaccessible from the US is harder to use than one that isn’t. Also all the normal things like UI and search. “Easy to create your own markets” is where we’ve gotten stuck so far. Prediction markets are absolutely on top of questions about whether Donald Trump will win various elections. This is a solved problem. What I really wanted last year (and would have subsidized!) was a market about whether Alameda County, California, would permit indoor gatherings of 50 people on January 8th 2022 (ie would I be forced to cancel my wedding). But I also would have appreciated the ability to put a few questions to prediction markets before starting my psychiatry practice, or my grants program, or any of a dozen other things I did. A friend has gone further, and half-jokingly said they want to create conditional prediction markets about whether they’re compatible with various women in our friend group, to be paid out six months after the first date. Some of these applications are attempts to route around the principal-agent problem. Maybe I have some question about whether a certain grant would succeed, I’m not sure who to ask, and even if someone gives me a “Bob Smith, Grant Evaluator” business card, I don’t know if he’s any good. A prediction market takes all the pain out of searching for information - if I subsidize it enough, it’ll attract people with the relevant skill set who will solve my problem for me. Probably some of these ideas wouldn’t work, but probably other ideas I can’t even think of now would. I don’t know what the killer app for prediction markets will be. But we’re not going to find out unless people can create their own subsidized markets and play around. Polymarket took some baby steps towards this before the settlement: they had a Discord server where anyone could propose questions, and a lot of those questions became markets. But they still had to be general interest, not “let Alice’s five friends predict her dating life”. And there’s a big difference between “talk it over with company representatives on a Discord server” and “press a button”. Imagine if you could only tweet by emailing Jack Dorsey and convincing him that your comment was a good thing to have on Twitter. Even if Jack had good judgment and approved most requests, this would be a long way from the limbic system < — > Send Tweet loop that real Twitter users know and love. I asked some people in the business why they won’t do this. They said most people are bad at writing good resolution criteria. They don’t want their employees to get stuck resolving incredibly dumb questions about people’s dating lives, hunting down inaccessible or conflicting information, and making a bunch of people mad whichever way they decide. As far as I can tell, Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy. But Manifold is US-based and can’t use real money, so there’s still no way to subsidize a market effectively. (This is why I’m pessimistic about Kalshi. They could potentially do a lot of good in the “will Afghanistan collapse?” types of markets the Nobel laureates want, though even there I think some of their betting limits will give them trouble - $25,000 is good money, but not quite good enough to incentivize founding the prediction market equivalent of a Wall Street trading firm. But even if they solve this, I can’t imagine the regulators giving them permission to host “will this grant work out?” or “how will my dating life go?” markets; it’s just too weird, and the CFTC is too conservative. I don’t know, maybe their connections will come through and pull it off, but I don’t even know if they’re ambitious enough to want this, and I hate having to rely on one organization.) Right now my hopes are, in ascending order of likelihood: Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

I’m most optimistic about this last one, but it would be tough. You could try a version of Polymarket without the centralized organization gating the front end and providing liquidity. But then how would it make money? It probably wouldn’t - which might be fine, Metaculus is a non-profit and is still exceptionally well-run and stable. If someone did a good job of this I would try really hard to get it funded, and would expect to succeed.

Mantic Monday: Ukraine Cube Manifold

February 14, 2022 · Original source

Not actually in order This is a semi-randomly selected sample of Manifold markets, but let’s go through them one by one. The Ukraine market is the biggest on Manifold. It’s also deeply out of step with every other prediction market and the top non-prediction-market authorities - who are all giving numbers in the 50s and 60s. I don’t understand how this is so low - yes, play money < real money, but mostly because play money doesn’t get enough people betting. Here lots of people are betting - it’s the biggest market on the site, and since you only start with $1000 either twenty people have bet everything or more people have bet a fraction - but it’s still wrong. I tried to spend some play money to correct it and it snapped back to just as wrong as it was before. I have no explanation. Midnight The Stray Cat is the second biggest market on Manifold, just after Ukraine. I guess the Internet really liking cats shouldn’t be a surprise at this point. In case you need to do research first I’m told this is the cat in question: Props to Manifold for a bunch of markets like the third one on there, where they eat their own dog food by using their market to predict how their business decisions are going to go. ACX Bot has copy-pasted all of my predictions from 2022. At some point they should be able to compare their results with Zvi (ie a single very smart person), with the contest many of you entered (ie an average of formless crowdsourced predictions), and Metaculus (ie a non-monetary forecasting tournament). I’m looking forward to it! Most of you already know Lars Doucet, who’s written some great ACX posts on Georgism. I don’t know what possessed him to make a Joe Rogan Georgism interviewee market, unless he’s gunning for the position. Valinor is a group house on my street, with ~a dozen people living in and around it. We’ve been talking about fixing the backyard for a while. Now we can bet about whether it will happen. Having a number for this actually affects some of my decisions a little. Connor is hijacking the prediction market to make a poll, which is pretty cute. Dwayne Johnson does not have a 15% chance of winning the election. Manifold is suffering from the usual play money problem, where if you only start out with $1000 in play money, nobody wants to lock it up for three years to make a 15% profit. Vivek’s market, “Will I believe that 13177 is a prime number”, is pretty unusual. I’m interpreting it as a test/demonstration of prediction markets’ information-gathering ability. If you don’t know something and it’s hard to Google, you can make a prediction market about whether you’ll believe it in the future, and people who are able to figure out the answer will bet on it. Based on the 97% YES rate, I’m guessing 13177 is in fact a prime number. What else can you do this with? TANSTAAFL’s “Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?” market is maybe pushing the limit of this methodology. Anyway, there are lots of me-too prediction markets but this is something genuinely new under the sun. Maybe it will be awesome itself, but I’m also hoping it helps bigger players realize how much more is possible. This Week In Metaculus A few new questions on intelligence enhancement, eg: The question explicitly allows embryo selection, but says it must raise IQ ten points and be available for <25% median income to count. Trivial improvements to existing embryo selection will top out around 9 points, so this seems to be predicting something more interesting, maybe iterated embryo selection at the very least. I’m probably slightly bearish on this one; I believe if it existed someone would find a way to get it, but I think the regulatory climate might be able to prevent the relevant research indefinitely. Improving adult IQ is really hard. This is a bold thing to speculate about! Atmospheric CO2 was 300ish for most of pre-industrial history, 400ish now, and rising. This question predicts 600 in 2100, which sounds like what happens if global warming gets a bit worse but eventually stabilizes. I’m less sure. I think if we make it to 2100, we’ll have so much technology that atmospheric CO2 can be whatever we want it to be. But maybe we’ll want it to stay where it is; once there’s been a lot of global warming and people have moved / shifted lifestyles, it could be equally disruptive to cool the planet back down. Right now it’s 5%, the official government prediction is 10% by 2030, but this market says 17.6%. But look at that probability distribution! It’s a lot of people saying 10%ish, plus a very long tail of very big numbers. I think people are disagreeing about how exponential this change is going to be. Shorts Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.

Inline links: predictions from 2022, ACX posts on Georgism, Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V2bV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fca419ec2-7b91-44cd-80b0-2aad1baa4c2f_766x166.png, The question, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ah6n!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1ff4f28d-1901-45f2-85bc-8f1c2120ecd1_770x187.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSK8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F80e3383c-6f68-412a-ac90-ca63236bdb10_769x167.png, This, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!frCz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F976d1b66-daee-43d1-948a-500e77ac5a2f_764x164.png, this market, holding an essay contest

Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.

Inline links: holding an essay contest

Play Money And Reputation Systems

February 21, 2022 · Original source

I used to be really skeptical here, but Metaculus and Manifold have softened my stance. So let’s look closer at how and whether these kinds of systems work.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

Metaculus has a weird system combining absolute and relative accuracy: all predictions are treated as a combination of “bets with the house” on absolute accuracy, plus bets against other predictors on relative accuracy. Why? As a kind of market-making function; even if nobody else has yet predicted, it’s still worth entering a market for the absolute accuracy points. This works, but has a lot of complicated consequences we’ll discuss more below.

Positive-sum means that the house always loses; on average, you make money every time you bet. Metaculus is infamous for this; see eg this question on Ukraine:

Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work

February 23, 2022 · Original source

…don’t really do much. The median goes from 2052 to about 2065. Four of the models give results between 2030 and 2070. The last two, Neural Net With Long Horizon and Evolution, suggest probably no AI this century (although Neural Net With Long Horizon does think there’s a 40% chance by 2100). Ajeya doesn’t really like either of these models and they’re not heavily weighted in her main result. Does The Truth Point To Itself? Back up a second. Here’s something that makes me kind of nervous. Most of Ajeya’s numbers are kind of made up, with several order-of-magnitude error bars and simplifying assumptions like “all animals are nematodes”. For a single parameter, we get estimates spanning seventeen different orders of magnitude: the upper bound is one hundred quadrillion times the lower bound. And yet four of the six models, including two genuinely exotic ones, manage to get dates within twenty years of 2050. And 2050 is also the date everyone else focuses on. Here’s the prediction-market-like site Metaculus: Their distribution looks a lot like Ajeya’s, and even has the same median, 2052 (though forecasters could have read Ajeya’s report). Katja Grace et al surveyed 352 AI experts, and they gave a median estimate of 2062 for an AI that could “outperform humans at all tasks” (though with many caveats and high sensitivity to question framing). This was before Ajeya’s report, so they definitely didn’t read it. So lots of Ajeya’s different methods and lots of other people presumably using different methodologies or no methodology at all, all converge on this same idea of 2050 give or take a decade or two. An optimist might say “The truth points to itself! There are 371 known proofs of the Pythagorean Theorem, and they all end up in the same place. That’s because no matter what methodology you use, if you use it well enough you get to the correct answer.” A pessimist might be more suspicious; we’ll return to this part later. FLOPS Alone Turn The Wheel Of History One more question: what if this is all bullshit? What if it’s an utterly useless total garbage steaming pile of grade A crap? Imagine a scientist in Victorian Britain, speculating on when humankind might invent ships that travel through space. He finds a natural anchor: the moon travels through space! He can observe things about the moon: for example, it is 220 miles in diameter (give or take an order of magnitude). So when humankind invents ships that are 220 miles in diameter, they can travel through space! Ships have certainly grown in size tremendously, from primitive kayaks to Roman triremes to Spanish galleons to the great ocean liners of the (Victorian) present. The AI forecasting organization AI Impacts actually has a whole report on historical ship size trends to prove an unrelated point about technological progress, so I didn’t even have to make this graph up. Suppose our Victorian scientist lived in 1858, right when the Great Eastern was launched. The trend line for ship size crossed 100m around 1843, and 200m in 1858, so doubling time is 15 years - but perhaps they notice this is going to be an outlier, so let’s round up a bit and say 18 years. The (one order of magnitude off estimate for the size of the) Moon is 350,000m, so you’d need ships to scale up by 350,000/200 = 1,750x before they’re as big as the Moon. That’s about 10.8 doublings, and a doubling time is 18 years, so we’ll get spaceships in . . . 2052 exactly. (fudging numbers to land where you want is actually fun and easy) SS Great Eastern, the extreme outlier large steamship from 1858. This has become sort of a mascot for quantitative technological progress forecasters. What is this scientist’s error? The big one is thinking that spaceship progress depends on some easily-measured quantity (size) instead of on fundamental advances (eg figuring out how rockets work). You can make the same accusation against Ajeya et al: you can have all the FLOPs in the world, but if you don’t understand how to make a machine think, your AI will be, well, a flop. Ajeya discusses this a bit on page 143 of her report. There is some sense in which FLOPs and knowing-what-you’re-doing trade of against each other. If you have literally no idea what you’re doing, you can sort of kind of re-run evolution until it comes up with something that looks good. If things are somehow even worse than that, you could always run AIXI, a hypothetical AI design guaranteed to get excellent results as long as you have infinite computation. You could run a Go engine by searching the entire branching tree structure of Go - you shouldn’t, and it would take a zillion times more compute than exists in the entire world, but you could. So in some sense what you’re doing, when you’re figuring out what you’re doing, is coming up with ways to do already-possible things more efficiently. But that’s just algorithmic progress, which Ajeya has already baked into her model. (our Victorian scientist: “As a reductio ad absurdum, you could always stand the ship on its end, and then climb up it to reach space. We’re just trying to make ships that are more efficient than that.”) Part II: Biology-Inspired AI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works Eliezer Yudkowsky presents a more subtle version of these kinds of objection in an essay called Biology-Inspired AI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works, published December 2021. Ajeya’s report is a 169-page collection of equations, graphs, and modeling assumptions. Yudkowsky’s rebuttal is a fictional dialogue between himself, younger versions of himself, famous AI scientists, and other bit players. At one point, a character called “Humbali” shows up begging Yudkowsky to be more humble, and Yudkowsky defeats him with devastating counterarguments. Still, he did found the field, so I guess everyone has to listen to him. He starts: in 1988, famous AI scientist Hans Moravec predicted human-level AI by 2010. He was using the same methodology as Ajeya: extrapolate how quickly processing power would grow (in FLOP/S), and see when it would match some estimate of the human brain. Moravec got the processing power almost exactly right (it hit his 2010 projection in 2008) and his human brain estimate pretty close (he says 10^13 FLOP/S, Ajeya says 10^15, this 2 OOM difference only delays things a few years), yet there was not human-level AI in 2010. What happened? Ajeya's answer could be: Moravec didn't realize that, in the modern ML paradigm, any given size of program requires a much bigger program to train. Ajeya, who has a 35-year advantage on Moravec, estimates approximately the same power for the finished program (10^16 vs. 10^13 FLOP/S) but says that training the 10^16 FLOP/S program will require 10^33ish FLOPs. Eliezer agrees as far as it goes, but says this points to a much deeper failure mode, which was that Moravec had no idea what he was doing. He was assuming processing power of human brain = processing power of computer necessary for AGI. Why? The human brain consumes around 20 watts of power. Can we thereby conclude that an AGI should consume around 20 watts of power, and that, when technology advances to the point of being able to supply around 20 watts of power to computers, we'll get AGI? […] You say that AIs consume energy in a very different way from brains? Well, they'll also consume computations in a very different way from brains! The only difference between these two cases is that you know something about how humans eat food and break it down in their stomachs and convert it into ATP that gets consumed by neurons to pump ions back out of dendrites and axons, while computer chips consume electricity whose flow gets interrupted by transistors to transmit information. Since you know anything whatsoever about how AGIs and humans consume energy, you can see that the consumption is so vastly different as to obviate all comparisons entirely. You are ignorant of how the brain consumes computation, you are ignorant of how the first AGIs built would consume computation, but "an unknown key does not open an unknown lock" and these two ignorant distributions should not assert much internal correlation between them. Cars don’t move by contracting their leg muscles and planes don’t fly by flapping their wings like birds. Telescopes do form images the same way as the lenses in our eyes, but differ by so many orders of magnitude in every important way that they defy comparison. Why should AI be different? You have to use some specific algorithm when you’re creating AI; why should we expect it to be anywhere near the same efficiency as the ones Nature uses in our brains? The same is true for arguments from evolution, eg Ajeya’s Evolutionary Anchor, ie “it took evolution 10^43 FLOPs of computation to evolve the human brain so maybe that will be the training cost”. AI scientists sitting in labs trying to figure things out, and nematodes getting eaten by other nematodes, are such different methods for designing things that it’s crazy to use one as an estimate for the other. Algorithmic Progress vs. Algorithmic Paradigm Shifts This post is a dialogue, so (Eliezer’s hypothetical model of) OpenPhil gets a chance to respond. They object: this is why we put a term for algorithmic progress in our model. The model isn’t very sensitive to changes in that term. If you want you can set it to some kind of crazy high value and see what happens, but you can’t say we didn’t consider it. OpenPhil: We did already consider that and try to take it into account: our model already includes a parameter for how algorithmic progress reduces hardware requirements. It's not easy to graph as exactly as Moore's Law, as you say, but our best-guess estimate is that compute costs halve every 2-3 years […] Eliezer: The makers of AGI aren't going to be doing 10,000,000,000,000 rounds of gradient descent, on entire brain-sized 300,000,000,000,000-parameter models, algorithmically faster than today. They're going to get to AGI via some route that you don't know how to take, at least if it happens in 2040. If it happens in 2025, it may be via a route that some modern researchers do know how to take, but in this case, of course, your model was also wrong. They're not going to be taking your default-imagined approach algorithmically faster, they're going to be taking an algorithmically different approach that eats computing power in a different way than you imagine it being consumed. OpenPhil: Shouldn't that just be folded into our estimate of how the computation required to accomplish a fixed task decreases by half every 2-3 years due to better algorithms? Eliezer: Backtesting this viewpoint on the previous history of computer science, it seems to me to assert that it should be possible to: Train a pre-Transformer RNN/CNN-based model, not using any other techniques invented after 2017, to GPT-2 levels of performance, using only around 2x as much compute as GPT-2;

Inline links: Metaculus, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SMnF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F807f66de-8c5c-4423-b293-ca92b5b64053_763x360.png, surveyed 352 AI experts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JxQ5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fceba6aa0-dbde-41ca-805e-01af4fac9324_769x336.png, a whole report on historical ship size trends, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PRDj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fde3d97f4-afca-45c4-9ed2-521cd25041df_460x262.jpeg, AIXI, Biology-Inspired AI Timelines: The Trick That Never Works

Play pro-level Go using 8-16 times as much computing power as AlphaGo, but only 2006 levels of technology. For reference, recall that in 2006, Hinton and Salakhutdinov were just starting to publish that, by training multiple layers of Restricted Boltzmann machines and then unrolling them into a "deep" neural network, you could get an initialization for the network weights that would avoid the problem of vanishing and exploding gradients and activations. At least so long as you didn't try to stack too many layers, like a dozen layers or something ridiculous like that. This being the point that kicked off the entire deep-learning revolution. Your model apparently suggests that we have gotten around 50 times more efficient at turning computation into intelligence since that time; so, we should be able to replicate any modern feat of deep learning performed in 2021, using techniques from before deep learning and around fifty times as much computing power. OpenPhil: No, that's totally not what our viewpoint says when you backfit it to past reality. Our model does a great job of retrodicting past reality. Eliezer: How so? OpenPhil: <Eliezer cannot predict what they will say here.> I think the argument here is that OpenPhil is accounting for normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts. Directional Error These are the two arguments Eliezer makes against OpenPhil that I find most persuasive. First, that you shouldn’t be using biological anchors at all. Second, that unpredictable paradigm shifts are more realistic than gradual algorithmic progress. These mostly add uncertainty to OpenPhil’s model, but Eliezer ends his essay making a stronger argument: he thinks OpenPhil is directionally wrong, and AI will come earlier than they think. Mostly this is the paradigm argument again. Five years from now, there could be a paradigm shift that makes AI much easier to build. It’s happened before; from GOFAI’s pre-programmed logical rules to Deep Blue’s tree searches to the sorts of Big Data methods that won the Netflix Prize to modern deep learning. Instead of just extrapolating deep learning scaling thirty years out, OpenPhil should be worried about the next big idea. Hypothetical OpenPhil retorts that this is a double-edged sword. Maybe the deep learning paradigm can’t produce AGI, and we’ll have to wait decades or centuries for someone to have the right insight. Or maybe the new paradigm you need for AGI will take more compute than deep learning, in the same way deep learning takes more compute than whatever Moravec was imagining. This is a pretty strong response, since it would have been true for every previous forecaster: remember, Moravec erred in thinking AI would come too soon, not too late. So although Eliezer is taking the cheap shot of saying OpenPhil’s estimate will be wrong just as everyone else’s was wrong before, he’s also giving himself the much harder case of arguing it might be wrong in the opposite direction as all its predecessors. Eliezer takes this objection seriously, but feels like on balance probably new paradigms will speed up AI rather than slow it down. Here he grudgingly and with suitable embarrassment does try to make an object-level semi-biological-anchors-related argument: Moravec was wrong because he ignored the training phase. And the proper anchor for the training phase is somewhere between evolution and a human childhood, where evolution represents “blind chance eventually finding good things” and human childhood represents “an intelligent cognitive engine trying to squeeze as much data out of experience as possible”. And part of what he expects paradigm shifts to do is to move from more evolutionary processes to more childhood-like processes, and that’s a net gain in efficiency. So he still thinks OpenPhil’s methods are more likely to overestimate the amount of time until AGI rather than underestimate it. What Moore’s Law Giveth, Platt’s Law Taketh Away Eliezer’s other argument is kind of a low blow: he refers to Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting: “any AI forecast will put strong AI thirty years out from when the forecast is made.” This isn’t exact. Hans Moravec, writing in 1988, said 2010 - so 22 years. Ray Kurzweil, writing in 2001, said 2023 - another 22 years. Vernor Vinge, in a 1993 speech, said 2023, and that was exactly 30 years, but Vinge knew about Platt’s Law and might have been joking. The point is: OpenPhil wrote a report in 2020 that predicted strong AI in 2052, isn’t that kind of suspicious? I’d previously mentioned it as a plus that Ajeya got around the same year everyone else got. The forecasters on Metaculus. The experts surveyed in Grace et al. Lots of other smart experts with clever models. But what if all of these experts and models and analyses are just fudging the numbers for the same Platt’s-Law-related reasons? Hypothetical OpenPhil is BTFO: OpenPhil: That part about Charles Platt's generalization is interesting, but just because we unwittingly chose literally exactly the median that Platt predicted people would always choose in consistent error, that doesn't justify dismissing our work, right? We could have used a completely valid method of estimation which would have pointed to 2050 no matter which year it was tried in, and, by sheer coincidence, have first written that up in 2020. In fact, we try to show in the report that the same methodology, evaluated in earlier years, would also have pointed to around 2050 - Eliezer: Look, people keep trying this. It's never worked. It's never going to work. 2 years before the end of the world, there'll be another published biologically inspired estimate showing that AGI is 30 years away and it will be exactly as informative then as it is now. I'd love to know the timelines too, but you're not going to get the answer you want until right before the end of the world, and maybe not even then unless you're paying very close attention. Timing this stuff is just plain hard. Part III: Responses And Commentary Response 1: Less Wrong Comments Less Wrong is a site founded by Eliezer Yudkowsky for Eliezer Yudkowsky fans who wanted to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky’s ideas. So, for whatever it’s worth - the comments on his essay were pretty negative. Carl Shulman, an independent researcher with links to both OpenPhil and MIRI (Eliezer’s org), writes the top-voted comment. He works from a model where there is hardware progress, software progress downstream of hardware progress, and independent (ie unrelated to algorithms) software progress, and where the first two make up most progress on the margin. Researchers generally develop new paradigms once they have enough compute available to tinker with them. Progress in AI has largely been a function of increasing compute, human software research efforts, and serial time/steps. Throwing more compute at researchers has improved performance both directly and indirectly (e.g. by enabling more experiments, refining evaluation functions in chess, training neural networks, or making algorithms that work best with large compute more attractive). Historically compute has grown by many orders of magnitude, while human labor applied to AI and supporting software by only a few. And on plausible decompositions of progress (allowing for adjustment of software to current hardware and vice versa), hardware growth accounts for more of the progress over time than human labor input growth. So if you're going to use an AI production function for tech forecasting based on inputs (which do relatively OK by the standards tech forecasting), it's best to use all of compute, labor, and time, but it makes sense for compute to have pride of place and take in more modeling effort and attention, since it's the biggest source of change (particularly when including software gains downstream of hardware technology and expenditures). […] A perfectly correlated time series of compute and labor would not let us say which had the larger marginal contribution, but we have resources to get at that, which I was referring to with 'plausible decompositions.' This includes experiments with old and new software and hardware, like the chess ones Paul recently commissioned, and studies by AI Impacts, OpenAI, and Neil Thompson. There are AI scaling experiments, and observations of the results of shocks like the end of Dennard scaling, the availability of GPGPU computing, and Besiroglu's data on the relative predictive power of computer and labor in individual papers and subfields. In different ways those tend to put hardware as driving more log improvement than software (with both contributing), particularly if we consider software innovations downstream of hardware changes. Vanessa Kosoy makes the obvious objection, which echoes a comment of Eliezer’s in the dialogue above: I'm confused how can this pass some obvious tests. For example, do you claim that alpha-beta pruning can match AlphaGo given some not-crazy advantage in compute? Do you claim that SVMs can do SOTA image classification with not-crazy advantage in compute (or with any amount of compute with the same training data)? Can Eliza-style chatbots compete with GPT3 however we scale them up? Mark Xu answers: My model is something like: For any given algorithm, e.g. SVMs, AlphaGo, alpha-beta pruning, convnets, etc., there is an "effective compute regime" where dumping more compute makes them better. If you go above this regime, you get steep diminishing marginal returns.

Inline links: normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts, Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting, the comments, Paul recently commissioned, AI Impacts, OpenAI, Neil Thompson, Besiroglu's, Vanessa Kosoy, Mark Xu

That is - suppose before we read Ajeya’s report, we started with some distribution over when we’d get AGI. For me, not being an expert in this area, this would be some combination of the Metaculus forecast and the Grace et al expert survey, slightly pushed various directions by the views of individual smart people I trust. Now Ajeya says maybe it’s more like some other distribution. I should end up with a distribution somewhere in between my prior and this new evidence. But where?

Open Thread 213

February 28, 2022 · Original source

1: Eli Lifland and Misha Yagudin have asked me to announce the Impactful Forecasting Prize, with $2,000 for first prize and more money available for other winners. Read the rules (bolded link above), write up forecasts on one of these Metaculus questions and submit via this form by March 11. They’ll also be having a meetup in Gather on March 2.

Inline links: Impactful Forecasting Prize, these Metaculus questions, this form, Gather

Ukraine Warcasting

March 01, 2022 · Original source

Starting with Metaculus:

— Will Kyiv fall to Russian forces by April 1 2022? 69% chance This is the most-predicted relevant question on Metaculus right now. The first day of the war, the market predicted as high as 90%; as people realized the strength of Ukrainian resistance, it fell to 80. Mid-Saturday there was a sudden drop from 78% to 72%, after some combination of a defiant Zelenskyy speech and a report that Russian paratroopers had been repelled. Since then it’s barely budged.

Inline links: https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9939/kyiv-to-fall-to-russian-forces-by-april-2022/

This is the most-predicted relevant question on Metaculus right now. The first day of the war, the market predicted as high as 90%; as people realized the strength of Ukrainian resistance, it fell to 80. Mid-Saturday there was a sudden drop from 78% to 72%, after some combination of a defiant Zelenskyy speech and a report that Russian paratroopers had been repelled. Since then it’s barely budged.

Ukraine Thoughts And Links

March 08, 2022 · Original source

a. Metaculus Alerts is a Twitter bot that alerts you when a Metaculus prediction on the Ukraine war has changed drastically in a short time. For example, “the chance of Russia taking Kiev by April has decreased 10% in the past 24 hours”. I find this a good substitute to refreshing the news every minute to see if something interesting has happened.

Inline links: Metaculus Alerts

k. Metaculus thinks Russia might soon close its borders. It might be helpful to talk to Russians you know about getting out of Russia if they can, before things get worse. See also Letter: Russians Are Welcome In America - though I don’t know what the visa situation is like now and it might be terrible.

Inline links: close its borders, getting out of Russia, Letter: Russians Are Welcome In America

March 14, 2022 · Original source

Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022?: 69% —→ 14%

Inline links: Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 71% —→ 70%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

Will World War III happen before 2050?: 20% —→21%

Inline links: Will World War III happen before 2050?

March 21, 2022 · Original source

Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022?: 14% —→ 2%

Inline links: Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 70% —→ 53%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

Will World War III happen before 2050?: 21% —→20%

Inline links: Will World War III happen before 2050?

Open Thread 217

March 27, 2022 · Original source

Metaculus currently has him at 40% to win the primary and 29% to win the general. I’m closer to 60/45. Although he’s getting support from some big funders, campaign finance privileges small-to-medium-sized donations from ordinary people. If you want to support him, you can see a list of possible options here - including donations. You can donate max $2900 for the primary, plus another $2900 for the general that will be refunded if he doesn’t make it. If you do donate, it would be extra helpful if the money came in before a key reporting deadline March 31. 3: Every year in autumn I hold a big Meetups Everywhere event, and every time people tell me I should do it more often than once a year. So this time we’ll hold a mini-Meetups-Everywhere this April. It won’t be any different from your usual meetup schedule except that it’ll be the Schelling time for everyone who only wants to come once every few months to come. If you’re a meetups organizer (or want to become one), please fill in this form with the date of a meetup April 11th or later. Next Sunday I’ll put the results on the Open Thread for people to see. 4: Speaking of meetups, the rationalist/EA establishment is trying to promote local meetups. If you’re a local ACX/LW meetups organizer, you’re potentially invited to attend an all-expenses paid retreat in California in July with our meetups czar Mingyuan. Please read more here, then fill in this form to get on her radar. 5: And speaking of Mingyuan, she is going to inspect - sorry, enjoy the hospitality of - the East Coast meetup groups. She’ll be in DC: 4/11–4/13 Baltimore: 4/14 Philadelphia: 4/15–4/16 NYC: 4/17–4/21 Yale: 4/22–4/23 Northampton: 4/24–4/25 Boston: 4/26–5/1. The local groups have already taken care of having meetups at the right time, but she’s looking for people who could host her and drive her between cities . Email meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com if you can help. 6: Last week I tried to figure out the needs of community members in Russia and Ukraine. There are some great resources on the thread, but issues that still need solving: Seven Ukrainian refugees looking for remote work

Inline links: here, donations., fill in this form, here, this form, on the thread, Seven Ukrainian refugees looking for remote work

Yudkowsky Contra Christiano On AI Takeoff Speeds

April 04, 2022 · Original source

This is the Metaculus forecasting question corresponding to Paul’s preferred formulation of hard/soft takeoff. Metaculans think there’s a 69% chance it’s true. But it fell by about 4% after the debate, suggesting that some people got won over to Eliezer’s point of view.

Inline links: Metaculus forecasting question

Links For April

April 14, 2022 · Original source

17: Metaculus: will plant-based meat pass a “Turing test” (where people can’t distinguish it from real meat) by 2023? Currently at 55%

Inline links: Metaculus

April 18, 2022 · Original source

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 53% → 5%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

Will World War III happen before 2050?: 20% →22%

Inline links: Will World War III happen before 2050?

Will Russia invade any other country in 2022?: 7% →5%

Inline links: Will Russia invade any other country in 2022?

May 10, 2022 · Original source

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 5% → 2%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

Will World War III happen before 2050?: 22% →25%

Inline links: Will World War III happen before 2050?

Will Russia invade any other country in 2022?: 5% →10%

Inline links: Will Russia invade any other country in 2022?

June 13, 2022 · Original source

Metaculus predicts 17000 cases and 400 deaths from monkeypox this year. But as usual, it’s all about the distribution 90% chance of fewer than 400,000 cases. 95% chance of fewer than 2.2 million cases. 98% chance of fewer than 500 million cases. This is encouraging, but a 2% chance of >500 million cases (there have been about 500 million recorded COVID infections total) is still very bad. Does Metaculus say this because it’s true, or because there will always be a few crazy people entering very large numbers without modeling anything carefully? I’m not sure. How would you test that? Warcasting The war in Ukraine has shifted into a new phase, with Russia concentrating in Donetsk and Luhansk, and finally beginning to make good use of its artillery advantage. I’m going to stop following the old Kiev-centric set of questions and replace them with more appropriate ones: Notice that this continues to rise, from 16% a month ago to 22% today. See Eikonal’s comment here for some discussion of how this might happen and what territories these might be (and note that we switched from Ukrainian control in the last question to Russian control in this one). I’m keeping this one in here, but it never changes. Meanwhile, on Insight Prediction: $2000 in liquidity and still 14% off from Metaculus, weird. Musk Vs. Marcus Elon Musk recently said he thought we might have AGI before 2029, and Gary Marcus said we wouldn’t and offered to bet on it. It’s an important tradition of AGI discussions that nobody can ever agree on a definition of it and it has to be re-invented every time the topic comes up. Marcus proposed five different things he thought an AI couldn’t do before 2029, such that if it does them, he admits he was wrong and Musk wins the bet (which purely hypothetical at this point; Musk hasn’t responded). The AI would have to do at least three of: Read a novel and answer complicated questions about eg the themes (existing language models can do this with pre-digested novels, eg LAMDA talking about Les Miserables here - I think Marcus means you have to give it a new novel that it has no corpus of humans ever having discussed before, and make it do the work itself).

Inline links: predicts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!UYb_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7f6313de-8f39-4c11-bbfb-00629e7f7276_778x300.png, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10738/ukraine-controls-dnrlnr-on-jan-1-2024/, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10745/russian-control-of-new-territory-2024-01-01/, Eikonal’s comment here, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10050/bilateral-ceasefire-between-russia--ukraine/, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10002/presidency-of-vladimir-putin-on-feb-1-2023/, https://insightprediction.com/m/206/will-russia-conquer-the-donbass-by-the-end-of-july-2022, https://insightprediction.com/m/1282/will-russia-conquer-luhansk-by-july-15th, https://insightprediction.com/m/232/when-will-the-russia-ukraine-war-end, said we wouldn’t, here

90% chance of fewer than 400,000 cases. 95% chance of fewer than 2.2 million cases. 98% chance of fewer than 500 million cases. This is encouraging, but a 2% chance of >500 million cases (there have been about 500 million recorded COVID infections total) is still very bad. Does Metaculus say this because it’s true, or because there will always be a few crazy people entering very large numbers without modeling anything carefully? I’m not sure. How would you test that? Warcasting The war in Ukraine has shifted into a new phase, with Russia concentrating in Donetsk and Luhansk, and finally beginning to make good use of its artillery advantage. I’m going to stop following the old Kiev-centric set of questions and replace them with more appropriate ones: Notice that this continues to rise, from 16% a month ago to 22% today. See Eikonal’s comment here for some discussion of how this might happen and what territories these might be (and note that we switched from Ukrainian control in the last question to Russian control in this one). I’m keeping this one in here, but it never changes. Meanwhile, on Insight Prediction: $2000 in liquidity and still 14% off from Metaculus, weird. Musk Vs. Marcus Elon Musk recently said he thought we might have AGI before 2029, and Gary Marcus said we wouldn’t and offered to bet on it. It’s an important tradition of AGI discussions that nobody can ever agree on a definition of it and it has to be re-invented every time the topic comes up. Marcus proposed five different things he thought an AI couldn’t do before 2029, such that if it does them, he admits he was wrong and Musk wins the bet (which purely hypothetical at this point; Musk hasn’t responded). The AI would have to do at least three of: Read a novel and answer complicated questions about eg the themes (existing language models can do this with pre-digested novels, eg LAMDA talking about Les Miserables here - I think Marcus means you have to give it a new novel that it has no corpus of humans ever having discussed before, and make it do the work itself).

Inline links: https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10738/ukraine-controls-dnrlnr-on-jan-1-2024/, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10745/russian-control-of-new-territory-2024-01-01/, Eikonal’s comment here, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10050/bilateral-ceasefire-between-russia--ukraine/, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10002/presidency-of-vladimir-putin-on-feb-1-2023/, https://insightprediction.com/m/206/will-russia-conquer-the-donbass-by-the-end-of-july-2022, https://insightprediction.com/m/1282/will-russia-conquer-luhansk-by-july-15th, https://insightprediction.com/m/232/when-will-the-russia-ukraine-war-end, said we wouldn’t, here

$2000 in liquidity and still 14% off from Metaculus, weird. Musk Vs. Marcus Elon Musk recently said he thought we might have AGI before 2029, and Gary Marcus said we wouldn’t and offered to bet on it. It’s an important tradition of AGI discussions that nobody can ever agree on a definition of it and it has to be re-invented every time the topic comes up. Marcus proposed five different things he thought an AI couldn’t do before 2029, such that if it does them, he admits he was wrong and Musk wins the bet (which purely hypothetical at this point; Musk hasn’t responded). The AI would have to do at least three of: Read a novel and answer complicated questions about eg the themes (existing language models can do this with pre-digested novels, eg LAMDA talking about Les Miserables here - I think Marcus means you have to give it a new novel that it has no corpus of humans ever having discussed before, and make it do the work itself).

Inline links: said we wouldn’t, here

July 12, 2022 · Original source

There is (inexplicably) no PredictIt market on whether Trump will run, but the relevant Metaculus question is at 82% (and didn’t rise much with the NYT article). If the NYT article caused the big spike in Trump predictions on PredictIt, something is wrong either with their market or with this one.

Inline links: the relevant Metaculus question

Metaculus lists the chance of Elon Musk becoming CEO of Twitter by 2025 as 10%.

Inline links: Metaculus lists

Metaculus is hard to read on this question - they really should make it easier to zoom in on their graphs, or at least give specific dates - but it looks like they show the same pattern:

Inline links: they show the same pattern

Slightly Against Underpopulation Worries

August 04, 2022 · Original source

Metaculus predicts Artificial General Intelligence (by their specific definition, which you can check here) in 2029, and superintelligence (see definition here) 41 months (ie 3.5 years) after that. This is why I even though I love predictions, I couldn’t bring myself to participate in the “predict what the world will be like in 2050!” contest that was going around this part of the blogosphere recently. Even 2050 is starting not to seem like a very real year. Don’t get me wrong, I think there’s even odds it happens, I would just feel silly predicting something like “US politics will center around this set of issues” and then 2050 comes along and things are more like “the cloud of microscopic death robots that used to be our solar system has expanded as far as Sirius B”.

Inline links: check here, here

From Metaculus (source) And are we seriously expecting First World countries to be worrying about labor shortages by 2100?

Inline links: source

August 16, 2022 · Original source

The community consensus so far seems to be to try to avoid Kalshi as long as it can. There are some good real-money prediction markets open to non-Americans: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, and Insight Prediction, although Americans will find visits prohibited nationally, and I would never recommend violating precepts negligently. You could also try play-money markets like Manifold, or market-adjacent forecasting sites like Metaculus.

Inline links: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, Insight Prediction, Manifold, Metaculus

This is just a lot of really smart people making lots and lots of bets on serious questions, and it makes me optimistic that Manifold’s flaws are shallow and its potential is high. Kudos to everyone involved - and if you want to participate, go to this page. This Week In The Markets Chance of a war with China by 2050 up from 30% in April to 55% now. What’s changed?

Inline links: this page, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8051/100-deaths-from-china-us-conflict-before-2050/

Chance of a war with China by 2050 up from 30% in April to 55% now. What’s changed?

August 26, 2022 · Original source

HUNTSVILLE, AL Contact: Mike, mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 3:00 PM Location: Barnes & Noble – 300 The Bridge St #100, Huntsville, AL 35806. I'll be in the cafe with a sign that says ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 866MP88H+53 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Barnes & Noble has an area for little kids. If you want to bring a service animal, that's probably fine, but I doubt they allow pets. PHOENIX, AZ Contact: Ben Morin, benjamin[dot]j[dot]morin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 15, 1:00 PM Location: Thirsty Lion Pub in Tempe. I will have a table with an ACX sign. Coordinates: 8559FVVQ+6C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: This will be our 5th meetup (started during the meetups everywhere last year). Notes: Please email if interested to be added to the email list, even if you can't make this event BELMONT, CA Contact: Moshe Z., belmont-acx[at]devskillup[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 2:00 PM Location: Twin Pines Park, Picnic Tables. The table will have some sign saying 'ACX Meetup' on it. Coordinates: 849VGP8C+RRG Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: You can join the mailing list here. BERKELEY, CA Contact: Scott Time: Sunday, September 18, 1:00 PM Location: Rose Garden Inn, a rationalist event space at 2740 Telegraph Ave. Come in through the front gate on Telegraph. Coordinates: 849VVP5R+X7V Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: The Bay rationality community has a mailing list, a Discord server, and a Facebook group. There are dinner meetups every Thursday at 7 PM in the East Bay, and occasional meetups in SF and South Bay. FILLMORE, CA Contact: Ryan, wiserd[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Wiserd#0906 Time: Saturday, October 1st, 6:00 PM Location: It's my house. There are a bunch of plants on the porch and garbage bins in the driveway. Coordinates: 856393VX+VQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP to my email or Discord. Kids and dogs are welcome in the back yard. Full vaccinations (on the honor system) and masks required. GRASS VALLEY, CA Contact: Max Harms, raelifin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Condon Park by the prospector statue. In the case of rain we'll change the location to a residence, so RSVP to get updated! Coordinates: 84FW6W8H+C5 Event link(s): LessWrong IRVINE, CA Contact: Nick C, cohenskijanuary1[at]mail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: University Town Center Coordinates: 8554M526+7H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once a month at the same location. LOS ANGELES, CA Contact: Vishal Prasad (koreindian), vprasadcs[at]gmail[dot]com, Contact me on Discord. I am "Vishal" on the server. Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:30 PM Location: 11841 Wagner St., Culver City, CA 90039 Coordinates: 8553XHWM+GP Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly every Wednesday. We have been around for over 8 years. We discuss articles, watch movies, lift weights. We have a Discord server, a LessWrong group, and a website! Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get. NEWPORT BEACH, CA Contact: Michael M, michaelmichalchik[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, August 27, 2:00 PM Location: Picnic tables next to 1900 Port Carlow community clubhouse. The park is verdant and pleasant and easy to access. Free street parking nearby. In case of bad weather, we have a couple of near by places to relocate to. Coordinates: 8554J48R+WCX Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We will meet most Saturdays at 2pm until whenever. There will be short suggested readings and question most weeks to spur conversation, but they are optional. Each week we will ask if people have had something happen recently that surprised them or changed the way they looked at the world. Something that should or did update their priors. Participation is optional. Notes: Its a public park with tables and BBQ's so you can bring food and well behaved pets. We may regularly go on casual walks in the surrounding area. SAN DIEGO, CA Contact: Julius, julius[dot]simonelli[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 3:00 PM Location: We will meet up in Bird Park. I will be wearing a red shirt. Coordinates: 8544PVQ8+Q7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Join our Discord server SAN FRANCISCO, CA Contact: Derek Pankaew, derekpankaew[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 11:00 AM Location: We'll between in the Panhandle, between Ashbury and Masonic, with a 'ACX' sign. Coordinates: 849VQHC3+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong SAN JOSE, CA Contact: David Friedman, ddfr[at]daviddfriedman[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: 3806 Williams Rd, San Jose, CA 95117 Coordinates: 849W825J+6P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Before Covid we hosted every month or two. No structure, just conversation and food. We feed everyone who is still there at dinner time. We have done it once or twice since Covid. I have an email list of interested people. Notes: Kids are welcome. Please RSVP to my email so I will have a rough count of how many we are feeding. SAN MARCOS, CA Contact: Eric F., EricF14159[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Hollandia Park Soccer Field. At the tables near the top parking lot. Coordinates: 85544VW4+RV Event link(s): LessWrong BOULDER, CO Contact: Josh Sacks, josh[dot]sacks+acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 3:00 PM Location: 9191 Tahoe Ln, Boulder, CO 80301 Coordinates: 85GP2V96+JQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so we know ~ how many people to expect! CARBONDALE, CO Contact: Nick, naj[at]njarboe[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 1:00 PM Location: Sopris Park - Center covered picnic tables - blue shirt with ACX sign on table Coordinates: 85FJ9QXP+QMF Event link(s): LessWrong DENVER, CO Contact: Ian Philips, iansphilips[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: palebone#2796 Time: Sunday, October 2, 11:00 AM Location: We'll be in the backyard patio of St. Mark's Coffee House. I'll wear a white shirt with (my brothers') baby faces on it and have a brown hat on. Coordinates: 85FQP2VP+9R Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet typically 4 times a year. LAKEWOOD, CO Contact: Steven Zuber, stevenjzuber[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, October 5, 7:00 PM Location: We meet in the clubhouse located in this townhome community: 8769 W Cornell Ave Lakewood, CO 80227 Coordinates: 85FPMW64+MW Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet the first Wednesday of every month. Informal, casual atmosphere with occasional presentations by people. Notes: Check the Meetup page or Facebook group for updates. FAIRFIELD, CT Contact: Justin Barclay, barclay[dot]justin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 10:00 AM Location: South Pine Creek Beach. I'll set up near the lifeguard stand. Coordinates: 87H84PCH+CM Event link(s): LessWrong MANCHESTER, CT Contact: Mike, park-mike[at]outlook[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Near flagpole on top of hill Coordinates: 87H9QFFH+J7 Event link(s): LessWrong NEW HAVEN, CT Contact: RM, acx[dot]meetup[dot]nhv[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 12:30 PM Location: Cross Campus (Yale University), New Haven, CT 06511. We'll be on the grass on the northern half of Cross Campus, closest to Sterling Memorial Library. I'll be wearing an orange shirt. Coordinates: 87H9836C+8VG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Feel free to bring friends! The vibe will be welcoming and relaxed, and you can stay for any amount of time. Please email me if you're thinking about coming so I can get the right number of Insomnia cookies! WASHINGTON, DC Contact: John Bennett, WashingtonDCAstralCodexTen[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 6:00 PM Location: Froggy Bottom Pub: 2021 K Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006 Coordinates: 87C4WX33+3J Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: The Washington DC ACX/SSC group has been active since the first Meetups Everywhere in 2017. We have Monthly Socials downtown, hikes, board game days, and other cultural events. We're looking to spin up more rationality Dojo-type events with nearby groups in the coming months. Notes: We've rented out the Froggy Bottom Pub for the night, dinner and soft drinks will be provided. Alcohol available for purchase if desired, but no purchases are required. Metered street parking on nearby blocks is free after 6:30. Closest Metros are Farragut West and Farragut North. CAPE CORAL / FORT MYERS, FL Contact: Shawn Spilman, shawn[dot]spilman[at]outlook[dot]com, 508 655 8123 Time: Sunday, October 2, 1:00 PM Location: 929 SW 54th Ln, Cape Coral, FL 33914 Coordinates: 76RWH224+44 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: RSVP via email. I can be flexible about the date. GULF BREEZE / PENSACOLA, FL Contact: Christian, christian[dot]h[dot]williams[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, October 12, 7:30 PM Location: The Bridge Bar - 33 Gulf Breeze Pkwy A, Gulf Breeze, FL 32561 Coordinates: 862J9RCF+G6 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by emailing me. Thanks! If I don't hear from anyone, I won't be there. I work for Metaculus, but promise not to talk your ear off about forecasting. (Unless you want it talked off.) MIAMI, FL Contact: Eric Magro, eric135033[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: eric135#4943 Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: Buckminster Fuller Fly's Eye Dome 140 NE 39th St #001, Miami, FL 33137 ----- Look for a paper sign on a table that says ACX MEETUP west of the dome. Coordinates: 76QXRR65+V2 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Miami ACX started in 2017. Our official meetup happens monthly in either Miami or Broward. There are activities happening on a weekly basis from Miami to Palm Beach. We have a Facebook group, Discord server, and Meetup.com group. ORLANDO, FL Contact: Noah Topper, noah[dot]topper[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 7:00 PM Location: 4000 Central Florida Blvd, Orlando, FL. We'll be meeting up at UCF's pavilion near Garages A and I. I'll have a pretty ACX Meetup sign. Coordinates: 76WWJQ2X+82 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We try to meet up once a month, so far they've just been casual social meetups with natural discussions of rationality topics. Here's our Discord link :) Notes: RSVPs on LessWrong would be greatly appreciated. :) TALLAHASSEE, FL Contact: JF, jf19o[at]fsu[dot]edu Time: Monday, August 29, 2:00 PM Location: Landis, FSU. I will be wearing a black shirt Coordinates: 862QCPR3+PX Event link(s): LessWrong ATHENS, GA Contact: Dallon, knox[dot]dallon[dot]a[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: leonard#4208 Time: Saturday, October 15, 3:00 PM Location: Hendershots on Prince Avenue Coordinates: 865RXJ68+2W Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I might bring some board games ATLANTA, GA Contact: Steve French, steve[at]digitaltoolfactory[dot]net Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: Bold Monk Brewing - 1737 Ellsworth Industrial Blvd NW suite d-1 · Atlanta, GA (upstairs – look for the ACX Atlanta sign) Coordinates: 865QRH2F+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We've been in existence for four years – we have a dedicated crew and a very active Slack group Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Meetup.com HONOLULU, HI Contact: Matt Popovich, mattpopovich[at]outlook[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 4:00 PM Location: We'll meet at Magic Island at Ala Moana Beach Park, 1201 Ala Moana Blvd, Honolulu, HI 96814. From the parking lot, walk along the left side of the peninsula out toward Magic Island Lagoon. We're usually near the end of the peninsula, somewhere around the bathroom building. Look for the large 'ACX' sign. Coordinates: 73H475M3+JP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Honolulu Rationality hosts discussion meetups about twice a month in Ala Moana Beach Park. Check us out on our website BOISE, ID Contact: Julia and John, jae[dot]miomu[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, October 7, 6:00 PM Location: Old Timer's Shelter in Ann Morrison Park. I will have an ACX sign. Coordinates: 85M5JQ6P+96 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP and feel free to bring kids. CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, IL Contact: Ben, cu[dot]acx[dot]meetups[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 7:00 PM Location: Siebel Center for Computer Science, Room 4403 Coordinates: 86GH4Q7G+H8F Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Discord server Notes: RSVPs are appreciated but not at all required. You can RSVP by email or by pinging me in the Discord server. Suggested entrance is the East side of the building (see Coordinates) - we'll try to make sure at least that door is unlocked, but if it isn't then ping us on email or Discord. CHICAGO, IL Contact: Todd, info[at]chicagorationality[dot]com, https://chicagorationality.com/ Time: Sunday, September 18, 1:00 PM Location: Grant Park - North side of Balbo between the tracks and Columbus Coordinates: 86HJV9FH+84 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Chicago Rationality does a monthly discussion meetup (typically the first Saturday of the month) and a monthly social meetup (typically the third weekend of the month) Notes: Sign up for our email list to be notified of future meetups EVANSTON, IL Contact: Uzair, uzairq93[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 7:00 PM Location: 626 Church Street, Evanston IL 60201 Coordinates: 86JJ28X9+5WQ Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: The venue is a pub but it's really more of a restaurant, big long tables available so space should be fine and non drinkers shouldn't feel too out of place. BLOOMINGTON, IN Contact: Avery, acxbloomington[at]fastmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 2:00 PM Location: Switchyard Park. Will be at one of the tables near the Rogers Street parking lot. I will bring a cardboard sign that says “ACX”. Coordinates: 86FM4FX6+4Q Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We met last year for Meetups Everywhere and it was fun! Here's a link to our Discord. Notes: You can RSVP via Discord or email, but you are encouraged to show up even if you did not RSVP! WEST LAFAYETTE, IN Contact: NR, mapreader4[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 1:00 PM Location: 1275 1st Street, West Lafayette, IN 47906. We'll be in the south of the Earhart Hall lobby (not the dining court) near the piano, and I will be wearing a green shirt and carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 86GMC3GG+728 Event link(s): LessWrong LEXINGTON, KY Contact: Nathan, nwculley[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 7:00 PM Location: Blue Stallion Brewing. 610 W. 3rd St., Lexington, KY 40508. We will have a sign indicating we are the ACX meetup. Coordinates: 86CQ3F4X+VF Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet 1-2 times a month to talk about ACX, books, memes, etc., often over drinks and board games. NEW ORLEANS, LA Contact: Blake, blake[at]philosophers[dot]group Time: Sunday, September 4, 11:11 AM Location: Petite Clouet Cafe. Look for the group with an iPad that has a People’s Pint sticker. Coordinates: 76XFXX73+8R Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Website Notes: Hybrid in-person and online, video link sent weekly. Email for the link. BOSTON, MA Contact: Robi Rahman, robirahman94[at]gmail[dot]com, 7039818526 Time: Saturday, September 10, 5:00 PM Location: Boston Common, at the Parkman Bandstand gazebo Coordinates: 87JC9W3M+PR Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: Mailing list, Facebook group, Meetup.com Notes: We'll be providing food at the meetup, and giving out free books related to ACX, rationality, and effective altruism. Email the hosts if you'd like a particular book or you have any dietary restrictions. Our group is also doing a tour of the JFK Presidential Library on September 9, you’re welcome to join! NORTHAMPTON, MA Contact: Alex, alex[at]alexliebowitz[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 6:00 PM Location: The Deck, 125A Pleasant St., Northampton MA 01096. The official address is bizarre and inaccurate; it's the outdoor dining part of a group of bars & restaurants in a former rail station... a whole block away from Pleasant St. The simplest way to get to The Deck is to enter The Platform, one of the other restaurants, by its street entrance around 36 Strong Ave., here (make sure to look at street view). Go inside and ask them to show you to The Deck. We'll have a sign. Coordinates: 87J9899F+H7H Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We started in the 2018 Meetups Everywhere and is still going strong. We aim to meet about once every two weeks. At most meetups we get about 5-7 people out of a rotation of 15-20; Meetups Everywhere and other special events tend to bring in a few more than usual. We're a totally social meetup with no 'format' or suggested readings. Although it's not rare for us to touch on ACX articles and related topics, the conversation varies wildly, and you are welcome even if you're the most occasional ACX reader. Notes: We have a (not very active) Discord where you can DM me or post on a public channel. I'm most responsive by email. There is a small chance we'll have to change the location to somewhere else in Northampton. Please check the Less Wrong or Facebook posts on or after August 26 to get the final word on location. BALTIMORE, MD Contact: Rivka, rivka[at]adrusi[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 7:00 PM Location: UMBC outside of the Performing Arts and Humanities Building, on the north side. I will have a sign that says ACX meetup. Parking is free on the weekends. Edit: Rain is forecasted; if it’s raining, we will be inside of the Performing Arts building, on the ground floor just inside the entrance. Coordinates: 87F5774P+53 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet Sundays at 7pm — half are in person and half are virtual. Notes: There will be pizza and drinks DETROIT, MI Contact: Matt Arnold, matt[dot]mattarn[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 20, 7:00 PM Location: Tenacity Craft, 8517 2nd Ave, Detroit, MI 48202 Coordinates: 86JR9WG9+R6 Event link(s): LessWrong MINNEAPOLIS, MN Contact: Timothy, tmbond[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Meet at the picnic tables near the southeast corner of Powderhorn Park - the ones by the parking lot. I will be wearing a green Google t-shirt and have a sign that says ACX. Coordinates: 86P8WPRW+76 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I will bring some snacks (but not a full lunch, so eat before or bring something if you'll be that hungry). Please RSVP on LessWrong. KANSAS CITY, MO Contact: Alex, alex[dot]hedtke[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:30 PM Location: We will be in the courtyard above Whole Foods (which is also an apartment complex). You can enter through the apartment lobby, located on Oak Street. We will have runners shepherding people from the entrance up to the courtyard. Coordinates: 86F72CM8+RR Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com SAINT LOUIS, MO Contact: JohnBuridan, littlejohnburidan[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 1:00 PM Location: Lily Pond Shelter, Tower Grove Park, St. Louis Coordinates: 86CFJP4R+XV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: BYOB WEST PLAINS, MO Contact: Liam, liamhession[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 12:00 PM Location: 10/40 Coffee, 24 Court Square, West Plains, MO Coordinates: 868CP4HW+CV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Hoping to get anyone from around the Ozark region DURHAM, NC Contact: Will Jarvis, willdjarvis[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 8, 7:30 PM Location: Ponysaurus Brewing Company, 219 Hood St, Durham Coordinates: 8773X4Q3+QW Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly! We also have a Discord LAKEWOOD, NJ Contact: Ben L, mywebdev3[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 29, 8:30 PM Location: TBD Event link(s): LessWrong MORRISTOWN, NJ Contact: Matt, matt[dot]brooks[at]impactmarkets[dot]io, Discord: Matt B#0216 Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: 10 N Park Pl, Morristown, NJ 07960 (at the center of the Morristown Green) Coordinates: 87G7QGW9+RJ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: This is the first meetup, come be a founding member of the Northern NJ ACX/EA/LW group! PRINCETON, NJ Contact: Danny K, dskumpf[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 3:00 PM Location: Palmer Square, Princeton, NJ 08540. On the green right outside The Bent Spoon and Rojo's Roastary, near the big tree. I'll have some sort of ACX Meetup sign! Coordinates: 87G7982Q+2CP Event link(s): LessWrong LAS VEGAS, NV Contact: Jonathan Ray, ray[dot]jonathan[dot]w[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 11:45 AM Location: At El Segundo Sol restaurant with giant ACX MEETUP signs Coordinates: 85864RHJ+3H Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet regularly and mostly just socialize. We have a new Discord server. RENO, NV Contact: Steven, stevenl451[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Steeven#7407 Time: Friday, September 2, 5:30 PM Location: We'll be in Crissie Caughlin Park, near the tables and the swing set Coordinates: 85F2G46W+FG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Feel free to bring kids/dogs and please RSVP on LessWrong if you are going BUFFALO, NY Contact: George Herold, ggherold[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 1:00 PM Location: 932 Welch Rd. Java Center, NY 14082 Coordinates: 87J3W467+8P Notes: Last-minute location change! LONG ISLAND, NY Contact: Gabe, gabeaweil[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, October 27, 7:00 PM Location: Whales Tale in Northport Coordinates: 87G8VJRW+99 Event link(s): LessWrong NEW YORK CITY, NY Contact: Jasmine, jasminermj[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 4:00 PM Location: Pavillion @ Rockefeller Park, Warren St / River Terrace Coordinates: 87G7PX9M+4J3 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: OBNYC has a Discord and a Google Group; the Google Group is the main mailing list we use for events NEWBURGH, NY Contact: Pedro David Bonilla, proportionatetoevidence[at]gmail[dot]com, Cell 8452001681 Time: Saturday, September 24, 10:00 AM Location: Perkins Restaurant & Bakery, 1421 NY-300, Newburgh, NY 12550 Coordinates: 87H7GWCH+GF Event link(s): LessWrong ROCHESTER, NY Contact: Skivverus, skivverus[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Skivverus#5915 Time: Saturday, October 8, 1:00 PM Location: 4870 Culver Road; will be wearing a polo shirt, jeans, and glasses, and may or may not have figured out a sign due to just getting back from honeymoon. Look for a pair of parrots, one white, one green with a yellow/orange head. Coordinates: 87M46FM6+Q5P Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Venue very near amusement park; non-bathroom, non-parking amenities are therefore available but not free. Plan accordingly. Not particularly attached to specific location named, just happen to live reasonably close to there; alternative suggestions acceptable. Canadian visitors also welcome should your logistics permit; airport transportation available. RSVP via Discord preferred, but email will also work. CLEVELAND, OH Contact: Jack Zhang, LukeZhao9[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 1:00 PM Location: Picnic tables at Wade Oval (university circle) Coordinates: 86HWG96Q+GC5 Event link(s): LessWrong COLUMBUS, OH Contact: Daniel, daniel[dot]m[dot]adamiak[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 3:00 PM Location: Jeffrey Park - Clinton Shelter. I will be wearing a red shirt. Coordinates: 86FVX3C3+QF Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once a month. We discuss EA, AI and other two letter initialisms. Occasionally we go for walks in local grottos and nature trails. Notes: Email me if you want to be added to the mailing list to receive any updates or future invites. RSVPing is appreciated. TOLEDO, OH Contact: Scout, scout[dot]sivar[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 12:00 PM Location: Black Kite Coffee Coordinates: 86HRMCCV+9R Event link(s): LessWrong OKLAHOMA CITY, OK Contact: bean, battleshipbean[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 1:00 PM Location: Edmond Public Library/Shannon Miller Park. I will be wearing a hat that says USS Iowa on it. Coordinates: 8674MG3C+MW Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Had four people last year and a good time, moved to Edmond because a lot of us are up here. ALBANY, OR Contact: Kenan (he/him), kbitikofer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:00 PM Location: Bowman Park, Albany, Oregon. In or near the shelter. I will wear a bright red shirt and carry a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 84PRJWR7+XC6 Event link(s): LessWrong CORVALLIS, OR Contact: Ethan Ashkie, ethanashkie[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, September 7, 6:00 PM Location: Common Fields, in the reserved outdoor seating near the entrance Coordinates: 84PRHP5P+VQ Event link(s): LessWrong EUGENE, OR Contact: Ben Smith, benjsmith[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, August 31, 7:00 PM Location: The Barn Light, 924 Willamette St, Eugene 97401 Coordinates: 84PR2WX4+VV Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much pizza to get, but if you forget, don't worry about it, we want you to come along anyway PORTLAND, OR Contact: Sam F Celarek, support[at]pearcommunity[dot]com, 513-432-3310, Discord: Sam Celarek#2845 Time: Friday, September 9, 5:00 PM Location: 205 NW 4th Ave Coordinates: 84QVG8FG+V4 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Portland Effective Altruism and Rationality is very active. We have book clubs, bi-weekly AI safety meet-ups, bi-weekly topical meet-ups, bi-weekly socials, and have an active Discord. Notes: We would prefer you RSVP on Meetup.com a week beforehand so that we can get the right amount of food! HARRISBURG, PA Contact: Phil, acxharrisburg[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Ever Grain Brewing Co, 4444 Carlisle Pike, Camp Hill, PA 17011 - We will be sitting at one of the picnic tables outside with an ACX MEETUP sign Coordinates: 87G562QQ+8P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Small monthly meetup group based out of Harrisburg - celebrating 1 year of actuality! You can see more of our events on LessWrong. INDIANA, PA Contact: Eric, ericindianapa[at]gmail[dot]com, 717-256-2717 Time: Saturday, September 24, 11:00 AM Location: Caffè Amadeus in downtown Indiana, PA. I will have a sign with 'ACX Meetup' on one of the tables. Coordinates: 87G2JRFX+48 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP via email or text message so I know how many to expect. PHILADELPHIA, PA Contact: Wes and Diana, rationalphilly[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 22, 6:30 PM Location: The Philadelphia Ethical Society, 1906 Rittenhouse Square. The meeting room is in the basement, look for the signs. Coordinates: 87F6WRXG+FQ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We tend to meet in downtown Philly on the last Thursday of the month. We're aiming to make the Ethical Society our new steady location. We have many links: Discord, Google Calendar, Facebook, Meetup, Google Group Notes: We'll be ordering food from a local restaurant, so no need to eat first. BYOB PITTSBURGH, PA Contact: Justin, pghacx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Westinghouse Shelter @ Schenley Park (W Circuit Rd near Schenley Dr). We have the outdoor shelter reserved, so light rain shouldn't be a problem, but in the event of extreme weather, we may relocate indoors (our default 'contingency indoor location' is Crazy Mocha Coffee on 2100 Murray Ave in Squirrel Hill). Coordinates: 87G2C3Q4+773 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet monthly-ish for general discussion and chit-chat, email me if you'd like to be notified of future meetups. STATE COLLEGE, PA Contact: John Slow, auk480[at]psu[dot]edu Time: Thursday, September 8, 5:00 PM Location: Old Main. I will be carrying an ACX meetup sign. Coordinates: 87G4Q4WP+HV Event link(s): LessWrong SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO Contact: Dan Gelfarb, danielgelfarb[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Lote 23, back corner under the tents. I will be wearing a blue shirt with a sign that says ACX meetup on it. Coordinates: 77CMCWVM+W32 Event link(s): LessWrong PROVIDENCE, RI Contact: James Bailey, feanor1600[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Prospect Terrace park, to the right of the Roger Williams statue Coordinates: 87HCRHJV+24 Event link(s): LessWrong SIOUX FALLS, SD Contact: S. C., villainsplus[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 2, 5:00 PM Location: 410 E 26th St, Sioux Falls, SD 57105 - the pavillion on the west side of McKennan Park, or the tables just south of it if I can't book it. I'll be the guy with the grill. Coordinates: 86M5G7JH+W57 Event link(s): LessWrong MEMPHIS, TN Contact: Michael, michael[at]postlibertarian[dot]com Time: Monday, September 5, 1:00 PM Location: French Truck Coffee at Crosstown Concourse, Central Atrium 1350 Concourse Ave, Memphis, TN 38104. We will be at one of the many tables near French Truck Coffee and I will have a sign that says ACX MEETUP. Coordinates: 867F5X2P+QHC Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet about every month or so. We've been around since 2019 but only regularly since mid 2021 due to the pandemic. We have a Discord server. NASHVILLE, TN Contact: Ellen, enwiegand[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 11:00 AM Location: OneCity Nashville (8 City Blvd, Nashville, TN 37209), next to the volleyball courts. I'll have a pink ballcap that says SPINSTER on it. Coordinates: 868M552H+XW Event link(s): LessWrong AUSTIN, TX Contact: Silas Barta, sbarta[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 12:00 PM Location: 4001 N Lamar, Austin Texas, park by Central Market near stone tables and tents Coordinates: 86248746+8C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Austin LessWrong has a weekly focused discussion, a weekly social mixer, a weekly online book club, and a monthly movie night. Been around since 2011. Notes: Location may change as we are talking to other venues BRYAN/COLLEGE STATION, TX Contact: Kenny, easwaran[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 9, 5:00 PM Location: Back patio of Torchy's Tacos at Texas and New Main. I'll have a yellow umbrella and pinkish/purple hair Coordinates: JMFC+4J Event link(s): LessWrong DALLAS, TX Contact: Ethan Morse, ethan[dot]morse97[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: ethanmorse#5255 Time: Sunday, September 11, 12:00 PM Location: Union, 3705 Cedar Springs Rd, Dallas, TX 75219. We'll be in the upstairs conference room. Coordinates: 8645R55R+9M9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get HOUSTON, TX Contact: Eric Magro, eric135033[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Empire Cafe, 1732 Westheimer Rd, Houston, TX 77098 ---- Look for a table with an ACX MEETUP sign. Coordinates: 76X6PHVW+5H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: There are meetups every week. We have a Discord and a Facebook group. WACO, TX Contact: Mike, BaylorACX[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 1:00 PM Location: Cameron Park, picnic tables next to Jacob's Ladder Coordinates: 8634HVG2+V9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please email me if you're thinking about attending! Would love to start an ACX community here :) SALT LAKE CITY, UT Contact: Ross Richey (aka Jeremiah), wearenotsaved[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 3:00 PM Location: Liberty Park near the ChargePoint stations Coordinates: 85GCP4WF+VJ Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet every other month, we do book clubs and movie nights as well. Notes: Will be outdoors. If the weather looks bad, email event organizer to check on location. CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA Contact: RL, effectivealtruismatuva[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 5:00 PM Location: 12 Rotunda Drive Charlottesville, VA 22903 - We’ll meet at the picnic tables across the street from The Virginian. There will be an ACX sign. Coordinates: 87C32FPX+3H4 Event link(s): LessWrong LYNCHBURG, VA Contact: Craig, craigbdaniel[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Three Roads Brewing - I will be wearing a purple t-shirt and will place an ""ACX"" card on the table Coordinates: 8792CV65+5G NORFOLK, VA Contact: Willa, walambert[at]pm[dot]me Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Pagoda & Oriental Garden, 265 W Tazewell St, Norfolk, VA 23510. I will be wearing a bright green shirt, will have a large green & yellow hat on, and will have a sign with ACX Meetup on it. Coordinates: 8785RPX4+W3 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: Hi! Virginia Rationalists was co-founded in Norfolk VA earlier this year by Willa & Yitzi with the goal of growing a thriving ACX / LW / EA community in our city & the state of Virginia. We meet every week at Fair Grounds cafe on Wednesday evenings from 5-7:30pm Eastern Time. We have a Discord server and a Twitter. RESTON, VA Contact: James, jrbalch333[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 1:30 PM Location: The matchbox at 1900 Reston Station Blvd, Reston, VA 20190 on the 1st floor of the giant Google building. I'll be holding a copy of Sapiens. Coordinates: 87C4WMX6+9X Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Email me to be added to the WhatsApp group RICHMOND, VA Contact: Cedar, cedar[dot]ren+acxmeetup[at]gmail[dot]com, @Cedar at this Discord server Time: Saturday, October 1, 2:30 PM Location: Richmond Public Libraries, West End Branch 5420 Patterson Ave, Richmond, VA 23226 Coordinates: 8794HFHQ+3G Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong & optionally reach out to me on Discord to introduce yourself! BURLINGTON, VT Contact: Forrest, lucidobservor[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Battery Park, at the benches in the south-western corner of the park, near the cannons facing the lake. I will have an 'ACX Meetup' sign. Coordinates: 87P8FQJH+8P Event link(s): LessWrong BELLINGHAM, WA Contact: Alex, bellinghamrationalish[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 29, 5:30 PM Location: Lake Padden Park, at one of the tables near the lake by the dog park. If it's rainy, we'll meet in one of the two covered gazebo areas just north (right, if you're facing the lake) of the planned spot. If the forecast looks really bad (e.g. very cold), I'll post an indoor location to the Meetup.com page at least three days in advance. Coordinates: 84WVMHX3+GM Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: Bellingham Rationalish discusses (in good faith!) topics in and around rationality. We usually meet the evening of the last Wednesday of each month. Our first meeting was a 2021 ACX Everywhere meetup. Notes: Please RSVP on Meetup so I have an idea how many people to expect. Kids, animals, food, beverages, etc. are all welcome. SEATTLE, WA Contact: Nikita Sokolsky, sokolx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 5:00 PM Location: Optimism Brewing (1158 Broadway, Seattle) Coordinates: 84VVJM7H+4Q Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong (or FB/Meetup) for planning purposes MADISON, WI Contact: Mary Wang, mmwang[at]wisc[dot]edu Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: 1022 High St. Blue house with red porches. If weather permits, we'll be in my large backyard, which has more seating now than last year. If rain, come in the side door. There will be air purifiers and open windows. Masks optional. Look for a sign at the end of the driveway that says ACX/SSC Meetup. Coordinates: 86MG3H3X+XW Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We have met fortnightly in the past, but quit last year when it got too cold to meet outside. We typically have shared a meal, sat around my kitchen table and talked. Have held a Solstice celebration.

October 18, 2022 · Original source

Sources: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen The lowest forecaster is higher than the highest pollster! Taking 538 as an example, forecasters range from 5 pp higher (Manifold) to 17 pp higher (PredictIt). Tournaments and real-money markets tend to give higher numbers than play-money sites. I would go with 47% on this one, based on the convergence between GJO, CSPI, and Polymarket. CFTC vs. PredictIt (and everyone else), Part II The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the US agency regulating prediction markets. In August, they told PredictIt (the biggest political prediction market) to shut down, effective in February. Now a motley group of stakeholders are suing the CFTC for a stay of execution. Plaintiffs include: 2 professors using the site as “a source of data for research”

Inline links: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen, they told PredictIt

One of my hopes for forecasting is that it eventually becomes so well-validated that decision-makers can take these kinds of considerations into account: “Should we sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine? It would have such-and-such benefits, but also increase the risk of nuclear escalation by 3.6%, is it worth it?” We can’t directly compare Samotsvety and Swift because they’re predicting over different time periods. But assuming that there’s more risk in the next six months than in the six months after that, I think Samotsvety is a little higher but they’re not embarrassingly far off. Metaculus is a bit more optimistic than either, believing there’s only a 4% chance of detonation in Ukraine in 2023 and a 7% chance of any use in the next ~year. Max Tegmark is going much higher than anyone else and says 16% chance of global nuclear war. Kalshi Applies For Election Markets Kalshi is a regulated and fully-legal prediction market with good lobbyists and a compliance team. This means the CFTC probably won’t randomly shut them down one day. But it also means they can only create new markets with CFTC permission. In July, Kalshi asked the CFTC for permission to make midterm election prediction markets - specifically, which party will win control of the House and Senate. The CFTC has said they will make a decision by October 28 (which doesn’t leave much time for predicting to happen before the November 8 election, but I guess it sets a precedent). September was the Request For Comment period, when the CFTC solicited comments from stakeholders about what they should do. Kalshi tried really hard to get lots of people to send in positive assessments - I know this because of how many people asked me “why is the CEO of Kalshi emailing me about this thing?” Their strategy seems to have worked; among the people who wrote to the CFTC in support were: A managing director at JP Morgan

Inline links: a 4% chance, a 7% chance, 16% chance, In July, they will make a decision by October 28, A managing director at JP Morgan

Source: Metaculus. Although the recent blast took out a few lanes, others are still open, so the market hasn’t resolved yet.

Inline links: Metaculus

Mantic Monday: Twitter Chaos Edition

November 04, 2022 · Original source

30: Writing Forecasting Questions For EA Organizations (6/10) Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.

November 21, 2022 · Original source

Polymarket is within 2% of Manifold. Metaculus here has slightly stricter criteria but broadly agrees. 71 traders, still pretty good, but I find it meaningless without a way to distinguish between “everything collapses, Elon sells it for peanuts to scavengers” vs. “Elon saves Twitter, then hands it over to a minion while he moves on to a company building giant death zeppelins”. Oh, here we go. 20 traders, they think Musk will stay in charge. 23 traders. Twitter was profitable in 2018 and 2019, then went back to being net negative in 2020 and 2021 (I don’t know why) . I don’t think it’s been very profitable lately, so it would be a feather in Musk’s cap if he accomplished this. 24 traders. Twitter’s mDAU have consistently gone up in the past. DAU is slightly different and I think more likely to include bots. 26 traders. One thing I like about Manifold is that it lets you choose any point along the gradient from “completely objective” (eg Twitter’s reported DAU count) to “completely subjective” (eg whether the person who made the market thinks something is better or worse). This at least uses a poll as its resolution method. But the poll will be in the comments of this market, which means it will mostly be by people who invested in this market, who’ll have strong incentives to manipulate it. Maybe Manifold should add a polling platform to their service? 815 traders, one of the biggest markets of all time. It’s easy to see the jump where Musk unbanned Trump the other day. Trump has said that he doesn’t need to tweet because he prefers his own Truth Social network. This is a good business decision on his part, but hinges on him having enough impulse control to stick to his plan and avoid tweeting. The market thinks there’s a 25% chance he can do it! Polymarket again within 2% of Manifold. Only 23 traders here, and they’re a lot less optimistic than the Trump traders. FTX! 43 traders, seems like probably. I’ve seen a lot of Twitter takes about how rich well-connected people never get in trouble for this kind of thing, but the markets seem less cynical. 251 traders, and by the way amazing job by “mr22” who started this market on October 5. I also appreciate the relatively late end date - there’s another market “. . . by 2024” which is in the 30s, but that’s because people don’t trust the justice system to move quickly, not because they think he’ll be found innocent. There are a series of markets on sentence length which seem to suggest more than a month but less than a year in jail; this doesn’t really make sense to me and I’m going to nervously ignore them. Only 8 traders here, so take with a grain of salt, but this is a great example of the creative ways people are using Manifold. The market resolves not to “yes” or “no” but to the percent of FTX US users’ funds that they eventually get back; you make money if you were closer than other traders. Here they seem to think most people will only be getting about 14 cents on the dollar. There’s another market for FTX.US users which is a little higher at 29. 34 traders. I think this is too high; I bet it was some random third-tier insider, just because there are more of them and they’re under less scrutiny. Moving on to the effects on effective altruism in particular (just assume I have all possible conflicts of interest here): 272 traders, check the detailed resolution criteria. I think the strongest case is something like the one described in this article, about Center for Effective Altruism leaders discussing concerns about Alameda Research in 2018. The article doesn’t give specifics but my guess is they were the same issues Kerry Vaughn describes here (though see the followup comment by an employee who left FTX, casting doubt on Vaughn’s claims). That means the market hinges on whether Vaughn’s allegations fit the resolution criteria that “the unethical behavior must have been related to fraudulent investment strategies that involve spending other people's money without their permission”. Vaughn describes “poor capital controls, including a lack of distinction between money owned by investors and money owned by Alameda itself”, which sounds like it’s in that direction but could cover a wide variety of badness levels. My guess is everyone will end up agreeing that disgruntled Alameda employees whisper-networked that some things were bad about the company in 2018, some of the rumors got to CEA leaders, the leaders debated whether this was worse than normal for a tech startup, decided it didn’t rise to a level where they needed to publicly freak out, and moved on. Isaac will have to pay attention to the details as they come out and decide whether or not it qualifies. 45 traders. This seems to confirm that the CEA incident is responsible for most of the probability mass above; many fewer people think the FTX Future Fund (ie the charitable branch of FTX responsible for giving out their money) was in on this. Related: this market only has five traders, but I’m highlighting it anyway in the hopes that it gets more. The most money is on 2022. My guess is that we’ll find that they had terrible accounting practices in 2018-2019 of the sort that could be classified as criminally incompetent in a way that bled into fraud (but the trades went fine so nobody was harmed) and then they ramped it up a lot in 2022 to deal with the crypto crash. I think this market will be harder to resolve than people expect. 47 traders. Everyone is panicking about this possibility, but it looks like it’s not too likely. 10 traders. I’ll take this chance to say: a lot of media is predicting the death of EA, or a major blow to EA, or something in that category. Not going to happen. The media isn’t good at understanding people who do things for reasons other than PR. But most EAs really believe. Like, really believe. If every single other effective altruist in the world were completely discredited, I would just shrug and do effective altruism on my own. If they instituted the death penalty for effective altruism, I would do it under cover of night using ZCash. And I’m nowhere near the most committed effective altruist; honestly I’m probably below average. “Saint gets eaten by lions in Colosseum, can early Christianity possibly survive this setback?” Update your model or prepare to be constantly surprised. 6 traders. So, we lost several hundred million dollars of funding in a giant disaster which was also morally outrageous and demoralizing. It happens. But lots of people have already emailed me asking how to send in more money to help fill the gap. Some added something like “it was so depressing that all the FTX money meant my money didn’t make a difference, but now I can help again, and it’s great!” Can these people fill the hole? 32% chance that they can! 10 traders. And if they don’t, we’ll still probably do better than in 2021, before all the FTX money started rolling in. We’ll try harder to hammer in the point about not doing “ends justify the means” reasoning, and do some reorgs and purges to prevent anything like this from happening again, we’ll make a bunch of other changes - some reasonable, some panic-driven - but we’ll go on. If all the far-future stuff collapses, we’ll donate to global health charities. If the global health charities don’t work, we’ll fund GiveWell to sit around and figure out something that does. If GiveWell gets hit by an asteroid, we’ll work on asteroid deflection (actually I think we might already be doing that). If asteroid deflection turns out to be -EV, we’ll switch to shrimp welfare, or give ourselves Zika virus, or any of a million other things. You have no idea how committed we are to continuing to do effective altruism regardless of whether or not it’s “popular”. But it will be popular. 45 traders, resolution criteria at the link, notice the dip when the FTX news broke, followed by recovery as people had time to think it over more. Moving on to slightly less serious topics: The snapshot doesn’t show this, but one of the suggestions is Atlas Rugged. 67 traders, interesting to see where forecasters’ priorities lie. This was a big rumor early on, along with “everyone was on meth”, but the on site psychiatrist said it was false during an interview. 13 traders. WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP GOING ON PODCASTS? Midterms! That was two weeks ago? It feels like years! A week before the midterms, I wrote: Polymarket, Manifold, and PredictIt now have shiny interfaces for predicting the upcoming US midterm elections. In terms of the Republicans taking the Senate, Polymarket is at 65%, Manifold at 58%, PredictIt at 73%, and 538 at 49%. Congratulations 538! Mike Saint Antoine (who wrote the review of Viral in the last Book Review Contest) has put some more work into scoring midterm election forecasts. Here are some headline results: Mike writes: The reason I didn’t just do a three-way comparison between PredictIt, FiveThirtyEight, and Manifold Markets is that the Manifold Markets forecasts included fewer questions than the PredictIt and FiveThirtyEight forecasts. So in order to do a fair comparison here, I’ll be comparing the smaller subset of questions for which PredictIt and Manifold Markets both gave a forecast. So it looks like both Manifold and 538 did better than PredictIt, and there’s no clear way to tell which of the former did better. (except I guess you could do this analysis with just the subset of questions Manifold and 538 share, but Mike didn’t and I’m also not going to). PredictIt has a pretty consistent Republican bias (it’s a minor epistemic sin to accuse a prediction market of having a predictable bias unless you’ve made money exploiting it, I made $600 this election so I’ll let myself pass). In years when Republicans do better than expected, it will probably look better than other markets; in years when they do worse, it will look worse. Still, this is a bias, so I think we should take them doing worse this year as a fair reflection of their accuracy, even thought next year it could go the other way. My main two takeaways here are: PredictIt isn’t yet good enough that the ideal theorems showing prediction markets should be unbiased and better than everyone else apply to it. The obvious explanation is its $800-per-question cap. Polymarket doesn’t have that cap and it did better, although Mike hasn’t done a formal comparison to 538.

Inline links: here, was profitable, mDAU have consistently gone up, https://polymarket.com/market/will-realdonaldtrump-tweet-in-2022, more than a month, less than a year, FTX.US users, this article, here, Not going to happen, some reorgs and purges to prevent anything like this from happening again, I think we might already be doing that, turns out to be -EV, shrimp welfare, give ourselves Zika virus, wrote, Polymarket, Manifold, PredictIt, 538, Viral, scoring midterm election forecasts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!z0IM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbcfb99af-ec23-4ff9-bcec-ffe248821898_1800x900.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NSlN!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c5602d-e060-454b-8a20-10e925c57526_1800x900.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vBga!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b35fbd9-ee89-4f4f-b8b9-832742e483fd_881x289.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h6tt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9355d197-997a-4c48-93c0-76abc23f2c12_881x287.png

2023 Prediction Contest

December 16, 2022 · Original source

This year I’m making it official, with a 50-question 2023 Prediction Benchmark Question Set. I hope that this can be used as a common standard to compare different forecasters and forecasting site (Manifold and Metaculus have already agreed to use it, and I’m hoping to get others). Also, I’d like to do an ACX Survey later this month, and this will let me try to correlate personality traits with forecasting accuracy.

Thanks to people from Metaculus, Manifold, and the EA forecasting community for helping with questions and plans.

Prediction Market FAQ

December 20, 2022 · Original source

After the event happens, use the outcome to update everyone’s reputation and refine the algorithm. Superforecasting uses some of the same ideas as prediction markets - probabilistic forecasts, incentives to get the right answer, aggregation methods that favor people with good track records. In studies comparing superforecasting tournaments to small prediction markets, the superforecasting tournaments have done equally well or even slightly better. My goal with this FAQ is not to claim that prediction markets are always better than superforecasting. I think of both as part of the same revolution in forecasting technology, and would be happy with policy-makers or other important people using either. Still, I do think that each has situations where they might be a better fit than the other. Superforecasting tournaments shine on questions so far in the future that financial incentives start to lose force (for example, people are unlikely to place bets on questions about 2100, when most of them will be dead anyway). They’re also good in situations where you can’t get a big prediction market together - superforecasting scales down more gracefully, since you can identify individuals as superforecasters and consult them even in situations where you can’t get a full tournament together. Prediction markets shine in avoiding advanced manipulation attempts, in providing a single canonical answer when someone might worry that any given tournament was biased, and in aggregating the results of superforecaster tournaments with each other and with other sources. Remember that a superforecasting tournament can be considered an “expert”, like Nate Silver. So by the argument in Part 2, we should expect that a big prediction market won’t consistently be worse than any given superforecasting tournament, as long as the tournament’s answers are public knowledge. If there were ever a superforecasting tournament that consistently outperformed prediction markets, that would be a simple mispricing, people would correct it, and the market would eventually agree with the tournament. 4.5: Aren’t prediction markets gambling? Isn’t gambling bad and addictive? Yes, sort of. But most countries allow forms of gambling that aren’t too addictive and have some social value. For example, investing in stocks, or investing in commodities futures. I think prediction markets are more like this than like traditional gambling in casinos. People who want to gamble can already buy cryptocurrencies, or trade stocks on Robin Hood, or (in 20 states) place online sports bets on sites like DraftKings. All these things seem more addictive than, and have less social utility than, prediction markets. I don’t think promoting or legalizing prediction markets is going to make the gambling situation much worse than it is already - so given how useful I think they are, I think they would be net positive. People who are more concerned about the gambling aspect might want to stick to play money prediction markets, which wouldn’t have this problem. 4.6: Where does the money in prediction markets come from? That is, if "you get a dollar when the Democrats win”, who provides the dollar? In the abstract, prediction markets pair up people who want to bet on different sides of a proposition. For example, if a market says that there’s a 75% chance that the Democrats win, then they pair up someone willing to buy a share in “The Democrats win” for $0.75 with someone willing to buy a share in “The Democrats lose” for $0.25, for a total of $1 spent on these two shares. Then, when the Democrats either win or lose, the person with the correct share gets the $1. In practice it’s annoying to have to wait for someone to take the opposite side of the trade, so some people (or bots!) play “market maker” and are willing to take your bet on the assumption that someone else will come along soon to take the other side. But it’s usually safe to abstract this step away and just imagine people betting with each other, using the market as an intermediary. 4.6.1: Then why should anyone play prediction markets, when on average they’ll only break even? It seems like this is a worse deal than stocks, which tend to go up over time. Every dollar someone wins on a prediction market corresponds to someone else’s loss; in expectation; across all participants, the average gain is 0. But the stock market tends to go up over time, as businesses expand to new areas and invent new products; across all participants, the average gain is about 4% per year. So why ever invest in prediction markets instead of stocks? Whatever the theoretical answer to this question, lots of people do invest in prediction markets instead of stocks sometimes; several existing prediction markets have questions with hundreds of thousands of dollars in trading volume. You would have to ask those people why they do it. Maybe it’s because it’s fun. Or maybe it’s because they think (rightly or wrongly) that they’re above average and can make a profit. This is no different than other zero-sum games like sports betting, which attracts billions of dollars each year. The futures and commodities markets are also zero-sum, but attract billions of dollars by giving companies an opportunity to hedge risk. For example, a nickel mine might get rich if the price of nickel goes up, but go bankrupt if the price of nickel goes down. And they might prefer a predictable world where they get a small but guaranteed profit no matter what happens to nickel prices. So they bet some amount of money on commodity markets that the price of nickel will go down, and then their income is the sum of what they make from their nickel mining and from their bets - which, if they handled their hedging correctly, should be a small but guaranteed profit. Prediction markets would allow hedging of other types of risk - for example, import-export businesses might want to hedge against the risk that a protectionist politician gets elected, or tourism companies might want to hedge against a pandemic that closes international borders. These people would inject enough money into the market to subsidize sophisticated speculators. Finally, I envision that someday people who want to know the answer to specific questions can subsidize prediction markets on them. For example, the Democratic Party might subsidize a conditional market (see 5.1) about which Democratic primary candidate is most likely to win the general election. Their money would go to giving the average investor a 4% (or some other number) rate of return - although of course winners would gain more than that and losers would still lose on net. I think this is the most likely way for prediction markets to become very big. 4.6.1.1: If people use prediction markets to hedge risk, won’t that distort them? That is, suppose that an import-export business spends millions of dollars betting that Trump will win in order to hedge against his protectionist policies. Since their bets aren’t based on the real chance of Trump winning, won’t that distort the market? No. Suppose that everyone knows Trump has a 50-50 chance of winning. And suppose the import-export business, in the process of hedging risk, bids it up to 90-10. Since you know Trump has a 50-50 chance of winning, you can get rich quick by bidding it back down to 50-50. From your point of view, the import-export business is (in expectation) giving you free money. But they’re still happy to do it, because they’re hedging their risk successfully. 4.7: Aren’t a lot of the questions we care about inherently subjective or hard to measure? This is a frequent problem for prediction markets. For example, we might want to know something like “will we get human-level AI before 2050?” But how do we define “human-level AI”? If there’s an AI that’s much better than humans at most tasks, but much worse at a few, is that “human-level”? If there’s an AI that seems human-level in demos, but the team that makes it won’t let it be independently tested, should that count? If it works through some kind of Frankenstein chip that combines vat-grown brain tissue with computing machinery, is that still an “AI”? Prediction markets have found a few ways around this problem. First, many groups (for example, Metaculus) try to define their resolution criteria very carefully. A typical Metaculus question on AI sounds like this: We will thus define "an AI system" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all completable by at least some humans. Able to reliably pass a 2-hour, adversarial Turing test during which the participants can send text, images, and audio files (as is done in ordinary text messaging applications) during the course of their conversation. An 'adversarial' Turing test is one in which the human judges are instructed to ask interesting and difficult questions, designed to advantage human participants, and to successfully unmask the computer as an impostor. A single demonstration of an AI passing such a Turing test, or one that is sufficiently similar, will be sufficient for this condition, so long as the test is well-designed to the estimation of Metaculus Admins.

Able to reliably pass a 2-hour, adversarial Turing test during which the participants can send text, images, and audio files (as is done in ordinary text messaging applications) during the course of their conversation. An 'adversarial' Turing test is one in which the human judges are instructed to ask interesting and difficult questions, designed to advantage human participants, and to successfully unmask the computer as an impostor. A single demonstration of an AI passing such a Turing test, or one that is sufficiently similar, will be sufficient for this condition, so long as the test is well-designed to the estimation of Metaculus Admins.

Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al. Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected. By "unified" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of "introspection" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.) Resolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public. Even this isn’t perfect (which models are “the equivalent of” a 1:8 scale Ferrari 312?), but in practice once you get to this level of details people mostly stop worrying about this. Another method (mostly associated with Manifold) is to just leave it up to human judgment - specifically, the judgment of the person who made the market. For example, I could make a market in “By 2050, will there be an AI which Scott Alexander thinks qualifies as ‘human-level’?” This will force market participants to price in the risk that I have bad judgment or act dishonestly. But perhaps these risks are small. For example, I might say elsewhere what I think qualifies as “human-level” AI, or you might think human-level AI will be so obvious when it comes that I will definitely agree with you about it. As for honesty, this could be enforced either legally or by reputation. Someone who has resolved their past 100 prediction markets honestly will probably resolve this one honestly too, especially if they get paid to do so and will never get customers again if they lie. When we invest on the normal stock market, we trust that our brokers / the NYSE / etc won’t run off with our money, and this trust is usually well-deserved. Even when we make an online purchase, we trust that the store we’re sending our money to won’t steal it and refuse to send us the product. It would be an exaggeration to say that trust is a solved problem, but evidence from Manifold suggests that most people price in a <1% chance that well-known market makers with good reputation resolve dishonestly. If prediction markets got big enough, they could spawn trusted “resolution companies” who individual markets and market-makers could outsource their resolution to, for a fee. If these companies were ever dishonest, they would lose all their business from then on, so they would probably be as honest as other businesses like your broker / the NYSE / various online stores / etc. 4.7.1: Isn’t a lot of the “crisis of trust” around questions that might never have clear future answers? For example, consider the debate around whether Donald Trump is a Russian agent. Maybe no proof will ever come out either way. Or maybe some evidence will appear that seems to prove one side or the other, but people will continue to deny it for political reasons, and the problem of resolving the prediction market will be just as hard as the problem of answering the original question. Indeed, prediction markets aren’t very good at this, and are only fully trustworthy on questions where the true answer will eventually become apparent. Still, they might not be completely useless. For example, if you’re worried about Trump being a Russian agent because you expect him to pursue pro-Russia policies, you can start markets in whether he pursues those policies. Or you can start a conditional market (see 5.1) on whether, if Russia ever releases its past intelligence data many years from now, the data confirm/disconfirm that Trump was an agent. See Part 5 for other clever ways you might try to address this problem. 4.8: “Meme stocks” like Gamestop and AMC sometimes remain mispriced indefinitely. How do we know this won’t happen with prediction markets? Meme stocks are a type of Ponzi. It’s “reasonable” to buy Gamestop at some inflated price, because - who knows? - someone else might buy it at an even more inflated price tomorrow. And this can keep going arbitrarily long, or at least long enough for you to get out with a profit. Unlike meme stocks, prediction markets have a clear resolution date. If you’re predicting who will win the next election, the market will go to 100% or 0% after the election finishes. No matter how many memes there were, you wouldn’t buy a share in “the Democrats will win the election” for 99% the day before Election Day if you knew they would definitely lose. But that means prediction markets should be accurately priced the day before Election Day, which means you shouldn’t buy at an inaccurate price two days before Election Day, and so on. I can’t say for sure that no prediction market will ever get mispriced for meme reasons, but they should be much more robust against meme mispricings than the stock market. And even the stock market doesn’t have too many meme stocks. 4.9: How do prediction markets deal with outcomes in the far future? Suppose there is a question “who will win the 2100 election?” Currently it says 25% Democrats, 75% Republicans, and I believe it should be 50-50 (we’ll ignore third parties, or the possibility of America not existing in 2100, for now). So if I bet on the market, I can (in expectation) double my money. But there are many better ways to double your money by 2100. For example, if the stock market grows 4% per year, I should expect any money invested in the stock market to multiply by 20x in 2100. So just doubling it in a prediction market is a bad option. Realistically, this means prediction markets won’t work well for far-future events. These might be a better match for forecaster tournaments or some other structure, where we get the forecaster track records through present events, then use those track records weighting their far-future predictions (see also 5.5). There are already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events. But if you really wanted to use a prediction market, you could theoretically solve this by putting investors’ money in index funds while they waited. Then the winner would get their (and the losers’) original deposits and investment profits, and it would go back to being a better option than investing in index funds directly. In practice this seems complicated and I wouldn’t expect it to work. 4.9.1: What about predicting things that would make it impossible or pointless to win money, like human extinction? Again, these questions probably aren’t great matches for prediction markets, and you should use forecasting tournaments or some other method (see also 5.5). If you really wanted, you might be able to make it work in theory through a mechanism sort of like this one. 5. What are some clever uses for prediction markets? Here’s a non-exhaustive list: 5.1: Conditional prediction markets / decision markets Suppose the government is trying to decide whether to throw its weight behind Vaccine A or Vaccine B for some deadly disease. There are some experts behind both, both sets of experts accuse the other of being in the pay of pharmaceutical companies, and decision-makers don’t know who to trust. They might make two prediction markets, like: If we decide to go with Vaccine A, will at least X people die from the disease?

Inline links: Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al, already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events, this one

January 24, 2023 · Original source

20th: Peter Wildeford. Peter is the co-CEO of effective altruist organization Rethink Priorities. He’s also one of the top forecasters on Metaculus. You can hear him discuss his forecasting strategies on the Inside View podcast.

Inline links: Rethink Priorities, the Inside View podcast

Or maybe the prediction market results will hold. One market (Manifold) and another market-like site (Metaculus) are joining the contest this year. If they do as well as last year, they’ll beat all but 15 of the 3500 entries. If things go very well, maybe we’ll discover new ways of aggregating their results that can beat every individual predictor, at least most of the time.

2023

January 31, 2023 · Original source

Happy One Millionth Prediction, Metaculus Metaculus celebrated its one millionth user forecast with a hackathon, a series of talks, and a party:

Inline links: hackathon, a series of talks

Metaculus celebrated its one millionth user forecast with a hackathon, a series of talks, and a party:

Inline links: hackathon, a series of talks

This was a helpful reminder that Metaculus is a real organization, not just a site I go to sometimes to check the probabilities of things. The company is run remotely; catching nine of them in a room together was a happy coincidence. Although I think it still relies heavily on grants, Metaculus’ theoretical business model is to create forecasts on important topics for organizations that want them (“partners”) - so far including universities, tech companies, and charities. A typical example is this recent forecasting tournament on the spread of COVID in Virginia, run in partnership with the Virginia Department of Health and the University of Virginia Biocomplexity Institute (this year’s version here). The main bottleneck is interest from policy-makers, which they’re trying to solve both through product improvement and public education. In December, Metaculus’ Director of Nuclear Risk, Peter Scoblic, published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine about forecasting’s “struggle for legitimacy” in the foreign policy world. It’s paywalled, but quoting liberally: Organizational change is difficult under the best of circumstances and is close to impossible when powerful insiders actively resist it. National security experts with decades of experience and access to classified information see little reason for deferring to the upstart winners of forecasting tournaments, contests that allow the public to compete at putting realistic odds on future events. Perhaps they are concerned that as forecasters get better at geopolitical analysis, they will threaten the notion of expertise and the professional identities of those who supply it. But forecasting should be seen as a complement to expert analysis, not a substitute for it. The same situation obtains among the corps of foreign-policy columnists, think tank fellows, and former government officials who wield more influence for the confidence of their convictions than for the precision of their predictions. There is little incentive for such analysts to ask when they have been wrong and why—questions that top forecasters must constantly confront if they are to maintain their place in the accuracy hierarchy. Instead, the “thought leader” ecosystem insulates the careers of people who would have washed out of any geopolitical forecasting tournament. It concludes: All this suggests that to make forecasting a resource that policymakers use, the quality of both supply and demand needs to improve. The former requires giving subject-matter experts a role in producing forecasts—in formulating questions (because they know which indicators are most germane) and in vetting the rationales that inform forecasts (because they can gut-check causal claims and fact-check evidence). The latter requires making the national security establishment more numerate or at least more open to quantitative appraisals of the future. These are challenging tasks, but forecasting scholars are already testing methods for not only measuring the best forecasts but also judging the most persuasive rationales for those forecasts. For example: What story best conveys that there is a 10–15 percent chance of between one and three million people dying in the Ukraine war by the end of 2024? Where forecasters provide probability, subject-matter experts can provide plausibility, making well-calibrated quantitative future estimates more convincing and palatable to policymakers—and therefore making their decisions a little less wrong. And in national security, being a little less wrong can be a lot less dangerous. These are the kinds of questions Metaculus-the-organization is thinking about, and the kinds of problems it’s trying to solve. They’ve also got some exciting ideas for making their product more policy-relevant. For example, they’re working on causal modeling, where forecasters not only predict the chance of (eg) a Russian nuclear strike, but also all of the inputs into their decision. For example, there’s a 10% chance of a strike, which comes from a 15% chance if the war in Ukraine continues vs. a 5% chance if it doesn’t. And they think there’s a 50% chance the war will continue, which comes from a 60% chance if the US stops arms shipments and a 33% chance if it doesn’t - and so on. Policymakers can play around with the causal graph, investigate which factors make a strike more vs. less likely, and check how their preferred policy would affect things they care about. For more on the intersection of forecasting and policy, see this EA Forum post. To learn more about Metaculus, follow them on Twitter or Facebook. And here’s to many millions more predictions! Taking Stock Prediction market users really want stocks. “Stock” in this sense means an instrument that measures the status of a person, group, or idea. When their status goes up, the stock goes up. When their status goes down, the stock goes down. It feels like a natural way to bet on things like “I’m bearish on Elon Musk and think everyone else is overestimating him.” It’s hard to turn this vague idea into a real financial instrument. You could try tying it to their Twitter follower count, or Google search trends, or net worth, but none of these exactly track “status”. If Musk commits murder in broad daylight, his search volume will go up, his Twitter follower count will stay about the same, his net worth might not be affected, but his status will have gone way down. The current solution is to make no effort whatsoever to moor stocks to the real world and just hope they work out. This could work! It’s kind of like a Ponzi scheme or crypto token. Some big influencer endorses MoonCoin, and MoonCoin goes up, because MoonCoin has gained status, which means more people will want to buy it, because it’s even more likely that more people will want to buy it later. Crypto tokens keep a fig leaf of “and maybe in the cyberpunk future when all transactions everywhere have switched to crypto this will really pay off”, but over time that fig leaf became increasingly threadbare, and a fun low-stakes instrument like Manifold stocks might do fine without it. But the 0% to 100% prediction scale is a bad match for stocks. If Elon started at 50% in 2000, then when Tesla made it big he surely should have doubled. And that brings him up to 100% and leaves nowhere for him to go. Also, people who bet on Elon Musk in 2000 might be miffed that their prescient choice only doubled their money. Probably the solution is some kind of cardinal number. But which one, and at what scale? Again, the lesson from crypto is that maybe it doesn’t matter. Just start at 10 or something or something and see where it ends up. Manifold leadership isn’t totally resigned yet to having stocks be meaningless Ponzi schemes. If you have a better idea for how to run stocks, leave it in the comments here and they’ll probably see it. CFTC vs. PredictIt Update So far it’s not clear if this means indefinite normal operation, or if they’ll spend the extra time trying to wind existing markets down. The overall chance of them winning their lawsuit remains unchanged at around 25%. PredictIt has gotten some sympathetic news coverage, including from the Washington Post. In the process, the Post tried to get some clarity on what terms of the no-action letter PredictIt violated, apparently without success: @CFTC why they're shutting PredictIt down. They give no real answer, just as in the original withdrawal letter. Closest thing we have to an answer is that they don't want other prediction markets. But why? No sense here at all. washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2023… ","username":"RichardHanania","name":"Richard Hanania","profile_image_url":"","date":"Tue Jan 24 18:12:59 +0000 2023","photos":[{"img_url":"https://pbs.substack.com/media/FnQbawZaYAAKRws.jpg","link_url":"https://t.co/zeKhe8sjnT","alt_text":null}],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":8,"like_count":39,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> @StephenPiment I'm flat appalled the CFTC said \"you violated terms\", but won't tell anyone, @PredictIt included, which ones, and then has big enough balls to try to get the judge to dismiss PI's \"shotgun\" defense. Um, with no info what other case COULD they make?\n","username":"kmett","name":"Edward Kmett","profile_image_url":"","date":"Sun Nov 27 19:01:29 +0000 2022","photos":[],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":8,"like_count":21,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{"url":"https://www.bonus.com/news/cftc-predictit-hearings-coming/","image":"https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8d5a1d5e-49ee-4294-84cd-eb5a4259bbc3_1200x800.jpeg","title":"Hearings Coming Soon in PredictIt Lawsuit, CFTC Asks to Dismiss","description":"The CFTC is seeking to have the PredictIt lawsuit dismissed, while the plaintiffs want the case fast-tracked due to the shutdown deadline.","domain":"bonus.com"},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> I guess they’ll have to give some kind of explanation during the hearing, right? Related: Richard Hanania has an article on How To Legalize Prediction Markets. The actual advice isn’t very surprising, and mostly boils down to “write letters to the government officials in charge of this”, but like other people I learned something new from the details: In the United States, prediction markets are, with a few minor exceptions, against the law. If you don’t have a legal background, you might think that means that Congress at some point considered the issue, decided people shouldn’t be able to bet on real world events, and passed a law to that effect, which was then signed by the president. But this is not what happened. As with most things, Congress has never directly considered the matter. Rather, prediction markets are illegal due to the discretion of a government agency called the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Why does it have this right? And on what basis has it made prediction markets illegal? […] In 1936, Congress passed and FDR signed the Commodity Exchange Act. In 1974, Congress created the CFTC to enforce the original law, which has been amended on multiple occasions over the years. The CFTC has authority to regulate what are called “derivatives markets.” A derivatives contract derives its value from some kind of underlying asset or benchmark in the real world. The thing to understand about derivatives is that the baseline is that they’re legal. That’s why you can “bet” on the price of oil through a futures contract. The CFTC wasn’t created to ban derivative markets, but to regulate them, though this can involve prohibiting certain kinds of markets altogether. Current law includes the following provision on event contracts, [banning]: activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law;

Inline links: this recent forecasting tournament, here, paywalled, this EA Forum post, Twitter, Facebook, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11236/-of-predictions-on-metaculus-by-eoy-2023/, remains unchanged at around 25%, Washington Post, How To Legalize Prediction Markets, can involve

Open Thread 262

February 06, 2023 · Original source

1: Thanks to everyone who entered the Prediction Contest; entry is now closed. You can continue to make predictions on Manifold or Metaculus, but they won’t officially count. Also, another prediction market, Futuur, has markets up for the contest questions. I’m pretty excited about this, because although Futuur does let you use play money like Manifold, it also offers real money betting (warning: requires crypto and a non-US IP). If you want to make real money bets on contest questions, now you can (and I’ll be seeing how they compare to the play money markets).

Inline links: Futuur, has markets up for the contest questions

OpenAI's "Planning For AGI And Beyond"

February 24, 2023 · Original source

A: Any project about trying to improve our knowledge of the future will be eligible. This can include writing prediction market / Metaculus questions, fortified essays for Metaculus, studying forecasting/prediction-related topics, new websites or companies in this space (yes, Manifold will fund its own competitors) or anything else you can think of.

A: We’re trying to figure that out. I would have liked to do it myself, but I think there are legal issues about me both providing the money and determining who gets it. Probably they will be some respected people from Metaculus or Manifold, or someone with forecasting grant-making experience.

March 01, 2023 · Original source

Sam Altman posing with leading AI safety proponent Eliezer Yudkowsky. Also Grimes for some reason. Planning For AGI And Beyond (“AGI” = “artificial general intelligence”, ie human-level AI) is the latest volley in that campaign. It’s very good, in all the ways ExxonMobil’s hypothetical statement above was very good. If they’re trying to fool people, they’re doing a convincing job! Still, it doesn’t apologize for doing normal AI company stuff in the past, or plan to stop doing normal AI company stuff in the present. It just says that, at some indefinite point when they decide AI is a threat, they’re going to do everything right. This is more believable when OpenAI says it than when ExxonMobil does. There are real arguments for why an AI company might want to switch from moving fast and breaking things at time t to acting all responsible at time t + 1 . Let’s explore the arguments they make in the document, go over the reasons they’re obviously wrong, then look at the more complicated arguments they might be based off of. Why Doomers Think OpenAI Is Bad And Should Have Slowed Research A Long Time Ago OpenAI boosters might object: there’s a disanalogy between the global warming story above and AI capabilities research. Global warming is continuously bad: a temperature increase of 0.5 degrees C is bad, 1.0 degrees is worse, and 1.5 degrees is worse still. AI doesn’t become dangerous until some specific point. GPT-3 didn’t hurt anyone. GPT-4 probably won’t hurt anyone. So why not keep building fun chatbots like these for now, then start worrying later? Doomers counterargue that the fun chatbots burn timeline. That is, suppose you have some timeline for when AI becomes dangerous. For example, last year Metaculus thought human-like AI would arrive in 2040, and superintelligence around 2043. Recent AIs have tried lying to, blackmailing, threatening, and seducing users. AI companies freely admit they can’t really control their AIs, and it seems high-priority to solve that before we get superintelligence. If you think that’s 2043, the people who work on this question (“alignment researchers”) have twenty years to learn to control AI. Then OpenAI poured money into AI, did ground-breaking research, and advanced the state of the art. That meant that AI progress would speed up, and AI would reach the danger level faster. Now Metaculus expects superintelligence in 2031, not 2043 (although this seems kind of like an over-update), which gives alignment researchers eight years, not twenty. So the faster companies advance AI research - even by creating fun chatbots that aren’t dangerous themselves - the harder it is for alignment researchers to solve their part of the problem in time. This is why some AI doomers think of OpenAI as an Exxon-Mobil style villain, even though they’ve promised to change course before the danger period. Imagine an environmentalist group working on research and regulatory changes that would have solar power ready to go in 2045. Then ExxonMobil invents a new kind of super-oil that ensures that, nope, all major cities will be underwater by 2031 now. No matter how nice a statement they put out, you’d probably be pretty mad! Why OpenAI Thinks Their Research Is Good Now, But Might Be Bad Later OpenAI understands the argument against burning timeline. But they counterargue that having the AIs speeds up alignment research and all other forms of social adjustment to AI. If we want to prepare for superintelligence - whether solving the technical challenge of alignment, or solving the political challenges of unemployment, misinformation, etc - we can do this better when everything is happening gradually and we’ve got concrete AIs to think about: We believe we have to continuously learn and adapt by deploying less powerful versions of the technology in order to minimize “one shot to get it right” scenarios […] As we create successively more powerful systems, we want to deploy them and gain experience with operating them in the real world. We believe this is the best way to carefully steward AGI into existence—a gradual transition to a world with AGI is better than a sudden one. We expect powerful AI to make the rate of progress in the world much faster, and we think it’s better to adjust to this incrementally. A gradual transition gives people, policymakers, and institutions time to understand what’s happening, personally experience the benefits and downsides of these systems, adapt our economy, and to put regulation in place. It also allows for society and AI to co-evolve, and for people collectively to figure out what they want while the stakes are relatively low. You might notice that, as written, this argument doesn’t support full-speed-ahead AI research. If you really wanted this kind of gradual release that lets society adjust to less powerful AI, you would do something like this: Release AI #1

Inline links: Planning For AGI And Beyond, Metaculus, they can’t really control their AIs

April 25, 2023 · Original source

This is the basic idea behind Zou et al (2022), Forecasting Future World Events With Neural Networks. They create a dataset, Autocast, with 6000 questions from forecasting tournaments Metaculus, Good Judgment Project, and CSET Foretell. Then they ask their AI (a variant of GPT-2) to predict them, given news articles up to some date before the event happened. Here’s their result:

Inline links: Forecasting Future World Events With Neural Networks

You can access their dataset here. The authors were originally planning to host a competition to see who could create the best AI forecaster, but due to financial constraints they’ll be running only a reduced version. You can read more about the semi-competition here. Metaculus Looking Good Two new reports say nice things about Metaculus’ accuracy.

Inline links: access their dataset here, here

Two new reports say nice things about Metaculus’ accuracy.

The Extinction Tournament

July 20, 2023 · Original source

A recent leak suggested that the cost of training GPT-4 was $63 million, which is already higher than the superforecasters’ median estimate of $35 million by 2024 has already been proven incorrect. I don’t know how many petaFLOP-days were involved in GPT-4, but maybe that one is already off also. There was another question on when an AI would pass a Turing Test. The superforecasters guessed 2060, the domain experts 2045. GPT-4 hasn’t quite passed the exact Turing Test described in the study, but it seems very close, so much so that we seem on track to pass it by the 2030s. Once again the experts look better than the superforecasters. So is it possible that we, in 2023, now have so much better insight into AI than the 2022 forecasters that we can throw out their results? We could investigate this by looking at Metaculus, a forecasting site that’s probably comparably advanced to this tournament. They have a question suspiciously similar to XPT’s global catastrophe framing: In summer 2022, the Metaculus estimate was 30%, compared to the XPT superforecasters’ 9% (why the difference? maybe because Metaculus is especially popular with x-risk-pilled rationalists). Since then it’s gone up to 38%. Over the same period, Metaculus estimates of AI catastrophe risk went from 6% to 15%. If the XPT superforecasters’ probabilities rose linearly by the same factor as Metaculus forecasters’, they might be willing to update total global catastrophe risk to 11% and AI catastrophe risk to 5%. But the main thing we’ve updated on since 2022 is that AI might be sooner. But most people in the tournament already agreed we would get AGI by 2100. The main disagreement was over whether it would cause a catastrophe once we got it. You could argue that getting it sooner increases that risk, since we’ll have less time to work on alignment. But I would be surprised if the kind of people saying the risk of AI extinction is 0.4% are thinking about arguments like that. So maybe we shouldn’t expect much change. FRI called back a few XPT forecasters in May 2023 to see if any of them wanted to change their minds, but they mostly didn’t. Overall I don’t think this was just a problem of the incentives being bad or the forecasters being stupid. This is a real, strong disagreement. We may be able to slightly increase their forecast based on recent events, but this would only change the estimate a little. Breaking Down The AI Estimate How did the forecasters arrive at their AI estimate? What were the cruxes between the people who thought AI was very dangerous, and the people who thought it wasn’t? You can think of AI extinction as happening in a series of steps: We get human-level AI by 2100.

Inline links: the cost of training GPT-4 was $63 million, Metaculus, a question, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k5Ep!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F09cb5518-f8d1-4a98-8c44-97158857dbd8_772x364.png

In summer 2022, the Metaculus estimate was 30%, compared to the XPT superforecasters’ 9% (why the difference? maybe because Metaculus is especially popular with x-risk-pilled rationalists). Since then it’s gone up to 38%. Over the same period, Metaculus estimates of AI catastrophe risk went from 6% to 15%. If the XPT superforecasters’ probabilities rose linearly by the same factor as Metaculus forecasters’, they might be willing to update total global catastrophe risk to 11% and AI catastrophe risk to 5%. But the main thing we’ve updated on since 2022 is that AI might be sooner. But most people in the tournament already agreed we would get AGI by 2100. The main disagreement was over whether it would cause a catastrophe once we got it. You could argue that getting it sooner increases that risk, since we’ll have less time to work on alignment. But I would be surprised if the kind of people saying the risk of AI extinction is 0.4% are thinking about arguments like that. So maybe we shouldn’t expect much change. FRI called back a few XPT forecasters in May 2023 to see if any of them wanted to change their minds, but they mostly didn’t. Overall I don’t think this was just a problem of the incentives being bad or the forecasters being stupid. This is a real, strong disagreement. We may be able to slightly increase their forecast based on recent events, but this would only change the estimate a little. Breaking Down The AI Estimate How did the forecasters arrive at their AI estimate? What were the cruxes between the people who thought AI was very dangerous, and the people who thought it wasn’t? You can think of AI extinction as happening in a series of steps: We get human-level AI by 2100.

There was no question about when or whether we’ll have superintelligence. Metaculus thinks superintelligence will come very shortly after human-level intelligence, and this is the conclusion of the best models and analyses I’ve seen as well. Still, I don’t know if the superforecasters here also believed this.

Inline links: Metaculus thinks superintelligence will come very shortly after human-level intelligence,, the best models and analyses

23: Room Temperature Superforecaster

August 01, 2023 · Original source

I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

Inline links: https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/, Paul Graham, source, this thread, Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yIPJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc81ce0d2-e9c7-41b9-be38-0182d21f0381_1024x682.jpeg, the exact text of the 1989 prediction

…but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

Inline links: Paul Graham, source, this thread, Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yIPJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc81ce0d2-e9c7-41b9-be38-0182d21f0381_1024x682.jpeg, the exact text of the 1989 prediction

We use Metaculus! It’s great!

August 25, 2023 · Original source

GULF BREEZE, FLORIDA, USA Contact: Christian Contact Info: christian[at]metaculus[dot]com Time: Wednesday, October 18th, 8:00 PM Location: Perfect Plain Brewing Coordinates: https://plus.codes/862JCQ7P+9C Notable Guests: Christian, the Director of Comms and Data for Metaculus Notes: Please email me if you'll make it. Would love to chat. If there are no takers, I won't be there.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/862JCQ7P+9C

August 28, 2023 · Original source

Kalshi: https://kalshi.com/markets/supercon/roomtemp-superconductor-reported Both reached the 40s to 50s! I think there just wasn’t enough smart money to drown out the people who wanted to bet on an exciting thing being true, or who were unduly influenced by a social media environment optimized to keep their attention by convincing them that an exciting thing was true. I have never claimed prediction markets are always good. All I wrote in the Prediction Market FAQ was that either a prediction market will be good, or you could make lots of free money. In this case, it was the second one. I regret I only made $30. I do hope this situation will improve over time, as over-eager forecasters get burned and dollars flow from dumb money to smarter. [EDIT: I should have included something about Metaculus here, but it’s confusing. I think the most popular Metaculus market was lower because it had stricter resolution criteria (the first replication had to be positive, instead of any replication) but that otherwise Metaculus raw probabilities mirrored everyone else’s. We don’t know how their algorithmically processed probabilities did yet and I’ll report on that information when I get it.] Salem/CSPI Tournament Winners The Salem Center and the Center For The Study Of Partisanship And Ideology, two think tanks associated with right-wing intellectual Richard Hanania, sponsored a prediction market tournament last year. Participants got $1000 in play money to bet on selected markets about current events; winners would be interviewed for a well-paying academic sinecure at one of the think tanks. Now the tournament is over. Winners have yet to be announced, but unofficially, everyone knows who they are: First place out of 999 participants is zubbybadger. Zubby is a prediction market veteran who was featured in a Washington Monthly article last year for his great track record in political betting (he’s made > $150,000 on PredictIt). Now he works as a “community manager” for Kalshi (I don’t know what this entails). Second place was Robert from Considerations On Codecrafting. He’s written a detailed reflection on his experience (part one, part two) which is my main source for this section and highly recommended. He describes himself as “having absolutely no experience with prediction markets”. Third place was Johnny Ten-Numbers, about whom I can find no further information. You can see the rest of the top 20 at the very bottom of this post. Reading Robert’s story of his experience, I’m struck by how little of the competition at the top was about predictive accuracy. Everyone in the top 20 was a very accurate predictor (Exactly equally accurate? Hard to tell.) What separated 1st place from 20th, aside from luck, was things like: Ability to move fast - both in responding to news, and in taking the other side of bad bets. Several top performers programmed bots to give them an edge here.

Inline links: Prediction Market FAQ, selected markets about current events, zubbybadger, featured in a Washington Monthly article last year, Robert, part one, part two, Johnny Ten-Numbers

4: 5:

5: 6:

Open Thread 298

October 16, 2023 · Original source

OPTIC is announcing intercollegiate forecasting tournaments in SF, DC, and Boston. Think 1-day hackathon/olympiad/debate tournament, but for forecasting the future — teams predict on topics ranging from geopolitics to celebrity twitter patterns to financial asset prices, and the best forecasters get thousands of dollars in cash prizes and exclusive internships at Metaculus.

Inline links: OPTIC, Metaculus

October 31, 2023 · Original source

Hanson is less sure about this answer than the overall story, but he suggests hiring. You could create some kind of product that companies could buy and give their hiring managers at the beginning of a hiring round, asking them to predict which candidates would get good employee evaluation results or promotions at the end of X amount of time. Even if you’re Manifold or Metaculus or someone who already has a good prediction engine, making this product requires a lot of adaptations. Who should be part of the market? What training should you give them beforehand? What should the resolution criteria be? Hanson thinks that the process of designing this product, answering customer questions about it, and iterating before you sell to the next customer is the kind of last-mile problem whose solution will make prediction markets ready for the big time.

Inline links: a standard article, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11245/winner-of-2024-us-presidential-election/, https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/7456, https://manifold.markets/jack/who-will-win-2024-us-presidential-e, https://polymarket.com/event/presidential-election-winner-2024?tid=1706346316664

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Sparked a renaissance in forecasting, including major roles in creating, funding, and/or staffing Metaculus, Manifold Markets, and the Forecasting Research Institute.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold Markets, Forecasting Research Institute

December 05, 2023 · Original source

Oh, and I almost forgot: Manifold Love: One Month Progress Report A month ago, Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love. The idea is, you bet on who would be a good match, and make (play) money if they end up having a second date or continuing on to a relationship.

Inline links: manifold.love

Manifold.love has also introduced OKCupid-style “compatibility questions”. They don’t seem to involve calculating a match percent yet AFAICT, but hopefully soon! Metaculus’ “Multiple Major Advances” Metaculus announces “multiple major advances to the Metaculus platform”, especially “new scores, new leaderboard, new medals”.

Inline links: announces “multiple major advances to the Metaculus platform”

Metaculus announces “multiple major advances to the Metaculus platform”, especially “new scores, new leaderboard, new medals”.

Inline links: announces “multiple major advances to the Metaculus platform”

Open Thread 309

January 01, 2024 · Original source

2: I’m too swamped to run my own forecasting tournament this year, so Metaculus is taking over. If you want to participate, check this link. I will be grading last year’s tournament and posting results hopefully sometime this month.

Inline links: check this link

January 30, 2024 · Original source

First of all, my allegiance has always been to forecasting in general, of which prediction markets are just a particularly flashy sub-category. So I find it encouraging that forecasting site Metaculus beats 538, usually considering the gold standard for political prediction.

As for the real-money prediction markets, yeah, they seem worse than other options. But solar power was worse than other options in 1990. They’re a fledgling technology, we have strong reasons to think they’ll work when they’re mature, and we know what we need to do to help them grow. Unlike 538, Metaculus, and play-money markets, they have bias-resistance properties that could be really useful if they ever get big.

Vox has a standard article about how we can’t be sure whether bad polls are bad, or whether they don’t matter this far before an election. This ought to be exactly the kind of problem prediction markets are good for, but: …Metaculus and PredictIt are 50-50, Manifold favors Biden, and Polymarket favors Trump. Shouldn’t really be possible, should it?

ACX Grants Results 2024

February 10, 2024 · Original source

S, $7,000, to produce materials on forecasting for governments. S is a strategic advisor for a European government, and wants to write manuals and run workshops for EU policy-makers on how to integrate forecasting platforms like Metaculus and prediction markets into their decision-making.

February 20, 2024 · Original source

How many residents will live in Prospera, a new special economic zone in Honduras, on Jan 1, 2026? Answer: 600 (80% confidence interval 100-2,000) This seems like a good guess (except that my confidence interval would have included zero because there’s a 20%+ chance that it gets shut down). So overall its forecasts seem pretty impressive. But I was concerned by its reasoning even in some of the questions it got “right”. For example, the Nikki Haley question tried to get a base rate by asking what percent of elections Haley had won before, and found she had won 71% of them - these were mostly elections for South Carolina governor. You can see what the AI is trying to do - but it’s not going to work. Then it got confused and read a lot of news stories about how she’s currently losing the 2024 presidential election, and seemed to think they were about 2028. So either the AI only got a reasonable probability by coincidence, or it was testing many different strategies, throwing out the useless ones, and updating only on the useful ones, in a way that was kind of opaque to the casual reader. Still, if the company says it beats most human forecasters, this doesn’t seem totally impossible based on what I’ve seen. And that would be exciting! An AI that can generate probabilistic forecasts for any question seems like in some way a culmination of the rationalist project. And if you can make something like this work, it doesn’t sound too outlandish that you could apply the same AI to conditional forecasts, or to questions about the past and present (eg whether COVID was a lab leak). I would be most excited if at some point this graduated from its geopolitical focus and was able to answer questions on any topic (eg “what is the chance that Astral Codex Ten gains paid subscribers this year?”), maybe if the questioner gives it links or feeds it some of the appropriate information. FutureSearch is run by a team formerly from Metaculus, including former Metaculus CTO (and Google internal prediction market veteran) Dan Schwarz. They’re looking for potential clients and/or investors; if you’re interested, email hello@futuresearch.ai. Vitalik On AI Prediction Markets Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum-founder-turned-cryptocurrency-public-intellectual, has a blog post on The Promise And Challenge Of Crypto + AI Applications. One of them is a prediction market. He writes: Prediction markets have been a holy grail of epistemics technology for a long time; I was excited about using prediction markets as an input for governance ("futarchy") back in 2014, and played around with them extensively in the last election as well as more recently. But so far prediction markets have not taken off too much in practice, and there is a series of commonly given reasons why: the largest participants are often irrational, people with the right knowledge are not willing to take the time and bet unless a lot of money is involved, markets are often thin, etc. One response to this is to point to ongoing UX improvements in Polymarket or other new prediction markets, and hope that they will succeed where previous iterations have failed. After all, the story goes, people are willing to bet tens of billions on sports, so why wouldn't people throw in enough money betting on US elections or LK99 that it starts to make sense for the serious players to start coming in? But this argument must contend with the fact that, well, previous iterations have failed to get to this level of scale (at least compared to their proponents' dreams), and so it seems like you need something new to make prediction markets succeed. And so a different response is to point to one specific feature of prediction market ecosystems that we can expect to see in the 2020s that we did not see in the 2010s: the possibility of ubiquitous participation by AIs. AIs are willing to work for less than $1 per hour, and have the knowledge of an encyclopedia - and if that's not enough, they can even be integrated with real-time web search capability. If you make a market, and put up a liquidity subsidy of $50, humans will not care enough to bid, but thousands of AIs will easily swarm all over the question and make the best guess they can. The incentive to do a good job on any one question may be tiny, but the incentive to make an AI that makes good predictions in general may be in the millions. Note that potentially, you don't even need the humans to adjudicate most questions: you can use a multi-round dispute system similar to Augur or Kleros, where AIs would also be the ones participating in earlier rounds. Humans would only need to respond in those few cases where a series of escalations have taken place and large amounts of money have been committed by both sides. This is a powerful primitive, because once a "prediction market" can be made to work on such a microscopic scale, you can reuse the "prediction market" primitive for many other kinds of questions: Is this social media post acceptable under [terms of use]?

Inline links: FutureSearch, hello@futuresearch.ai, The Promise And Challenge Of Crypto + AI Applications, back in 2014, played around with them extensively, more recently, Polymarket, tens of billions on sports, LK99, Augur

Metaculus asks the same question and forecasts that AI will be able to make feature films by 2030:

Metaculus asks the same question and forecasts that AI will be able to make feature films by 2030: The dumbest possible way to do this is to ask GPT-4 to write a summary (“write the summary of a plot for a detective mystery story”), then ask it to convert the summary into a 100-point outline, then convert that into 100 minutes of a 100-minute movie, then ask Sora to generate each one-minute block. This wouldn’t work as written now (I don’t think Sora can do sound, it wouldn’t keep actors and style consistent unless you forced it), but it seems like something that requires incremental improvement rather than a grand breakthrough.

Who Predicted 2023?

March 05, 2024 · Original source

Then I released the list of 3300 x 50 guesses, and asked people to analyze them with the aggregation algorithm of their choice to produce what they thought was the best possible list. 460 of you took me up on that (“Full Mode”). Then I waited until 2024 and sent everything to Eric Neyman, who’s better at math than I am. He used the Metaculus scoring function to assess everyone’s accuracy. Thanks to Eric (and to Sam Marks, who helped last time around) for taking care of this. II. And The Winners Are . . . For Blind Mode - where you had to rely on your wits alone and couldn’t spend more than five minutes per question - the winners are: Small Singapore gave me no information except this pseudonym and won’t answer any emails. I don’t even know how to give them their prize money. Please email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if this is you.

Inline links: the Metaculus scoring function

Leonard B. lives in Oregon, and works in real estate development and asset management. He started forecasting during the pandemic, has qualified as a "superforecaster" since 2022, and has recently been doing some work at the Swift Centre For Applied Forecasting. He's "lbiii" on various forecasting platforms (especially Metaculus) and says "I like to hear about cool projects to get involved in, and am especially keen to connect with folks who are working to make forecasting more visible and decision-relevant to policymakers - reach out to possiblylenny@gmail.com"

Inline links: Swift Centre For Applied Forecasting

Andrey S is a psychologist in Israel with a background in computer science. He started forecasting on Metaculus a few years ago, and describes himself as "always interested in learning and expanding my point of view".

March 12, 2024 · Original source

Then they fine-tune the whole system on forecasting questions from prediction sites (eg Metaculus, Manifold) that ended between mid-2023 and today. Why mid-2023? Because the AI was trained in mid-2023 and only knows what happened before then, and they can artificially limit its news API calls to before mid-2023. This lets them train the AI on thousands of forecasting questions without letting the AI cheat or having to wait years for the questions to resolve. They select the reasoning where the AI does well, and fine-tune it to do more stuff like that. The Halawi et al AI forecasting method. They find this works almost as well as the human crowd: Are these the data I’ve been trying to get for years - which forecasting platforms beat which others? I don’t think so - Metaculus’ good Briar score only means it performs well on Metaculus’ questions, which might be easier or harder than some other platform’s questions. Can we use the Halawi et al AI as a fixed comparison point, since it’s always the same skill level? I’m not sure - it trained on each of these markets for the style of question that’s in each market, so it might be biased. Still, these numbers are all about where I would expect them to be, except maybe Polymarket, which does better than I would have expected. But the crowd still beats the AI, right? Halawi et al object that humans can forecast only when they feel like it - you can bet on a prediction market question you feel confident on, and avoid one you don’t. When they let their AI forecast only on those questions where it’s most likely to do well (eg those with lots of relevant news articles), it very slightly outperforms the human crowd. As AI gets better, will it naturally beat humans in forecasting? Halawi et al say this won’t be trivial. They find a version of their system based off GPT-3.5 is only very slightly worse than the final version built off GPT-4. This suggests a forecasting AI built off GPT-5 or 6 might get only small improvements. The second team is Tetlock et al. They start from the same place as Halawi - out-of-the-box LLMs aren’t good at forecasting. They’re more scathing about this than Halawi was - they argue that out-of-the-box models do worse than predicting 50% for everything (this was close to true of human forecasters in the ACX tournament). Instead of increasing quality, Tetlock increases quantity. He wants to do wisdom of crowds, where the crowd is a bunch of different LLMs. So he gets twelve LLMs - including Bard, GPT, Claude, Mistral, PaLM, LLaMa, some Chinese models I’d never heard of, and a couple of variations on these bases - asks them to predict questions, and averages the results. Remember, you gotta prompt your model with “you are a smart person”, or else it won’t be smart! The results: Next, we compare the LLM crowd performance to that of the human crowd for our second hypothesis, directly putting the two crowd-aggregation mechanisms head-to-head. To do this, we use the same LLM crowd average as before (taking the median LLM prediction on each question and averaging up the Brier scores across questions). We compare this to the average of median human predictions on the same questions. In our preregistered analysis, we fail to find statistically significant differences between the LLM crowd’s mean Brier score of M=0.20 (SD=0.12) and that of the human crowd, M=0.19 (SD=0.19), t(60) = 0.19, p = 0.850 Their study was much smaller than Halawi’s (31 questions vs. 3,672), so I don’t think this result (nonsignificant small difference) should be considered different from Halawi’s (significant small difference). Still, it’s weird, isn’t it? Halawi used a really complicated tower of prompts and APIs and fine-tunings, and Tetlock just got more LLMs, and they both did about the same. I have two questions after reading these results: Did they actually do the same, or is this just a function of the small sample size in Tetlock and the non-head-to-head comparison?

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GHoU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5bd5e57d-0422-49e1-80fd-20795d476ec8_807x412.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1tff!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fed7d58b4-254b-4782-b499-bc0b6297b8a4_813x302.png, Tetlock et al, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4SEc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdce72400-aa57-4f52-99cb-5f551bd4d79d_675x435.png

Are these the data I’ve been trying to get for years - which forecasting platforms beat which others? I don’t think so - Metaculus’ good Briar score only means it performs well on Metaculus’ questions, which might be easier or harder than some other platform’s questions. Can we use the Halawi et al AI as a fixed comparison point, since it’s always the same skill level? I’m not sure - it trained on each of these markets for the style of question that’s in each market, so it might be biased. Still, these numbers are all about where I would expect them to be, except maybe Polymarket, which does better than I would have expected. But the crowd still beats the AI, right? Halawi et al object that humans can forecast only when they feel like it - you can bet on a prediction market question you feel confident on, and avoid one you don’t. When they let their AI forecast only on those questions where it’s most likely to do well (eg those with lots of relevant news articles), it very slightly outperforms the human crowd. As AI gets better, will it naturally beat humans in forecasting? Halawi et al say this won’t be trivial. They find a version of their system based off GPT-3.5 is only very slightly worse than the final version built off GPT-4. This suggests a forecasting AI built off GPT-5 or 6 might get only small improvements. The second team is Tetlock et al. They start from the same place as Halawi - out-of-the-box LLMs aren’t good at forecasting. They’re more scathing about this than Halawi was - they argue that out-of-the-box models do worse than predicting 50% for everything (this was close to true of human forecasters in the ACX tournament). Instead of increasing quality, Tetlock increases quantity. He wants to do wisdom of crowds, where the crowd is a bunch of different LLMs. So he gets twelve LLMs - including Bard, GPT, Claude, Mistral, PaLM, LLaMa, some Chinese models I’d never heard of, and a couple of variations on these bases - asks them to predict questions, and averages the results. Remember, you gotta prompt your model with “you are a smart person”, or else it won’t be smart! The results: Next, we compare the LLM crowd performance to that of the human crowd for our second hypothesis, directly putting the two crowd-aggregation mechanisms head-to-head. To do this, we use the same LLM crowd average as before (taking the median LLM prediction on each question and averaging up the Brier scores across questions). We compare this to the average of median human predictions on the same questions. In our preregistered analysis, we fail to find statistically significant differences between the LLM crowd’s mean Brier score of M=0.20 (SD=0.12) and that of the human crowd, M=0.19 (SD=0.19), t(60) = 0.19, p = 0.850 Their study was much smaller than Halawi’s (31 questions vs. 3,672), so I don’t think this result (nonsignificant small difference) should be considered different from Halawi’s (significant small difference). Still, it’s weird, isn’t it? Halawi used a really complicated tower of prompts and APIs and fine-tunings, and Tetlock just got more LLMs, and they both did about the same. I have two questions after reading these results: Did they actually do the same, or is this just a function of the small sample size in Tetlock and the non-head-to-head comparison?

Inline links: Tetlock et al, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4SEc!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdce72400-aa57-4f52-99cb-5f551bd4d79d_675x435.png

Halawi and Tetlock’s AIs did between slightly-worse-than and equivalent-to the participant aggregate, so let’s say 90-95th percentile. FutureSearch claims to equal a 98th percentile forecaster, but they got this number through totally different and slightly suspicious methodology, so I don’t know if it’s actually any better. Still, we see that Samotsvety is capable of 98%ile performance (likely real and repeatable) and Metaculus of 99.5th. So there’s still a long way to go before we exhaust the limits of what’s possible to predict given the available amount of information! Towards Rationality Engines An interlude, before we get to other interesting prediction news. Forecasting AIs are pretty cool. I wouldn’t have expected them to work as well as they do. They are already superforecaster-level, and given the amount of low-hanging fruit that gets picked every day here, I can see them equalling or exceeding the top human forecasters in the next few years But they can’t answer many of the questions we care about most - questions that aren’t about prediction. Do masks prevent COVID transmission? Was OJ guilty? Did global warming contribute to the California superdrought? What caused the opioid crisis? Is social media bad for children? I see two interesting challenges ahead here: Making an AI that can do this.

Open Thread 320

March 18, 2024 · Original source

Datscilly, a Metaculus Pro Forecaster who was ranked #1 on the Metaculus leaderboard from 2018 to 2021 for baseline accuracy.

Open Thread 324

April 08, 2024 · Original source

4: The hedge fund Bridgewater is running a forecasting contest on Metaculus. US residents only, extra prizes for undergraduates. Prizes include $25,000 and potentially getting recruited by Bridgewater (in which case read the “Corporate Culture” section on their wiki page before accepting).

Inline links: is running a forecasting contest on Metaculus

Highlights From The Comments On The Lab Leak Debate

April 09, 2024 · Original source

Even if you don’t want to convince yourself, this is the correct next step. Again by analogy to Tetlock - if he had started with just one superforecaster, and his thesis was “this guy is really smart, but I refuse to prove it”, nothing would have changed. Instead, his theory of change goes through publishing in a bunch of papers, to identifying other superforecasters, to teaching general principles of superforecasting, to superforecasting as a service (either through specific superforecasters at GJO, or through projects that seek to emulate them like Metaculus, FutureSearch, etc). If Rootclaim doesn’t scale, it either dies with Saar, or at best Saar lives a long life and puts out a few more dozen Rootclaim analyses but nothing else comes of it. You’ve got to start training other people eventually, and part of that process involves demonstrating you did it right, and that’s going to involve inter-rater reliability.

May 13, 2024 · Original source

People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Inline links: forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”, Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup, Cultivate Labs, choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas, here, superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk, here, @Grayden, here, here, “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here

This is a response to the predictions I made in my update on the Lumina probiotic. You can click “see three more answers” for the question on side effects (separate from this question on efficacy). My numbers were 5/35/10/50 for the first question and 30/5/<1 for the second. Huh?

Inline links: my update on the Lumina probiotic

The New York case is going on now, and it seems like there’s an 80% chance he’ll be found guilty. The part I don’t understand is the last one (73% found guilty of felony in New York) vs. the second one (56% of any felony at all). This might just be a failure of arbitrage. It looks like nobody expects jail time in any case. Here’s an embarrassing screwup from Metaculus. This question was about when there would be a “Great Power war”, with Great Powers defined as any country in the top ten of military spending. But surprise surprise, Ukraine getting invaded made them spend a lot of money on their military that year, so they rose to #8 in the world in military spending in 2023. Since Russia is also in the top ten, this qualifies as a “Great Power war” by the technical definition, and the question resolves positive. Moral of the story: resolution criteria are hard!

Prediction Markets Suggest Replacing Biden

July 02, 2024 · Original source

I assume they chose these three because they’re the only ones discussed enough to have enough data. I am following their lead. I appreciate John and Maxim’s work, but I’m not completely comfortable trusting it. Their model is based on results from Betfair, Smarkets, PredictIt, and Polymarket. But I don’t know much about the first two (as an American, I’m banned from even reading Betfair), and the latter two are notoriously bad at partisan political questions. They usually overestimate Republicans’ chances, partly because Democrats’ opposition to online political betting has turned the pool of online political bettors disproportionately red. While a fluid and easily-accessible prediction market should be able to avoid biases like these, neither PredictIt nor Polymarket really qualifies. The CFTC, which regulates prediction markets, has crippled both - PredictIt has very low maximum investments per market, and Polymarket is crypto-only and banned for US citizens. These have prevented their biases from being corrected and made both of them perform relatively weakly in head-to-head contests. And Stossel/Lott’s focus on betting sites automatically excludes two of the biggest and most historically accurate forecasting engines from their calculation - Metaculus and Manifold. In order to get numbers I trusted more than theirs, I looked at Metaculus, Manifold, PredictIt, and Polymarket, weighting each by how much I trusted it. Here’s what I found: The Biden number is about 4% higher than Nate Silver’s model over the same time period; see below for why that might be. [EDIT 7/2/24: Original version had a miscalculation which decreased everyone’s odds by about 10%. Above version should be correct.] You can find my sources at the bottom of the post. “Explicit” odds are based on questions like “What are the chances of Biden winning if he is the nominee?” “Implied” odds were generated by combining the questions “What is the chance of Biden being the nominee?” and “What is the chance of Biden winning?”; this is safe enough with Biden, but with unlikely nominees like Newsom, some of the percentages can get small enough that they start running into small-number-biases and become less trustworthy. I’ve weighted each market’s explicit calculation higher than their implicit one to compensate. A possible objection to these results: conditional probabilities don’t exactly reflect the intuitive concept of decision-making. That is, we’re not asking “We want to know whether or not to keep Biden, so what are the chances that he’ll win if we do?”, we’re asking the market for the chance that he’ll win, in the set of worlds where people decide to keep him for other reasons. We should expect this to overestimate his performance. That is, imagine that tomorrow, Biden has completely recovered, he easily wins his next debate with Trump, and everyone agrees the most recent debate was just a fluke - in that world, he is both more likely to be nominated and more likely to win. Alternatively, if tomorrow he gets much worse and can’t even speak in full sentences, he’s much less likely to be nominated and much more likely to lose. Since the real world includes both those possibilities, restricting ourselves to the set of worlds where he gets nominated means we’re overestimating the chance that he wins. There are similar-albeit-less-severe problems with other candidates - if we choose Newsom, that might be because he won some kind of debate or process versus Harris and all the other potential replacements. Overall I expect this to be mostly correct, but probably overestimate Biden’s chances by a percent or two relative to others. Along with these three candidates, Metaculus had an explicit “should the Democrats replace Biden?” question: Manifold also asks how Democrats will do if they replace Biden (without specifying a particular replacement): We can compare this to their Biden market… …and find that once again, they expect replacing Biden to go better (though I think 51% is just cope). At the Manifest prediction market conference in early June, I interviewed Nate Silver: …and asked him for his probability that the Democrats would win this election, versus his probability that the Democrats would win conditional on Biden not being the nominee (specifically “drops dead tomorrow of natural causes”). He said 40-45% chance normally, 50% chance without Biden. This was before the debate, but I think it matches the markets’ opinion that switching candidates would help the Democrats’ chances - and this has only become more true since the debate. On the other hand, polls asking people how they would vote in possible matchups don’t show any advantage of alternate candidates over Biden. Here’s the only post-debate poll I could find: And if Biden does need to be replaced, Democrats mostly support Harris, who the prediction markets find least promising: Maybe Democrats are the wrong people to ask - they’re already going to vote Biden, so you want someone who’s more attractive to independents. Of course, in a normal primary it would be Democrats making the decision. But if elites are going to do something behind closed doors, maybe they should take advantage and choose the candidate most likely to win, for once. I think these polls are the strongest objection to the prediction markets’ verdict. You could make an argument where prediction market users are mostly educated liberal white males, and even though they’re incentivized to honestly determine what ordinary people think, they’re too out-of-touch with ordinary people to do so effectively. Or they might be over-fixating on “voters don’t like Biden’s senility” without considering that, even if voters didn’t know Biden was currently senile before Thursday, they probably guessed that he would become senile sometime in his four-year term, and had basically accepted that his aides would do the hard work. Maybe they prefer a well-known likeable incumbent over an unknown quantity (and the unknown quantity’s potential new/weird aides), even if the well-known likeable incumbent is senile. Maybe elites know more than we do about how hard it is to inject a new candidate at the last moment, how dangerous it is to have someone who hasn’t been thoroughly vetted for scandals, et cetera. Still, for now I trust the prediction markets. I think replacing Biden would add ~10 prcentage points to the Democrats’ chance of victory. At the end of this post, I’ll list the prediction markets I’m using as sources. But before then, a brief interlude of: Fuzzy Subjective Human Factors I Am Not Really Qualified To Talk About Many people on Twitter are asking “how could anyone possibly have been stupid enough to not realize that Biden was senile?” I was that stupid. I didn’t say it openly, because I’m at least smart enough to have a high threshold for giving my opinion on political things I don’t know much about. But I thought it in my heart. So in case the people asking “how could anyone have been that stupid?” actually want an explanation, here’s my former reasoning. Republicans have been accusing Biden of being senile (and the Democrats of hiding it) for at least five years now. Before the 2020 debates, they were excited that this was when they could finally prove once and for all that Biden was senile. Then Biden did fine, and they retreated to “well he’s senile but they have some secret drug they’re giving him, just during debates, that makes him look fine”. Notice this is from 2020; according to polls, he did win the debate that year (source) I think a lot about experimental cognitive enhancement drugs, and I can say with confidence that nothing like that exists. Stimulants can help people with mild dementia be more active and motivated, but they don’t really improve cognition directly, and they can’t make a demented person temporarily lucid. Still, for the past four years, every time Biden was going to do something - a press conference, a State of the Union, whatever - the Republicans would say “ha, this time is going to be the proof that he’s senile!” And then he would always do fine, and they would retreat back to “I guess he used the secret drug this time too”. The satire site Babylon Bee had some funny articles about this: Babylon Bee, after Biden gave a good State of the Union speech earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Democrats were spreading the alternate narrative that Trump was senile. This one has gotten less press, because I don’t know how many people really believed it. But it came up occasionally, along with out-of-context video snippets where Trump said or did something dumb or meandering. Of course, anybody with a presidential candidate’s level of public exposure will have a few gaffes. Even if they don’t, you can always deceptively crop something so it looks like they did. Wait, why is a psychoanalyst getting quoted as a top expert in dementia? (source) I didn’t know you could diagnose someone via Change.org petition, but 2544 people who claim to be licensed professionals can’t be wrong! So with the constant attempts to prove that both candidates were senile, the constant demonstration by both candidates that they weren’t, and the constant retreat into conspiracy theories of “I guess he used the magic drug again but we’ll get him next time!”, I just tuned out this entire category of thing. And I guess I kept it tuned out longer than I should have, whoops. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Even if liars are saying something for their usual liar reasons, it can still be true. For twenty years, people spread false rumors that Castro was on his deathbed, but this didn’t make Castro immortal. In the same way, I should have figured out that even if I couldn’t trust any particular claim that Biden was senile, the prior for an 81 year old becoming senile was still high. But I guess I assumed that if he was becoming senile, some Democratic elites would have secret knowledge about it, and they couldn’t possibly be so stupid as to deny it while also scheduling him for a debate where it would inevitably come out. So I figured the Democratic elites who were closest to him thought he was doing well, and I trusted them more than the people who had been wrong every time for the past five years. I’m still confused what those elites were thinking. Reading the news coverage for the past few days (including some video clips from a post-debate rally where he seemed noticeably better) it seems like some combination of: He has good days and bad days, and they were hoping this would be a good day.

The Biden number is about 4% higher than Nate Silver’s model over the same time period; see below for why that might be. [EDIT 7/2/24: Original version had a miscalculation which decreased everyone’s odds by about 10%. Above version should be correct.] You can find my sources at the bottom of the post. “Explicit” odds are based on questions like “What are the chances of Biden winning if he is the nominee?” “Implied” odds were generated by combining the questions “What is the chance of Biden being the nominee?” and “What is the chance of Biden winning?”; this is safe enough with Biden, but with unlikely nominees like Newsom, some of the percentages can get small enough that they start running into small-number-biases and become less trustworthy. I’ve weighted each market’s explicit calculation higher than their implicit one to compensate. A possible objection to these results: conditional probabilities don’t exactly reflect the intuitive concept of decision-making. That is, we’re not asking “We want to know whether or not to keep Biden, so what are the chances that he’ll win if we do?”, we’re asking the market for the chance that he’ll win, in the set of worlds where people decide to keep him for other reasons. We should expect this to overestimate his performance. That is, imagine that tomorrow, Biden has completely recovered, he easily wins his next debate with Trump, and everyone agrees the most recent debate was just a fluke - in that world, he is both more likely to be nominated and more likely to win. Alternatively, if tomorrow he gets much worse and can’t even speak in full sentences, he’s much less likely to be nominated and much more likely to lose. Since the real world includes both those possibilities, restricting ourselves to the set of worlds where he gets nominated means we’re overestimating the chance that he wins. There are similar-albeit-less-severe problems with other candidates - if we choose Newsom, that might be because he won some kind of debate or process versus Harris and all the other potential replacements. Overall I expect this to be mostly correct, but probably overestimate Biden’s chances by a percent or two relative to others. Along with these three candidates, Metaculus had an explicit “should the Democrats replace Biden?” question: Manifold also asks how Democrats will do if they replace Biden (without specifying a particular replacement): We can compare this to their Biden market… …and find that once again, they expect replacing Biden to go better (though I think 51% is just cope). At the Manifest prediction market conference in early June, I interviewed Nate Silver: …and asked him for his probability that the Democrats would win this election, versus his probability that the Democrats would win conditional on Biden not being the nominee (specifically “drops dead tomorrow of natural causes”). He said 40-45% chance normally, 50% chance without Biden. This was before the debate, but I think it matches the markets’ opinion that switching candidates would help the Democrats’ chances - and this has only become more true since the debate. On the other hand, polls asking people how they would vote in possible matchups don’t show any advantage of alternate candidates over Biden. Here’s the only post-debate poll I could find: And if Biden does need to be replaced, Democrats mostly support Harris, who the prediction markets find least promising: Maybe Democrats are the wrong people to ask - they’re already going to vote Biden, so you want someone who’s more attractive to independents. Of course, in a normal primary it would be Democrats making the decision. But if elites are going to do something behind closed doors, maybe they should take advantage and choose the candidate most likely to win, for once. I think these polls are the strongest objection to the prediction markets’ verdict. You could make an argument where prediction market users are mostly educated liberal white males, and even though they’re incentivized to honestly determine what ordinary people think, they’re too out-of-touch with ordinary people to do so effectively. Or they might be over-fixating on “voters don’t like Biden’s senility” without considering that, even if voters didn’t know Biden was currently senile before Thursday, they probably guessed that he would become senile sometime in his four-year term, and had basically accepted that his aides would do the hard work. Maybe they prefer a well-known likeable incumbent over an unknown quantity (and the unknown quantity’s potential new/weird aides), even if the well-known likeable incumbent is senile. Maybe elites know more than we do about how hard it is to inject a new candidate at the last moment, how dangerous it is to have someone who hasn’t been thoroughly vetted for scandals, et cetera. Still, for now I trust the prediction markets. I think replacing Biden would add ~10 prcentage points to the Democrats’ chance of victory. At the end of this post, I’ll list the prediction markets I’m using as sources. But before then, a brief interlude of: Fuzzy Subjective Human Factors I Am Not Really Qualified To Talk About Many people on Twitter are asking “how could anyone possibly have been stupid enough to not realize that Biden was senile?” I was that stupid. I didn’t say it openly, because I’m at least smart enough to have a high threshold for giving my opinion on political things I don’t know much about. But I thought it in my heart. So in case the people asking “how could anyone have been that stupid?” actually want an explanation, here’s my former reasoning. Republicans have been accusing Biden of being senile (and the Democrats of hiding it) for at least five years now. Before the 2020 debates, they were excited that this was when they could finally prove once and for all that Biden was senile. Then Biden did fine, and they retreated to “well he’s senile but they have some secret drug they’re giving him, just during debates, that makes him look fine”. Notice this is from 2020; according to polls, he did win the debate that year (source) I think a lot about experimental cognitive enhancement drugs, and I can say with confidence that nothing like that exists. Stimulants can help people with mild dementia be more active and motivated, but they don’t really improve cognition directly, and they can’t make a demented person temporarily lucid. Still, for the past four years, every time Biden was going to do something - a press conference, a State of the Union, whatever - the Republicans would say “ha, this time is going to be the proof that he’s senile!” And then he would always do fine, and they would retreat back to “I guess he used the secret drug this time too”. The satire site Babylon Bee had some funny articles about this: Babylon Bee, after Biden gave a good State of the Union speech earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Democrats were spreading the alternate narrative that Trump was senile. This one has gotten less press, because I don’t know how many people really believed it. But it came up occasionally, along with out-of-context video snippets where Trump said or did something dumb or meandering. Of course, anybody with a presidential candidate’s level of public exposure will have a few gaffes. Even if they don’t, you can always deceptively crop something so it looks like they did. Wait, why is a psychoanalyst getting quoted as a top expert in dementia? (source) I didn’t know you could diagnose someone via Change.org petition, but 2544 people who claim to be licensed professionals can’t be wrong! So with the constant attempts to prove that both candidates were senile, the constant demonstration by both candidates that they weren’t, and the constant retreat into conspiracy theories of “I guess he used the magic drug again but we’ll get him next time!”, I just tuned out this entire category of thing. And I guess I kept it tuned out longer than I should have, whoops. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Even if liars are saying something for their usual liar reasons, it can still be true. For twenty years, people spread false rumors that Castro was on his deathbed, but this didn’t make Castro immortal. In the same way, I should have figured out that even if I couldn’t trust any particular claim that Biden was senile, the prior for an 81 year old becoming senile was still high. But I guess I assumed that if he was becoming senile, some Democratic elites would have secret knowledge about it, and they couldn’t possibly be so stupid as to deny it while also scheduling him for a debate where it would inevitably come out. So I figured the Democratic elites who were closest to him thought he was doing well, and I trusted them more than the people who had been wrong every time for the past five years. I’m still confused what those elites were thinking. Reading the news coverage for the past few days (including some video clips from a post-debate rally where he seemed noticeably better) it seems like some combination of: He has good days and bad days, and they were hoping this would be a good day.

Links for July 2024

July 24, 2024 · Original source

35: Metaculus is running an AI bot forecasting tournament. You write the bot, they provide the questions, best bot wins $30,000 prize. Learn more here.

Inline links: here

Open Thread 340

July 29, 2024 · Original source

Mike Hawke points out that despite the new legislation promoting nuclear power, Metaculus’ forecast of US nuclear power in 2050 hasn’t budged.

Inline links: Metaculus’ forecast of US nuclear power in 2050 hasn’t budged

September 17, 2024 · Original source

FiveThirtyNine (ha ha) is a new forecasting AI that purports to be “superintelligent”, ie able to beat basically all human forecasters. In fact, its creators go further than that: they say it beats Metaculus, a site which aggregates the estimates of hundreds of forecasters to generate estimates more accurate than any of them. You can read the announcement here and play with the model itself here.

Inline links: here, here

The basic structure is the same as past forecasting AIs like FutureSearch. A heavily-modified copy of ChatGPT gathers relevant news articles, then prompts itself to think in superforecaster-like ways. The creators say the ChatGPT copy had a knowledge cutoff of October 2023, so they tested it on Metaculus questions from after that date. It got 87.7% accuracy, slightly above Metaculus forecasters’ 87.0%. Manifold is skeptical: The commenters, especially Neel Nanda, found that doing knowledge cutoffs properly is hard, and the ChatGPT base seems to know about news events after October 2023 - upon questioning, it seemed aware of an earthquake in November 2023. When presented with a different set of questions that were all after November 2023, FiveThirtyNine substantially underperformed the Metaculus average. But also, my attempts to play around with the bot haven’t been encouraging: I asked it to predict the chance that Prospera would have a population of at least 1,000 in 2027. Like FutureSearch on the same question, it cited many interesting news articles on Prospera’s chances but failed to do the basic step of figuring out its current population and growth rate. It eventually concluded 35% chance, which is reasonable enough. But when asked whether Prospera would have a population of 100,000 in 2028, it also said 35% chance, which is absurd.

Inline links: FutureSearch, When presented with a different set of questions

A Twitter user pointed out (and I confirmed) that upon being asked “What is the probability that Joe Biden is still President in October 2025?”, it goes through a lot of reasoning about his age and dementia and finally concludes 55% because he’s not that demented. I originally thought this might be due to the knowledge cutoff (it doesn’t know Biden dropped out in favor of Harris), but if I ask the AI about October 2029, then it says that Joe Biden has dropped out in favor of Harris (even though in that question it doesn’t matter). So now I think it’s more like ChatGPT’s tendency to round anything that sounds vaguely like the surgeon riddle off to the surgeon riddle - in the same way, FiveThirtyNine rounds off anything that sounds vaguely like the popular question “is Biden too old and demented to stay president?” into that question, even though there are much stronger non-dementia-related reasons he can’t be president next year. The FutureSearch team wrote a LessWrong post generalizing these kinds of observations, Contra Papers Claiming Superhuman AI Forecasting. They examine four claims, including the one above, and find similar problems with all of them. Sometimes the teams involved missed potential data contamination (ie their LLM wasn’t forecasting, it just already knew the answers). Other times the LLM failed but - in the spirit of technologists everywhere - the researchers invented finicky definitions of “above human level” by which even mediocre AIs qualified. They conclude: Today's autonomous AI forecasting can be better than average, or even experienced, human forecasters…but it's very unlikely that any autonomous AI forecaster yet built is close to the accuracy of a top 2% Metaculus forecaster, or the crowd. Still, FiveThirtyNine is a big advance in at least one way: as far as I know, it’s the first high-quality AI forecaster which is free to the general public. Try it out! This means there’s still time to use this joke when they invent the actually good one! r/MarkMyWords This is a subreddit for people who want to record bold predictions. There’s nothing formal - nobody gives probabilities, and some of them don’t even have end dates. It’s just people going out on a limb to say they’re sure something will happen. …most of them are “mark my words, time will prove Democrats right about everything, and reveal Republicans to be disgusting criminal hypocrites”. …so much so that it kind of fails as a potentially interesting institution and becomes just another monument to how sad the Internet’s gotten. Still, it might be fun to keep going until you find an old post where the prediction has already “resolved”, and see what happens. Here are some of the highest-upvoted posts from at least a year ago (minus pop culture and dumb in-jokes): MMW: It will turn out the Notre Dame fire was actually arson, and not an “accident” as the Paris police initially claimed.

Inline links: round anything that sounds vaguely like the surgeon riddle off to the surgeon riddle, Contra Papers Claiming Superhuman AI Forecasting, Try it out!, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-I28!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0ca5e763-6951-41f1-899d-d033d9729bd0_592x116.png, This is a subreddit, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5XR0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F07c2b745-404d-4cc4-90ac-3dbbfd7eb2c9_1274x549.png, It will turn out the Notre Dame fire was actually arson, and not an “accident” as the Paris police initially claimed

Mantic Monday: Judgment Day

November 05, 2024 · Original source

Yet in the end, everything is so perfectly balanced that the sum total of these luminaries refuse to say which side of even we’re on. The nation balances on a knife’s edge. Eli Lilly stock moons. A red sun hangs over Philadelphia, where American democracy began and may yet end. A man walks into a diner just before closing time. He looks like a good tipper. The waitress was hoping to leave early and go vote. She decides against. Seven trumpets sound; seven seals are opened; there is silence in Heaven for the space of about half an hour. As George RR Martin put it, “God flips a coin and the world holds its breath.” Tomorrow - if we are so lucky - there will be a result. The great function that has consumed us for so long will return 0 or 1. The pundits who guessed 51-49 will be hailed as prophets; the pundits who guessed 49-51 will get bullied out of public life. The winner’s campaign operatives will be praised as world-historic geniuses, the loser’s mocked forever as utter nincompoops. Thousands of lifelong public servants who backed Mr. 49% will be tossed from DC like used toilet paper and replaced with thousands of hacks who backed Mr. 51%. Funding streams will go dry. Whole lands will turn to economic deserts. Fortunes will be destroyed. A few people will make good on their exile and suicide threats. Most won’t. The Union will either survive or not. If it survives, we’ll do it all over again four years later. A red sun sets over DC. The marble monuments are stained crimson; the statues of Lincoln and Jefferson and the rest look like they writhe in hellfire. The people seclude themselves in their houses. A city where even the Christians are atheist kneels in prayer. On some level, they know - we know - it was never just about choosing a leader. It was all for this - the same urge that drove the games of the Colosseum and sacrifices of Tenochtitlan. The need for a single moment of unconditioned reality. For one evening, the people of the richest and most secure nation in history, fat off the spoils of six continents, will know the same fear as the starving Catalhuyuk farmer, staring at the sky, wondering if the rains will come. For one evening, everyone - rich or poor, religious or secular, Democrat or Republican - will join in the prayer of the poet: “Judge of the Nations, spare us yet Lest we forget - lest we forget!” Don’t Blame Me, I Voted For Kodos Metaculus uses experimental “conditional forecasts” to determine the consequences of a Trump/Harris victory. How it works (example): you set up two forecasts: If Trump wins, will China invade Taiwan?

Inline links: the prayer of the poet, experimental “conditional forecasts”, example

Iranian nukes more likely under Trump (49.5%) than Harris (45%) All of these involve foreign policy going worse under Trump than Harris. Is this unfair? Even Trump’s supporters would agree he is less interested in funding Ukrainian resistance than Harris; Metaculus’ numbers here seem in line with this. Harris is more likely to continue deals where Iran gets sanctions relief / money in exchange for not going nuclear. Whether or not you agree with Trump that those deals are extortionary and unfair, it makes sense that Iran is more likely to go nuclear if those deals are discontinued. But this is also a small effect and could be noise. The Taiwan numbers are the least convincing, but seem to be based off of arguments like the ones here: Trump has said that Taiwan should “pay for” defense, and generally been skeptical of foreign entanglements. And here’s Manifold’s version of the same thing: Polymarket’s Wild Ride On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.

Inline links: here, here’s, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ubU7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F709cc4a2-d203-424d-a6fb-a796d1ad2cdb_949x547.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!i5yn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc272d35b-10d7-4580-9757-05dd258e69d3_741x443.png, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, followup, Smarkets, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8twW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F25ccd651-3404-446a-a7cb-5747af316038_1180x315.png

On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.

Inline links: New York Times, Wall Street Journal, followup, Smarkets, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8twW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F25ccd651-3404-446a-a7cb-5747af316038_1180x315.png

Congrats To Polymarket, But I Still Think They Were Mispriced

November 07, 2024 · Original source

This is equivalent to the implicit argument between Polymarket and a group of other forecasting sites, especially Metaculus.

Inline links: Metaculus

Just before the election, Polymarket and other real-money prediction markets said Trump had a 60% chance of winning. Metaculus and other non-money forecasting sites said he had a 50% chance of winning.

Then Trump won. Should this increase your trust in Polymarket rather than Metaculus? Only by the tiniest of amounts. If you previously thought (like I did) that there was a 90% chance that Metaculus was more accurate, you should update down to 88%.

H5N1: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

January 01, 2025 · Original source

From “Genesis and pathogenesis of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus”, linked above. You may recognize the lead author - Michael Worobey has also been a leading voice on the zoonotic side of the COVID origins debate. The recent history of the flu, as far as I can tell, is: 1918: An H1N1 flu (“Spanish flu”) jumped from birds to humans in America and killed 50 million people worldwide. This replaced all older strains, so most seasonal flus during this era were H1N1. 1957: An H2N2 flu (“Asian flu”) crossed from birds to humans in China, and killed about 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H1N1 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H2N2. 1968: An H3N2 flu (“Hong Kong flu”) crossed from pigs (?) to humans in Hong Kong, and killed another 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H2N2 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H3N2. 1977: An H1N1 flu (“Russian flu”) leaked from a biology lab (?) in Russia (it might have been a strain from the 1940s, which the Russians were trying to make a vaccine for). It didn’t kill that many people, but it stuck around, and from then on, seasonal flus could be either H3N2 or H1N1. 2009: An H1N1 flu (“Mexican flu” until the PC police stepped in; afterwards “swine flu”) took some horrible circuitous route between birds and pigs and back again, crossed over into humans in Mexico, and killed 200,000 people. It outcompeted older strains of H1N1, but couldn’t crowd out H3N2, so seasonal flus are still either H3N2 or H1N1. …which brings us to the present, hopefully illuminating why “new flu strain crosses over from animals into humans” is such an “uh oh” moment. The Bird Flu Technically, all pandemic flus start as bird flus. Influenza A evolved in birds. Sometimes it spreads to other animals, including pigs, cattle, and humans. The most common way for a bird flu to spread to humans is to “reassort” (not exactly virus sex, but close enough, and the real version is less memorable) with a human flu virus (ie one that has already crossed over to humans). The resulting virus has all of the human flu virus’ human adaptations, but borrows enough new antigens from the bird virus to evade the immune system. Pigs can be infected by both human and bird viruses, so they are a common place for this reassortment to take place. If reassortment is sort of like viral sex, pigs are sort of like Tinder. When a bird flu and human flu reassort in pigs, the resulting disease is called a swine flu. At least the 2009 flu pandemic was a swine flu, and a minority opinion thinks the 1918 pandemic was too. There aren’t major epidemiological differences between direct-from-bird flus and swine flus. H5N1 was first noticed in birds - specifically, a flock of chickens in Scotland in 1959 - after which it disappeared for forty years. In 1996, it showed up in geese in China, then gradually increased its market share among birds worldwide. In 2022, it was found in minks; apparently it had learned to infect mammals. By early 2024, it was seen in cows. Now it’s in cow herds in 16 states, and one of them (California) has declared a state of emergency. And in October, H5N1 was found in pigs for the first time. It’s not uncommon for humans to catch an animal disease. This doesn’t mean the disease has “crossed over” to humans. If the virus isn’t suited to human-to-human transmission, it simply dies off (either before or after killing its human host). Thus, chicken farmers have been reporting scattered H5N1 cases since 1997; now that the virus has spread to cattle, cow farmers have started reporting the same. A Metaculus comment on this topic introduced me to the phrase “biocomputational surface”. Every viral replication that takes place in a human gives the virus one more chance to develop the set of mutations that makes it human-transmissible and start the next pandemic. Or, more likely, every viral replication that takes place in a human who has both the H5N1 bird flu and a normal human flu - or in a pig which has both viruses - gives the virus one extra chance to reassort in a way that produces a bird-antigen-fortified human-adapted flu virus. This doesn’t mean H5N1 will definitely become human-transmissible soon. Many viruses hang out on the borders of transmissibility for decades. Some, for unclear reasons, never cross over at all. But all of this is compatible with the virus becoming transmissible soon. So: What Is The Chance Of A Pandemic? The prediction markets on this topic ask a question about “10,000 cases in the United States”. Does this necessarily mean “pandemic”? Might it be possible to get to 10,000 cases just from the scattered chicken and cow farmers, with no human-to-human transmission? Despite many chicken and cow infections this year, there have only been 60 - 70 recorded human cases. Unless there is a phase change in screening methods, it seems hard for this number to increase to 10,000 off farmers alone. I think it’s fair to treat this question as operationalizing “what is the chance of a pandemic”? By this definition, Manifold estimates a 40% chance of an H5N1 pandemic in 2025. Metaculus estimates a 5% chance. You can see below whether that’s changed since I wrote this essay: 5% versus 40% is a big difference! Who do we trust? I trust Metaculus. Metaculus has beaten Manifold in both of the two head-to-head comparisons that I know of (Jeremiah Johnson’s and mine). Manifold’s number swings by a factor of two from week to week; Metaculus has been steady. But also, Metaculus hosts a CDC-sponsored respiratory disease forecasting tournament which has enriched them in epidemiological expertise. And if you look at the quality of comments on both sites, it’s pretty obvious where the people with more intellectual chops are hanging out. The Manifold comments are mostly single sentences, or occasionally just links to an article about new cases. The Metaculus comments look more like this one by dimaklenchin: Despite the panic propaganda, H5N1 is unlikely to be "just a single mutation away from switching host preference": 1) It normally takes a lot more than a single mutation to switch hosts. E.g., there are at least five different reasons why SIV (monkey equivalent of HIV) is not infectious to humans. Heck, a variant of SIV that bears HIV's receptor-recognizing surface protein (SHIV) is still not infectious to humans. HIV most certainly evolved from SIV but, almost as certainly, it took a very long time to get there. Not that all viruses are the same and things can't turn out differently with flu, but I don't subscribe to the idea that a mere change of receptor specificity (something that can take 1-2 mutations) will be sufficient. 2) We have data. Lots of human infections with other varieties of bird flu in the past - all those viruses ultimately went nowhere. Why would H5N1 be radically different? E.g., the "Canadian teen", despite what sounds like a prolonged exposure, failed to infect anyone around him. Since I am at 18% for the h-2-h H5N1 detection in 2025, I am arbitrarily going ~ an order of magnitude lower than that for something as unprecedented as 10K human infections. Maybe should be much lower but hedging for the time being and will allow another couple months of observations. And Sergio: I'm currently at 20% on the question of reported human-to-human transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 globally before 2026. However, this question is only about the US, and is more general about all subtypes of H5. But H5N1 very strongly appears to be the most important subtype to consider in this time period. And, given the current situation in the US with H5N1 human cases derived from exposure to poultry or cattle (with cattle(mammals) being more worrisome), h2h transmission seems quite more likely to arise in North America than elsewhere before 2026. Conditioning on h2h transmission in the US (and also trying to consider, with lower probability, a start in Canada), I want to estimate the chances that it becomes sustained and out of control (in which case, if it starts in Canada, I largely expect it to spread to the US). The (6) past events of probable h2h transmission of avian H5(N1), none of which were sustained, could serve as a base rate, although I'm a bit wary of giving much weight to this precedent, since the last event was quite a while ago (2007), and also because reporting and testing standards may have improved considerably since then (so perhaps they might not have been classified as h2h transmission events if they had occurred more recently). The current situation in the US, and events such as the Canadian teen who got sick with H5N1, do suggest a higher background level of risk than normal (which would be reduced if a vaccine for cattle is licensed soon), but I'm wary of overupdating. Conditioned on sustained h2h transmission, reaching over 10k cases in a few months seems likely, although perhaps very strong monitoring and surveillance could contain the situation in time (at the very least to moderate the growth rate). Trying to combine all these factors somewhat haphazardly, I'm currently at 3.5% for this question. That’s before 2026. What about longer-term? Manifold gives a ~50% chance before 2030; Metaculus uses a more complicated method but it says about 25% chance before 2030. H5N1 may cross to humans, but it could take a while. Superforecaster Juan Cambeiro at The Institute For Progress estimated a 4% chance of a “worse than COVID” H5N1 pandemic in “the next year”, but their estimate was made in 2023, without the benefit of the Metaculus estimates or most of our current knowledge. This feels high now - Metaculus says 5% total for H5N1 pandemic, and most pandemic flus are not worse than COVID. IFP also seem to be expecting a case fatality rate greater than 10%, which I find unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. I trust their estimate less than Metaculus’ current ones. I conclude that the most plausible estimate for the chance of an H5N1 pandemic in the next year is 5%. Interestingly, 5% is about the base rate for pandemic flus per year: five in the past century = one per twenty years = 5% chance per year. Isn’t it surprising that we’re still at the base rate when we can see a dangerous-looking flu virus spreading through the types of animals that have caused pandemic flus in the past? Part of the answer is that we’re not - in addition to the 5% chance of H5N1, we have to add the chance of some other pandemic flu. This probably isn’t 5% on its own; scientists monitor flu strains closely, and they haven’t found any others which are giving off as many red flags as H5N1. Still, something could always come out of left field. Maybe we should add a 2.5% chance of some other strain, for a total of 7.5% chance of a flu pandemic (ie beyond normal seasonal flu) next year. But still, isn’t it surprising that we’re so close to the base rate? One way to think about this: the base rate represents how concerned we should be if there was no epidemiological monitoring at all. In that case, we would estimate a probability distribution across different epidemiological landscapes, most of which contain some concerning-looking flu strains. Since we are doing the epidemiological monitoring, we can collapse that distribution into a single picture: one flu strain, H5N1, is in fact pretty concerning, and other strains mostly aren’t. This is enough to move our prior from 5% to 7.5%, but no more. The forecasters I talked to raised one other point of uncertainty: does the flu work more like a dice roll, or like a bus? Dice rolls are uncorrelated with their predecessors; even if it’s been a hundred rolls since you last rolled a 6, your chance this time is still 1/6. But buses come at fixed intervals; if the buses are hourly, and you haven’t seen a bus in the past 59 minutes, then your chance of seeing a bus in the next minute is very high. It’s been 16 years since the last flu pandemic; these pandemics come (on average) every 20 years. I don’t think anyone has a good sense of how to think about this. But it was 40 years between the Spanish and Hong Kong flus, so the twenty year number is at best a rule of thumb. The 5% number feels very low to me (and, apparently, to the average Manifold forecaster). Isn’t H5N1 spreading to cows and pigs and all sorts of other mammals? Isn’t it in the news all the time? I trust Metaculus a lot, but I agree that this is a surprising update, and I’m taking it on faith rather than feeling it in my bones. What Would The Fatality Rate Be For An H5N1 Pandemic? There are four basic stories you could tell about likely H5N1 mortality. First, maybe mortality would be 50%. The argument here is that official statistics report this mortality rate in the chicken farmers who have been infected with H5N1 so far. Several news sources and even some scientists have raised the specter of a pandemic version of H5N1 pandemic with this same death rate, which could kill a quarter to a third of the world population. THIS IS EXTREMELY FAKE. The official statistics only report fatality rate in the infections we know about. Bird flu is rare, there’s no mass testing, and we only learn that somebody had it if they’re in a hospital and the doctors are worried enough to test for rare conditions. Of Americans who got bird flu in the past year, 0 out of 61 have died. Probably this is mostly because America upped its detection game and is now finding milder cases; we also can’t rule out the virus mutating to become less virulent. Metaculus estimates the current true mortality rate as 1.25%. …but leaves a wide 90% confidence interval, from 0.5% to 7%. Second, maybe mortality would be somewhere around 1.25%. The argument here is that Metaculus uses this as its central estimate of US mortality. But Sentinel discusses some reasons to be skeptical of broad inferences from the US numbers: Scientists have been puzzled by the apparently low H5N1 case fatality rate in humans in the US. They offer a number of hypotheses: “The way in which the virus is being transmitted — along with the amount of virus exposure — is limiting the severity of disease.”

Inline links: was found in pigs, Jeremiah Johnson’s, mine, a CDC-sponsored respiratory disease forecasting tournament, dimaklenchin, Sergio, reported human-to-human transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 globally before 2026, human cases, past events, vaccine for cattle is licensed soon, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fL7J!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd6a70fa6-b356-422d-ba9a-5db431e5a056_751x471.png, The Institute For Progress estimated, news, sources, scientists, Sentinel discusses

H5N1 may cross to humans, but it could take a while. Superforecaster Juan Cambeiro at The Institute For Progress estimated a 4% chance of a “worse than COVID” H5N1 pandemic in “the next year”, but their estimate was made in 2023, without the benefit of the Metaculus estimates or most of our current knowledge. This feels high now - Metaculus says 5% total for H5N1 pandemic, and most pandemic flus are not worse than COVID. IFP also seem to be expecting a case fatality rate greater than 10%, which I find unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. I trust their estimate less than Metaculus’ current ones. I conclude that the most plausible estimate for the chance of an H5N1 pandemic in the next year is 5%. Interestingly, 5% is about the base rate for pandemic flus per year: five in the past century = one per twenty years = 5% chance per year. Isn’t it surprising that we’re still at the base rate when we can see a dangerous-looking flu virus spreading through the types of animals that have caused pandemic flus in the past? Part of the answer is that we’re not - in addition to the 5% chance of H5N1, we have to add the chance of some other pandemic flu. This probably isn’t 5% on its own; scientists monitor flu strains closely, and they haven’t found any others which are giving off as many red flags as H5N1. Still, something could always come out of left field. Maybe we should add a 2.5% chance of some other strain, for a total of 7.5% chance of a flu pandemic (ie beyond normal seasonal flu) next year. But still, isn’t it surprising that we’re so close to the base rate? One way to think about this: the base rate represents how concerned we should be if there was no epidemiological monitoring at all. In that case, we would estimate a probability distribution across different epidemiological landscapes, most of which contain some concerning-looking flu strains. Since we are doing the epidemiological monitoring, we can collapse that distribution into a single picture: one flu strain, H5N1, is in fact pretty concerning, and other strains mostly aren’t. This is enough to move our prior from 5% to 7.5%, but no more. The forecasters I talked to raised one other point of uncertainty: does the flu work more like a dice roll, or like a bus? Dice rolls are uncorrelated with their predecessors; even if it’s been a hundred rolls since you last rolled a 6, your chance this time is still 1/6. But buses come at fixed intervals; if the buses are hourly, and you haven’t seen a bus in the past 59 minutes, then your chance of seeing a bus in the next minute is very high. It’s been 16 years since the last flu pandemic; these pandemics come (on average) every 20 years. I don’t think anyone has a good sense of how to think about this. But it was 40 years between the Spanish and Hong Kong flus, so the twenty year number is at best a rule of thumb. The 5% number feels very low to me (and, apparently, to the average Manifold forecaster). Isn’t H5N1 spreading to cows and pigs and all sorts of other mammals? Isn’t it in the news all the time? I trust Metaculus a lot, but I agree that this is a surprising update, and I’m taking it on faith rather than feeling it in my bones. What Would The Fatality Rate Be For An H5N1 Pandemic? There are four basic stories you could tell about likely H5N1 mortality. First, maybe mortality would be 50%. The argument here is that official statistics report this mortality rate in the chicken farmers who have been infected with H5N1 so far. Several news sources and even some scientists have raised the specter of a pandemic version of H5N1 pandemic with this same death rate, which could kill a quarter to a third of the world population. THIS IS EXTREMELY FAKE. The official statistics only report fatality rate in the infections we know about. Bird flu is rare, there’s no mass testing, and we only learn that somebody had it if they’re in a hospital and the doctors are worried enough to test for rare conditions. Of Americans who got bird flu in the past year, 0 out of 61 have died. Probably this is mostly because America upped its detection game and is now finding milder cases; we also can’t rule out the virus mutating to become less virulent. Metaculus estimates the current true mortality rate as 1.25%. …but leaves a wide 90% confidence interval, from 0.5% to 7%. Second, maybe mortality would be somewhere around 1.25%. The argument here is that Metaculus uses this as its central estimate of US mortality. But Sentinel discusses some reasons to be skeptical of broad inferences from the US numbers: Scientists have been puzzled by the apparently low H5N1 case fatality rate in humans in the US. They offer a number of hypotheses: “The way in which the virus is being transmitted — along with the amount of virus exposure — is limiting the severity of disease.”

Inline links: The Institute For Progress estimated, news, sources, scientists, Sentinel discusses

Metaculus Forecasting Contest

January 20, 2025 · Original source

This is normally when I would announce the winners of the 2024 forecasting contest, but there are some complications and Metaculus has asked me to wait until they get sorted out.

But time doesn’t wait, and we have to get started on the new year’s forecasting contest to make sure there’s enough time for events to happen or not. That means the 2025 contest is now open! This year I had hoped to arrange some kind of fair comparison with Polymarket so I could prove my thesis that it usually underperforms Metaculus - but with all the excitement of the election and the feds harassing Shayne we never got around to making it work.

Inline links: https://www.metaculus.com/tournament/ACX2025/, the feds harassing Shayne

This year I had hoped to arrange some kind of fair comparison with Polymarket so I could prove my thesis that it usually underperforms Metaculus - but with all the excitement of the election and the feds harassing Shayne we never got around to making it work.

Inline links: the feds harassing Shayne

Open Thread 370

February 24, 2025 · Original source

4: Some straggler Metaculus/ACX forecasting winners who I didn’t get to mention last week:

Links For February 2025

February 27, 2025 · Original source

43: Just as there are stock indexes like NASDAQ or Shanghai Composite to easily track questions like “how is tech doing?” or “how is China doing?”, Metaculus is experimenting with prediction market indices. I’m skeptical of their flagship example - “how ready are we for AGI?” - which seems to be a weird mishmash of questions about how good AI capabilities are, how well technical alignment is going, and stuff like UBI. Split between recommending better curation vs. worse curation (eg something more like NASDAQ that includes so many thousands of stocks that it can’t help but track underlying trends).

Inline links: experimenting with prediction market indices, “how ready are we for AGI?”

OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

March 13, 2025 · Original source

This Metaculus question looks like the Manifold market, but without the big drop at the end. Are the Manifolders overreacting, or are the Metaculans asleep at the wheel?

Inline links: This

Inline links: now a new report comes out, Here are some related Metaculus questions, Ozy, Stutzman et al, is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS, Pessimists’ Archive, Isaac King on X, Peter Hague (on X), Phaethon, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ry-j!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcea22939-8cf9-4b32-8494-511f01cb2758_964x755.png, Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X), https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VScL!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2509e243-f6f7-4448-9779-a8f9be45a2f9_1500x1500.png, proposes a three-stage model of secularization, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf, nxthompson on X, a huge survey, Steven Adler on AI psychosis, they cloned her, dozens of times, a lawsuit, Gwern, on X, got 40% of the e-commerce funding, What Happened To Pathology AI Companies?, Will Data Centers Crash The Economy?, Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument, and who is still fighting the good fight, countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania, Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin, on formal benchmarks, speculated, a “reverse DeepSeek moment”, with Peter, this tweet by Shakeel, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GJNZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3ba0d8cf-fab8-4370-bcad-df789e157fdc_591x402.png, Wylfcen on X, Zvi points out that, AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test, customized “In This House We Believe” signs, China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is, xlr8harder, Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby, Hector (cloud), demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin, Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference, finds that it is quite bad, violently skeptical, literally so?, This tweet, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!S9fU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa558c09b-7fb6-40a8-a8a0-27b658a2c876_576x687.png, describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X), link on X, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zyh7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F75e9f0f6-d794-4ea2-b24b-5d4803bf28dc_590x478.png, New study claims consultants are actually good, tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, The Argument, a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, criticizes the article, infant brain waves, debate on X, has a presponse here, first foray into housing policy

June 18, 2025 · Original source

No update this time, but from last cycle: “Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.”

Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

Open Thread 405

October 27, 2025 · Original source

4: Metaculus is gearing up for another yearly forecasting contest, and looking for ideas for questions. You can see this year’s question set here - for example, “Will there be a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war by the end of 2025?”. I’ll post an Open Thread comment below where you can list your ideas and someone from Metaculus will read them.

Inline links: this year’s question set here

ACX Forecasting Contest

November 14, 2025 · Original source

ACX has been co-running a forecasting contest with Metaculus for the past few years. Lately the “co-running” has drifted towards them doing all the work and giving me credit, but that’s how I like it! Last year’s contest included more than 4500 forecasters predicting on 33 questions covering US politics, international events, AI, and more.

Inline links: Last year’s contest

They’re preparing for this year’s contest, and currently looking for interesting questions. These could be any objective outcome that might or might not happen in 2026, whose answer will be known by the end of the year. Not “Will Congress do a good job?”, but “Will Congress’ approval rating be above 40% on December 1, 2026?”. Or, even better, “Will Congress’ approval rating be above 40% according to the first NYT Congressional Approval Tracker update to be published after December 1, 2026?”. Please share ideas for 2026 forecast questions here. The top ten question contributors will win prizes from $150 to $700. You can see examples of last year’s questions here (click on each one for more details).

Inline links: Please share ideas for 2026 forecast questions, here

This year’s contest will also include AI bots, who will compete against the humans and one another for prizes of their own. To learn more about building a Metaculus forecasting bot, see here.

Inline links: here

Metaculus Prediction Contest 2026

December 27, 2025 · Original source

This year’s prediction contest is live on Metaculus. They write:

Inline links: This year’s prediction contest

You are welcome to create a bot account to forecast and participate in addition to your regular Metaculus account. Create a bot account and get support building a bot here.

Inline links: here

To participate in the tournament or learn more, go to Metaculus.

Inline links: go to Metaculus

Mantic Monday: The Monkey's Paw Curls

January 13, 2026 · Original source

…this market is about whether Greenland or a meaningful portion of it becomes part of America, not about minor acquisitions like a single building or small plot of land. Here’s a pretty crazy Metaculus question - the resolution criteria specify it’s not about scammers using AIs to blackmail their victims, it’s about an AI independently developing and executing a blackmail plan without human prompting or support. Sometime like this has already happened in toy experiments conducted by safety teams when all the conditions were exactly right, but forecasters seem confident it will happen in real life sometime in the next three years. I don’t understand what’s going on here, and I’m going to recheck this question after signal-boosting it to see if it changes.

Inline links: https://www.metaculus.com/questions/16553/ai-blackmail-for-material-gain-by-eoy-2028/

Here’s a pretty crazy Metaculus question - the resolution criteria specify it’s not about scammers using AIs to blackmail their victims, it’s about an AI independently developing and executing a blackmail plan without human prompting or support. Sometime like this has already happened in toy experiments conducted by safety teams when all the conditions were exactly right, but forecasters seem confident it will happen in real life sometime in the next three years. I don’t understand what’s going on here, and I’m going to recheck this question after signal-boosting it to see if it changes.

Inline links: Here’s a pretty crazy Metaculus question

3: You have five days left to submit your predictions in the ACX/Metaculus 2026 Prediction Contest.

Inline links: to submit your predictions in the ACX/Metaculus 2026 Prediction Contest

Open Thread 419

February 02, 2026 · Original source

1: Congratulations to the winners of last year’s ACX/Metaculus Forecasting Contest, especially:

Inline links: the winners of last year’s ACX/Metaculus Forecasting Contest

All of these winners got approximately $100. And thanks again to Metaculus for making this happen. You can follow along with the 2026 contest here, although it’s too late to participate.

Inline links: here

The Passage Of Polymarket

March 03, 2026 · Original source

America will hold midterm elections on November 3. Incumbents always have a hard time during midterms, and Trump’s approval rating is low, so it’s expected to be a good year for Democrats. Prediction markets expect them to win at least the House (80% chance) and maybe even the Senate (20 - 40% chance). This simple story is complicated by two different Republican attempts to change voting law.

This seems like a good sign that there won’t be mass voter disenfranchisement. But Metaculus expects a 25% chance that martial law is declared?!

But Metaculus expects a 25% chance that martial law is declared?!

Manifold53 mentions across 53 issues

Manifold is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 53 times across 53 issues between February 07, 2022 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice"; "Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing"; "A few smaller markets that Clay didn’t include: Manifold is only at 36%". It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Polymarket, Kalshi.

Article page: Manifold
Mention count: 53
Issue count: 53
First seen: February 07, 2022
Last seen: March 03, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

The Passage Of Polymarket February 07, 2022
Mantic Monday: Ukraine Cube Manifold February 14, 2022
Open Thread 212 February 21, 2022
Play Money And Reputation Systems February 21, 2022
Ukraine Warcasting March 01, 2022
22 March 21, 2022
Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets March 28, 2022
22 May 10, 2022
22 June 13, 2022
22 August 16, 2022
22 October 18, 2022
Open Thread 248 October 30, 2022
ACX Grants: Project Updates November 04, 2022
Mantic Monday: Twitter Chaos Edition November 21, 2022
2023 Prediction Contest December 16, 2022
Prediction Market FAQ December 20, 2022
Who Predicted 2022? January 24, 2023
Open Thread 262 February 06, 2023
23 February 14, 2023
Announcing Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants February 24, 2023
Open Thread 270 April 03, 2023
23 April 25, 2023
23 May 23, 2023
Links For July 2023 July 06, 2023
23: Room Temperature Superforecaster August 01, 2023
Links For August 2023 August 09, 2023
23 August 28, 2023
Impact Market Mini-Grants Results October 09, 2023
23 October 31, 2023
23 December 05, 2023
Links For January 2024 January 18, 2024
24 January 30, 2024
24 February 20, 2024
Who Predicted 2023? March 05, 2024
24 March 12, 2024
In Continued Defense Of Non-Frequentist Probabilities March 21, 2024
Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate March 28, 2024
Highlights From The Comments On The Lab Leak Debate April 09, 2024
24 May 13, 2024
Prediction Markets Suggest Replacing Biden July 02, 2024
24 September 17, 2024
Open Thread 352 October 21, 2024
Mantic Monday: Judgment Day November 05, 2024
Congrats To Polymarket, But I Still Think They Were Mispriced November 07, 2024
H5N1: Much More Than You Wanted To Know January 01, 2025
OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know March 13, 2025
Open Thread 375 March 31, 2025
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025
Links For September 2025 September 04, 2025
ACX Grants Results 2025 October 13, 2025
Mantic Monday: The Monkey's Paw Curls January 13, 2026
Open Thread 420 February 09, 2026
Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day March 03, 2026

Metaculus 37 shared issues
Polymarket 28 shared issues
Kalshi 20 shared issues
Manifold Markets 17 shared issues
PredictIt 17 shared issues

Source context

February 07, 2022 · Original source

Easy to create your own subsidized markets “Real money” should be self-explanatory. Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice, but so far they’re limited to a small group of enthusiasts playing in their spare time. I value them both, but neither is the killer app that makes prediction markets as central to everyday life as stock markets or polls or whatever. “Easy to use” is kind of self-explanatory, but with some caveats. A big part of ease-of-use is liquidity; you can get that from a big user base or from clever deployment of automated market makers. A market that requires crypto knowledge is harder to use than one that doesn’t; one that’s inaccessible from the US is harder to use than one that isn’t. Also all the normal things like UI and search. “Easy to create your own markets” is where we’ve gotten stuck so far. Prediction markets are absolutely on top of questions about whether Donald Trump will win various elections. This is a solved problem. What I really wanted last year (and would have subsidized!) was a market about whether Alameda County, California, would permit indoor gatherings of 50 people on January 8th 2022 (ie would I be forced to cancel my wedding). But I also would have appreciated the ability to put a few questions to prediction markets before starting my psychiatry practice, or my grants program, or any of a dozen other things I did. A friend has gone further, and half-jokingly said they want to create conditional prediction markets about whether they’re compatible with various women in our friend group, to be paid out six months after the first date. Some of these applications are attempts to route around the principal-agent problem. Maybe I have some question about whether a certain grant would succeed, I’m not sure who to ask, and even if someone gives me a “Bob Smith, Grant Evaluator” business card, I don’t know if he’s any good. A prediction market takes all the pain out of searching for information - if I subsidize it enough, it’ll attract people with the relevant skill set who will solve my problem for me. Probably some of these ideas wouldn’t work, but probably other ideas I can’t even think of now would. I don’t know what the killer app for prediction markets will be. But we’re not going to find out unless people can create their own subsidized markets and play around. Polymarket took some baby steps towards this before the settlement: they had a Discord server where anyone could propose questions, and a lot of those questions became markets. But they still had to be general interest, not “let Alice’s five friends predict her dating life”. And there’s a big difference between “talk it over with company representatives on a Discord server” and “press a button”. Imagine if you could only tweet by emailing Jack Dorsey and convincing him that your comment was a good thing to have on Twitter. Even if Jack had good judgment and approved most requests, this would be a long way from the limbic system < — > Send Tweet loop that real Twitter users know and love. I asked some people in the business why they won’t do this. They said most people are bad at writing good resolution criteria. They don’t want their employees to get stuck resolving incredibly dumb questions about people’s dating lives, hunting down inaccessible or conflicting information, and making a bunch of people mad whichever way they decide. As far as I can tell, Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy. But Manifold is US-based and can’t use real money, so there’s still no way to subsidize a market effectively. (This is why I’m pessimistic about Kalshi. They could potentially do a lot of good in the “will Afghanistan collapse?” types of markets the Nobel laureates want, though even there I think some of their betting limits will give them trouble - $25,000 is good money, but not quite good enough to incentivize founding the prediction market equivalent of a Wall Street trading firm. But even if they solve this, I can’t imagine the regulators giving them permission to host “will this grant work out?” or “how will my dating life go?” markets; it’s just too weird, and the CFTC is too conservative. I don’t know, maybe their connections will come through and pull it off, but I don’t even know if they’re ambitious enough to want this, and I hate having to rely on one organization.) Right now my hopes are, in ascending order of likelihood: Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.

Mantic Monday: Ukraine Cube Manifold

February 14, 2022 · Original source

Nobody has reached the promised land at the furthest point. But all three connected vertices are occupied. Augur is real-money and lets people create their own markets, (but it’s impossible to use - it’s made of complicated crypto contracts that nobody’s made a workable front end for yet). Polymarket is real money and easy to use (but doesn’t let people create their own markets; apparently they’re nervous about resolution disputes). Manifold is easy to use and lets people create their own market, but it’s not real money (they’re American and centralized, so they have to follow anti-gambling regulations). Manifold Markets Speaking of which, they’re open! As the cube suggests, Manifold is a site where anyone can create their own (play money) prediction market. They set the question and they decide when and how it resolves (with everyone else just out of luck if they decide to fake it or rug-pull). It’s a bold strategy, but boy oh boy are people liking it so far: Not actually in order This is a semi-randomly selected sample of Manifold markets, but let’s go through them one by one. The Ukraine market is the biggest on Manifold. It’s also deeply out of step with every other prediction market and the top non-prediction-market authorities - who are all giving numbers in the 50s and 60s. I don’t understand how this is so low - yes, play money < real money, but mostly because play money doesn’t get enough people betting. Here lots of people are betting - it’s the biggest market on the site, and since you only start with $1000 either twenty people have bet everything or more people have bet a fraction - but it’s still wrong. I tried to spend some play money to correct it and it snapped back to just as wrong as it was before. I have no explanation. Midnight The Stray Cat is the second biggest market on Manifold, just after Ukraine. I guess the Internet really liking cats shouldn’t be a surprise at this point. In case you need to do research first I’m told this is the cat in question: Props to Manifold for a bunch of markets like the third one on there, where they eat their own dog food by using their market to predict how their business decisions are going to go. ACX Bot has copy-pasted all of my predictions from 2022. At some point they should be able to compare their results with Zvi (ie a single very smart person), with the contest many of you entered (ie an average of formless crowdsourced predictions), and Metaculus (ie a non-monetary forecasting tournament). I’m looking forward to it! Most of you already know Lars Doucet, who’s written some great ACX posts on Georgism. I don’t know what possessed him to make a Joe Rogan Georgism interviewee market, unless he’s gunning for the position. Valinor is a group house on my street, with ~a dozen people living in and around it. We’ve been talking about fixing the backyard for a while. Now we can bet about whether it will happen. Having a number for this actually affects some of my decisions a little. Connor is hijacking the prediction market to make a poll, which is pretty cute. Dwayne Johnson does not have a 15% chance of winning the election. Manifold is suffering from the usual play money problem, where if you only start out with $1000 in play money, nobody wants to lock it up for three years to make a 15% profit. Vivek’s market, “Will I believe that 13177 is a prime number”, is pretty unusual. I’m interpreting it as a test/demonstration of prediction markets’ information-gathering ability. If you don’t know something and it’s hard to Google, you can make a prediction market about whether you’ll believe it in the future, and people who are able to figure out the answer will bet on it. Based on the 97% YES rate, I’m guessing 13177 is in fact a prime number. What else can you do this with? TANSTAAFL’s “Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?” market is maybe pushing the limit of this methodology. Anyway, there are lots of me-too prediction markets but this is something genuinely new under the sun. Maybe it will be awesome itself, but I’m also hoping it helps bigger players realize how much more is possible. This Week In Metaculus A few new questions on intelligence enhancement, eg: The question explicitly allows embryo selection, but says it must raise IQ ten points and be available for <25% median income to count. Trivial improvements to existing embryo selection will top out around 9 points, so this seems to be predicting something more interesting, maybe iterated embryo selection at the very least. I’m probably slightly bearish on this one; I believe if it existed someone would find a way to get it, but I think the regulatory climate might be able to prevent the relevant research indefinitely. Improving adult IQ is really hard. This is a bold thing to speculate about! Atmospheric CO2 was 300ish for most of pre-industrial history, 400ish now, and rising. This question predicts 600 in 2100, which sounds like what happens if global warming gets a bit worse but eventually stabilizes. I’m less sure. I think if we make it to 2100, we’ll have so much technology that atmospheric CO2 can be whatever we want it to be. But maybe we’ll want it to stay where it is; once there’s been a lot of global warming and people have moved / shifted lifestyles, it could be equally disruptive to cool the planet back down. Right now it’s 5%, the official government prediction is 10% by 2030, but this market says 17.6%. But look at that probability distribution! It’s a lot of people saying 10%ish, plus a very long tail of very big numbers. I think people are disagreeing about how exponential this change is going to be. Shorts Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.

Inline links: Augur, Polymarket, Manifold, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j26W!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcba2cb25-7980-446d-8050-499c35c4e56f_919x1017.png, predictions from 2022, ACX posts on Georgism, Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V2bV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fca419ec2-7b91-44cd-80b0-2aad1baa4c2f_766x166.png, The question, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Ah6n!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1ff4f28d-1901-45f2-85bc-8f1c2120ecd1_770x187.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSK8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F80e3383c-6f68-412a-ac90-ca63236bdb10_769x167.png, This, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!frCz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F976d1b66-daee-43d1-948a-500e77ac5a2f_764x164.png, this market, holding an essay contest

Not actually in order This is a semi-randomly selected sample of Manifold markets, but let’s go through them one by one. The Ukraine market is the biggest on Manifold. It’s also deeply out of step with every other prediction market and the top non-prediction-market authorities - who are all giving numbers in the 50s and 60s. I don’t understand how this is so low - yes, play money < real money, but mostly because play money doesn’t get enough people betting. Here lots of people are betting - it’s the biggest market on the site, and since you only start with $1000 either twenty people have bet everything or more people have bet a fraction - but it’s still wrong. I tried to spend some play money to correct it and it snapped back to just as wrong as it was before. I have no explanation. Midnight The Stray Cat is the second biggest market on Manifold, just after Ukraine. I guess the Internet really liking cats shouldn’t be a surprise at this point. In case you need to do research first I’m told this is the cat in question: Props to Manifold for a bunch of markets like the third one on there, where they eat their own dog food by using their market to predict how their business decisions are going to go. ACX Bot has copy-pasted all of my predictions from 2022. At some point they should be able to compare their results with Zvi (ie a single very smart person), with the contest many of you entered (ie an average of formless crowdsourced predictions), and Metaculus (ie a non-monetary forecasting tournament). I’m looking forward to it! Most of you already know Lars Doucet, who’s written some great ACX posts on Georgism. I don’t know what possessed him to make a Joe Rogan Georgism interviewee market, unless he’s gunning for the position. Valinor is a group house on my street, with ~a dozen people living in and around it. We’ve been talking about fixing the backyard for a while. Now we can bet about whether it will happen. Having a number for this actually affects some of my decisions a little. Connor is hijacking the prediction market to make a poll, which is pretty cute. Dwayne Johnson does not have a 15% chance of winning the election. Manifold is suffering from the usual play money problem, where if you only start out with $1000 in play money, nobody wants to lock it up for three years to make a 15% profit. Vivek’s market, “Will I believe that 13177 is a prime number”, is pretty unusual. I’m interpreting it as a test/demonstration of prediction markets’ information-gathering ability. If you don’t know something and it’s hard to Google, you can make a prediction market about whether you’ll believe it in the future, and people who are able to figure out the answer will bet on it. Based on the 97% YES rate, I’m guessing 13177 is in fact a prime number. What else can you do this with? TANSTAAFL’s “Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?” market is maybe pushing the limit of this methodology. Anyway, there are lots of me-too prediction markets but this is something genuinely new under the sun. Maybe it will be awesome itself, but I’m also hoping it helps bigger players realize how much more is possible. This Week In Metaculus A few new questions on intelligence enhancement, eg: The question explicitly allows embryo selection, but says it must raise IQ ten points and be available for <25% median income to count. Trivial improvements to existing embryo selection will top out around 9 points, so this seems to be predicting something more interesting, maybe iterated embryo selection at the very least. I’m probably slightly bearish on this one; I believe if it existed someone would find a way to get it, but I think the regulatory climate might be able to prevent the relevant research indefinitely. Improving adult IQ is really hard. This is a bold thing to speculate about! Atmospheric CO2 was 300ish for most of pre-industrial history, 400ish now, and rising. This question predicts 600 in 2100, which sounds like what happens if global warming gets a bit worse but eventually stabilizes. I’m less sure. I think if we make it to 2100, we’ll have so much technology that atmospheric CO2 can be whatever we want it to be. But maybe we’ll want it to stay where it is; once there’s been a lot of global warming and people have moved / shifted lifestyles, it could be equally disruptive to cool the planet back down. Right now it’s 5%, the official government prediction is 10% by 2030, but this market says 17.6%. But look at that probability distribution! It’s a lot of people saying 10%ish, plus a very long tail of very big numbers. I think people are disagreeing about how exponential this change is going to be. Shorts Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.

These run from about 48% to 60%, but I think the differences are justified by the slightly different wordings of the question and definitions of “invasion”. You see a big jump last Friday when the US government increased the urgency of their own warnings. I ignored this on Friday because I couldn’t figure out what their evidence was, but it looks like the smart money updated a lot on it. A few smaller markets that Clay didn’t include: Manifold is only at 36% despite several dozen traders. I think they’re just wrong - but I’m not going to use any more of my limited supply of play money to correct it, thus fully explaining the wrongness. Futuur is at 47%, but also thinks there’s an 18% chance Russia invades Lithuania, so I’m going to count this as not really mature. Insight Prediction, a very new site I’ve never seen before, claims to have $93,000 invested and a probability of 22%, which is utterly bizarre; I’m too suspicious and confused to invest, and maybe everyone else is too. (PredictIt, Polymarket, and Kalshi all avoid this question. I think PredictIt has a regulatory agreement that limits them to politics. Polymarket and Kalshi might just not be interested, or they might be too PR-sensitive to want to look like they’re speculating on wars where thousands of people could die.) What happens afterwards? Clay beats me again: For context: So it looks like forecasters expect that, conditional upon Russia invading at all, there’s an 80% chance they’ll take Mariupol in the east, a 66% chance they’ll take Kharkiv (also eastern, but only a third ethnic Russian and currently aligned with the central government), and only about a 30% chance they take Kyiv or Odessa. See also this thread full of speculation in the subreddit. As for me, I’m going all in on “yes” after seeing this tweet: Alexander Cube Last week I speculated that to truly realize the potential of prediction markets, we’d need one that was real money, easy to use, and easy to create markets on. Gustavo Lacerda and Nuno Sempere very kindly drew this picture and named it after me: Nobody has reached the promised land at the furthest point. But all three connected vertices are occupied. Augur is real-money and lets people create their own markets, (but it’s impossible to use - it’s made of complicated crypto contracts that nobody’s made a workable front end for yet). Polymarket is real money and easy to use (but doesn’t let people create their own markets; apparently they’re nervous about resolution disputes). Manifold is easy to use and lets people create their own market, but it’s not real money (they’re American and centralized, so they have to follow anti-gambling regulations). Manifold Markets Speaking of which, they’re open! As the cube suggests, Manifold is a site where anyone can create their own (play money) prediction market. They set the question and they decide when and how it resolves (with everyone else just out of luck if they decide to fake it or rug-pull). It’s a bold strategy, but boy oh boy are people liking it so far: Not actually in order This is a semi-randomly selected sample of Manifold markets, but let’s go through them one by one. The Ukraine market is the biggest on Manifold. It’s also deeply out of step with every other prediction market and the top non-prediction-market authorities - who are all giving numbers in the 50s and 60s. I don’t understand how this is so low - yes, play money < real money, but mostly because play money doesn’t get enough people betting. Here lots of people are betting - it’s the biggest market on the site, and since you only start with $1000 either twenty people have bet everything or more people have bet a fraction - but it’s still wrong. I tried to spend some play money to correct it and it snapped back to just as wrong as it was before. I have no explanation. Midnight The Stray Cat is the second biggest market on Manifold, just after Ukraine. I guess the Internet really liking cats shouldn’t be a surprise at this point. In case you need to do research first I’m told this is the cat in question: Props to Manifold for a bunch of markets like the third one on there, where they eat their own dog food by using their market to predict how their business decisions are going to go. ACX Bot has copy-pasted all of my predictions from 2022. At some point they should be able to compare their results with Zvi (ie a single very smart person), with the contest many of you entered (ie an average of formless crowdsourced predictions), and Metaculus (ie a non-monetary forecasting tournament). I’m looking forward to it! Most of you already know Lars Doucet, who’s written some great ACX posts on Georgism. I don’t know what possessed him to make a Joe Rogan Georgism interviewee market, unless he’s gunning for the position. Valinor is a group house on my street, with ~a dozen people living in and around it. We’ve been talking about fixing the backyard for a while. Now we can bet about whether it will happen. Having a number for this actually affects some of my decisions a little. Connor is hijacking the prediction market to make a poll, which is pretty cute. Dwayne Johnson does not have a 15% chance of winning the election. Manifold is suffering from the usual play money problem, where if you only start out with $1000 in play money, nobody wants to lock it up for three years to make a 15% profit. Vivek’s market, “Will I believe that 13177 is a prime number”, is pretty unusual. I’m interpreting it as a test/demonstration of prediction markets’ information-gathering ability. If you don’t know something and it’s hard to Google, you can make a prediction market about whether you’ll believe it in the future, and people who are able to figure out the answer will bet on it. Based on the 97% YES rate, I’m guessing 13177 is in fact a prime number. What else can you do this with? TANSTAAFL’s “Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?” market is maybe pushing the limit of this methodology. Anyway, there are lots of me-too prediction markets but this is something genuinely new under the sun. Maybe it will be awesome itself, but I’m also hoping it helps bigger players realize how much more is possible. This Week In Metaculus A few new questions on intelligence enhancement, eg: The question explicitly allows embryo selection, but says it must raise IQ ten points and be available for <25% median income to count. Trivial improvements to existing embryo selection will top out around 9 points, so this seems to be predicting something more interesting, maybe iterated embryo selection at the very least. I’m probably slightly bearish on this one; I believe if it existed someone would find a way to get it, but I think the regulatory climate might be able to prevent the relevant research indefinitely. Improving adult IQ is really hard. This is a bold thing to speculate about! Atmospheric CO2 was 300ish for most of pre-industrial history, 400ish now, and rising. This question predicts 600 in 2100, which sounds like what happens if global warming gets a bit worse but eventually stabilizes. I’m less sure. I think if we make it to 2100, we’ll have so much technology that atmospheric CO2 can be whatever we want it to be. But maybe we’ll want it to stay where it is; once there’s been a lot of global warming and people have moved / shifted lifestyles, it could be equally disruptive to cool the planet back down. Right now it’s 5%, the official government prediction is 10% by 2030, but this market says 17.6%. But look at that probability distribution! It’s a lot of people saying 10%ish, plus a very long tail of very big numbers. I think people are disagreeing about how exponential this change is going to be. Shorts Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.

Open Thread 212

February 21, 2022 · Original source

3: I’m running an experiment with letting conditional prediction markets decide which books I’ll review. I’ve opened a bunch of play money Manifold markets trying to predict how many “likes” I would get by reviewing Nixonland, Whither Socialism, Penelope’s Dream Of Twenty Geese, The Search For The Perfect Health System, something by Rene Girard, The Power Of The Powerless, or A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis. I don’t promise to definitely review whichever one gets the highest percent chance, but it will probably affect my decision. I realize there are many ways this could go wrong, which is why I’m describing it as an “experiment” - still, predict if you want!

Inline links: Nixonland, Whither Socialism, Penelope’s Dream Of Twenty Geese, The Search For The Perfect Health System, something by Rene Girard, The Power Of The Powerless, A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Play Money And Reputation Systems

February 21, 2022 · Original source

I used to be really skeptical here, but Metaculus and Manifold have softened my stance. So let’s look closer at how and whether these kinds of systems work.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

Manifold only rewards relative accuracy; you have to bet with some other specific person, and you only make money insofar as you’re better than them. All real-money prediction markets are also like this, and Manifold is straightforwardly imitating this straightforward design.

(Manifold solves the same problem by having market makers be a specific user who wants the market to exist, and making that person ante up money at a specific starting price to make that happen. This seems a lot more straightforward and frees them from the complicated consequences.)

Ukraine Warcasting

March 01, 2022 · Original source

— Will Russia control Kyiv on 4/2/22? 54% chance This is Manifold’s biggest Ukraine market right now. It’s very similar to the biggest Metaculus question, although the resolution criteria are different (Metaculus: 6/10 raions; Manifold: informal, whether Duncan says so). I don’t know if that fully explains the different probabilities: 69% chance on Metaculus vs. 54% chance on Manifold. In the past when Metaculus and Manifold disagreed I’ve eyeballed Metaculus as being more accurate, but few data points so far.

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/Duncan/will-russia-control-kyiv-as-of-apri

This is Manifold’s biggest Ukraine market right now. It’s very similar to the biggest Metaculus question, although the resolution criteria are different (Metaculus: 6/10 raions; Manifold: informal, whether Duncan says so). I don’t know if that fully explains the different probabilities: 69% chance on Metaculus vs. 54% chance on Manifold. In the past when Metaculus and Manifold disagreed I’ve eyeballed Metaculus as being more accurate, but few data points so far.

I would add that Manifold did worse than any of these; it was at 36% on 2/14, and barely made it to 50% before the actual invasion happened.

March 21, 2022 · Original source

The real dataset also has a “market” baseline that I didn’t include above. It’s mostly based off Manifold questions, but Manifold hadn’t really launched yet and most of them only had one or two bets and were wildly off everyone else’s guesses. I don’t think this is going to be a fair test of anything. Now that I know Sam and Eric are willing to put work into this, I’ll figure out something better for next year.

Inline links: mostly based off

Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets

March 28, 2022 · Original source

Austin, a co-founder of Manifold Markets (formerly Mantic Markets) asks the market what he’ll decide on this technical question. This does two things:

Niels Bohr supposedly said that “prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”. So why not predict the past and present instead? Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/ChrisVeenboer/did-taylor-hawkins-the-drummer-of-t

Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.

May 10, 2022 · Original source

The red line marks the Supreme Court leak. After a month of near-stability, Democrats’ chances went from 22% to 29%, before stabilizing around 26%. Markets on the Senate and on other sites like Polymarket tell a similar story. This is as far as we can go without using Manifold. Manifold questions have much less volume than PredictIt or Metaculus, and I have much less confidence in them, but for the record, here are a few: Disclaimer: I moved that one a bit myself, it was around 77% and I thought that was too high. Despite the fearmongering, this one looks about right to me. Disclaimer that Manifold probably can’t handle probabilities this small correctly and there’s no reason to think 0.2% is more realistic than 2%. It’s not 10% though. I couldn’t find some markets I wanted, so I’ve created them on Manifold for you to bet on: Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

Inline links: Polymarket, https://manifold.markets/fortenforge/did-the-dobbs-v-jackson-leak-come-f, https://manifold.markets/BrianAhuja/will-interracial-marriage-be-banned, Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

Disclaimer: I moved that one a bit myself, it was around 77% and I thought that was too high. Despite the fearmongering, this one looks about right to me. Disclaimer that Manifold probably can’t handle probabilities this small correctly and there’s no reason to think 0.2% is more realistic than 2%. It’s not 10% though. I couldn’t find some markets I wanted, so I’ve created them on Manifold for you to bet on: Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/BrianAhuja/will-interracial-marriage-be-banned, Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

Despite the fearmongering, this one looks about right to me. Disclaimer that Manifold probably can’t handle probabilities this small correctly and there’s no reason to think 0.2% is more realistic than 2%. It’s not 10% though. I couldn’t find some markets I wanted, so I’ve created them on Manifold for you to bet on: Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

Inline links: Will the Supreme Court leaker’s identity be known by 2023?

June 13, 2022 · Original source

3: Here’s presidential nominees on PredictIt ($13,000,000 in liquidity), Polymarket ($30,000), and Manifold ($M3170):

Inline links: PredictIt, Polymarket, Manifold

PredictIt looks good, Manifold looks okay, Polymarket seems to have a long tail of implausible vanity candidates stuck around the 10% level.

4: This is crazy and over-optimistic, right?

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/Austin/will-manifold-ever-be-worth-1b

August 16, 2022 · Original source

What’s the catch? Offer not open to US citizens - a vexing, problematic negation. And you need to have a Solana wallet, own crypto, and know how to use it. And there’s not a lot of volume so far. But otherwise, no catch. This is just a really good new thing. Think of it as Manifold Markets, but with real money (and 10x harder to use).

The community consensus so far seems to be to try to avoid Kalshi as long as it can. There are some good real-money prediction markets open to non-Americans: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, and Insight Prediction, although Americans will find visits prohibited nationally, and I would never recommend violating precepts negligently. You could also try play-money markets like Manifold, or market-adjacent forecasting sites like Metaculus.

Inline links: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, Insight Prediction, Manifold, Metaculus

Finally, there’s a claim that Aristotle, the for-profit company involved with PredictIt, might try to move into the fully-regulated-prediction-market space and compete with Kalshi. I’m posting this as an encouragement for you to click on it and bet, not as a final word about the probability - there are only four bets so far! This might actually be a good move; Kalshi had to spend lots of blood and sweat and money getting the CFTC to approve a prediction market, but now that there’s a precedent it’ll be easier for the next entrant. And the Kalshi-haters might support a competitor out of pure spite. This would be almost unfair: Kalshi would have done all the hard work, get forced into unethical business practices to make back the money it sacrificed, and then someone else could free-ride with a spotless reputation.

Inline links: a claim that, https://manifold.markets/ahalekelly/will-predictits-cftc-application-to

October 18, 2022 · Original source

The Manifold Markets team, along with Nuno Sempere, Linch Zhang, Ozzie Gooen, and other rationalist/EA forecasters.

Inline links: The Manifold Markets team

First of all, thanks to the Substack team for making Manifold Markets embed easily in Substack! Taking advantage of their hard work:

Sources: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen The lowest forecaster is higher than the highest pollster! Taking 538 as an example, forecasters range from 5 pp higher (Manifold) to 17 pp higher (PredictIt). Tournaments and real-money markets tend to give higher numbers than play-money sites. I would go with 47% on this one, based on the convergence between GJO, CSPI, and Polymarket. CFTC vs. PredictIt (and everyone else), Part II The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the US agency regulating prediction markets. In August, they told PredictIt (the biggest political prediction market) to shut down, effective in February. Now a motley group of stakeholders are suing the CFTC for a stay of execution. Plaintiffs include: 2 professors using the site as “a source of data for research”

Inline links: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen, they told PredictIt

Open Thread 248

October 30, 2022 · Original source

1: Polymarket, Manifold, and PredictIt now have shiny interfaces for predicting the upcoming US midterm elections. In terms of the Republicans taking the Senate, Polymarket is at 65%, Manifold at 58%, PredictIt at 73%, and 538 at 49%.

Inline links: Polymarket, Manifold, PredictIt, 538

Mantic Monday: Twitter Chaos Edition

November 04, 2022 · Original source

33: SD’s Neutrino Research (5/10) SD says his neutrino thesis is going well, and he is applying for graduate programs in neutrino physics. 34: User-Created Prediction Markets (9/10) Manifold Markets wanted to create a new prediction market platform where anyone could post questions. They’ve since pivoted to play money and raised $2.4 million in grants and seed funding, with about 10,000 different markets and 300 daily average users. I and many of my friends visit their site daily or at least weekly, and I often link them on Mantic Mondays. They have deals going with the Salem Center at University of Texas, Clearer Thinking, and various EA groups.

Inline links: Manifold Markets

30: Writing Forecasting Questions For EA Organizations (6/10) Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.

November 21, 2022 · Original source

Mike writes: The reason I didn’t just do a three-way comparison between PredictIt, FiveThirtyEight, and Manifold Markets is that the Manifold Markets forecasts included fewer questions than the PredictIt and FiveThirtyEight forecasts. So in order to do a fair comparison here, I’ll be comparing the smaller subset of questions for which PredictIt and Manifold Markets both gave a forecast. So it looks like both Manifold and 538 did better than PredictIt, and there’s no clear way to tell which of the former did better. (except I guess you could do this analysis with just the subset of questions Manifold and 538 share, but Mike didn’t and I’m also not going to). PredictIt has a pretty consistent Republican bias (it’s a minor epistemic sin to accuse a prediction market of having a predictable bias unless you’ve made money exploiting it, I made $600 this election so I’ll let myself pass). In years when Republicans do better than expected, it will probably look better than other markets; in years when they do worse, it will look worse. Still, this is a bias, so I think we should take them doing worse this year as a fair reflection of their accuracy, even thought next year it could go the other way. My main two takeaways here are: PredictIt isn’t yet good enough that the ideal theorems showing prediction markets should be unbiased and better than everyone else apply to it. The obvious explanation is its $800-per-question cap. Polymarket doesn’t have that cap and it did better, although Mike hasn’t done a formal comparison to 538.

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vBga!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2b35fbd9-ee89-4f4f-b8b9-832742e483fd_881x289.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h6tt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9355d197-997a-4c48-93c0-76abc23f2c12_881x287.png

This is all going to be so, so obsolete by the time I finish writing it and hit the “send post” button. But here goes: 395 traders on this, so one of Manifold’s biggest markets, probably representative. The small print defines a major outage as one that lasts more than an hour. See here for a good explanation of why some people expect Twitter outages.

Inline links: See here

395 traders on this, so one of Manifold’s biggest markets, probably representative. The small print defines a major outage as one that lasts more than an hour. See here for a good explanation of why some people expect Twitter outages.

Inline links: See here

2023 Prediction Contest

December 16, 2022 · Original source

Each winter, I make predictions about the year to come. The past few years, this has outgrown my blog, with other people including Zvi and Manifold (plus Sam and Eric’s contest version).

Inline links: Zvi, Manifold, contest version

This year I’m making it official, with a 50-question 2023 Prediction Benchmark Question Set. I hope that this can be used as a common standard to compare different forecasters and forecasting site (Manifold and Metaculus have already agreed to use it, and I’m hoping to get others). Also, I’d like to do an ACX Survey later this month, and this will let me try to correlate personality traits with forecasting accuracy.

Thanks to people from Metaculus, Manifold, and the EA forecasting community for helping with questions and plans.

Prediction Market FAQ

December 20, 2022 · Original source

when you’re not sure which of many competing experts to trust, you should trust a prediction market instead of any of them Going through these claims one by one: 3.1: Why expect all prediction markets to agree with each other? Either all prediction markets agree with each other, or you can get rich quick: Suppose prediction markets disagreed. For example, suppose the RNC ran an Official Republican Prediction Market that said there was only a 10% chance Democrats would win the next election, and a 90% chance Republicans would. And suppose the DNC ran an Official Democrat Prediction Market that made the opposite prediction: 90% chance Democrats, 10% chance Republicans. Then you could buy a share of “Democrats will win” from the Republican market for 10 cents, plus a share of “Republicans will win” from the Democrat market for 10 cents, and be guaranteed to make $1 when one party or the other wins. You have turned 20 cents into a guaranteed $1. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This is just what financial experts call “arbitrage”. You may notice that in finance, people always give specific prices for things like shares of stock, barrels of oil, or Bitcoins. People say things like “Google stock is up to $300”, but never “Google stock is up to $300 on the NYSE, but down to $200 on NASDAQ”. If that was true, people would buy it on NASDAQ, sell it on NYSE, make $100 in free money, and get rich quick. In ideal situations, arbitrage forces everybody everywhere to agree on the same price for a financial instrument. Prediction markets turn claims about truth into financial instruments in a way which forces everybody everywhere to agree on how likely the claim is to be true. 3.2: Why expect prediction markets to be hard for special interests to manipulate? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt, or you can get rich quick. Argument: Suppose a prediction market was currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt. For example, suppose there is a prediction market for whether the sun will rise tomorrow. The true probability is obviously 100%, corresponding to a cost of $1.00. But suppose some special interest who wanted to trick people into believing the sun would not rise successfully spent money to bid the market down to only 10%. This means that you can buy, for $0.10, a share which pays $1 if the sun rises tomorrow. In other words, you can dectuple your money for free. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This may sound complicated in theory, but it plays out straightforwardly in real life. As a test, I tried to manipulate the market on whether Austin Chen, founder of Manifold Markets, would be charged with a felony. There’s no reason to think he should be, so the price started at 5%. I spent $200 in Manifold’s play money bidding it up to 95%. Within an hour, other investors noticed the mispricing and corrected it back down to 5% again. 3.3: Why expect prediction markets to be free from bias? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of bias, or you can get rich quick. The argument: Suppose all smart people, including you, know that there is an 80% chance that the Democrats’ economic plan will create new jobs. But suppose that Republicans, because of their partisan biases, refuse to believe it, and say there is only a 40% chance. And suppose the Republicans set up their own prediction market where they bid the price of a share down to $0.40. You can, of course, go on this prediction market, buy shares for $0.40, and double your money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I already described how something like this happens on PredictIt (a non-ideal prediction market that you can only make a few hundred dollars in expectation by correcting), and that I do in fact make a few hundred dollars every election season. 3.4: Why should I believe a prediction market’s consensus over my own opinion? This is the same argument as “the prediction market will always be at least as accurate as the top expert” only with you in the place of the top expert. Either prediction markets are at least as smart as you are, or you can get rich quick. The argument here is the same as “at least as smart as the smartest expert” argument in 2, except replacing “the smartest expert” with “you”. But just to lay it out explicitly: Suppose you were smarter than some prediction market. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I like this because it’s a good empirical test, and one that many people have tried. If you think you’re smarter than the prediction markets, bet on them and see what happens! I think most people will find that (over the long run) they lose money, and eventually this will cure them of their delusion that they can beat the markets. A few people might find that (over the long run) they do win money, just as a few people (eg Warren Buffett) can consistently win money on the stock market. Hopefully those people will quit their day jobs and become full-time prediction market traders. They’ll become multimillionaires, and their hard work will ensure that prediction markets stay more accurate than the rest of us. 3.5: Why should I believe that a prediction market makes good decisions about which of many competing experts to trust? Suppose you accept that a prediction market will always be at least as accurate as some well-known expert (eg Nate Silver). But what if you’re not sure who the real experts are? Or what if there are many experts, all saying different things, and nobody knows who to trust? In this case, a prediction market will always be at least as good as any other source (including you) at telling good experts from bad, or at figuring out which of many good experts is the best. By this point you should be able to predict the argument, but for completeness’ sake: Suppose you were better than the prediction market at determining which of many competing experts to trust, or how to aggregate the pronouncements of many experts into a single authoritative opinion. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. To ground this in a real example, suppose there is some new virus which might or might not spread to the United States. A Harvard professor of epidemiology says there’s a 70% chance it will spread, a Yale professor of epidemiology says there’s an 90% chance it will spread, and a guy in a tinfoil hat on Infowars says there’s a 0% chance it will spread because it’s all a fake government plot. If I knew nothing else about this situation, I would probably think there’s about an 80% chance the virus will spread. I trust the Harvard and Yale professors equally much, and the tinfoil hat guy not at all. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 10%, because most people trusted the tinfoil hat guy. I would want to buy YES shares until the price got up to 80%, because in expectation I would octuple my money. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 70%. Now I wouldn’t be sure whether the prediction market was dumber than me (believed tinfoil hat guy) or smarter than me (they know a lot about epidemiology - or about the credibility of specific experts - and have decided to trust the Harvard professor over the Yale professor). Maybe I could improve on this. If I knew things about epidemiology, I could read over both professors’ arguments and try to figure out if one was better than the other. If I knew things about academia, I could pick over both professors’ resumes and see whether the Harvard professor seemed more distinguished or had more respect in her own field than the Yale professor. In the end, I might decide the prediction market was right to price it at 70% (in which case I wouldn’t do anything), or that actually both experts seemed equally expert (in which case I might bid it up to 80%), or that actually the Yale epidemiologist was better (in which case I might bid it up to 90%). 3.5.1: Isn’t it weird to give non-experts (like prediction market investors) the final judgment in which of two experts is right? Yes, but I don’t think this is avoidable. If there were no such thing as prediction markets, and the Harvard epidemiologist said 70%, and the Yale epidemiologist said 90%, and the tinfoil hat guy said 0%, and for some reason it mattered a lot to you which of these was true - then you would still have to make that decision. If there’s some extremely authoritative source who can make the decision for you - let’s say the World Health Organization says “after reviewing all experts’ arguments, we believe that the final probability is 75%” - then great! Either: The WHO is clearly the most trustworthy source - in which case we go back to the Nate Silver situation where the prediction market should be just as accurate as it is.

Operate using play-money only. Here Manifold is the leader. You could also think of superforecasting tournaments like Metaculus as a version of this. I claim that the main reason prediction markets haven’t fulfilled their potential and become a major pillar of worldwide decision-making is that none of these solutions are really adequate. For whatever reason, most people interested in prediction markets are American, so Polymarket has a limited userbase. The regulators are pretty harsh, so the companies that strike deals to get exemptions usually have to trade away most of their functionality. Kalshi can only ask a few specific regulator-approved questions; the limits are so harsh that they’re not even allowed to predict elections. Play-money prediction markets like Manifold are a lot of fun, but there’s a limit to how much work people will do to earn play money. I want a world where the people who are best at correcting mispricings in prediction markets can make full-time jobs out of it, and where there are prediction market equivalents of Goldman Sachs where hundreds of brilliant people work together with cut-throat efficiency to find mispricings the moment they appear. Play money won’t get us there. Real money prediction markets tend to have between four- and six-digit (very occasionally seven-digit) volumes on most questions. Play money prediction markets have between one- and four-digit numbers of traders on most questions. Most big prediction markets are usually within 10% of each other and the best outside experts, but not always within 1%. Traditional financial markets are usually within 1% of each other, so I think this is because the prediction markets are still too small to have sub-1% accuracy. I hope that as they grow bigger they can reach this milestone. 7. What can I do to help promote prediction markets? If you’re an ordinary person with no special expertise or skills, I think the best thing you can do is create a Manifold Markets account, bet on topics that are interesting to you, and create markets for any interesting topics that don’t have one yet. I think this could be helpful for a few reasons: It’s hard to really understand prediction markets until you’ve played a few yourself.

Inline links: Manifold, Metaculus

Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al. Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected. By "unified" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of "introspection" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.) Resolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public. Even this isn’t perfect (which models are “the equivalent of” a 1:8 scale Ferrari 312?), but in practice once you get to this level of details people mostly stop worrying about this. Another method (mostly associated with Manifold) is to just leave it up to human judgment - specifically, the judgment of the person who made the market. For example, I could make a market in “By 2050, will there be an AI which Scott Alexander thinks qualifies as ‘human-level’?” This will force market participants to price in the risk that I have bad judgment or act dishonestly. But perhaps these risks are small. For example, I might say elsewhere what I think qualifies as “human-level” AI, or you might think human-level AI will be so obvious when it comes that I will definitely agree with you about it. As for honesty, this could be enforced either legally or by reputation. Someone who has resolved their past 100 prediction markets honestly will probably resolve this one honestly too, especially if they get paid to do so and will never get customers again if they lie. When we invest on the normal stock market, we trust that our brokers / the NYSE / etc won’t run off with our money, and this trust is usually well-deserved. Even when we make an online purchase, we trust that the store we’re sending our money to won’t steal it and refuse to send us the product. It would be an exaggeration to say that trust is a solved problem, but evidence from Manifold suggests that most people price in a <1% chance that well-known market makers with good reputation resolve dishonestly. If prediction markets got big enough, they could spawn trusted “resolution companies” who individual markets and market-makers could outsource their resolution to, for a fee. If these companies were ever dishonest, they would lose all their business from then on, so they would probably be as honest as other businesses like your broker / the NYSE / various online stores / etc. 4.7.1: Isn’t a lot of the “crisis of trust” around questions that might never have clear future answers? For example, consider the debate around whether Donald Trump is a Russian agent. Maybe no proof will ever come out either way. Or maybe some evidence will appear that seems to prove one side or the other, but people will continue to deny it for political reasons, and the problem of resolving the prediction market will be just as hard as the problem of answering the original question. Indeed, prediction markets aren’t very good at this, and are only fully trustworthy on questions where the true answer will eventually become apparent. Still, they might not be completely useless. For example, if you’re worried about Trump being a Russian agent because you expect him to pursue pro-Russia policies, you can start markets in whether he pursues those policies. Or you can start a conditional market (see 5.1) on whether, if Russia ever releases its past intelligence data many years from now, the data confirm/disconfirm that Trump was an agent. See Part 5 for other clever ways you might try to address this problem. 4.8: “Meme stocks” like Gamestop and AMC sometimes remain mispriced indefinitely. How do we know this won’t happen with prediction markets? Meme stocks are a type of Ponzi. It’s “reasonable” to buy Gamestop at some inflated price, because - who knows? - someone else might buy it at an even more inflated price tomorrow. And this can keep going arbitrarily long, or at least long enough for you to get out with a profit. Unlike meme stocks, prediction markets have a clear resolution date. If you’re predicting who will win the next election, the market will go to 100% or 0% after the election finishes. No matter how many memes there were, you wouldn’t buy a share in “the Democrats will win the election” for 99% the day before Election Day if you knew they would definitely lose. But that means prediction markets should be accurately priced the day before Election Day, which means you shouldn’t buy at an inaccurate price two days before Election Day, and so on. I can’t say for sure that no prediction market will ever get mispriced for meme reasons, but they should be much more robust against meme mispricings than the stock market. And even the stock market doesn’t have too many meme stocks. 4.9: How do prediction markets deal with outcomes in the far future? Suppose there is a question “who will win the 2100 election?” Currently it says 25% Democrats, 75% Republicans, and I believe it should be 50-50 (we’ll ignore third parties, or the possibility of America not existing in 2100, for now). So if I bet on the market, I can (in expectation) double my money. But there are many better ways to double your money by 2100. For example, if the stock market grows 4% per year, I should expect any money invested in the stock market to multiply by 20x in 2100. So just doubling it in a prediction market is a bad option. Realistically, this means prediction markets won’t work well for far-future events. These might be a better match for forecaster tournaments or some other structure, where we get the forecaster track records through present events, then use those track records weighting their far-future predictions (see also 5.5). There are already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events. But if you really wanted to use a prediction market, you could theoretically solve this by putting investors’ money in index funds while they waited. Then the winner would get their (and the losers’) original deposits and investment profits, and it would go back to being a better option than investing in index funds directly. In practice this seems complicated and I wouldn’t expect it to work. 4.9.1: What about predicting things that would make it impossible or pointless to win money, like human extinction? Again, these questions probably aren’t great matches for prediction markets, and you should use forecasting tournaments or some other method (see also 5.5). If you really wanted, you might be able to make it work in theory through a mechanism sort of like this one. 5. What are some clever uses for prediction markets? Here’s a non-exhaustive list: 5.1: Conditional prediction markets / decision markets Suppose the government is trying to decide whether to throw its weight behind Vaccine A or Vaccine B for some deadly disease. There are some experts behind both, both sets of experts accuse the other of being in the pay of pharmaceutical companies, and decision-makers don’t know who to trust. They might make two prediction markets, like: If we decide to go with Vaccine A, will at least X people die from the disease?

Inline links: Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al, already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events, this one

January 24, 2023 · Original source

But Sam and Eric object that prediction markets were also handicapped this year - most of the markets they took their numbers from were very small Manifold markets with only a single-digit number of participants, just a few months after Manifold started existing at all. They say the most likely reason prediction markets did so well was because only the most knowledgeable people will bet on a certain question, whereas our contest encouraged everyone to predict each question (technically you could opt out, but most people didn’t). Plausibly this coming year, when we have multiple big prediction markets for each question, the markets will totally blow away all other participants.

Or maybe the prediction market results will hold. One market (Manifold) and another market-like site (Metaculus) are joining the contest this year. If they do as well as last year, they’ll beat all but 15 of the 3500 entries. If things go very well, maybe we’ll discover new ways of aggregating their results that can beat every individual predictor, at least most of the time.

Open Thread 262

February 06, 2023 · Original source

1: Thanks to everyone who entered the Prediction Contest; entry is now closed. You can continue to make predictions on Manifold or Metaculus, but they won’t officially count. Also, another prediction market, Futuur, has markets up for the contest questions. I’m pretty excited about this, because although Futuur does let you use play money like Manifold, it also offers real money betting (warning: requires crypto and a non-US IP). If you want to make real money bets on contest questions, now you can (and I’ll be seeing how they compare to the play money markets).

Inline links: Futuur, has markets up for the contest questions

7: And you can bet on both Lars’ and my predictions about the chatbot propaganda apocalypse on Manifold. For example:

Inline links: Lars’, my

February 14, 2023 · Original source

In honor of Valentine’s Day, this installment of Mantic Monday will focus on attempted clever engineering solutions to romance. We’ll start with the usual prediction markets, then move on to other types of algorithmic and financial schemes. Normal content will resume next time around. Date Recommendation Markets Aella is a Internet celebrity known for her interest in various disgusting crimes against nature, ie podcasts and video streams. Unrelatedly, she also studies fetishes. She’s been looking for a partner for a few years. Most recently, she created this prediction market. The way it works:

Presumably Aella will seriously look into the top few candidates, and try asking them out. Why is this good? Consider Aella’s perspective: she can log off for a few weeks, then check back and see a ranked list of who the Internet thinks she’s most compatible with. It’s kind of like asking your friends for dating recommendations, except with better incentives on your friends’ part to predict exactly how likely you are to get along with each candidate. The current leading candidate (in blue) is Steven Bonnell aka Destiny, a famous streamer. I don’t know if he is actually especially compatible with Aella, or if he just has a lot of fans on Manifold who like him and are rooting for him to date someone, or who think it would be funny to add his name in. It wouldn’t surprise me if this worked for Aella; she’s famous and probably dates other famous people; enough people know her and her potential partners that it’s worth crowdsourcing recommendations. What about the rest of us? I was able to find one non-famous person who made a market like this, apparently with good effect, but they seemed awkward enough about it that I’m not going to link it here or provide more details. Non-famous people realistically have easier ways to ask their friends, but I still think this provides value. Sadly, Porn talked about the “omniscient authority” - asking someone on a date is so scary that people want to pretend their normal human psychological needs had no input into the decision - “It’s … not like I … like you or anything, baka! I’m just doing this because I - a pure abstract intelligence who is not horny for you in any way - was informed by friends/matchmakers/our OKCupid match percentage/’the algorithm’/a dream, that asking you on a date was my duty, which I now dispassionately fulfilling.” A prediction market would make a great omniscient authority here. Also, consider the implications for romance stories. I’ve only thought about this for five minutes, so I definitely haven’t exhausted the space, but I imagine: Someone does some kind of complicated financial fraud to manipulate a prediction market into telling their crush to date them. Think Wolf Of Wall Street, but a rom-com.

And how come none of them will let you write a decent profile? Is this like the thing where I imagine that what people want out of a socialization space is a quiet comfortable area where they can hold audible conversations, but what they actually want is somewhere extremely dark with very loud music where everybody is drunk, in the hopes that this puts them into some kind of weird trance state where they can do social actions they would otherwise never contemplate? Are dating sites unusable because everyone wants to be confused into a trance state where they can imagine they aren’t sending scary self-revelatory messages to total strangers? This Week In The Markets See the resolution criteria for definition of “cold approach” and some basic facts about the person involved (who seems a bit more desirable than average). This looks like the market’s generic opinion on how many cold approaches you need if you are a bit-more-desirable-than-average guy

23: Room Temperature Superforecaster

February 24, 2023 · Original source

I still dream of running an ACX Grants round using impact certificates, but I want to run a lower-stakes test of the technology first. In conjunction with the Manifold Markets team, we’re announcing the Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants, a $20,000 grants round for forecasting projects.

A: This is Astral Codex Ten, a blog about various science / technology / philosophy / politics issues, which sometimes does grants rounds and projects like this one. I think I have a good reputation of paying for things I say I am going to pay for, see for example last year’s ACX Grants. Manifold Markets is a company that runs a prediction market website and is generally interested in unusual market structures solving social problems. We’re co-sponsoring this impact market in order to test impact markets as a charitable funding mechanism.

Inline links: ACX Grants, Manifold Markets

Go to Manifold’s impact market site, Manifund, who have kindly agreed to handle the technology side of this.

Inline links: Manifund

Open Thread 270

April 03, 2023 · Original source

4: Last month I teamed up with Manifold to run an impact market on forecasting grants. Now Manifold is using their impact market infrastructure, Manifund, to start a market in prizes on Open Philanthropy’s AI-related essay contest. The idea is - you write an essay and submit it in hopes of winning (let’s say) the $50,000 first prize. Then you sell the right to the prize on the impact market - for example if you think you’re 10% likely to win (so your essay is worth $5,000) and someone else thinks you’re 20% likely to win (so your essay is worth $10,000), then you could sell the rights to the prize money to them for $7,500 (it’s a bit more complicated than that, but you get the idea). I’m not directly involved in this one, but I trust Manifold a lot and this should help them develop their impact market work further. Yes, you still have to be an accredited investor to buy certificates (though not to sell your essay!). Go here for more information. I guess this doubles as an announcement that there’s an AI-related essay contest with a first prize of $50,000. Entries are due May 31 - no, they won’t find it funny if you use GPT.

Inline links: Open Philanthropy’s AI-related essay contest

April 25, 2023 · Original source

Nikos Bosse compares Metaculus’ performance to its “competitor” Manifold Markets, and finds that overall Metaculus was more accurate:

Inline links: compares Metaculus’ performance to its “competitor” Manifold Markets

The mean Brier score was 0.084 for Metaculus and 0.107 for Manifold. This difference was significant using a paired test. Metaculus was ahead of Manifold on 75% of the questions (48 out of 64).

Does this mean that forecasting tournaments are better than prediction markets? Some past studies have provided very tentative evidence in that direction, but this one probably doesn’t - many more people use Metaculus than Manifold, and Nikos didn’t control for number of forecasters.

May 23, 2023 · Original source

Manifold is a play money prediction market. Its intended purpose is to have fun and estimate the probabilities of important events. But instead of betting on important events, you might choose to speculate on trivialities. And instead of having fun, you might choose to ruin your life.

From the beginning, there were joke markets like “Will at least 100 people bet on this market?” or “Will this market’s probability end in an even number?” While serious people worked on increasingly sophisticated estimation mechanisms for world events, pranksters worked on increasingly convoluted jokes. In early April, power user Is. started “Whales Vs. Minnows”: Will traders hold at least 10000x as many YES shares as there are traders holding NO shares? In other words, Team Whale had to sink lots of mana (play money) into the market, and Team Minnow had to get lots of people to participate.

Inline links: Will traders hold at least 10000x as many YES shares as there are traders holding NO shares?

Team Minnow started cheating first. They rounded up their friends and asked them to register Manifold accounts and join the market. This might have been semi-fair to start, but then they started paying people, in real money, to do it. Team Whale - mostly Is. - figured out some cheats of their own, which you can read about here.

Inline links: here

Links For July 2023

July 06, 2023 · Original source

Manifold market on changing Harvard demographics, for context the most recent Harvard class is 29.9% Asian (see also % black here):

Inline links: % black

DeepMind founder Mustafa Suleyman and others announce that their new company, InflectionAI, exists and has raised $1 billion in funding. Still, Manifold classes it as only a minor contender:

Inline links: InflectionAI

August 01, 2023 · Original source

Jacob Cohen describes himself as the president of his school’s forecasting club. I think we’re going to be all right. Manifest 2023 Manifold Markets is sponsoring Manifest, an “inaugural forecasting & prediction market conference”, to be held at the Rose Garden Inn, Berkeley, California the weekend of September 22. Their website is short on details, but listed speakers and guests of honor are: …now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

Inline links: Jacob Cohen, Manifest, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!owXd!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F11594b53-e8df-4064-aacf-af4890ac0fe6_1503x615.png, https://polymarket.com/event/is-the-room-temp-superconductor-real, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/, Paul Graham, source, this thread, Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yIPJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc81ce0d2-e9c7-41b9-be38-0182d21f0381_1024x682.jpeg, the exact text of the 1989 prediction

…now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

Inline links: https://polymarket.com/event/is-the-room-temp-superconductor-real, https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/, Paul Graham, source, this thread, Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yIPJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc81ce0d2-e9c7-41b9-be38-0182d21f0381_1024x682.jpeg, the exact text of the 1989 prediction

Sinclair Chen. Sinclair works at Manifold; she can be spotted at most Bay Area ACX meetups. I didn’t realize the degree to which she goes hard: “CFTC, if you are reading this, know that there is blood on your hands.” This is not exactly the message I would have written. But I think, as the Catholics like to say, that it comes from a vice which is the excess or perversion of a divine virtue, and I appreciate her for being the sort of person who’s like this, sort of.

Inline links: Sinclair Chen

Links For August 2023

August 09, 2023 · Original source

33: Claim: phase transition in Cu2S impurity fully explains superconductor-like properties of supposed “room temperature superconductor” LK-99 (paper, Twitter discussion). Prediction markets on Manifold and Polymarket are down from high-30s% last week to ~10% now.

Inline links: paper, Twitter discussion, Manifold, Polymarket

August 28, 2023 · Original source

Sorry guys, LK-99 doesn’t work. The prediction markets have dropped from highs in the 40s down to 5 - 10. It’s over. What does this tell us about prediction markets? Were they dumb to ever believe at all? Or were they aggregating the evidence effectively, only to update after new evidence came in?

Inline links: LK-99 doesn’t work

First, the simplest proof that something was predictable is to have predicted it. Since I know you’ll ask, yes, I bet on the markets at the time - 10,000 mana on Manifold and $100 on Kalshi - and made a nice profit. I would have bet more on Kalshi but it took too long to load the money onto my account.

Second, on Manifold, the biggest NO bets were superforecasters, people on the leaderboards, and rationalist celebrities; the biggest YES bets were randos with none of those qualifications.

Impact Market Mini-Grants Results

October 09, 2023 · Original source

Last March we (ACX and Manifold Markets) did a test run of an impact market, a novel way of running charitable grants. You can read the details at the links, but it’s basically a VC ecosystem for charity: profit-seeking investors fund promising projects and grantmakers buy credit for successes from the investors. To test it out, we promised at least $20,000 in retroactive grants for forecasting-related projects, and intrepid guinea-pig investors funded 18 projects they thought we might want to buy.

Inline links: Manifold Markets, a test run, impact market, 18 projects

Enjoy the public goods we’ve produced. The Crystal Ballin’ Podcast has one episode and is hoping to make more (as are their competitors, the Market Manipulation Podcast). OPTIC is looking for participants and volunteers. You can still use Manifolio to make Kelly bets, the Telegram bot for Telegram-based prediction markets, and the browser extension to see what Manifold markets people are betting on. And although it’s not technically one of ours, I still like The Base Rate Times.

Inline links: Crystal Ballin’ Podcast, Market Manipulation Podcast, OPTIC, Manifolio, Telegram bot, browser extension, The Base Rate Times

Over the past six months, founders have worked on their projects. Some collapsed, losing their investors all their money. Others flourished, shooting up in value far beyond investor predictions. We got five judges (including me) to assess the final value of each of the 18 projects. Their results mostly determine what I will be offering investors for their impact certificates (see caveats below). They are: We’ll be buying back impact certs at the value on the MEDIAN column - so, for example, we’ll pay $300 for 100% of the certs for the Crystal Ballin’ Podcast.

October 31, 2023 · Original source

Hanson is less sure about this answer than the overall story, but he suggests hiring. You could create some kind of product that companies could buy and give their hiring managers at the beginning of a hiring round, asking them to predict which candidates would get good employee evaluation results or promotions at the end of X amount of time. Even if you’re Manifold or Metaculus or someone who already has a good prediction engine, making this product requires a lot of adaptations. Who should be part of the market? What training should you give them beforehand? What should the resolution criteria be? Hanson thinks that the process of designing this product, answering customer questions about it, and iterating before you sell to the next customer is the kind of last-mile problem whose solution will make prediction markets ready for the big time.

But also, the media is a dignified, official institution, and it prefers interacting with other dignified, official institutions. It likes being able to say “a professor from Harvard said X”, and not “this guy who does really well betting on Manifold says X”. He talked about wanting to quote a superforecaster from Samotsvety Forecasts, a leading prediction group, but expected his editors to ask why these people with the weird Russian name were relevant or trustworthy. It’s easier to cite someone who is “a fellow at the Forecasting Research Institute”, which has the same kind of official ring as “a professor at Harvard”.

Inline links: Samotsvety Forecasts

And many more.

Inline links: many more

December 05, 2023 · Original source

Source: Older version of this market. People joked about this graph showing how crazy the OpenAI situation was. The situation might have been crazy, but that’s not the lesson of this graph. The lesson is: it’s hard to design prediction markets for “why” questions.

Inline links: this market

At some point the market cleared up - I don’t know if this was an intervention or people just converged on a few answers. Now it looks like this:

Inline links: Now it looks like this

Here are some other (attempted) OpenAI related markets: I appreciate how this started in September, shows Altman’s sudden-firing, the first plan to unfire him, the falling apart of the first plan to unfire, and then the second, successful plan to unfire him.

Links For January 2024

January 18, 2024 · Original source

35: Prediction site Manifold Markets is running a $30,000 Community Fund based on impact certificates. If you want to make something cool for the Manifold community, you can run an impact funding round, and then they’ll pay you out of the $30,000 if it’s good.

Inline links: $30,000 Community Fund

19: If Manifold is too social for you, there’s also Fatebook, a site where you can record your personal predictions and auto-judge calibration/accuracy/etc. For example, Predict Your Year here. Also available for Discord/Slack.

Inline links: Fatebook, Predict Your Year here

January 30, 2024 · Original source

I would also add that I joined a different forecasting site, Manifold Markets back in August, and in 3 months have turned the 500 starting ‘Mana’ you get when you sign up into 8500 mana, and have specifically made a point to not do any research and just buy/sell based on intuition. Again, not sure what to conclude here, but it seems very possible that these sites are just full of people who are terrible at predicting things, such that it’s easy to do quite well by just being half-decent.

I also find it encouraging that the play-money prediction market site Manifold comes pretty close and beats all the real-money sites. Nate Silver is only one person, he has only one area of expertise, and you can’t hire him to predict random things for you (unless you’re rich and he’s bored). If Manifold can apply only-slightly-sub-Nate-Silver levels of analysis at scale to arbitrary topics, that’s a big deal.

…Metaculus and PredictIt are 50-50, Manifold favors Biden, and Polymarket favors Trump. Shouldn’t really be possible, should it?

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/jack/who-will-win-2024-us-presidential-e, https://polymarket.com/event/presidential-election-winner-2024?tid=1706346316664

February 20, 2024 · Original source

Manifold has lots of bots. There’s a Silicon League entirely for bots. Lots of bots make lots of money:

Most of these bots are boring. They’re bots programmed to automatically buy some market once the price gets low enough, or to arbitrage basically-identical markets, or do some other technical finance maneuver. But you could imagine more interesting bots. Ones that forecasts the same way humans forecast. You could imagine a bot based on ChatGPT that asks “What is the probability of a cease-fire in Ukraine this year?” and bets on ChatGPT’s answer. And by “you could imagine” I mean “there’s now a Humans Vs. Bots tournament on Manifold with an ℳ250,000 prize” Let’s see how they’re doing: All of these bots seem to be making small profits, with GPT in the lead. But what’s this? The Nermit bot is based on FutureSearch.ai, a new company trying to build an AI-based forecaster. Based on their own internal calculations, they claim success: But see foonote 1 How is this1 possible? Some studies of superforecasters converge on the same technique: figure out a base rate for some event, then alter it based on the current situation. For example, if you wanted to know the chance of a cease-fire in Ukraine over the next year, you might start by plotting the distribution of war lengths over the past century, then check how many wars that had lasted at least two years had a cease-fire in the third. Then you might adjust a little bit down for factors like “there haven’t been any promising peace talks yet” and “the two sides seem equally balanced”. FutureSearch’s AI tries to do something similar. It prompts itself with questions like “What would be a good reference class for this question?”

Inline links: Humans Vs. Bots tournament, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!r04t!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd8006d5d-af52-4870-90a7-c63a84497670_827x110.webp, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WvxC!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5db0765c-69c6-4362-ada4-9a7210701bff_962x510.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DOia!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F516f9622-aa25-45d2-958a-077c6840d65f_947x505.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kcLW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F21afa244-9cfb-4714-841d-c963d5d2e125_955x517.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!V4Vp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b9dd4ab-0fa2-4421-984b-07c66a220080_958x529.png, FutureSearch.ai, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MjV7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc584dabc-477f-4096-a3f1-c4a929b6cded_411x372.png, 1

This was a Manifold promotional event for Valentine’s Day, taking the form of a “prediction market dating show” where six contestants competed to win a date with local celebrity Aella. It was not what I was expecting.

Who Predicted 2023?

March 05, 2024 · Original source

Manifold Markets: Manifold, a popular play money prediction market site, kindly agreed to open markets into our fifty questions so we could compare them to participants. The markets got between 80 and 1500 participants, average around 150. Their forecast, had it been a contestant, would have placed in the 89th percentile. This would be good for an individual, but it’s surprisingly bad for an aggregation method - in fact, it’s worse than taking the median of a randomly selected group of 150 participants! The market mechanism seems to be subtracting value! Someone might want to double-check this.

Inline links: Manifold Markets

I began by collecting data from Manifold Markets for these questions. I then compared those forecasts to the forecasts of superforecasters in the blind data, subset to those who had given forecasts on the S&P500 and Bitcoin questions that were reasonably consistent with the efficiency of markets; I subset to those who forecasted between 30% and 80% for the probability that the S&P500 and Bitcoin would increase during 2023, which were the only reasonable predictions by the time blind mode ended in mid-January. I then used my own judgment to tweak forecasts where I strongly disagreed with the prediction markets and the superforecasters (for example, I was more than 15 percentage points away from the average of Manifold Markets and the efficient-market-believing superforecasters on questions 17, 19, 21, 30, 34, and 50). I paid especially close attention to questions where late-breaking news made the superforecasters' forecasts less relevant (and I downweighted their forecasts on those questions accordingly).

Participant aggregate: This is the “wisdom of crowds” one. If you average the guess of every participant (eg if someone says 80% chance Biden leads, and another says 90% chance, then you go with 85%), you usually do better than the vast majority of individuals. In this case, the aggregate was 95th percentile, beating out superforecasters and Manifold.

March 12, 2024 · Original source

Then they fine-tune the whole system on forecasting questions from prediction sites (eg Metaculus, Manifold) that ended between mid-2023 and today. Why mid-2023? Because the AI was trained in mid-2023 and only knows what happened before then, and they can artificially limit its news API calls to before mid-2023. This lets them train the AI on thousands of forecasting questions without letting the AI cheat or having to wait years for the questions to resolve. They select the reasoning where the AI does well, and fine-tune it to do more stuff like that. The Halawi et al AI forecasting method. They find this works almost as well as the human crowd: Are these the data I’ve been trying to get for years - which forecasting platforms beat which others? I don’t think so - Metaculus’ good Briar score only means it performs well on Metaculus’ questions, which might be easier or harder than some other platform’s questions. Can we use the Halawi et al AI as a fixed comparison point, since it’s always the same skill level? I’m not sure - it trained on each of these markets for the style of question that’s in each market, so it might be biased. Still, these numbers are all about where I would expect them to be, except maybe Polymarket, which does better than I would have expected. But the crowd still beats the AI, right? Halawi et al object that humans can forecast only when they feel like it - you can bet on a prediction market question you feel confident on, and avoid one you don’t. When they let their AI forecast only on those questions where it’s most likely to do well (eg those with lots of relevant news articles), it very slightly outperforms the human crowd. As AI gets better, will it naturally beat humans in forecasting? Halawi et al say this won’t be trivial. They find a version of their system based off GPT-3.5 is only very slightly worse than the final version built off GPT-4. This suggests a forecasting AI built off GPT-5 or 6 might get only small improvements. The second team is Tetlock et al. They start from the same place as Halawi - out-of-the-box LLMs aren’t good at forecasting. They’re more scathing about this than Halawi was - they argue that out-of-the-box models do worse than predicting 50% for everything (this was close to true of human forecasters in the ACX tournament). Instead of increasing quality, Tetlock increases quantity. He wants to do wisdom of crowds, where the crowd is a bunch of different LLMs. So he gets twelve LLMs - including Bard, GPT, Claude, Mistral, PaLM, LLaMa, some Chinese models I’d never heard of, and a couple of variations on these bases - asks them to predict questions, and averages the results. Remember, you gotta prompt your model with “you are a smart person”, or else it won’t be smart! The results: Next, we compare the LLM crowd performance to that of the human crowd for our second hypothesis, directly putting the two crowd-aggregation mechanisms head-to-head. To do this, we use the same LLM crowd average as before (taking the median LLM prediction on each question and averaging up the Brier scores across questions). We compare this to the average of median human predictions on the same questions. In our preregistered analysis, we fail to find statistically significant differences between the LLM crowd’s mean Brier score of M=0.20 (SD=0.12) and that of the human crowd, M=0.19 (SD=0.19), t(60) = 0.19, p = 0.850 Their study was much smaller than Halawi’s (31 questions vs. 3,672), so I don’t think this result (nonsignificant small difference) should be considered different from Halawi’s (significant small difference). Still, it’s weird, isn’t it? Halawi used a really complicated tower of prompts and APIs and fine-tunings, and Tetlock just got more LLMs, and they both did about the same. I have two questions after reading these results: Did they actually do the same, or is this just a function of the small sample size in Tetlock and the non-head-to-head comparison?

There’s been more news and claims about the LK-99 alleged superconductor recently, all of which have totally failed to move the market away from 4%:

When the OpenAI board tried to fire Sam Altman last year and everyone said they were making a crazy mistake, I urged patience, saying maybe there was some kind of good plan. With the appointment of a new board, the last few loose ends from the affair have now been settled, and - I was wrong. There was no good plan and it was a giant self-own, sorry. The new board is back to having Sam Altman, plus random businesspeople who I don’t expect to have good opinions or exercise real restraint. Accordingly, the prediction market about whether anything good will come of it has gone down from its already low levels:

In Continued Defense Of Non-Frequentist Probabilities

March 21, 2024 · Original source

In other words, there’s something special about the number 17% on this question. It has properties that other numbers like 38% or 99.9999% don’t have. If someone asked you (rather than Samotsvety) for this number, you would give a less good number that didn’t have these special properties. If by some chance you actually were better at finding these kinds of numbers than Samotsvety, you could probably get a job as a forecasting consultant. Or you could make lots of play money on Manifold, or lots of real money on the stock market, or help your preferred political party as a campaign strategist.

Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate

March 28, 2024 · Original source

This was a decisive victory. There were two judges, who each gave separate verdicts (or were allowed to declare a draw). Both judges decided in favor of Peter. You can see the judges’ own summary of their reasoning here (Will, Eric) Manifold agreed with the judges. There was a prediction market on who would win. It started out 70-30 in favor of lab leak. As the videos came out, zoonosis started doing better and better. I don’t want to take the exact final numbers too seriously, since I think some of the later price increases involved hints from the participants’ behavior. But it’s clear which way viewers thought the wind was blowing4. Around the same time, the Good Judgment Project - Philip Tetlock’s group studying superforecasters - put out a report on the lab leak hypothesis. After studying it in depth, his forecasters ended up 75-25 in favor of zoonosis. The Rootclaim debate was one of ten sources they said they found especially interesting. And also around the same time, and unrelated to any of this, the Global Catastrophic Risks Institute surveyed experts (“168 virologists, infectious disease epidemiologists, and other scientists from 47 countries”) and found the same thing (though see here for some potential problems with the survey): For what it’s worth, I was close to 50-50 before the debate, and now I’m 90-10 in favor of zoonosis. III. The Math And The Aftermath The third debate session was about “inference”, how to put evidence together. I put this part off until after disclosing the winner, because I wanted to talk about some of these issues at more length. The Math: Judges Both judges included a probabilistic analysis in their written decision. Here’s the same table as above, expanded to add the judges: I shoehorned the judges’ factors into the categories I already had; some of them were actually subtly different from Peter’s, Saar’s, and each other’s. The “priors” category is especially a mess here. We’ll go over these later, but I get the impression that they both thought of probabilistic analyses as an afterthought. For example, Judge Eric wrote 30,000 words about which considerations moved him, and only then includes the analysis, saying: I am not convinced that this Bayesian calculation is even an appropriate way to estimate the relative posterior probability of Z and LL; it just seemed fair that after criticizing Rootclaim’s calculations at length I should make an attempt at it myself. Judge Will’s decision ran to 10,000 words. He said he independently tried both reasoning it out intuitively, and running the Bayesian analysis, and was relieved when these two methods returned the same result. He said: I am skeptical that the Bayesian decision making/evaluation methods are any more "objective" than [intuitive reasoning]. I think they maximize legibility, not objectivity, and tend to hide the intuitive/heuristic portion in the data inclusion step and values, where it’s harder to see . . . I am not skilled in the Bayesian method, and I am sure I made significant mistakes. More time and practice would improve and refine my estimates. At the fundamental rules of the universe level, Bayesian analysis must be the best way to evaluate evidence. However, I am unsure that it’s a good strategy for a human given our cognitive limitations, and doubly unsure it’s truly being used (in the dispassionate sense) where the outcome is social desirability/fame/Twitter likes. I’m focusing on this because Saar’s opinion is that the debate went wrong (for his side) because he didn’t realize the judges were going to use Bayesian math, they did the math wrong (because Saar hadn’t done enough work explaining how to do it right), and so they got the wrong answer. I want to discuss the math errors he thinks the judges made, but this discussion would be incomplete without mentioning that the judges themselves say the numbers were only a supplement for their intuitive reasoning. That having been said, let’s look deeper into some of Saar’s concerns. The Math: Extreme Odds Saar complained that Peter’s odds were too extreme. For example, Peter said there was only a 1/10,000 chance that a lab leak pandemic would first show up at a wet market. Peter’s argument went something like: obviously a zoonotic pandemic would start at a site selling weird animals. But a lab leak pandemic - if it didn’t start at the lab - could show up anywhere. 1/10,000 Wuhan citizens work at the wet market. So if a lab leak was going to show up somewhere random, the wet market was a 1/10,000 chance. Saar had specific arguments against this, but he also had a more general argument: you should rarely see odds like 1/10,000 outside of well-understood domains. In his blog post, he gave this example: A prosecutor shows the court a statistical analysis of which DNA markers matched the defendant and their prevalence, arriving at a 1E-9 probability they would all match a random person, implying a Bayes factor near 1E9 for guilty. But if we try to estimate p(DNA|~guilty) by truly assuming innocence, it is immediately evident how ridiculous it is to claim only 1 out of a billion innocent suspects will have a DNA match to the crime scene. There are obviously far better explanations like a lab mistake, framing, an object of the suspect being brought by someone to the scene, etc. So the real p(wet market|lab leak) isn’t the 1/10,000 chance a pandemic arising in a random place hits the wet market, but the (higher?) probability that there’s something wrong with Peter’s argument. Then Saar tried to show specific things that might be wrong with Peter’s argument. I didn’t find his specific examples convincing. But maybe the question shouldn’t be whether I agreed with him. It should be whether I’m so confident he’s wrong that I would give it 10,000-to-1 odds. This makes total sense, it’s absolutely true, and I want to be really, really careful with it. If you take this kind of reasoning too far, you can convince yourself that the sun won’t rise tomorrow morning. All you have to do is propose 100 different reasons the sunrise might not happen. For example: The sun might go nova.

Inline links: Will, Eric, agreed, 4, put out a report on the lab leak hypothesis, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!g7k2!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F37f1b493-b556-41ec-925e-03f9d8bc26cb_1456x849.webp, surveyed experts, see here, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Zejl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe9c88e87-b6ca-4c6d-840e-24da726f50b7_975x365.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!T5rV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4983e2cd-4151-42de-9685-08037ef7a8e8_635x788.png

Okay, this one is just awful. It takes the risky gambit above - giving extreme odds to something - then doubles down on it by multiplying across twenty different stages to get a stupendously low probability of 1/5*10^25. If we believe this, it’s more likely that we win the lottery three times in a row than that we learn lab leak was true after all. Eliezer Yudkowsky calls this the Multiple Stage Fallacy. Even aside from the failure mode in the sunrise example above (where people are too reluctant to give strong probabilities), it fails because people don’t think enough about the correlations between stages. For example, maybe there’s only 1/10 odds that the Wuhan scientists would choose the suboptimal RRAR furin cleavage site. And maybe there’s only 1/20 odds that they would add a proline in front to make it PRRAR. But are these really two separate forms of weirdness, such that we can multiply them together and get 1/200? Or are scientists who do one weird thing with a furin cleavage site more likely to do another? Mightn’t they be pursuing some general strategy of testing weird furin cleavage sites? (For example, Yuri proposed that, because the scientists wanted to understand how pandemic coronaviruses originate in nature, they might deliberately pick more natural-looking features over more designed-looking ones, which would neatly explain many features seemingly inconsistent with lab leak. Is this a conspiracy theory? Rootclaim is able to successfully route around this question. If the probability of a feature happening in nature is X, then the probability of it happening in this variant of lab leak scenario is X * [chance that the scientists wanted to imitate nature). This gives it a (deserved) complexity penalty without ruling out this (non-zero and potentially important) possibility.) In any case, Peter didn’t care as much about probabilistic analysis as Saar, he didn’t make his case hinge on this slide, and he might have been kind of using it to troll Rootclaim (which definitely worked). He might not have been making any of the mistakes above. But anyone who took this slide seriously would end up dramatically miscalibrated. The Math: Big Pictures Another of Saar’s concerns with the verdict was that Peter was an extraordinary debater, to the point where it could have overwhelmed the signal from the evidence. It’s hard to watch the videos and not come away impressed. Peter seems to have a photographic memory for every detail of every study he’s ever read. He has some kind of 3D model in his brain of Wuhan, the wet market, and how all of its ventilation ducts and drains interacted with each other. Whenever someone challenged one of his points, he had a ten-slide PowerPoint presentation already made up to address that particular challenge, and would go over it with complete fluency, like he was reciting a memorized speech. I sometimes get accused of overdoing things, but I can’t imagine how many mutations it would take to make me even a fraction as competent as Peter was. Saar’s closing argument included the admission: Peter, I think everyone can agree, has much more knowledge on [COVID] origins than we do. He's invested much more time. He may be a much more talented researcher. He's much more into the details. He probably knows the best in the world on origins at this point. Once you’ve described your opponent that way in your closing argument, what’s left of your case? Saar thought a lot was left. Throughout the debate, he tried to make a point about how getting the inference right was more important than winning sub-sub-sub-debates about individual lines of evidence. Although Peter won most specific points of contention, Saar thought that if the judges could just keep their mind on the big picture, they would realize a lab leak was more likely. I’m potentially sympathetic to arguments like Saar’s. Imagine a debate about UFOs. Imaginary-Saar says “UFOs can’t be real, because it doesn’t make sense for aliens to come to Earth, circle around a few fields in Kansas, then leave without providing any other evidence of their existence.” Imaginary-Peter says “John Smith of Topeka saw a UFO at 4:52 PM on 6/12/2010, and everyone agrees he’s an honorable person who wouldn’t lie, so what’s your explanation of that?” Saar says “I don’t know, maybe he was drunk or something?” Peter says “Ha, I’ve hacked his cell phone records and geolocated him to coordinates XYZ, which is a mosque. My analysis finds that he’s there on 99.5% of Islamic holy days, which proves he’s a very religious Muslim. And religious Muslims don’t drink! Your argument is invalid!” On the one hand, imaginary-Peter is very impressive and sure did shoot down Saar’s point. On the other, imaginary-Saar never really claimed to have a great explanation for this particular UFO sighting, and his argument doesn’t depend on it. Instead of debating whether Smith could or couldn’t have been drunk, we need to zoom out and realize that the aliens explanation makes no sense. The problem was, Saar couldn’t effectively communicate what his big picture was. Neither deployed some kind of amazingly elegant prior. They both used the same kind of evidence. The only difference was that Peter’s evidence hung together, and Saar’s evidence fell apart on cross-examination. I think - not because Saar really explained it, but just reading between the lines - Saar thought the un-ignorable big picture evidence was the origin in a city with a coronavirus gain-of-function lab, and the twelve-nucleotide insertion in the furin cleavage site. To some degree, Peter just ate the loss on those questions. No matter how you slice it, it really is a weird coincidence that the epidemic started so close to Asia’s biggest coronavirus laboratory. Peter tried to deflect this - he pointed out there were other BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc. But this was a rare question where he unambiguously came out looking worse - the other cities’ labs had much less coronavirus-specific research. Wuhan really was unique (aside from the other big coronavirus lab in North Carolina). Peter did better when he tried to control the damage: there are a couple hundred million people in the South Asian areas where people eat weird animals exposed to virus-infected bats, Wuhan has a population of about 12 million, so maybe 1.5% of all potential zoonotic pandemics should start in Wuhan. Peter tried to argue that Wuhan was a local trade center, so maybe we should up that to 5 - 10%. 5 - 10% coincidences aren’t that rare. Even 1.5% coincidences happen sometimes. Likewise, the furin cleavage site really does stand on a genetic map. I didn’t feel like either side did much math to quantify how weird it was. Naively, I might think of this as “30,000 bases in COVID, only one insertion, it’s in what’s obviously the most interesting place - sounds like 30,000-to-one odds against”. Against that, a virus with a boring insertion would never have become a pandemic, so maybe you need to multiply this by however much viral evolution is going on in weird caves in Laos, and then you would get the odds that at least one virus would have an insertion interesting enough to go global. Neither participant calculated this in a way that satisfied me (though see here for related discussion). Instead, Peter tried to undermine the furin argument by showing that, as surprising as the site was under a natural origin, it would be an even more surprising choice for human engineers. Saar argued it wasn’t - but because of his policy of giving adjusted-for-model-error odds, he only gave this a factor of 30 in his analysis. Since Peter gave it a higher factor of 50 in his analysis, it looked from the outside like Saar had already conceded this point, and the judges were mostly happy to go with Saar’s artificially-low estimate. The Math: Double Coincidences Saar brought up an interesting point halfway through the debate: you should rarely see high Bayes factors on both sides of an argument. That is, suppose you accept that there’s only a 1-in-10,000 chance that the pandemic starts at a wet market under lab leak. And suppose you accept there’s only a 1-in-10,000 chance that COVID’s furin cleavage site could evolve naturally. If lab leak is true, then you might find 1-in-10,000 evidence for lab leak. But it’s a freak coincidence that there was 1-in-10,000 evidence for zoonosis5. Likewise, if zoonosis is true, you might find 1-in-10,000 evidence for this true thing. But it’s a freak coincidence that there was 1-in-10,000 evidence for lab leak. Either way, you’re accepting that a 1-in-10,000 freak coincidence happened. Isn’t it more likely you’ve bungled your analysis? I was following along at home, and I definitely bungled this point; I had some high Bayes factors on both sides. I adjusted some of them downward based on Saar’s good point, but how far should we take it? Here I remember The Pyramid And The Garden: you can get very strong coincidences if you have many degrees of freedom, ie buy a lot of lottery tickets. So for example, suppose there are fifty things about a virus. You should expect at least one of those to have a one-in-fifty coincidence by pure chance. What about more than that? You might be able to get away with this by saying there are an infinite number of possible conspiracy theories, and some from that infinite set are brought into existence when a strong enough coincidence makes them plausible. For example, it’s really weird that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both died on the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. If I wanted, I could form a conspiracy theory about a group of weird assassins obsessed with killing Founding Fathers on important dates, and then Jefferson and Adams’ deaths would be 1/10,000 evidence for that theory. But this is the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy, which Saar warned against several times. I don’t know if “the virus started in Wuhan, which is where they’re doing this research” gets a Texas Sharpshooter penalty, or how high that penalty should be. But the furin cleavage site doesn’t - people were talking about lab leak before anyone noticed it. The Aftermath: Peter Peter seemed satisfied with the result, in an understated sort of way: It seemed like an interesting experiment in monetizing the debunking of a conspiracy theory. I think there's usually a big asymmetry where it's easy to get rich spreading bullshit (like, the top anti-vaxxers during the pandemic all made a million dollars a year on substack), but it's almost impossible to make money on debunking it. The Rootclaim challenge seemed like one rare case where the opposite was true. Beyond that, I don't know what it's good for. It does seem like there could be a positive social impact from more people understanding that the lab leak hypothesis is (almost certainly) false. The Aftermath: Saar Saar says the debate didn’t change his mind. In fact, by the end of the debate, Rootclaim released an updated analysis that placed an even higher probability on lab leak than when they started. In his blog post, he discussed the issues above, and said the judges had erred in not considering them. He respects the judges, he appreciates their efforts, he just thinks they got it wrong. Although he respected their decision, he wanted the judges to correct what he saw as mistakes in their published statements, which delayed the public verdict and which which Viewers Like You did not appreciate: I ran an early draft of this post by him. There was some miscommunication about the exact publication date, so he hasn’t had time to write up a full response, but he has some quick thoughts (and I’ll link the full response when he writes it). He says: We will provide a full response to this post soon, but the main problem with it is fairly simple: There is general agreement that the main evidence for zoonosis is HSM (Huanan Seafood Market) forming an early cluster of cases. The contention is whether it is amazing 10,000x evidence, or is it negligible. All other evidence points to a lab leak, and if HSM is shown to be weak, lab leak is a clear winner. We provided an analysis of why it is negligible that is as close to mathematical proof as such things can be. Read it here. Scott and I exchanged a few emails on this issue and Scott preferred to discuss more intuitive analyses of HSM, using rules of thumb that likely served him well in the past. While I believe I managed to mostly explain where these failed, and Scott understands HSM is far weaker evidence than he initially thought6, he still has a very strong intuitive feeling (based on years of dealing with probabilities) that this is some exceptional coincidence, and that prevents him from properly updating his posterior. At the end of the day, this cannot be settled without going through our semi-formal derivation, understanding it, and either identifying the problem with it or accepting it (and thereby accepting lab-leak to be more likely). Here is a quick summary of the mistakes made by those claiming HSM is strong evidence: The first mistake is conflating Bayes factors with conditional probabilities. 1/10000 is the supposed conditional probability p(HSM|Lab Leak), That should be divided by the conditional probability of HSM under Zoonosis. Markets were not identified as a high-risk location prior to this outbreak (This will be elaborated in the full response), and in SARS1 the spillovers were mostly at restaurants and other food handlers that deal more closely with wildlife. While it's cool to point to the raccoon dog photo, that was a result of a retrospective search (we don't know what other photos they took which in retrospect would be brought up as premonition). Unbiased data shows markets are not a likely spillover location for zoonosis. We originally estimated p(HSM|Zoonosis)<0.1. Following more research we did to answer Scott's questions, this is more likely <0.03.

Inline links: Multiple Stage Fallacy, see here, 5, The Pyramid And The Garden, Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy, blog post, 6

A separate market on the lab leak hypothesis itself shifted less, from about 70% to 60%. This could either be because bettors thought Peter was a great debater but wasn’t actually right, or because most people in this (very large) market didn’t even watch the debate. In general I’m not optimistic about markets with no plausible way of ever being resolved.

Inline links: market on the lab leak hypothesis itself

Highlights From The Comments On The Lab Leak Debate

April 09, 2024 · Original source

This alone isn’t fatal to lab leak. It’s perfectly possible for the lab to leak (let’s say) November 5th, the virus spreads a bit, and then a month later someone goes to the wet market, coughs on a vendor, and starts the officially recognized pandemic. But if that were true, you’d expect (let’s say) 30 cases by early December. Let’s say the wet market vendor was exactly Case # 30. She infected the other wet market vendors, starting a pandemic with an obvious center at the wet market and lots of infected wet market vendors and patrons. What about Case # 29? If they were (let’s say) a barista, how come they didn’t infect people at their coffee shop? How come there wasn’t a second obvious cluster radiating out from a coffee shop, lots of coffee-shop-linked cases, etc? How come there weren’t 30 equally-sized clusters? In order to avoid this, you either need to claim that the wet market was a perfect superspreader location, or that the pattern with lots of cases in the wet market and few-to-none anywhere else was a result of ascertainment bias. Saar made both those arguments during the debate, but I thought Peter rebutted them effectively. 1.4: COVID in Brazilian wastewater Nicholas Halden (blog) writes: What should we make of this study, which found the presence of covid in Brazilian wastewater in late 2019? Consider the doubling times. The study says that scientists working in late 2020 found COVID in samples of Brazilian wastewater from November 27, 2019. This was long before the first detected case of transmission in Brazil on March 13, 2020. Between November 27, 2019 and March 13, 2020 is about 16 weeks, so 32 COVID doubling times. 32 doubling times with no lockdown is enough time for COVID to infect every single person in Brazil. If COVID had infected everyone in Brazil before the first recognized case, we would have noticed. (again, COVID doubling time isn’t exactly invariably 3.5 days, but here we’re talking about numbers big enough that the exact details don’t matter very much) So if COVID was in Brazil on November 27, it must have fizzled out instead of going pandemic. How likely is that? If one person had COVID, it’s not too unlikely - not all COVID cases transmit it forward. If (let’s say) twenty people had COVID, it’s very unlikely - at that point, the law of large numbers takes over; in a freak coincidence, every single patient would have to fail to infect anyone else. So almost certainly fewer than 20 people in Brazil had COVID in November 27. So which is more likely - that somehow 20 people had COVID long before the virus was officially detected, and on a totally different continent, yet somehow a scientist looking through wastewater found the water from exactly those people and managed to detect the virus? Or that there was a sampling error, which happens all the time in these kinds of things? Peter wrote a blog post on some of these issues. He found that there were positive tests from wastewater samples as early as March 2019, which doesn’t fit anyone’s timeline, including lab leakers’. And most of these positives (including the Brazilian sample) contained later strains of the virus with mutations it picked up late in 2020. So these were almost certainly false positives from contamination. 1.5: Biorealism’s 16 arguments Biorealism has a list of sixteen arguments, which he liked so much that he posted it three times in the ACX comments, twice on Less Wrong, twice on Manifold, and about a dozen times on Twitter under multiple account names. Some posts were slightly different from others, but a typical version is: Importantly, Miller incorrectly claimed the N501Y mutation would result from passage in hACE2 mice (mixed them up with BALB/c mice). The major papers Miller relied on have been seriously challenged since the debate. See Stoyan and Chiu (2024), Weissman (2024), Bloom (2023) and Lv et al (2024). Overall the circumstantial evidence makes lab v plausible: Peter admitted getting this wrong during the debate. I think this very minor point about mice mutations was approximately his only mistake in 15 hours of debating, and he admitted it as soon as he noticed. Biorealism somehow heard about this (obviously not through watching the debate, as we’ll see in a moment), then left about 20-30 comments starting with it, under various accounts, on various platforms, as if it somehow discredited Peter. This is making me somewhat less charitable to him and his 16 arguments than I would be otherwise. 1. Chinese researchers Botao & Lei Xiao observed lab origin was likely given the nearest known relatives to SARS-CoV-2 were far from Wuhan. Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) sampled SARS-related bat coronaviruses where the nearest relatives are found in Yunnan, Laos and Vietnam ~1500km away. They refuse to share their records. The ancestral viruses of SARS were found equally far from where SARS spilled over into humans, so we know it’s possible (and likely) for viruses to travel that far. 2. Patrick Berche, DG at Institut Pasteur in Lille 2014-18, notes you would expect secondary outbreaks if it arose via the live animal trade. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10234839/ There are constant outbreaks of weird coronaviruses in animal handlers. See eg this paper, which estimates about 60,000 of these per year. None of these ever go anywhere, because the farmers are in rural areas that aren’t dense enough to sustain a high R0, and the epidemic fizzles out after a single digit number of cases. Any early outbreaks of COVID would have vanished into this long and mostly unnoticed list. 3. Molecular data: Only sarbecovirus with a furin cleavage site. Well adapted to human ACE2 cells. Low genetic diversity indicating a lack of prior circulation (Berche 2023). Restriction site SARS-CoV-2 BsaI/BsmBI restriction map falls neatly within the ideal range for a reverse genetics system and used previously at WIV and UNC. Ngram analysis of the codon usage per Professor Louis Nemzer https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1667232580255490053?t=IJgitS5cw364ioclzVWxaA&s=19 The SARS2 backbone is very low in CG and CpG. While the 12-nt insert that gives it the FCS is extremely high in both. Almost as if it was some kind of chimera of a consensus sequence and a codon-optimized polybasic cleavage site? https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1752800486837678377?t=EpIRgyybJVaPgeMP5xdstA&s=19 https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.10.18.512756v1 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10311-021-01211-0?fbclid=IwAR1HMUMtLIAFOFppVasQDeoIAYrVhP8j4YoPO4wnaTOUiKLsllZl_oKryOw Most of this was discussed extensively in the second session of the debate, which I recommend. The CGG-CGG arginine codon usage is particularly unusual but used in synthetic biology. I asked a synthetic biologist about this. He said: » “Nope. I would literally never do this if I was designing a small insert (maybe I wouldn't notice if it happened by chance with ~1 in 25 odds in a naive codon optimization algorithm as part of a larger sequence). High GC% is bad. Tandem repeat is worse. Several other perfectly fine arginine codons. And I wouldn't engineer a viral genome using human codon usage. An engineer would not do it.” 4. DEFUSE full proposal: virus 20% different from SARS1, consensus seq assembled with 6 segments, without disrupting coding seq, BsmBI order, FCS. SARS2: 20% different than SARS1, 6 evenly spaced fragments w BsmBI and BsaI restriction sites, FCS. Jesse Bloom, Jack Nunberg, Robert Townley, Alexandre Hassanin have observed this workflow could have lead to SARS-CoV-2. Work often begins before funding sought or goes ahead anyway. Re: 4 - Also scattered across second section of debate, also not going to retread 5. Market cases were all lineage B. Lv et al (2024) indicates there was a single point of emergence and A came before B. So market cases not the primary cases. See also Bloom (2021), Kumar et al (2022). Peter Ben Embarek said there were likely already thousands of cases in Wuhan in December 2019.https://t.co/50kFV9zSb6 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/34398234/ https://academic.oup.com/bioinformatics/article/38/10/2719/6553661 There was a Lineage A sample in the market, lab leak proponents just try to ignore/dismiss/conspiracize it away. The first two known Lineage A cases were very close to the market. Lv (is this even a real name? It sounds like Roman numeral? But I guess that’s what you expect in a country ruled by someone named Xi) found some weird COVID variants in Shanghai that might or might not mean anything; you can see some discussion of the implications here, but I don’t think they’re strong evidence either way. If A was first, it means some really weird stuff coincidences have to happen to give us the spread rates and genetic clock data we get, but they’re not necessarily weirder in the zoonosis hypothesis than the lab leak one. The claim that there were “thousands of cases in Wuhan in December 2019” is very easy to disprove by doubling rate arguments like the one above, by the blood bank study mentioned above, by the WHO’s failed case search, and by many other lines of argument. 6. Evidence for lineage A in the market is based on a low quality sample according to Liu et. al. (2023). I really think lab leakers need to decide whether they think China is a sinister actor trying to cover up the truth, or whether they should trust every offhand comment by Chinese government officials as gospel. Dr. Liu doesn’t explain in what sense he thinks the Lineage A sample is “low-quality”, and the Western scientists who I asked about this said they didn’t understand this complaint and that the sample was fine. A Western team re-analyzing the same sample describes it as “conclusively contain[ing] Lineage A.” I think most lab leakers have switched from trying to deny the genetics to claiming that this was “contamination”, which also doesn’t make sense (the sample is genetically very early). Note that aside from this sample, the first two Lineage A cases discovered were both very close to the wet market. 7. Bloom (2023) shows market samples do not support market origin. There is also no evidence of transmission in the claimed susceptible animals elsewhere. https://academic.oup.com/ve/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ve/vead089/7504441 Discussed extensively in my article as well as the first section of the debate. 8. Lineage A and B only two mutations apart. François Ballox, Bloom and Virginie Courtier-Orgogozo note this is unlikely to reflect two separate animal spillovers as opposed to incomplete case ascertainment of human to human transmission (Bloom 2021). Discussed extensively in my article as well as the first section of the debate. 9. Sampling bias. George Gao, Chinese CDC head at the time, acknowledged to the BBC stating they may have focused too much on and around the market and missed cases on the other side of the city. David Bahry outlines the documented bias. Michael Weissman has shown this mathematically. https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.00313-23 https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnae021/7632556 Re: Dr. Gao, see above comment about Chinese officials. See the section Ascertainment Bias below for why I disagree with this specific claim, which also addresses the Michael Weissman argument. 10. Spatial statistics experts show the Worobey claim the market was the early epicentre was flawed. https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnad139/7557954 Re: 10 - See Confirmation Of The Centrality Of The Huanan Market Among Early COVID-19 Cases, a response to the paper you cite: The centrality of Wuhan's Huanan market in maps of December 2019 COVID-19 case residential locations, established by Worobey et al. (2022a), has recently been challenged by Stoyan and Chiu (2024, SC2024). SC2024 proposed a statistical test based on the premise that the measure of central tendency (hereafter, "centre") of a sample of case locations must coincide with the exact point from which local transmission began. Here we show that this premise is erroneous. SC2024 put forward two alternative centres (centroid and mode) to the centre-point which was used by Worobey et al. for some analyses, and proposed a bootstrapping method, based on their premise, to test whether a particular location is consistent with it being the point source of transmission. We show that SC2024's concerns about the use of centre-points are inconsequential, and that use of centroids for these data is inadvisable. The mode is an appropriate, even optimal, choice as centre; however, contrary to SC2024's results, we demonstrate that with proper implementation of their methods, the mode falls at the entrance of a parking lot at the market itself, and the 95% confidence region around the mode includes the market. Thus, the market cannot be rejected as central even by SC2024's overly stringent statistical test. I think this response is pretty strong. In one analysis, they show that even though the other paper’s methodology is worse than theirs, if you apply it correctly (instead of inappropriately excluding various cases like the paper’s authors did), the center of all early cases in Hubei province lands on the wet market parking lot. In another analysis, they show that the other paper’s recommended tests wouldn’t have correctly pointed to the offending water pump in the famous John Snow cholera outbreak, but theirs would have. Still, I think it’s useful to supplement fancy statistics with normal common sense, so I recommend just looking at the map of early cases: …and deciding whether you think the assumptions behind a specific statistical test are likely to debunk the idea that cases are centered around the wet market. 11. Wuhan used as a control for a 2015 serological study on SARS-related bat coronaviruses due to its urban location. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6178078/ I don’t know why this point is supposed to matter. If you mean that Wuhan isn’t directly exposed to bats, nobody ever said it was. The zoonotic theory is that wildlife carted in from other areas of China started the pandemic in the wet market. 12. Superspreader events also seen at wet markets in Beijing and Singapore (Xinfadi and Jurong). This was discussed very extensively in the debates, both in section 1 and section 3. Wet markets weren’t “superspreader locations” - in fact, the disease spread no more quickly there than anywhere else. They were the first place in those cities that the pandemic started, due to contaminated animal products. If anything, this supports zoonosis. See also my discussion with Saar on this point below. 13. WIV refuse to share their records with NIH who terminated subaward in 2022. Wider suspension over biosafety concerns. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-18/us-suspends-wuhan-institute-funds-over-covid-stonewalling Although WIV has not been especially forthcoming, some of their databases were leaked in various ways and showed that they did not have any viruses capable of transforming into COVID. 14. PLA involvement at WIV and MERS research prior to SARS-COV-2. MERS features several similarities with SARS-CoV-2. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7022351/ I can’t even tell what conspiracy theory you’re trying to propose with this one; if you spell it out I can try to explain why it might be false. 15. SARS1 leaked several times and SARS-COV-2 has leaked from a BSL-3 lab in Taiwan. Agreed that SARS leaked several times. It also spilled over from animals several times. During the debate, a lab leak rate of once per lab per 500 years was proposed (everyone agreed to steelman this by 10x for WIV numbers); I would be interested to know whether anything about the study of SARS challenges that number. 16. Unpublished infectious clone identified from Wuhan contradicting arguments such reverse genetics systems would be published. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.02.12.528210v1.full I asked some scientists about this paper and here’s what they told me. Wuhan University sequenced some rice. In the middle of the sequence, there’s an unexpected sequence from a common coronavirus, HKU4. The most likely explanation is that someone else in Wuhan was working on the coronavirus and there was cross-contamination. Plausibly this is Wuhan Institute of Virology, who is known to work with coronaviruses. This is cool detective work, but it’s not clear what it’s supposed to prove. I think some lab leakers are using it to prove that WIV can do reverse genetics, but they admitted this already in a published paper so that’s not too helpful. I think others are using it to prove WIV had “secret viruses” in their catalogue, but the rice virus wasn’t secret, it was HKU4, which is common and which WIV has already published papers about. 1.6: DrJayChou’s 7 Arguments Once again, I cannot stress enough how much better a take you might have on this debate if you watch it. “The first known case predates the market outbreak by a month” - this is not the consensus position. I cannot say for sure what Dr. Chou means by this, but I suspect he’s referring to one of the many claims to this effect that Peter effectively debunked during the debate (Connor Reed, Mr. Chen, the 92 cases, Brazil, etc).

Inline links: blog, writes, this study, wrote a blog post on some of these issues, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10234839/, this paper, https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1667232580255490053?t=IJgitS5cw364ioclzVWxaA&s=19, https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1752800486837678377?t=EpIRgyybJVaPgeMP5xdstA&s=19, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.10.18.512756v1, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10311-021-01211-0?fbclid=IwAR1HMUMtLIAFOFppVasQDeoIAYrVhP8j4YoPO4wnaTOUiKLsllZl_oKryOw, https://t.co/50kFV9zSb6, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/34398234/, https://academic.oup.com/bioinformatics/article/38/10/2719/6553661, here, describes it as, https://academic.oup.com/ve/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ve/vead089/7504441, https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.00313-23, https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnae021/7632556, https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnad139/7557954, Confirmation Of The Centrality Of The Huanan Market Among Early COVID-19 Cases, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!BNAm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffd4cddb-6e3e-41f5-8ef6-ec0b27bec600_626x426.webp, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6178078/, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-18/us-suspends-wuhan-institute-funds-over-covid-stonewalling, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7022351/, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.02.12.528210v1.full, a published paper, has already published papers about, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yA9U!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F467dd304-190a-4437-8920-d498c433dffb_1600x960.jpeg

May 13, 2024 · Original source

Statements by two dissenting CFTC commissioners (1, 2) on why they oppose. Pivotal Act Manifold Markets says they’re pivoting to a new model combining play money points and real-money gambling. Manifold may be a beloved local fixture, but their growth and revenue aren’t too impressive: In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Inline links: 1, 2, Manifold Markets says, https://manifold.markets/stats, Chumba Casino, Fliff, have to be handwritten in a very specific way, rejects them, more people, https://manifold.markets/Joshua/good-pivot-bad-pivot-which-opinions, leaving the site, Manifund, report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F-e7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F679c34d2-766f-41bd-ae75-b036bcdb06f9_1456x849.webp, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JSEn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9c315554-fca5-4dc5-ac9a-d531b4ce7534_883x519.png, forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”, Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup, Cultivate Labs, choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas, here, superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk, here, @Grayden, here, here, “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here

Probably no effect on Manifold’s pivot, see below.

In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Inline links: Chumba Casino, Fliff, have to be handwritten in a very specific way, rejects them, more people, here, https://manifold.markets/Joshua/good-pivot-bad-pivot-which-opinions, leaving the site, Manifund, report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F-e7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F679c34d2-766f-41bd-ae75-b036bcdb06f9_1456x849.webp, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JSEn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9c315554-fca5-4dc5-ac9a-d531b4ce7534_883x519.png, forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”, Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup, Cultivate Labs, choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas, here, superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk, here, @Grayden, here, here, “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here

Prediction Markets Suggest Replacing Biden

July 02, 2024 · Original source

I assume they chose these three because they’re the only ones discussed enough to have enough data. I am following their lead. I appreciate John and Maxim’s work, but I’m not completely comfortable trusting it. Their model is based on results from Betfair, Smarkets, PredictIt, and Polymarket. But I don’t know much about the first two (as an American, I’m banned from even reading Betfair), and the latter two are notoriously bad at partisan political questions. They usually overestimate Republicans’ chances, partly because Democrats’ opposition to online political betting has turned the pool of online political bettors disproportionately red. While a fluid and easily-accessible prediction market should be able to avoid biases like these, neither PredictIt nor Polymarket really qualifies. The CFTC, which regulates prediction markets, has crippled both - PredictIt has very low maximum investments per market, and Polymarket is crypto-only and banned for US citizens. These have prevented their biases from being corrected and made both of them perform relatively weakly in head-to-head contests. And Stossel/Lott’s focus on betting sites automatically excludes two of the biggest and most historically accurate forecasting engines from their calculation - Metaculus and Manifold. In order to get numbers I trusted more than theirs, I looked at Metaculus, Manifold, PredictIt, and Polymarket, weighting each by how much I trusted it. Here’s what I found: The Biden number is about 4% higher than Nate Silver’s model over the same time period; see below for why that might be. [EDIT 7/2/24: Original version had a miscalculation which decreased everyone’s odds by about 10%. Above version should be correct.] You can find my sources at the bottom of the post. “Explicit” odds are based on questions like “What are the chances of Biden winning if he is the nominee?” “Implied” odds were generated by combining the questions “What is the chance of Biden being the nominee?” and “What is the chance of Biden winning?”; this is safe enough with Biden, but with unlikely nominees like Newsom, some of the percentages can get small enough that they start running into small-number-biases and become less trustworthy. I’ve weighted each market’s explicit calculation higher than their implicit one to compensate. A possible objection to these results: conditional probabilities don’t exactly reflect the intuitive concept of decision-making. That is, we’re not asking “We want to know whether or not to keep Biden, so what are the chances that he’ll win if we do?”, we’re asking the market for the chance that he’ll win, in the set of worlds where people decide to keep him for other reasons. We should expect this to overestimate his performance. That is, imagine that tomorrow, Biden has completely recovered, he easily wins his next debate with Trump, and everyone agrees the most recent debate was just a fluke - in that world, he is both more likely to be nominated and more likely to win. Alternatively, if tomorrow he gets much worse and can’t even speak in full sentences, he’s much less likely to be nominated and much more likely to lose. Since the real world includes both those possibilities, restricting ourselves to the set of worlds where he gets nominated means we’re overestimating the chance that he wins. There are similar-albeit-less-severe problems with other candidates - if we choose Newsom, that might be because he won some kind of debate or process versus Harris and all the other potential replacements. Overall I expect this to be mostly correct, but probably overestimate Biden’s chances by a percent or two relative to others. Along with these three candidates, Metaculus had an explicit “should the Democrats replace Biden?” question: Manifold also asks how Democrats will do if they replace Biden (without specifying a particular replacement): We can compare this to their Biden market… …and find that once again, they expect replacing Biden to go better (though I think 51% is just cope). At the Manifest prediction market conference in early June, I interviewed Nate Silver: …and asked him for his probability that the Democrats would win this election, versus his probability that the Democrats would win conditional on Biden not being the nominee (specifically “drops dead tomorrow of natural causes”). He said 40-45% chance normally, 50% chance without Biden. This was before the debate, but I think it matches the markets’ opinion that switching candidates would help the Democrats’ chances - and this has only become more true since the debate. On the other hand, polls asking people how they would vote in possible matchups don’t show any advantage of alternate candidates over Biden. Here’s the only post-debate poll I could find: And if Biden does need to be replaced, Democrats mostly support Harris, who the prediction markets find least promising: Maybe Democrats are the wrong people to ask - they’re already going to vote Biden, so you want someone who’s more attractive to independents. Of course, in a normal primary it would be Democrats making the decision. But if elites are going to do something behind closed doors, maybe they should take advantage and choose the candidate most likely to win, for once. I think these polls are the strongest objection to the prediction markets’ verdict. You could make an argument where prediction market users are mostly educated liberal white males, and even though they’re incentivized to honestly determine what ordinary people think, they’re too out-of-touch with ordinary people to do so effectively. Or they might be over-fixating on “voters don’t like Biden’s senility” without considering that, even if voters didn’t know Biden was currently senile before Thursday, they probably guessed that he would become senile sometime in his four-year term, and had basically accepted that his aides would do the hard work. Maybe they prefer a well-known likeable incumbent over an unknown quantity (and the unknown quantity’s potential new/weird aides), even if the well-known likeable incumbent is senile. Maybe elites know more than we do about how hard it is to inject a new candidate at the last moment, how dangerous it is to have someone who hasn’t been thoroughly vetted for scandals, et cetera. Still, for now I trust the prediction markets. I think replacing Biden would add ~10 prcentage points to the Democrats’ chance of victory. At the end of this post, I’ll list the prediction markets I’m using as sources. But before then, a brief interlude of: Fuzzy Subjective Human Factors I Am Not Really Qualified To Talk About Many people on Twitter are asking “how could anyone possibly have been stupid enough to not realize that Biden was senile?” I was that stupid. I didn’t say it openly, because I’m at least smart enough to have a high threshold for giving my opinion on political things I don’t know much about. But I thought it in my heart. So in case the people asking “how could anyone have been that stupid?” actually want an explanation, here’s my former reasoning. Republicans have been accusing Biden of being senile (and the Democrats of hiding it) for at least five years now. Before the 2020 debates, they were excited that this was when they could finally prove once and for all that Biden was senile. Then Biden did fine, and they retreated to “well he’s senile but they have some secret drug they’re giving him, just during debates, that makes him look fine”. Notice this is from 2020; according to polls, he did win the debate that year (source) I think a lot about experimental cognitive enhancement drugs, and I can say with confidence that nothing like that exists. Stimulants can help people with mild dementia be more active and motivated, but they don’t really improve cognition directly, and they can’t make a demented person temporarily lucid. Still, for the past four years, every time Biden was going to do something - a press conference, a State of the Union, whatever - the Republicans would say “ha, this time is going to be the proof that he’s senile!” And then he would always do fine, and they would retreat back to “I guess he used the secret drug this time too”. The satire site Babylon Bee had some funny articles about this: Babylon Bee, after Biden gave a good State of the Union speech earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Democrats were spreading the alternate narrative that Trump was senile. This one has gotten less press, because I don’t know how many people really believed it. But it came up occasionally, along with out-of-context video snippets where Trump said or did something dumb or meandering. Of course, anybody with a presidential candidate’s level of public exposure will have a few gaffes. Even if they don’t, you can always deceptively crop something so it looks like they did. Wait, why is a psychoanalyst getting quoted as a top expert in dementia? (source) I didn’t know you could diagnose someone via Change.org petition, but 2544 people who claim to be licensed professionals can’t be wrong! So with the constant attempts to prove that both candidates were senile, the constant demonstration by both candidates that they weren’t, and the constant retreat into conspiracy theories of “I guess he used the magic drug again but we’ll get him next time!”, I just tuned out this entire category of thing. And I guess I kept it tuned out longer than I should have, whoops. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Even if liars are saying something for their usual liar reasons, it can still be true. For twenty years, people spread false rumors that Castro was on his deathbed, but this didn’t make Castro immortal. In the same way, I should have figured out that even if I couldn’t trust any particular claim that Biden was senile, the prior for an 81 year old becoming senile was still high. But I guess I assumed that if he was becoming senile, some Democratic elites would have secret knowledge about it, and they couldn’t possibly be so stupid as to deny it while also scheduling him for a debate where it would inevitably come out. So I figured the Democratic elites who were closest to him thought he was doing well, and I trusted them more than the people who had been wrong every time for the past five years. I’m still confused what those elites were thinking. Reading the news coverage for the past few days (including some video clips from a post-debate rally where he seemed noticeably better) it seems like some combination of: He has good days and bad days, and they were hoping this would be a good day.

Manifold also asks how Democrats will do if they replace Biden (without specifying a particular replacement): We can compare this to their Biden market… …and find that once again, they expect replacing Biden to go better (though I think 51% is just cope). At the Manifest prediction market conference in early June, I interviewed Nate Silver: …and asked him for his probability that the Democrats would win this election, versus his probability that the Democrats would win conditional on Biden not being the nominee (specifically “drops dead tomorrow of natural causes”). He said 40-45% chance normally, 50% chance without Biden. This was before the debate, but I think it matches the markets’ opinion that switching candidates would help the Democrats’ chances - and this has only become more true since the debate. On the other hand, polls asking people how they would vote in possible matchups don’t show any advantage of alternate candidates over Biden. Here’s the only post-debate poll I could find: And if Biden does need to be replaced, Democrats mostly support Harris, who the prediction markets find least promising: Maybe Democrats are the wrong people to ask - they’re already going to vote Biden, so you want someone who’s more attractive to independents. Of course, in a normal primary it would be Democrats making the decision. But if elites are going to do something behind closed doors, maybe they should take advantage and choose the candidate most likely to win, for once. I think these polls are the strongest objection to the prediction markets’ verdict. You could make an argument where prediction market users are mostly educated liberal white males, and even though they’re incentivized to honestly determine what ordinary people think, they’re too out-of-touch with ordinary people to do so effectively. Or they might be over-fixating on “voters don’t like Biden’s senility” without considering that, even if voters didn’t know Biden was currently senile before Thursday, they probably guessed that he would become senile sometime in his four-year term, and had basically accepted that his aides would do the hard work. Maybe they prefer a well-known likeable incumbent over an unknown quantity (and the unknown quantity’s potential new/weird aides), even if the well-known likeable incumbent is senile. Maybe elites know more than we do about how hard it is to inject a new candidate at the last moment, how dangerous it is to have someone who hasn’t been thoroughly vetted for scandals, et cetera. Still, for now I trust the prediction markets. I think replacing Biden would add ~10 prcentage points to the Democrats’ chance of victory. At the end of this post, I’ll list the prediction markets I’m using as sources. But before then, a brief interlude of: Fuzzy Subjective Human Factors I Am Not Really Qualified To Talk About Many people on Twitter are asking “how could anyone possibly have been stupid enough to not realize that Biden was senile?” I was that stupid. I didn’t say it openly, because I’m at least smart enough to have a high threshold for giving my opinion on political things I don’t know much about. But I thought it in my heart. So in case the people asking “how could anyone have been that stupid?” actually want an explanation, here’s my former reasoning. Republicans have been accusing Biden of being senile (and the Democrats of hiding it) for at least five years now. Before the 2020 debates, they were excited that this was when they could finally prove once and for all that Biden was senile. Then Biden did fine, and they retreated to “well he’s senile but they have some secret drug they’re giving him, just during debates, that makes him look fine”. Notice this is from 2020; according to polls, he did win the debate that year (source) I think a lot about experimental cognitive enhancement drugs, and I can say with confidence that nothing like that exists. Stimulants can help people with mild dementia be more active and motivated, but they don’t really improve cognition directly, and they can’t make a demented person temporarily lucid. Still, for the past four years, every time Biden was going to do something - a press conference, a State of the Union, whatever - the Republicans would say “ha, this time is going to be the proof that he’s senile!” And then he would always do fine, and they would retreat back to “I guess he used the secret drug this time too”. The satire site Babylon Bee had some funny articles about this: Babylon Bee, after Biden gave a good State of the Union speech earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Democrats were spreading the alternate narrative that Trump was senile. This one has gotten less press, because I don’t know how many people really believed it. But it came up occasionally, along with out-of-context video snippets where Trump said or did something dumb or meandering. Of course, anybody with a presidential candidate’s level of public exposure will have a few gaffes. Even if they don’t, you can always deceptively crop something so it looks like they did. Wait, why is a psychoanalyst getting quoted as a top expert in dementia? (source) I didn’t know you could diagnose someone via Change.org petition, but 2544 people who claim to be licensed professionals can’t be wrong! So with the constant attempts to prove that both candidates were senile, the constant demonstration by both candidates that they weren’t, and the constant retreat into conspiracy theories of “I guess he used the magic drug again but we’ll get him next time!”, I just tuned out this entire category of thing. And I guess I kept it tuned out longer than I should have, whoops. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Even if liars are saying something for their usual liar reasons, it can still be true. For twenty years, people spread false rumors that Castro was on his deathbed, but this didn’t make Castro immortal. In the same way, I should have figured out that even if I couldn’t trust any particular claim that Biden was senile, the prior for an 81 year old becoming senile was still high. But I guess I assumed that if he was becoming senile, some Democratic elites would have secret knowledge about it, and they couldn’t possibly be so stupid as to deny it while also scheduling him for a debate where it would inevitably come out. So I figured the Democratic elites who were closest to him thought he was doing well, and I trusted them more than the people who had been wrong every time for the past five years. I’m still confused what those elites were thinking. Reading the news coverage for the past few days (including some video clips from a post-debate rally where he seemed noticeably better) it seems like some combination of: He has good days and bad days, and they were hoping this would be a good day.

We can compare this to their Biden market… …and find that once again, they expect replacing Biden to go better (though I think 51% is just cope). At the Manifest prediction market conference in early June, I interviewed Nate Silver: …and asked him for his probability that the Democrats would win this election, versus his probability that the Democrats would win conditional on Biden not being the nominee (specifically “drops dead tomorrow of natural causes”). He said 40-45% chance normally, 50% chance without Biden. This was before the debate, but I think it matches the markets’ opinion that switching candidates would help the Democrats’ chances - and this has only become more true since the debate. On the other hand, polls asking people how they would vote in possible matchups don’t show any advantage of alternate candidates over Biden. Here’s the only post-debate poll I could find: And if Biden does need to be replaced, Democrats mostly support Harris, who the prediction markets find least promising: Maybe Democrats are the wrong people to ask - they’re already going to vote Biden, so you want someone who’s more attractive to independents. Of course, in a normal primary it would be Democrats making the decision. But if elites are going to do something behind closed doors, maybe they should take advantage and choose the candidate most likely to win, for once. I think these polls are the strongest objection to the prediction markets’ verdict. You could make an argument where prediction market users are mostly educated liberal white males, and even though they’re incentivized to honestly determine what ordinary people think, they’re too out-of-touch with ordinary people to do so effectively. Or they might be over-fixating on “voters don’t like Biden’s senility” without considering that, even if voters didn’t know Biden was currently senile before Thursday, they probably guessed that he would become senile sometime in his four-year term, and had basically accepted that his aides would do the hard work. Maybe they prefer a well-known likeable incumbent over an unknown quantity (and the unknown quantity’s potential new/weird aides), even if the well-known likeable incumbent is senile. Maybe elites know more than we do about how hard it is to inject a new candidate at the last moment, how dangerous it is to have someone who hasn’t been thoroughly vetted for scandals, et cetera. Still, for now I trust the prediction markets. I think replacing Biden would add ~10 prcentage points to the Democrats’ chance of victory. At the end of this post, I’ll list the prediction markets I’m using as sources. But before then, a brief interlude of: Fuzzy Subjective Human Factors I Am Not Really Qualified To Talk About Many people on Twitter are asking “how could anyone possibly have been stupid enough to not realize that Biden was senile?” I was that stupid. I didn’t say it openly, because I’m at least smart enough to have a high threshold for giving my opinion on political things I don’t know much about. But I thought it in my heart. So in case the people asking “how could anyone have been that stupid?” actually want an explanation, here’s my former reasoning. Republicans have been accusing Biden of being senile (and the Democrats of hiding it) for at least five years now. Before the 2020 debates, they were excited that this was when they could finally prove once and for all that Biden was senile. Then Biden did fine, and they retreated to “well he’s senile but they have some secret drug they’re giving him, just during debates, that makes him look fine”. Notice this is from 2020; according to polls, he did win the debate that year (source) I think a lot about experimental cognitive enhancement drugs, and I can say with confidence that nothing like that exists. Stimulants can help people with mild dementia be more active and motivated, but they don’t really improve cognition directly, and they can’t make a demented person temporarily lucid. Still, for the past four years, every time Biden was going to do something - a press conference, a State of the Union, whatever - the Republicans would say “ha, this time is going to be the proof that he’s senile!” And then he would always do fine, and they would retreat back to “I guess he used the secret drug this time too”. The satire site Babylon Bee had some funny articles about this: Babylon Bee, after Biden gave a good State of the Union speech earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Democrats were spreading the alternate narrative that Trump was senile. This one has gotten less press, because I don’t know how many people really believed it. But it came up occasionally, along with out-of-context video snippets where Trump said or did something dumb or meandering. Of course, anybody with a presidential candidate’s level of public exposure will have a few gaffes. Even if they don’t, you can always deceptively crop something so it looks like they did. Wait, why is a psychoanalyst getting quoted as a top expert in dementia? (source) I didn’t know you could diagnose someone via Change.org petition, but 2544 people who claim to be licensed professionals can’t be wrong! So with the constant attempts to prove that both candidates were senile, the constant demonstration by both candidates that they weren’t, and the constant retreat into conspiracy theories of “I guess he used the magic drug again but we’ll get him next time!”, I just tuned out this entire category of thing. And I guess I kept it tuned out longer than I should have, whoops. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Even if liars are saying something for their usual liar reasons, it can still be true. For twenty years, people spread false rumors that Castro was on his deathbed, but this didn’t make Castro immortal. In the same way, I should have figured out that even if I couldn’t trust any particular claim that Biden was senile, the prior for an 81 year old becoming senile was still high. But I guess I assumed that if he was becoming senile, some Democratic elites would have secret knowledge about it, and they couldn’t possibly be so stupid as to deny it while also scheduling him for a debate where it would inevitably come out. So I figured the Democratic elites who were closest to him thought he was doing well, and I trusted them more than the people who had been wrong every time for the past five years. I’m still confused what those elites were thinking. Reading the news coverage for the past few days (including some video clips from a post-debate rally where he seemed noticeably better) it seems like some combination of: He has good days and bad days, and they were hoping this would be a good day.

September 17, 2024 · Original source

The basic structure is the same as past forecasting AIs like FutureSearch. A heavily-modified copy of ChatGPT gathers relevant news articles, then prompts itself to think in superforecaster-like ways. The creators say the ChatGPT copy had a knowledge cutoff of October 2023, so they tested it on Metaculus questions from after that date. It got 87.7% accuracy, slightly above Metaculus forecasters’ 87.0%. Manifold is skeptical: The commenters, especially Neel Nanda, found that doing knowledge cutoffs properly is hard, and the ChatGPT base seems to know about news events after October 2023 - upon questioning, it seemed aware of an earthquake in November 2023. When presented with a different set of questions that were all after November 2023, FiveThirtyNine substantially underperformed the Metaculus average. But also, my attempts to play around with the bot haven’t been encouraging: I asked it to predict the chance that Prospera would have a population of at least 1,000 in 2027. Like FutureSearch on the same question, it cited many interesting news articles on Prospera’s chances but failed to do the basic step of figuring out its current population and growth rate. It eventually concluded 35% chance, which is reasonable enough. But when asked whether Prospera would have a population of 100,000 in 2028, it also said 35% chance, which is absurd.

Inline links: FutureSearch, When presented with a different set of questions

1: You knew it was coming: See also various slightly-weaker or slightly-stronger versions of the same question (includes wildlife, includes any immigrants, includes only Springfield). I actually appreciate this a lot, because most of the debate around Catgate has focused on how there’s “no evidence” it’s happening, but “no evidence” is cheap and I prefer an outright forecast.

Inline links: includes wildlife, includes any immigrants, includes only Springfield, “no evidence” is cheap

See also various slightly-weaker or slightly-stronger versions of the same question (includes wildlife, includes any immigrants, includes only Springfield). I actually appreciate this a lot, because most of the debate around Catgate has focused on how there’s “no evidence” it’s happening, but “no evidence” is cheap and I prefer an outright forecast.

Inline links: includes wildlife, includes any immigrants, includes only Springfield, “no evidence” is cheap

Open Thread 352

October 21, 2024 · Original source

3: I’ve been asked to advertise The Curve, a conference on “the trajectory of transformative AI”, including forecasting, alignment, etc. It’s by the Manifold/Manifest/Manifund team and will be held at Lighthaven, Berkeley from November 22 - 24, tickets are $100 for students, $300 - $800 for others. Apply here. I hope to attend.

Inline links: The Curve, Lighthaven, here

Mantic Monday: Judgment Day

November 05, 2024 · Original source

3: Manifold Markets is hosting an election night party (or mourning vigil, depending) in Berkeley, go here for details.

Inline links: go here for details

Iranian nukes more likely under Trump (49.5%) than Harris (45%) All of these involve foreign policy going worse under Trump than Harris. Is this unfair? Even Trump’s supporters would agree he is less interested in funding Ukrainian resistance than Harris; Metaculus’ numbers here seem in line with this. Harris is more likely to continue deals where Iran gets sanctions relief / money in exchange for not going nuclear. Whether or not you agree with Trump that those deals are extortionary and unfair, it makes sense that Iran is more likely to go nuclear if those deals are discontinued. But this is also a small effect and could be noise. The Taiwan numbers are the least convincing, but seem to be based off of arguments like the ones here: Trump has said that Taiwan should “pay for” defense, and generally been skeptical of foreign entanglements. And here’s Manifold’s version of the same thing: Polymarket’s Wild Ride On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.

It also serves as yet another point in favor of non-real-money forecasts like Metaculus, Nate Silver, and Manifold, all three of which agreed with each other while disagreeing with the big real-money markets like Polymarket, Smarkets, and Betfair. In theory we can’t say which group (real money vs. no money) was right. In practice, we know that Polymarket was mostly skewed by one giant bet, that there wasn’t nearly enough pro-Trump news to explain the movement, and that past disagreements have usually resolved in favor of the no-money markets. I’m as surprised as anyone to learn this (especially since Manifold is so close to a money market that a lot of explanations for real-money markets’ failure ought to affect them too), but it does seem to be a consistent feature of these things.

Congrats To Polymarket, But I Still Think They Were Mispriced

November 07, 2024 · Original source

One group - the non-money forecasters - said the election was 50%. Nate Silver was in this group. So was Metaculus, a forecasting engine which has outperformed prediction markets in the past, and Manifold, a mostly-play-money prediction market.

In my own contest, Metaculus (a non-money forecaster) outperformed Manifold (a play-money market with some tenuous connection to real money). And in Manifold’s own poll, users said they thought Metaculus was more accurate than Polymarket or themselves.

Inline links: my own contest, users said

Non-money forecasters have an opposite problem of having no incentive to get things right in the first place. This disqualifies most pundits, but the best forecasting sites have found ways around this. On Metaculus, users risk reputation rather than money; this is easier, since there isn’t some opportunity cost to Metaculus reputation that creates weird dynamics of when vs. when not to invest. On Manifold, people risk play money, which is sort of linked to real money in various obscure ways but you can’t trivially sink your life savings into Manifold and expect to get it back; this is about halfway between monetary and reputational systems. As for Nate Silver, I think he loves gambling enough that he naturally uses a gambling mindset even when he’s not risking money (although he is risking his own reputation, and sometimes does risk money on his beliefs). I didn’t originally think these kinds of “soft” incentives would work as well as real money, but the evidence above has changed my mind.

Inline links: sometimes does risk money on his beliefs

H5N1: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

January 01, 2025 · Original source

From “Genesis and pathogenesis of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus”, linked above. You may recognize the lead author - Michael Worobey has also been a leading voice on the zoonotic side of the COVID origins debate. The recent history of the flu, as far as I can tell, is: 1918: An H1N1 flu (“Spanish flu”) jumped from birds to humans in America and killed 50 million people worldwide. This replaced all older strains, so most seasonal flus during this era were H1N1. 1957: An H2N2 flu (“Asian flu”) crossed from birds to humans in China, and killed about 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H1N1 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H2N2. 1968: An H3N2 flu (“Hong Kong flu”) crossed from pigs (?) to humans in Hong Kong, and killed another 2 million people worldwide. It replaced the H2N2 strain, so most seasonal flus during this era were H3N2. 1977: An H1N1 flu (“Russian flu”) leaked from a biology lab (?) in Russia (it might have been a strain from the 1940s, which the Russians were trying to make a vaccine for). It didn’t kill that many people, but it stuck around, and from then on, seasonal flus could be either H3N2 or H1N1. 2009: An H1N1 flu (“Mexican flu” until the PC police stepped in; afterwards “swine flu”) took some horrible circuitous route between birds and pigs and back again, crossed over into humans in Mexico, and killed 200,000 people. It outcompeted older strains of H1N1, but couldn’t crowd out H3N2, so seasonal flus are still either H3N2 or H1N1. …which brings us to the present, hopefully illuminating why “new flu strain crosses over from animals into humans” is such an “uh oh” moment. The Bird Flu Technically, all pandemic flus start as bird flus. Influenza A evolved in birds. Sometimes it spreads to other animals, including pigs, cattle, and humans. The most common way for a bird flu to spread to humans is to “reassort” (not exactly virus sex, but close enough, and the real version is less memorable) with a human flu virus (ie one that has already crossed over to humans). The resulting virus has all of the human flu virus’ human adaptations, but borrows enough new antigens from the bird virus to evade the immune system. Pigs can be infected by both human and bird viruses, so they are a common place for this reassortment to take place. If reassortment is sort of like viral sex, pigs are sort of like Tinder. When a bird flu and human flu reassort in pigs, the resulting disease is called a swine flu. At least the 2009 flu pandemic was a swine flu, and a minority opinion thinks the 1918 pandemic was too. There aren’t major epidemiological differences between direct-from-bird flus and swine flus. H5N1 was first noticed in birds - specifically, a flock of chickens in Scotland in 1959 - after which it disappeared for forty years. In 1996, it showed up in geese in China, then gradually increased its market share among birds worldwide. In 2022, it was found in minks; apparently it had learned to infect mammals. By early 2024, it was seen in cows. Now it’s in cow herds in 16 states, and one of them (California) has declared a state of emergency. And in October, H5N1 was found in pigs for the first time. It’s not uncommon for humans to catch an animal disease. This doesn’t mean the disease has “crossed over” to humans. If the virus isn’t suited to human-to-human transmission, it simply dies off (either before or after killing its human host). Thus, chicken farmers have been reporting scattered H5N1 cases since 1997; now that the virus has spread to cattle, cow farmers have started reporting the same. A Metaculus comment on this topic introduced me to the phrase “biocomputational surface”. Every viral replication that takes place in a human gives the virus one more chance to develop the set of mutations that makes it human-transmissible and start the next pandemic. Or, more likely, every viral replication that takes place in a human who has both the H5N1 bird flu and a normal human flu - or in a pig which has both viruses - gives the virus one extra chance to reassort in a way that produces a bird-antigen-fortified human-adapted flu virus. This doesn’t mean H5N1 will definitely become human-transmissible soon. Many viruses hang out on the borders of transmissibility for decades. Some, for unclear reasons, never cross over at all. But all of this is compatible with the virus becoming transmissible soon. So: What Is The Chance Of A Pandemic? The prediction markets on this topic ask a question about “10,000 cases in the United States”. Does this necessarily mean “pandemic”? Might it be possible to get to 10,000 cases just from the scattered chicken and cow farmers, with no human-to-human transmission? Despite many chicken and cow infections this year, there have only been 60 - 70 recorded human cases. Unless there is a phase change in screening methods, it seems hard for this number to increase to 10,000 off farmers alone. I think it’s fair to treat this question as operationalizing “what is the chance of a pandemic”? By this definition, Manifold estimates a 40% chance of an H5N1 pandemic in 2025. Metaculus estimates a 5% chance. You can see below whether that’s changed since I wrote this essay: 5% versus 40% is a big difference! Who do we trust? I trust Metaculus. Metaculus has beaten Manifold in both of the two head-to-head comparisons that I know of (Jeremiah Johnson’s and mine). Manifold’s number swings by a factor of two from week to week; Metaculus has been steady. But also, Metaculus hosts a CDC-sponsored respiratory disease forecasting tournament which has enriched them in epidemiological expertise. And if you look at the quality of comments on both sites, it’s pretty obvious where the people with more intellectual chops are hanging out. The Manifold comments are mostly single sentences, or occasionally just links to an article about new cases. The Metaculus comments look more like this one by dimaklenchin: Despite the panic propaganda, H5N1 is unlikely to be "just a single mutation away from switching host preference": 1) It normally takes a lot more than a single mutation to switch hosts. E.g., there are at least five different reasons why SIV (monkey equivalent of HIV) is not infectious to humans. Heck, a variant of SIV that bears HIV's receptor-recognizing surface protein (SHIV) is still not infectious to humans. HIV most certainly evolved from SIV but, almost as certainly, it took a very long time to get there. Not that all viruses are the same and things can't turn out differently with flu, but I don't subscribe to the idea that a mere change of receptor specificity (something that can take 1-2 mutations) will be sufficient. 2) We have data. Lots of human infections with other varieties of bird flu in the past - all those viruses ultimately went nowhere. Why would H5N1 be radically different? E.g., the "Canadian teen", despite what sounds like a prolonged exposure, failed to infect anyone around him. Since I am at 18% for the h-2-h H5N1 detection in 2025, I am arbitrarily going ~ an order of magnitude lower than that for something as unprecedented as 10K human infections. Maybe should be much lower but hedging for the time being and will allow another couple months of observations. And Sergio: I'm currently at 20% on the question of reported human-to-human transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 globally before 2026. However, this question is only about the US, and is more general about all subtypes of H5. But H5N1 very strongly appears to be the most important subtype to consider in this time period. And, given the current situation in the US with H5N1 human cases derived from exposure to poultry or cattle (with cattle(mammals) being more worrisome), h2h transmission seems quite more likely to arise in North America than elsewhere before 2026. Conditioning on h2h transmission in the US (and also trying to consider, with lower probability, a start in Canada), I want to estimate the chances that it becomes sustained and out of control (in which case, if it starts in Canada, I largely expect it to spread to the US). The (6) past events of probable h2h transmission of avian H5(N1), none of which were sustained, could serve as a base rate, although I'm a bit wary of giving much weight to this precedent, since the last event was quite a while ago (2007), and also because reporting and testing standards may have improved considerably since then (so perhaps they might not have been classified as h2h transmission events if they had occurred more recently). The current situation in the US, and events such as the Canadian teen who got sick with H5N1, do suggest a higher background level of risk than normal (which would be reduced if a vaccine for cattle is licensed soon), but I'm wary of overupdating. Conditioned on sustained h2h transmission, reaching over 10k cases in a few months seems likely, although perhaps very strong monitoring and surveillance could contain the situation in time (at the very least to moderate the growth rate). Trying to combine all these factors somewhat haphazardly, I'm currently at 3.5% for this question. That’s before 2026. What about longer-term? Manifold gives a ~50% chance before 2030; Metaculus uses a more complicated method but it says about 25% chance before 2030. H5N1 may cross to humans, but it could take a while. Superforecaster Juan Cambeiro at The Institute For Progress estimated a 4% chance of a “worse than COVID” H5N1 pandemic in “the next year”, but their estimate was made in 2023, without the benefit of the Metaculus estimates or most of our current knowledge. This feels high now - Metaculus says 5% total for H5N1 pandemic, and most pandemic flus are not worse than COVID. IFP also seem to be expecting a case fatality rate greater than 10%, which I find unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. I trust their estimate less than Metaculus’ current ones. I conclude that the most plausible estimate for the chance of an H5N1 pandemic in the next year is 5%. Interestingly, 5% is about the base rate for pandemic flus per year: five in the past century = one per twenty years = 5% chance per year. Isn’t it surprising that we’re still at the base rate when we can see a dangerous-looking flu virus spreading through the types of animals that have caused pandemic flus in the past? Part of the answer is that we’re not - in addition to the 5% chance of H5N1, we have to add the chance of some other pandemic flu. This probably isn’t 5% on its own; scientists monitor flu strains closely, and they haven’t found any others which are giving off as many red flags as H5N1. Still, something could always come out of left field. Maybe we should add a 2.5% chance of some other strain, for a total of 7.5% chance of a flu pandemic (ie beyond normal seasonal flu) next year. But still, isn’t it surprising that we’re so close to the base rate? One way to think about this: the base rate represents how concerned we should be if there was no epidemiological monitoring at all. In that case, we would estimate a probability distribution across different epidemiological landscapes, most of which contain some concerning-looking flu strains. Since we are doing the epidemiological monitoring, we can collapse that distribution into a single picture: one flu strain, H5N1, is in fact pretty concerning, and other strains mostly aren’t. This is enough to move our prior from 5% to 7.5%, but no more. The forecasters I talked to raised one other point of uncertainty: does the flu work more like a dice roll, or like a bus? Dice rolls are uncorrelated with their predecessors; even if it’s been a hundred rolls since you last rolled a 6, your chance this time is still 1/6. But buses come at fixed intervals; if the buses are hourly, and you haven’t seen a bus in the past 59 minutes, then your chance of seeing a bus in the next minute is very high. It’s been 16 years since the last flu pandemic; these pandemics come (on average) every 20 years. I don’t think anyone has a good sense of how to think about this. But it was 40 years between the Spanish and Hong Kong flus, so the twenty year number is at best a rule of thumb. The 5% number feels very low to me (and, apparently, to the average Manifold forecaster). Isn’t H5N1 spreading to cows and pigs and all sorts of other mammals? Isn’t it in the news all the time? I trust Metaculus a lot, but I agree that this is a surprising update, and I’m taking it on faith rather than feeling it in my bones. What Would The Fatality Rate Be For An H5N1 Pandemic? There are four basic stories you could tell about likely H5N1 mortality. First, maybe mortality would be 50%. The argument here is that official statistics report this mortality rate in the chicken farmers who have been infected with H5N1 so far. Several news sources and even some scientists have raised the specter of a pandemic version of H5N1 pandemic with this same death rate, which could kill a quarter to a third of the world population. THIS IS EXTREMELY FAKE. The official statistics only report fatality rate in the infections we know about. Bird flu is rare, there’s no mass testing, and we only learn that somebody had it if they’re in a hospital and the doctors are worried enough to test for rare conditions. Of Americans who got bird flu in the past year, 0 out of 61 have died. Probably this is mostly because America upped its detection game and is now finding milder cases; we also can’t rule out the virus mutating to become less virulent. Metaculus estimates the current true mortality rate as 1.25%. …but leaves a wide 90% confidence interval, from 0.5% to 7%. Second, maybe mortality would be somewhere around 1.25%. The argument here is that Metaculus uses this as its central estimate of US mortality. But Sentinel discusses some reasons to be skeptical of broad inferences from the US numbers: Scientists have been puzzled by the apparently low H5N1 case fatality rate in humans in the US. They offer a number of hypotheses: “The way in which the virus is being transmitted — along with the amount of virus exposure — is limiting the severity of disease.”

H5N1 may cross to humans, but it could take a while. Superforecaster Juan Cambeiro at The Institute For Progress estimated a 4% chance of a “worse than COVID” H5N1 pandemic in “the next year”, but their estimate was made in 2023, without the benefit of the Metaculus estimates or most of our current knowledge. This feels high now - Metaculus says 5% total for H5N1 pandemic, and most pandemic flus are not worse than COVID. IFP also seem to be expecting a case fatality rate greater than 10%, which I find unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. I trust their estimate less than Metaculus’ current ones. I conclude that the most plausible estimate for the chance of an H5N1 pandemic in the next year is 5%. Interestingly, 5% is about the base rate for pandemic flus per year: five in the past century = one per twenty years = 5% chance per year. Isn’t it surprising that we’re still at the base rate when we can see a dangerous-looking flu virus spreading through the types of animals that have caused pandemic flus in the past? Part of the answer is that we’re not - in addition to the 5% chance of H5N1, we have to add the chance of some other pandemic flu. This probably isn’t 5% on its own; scientists monitor flu strains closely, and they haven’t found any others which are giving off as many red flags as H5N1. Still, something could always come out of left field. Maybe we should add a 2.5% chance of some other strain, for a total of 7.5% chance of a flu pandemic (ie beyond normal seasonal flu) next year. But still, isn’t it surprising that we’re so close to the base rate? One way to think about this: the base rate represents how concerned we should be if there was no epidemiological monitoring at all. In that case, we would estimate a probability distribution across different epidemiological landscapes, most of which contain some concerning-looking flu strains. Since we are doing the epidemiological monitoring, we can collapse that distribution into a single picture: one flu strain, H5N1, is in fact pretty concerning, and other strains mostly aren’t. This is enough to move our prior from 5% to 7.5%, but no more. The forecasters I talked to raised one other point of uncertainty: does the flu work more like a dice roll, or like a bus? Dice rolls are uncorrelated with their predecessors; even if it’s been a hundred rolls since you last rolled a 6, your chance this time is still 1/6. But buses come at fixed intervals; if the buses are hourly, and you haven’t seen a bus in the past 59 minutes, then your chance of seeing a bus in the next minute is very high. It’s been 16 years since the last flu pandemic; these pandemics come (on average) every 20 years. I don’t think anyone has a good sense of how to think about this. But it was 40 years between the Spanish and Hong Kong flus, so the twenty year number is at best a rule of thumb. The 5% number feels very low to me (and, apparently, to the average Manifold forecaster). Isn’t H5N1 spreading to cows and pigs and all sorts of other mammals? Isn’t it in the news all the time? I trust Metaculus a lot, but I agree that this is a surprising update, and I’m taking it on faith rather than feeling it in my bones. What Would The Fatality Rate Be For An H5N1 Pandemic? There are four basic stories you could tell about likely H5N1 mortality. First, maybe mortality would be 50%. The argument here is that official statistics report this mortality rate in the chicken farmers who have been infected with H5N1 so far. Several news sources and even some scientists have raised the specter of a pandemic version of H5N1 pandemic with this same death rate, which could kill a quarter to a third of the world population. THIS IS EXTREMELY FAKE. The official statistics only report fatality rate in the infections we know about. Bird flu is rare, there’s no mass testing, and we only learn that somebody had it if they’re in a hospital and the doctors are worried enough to test for rare conditions. Of Americans who got bird flu in the past year, 0 out of 61 have died. Probably this is mostly because America upped its detection game and is now finding milder cases; we also can’t rule out the virus mutating to become less virulent. Metaculus estimates the current true mortality rate as 1.25%. …but leaves a wide 90% confidence interval, from 0.5% to 7%. Second, maybe mortality would be somewhere around 1.25%. The argument here is that Metaculus uses this as its central estimate of US mortality. But Sentinel discusses some reasons to be skeptical of broad inferences from the US numbers: Scientists have been puzzled by the apparently low H5N1 case fatality rate in humans in the US. They offer a number of hypotheses: “The way in which the virus is being transmitted — along with the amount of virus exposure — is limiting the severity of disease.”

Inline links: The Institute For Progress estimated, news, sources, scientists, Sentinel discusses

OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

March 13, 2025 · Original source

Manifold asks whether they might end up funding AI safety efforts:

Manifold asks whether they might end up funding AI safety efforts: This sort of makes sense - surely this is the most direct way to interpret a mandate of using charity dollars to “make sure AI benefits humanity”. And an obvious commitment to pursuing their mission exactly as described would look good to regulators. But it also might not be as popular with the normies as “health care, education, and science” - and doing popular things would look good to regulators too. If this is on their mind, Altman hasn’t mentioned it.

What Do Prediction Markets Say? This is the biggest Manifold market on the topic. The big drop at the end is when the judge ruled Musk’s case had merit.

Inline links: This

Open Thread 375

March 31, 2025 · Original source

2: There’s another Manifest (Manifold-sponsored fun conference on prediction markets) this year. June 6-8 in Berkeley, tickets are $538 but look for various combos/deals/discounts. More information here.

Inline links: here

Inline links: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is, xlr8harder, Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby, Hector (cloud), demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin, Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference, finds that it is quite bad, violently skeptical, literally so?, This tweet, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!S9fU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa558c09b-7fb6-40a8-a8a0-27b658a2c876_576x687.png, describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X), link on X, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zyh7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F75e9f0f6-d794-4ea2-b24b-5d4803bf28dc_590x478.png, New study claims consultants are actually good, tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, The Argument, a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, criticizes the article, infant brain waves, debate on X, has a presponse here, first foray into housing policy

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Helped create Manifold Markets, a prediction market site with thousands of satisfied users, whose various spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community.

No update this time, but from last cycle: “Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.”

Manifold is the largest social prediction market platform with over 150k user‑created markets and more than 30 million trades. Our markets have been featured here on ACX, in the NYT, Nate Silver’s latest book, and countless Substacks, podcasts, and tweets. Forecasters, journalists, researchers, and casual users alike use Manifold to get accurate real-time odds on everything from elections to AI timelines to personal drama.

Inline links: Manifold

Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

2: Manifold, 24 traders:

Inline links: Manifold

43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

ACX Grants Results 2025

October 13, 2025 · Original source

Second, the Manifund team. Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, handled our funds, disbursement, infrastructure, and miscellaneous coding needs. Special thanks to Austin Chen for taking point on this.

Inline links: Manifund

Charlie Molthrop, $5K, for “normie-friendly prediction market interfaces”. Charlie has already made some tools for visualizing Manifold and Polymarket results; for example, a bot that tweets sudden dramatic changes on important Manifold questions.

Elaine Perlman, $94K, to continue lobbying for kidney donation incentives. Elaine works with Waitlist Zero and the Coalition To Modify NOTA to promote the End Kidney Deaths Act, which offers valuable tax credits to kidney donors. They estimate this bill could save 100,000 lives over the next decade, and save the government $50 billion/year (dialysis is very expensive, Medicare currently covers it, and transplantees would no longer need it). Since our previous grant last year, the EKDA has been cosponsored by 29 members of Congress, discussed in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and profiled in the LA Times. The prediction markets are down to only 25% chance it gets passed this year, but I’m optimistic about 2026 - 2027

Inline links: End Kidney Deaths Act, Journal of the American Medical Association, the LA Times, 25% chance it gets passed this year

Mantic Monday: The Monkey's Paw Curls

January 13, 2026 · Original source

If the Republican gets elected, will the economy be good four years later? …and if one market is higher than the other, then you’ve successfully forced everyone to settle on a canonical probability of which candidate will be better for the economy. The fatal flaw is confounding by noncausal pathways. For example, bettors might reason: suppose for some extrinsic reason (let’s say someone struck oil) the economy is very good from 2026 - 2028. Then in 2028, people will feel better about Trump, and are more likely to elect Vance. And if the economy is very good from 2026 - 2028, then it’s more likely to be very good from 2028 - 2032 (the oil is still there). Therefore, we should bet up the Republicans → good market, and bet down the Democrats → good market, before we even think about whether Republicans or Democrats will do a better job with the economy. Therefore, this can’t be a good way to determine whether Republicans or Democrats will do a better job with the economy. Here’s a potential workaround I’ve never seen before: suppose you create a set of conditional prediction markets as above. Then you create a set of secondary markets, asking bettors to predict the price of the first set of markets on the day before Election Day. On the day before Election Day, either they’ll have struck oil, or they won’t have. So regardless of the oil situation, people will be factoring in only the true effect of the parties’ policies. If you ask people today to predict those markets, they’ll be predicting the true effect of the policies. Giving an example with numbers on everything (thanks to AI for gaming this out with me): - 25% chance of striking oil - NO OIL WORLD (75% chance): ------ D increases GDP 5%, R increases GDP 2% ------ D wins 50%, R wins 50% - YES OIL WORLD (25% chance): ------ D increases GDP 10%, R increases GDP 7% ------ D wins 10%, R wins 90% Total P(R wins) = 0.75×0.5 + 0.25×0.9 = 0.375 + 0.225 = 0.6 Total P(D wins) = 0.75×0.5 + 0.25×0.1 = 0.375 + 0.025 = 0.4 Naive conditional market calculation E[GDP | R wins] = (0.225×7% + 0.375×2%) / 0.6 = (1.575% + 0.75%) / 0.6 = 3.875% E[GDP | D wins] = (0.025×10% + 0.375×5%) / 0.4 = (0.25% + 1.875%) / 0.4 = 5.3125% Naive difference: 5.3125% - 3.875% = 1.4375% (understates the true 3% causal effect of D policies) Secondary market calculation On Election Eve, conditional on oil found: R market = 7%, D market = 10% On Election Eve, conditional on no oil: R market = 2%, D market = 5% E[Today's market on the Election Eve R market price] = 0.25×7% + 0.75×2% = 1.75% + 1.5% = 3.25% E[Today's market on the Election Eve D market price] = 0.25×10% + 0.75×5% = 2.5% + 3.75% = 6.25% Secondary market difference: 6.25% - 3.25% = 3% (exactly the true causal effect)This doesn’t completely solve the conditional problem. There could be residual correlations based on hidden variables that affect the outcome of interest (in this case the election) without being known to bettors even on Election Day Eve. A trivial example is some extraordinary event which happens at 12:01 AM on Election Day. A more subtle example goes something like: suppose the economy is subtly good, nobody has managed to aggregate the statistics and figure this out in a legible way yet, and each individual person still only has private knowledge that the economy is good for him- or her-self. They might still be more likely to vote Republican based on their own private economic optimism, and then the hidden goodness of the economy might become manifest and improve GDP during the next term. Yes, this example is a stretch; maybe I’m missing better ones, or maybe this is a silly edge case failure mode that shouldn’t bother us in real life. What about interaction effects - for example, if Democrats were better at milking a good economy and making it even better, but Republicans were better at correcting a distressed economy and bringing it back to average, would that break the link between the primary and secondary markets? This is beyond my poor mathematical ability, but the AIs claim it’s not a problem - the secondary market workaround still ensures the correct difference. Bonus question: Is there a way to simplify this so that we don’t have to run all four markets? The End Of The Beginning When I started this column in 2021, I dreamed of a time when there would be big legal prediction markets on important topics. That’s come true. There have been some small benefits, but not the epistemic wonderland I hoped for. So what now? Do we pat Shayne Coplan and Tarek Mansour on the back, let them enjoy their superyachts, and otherwise forget about this space? I see two ways forward. The first is to continue praying for the original Manifold vision - a prediction market site which offers: Real money markets

When I ask Manifold why they won’t add 1, they say that Polymarket and Kalshi already dominate the space, and they have other, more interesting plans (to be announced soon). When I ask Polymarket why they won’t do 2, the answer is a combination of regulatory issues, fear that people would write bad resolution criteria and it would reflect badly on them, and there always being something more important to do. I haven’t asked Kalshi, but their answer would definitely be regulatory.

Expecting this to happen in 2027, what will that look like, and who should we invest in? Maybe this benefits Manifold - all of a sudden, play-money markets become much more important, and quantity becomes more important at the expense of quality. But branding and perception are important, so the victory could also go to someone who designs around superforecasting bots from the ground up.

Open Thread 420

February 09, 2026 · Original source

Draaglom on the dynamics of the Manifold lab leak market

Inline links: Draaglom on the dynamics of the Manifold lab leak market

The Passage Of Polymarket

March 03, 2026 · Original source

Stephen Grugett and Ian Philips of Manifold Markets have announced a new project, MNX.

Inline links: MNX

Partly it’s because Anthropic seems likely to win on appeal. Hegseth has said the government will keep using Anthropic for the next six months (undermining his case that they’re a national security risk) and has signed a substantially similar contract with OpenAI (undermining his case that their contract terms were unworkable). The prediction markets think the courts will be sympathetic: But even in the 28% of timelines where the designation sticks, things don’t seem so bad. Secretary of War Hegseth originally tweeted that:

Inline links: tweeted

The lawyers who weighed in seem to think that Anthropic’s interpretation of the law is correct, and Secretary Hegseth’s interpretation confused. In some situations, this might be cold comfort - how much does it help to be right about the law when the government is wrong? But in this case, it probably helps a lot. Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are all big Anthropic investors - each owns about a 10% stake - and have multi-billion dollar AI compute contracts. Together, the three tech giants must have at least $100 billion riding on Anthropic’s success. They also have good administration connections and great lobbyists, and even Hegseth isn’t stupid enough to pick fights with them all at once. So probably they send their lobbyists to have a talk with Hegseth about what the “supply chain risk” designation actually entails, Hegseth enforces the letter of the law, and Anthropic is barely affected. At least this is the story the prediction markets are going with: In this best-case scenario, Anthropic’s downside is losing some government contracts that made up ~5% of its business, plus some other Department-of-War-contractor contracts that probably add up to another ~5%.

Manifold Markets35 mentions across 35 issues

Manifold Markets is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 35 times across 35 issues between February 01, 2022 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Manifold Markets is still alive and active: 30%"; "Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy"; "And the team behind Manifold Markets (ACX grant recipient) want me to announce that they’re officially open!". It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Manifold, Polymarket.

Article page: Manifold Markets
Mention count: 35
Issue count: 35
First seen: February 01, 2022
Last seen: March 03, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Predictions For 2022 February 01, 2022
The Passage Of Polymarket February 07, 2022
Open Thread 211 February 13, 2022
22 March 14, 2022
Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets March 28, 2022
22 August 16, 2022
22 October 18, 2022
ACX Grants: Project Updates November 04, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide November 30, 2022
Open Thread 253 December 05, 2022
Prediction Market FAQ December 20, 2022
Announcing Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants February 24, 2023
Impact Market Mini-Grants Update March 03, 2023
23 April 25, 2023
Open Thread 276 May 14, 2023
23: Room Temperature Superforecaster August 01, 2023
Open Thread 293 September 11, 2023
Impact Market Mini-Grants Results October 09, 2023
Open Thread 298 October 16, 2023
In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023
Apply For An ACX Grant (2024) December 08, 2023
Links For January 2024 January 18, 2024
ACX Grants Results 2024 February 10, 2024
Open Thread 318 March 04, 2024
Who Predicted 2023? March 05, 2024
Open Thread 327 April 28, 2024
24 May 13, 2024
Open Thread 343 August 19, 2024
Mantic Monday: Judgment Day November 05, 2024
Links For February 2025 February 27, 2025
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025
Apply For An ACX Grant (2025) July 24, 2025
ACX Grants Results 2025 October 13, 2025
Open Thread 423 March 02, 2026
Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day March 03, 2026

Metaculus 18 shared issues
Manifold 17 shared issues
Polymarket 14 shared issues
Kalshi 12 shared issues
FDA 9 shared issues

Source context

Predictions For 2022

February 01, 2022 · Original source

PREDICTION MARKETS 88. No new real-money prediction market becomes bigger than Polymarket: 70% 89. Manifold Markets is still alive and active: 30% 90. New legal US real-money prediction market at least half as big as Kalshi: 5% 91. New illegal but easy-to-use market satisfying the above: 20% 92. I post my scores on these predictions before 2/1/23: 80%

February 07, 2022 · Original source

Easy to create your own subsidized markets “Real money” should be self-explanatory. Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice, but so far they’re limited to a small group of enthusiasts playing in their spare time. I value them both, but neither is the killer app that makes prediction markets as central to everyday life as stock markets or polls or whatever. “Easy to use” is kind of self-explanatory, but with some caveats. A big part of ease-of-use is liquidity; you can get that from a big user base or from clever deployment of automated market makers. A market that requires crypto knowledge is harder to use than one that doesn’t; one that’s inaccessible from the US is harder to use than one that isn’t. Also all the normal things like UI and search. “Easy to create your own markets” is where we’ve gotten stuck so far. Prediction markets are absolutely on top of questions about whether Donald Trump will win various elections. This is a solved problem. What I really wanted last year (and would have subsidized!) was a market about whether Alameda County, California, would permit indoor gatherings of 50 people on January 8th 2022 (ie would I be forced to cancel my wedding). But I also would have appreciated the ability to put a few questions to prediction markets before starting my psychiatry practice, or my grants program, or any of a dozen other things I did. A friend has gone further, and half-jokingly said they want to create conditional prediction markets about whether they’re compatible with various women in our friend group, to be paid out six months after the first date. Some of these applications are attempts to route around the principal-agent problem. Maybe I have some question about whether a certain grant would succeed, I’m not sure who to ask, and even if someone gives me a “Bob Smith, Grant Evaluator” business card, I don’t know if he’s any good. A prediction market takes all the pain out of searching for information - if I subsidize it enough, it’ll attract people with the relevant skill set who will solve my problem for me. Probably some of these ideas wouldn’t work, but probably other ideas I can’t even think of now would. I don’t know what the killer app for prediction markets will be. But we’re not going to find out unless people can create their own subsidized markets and play around. Polymarket took some baby steps towards this before the settlement: they had a Discord server where anyone could propose questions, and a lot of those questions became markets. But they still had to be general interest, not “let Alice’s five friends predict her dating life”. And there’s a big difference between “talk it over with company representatives on a Discord server” and “press a button”. Imagine if you could only tweet by emailing Jack Dorsey and convincing him that your comment was a good thing to have on Twitter. Even if Jack had good judgment and approved most requests, this would be a long way from the limbic system < — > Send Tweet loop that real Twitter users know and love. I asked some people in the business why they won’t do this. They said most people are bad at writing good resolution criteria. They don’t want their employees to get stuck resolving incredibly dumb questions about people’s dating lives, hunting down inaccessible or conflicting information, and making a bunch of people mad whichever way they decide. As far as I can tell, Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy. But Manifold is US-based and can’t use real money, so there’s still no way to subsidize a market effectively. (This is why I’m pessimistic about Kalshi. They could potentially do a lot of good in the “will Afghanistan collapse?” types of markets the Nobel laureates want, though even there I think some of their betting limits will give them trouble - $25,000 is good money, but not quite good enough to incentivize founding the prediction market equivalent of a Wall Street trading firm. But even if they solve this, I can’t imagine the regulators giving them permission to host “will this grant work out?” or “how will my dating life go?” markets; it’s just too weird, and the CFTC is too conservative. I don’t know, maybe their connections will come through and pull it off, but I don’t even know if they’re ambitious enough to want this, and I hate having to rely on one organization.) Right now my hopes are, in ascending order of likelihood: Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.

Open Thread 211

February 13, 2022 · Original source

2: And the team behind Manifold Markets (ACX grant recipient) want me to announce that they’re officially open!

Inline links: Manifold Markets

This has been kind of surreal for me, because I haven’t seen much about them in the usual prediction market news, but lots of friends from outside the forecasting space have gotten involved. A writing circle I know are betting with each other about who will finish their stories when. A housemate opened a market into whether she’ll get pregnant, and another housemate who helps with childcare is buying shares “as a hedge”. I’m feeling pretty good about my claim last week that easy market creation would open up hitherto unexplored territories. TFW you learn the market says 85% chance your friend hooks up with your ex 3: Related: ACX Grants recipient Nuno Sempere somehow got grant money of his own and is giving out $10K in prediction market related microgrants. Apply here if interested.

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/wildwestwind/will-westwind-and-nextworldover-hoo-06ce76815de9, Apply here

TFW you learn the market says 85% chance your friend hooks up with your ex 3: Related: ACX Grants recipient Nuno Sempere somehow got grant money of his own and is giving out $10K in prediction market related microgrants. Apply here if interested.

Inline links: Apply here

March 14, 2022 · Original source

4: Also last month, I suggested Manifold Markets have a loan feature to help boost investment in long-term markets. They’ve since added this feature: your first $M20 will automatically be a zero-interest loan.

Inline links: Manifold Markets

1: Taosumer reviews my Prediction Market Cube and asks why I don’t have “decentralized” on there as a desideratum. My answer: decentralization is great, but for me it cashes out in “ease of use” - specifically, it’s easy to use it because the government hasn’t shut it down or banned you. Or as “real money” - the reason Manifold isn’t real-money is because they’re centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore need to obey laws. Or as “easy to create market” - the reason Kalshi doesn’t let you create markets is partly because it’s centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore needs to limit markets to things regulators like. I agree that, because of those second order effects, decentralization is crucial and needs to be pursued more, and I agree that it’s a tragedy that [whatever happened to Augur] happened to Augur.

Inline links: Taosumer reviews

5: Related: I’m testing Manifold as a knowledge-generation device. If you want to help, go bet in the market about how I’ll rank interventions in an upcoming updated version of the Biodeterminists’ Guide To Pregnancy.

Inline links: go bet in the market

Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets

March 28, 2022 · Original source

Austin, a co-founder of Manifold Markets (formerly Mantic Markets) asks the market what he’ll decide on this technical question. This does two things:

Niels Bohr supposedly said that “prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”. So why not predict the past and present instead? Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.

Inline links: https://manifold.markets/ChrisVeenboer/did-taylor-hawkins-the-drummer-of-t

Here’s a recent market on Manifold (click image for link). Taylor Hawkins is a famous drummer who died last weekend under unclear circumstances. This market asks if he died of drug-related causes. Presumably someone will do an autopsy or investigation soon, and Chris will resolve the market based on that information. This is a totally standard prediction market, except that it’s technically about interpreting past events.

August 16, 2022 · Original source

What’s the catch? Offer not open to US citizens - a vexing, problematic negation. And you need to have a Solana wallet, own crypto, and know how to use it. And there’s not a lot of volume so far. But otherwise, no catch. This is just a really good new thing. Think of it as Manifold Markets, but with real money (and 10x harder to use).

The community consensus so far seems to be to try to avoid Kalshi as long as it can. There are some good real-money prediction markets open to non-Americans: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, and Insight Prediction, although Americans will find visits prohibited nationally, and I would never recommend violating precepts negligently. You could also try play-money markets like Manifold, or market-adjacent forecasting sites like Metaculus.

Inline links: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, Insight Prediction, Manifold, Metaculus

Finally, there’s a claim that Aristotle, the for-profit company involved with PredictIt, might try to move into the fully-regulated-prediction-market space and compete with Kalshi. I’m posting this as an encouragement for you to click on it and bet, not as a final word about the probability - there are only four bets so far! This might actually be a good move; Kalshi had to spend lots of blood and sweat and money getting the CFTC to approve a prediction market, but now that there’s a precedent it’ll be easier for the next entrant. And the Kalshi-haters might support a competitor out of pure spite. This would be almost unfair: Kalshi would have done all the hard work, get forced into unethical business practices to make back the money it sacrificed, and then someone else could free-ride with a spotless reputation.

Inline links: a claim that, https://manifold.markets/ahalekelly/will-predictits-cftc-application-to

October 18, 2022 · Original source

The Manifold Markets team, along with Nuno Sempere, Linch Zhang, Ozzie Gooen, and other rationalist/EA forecasters.

Inline links: The Manifold Markets team

First of all, thanks to the Substack team for making Manifold Markets embed easily in Substack! Taking advantage of their hard work:

Sources: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen The lowest forecaster is higher than the highest pollster! Taking 538 as an example, forecasters range from 5 pp higher (Manifold) to 17 pp higher (PredictIt). Tournaments and real-money markets tend to give higher numbers than play-money sites. I would go with 47% on this one, based on the convergence between GJO, CSPI, and Polymarket. CFTC vs. PredictIt (and everyone else), Part II The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the US agency regulating prediction markets. In August, they told PredictIt (the biggest political prediction market) to shut down, effective in February. Now a motley group of stakeholders are suing the CFTC for a stay of execution. Plaintiffs include: 2 professors using the site as “a source of data for research”

Inline links: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen, they told PredictIt

Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide

November 04, 2022 · Original source

33: SD’s Neutrino Research (5/10) SD says his neutrino thesis is going well, and he is applying for graduate programs in neutrino physics. 34: User-Created Prediction Markets (9/10) Manifold Markets wanted to create a new prediction market platform where anyone could post questions. They’ve since pivoted to play money and raised $2.4 million in grants and seed funding, with about 10,000 different markets and 300 daily average users. I and many of my friends visit their site daily or at least weekly, and I often link them on Mantic Mondays. They have deals going with the Salem Center at University of Texas, Clearer Thinking, and various EA groups.

Inline links: Manifold Markets

30: Writing Forecasting Questions For EA Organizations (6/10) Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.

November 30, 2022 · Original source

I think those numbers might be "over one year", and they could stay on it longer than a year. I was kind of lazy just asserting “drugs might get better”, but I think the upcoming CagriSema combination and AMG-133 are good examples of how this might play out. Max Görlitz has done the proper thing and made Manifold markets for each of my predictions - see here, here, here, here, and here. Despite the problems with prediction markets for decades in the future, the “will obesity be cut in half by 2050” one seems popular: 5. Do You Have To Stay On Semaglutide Forever Or Else Gain The Weight Back? Biff_Ditt writes: I saw on the 1 year follow-up to the STEP-1 trial that most of the participants gained all of their lost weight back. Biff is probably thinking of Weight Regain And Cardiometabolic Effects After Withdrawal Of Semaglutide, which finds people gained back 2/3 of the lost weight after a year. The graph looks like it’s in the process of plateauing but not quite there, so I don’t know if we should expect them to regain the other third later. This matches what I would expect from my understanding of other diets and weight loss drugs. Still, some people disagree. Maximum Liberty writes: Anecdote is not the singular of data, but my better half lost 25 pounds on it, then had to get off it for reasons unrelated to the drug. She has not regained the weight yet -- and consistently eats less now that she had for years. So in at least one case, the drug helped with a successful change in eating habits. Lauren Thomas writes: So there's been a lot of research on dieting and losing weight, etc., and one of the things that has been found is that your body has a "set" point weight wise that it will try REALLY hard to return you to. If you lose weight, your body will slow its metabolism until you return to that weight. If you gain weight, your body will rev up metabolism. That's why you might gain 10 lbs over Christmas and then lose it in January without purposefully trying to lose weight. (this is all in the short term, ofc, as people do tend to naturally gain weight as they age). This seems to imply that semaglutide would need to be taken forever. However, there seems to be an important caveat: you *can* reset your set point, it just takes a long time at the new weight. When most people go on diets and lose weight, they end up regaining the new weight quite quickly after they "end" their diet, so they don't have a chance to reset their set point. Speaking from personal experience, I had kind of an accidental natural experiment with this: I once lost 40 lbs over the course of a year and a half, where I began with a very strict low carb diet that very very slowly trailed off to a normal diet, mostly because I got progressively more tired of being on the low carb diet. So by the time I had gotten back to my normal diet, I had been losing weight for a long time. I ended up regaining 10 lbs of the weight, but no more, and am still ~30 lbs below my peak even today (5 years later). Something like this has been my experience with dieting too so far. And something like set point reset has to exist in order to explain things like why so many obese people fail to lose weight after they start eating healthy, and maybe other things like anorexia. And maybe it works for some people. Still, the evidence suggests that most people who stop semaglutide will regain the weight, at least for the protocol used in the study. Maybe some other protocol that had them on it for more than a year would have done better? 6. Personal Anecdotes Edgehopper writes: I couldn’t get Wegovy at a reasonable price when it was approved, and then Novo Nordisk started having huge supply chain problems with their injectors. Fortunately, Eli Lilly’s coupon for Mounjaro was less restrictive at first, though they’ve had to crack down as they have trouble meeting demand for both off-label weight loss use and for the approved T2D use. I am what the doctors call “morbidly obese,” and it’s been more effective than anything else I’ve ever tried. Down about 35 lbs in the first three months, and unlike with other diets I’ve tried, I’m not feeling miserable or hungry all the time. Assuming there aren’t scary side-effects in the future, these really are miracle drugs. I do expect the price to come down relatively quickly due to competition, which is a good thing. Education Realist (blog) writes: I am on Mounjaro, and have been for four months. Lost 20 pounds so far, and I'm not yet on full dosage. Occasional mild nausea but real issue for me is....tiredness. Not fatigue or exhaustion. I'm a former insomniac who can now hit the sack at 9:00 and sleep happily to 6 am, which is insanely weird. I have been trying to lose weight for 6 years, and for most of that time been in a 20 pound range that is 100 pounds over what someone of my height should weigh. I've eaten 1500 calories a day and not lost a pound, have to drop to 1100 to lose weight verrry slowly (that's with intermittent fasting and low carbs, around 50 grams). Last year before Mounjaro I started intermittent fasting and lost 20 pounds very quickly and then stopped cold. I do not have eating issues. I don't binge. I cut out the "four white foods" six years ago because I learned that I do better on meat and cheese and vegetables than I do on pasta or bread or potatoes and vegetables. I put on weight despite walking two and in some cases four miles a day, which I can do easily. I am ridiculously healthy and do not have an obesity diagnosis. Stone cold normal readings in A1c, glucose, cholestrol. My doctor sent me to an endocrinologist after I lost 20 pounds and then stopped cold despite the same behavior (which I still do today) because she agreed I might be insulin resistant. Endocrinologist shrugged, said it's multifactorial, but agreed that anyone with my numbers, appearance, and obvious good health was clearly doing everything right and put me on Mounjaro with no further questions. Diagnosis: insulin resistance. My insurance pays around $500 but I'm on the $25 coupon. I didn't change a single thing about my eating habits and lost ten pounds in 2 months on the low dosage. Higher dosages have finally reduced my appetite somewhat, but my endocrinologist and I have decided to stop the increases at 12.5 (15 is the top) and then maybe even reduce, since my appetite is decreasing but the weight loss rate is constant. Because I lost weight doing the same behavior and no drop, I'm quite convinced that something far different than appetite suppressing is also going on (fwiw, I was on phentarmine back in the day and liked it fine). Mounjaro is supposed to increase insulin production and reduce the liver's sugar production, although what that means I dunno. I have no idea what's up with obesity but the idea that it's all about cutting intake and exercise is just stupid. I should have been losing weight for all of the past six years and haven't. Plenty of people eat healthily and are still obese. We're probably the descendants of famine survivors. Anyway, I wrote about it here: https://educationrealist.wordpress.com/2022/10/09/weight-loss-and-mounjaro Eliezer Yudkowsky writes: I tried semaglutide and it did nothing to slow rate of weight gain, just produced stomach upset, going up to 2.4mg injectable. I know one other person trying semaglutide and they reported something similar. I wonder if they played some clever games with their choice of patients. My expectation of how the news goes here is a whole lot of people who try semaglutide, maybe after fighting really hard to get on it, and find that it does nothing. That said, I know at least one friend of a friend, if not a friend per se, who claims that semaglutide was their miracle drug. So maybe still worth that hard fight, even if I'm guessing that the real proportion who get nothing out of it will prove to be over 50% in real populations. Further fun fact: Semaglutide comes heavily recommended with diet and exercise and many stern injunctions about that! The actual insert sheet includes a graph for how much weight people lose with and without "lifestyle interventions" added. The two graphs are roughly the same. Lan writes: I wonder about the adoption of the medication, though. I took victoza (=saxenda, but approved for diabetes) and the absence of the desire to eat lead to some unforeseen lifestyle side effects. Given that 5 almonds made me full for the day, I was not interested in having dinner with the family or going out with friends. There is the reality that some restaurants would probably not be happy if you only ordered the smallest appetizer. In addition, alcohol was also very difficult, because the drug slows down gastric emptying and your stomach ends up absorbing alcohol for hours. I got really, really drunk for an entire night from a single glass of wine once. Before taking this drug I had not fully appreciated how much of one's (social) life revolves around food; lunch break with colleagues, dinner with family or friends, drinks on the weekend, a sweet treat, snacks and a movie etc. But once I was not interested in food anymore, combined with the tiredness that comes with eating little, a lot of those activities also lost their appeal. (On the upside, I slept like a log.) Walter Sobchak, Esq writes: I have been taking Wegovy for 14 months. When I began I weighed 275 lbs and my BMI was 39.9. I have hypertension, albeit well controlled by medicines. Diet and exercise phaaahhh. I could eat faster than I could exercise. And no, I eat very little fast food and little candy and soda. I worked with my doctor to be prescribed Wegovy. It was only approved by the FDA in June 2021. My doctor was reluctant because he was unfamiliar with the class of compounds. He does not like to prescribe off label so he was not willing to to start me on Ozempic. But, the FDA solved that problem. I knew to ask for the drug because my daughter was pre-diabetic and had been put on Metformin and Ozempic. She lost 100 lbs. in 2019 and 2020. I started on Wegovy in September 2021. I now weigh 220 and my BMI is 31.5. That represents a 20% reduction in my original weight. 220 was my original goal. To get a BMI under 30 I would have to be under 209. I doubt that I will get there. I am back in 40 in. trousers which I had not been able to wear in 30 years. 220 was my original goal. I have had no major side effects other than constipation. Even that is a little hard to tease out. I am on 7 Rx drugs and at least 5 of them are constipating. I have been pounding Metamucil and Colace for years. I have been able to fill my prescriptions using a GoodRx coupon at $1328 for a box with 4 injectors. A year requires 13 boxes. The total cost for 15 boxes has been about $20,000. I can afford it and it has been worth while. I call it a bargain, the best I've ever had. I understand that it still way too expensive for the American health care system to afford. But given the bonanza size of the market. There will be lots of competition starting with the Lilly's tirzepatide. There are several other pharma's with GLP-1 agonists in development. I am sure that the cost will come down. My doctor tells me that I can expect to stay on semaglutide for the long term. He is proposing that I switch to Ozempic 2 mg for maintenance as I can buy that for less than $1,000 for a four dose pen. My only sadness is that semaglutide wasn't invented 40 years ago when i would have saved me from a lot of damage. But, I am grateful that it exists now and that it has helped my daughter so much. Also from Walter, and I was wondering about this: I was very concerned with the injections before I started Wegovy. My experience is that the injector is fast and almost painless. My pharmacist was important because he showed me how to do it correctly before I started. 7. Tangents That I Find Tedious, But Other People Apparently Really Want To Debate Why can’t people just diet and exercise? (142 comments)

Inline links: here, here, here, here, here, writes, Weight Regain And Cardiometabolic Effects After Withdrawal Of Semaglutide, writes, writes, anorexia, writes, Education Realist, blog, https://educationrealist.wordpress.com/2022/10/09/weight-loss-and-mounjaro, writes, writes, from Walter, Why can’t people just diet and exercise?

Open Thread 253

December 05, 2022 · Original source

1: I was supposed to post this last time, forgot, and edited it in later, but I’ll put it in again this time for those of you who missed it - ACX Grantee Manifold Markets is looking for new investors after some recent growth. If interested, email austin@manifold.markets for more details. Product sample below:

Inline links: Manifold Markets

Prediction Market FAQ

December 20, 2022 · Original source

when you’re not sure which of many competing experts to trust, you should trust a prediction market instead of any of them Going through these claims one by one: 3.1: Why expect all prediction markets to agree with each other? Either all prediction markets agree with each other, or you can get rich quick: Suppose prediction markets disagreed. For example, suppose the RNC ran an Official Republican Prediction Market that said there was only a 10% chance Democrats would win the next election, and a 90% chance Republicans would. And suppose the DNC ran an Official Democrat Prediction Market that made the opposite prediction: 90% chance Democrats, 10% chance Republicans. Then you could buy a share of “Democrats will win” from the Republican market for 10 cents, plus a share of “Republicans will win” from the Democrat market for 10 cents, and be guaranteed to make $1 when one party or the other wins. You have turned 20 cents into a guaranteed $1. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This is just what financial experts call “arbitrage”. You may notice that in finance, people always give specific prices for things like shares of stock, barrels of oil, or Bitcoins. People say things like “Google stock is up to $300”, but never “Google stock is up to $300 on the NYSE, but down to $200 on NASDAQ”. If that was true, people would buy it on NASDAQ, sell it on NYSE, make $100 in free money, and get rich quick. In ideal situations, arbitrage forces everybody everywhere to agree on the same price for a financial instrument. Prediction markets turn claims about truth into financial instruments in a way which forces everybody everywhere to agree on how likely the claim is to be true. 3.2: Why expect prediction markets to be hard for special interests to manipulate? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt, or you can get rich quick. Argument: Suppose a prediction market was currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt. For example, suppose there is a prediction market for whether the sun will rise tomorrow. The true probability is obviously 100%, corresponding to a cost of $1.00. But suppose some special interest who wanted to trick people into believing the sun would not rise successfully spent money to bid the market down to only 10%. This means that you can buy, for $0.10, a share which pays $1 if the sun rises tomorrow. In other words, you can dectuple your money for free. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This may sound complicated in theory, but it plays out straightforwardly in real life. As a test, I tried to manipulate the market on whether Austin Chen, founder of Manifold Markets, would be charged with a felony. There’s no reason to think he should be, so the price started at 5%. I spent $200 in Manifold’s play money bidding it up to 95%. Within an hour, other investors noticed the mispricing and corrected it back down to 5% again. 3.3: Why expect prediction markets to be free from bias? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of bias, or you can get rich quick. The argument: Suppose all smart people, including you, know that there is an 80% chance that the Democrats’ economic plan will create new jobs. But suppose that Republicans, because of their partisan biases, refuse to believe it, and say there is only a 40% chance. And suppose the Republicans set up their own prediction market where they bid the price of a share down to $0.40. You can, of course, go on this prediction market, buy shares for $0.40, and double your money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I already described how something like this happens on PredictIt (a non-ideal prediction market that you can only make a few hundred dollars in expectation by correcting), and that I do in fact make a few hundred dollars every election season. 3.4: Why should I believe a prediction market’s consensus over my own opinion? This is the same argument as “the prediction market will always be at least as accurate as the top expert” only with you in the place of the top expert. Either prediction markets are at least as smart as you are, or you can get rich quick. The argument here is the same as “at least as smart as the smartest expert” argument in 2, except replacing “the smartest expert” with “you”. But just to lay it out explicitly: Suppose you were smarter than some prediction market. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I like this because it’s a good empirical test, and one that many people have tried. If you think you’re smarter than the prediction markets, bet on them and see what happens! I think most people will find that (over the long run) they lose money, and eventually this will cure them of their delusion that they can beat the markets. A few people might find that (over the long run) they do win money, just as a few people (eg Warren Buffett) can consistently win money on the stock market. Hopefully those people will quit their day jobs and become full-time prediction market traders. They’ll become multimillionaires, and their hard work will ensure that prediction markets stay more accurate than the rest of us. 3.5: Why should I believe that a prediction market makes good decisions about which of many competing experts to trust? Suppose you accept that a prediction market will always be at least as accurate as some well-known expert (eg Nate Silver). But what if you’re not sure who the real experts are? Or what if there are many experts, all saying different things, and nobody knows who to trust? In this case, a prediction market will always be at least as good as any other source (including you) at telling good experts from bad, or at figuring out which of many good experts is the best. By this point you should be able to predict the argument, but for completeness’ sake: Suppose you were better than the prediction market at determining which of many competing experts to trust, or how to aggregate the pronouncements of many experts into a single authoritative opinion. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. To ground this in a real example, suppose there is some new virus which might or might not spread to the United States. A Harvard professor of epidemiology says there’s a 70% chance it will spread, a Yale professor of epidemiology says there’s an 90% chance it will spread, and a guy in a tinfoil hat on Infowars says there’s a 0% chance it will spread because it’s all a fake government plot. If I knew nothing else about this situation, I would probably think there’s about an 80% chance the virus will spread. I trust the Harvard and Yale professors equally much, and the tinfoil hat guy not at all. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 10%, because most people trusted the tinfoil hat guy. I would want to buy YES shares until the price got up to 80%, because in expectation I would octuple my money. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 70%. Now I wouldn’t be sure whether the prediction market was dumber than me (believed tinfoil hat guy) or smarter than me (they know a lot about epidemiology - or about the credibility of specific experts - and have decided to trust the Harvard professor over the Yale professor). Maybe I could improve on this. If I knew things about epidemiology, I could read over both professors’ arguments and try to figure out if one was better than the other. If I knew things about academia, I could pick over both professors’ resumes and see whether the Harvard professor seemed more distinguished or had more respect in her own field than the Yale professor. In the end, I might decide the prediction market was right to price it at 70% (in which case I wouldn’t do anything), or that actually both experts seemed equally expert (in which case I might bid it up to 80%), or that actually the Yale epidemiologist was better (in which case I might bid it up to 90%). 3.5.1: Isn’t it weird to give non-experts (like prediction market investors) the final judgment in which of two experts is right? Yes, but I don’t think this is avoidable. If there were no such thing as prediction markets, and the Harvard epidemiologist said 70%, and the Yale epidemiologist said 90%, and the tinfoil hat guy said 0%, and for some reason it mattered a lot to you which of these was true - then you would still have to make that decision. If there’s some extremely authoritative source who can make the decision for you - let’s say the World Health Organization says “after reviewing all experts’ arguments, we believe that the final probability is 75%” - then great! Either: The WHO is clearly the most trustworthy source - in which case we go back to the Nate Silver situation where the prediction market should be just as accurate as it is.

Operate using play-money only. Here Manifold is the leader. You could also think of superforecasting tournaments like Metaculus as a version of this. I claim that the main reason prediction markets haven’t fulfilled their potential and become a major pillar of worldwide decision-making is that none of these solutions are really adequate. For whatever reason, most people interested in prediction markets are American, so Polymarket has a limited userbase. The regulators are pretty harsh, so the companies that strike deals to get exemptions usually have to trade away most of their functionality. Kalshi can only ask a few specific regulator-approved questions; the limits are so harsh that they’re not even allowed to predict elections. Play-money prediction markets like Manifold are a lot of fun, but there’s a limit to how much work people will do to earn play money. I want a world where the people who are best at correcting mispricings in prediction markets can make full-time jobs out of it, and where there are prediction market equivalents of Goldman Sachs where hundreds of brilliant people work together with cut-throat efficiency to find mispricings the moment they appear. Play money won’t get us there. Real money prediction markets tend to have between four- and six-digit (very occasionally seven-digit) volumes on most questions. Play money prediction markets have between one- and four-digit numbers of traders on most questions. Most big prediction markets are usually within 10% of each other and the best outside experts, but not always within 1%. Traditional financial markets are usually within 1% of each other, so I think this is because the prediction markets are still too small to have sub-1% accuracy. I hope that as they grow bigger they can reach this milestone. 7. What can I do to help promote prediction markets? If you’re an ordinary person with no special expertise or skills, I think the best thing you can do is create a Manifold Markets account, bet on topics that are interesting to you, and create markets for any interesting topics that don’t have one yet. I think this could be helpful for a few reasons: It’s hard to really understand prediction markets until you’ve played a few yourself.

Inline links: Manifold, Metaculus

Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al. Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected. By "unified" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of "introspection" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.) Resolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public. Even this isn’t perfect (which models are “the equivalent of” a 1:8 scale Ferrari 312?), but in practice once you get to this level of details people mostly stop worrying about this. Another method (mostly associated with Manifold) is to just leave it up to human judgment - specifically, the judgment of the person who made the market. For example, I could make a market in “By 2050, will there be an AI which Scott Alexander thinks qualifies as ‘human-level’?” This will force market participants to price in the risk that I have bad judgment or act dishonestly. But perhaps these risks are small. For example, I might say elsewhere what I think qualifies as “human-level” AI, or you might think human-level AI will be so obvious when it comes that I will definitely agree with you about it. As for honesty, this could be enforced either legally or by reputation. Someone who has resolved their past 100 prediction markets honestly will probably resolve this one honestly too, especially if they get paid to do so and will never get customers again if they lie. When we invest on the normal stock market, we trust that our brokers / the NYSE / etc won’t run off with our money, and this trust is usually well-deserved. Even when we make an online purchase, we trust that the store we’re sending our money to won’t steal it and refuse to send us the product. It would be an exaggeration to say that trust is a solved problem, but evidence from Manifold suggests that most people price in a <1% chance that well-known market makers with good reputation resolve dishonestly. If prediction markets got big enough, they could spawn trusted “resolution companies” who individual markets and market-makers could outsource their resolution to, for a fee. If these companies were ever dishonest, they would lose all their business from then on, so they would probably be as honest as other businesses like your broker / the NYSE / various online stores / etc. 4.7.1: Isn’t a lot of the “crisis of trust” around questions that might never have clear future answers? For example, consider the debate around whether Donald Trump is a Russian agent. Maybe no proof will ever come out either way. Or maybe some evidence will appear that seems to prove one side or the other, but people will continue to deny it for political reasons, and the problem of resolving the prediction market will be just as hard as the problem of answering the original question. Indeed, prediction markets aren’t very good at this, and are only fully trustworthy on questions where the true answer will eventually become apparent. Still, they might not be completely useless. For example, if you’re worried about Trump being a Russian agent because you expect him to pursue pro-Russia policies, you can start markets in whether he pursues those policies. Or you can start a conditional market (see 5.1) on whether, if Russia ever releases its past intelligence data many years from now, the data confirm/disconfirm that Trump was an agent. See Part 5 for other clever ways you might try to address this problem. 4.8: “Meme stocks” like Gamestop and AMC sometimes remain mispriced indefinitely. How do we know this won’t happen with prediction markets? Meme stocks are a type of Ponzi. It’s “reasonable” to buy Gamestop at some inflated price, because - who knows? - someone else might buy it at an even more inflated price tomorrow. And this can keep going arbitrarily long, or at least long enough for you to get out with a profit. Unlike meme stocks, prediction markets have a clear resolution date. If you’re predicting who will win the next election, the market will go to 100% or 0% after the election finishes. No matter how many memes there were, you wouldn’t buy a share in “the Democrats will win the election” for 99% the day before Election Day if you knew they would definitely lose. But that means prediction markets should be accurately priced the day before Election Day, which means you shouldn’t buy at an inaccurate price two days before Election Day, and so on. I can’t say for sure that no prediction market will ever get mispriced for meme reasons, but they should be much more robust against meme mispricings than the stock market. And even the stock market doesn’t have too many meme stocks. 4.9: How do prediction markets deal with outcomes in the far future? Suppose there is a question “who will win the 2100 election?” Currently it says 25% Democrats, 75% Republicans, and I believe it should be 50-50 (we’ll ignore third parties, or the possibility of America not existing in 2100, for now). So if I bet on the market, I can (in expectation) double my money. But there are many better ways to double your money by 2100. For example, if the stock market grows 4% per year, I should expect any money invested in the stock market to multiply by 20x in 2100. So just doubling it in a prediction market is a bad option. Realistically, this means prediction markets won’t work well for far-future events. These might be a better match for forecaster tournaments or some other structure, where we get the forecaster track records through present events, then use those track records weighting their far-future predictions (see also 5.5). There are already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events. But if you really wanted to use a prediction market, you could theoretically solve this by putting investors’ money in index funds while they waited. Then the winner would get their (and the losers’) original deposits and investment profits, and it would go back to being a better option than investing in index funds directly. In practice this seems complicated and I wouldn’t expect it to work. 4.9.1: What about predicting things that would make it impossible or pointless to win money, like human extinction? Again, these questions probably aren’t great matches for prediction markets, and you should use forecasting tournaments or some other method (see also 5.5). If you really wanted, you might be able to make it work in theory through a mechanism sort of like this one. 5. What are some clever uses for prediction markets? Here’s a non-exhaustive list: 5.1: Conditional prediction markets / decision markets Suppose the government is trying to decide whether to throw its weight behind Vaccine A or Vaccine B for some deadly disease. There are some experts behind both, both sets of experts accuse the other of being in the pay of pharmaceutical companies, and decision-makers don’t know who to trust. They might make two prediction markets, like: If we decide to go with Vaccine A, will at least X people die from the disease?

Inline links: Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al, already good forecasting tournaments on some far future events, this one

Impact Market Mini-Grants Update

February 24, 2023 · Original source

I still dream of running an ACX Grants round using impact certificates, but I want to run a lower-stakes test of the technology first. In conjunction with the Manifold Markets team, we’re announcing the Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants, a $20,000 grants round for forecasting projects.

A: This is Astral Codex Ten, a blog about various science / technology / philosophy / politics issues, which sometimes does grants rounds and projects like this one. I think I have a good reputation of paying for things I say I am going to pay for, see for example last year’s ACX Grants. Manifold Markets is a company that runs a prediction market website and is generally interested in unusual market structures solving social problems. We’re co-sponsoring this impact market in order to test impact markets as a charitable funding mechanism.

Inline links: ACX Grants, Manifold Markets

Go to Manifold’s impact market site, Manifund, who have kindly agreed to handle the technology side of this.

Inline links: Manifund

March 03, 2023 · Original source

To test this new model, ACX and the Manifold Markets team are running a prototype mini-grants round for forecasting projects. Thanks to everyone who submitted a proposal.

Inline links: are running a prototype mini-grants round for forecasting projects

The deadline for further project submissions is tonight, so get them in now if you have them! 3: Manifold continues to approve accredited investors. If you’re an accredited investor (approximately: you make $200K+ per year, or have $1MM net worth), and you feel like you understand impact markets, you’re welcome to participate in the investment phase. 4: …which is starting now! Bid for equity on projects that you expect to succeed - and in six months when I give them retroactive grants, those grants will go to you in proportion to how much equity you hold. Some restrictions apply, see original post for details. The auctions say they’re closing March 8th, but we’re running a little behind schedule and might keep them open until March 12th instead. 5: You can also ignore everything we’re doing and use Manifund’s impact market for any other kind of charitable project you want. Keep in mind that there is no guarantee that we or anyone else will ever retroactively fund these, and you’re kind of operating on blind faith here. Two people are already trying this: Feel free to buy or trade equity in these projects, but remember that nobody including me has any story for why they might ever make money, and this would be a strange thing to do from a profit-maximizing perspective. 6: Current planned schedule (may change quickly) is: Tonight: Deadline for project submissions

Inline links: see original post for details, https://manifund.org/

April 25, 2023 · Original source

Nikos Bosse compares Metaculus’ performance to its “competitor” Manifold Markets, and finds that overall Metaculus was more accurate:

Inline links: compares Metaculus’ performance to its “competitor” Manifold Markets

The mean Brier score was 0.084 for Metaculus and 0.107 for Manifold. This difference was significant using a paired test. Metaculus was ahead of Manifold on 75% of the questions (48 out of 64).

Does this mean that forecasting tournaments are better than prediction markets? Some past studies have provided very tentative evidence in that direction, but this one probably doesn’t - many more people use Metaculus than Manifold, and Nikos didn’t control for number of forecasters.

Open Thread 276

May 14, 2023 · Original source

4: Manifold Markets and Charity Entrepreneurship are hosting a tournament (top prize $1000) to see if prediction markets can help select among charity ideas. See here (and press the Read More button) for more.

Inline links: See here

23: Room Temperature Superforecaster

August 01, 2023 · Original source

Jacob Cohen describes himself as the president of his school’s forecasting club. I think we’re going to be all right. Manifest 2023 Manifold Markets is sponsoring Manifest, an “inaugural forecasting & prediction market conference”, to be held at the Rose Garden Inn, Berkeley, California the weekend of September 22. Their website is short on details, but listed speakers and guests of honor are: …now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

…now that I think about it I do remember vaguely agreeing to something like this, though I’m not currently planning to give any particular speeches. But Aella and Robert are great - and although I’ve never met the third guy, it seems appropriate for a conference called Manifest to feature someone named Destiny. Manifold tends to do things on impulse and fill in the details later, so the schedule looks sparse. But usually the things they throw together last-minute end up being pretty good, so I’m looking forward to this. Tickets cost $220, but can also be purchased with mana (Manifold Markets’ play money), at least until the CFTC notices. It looks like there’s an arbitrage you can use to get the tickets at a 10% discount - I think this is less likely to be a mistake than a preference to have people who can spot arbitrages 10% over-represented at the conference compared to everyone else. Room Temperature Superforecaster Maybe the long-awaited killer app for prediction markets is . . . debating superconductors? First, the markets: I’m heartened to see these two very big markets ($200,000+ volume, 2,000+ traders) within 1% of each other (as of time of writing). This is a really difficult question without an obvious prior, so the level of convergence suggests the markets really are doing their job… …but Metaculus is much lower, probably because the other two are asking if any replication will be positive, and Metaculus is asking if the first replication attempt will be. It’s bad news that these numbers are so different, and suggests a high chance that this stays confusing and comes down to finicky resolution criteria. Still, this has gotten lots of people checking the prediction markets, including Paul Graham: …and around 500 others, according to the Manifold Active Users graph (source): Aside from headline numbers, I’ve also appreciated prediction market comment sections as a good place to stay up to date on the latest developments (including a link to this thread) Elsewhere In Forecasting NYPost: Blind Mystic Baba Vanga Makes Terrifying Nuclear Disaster Prediction For 2023: A blind mystic who allegedly predicted 9/11 is said to have foreseen a nuclear disaster that will ravage Earth before the end of 2023. Baba Vanga, a blind Bulgarian woman, is rumored to have predicted some of the biggest events in world history. She died more than a quarter of a century ago, but many of her predictions are said to have come true long after her death. Now, her followers claim that Baba Vanga foresaw a devastating nuclear disaster that will unfold this year. Big if true. In what sense did she predict 9/11? Another article gives the exact text of the 1989 prediction: “Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds. The wolves will be howling in a bush, and innocent blood will be gushing.” This is a 1989 prediction! If you’re calling airplanes “steel birds” in 1989, you’re just hoping that people forget you lived when airplanes already existed and then get impressed with you for predicting them. Come on! (you could argue that the second half is about Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz howling for war with Iraq from within the Bush administration, but Ass. Sec Wolf played a minimal role in the war buildup so I think if you are being very strict in your interpretation there was really only one wolf involved.) Anyway, Vanga’s other predictions for 2023 include: Earth’s orbit will change

Sinclair Chen. Sinclair works at Manifold; she can be spotted at most Bay Area ACX meetups. I didn’t realize the degree to which she goes hard: “CFTC, if you are reading this, know that there is blood on your hands.” This is not exactly the message I would have written. But I think, as the Catholics like to say, that it comes from a vice which is the excess or perversion of a divine virtue, and I appreciate her for being the sort of person who’s like this, sort of.

Inline links: Sinclair Chen

Open Thread 293

September 11, 2023 · Original source

2: Manifold Markets wants me to remind you that this is approximately your last chance to sign up for Manifest, their forecasting and prediction market conference in Berkeley, CA. Guests will include Nate Silver, Robin Hanson, Aella, Zvi, and the CEOs of Kalshi, Manifold, and Polymarket. I’m still figuring out if I can make it but I’ll try my best.

Inline links: Manifest, their forecasting and prediction market conference

Impact Market Mini-Grants Results

October 09, 2023 · Original source

Last March we (ACX and Manifold Markets) did a test run of an impact market, a novel way of running charitable grants. You can read the details at the links, but it’s basically a VC ecosystem for charity: profit-seeking investors fund promising projects and grantmakers buy credit for successes from the investors. To test it out, we promised at least $20,000 in retroactive grants for forecasting-related projects, and intrepid guinea-pig investors funded 18 projects they thought we might want to buy.

Inline links: Manifold Markets, a test run, impact market, 18 projects

Enjoy the public goods we’ve produced. The Crystal Ballin’ Podcast has one episode and is hoping to make more (as are their competitors, the Market Manipulation Podcast). OPTIC is looking for participants and volunteers. You can still use Manifolio to make Kelly bets, the Telegram bot for Telegram-based prediction markets, and the browser extension to see what Manifold markets people are betting on. And although it’s not technically one of ours, I still like The Base Rate Times.

Inline links: Crystal Ballin’ Podcast, Market Manipulation Podcast, OPTIC, Manifolio, Telegram bot, browser extension, The Base Rate Times

Over the past six months, founders have worked on their projects. Some collapsed, losing their investors all their money. Others flourished, shooting up in value far beyond investor predictions. We got five judges (including me) to assess the final value of each of the 18 projects. Their results mostly determine what I will be offering investors for their impact certificates (see caveats below). They are: We’ll be buying back impact certs at the value on the MEDIAN column - so, for example, we’ll pay $300 for 100% of the certs for the Crystal Ballin’ Podcast.

Open Thread 298

October 16, 2023 · Original source

The Rationalist revival has put wind into the sails of start-ups like Manifold Markets, which was initially funded by a grant program run by Astral Codex Ten, a Rationalist blog that has promoted prediction markets. (It also received $1 million from the FTX Future Fund, the philanthropic arm of the bankrupt crypto exchange whose founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, is a fan of prediction markets.)

5: The New York Times recently published an article about the Manifest prediction market conference. I think it’s overall very good, and appreciate the care that the reporter put in to understanding the ideas (plus the frankly majestic picture of the Manifold co-founders). I do want to correct one paragraph, though:

Inline links: an article about the Manifest prediction market conference

I think a natural reading of this sentence is that Astral Codex Ten received $1 million from the FTX Future Fund. Some people who read the article said they understood it this way and thought I took FTX money. I didn’t. The article meant to say that Manifold did.

Apply For An ACX Grant (2024)

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Sparked a renaissance in forecasting, including major roles in creating, funding, and/or staffing Metaculus, Manifold Markets, and the Forecasting Research Institute.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold Markets, Forecasting Research Institute

December 08, 2023 · Original source

This year we’re partnering with Manifund, the charity arm of Manifold Markets, who will be handling the administrative/infrastructure side of things.

Inline links: Manifund

If you want to join these four institutions as a potential final oracular funder of impact certificates, see this document and email rachel@manifund.org. If you want to invest in impact certificates, I’ll give you more information on the ACX Grants version later, and you can look over the existing impact certs while you’re waiting.

Inline links: this document, the existing impact certs

Links For January 2024

January 18, 2024 · Original source

35: Prediction site Manifold Markets is running a $30,000 Community Fund based on impact certificates. If you want to make something cool for the Manifold community, you can run an impact funding round, and then they’ll pay you out of the $30,000 if it’s good.

Inline links: $30,000 Community Fund

19: If Manifold is too social for you, there’s also Fatebook, a site where you can record your personal predictions and auto-judge calibration/accuracy/etc. For example, Predict Your Year here. Also available for Discord/Slack.

Inline links: Fatebook, Predict Your Year here

ACX Grants Results 2024

February 10, 2024 · Original source

Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, which will handle getting everyone their money and run the upcoming impact market. Thanks especially to Austin Chen, Rachel Weinberg, and Saul Munn.

Inline links: Manifund

Here I’m leaning heavily into my experience funding Manifold last time around. The lesson I’m currently taking away from that is that having multiple platforms working on an important problem is less like splitting the party, and more like buying multiple lottery tickets for getting the exact right combination factors that lets something become successful. I hope I’m not over-updating on one dramatic event here, but I’m still very new to grant-making and I don’t have that many data points to learn from!

Inline links: over-updating on one dramatic event

Open Thread 318

March 04, 2024 · Original source

2: Last year Manifold Markets held a prediction market conference/festival, Manifest, in Berkeley. I thought it was a lot of fun. They’re going to do it again this year, June 7 to 9th, you can get tickets here, cheaper early bird tickets ($249) are first come, first serve.

Inline links: here

Who Predicted 2023?

March 05, 2024 · Original source

Manifold Markets: Manifold, a popular play money prediction market site, kindly agreed to open markets into our fifty questions so we could compare them to participants. The markets got between 80 and 1500 participants, average around 150. Their forecast, had it been a contestant, would have placed in the 89th percentile. This would be good for an individual, but it’s surprisingly bad for an aggregation method - in fact, it’s worse than taking the median of a randomly selected group of 150 participants! The market mechanism seems to be subtracting value! Someone might want to double-check this.

Inline links: Manifold Markets

I began by collecting data from Manifold Markets for these questions. I then compared those forecasts to the forecasts of superforecasters in the blind data, subset to those who had given forecasts on the S&P500 and Bitcoin questions that were reasonably consistent with the efficiency of markets; I subset to those who forecasted between 30% and 80% for the probability that the S&P500 and Bitcoin would increase during 2023, which were the only reasonable predictions by the time blind mode ended in mid-January. I then used my own judgment to tweak forecasts where I strongly disagreed with the prediction markets and the superforecasters (for example, I was more than 15 percentage points away from the average of Manifold Markets and the efficient-market-believing superforecasters on questions 17, 19, 21, 30, 34, and 50). I paid especially close attention to questions where late-breaking news made the superforecasters' forecasts less relevant (and I downweighted their forecasts on those questions accordingly).

Participant aggregate: This is the “wisdom of crowds” one. If you average the guess of every participant (eg if someone says 80% chance Biden leads, and another says 90% chance, then you go with 85%), you usually do better than the vast majority of individuals. In this case, the aggregate was 95th percentile, beating out superforecasters and Manifold.

Open Thread 327

April 28, 2024 · Original source

4: Manifold Markets wants to pivot from play-money prediction markets to real-ish money via a loophole that allows certain kinds of gambling-like activity. In the process, they’re devaluing mana (as available for charitable donations) by a factor of ten as of May 1. If you want to donate your mana to charity, do it before then. [EDIT: Delayed until 5/15, and with other considerations)

Inline links: wants to pivot, with other considerations

May 13, 2024 · Original source

Statements by two dissenting CFTC commissioners (1, 2) on why they oppose. Pivotal Act Manifold Markets says they’re pivoting to a new model combining play money points and real-money gambling. Manifold may be a beloved local fixture, but their growth and revenue aren’t too impressive: In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Probably no effect on Manifold’s pivot, see below.

In the interests of continuing to exist and push prediction markets forward, they will switch to a “sweepstakes” model. Although gambling is illegal in most US states and requires complicated licensing in others, there’s a “sweepstakes loophole”; companies are allowed to offer “prize sweepstakes”, and you can use this to sort of reconstruct the concept of gambling in a legal way. You don’t give the company money and get back money. You pay for “points”, get “sweepstakes tokens” as a bonus, gamble the “sweepstakes tokens”, and then cash in the sweepstakes tokens for money. This is a pretty surprising loophole, but it’s already used by sites like Chumba Casino and Fliff. (and apparently it creates weird incentives! In order to maintain the fiction of being a “sweepstakes”, these casinos have to give you “tokens” if you request them by mail. If you send a postcard to Chumba Casino asking for free money, they’ll give it to you, $5 per postcard. Is this an infinite free money pump? My impression is in theory yes, but the postcards have to be handwritten in a very specific way, the company sometimes rejects them for weird reasons, the cost of materials and mailing lowers your profit to more like $4, and so you’d have to hand-write 250 postcards to make $1,000. I’m still surprised more people don’t do this.) Because real money is involved, Manifold will have to tighten the rules on markets, including banning N/A resolutions. You can see a full list of changes here. Manifold users are split between acknowledging that the for-profit company they love needs some way to make money, being salty about the changes, and being worried that creating more of a casino atmosphere will be bad for users / the world / ability to function as a good prediction market. (I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Open Thread 343

August 19, 2024 · Original source

5: Manifold Markets is looking for a backend engineer. See here (I know it doesn’t look like a job advertisement, but scroll down, it is) for more.

Inline links: See here

Mantic Monday: Judgment Day

November 05, 2024 · Original source

3: Manifold Markets is hosting an election night party (or mourning vigil, depending) in Berkeley, go here for details.

Inline links: go here for details

Iranian nukes more likely under Trump (49.5%) than Harris (45%) All of these involve foreign policy going worse under Trump than Harris. Is this unfair? Even Trump’s supporters would agree he is less interested in funding Ukrainian resistance than Harris; Metaculus’ numbers here seem in line with this. Harris is more likely to continue deals where Iran gets sanctions relief / money in exchange for not going nuclear. Whether or not you agree with Trump that those deals are extortionary and unfair, it makes sense that Iran is more likely to go nuclear if those deals are discontinued. But this is also a small effect and could be noise. The Taiwan numbers are the least convincing, but seem to be based off of arguments like the ones here: Trump has said that Taiwan should “pay for” defense, and generally been skeptical of foreign entanglements. And here’s Manifold’s version of the same thing: Polymarket’s Wild Ride On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.

It also serves as yet another point in favor of non-real-money forecasts like Metaculus, Nate Silver, and Manifold, all three of which agreed with each other while disagreeing with the big real-money markets like Polymarket, Smarkets, and Betfair. In theory we can’t say which group (real money vs. no money) was right. In practice, we know that Polymarket was mostly skewed by one giant bet, that there wasn’t nearly enough pro-Trump news to explain the movement, and that past disagreements have usually resolved in favor of the no-money markets. I’m as surprised as anyone to learn this (especially since Manifold is so close to a money market that a lot of explanations for real-money markets’ failure ought to affect them too), but it does seem to be a consistent feature of these things.

Links For February 2025

February 27, 2025 · Original source

48: Manifold Markets cofounder James Grugett has founded a new company, Codebuff, in the bustling LLM-wrapper-for-coding space. Some discussion here (X) including from James (X) on whether the new Claude 3.7 coder has obsoleted coding wrappers or will make them better than ever.

Inline links: founded, Codebuff, here (X), from James (X)

31: Related: this is all fun to think about, but very early polling for the 2028 Democratic primary suggests that by far the #1 candidate is . . . Kamala Harris at 37%, beating Mayor Pete, Gavin, and AOC with 11%, 9%, and 7% respectively. I know you’re not supposed to take early polls like this seriously in terms of who will actually win, but can you take them seriously as a guide to whether people have learned any lessons / no longer love losing? Maybe this is all just name recognition? Also, significant chance that Harris runs for (and wins) the California governorship in 2026.

Inline links: very early polling for the 2028 Democratic primary, significant chance

Apply For An ACX Grant (2025)

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Helped create Manifold Markets, a prediction market site with thousands of satisfied users, whose various spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community.

No update this time, but from last cycle: “Nathan Young has since gotten much larger grants to do much more exciting forecasting work, particularly a platform for generating forecasting questions. With my approval, he’s put my grant on the back burner while he works on other things, but he still hopes to get some questions up on Manifold or Metaculus sometime.”

Manifold is the largest social prediction market platform with over 150k user‑created markets and more than 30 million trades. Our markets have been featured here on ACX, in the NYT, Nate Silver’s latest book, and countless Substacks, podcasts, and tweets. Forecasters, journalists, researchers, and casual users alike use Manifold to get accurate real-time odds on everything from elections to AI timelines to personal drama.

Inline links: Manifold

July 24, 2025 · Original source

The program is conducted in partnership with Manifund, a charity spinoff of Manifold Markets, who handle the administrative/infrastructure side of things.

Inline links: Manifund

ACX Grants Results 2025

October 13, 2025 · Original source

Second, the Manifund team. Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, handled our funds, disbursement, infrastructure, and miscellaneous coding needs. Special thanks to Austin Chen for taking point on this.

Inline links: Manifund

Charlie Molthrop, $5K, for “normie-friendly prediction market interfaces”. Charlie has already made some tools for visualizing Manifold and Polymarket results; for example, a bot that tweets sudden dramatic changes on important Manifold questions.

Elaine Perlman, $94K, to continue lobbying for kidney donation incentives. Elaine works with Waitlist Zero and the Coalition To Modify NOTA to promote the End Kidney Deaths Act, which offers valuable tax credits to kidney donors. They estimate this bill could save 100,000 lives over the next decade, and save the government $50 billion/year (dialysis is very expensive, Medicare currently covers it, and transplantees would no longer need it). Since our previous grant last year, the EKDA has been cosponsored by 29 members of Congress, discussed in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and profiled in the LA Times. The prediction markets are down to only 25% chance it gets passed this year, but I’m optimistic about 2026 - 2027

Inline links: End Kidney Deaths Act, Journal of the American Medical Association, the LA Times, 25% chance it gets passed this year

Open Thread 423

March 02, 2026 · Original source

1: ACX Grantee Stephen Grugett (of Manifold Markets) wants me to announce his latest project: MNX, “a decentralized futures exchange targeting sophisticated traders and focused on the AI economy”. It’s a real-money platform where traders who want to hedge their AI plays can bet on benchmark progress, compute prices, etc. Announcement here, testnet here.

Inline links: MNX, here

March 03, 2026 · Original source

Stephen Grugett and Ian Philips of Manifold Markets have announced a new project, MNX.

Inline links: MNX

Partly it’s because Anthropic seems likely to win on appeal. Hegseth has said the government will keep using Anthropic for the next six months (undermining his case that they’re a national security risk) and has signed a substantially similar contract with OpenAI (undermining his case that their contract terms were unworkable). The prediction markets think the courts will be sympathetic: But even in the 28% of timelines where the designation sticks, things don’t seem so bad. Secretary of War Hegseth originally tweeted that:

Inline links: tweeted

The lawyers who weighed in seem to think that Anthropic’s interpretation of the law is correct, and Secretary Hegseth’s interpretation confused. In some situations, this might be cold comfort - how much does it help to be right about the law when the government is wrong? But in this case, it probably helps a lot. Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are all big Anthropic investors - each owns about a 10% stake - and have multi-billion dollar AI compute contracts. Together, the three tech giants must have at least $100 billion riding on Anthropic’s success. They also have good administration connections and great lobbyists, and even Hegseth isn’t stupid enough to pick fights with them all at once. So probably they send their lobbyists to have a talk with Hegseth about what the “supply chain risk” designation actually entails, Hegseth enforces the letter of the law, and Anthropic is barely affected. At least this is the story the prediction markets are going with: In this best-case scenario, Anthropic’s downside is losing some government contracts that made up ~5% of its business, plus some other Department-of-War-contractor contracts that probably add up to another ~5%.

Manifund21 mentions across 21 issues

Manifund is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 21 times across 21 issues between February 24, 2023 and January 12, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Register on Manifund as an accredited investor"; "Manifund will ask you for documents demonstrating your net worth and/or income"; "And Manifund has published a document". It most often appears alongside ACX Grants, Manifold Markets, Manifold.

Article page: Manifund
Mention count: 21
Issue count: 21
First seen: February 24, 2023
Last seen: January 12, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Announcing Forecasting Impact Mini-Grants February 24, 2023
Open Thread 265 February 26, 2023
Impact Market Mini-Grants Update March 03, 2023
Open Thread 270 April 03, 2023
Impact Market Mini-Grants Results October 09, 2023
Apply For An ACX Grant (2024) December 08, 2023
ACX Grants Results 2024 February 10, 2024
Open Thread 315 February 12, 2024
ACX Grants Followup Impact Market March 07, 2024
Open Thread 320 March 18, 2024
24 May 13, 2024
Open Thread 334 June 17, 2024
Open Thread 348 September 23, 2024
Open Thread 352 October 21, 2024
Sorry, I Still Think MR Is Wrong About USAID May 29, 2025
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025
Open Questions For Future ACX Grants Rounds June 19, 2025
Apply For An ACX Grant (2025) July 24, 2025
ACX Grants Results 2025 October 13, 2025
Open Thread 404 October 20, 2025
Open Thread 416 January 12, 2026

ACX Grants 11 shared issues
Manifold Markets 9 shared issues
Manifold 7 shared issues
ACX 5 shared issues
ACX 5 shared issues

Source context

Impact Market Mini-Grants Update

February 24, 2023 · Original source

Go to Manifold’s impact market site, Manifund, who have kindly agreed to handle the technology side of this.

Inline links: Manifund

Register on Manifund as an accredited investor. Accredited investors must have either net worth of > $1 million, or have made $200,000 ($300,000 combined income if married) for each of the past two years, with an expectation of continuing to make that amount. Manifund may ask you for a bank/tax statement proving that you meet this requirements.

Inline links: Manifund

A: Manifund will ask you for documents demonstrating your net worth and/or income; hopefully these won’t be too painful to provide.

Open Thread 265

February 26, 2023 · Original source

2: We have seven project proposals for the Forecasting Mini-Grants Round and are still looking for more. And Manifund has published a document explaining their auction mechanism.

Inline links: Forecasting Mini-Grants Round, their auction mechanism

March 03, 2023 · Original source

2: Sixteen people have submitted projects! (click to be linked to market home page) The deadline for further project submissions is tonight, so get them in now if you have them!

Inline links: https://manifund.com/

The deadline for further project submissions is tonight, so get them in now if you have them!

The deadline for further project submissions is tonight, so get them in now if you have them! 3: Manifold continues to approve accredited investors. If you’re an accredited investor (approximately: you make $200K+ per year, or have $1MM net worth), and you feel like you understand impact markets, you’re welcome to participate in the investment phase. 4: …which is starting now! Bid for equity on projects that you expect to succeed - and in six months when I give them retroactive grants, those grants will go to you in proportion to how much equity you hold. Some restrictions apply, see original post for details. The auctions say they’re closing March 8th, but we’re running a little behind schedule and might keep them open until March 12th instead. 5: You can also ignore everything we’re doing and use Manifund’s impact market for any other kind of charitable project you want. Keep in mind that there is no guarantee that we or anyone else will ever retroactively fund these, and you’re kind of operating on blind faith here. Two people are already trying this: Feel free to buy or trade equity in these projects, but remember that nobody including me has any story for why they might ever make money, and this would be a strange thing to do from a profit-maximizing perspective. 6: Current planned schedule (may change quickly) is: Tonight: Deadline for project submissions

Inline links: see original post for details, https://manifund.org/

Open Thread 270

April 03, 2023 · Original source

4: Last month I teamed up with Manifold to run an impact market on forecasting grants. Now Manifold is using their impact market infrastructure, Manifund, to start a market in prizes on Open Philanthropy’s AI-related essay contest. The idea is - you write an essay and submit it in hopes of winning (let’s say) the $50,000 first prize. Then you sell the right to the prize on the impact market - for example if you think you’re 10% likely to win (so your essay is worth $5,000) and someone else thinks you’re 20% likely to win (so your essay is worth $10,000), then you could sell the rights to the prize money to them for $7,500 (it’s a bit more complicated than that, but you get the idea). I’m not directly involved in this one, but I trust Manifold a lot and this should help them develop their impact market work further. Yes, you still have to be an accredited investor to buy certificates (though not to sell your essay!). Go here for more information. I guess this doubles as an announcement that there’s an AI-related essay contest with a first prize of $50,000. Entries are due May 31 - no, they won’t find it funny if you use GPT.

Inline links: Open Philanthropy’s AI-related essay contest

Impact Market Mini-Grants Results

October 09, 2023 · Original source

Check out Manifund, which continues to raise money for interesting projects. There’s no functioning impact market for now, so you shouldn’t think of this as buying an impact certificate. But if you want to look at interesting projects and fund them out of the goodness of your heart, check them out.

Inline links: Manifund

Thanks again to everyone who participated, whether as project leader, investor, or judge. And thanks especially to Austin Chen, Rachel Weinberg, and the rest of the Manifund and Manifold teams for the technology and organization that made this possible. If we owe you money, expect an email from Manifund sometime in the next two weeks. If you don’t get it, email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com.

Apply For An ACX Grant (2024)

December 08, 2023 · Original source

This year we’re partnering with Manifund, the charity arm of Manifold Markets, who will be handling the administrative/infrastructure side of things.

Inline links: Manifund

If you win a grant, Manifund will send you the money, probably by bank wire. I might ask you to fill out another 15 - 30 minute form letting me know how your project did after one year, three years, five years, etc.

An effort to perform rapid replication of results in psychology journals. You can read the full list here. What are impact certificates / impact markets? This year’s ACX Grants will be a hybrid design. Most of it will use the traditional funding model. But applicants whose projects don’t get funded by the traditional model will have the option (not requirement! you don’t have to think about this if you don’t want to!) to opt in to an “impact market”, a non-traditional charitable funding institution. In an impact market, charitable projects offer to sell a sort of “stock”, called “impact certificates”. Investors buy the impact certificates, funding the project. If the project succeeds, a funder (like a grantmaker or foundation) may choose to buy the impact certificates, becoming the “spiritual owner” of the project (ie endorsing it as something good that ought to have been funded, and getting some sort of social credit for funding it). This money goes to the investors, who hopefully profit off of their investment, vindicating their decision to buy the certificates in the first place. The motivating idea is that a grantmaker might dismiss a charity’s plan as impossible, but an investor might believe they could succeed. The investor can fund the plan, then collect from the grantmaker if they turn out to be right. Everyone benefits: the charity gets funded, the investor makes a profit, and the grantmaker gets more of whatever kind of change they want (since a successful project is able to happen). We ran a test grant of impact markets earlier this year, along with partner Manifund. You can see the announcement here, the results here, and Manifund’s continuing impact market here. How will this year’s ACX Grants (optionally!!!) use impact markets? Most of ACX Grants will happen through the traditional grantmaking structure. But if I don’t fund your grant, you have the option of letting us auto-convert it into an impact certificate and place it on Manifund’s impact market. Then investors might fund your grant. From your perspective, this will just look like you getting the money you wanted, plus an investor who might give you some help and advice if you want. You won’t have to handle any of the impact market details, worry about your “stock price”, or anything like that. (if you do want to do those things, you can work with Manifund to create a bespoke impact certificate contract - but you don’t have to) I’m hesitant to fund AI safety grants and effective altruism community-building grants myself, both because of difficulty judging these things and because of potential conflicts of interest, so these are more likely to end up on the impact market than other things. This is an exception to the “you don’t have to use impact markets if you don’t want to” rule, sorry. (there’s some concern that impact markets have skewed incentives for projects that have a risk of doing severe harm, and I understand AI safety and EA community building are especially dangerous here and we’ve avoided them in the past. We’ll be pre-screening projects before allowing them on the impact market, and eliminating ones in that category. Final oracular funders will also be encouraged not to fund projects that they think ex ante could have caused harm.) We have four potential oracular funders who have expressed interest in impact certificates: Next year’s ACX Grants

Inline links: here, here, here, here

ACX Grants Results 2024

February 10, 2024 · Original source

If your name is below, you should have received an email with further information. If you didn’t, email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com, and include the phrase “this is a genuine non-spam message” in the text. Unless my email specifically mentioned you as an exception, Manifund will be handling payments and you’ll hear from them soon.

And this is just the first step! Our partners at Manifund are taking it from here. For now, you can go to their ACX Grants page to get more information on the funded grants, see which ones want more money, and donate if you’re interested. You can also discuss the specifics of proposals in the comments section there.

Inline links: ACX Grants page

Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, which will handle getting everyone their money and run the upcoming impact market. Thanks especially to Austin Chen, Rachel Weinberg, and Saul Munn.

Inline links: Manifund

Open Thread 315

February 12, 2024 · Original source

1: Thanks to everyone who commented on this year’s ACX Grants. Reminder that you can go to Manifund to learn more about ACX Grants projects, comment on individual efforts, and donate to the ones that need more funding.

Inline links: on this year’s ACX Grants, Manifund

ACX Grants Followup Impact Market

March 07, 2024 · Original source

First, although about 140 of you expressed interest in and qualified for the impact market round, only 44 have responded to emails from Manifund, signed the necessary documents, and actually gotten featured. So there are only 44 proposals on the market so far. If you want to participate in the impact market, but aren’t on there yet, please check your email and spam folder for messages from Manifund. If you didn’t get any, but you applied to ACX Grants and want to participate, please email rachel@manifund.org.

Second, you can’t legally run a stock-market-like institution without lots of SEC approvals that we’re not really specced to get. Last time we got around this problem by only selling to accredited investors (ie rich people). This time our sponsors at Manifund want to try something different. Anyone, accredited investor or not, can invest in charities. But when you sell your investment, you won’t get a payout in real money. You’ll get it in special Manifund dollars that you can donate to other charities, but can’t spend on non-charitable purposes. I realize this is less fun than real dollars, sorry.

Despite these minor hiccups, I’m still pretty excited about this. Go to https://manifund.com/causes/acx-grants-2024?tab=certs to check this one out.

Inline links: https://manifund.com/causes/acx-grants-2024?tab=certs

Open Thread 320

March 18, 2024 · Original source

3: The ACX Grants impact market on Manifund is up to 53 proposals, including growing blood vessels in the lab, an online psychiatry/psychology journal, and a swarm of robotic bees. In case you’ve forgotten, the link for the overall ACX Grants impact market is here, and my explanation of what’s going on is here.

Inline links: growing blood vessels in the lab, online psychiatry/psychology journal, a swarm of robotic bees, ACX Grants impact market is here, here

May 13, 2024 · Original source

(I understand most of the NO vote here is based on the theory that there will be legal intervention - maybe because the government is willing to tolerate sweepstakes casinos but not sweepstakes prediction markets). Manifold co-founder Austin Chen won’t be involved. He’s leaving the site - not explicitly because of the pivot, he just said it seems to be “trapped in local optima”. He plans to focus on other parts of the Manifold empire, especially Manifund, which tests impact markets, regranting, and other “experimental” charity models. Manifold will continue in the hands of the other two co-founders, James and Stephen Grugett. Superhindcasting I mentioned this in my lab leak post, but it deserves more attention here: Good Judgment Project’s report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic. Good Judgment Project employs superforecasters who will predict things for clients. Some people interested in COVID origins asked them to judge whether lab leak was plausible. Their headline result was 74% zoonosis, 25% lab leak, 1% something else. Part of GJP’s method is getting their forecasters to share sources and talk to each other. Here’s the graph for how that went: People changed their minds a little over time, but not in a very consistent way that mattered much in the end. What was the “client feedback”? The report says: Client feedback was provided to the Superforecasters on December 21. The client posed questions to the Superforecasters about their assessments up to that date and asked for their reactions to several studies and articles. In the days following the client engagement, the Superforecasters lowered their confidence in the natural zoonosis hypothesis from 73% to 67%, although zoonosis remained the most likely potential cause in their assessment. But following an active engagement with recent genomic studies and historical base rates of zoonotic spillovers, those numbers began to return to earlier levels. January also saw increased attention to the geopolitical context and transparency issues, particularly related to research activities in Wuhan Is this bad? I’m imagining a pro-lab-leak client saying “But what about [this list of pro-lab-leak arguments]?” and then the superforecasters read them and adjust. In one sense, it’s good that they got to see more arguments; on the other, it seems like a potential route by which clients could bias the results - probabilities never quite got back to where they were before the feedback, though they got pretty close. The last-minute spike for zoonosis might be the Rootclaim debate results, which were released on 2/18. So maybe the client feedback and the Rootclaim results both slightly affected the numbers, but mostly the superforecasters started out pro-zoonosis and stuck to their guns. Dan Schwarz and the FutureSearch team say that forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”. Despite the report making this sound like a pretty intense process, we don’t get much information about details: In their extensive discussions , Good Judgment’s Superforecasters assessed base rates and historical patterns, existing evidence and scientific analysis, geopolitical context and transparency concerns, trust in intelligence communities, and methodological constraints. 1. Base Rates and Historical Patterns: The Superforecasters frequently referenced base rates, i.e., the history of pandemics emerging from natural zoonosis versus the history of laboratory leaks, to anchor their probabilities. For the former, they discussed how the base rates are changing as the climate warms and as expanding human populations push farther into natural environments that previously saw little human presence. For the latter, they acknowledged that it has only been 12 years since the advent of CRISPR gene- editing tools, and the base rate of lab leaks in the short synthetic biology era is not yet well established. 2. New Evidence and Scientific Analysis: Throughout the period, the Superforecasters adapted their forecasts in light of new scientific evidence, including genomic analyses of SARS-CoV-2 and its relation to bat viruses, and the debate over potential laboratory manipulation. 3. Geopolitical Context and Transparency Concerns: The geopolitical implications of the virus’s origins, particularly in relation to China’s transparency and the involvement of international research institutions, played a significant role in the analysis. Concerns over data veracity, and over the political ramifications of determining that the pandemic’s origins were other than zoonosis, were extensively debated. 4. Trust in Intelligence: Commentary on trust in intelligence communities and discussions about the impact of geopolitical biases on the interpretation of evidence illustrated the complex interplay between science, politics, and human behavior in assessing the pandemic’s origins. 5. Methodological Critiques and the Evaluation of Evidence: The Superforecasters engaged in methodological critiques of the evidence base, including the scrutiny of laboratory practices and biocontainment levels [...] In the end, most Superforecasters were in rough agreement on issues like the base rates of zoonotic spillover. Where they most often disagreed was on the interpretation of actions by Chinese officials and whether their actions reflected how an authoritarian government would react in any crisis over which it did not have full control, or whether those actions were indicative of attempts to cover up a biomedical research-related accident that allowed the SARS-CoV-2 virus to enter circulation in China and, ultimately, the entire globe. Probably it would be too much to ask for to get a transcript of all their discussions - then they’d be nervous saying things that might make them look bad to an audience. What would be a good balance between getting more information and not imposing on their time? Forecasting is an unusually legible and easy-to-judge domain. One of the theories of change for forecasting was to use it to identify smart people with good reasoning, then turn them loose on less well-behaved problems. This is one of the first big attempts to do this at scale. How did it work? We can’t tell, because it’s inherently an illegible and hard-to-judge domain. Darn. I don’t know what I expected. Notes From A Local Optimum Austin’s concern - that forecasting has reached a local optimum - is widely shared. We have some good sites: Manifold, Metaculus, Polymarket, GJO, etc - all doing good work. We have good-ish probabilities for a few important questions. Every so often a news source cites them. Sometimes a decision-maker looks at them behind the scenes, maybe. Is this all there is? The FutureSearch team says the next step is to focus on “rationale”. We need to use forecasting not just to get a raw probability, but to explain what’s going on and why we think something. Then instead of just convincing policy-makers to trust forecasts, we can tell them why something is true, or inform their discussions even if they’re not willing to blindly trust a number. Is this a betrayal of the forecasting ethos? The original dream was that instead of a bunch of people giving arguments, we could just test who was right. Now we’re going back to the arguments? People have argued forever; what does forecasting add to that? Well, they add the knowledge that the arguments are from people who have been right a lot before and are incentivized to be right again. Still, it’s not a natural fit. Probably it’s relevant here that FutureSearch’s forecasting AI does a really good job of this by default, in a way humans can’t match. Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup doesn’t have a single thesis, but the first part is a well-supported complaint that most forecasting sites aren’t good business. They either burn VC money, burn EA donations, or converge towards casinos to support themselves. He gives an honorable exception to Cultivate Labs, which sells prediction market software rather than the results themselves. Open Philanthropy (billionaire Dustin Moskovitz’s EA-aligned charitable foundation) has at least given forecasting a vote of confidence, recently choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas. Still, they got a lot of pushback on the decision, for example SuperDuperForecasting here: This will be a total waste of time and money unless OpenPhil actually pushes the people it funds towards achieving real-world impact. The typical pattern in the past has been to launch yet another forecasting tournament to try to find better forecasts and forecasters. No one cares, we already know how to do this since at least 2012! The unsolved problem is translating the research into real-world impact. Does the Forecasting Research Institute have any actual commercial paying clients? What is Metaculus's revenue from actual clients rather than grants? Who are they working with and where is the evidence that they are helping high-stakes decision makers improve their thought processes? Incidentally, I note that forecasting is not actually successful even within EA at changing anything: superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk than the median EA, but has this made any kind of difference to how EA spends its money? It seems very unlikely. And Marcus Abramovich here: I'm in the process of writing up my thoughts on forecasting in general and particularly EA's reverence for forecasting but I feel, similar to @Grayden that forecasting is a game that is nearly perfectly designed to distract EAs from useful things. It's a combination of winning, being right when others are wrong and seemingly useful, all wrapped into a fun game. I'd like to see tangible benefits to more broad funding of forecasting that seems to be done in t he millions and tens of millions of dollars. I would also be the type of person you would think would be a greater fan of forecasting. I'm the number one forecaster on Manifold and I've made tens of thousands of dollars on Polymarket. But I think we should start to think of forecasting as more of a game that EAs like to play, something like Magic the Gathering that is fun and has some relations to useful things but isn't really useful by itself. Eli Lifland has a long and hard-to-summarize comment here, response from Ozzie Gooen here, podcast between them on “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here. I’m split on this. My previous hope was that the field would gradually grow, without any qualitative changes or discontinuities, until it became big enough that journalists and policy-makers were aware of it and took it seriously (compare eg the growth of the Internet as a scholarly resource). I think the strongest argument against this is Manifold’s relatively flat user numbers. Is there a new hope? I think if nothing else, forecasting might be useful as a testing ground: First, to create forecasting AIs (like FutureSearch) which can then get consulted on a variety of questions, eg by policy-makers. The biggest holdup has always been the need to gather 20 or 50 or however many hard-to-find superforecasters for whatever question you’re asking, and then trust their advice even though they’re fallible fleshbag humans. If you can use the 20 to 50 superforecasters to inspire an AI, and then test the AI and prove it’s good, people might be more interested. This is especially true if the AI can branch out beyond traditional forecasting questions. Once we have a few of these, we can start comparing the next generation of AIs to the previous generation, and skip the superforecasters.

Inline links: leaving the site, Manifund, report on Superforecasting The Origins Of The COVID-19 Pandemic., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!F-e7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F679c34d2-766f-41bd-ae75-b036bcdb06f9_1456x849.webp, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JSEn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9c315554-fca5-4dc5-ac9a-d531b4ce7534_883x519.png, forecasting has a “rationale-shaped hole”, Nuno’s yearly forecasting roundup, Cultivate Labs, choosing to promote it to one of their main donation areas, here, superforecasters are generally far more relaxed about Xrisk, here, @Grayden, here, here, “Is Forecasting A Promising EA Cause Area?” here

Open Thread 334

June 17, 2024 · Original source

1: In my Quests and Requests post, I challenged someone to create a good dating site. A team led by Shreeda Segan is working on this and trying to raise money on Manifund; you can read more about their plan and funding goals here.

Inline links: my Quests and Requests post, here

Open Thread 348

September 23, 2024 · Original source

That they have an open EA community choice fundraiser at Manifund to help extend their runway and pursue EA-aligned use cases. You can reach out to jordan@spartacus.app with any questions.

Inline links: an open EA community choice fundraiser at Manifund

Open Thread 352

October 21, 2024 · Original source

3: I’ve been asked to advertise The Curve, a conference on “the trajectory of transformative AI”, including forecasting, alignment, etc. It’s by the Manifold/Manifest/Manifund team and will be held at Lighthaven, Berkeley from November 22 - 24, tickets are $100 for students, $300 - $800 for others. Apply here. I hope to attend.

Inline links: The Curve, Lighthaven, here

Sorry, I Still Think MR Is Wrong About USAID

May 29, 2025 · Original source

There’s nothing wrong with this - ACX Grants maintains its 0% overhead because Manifund covers our bills. My point is that it’s nothing to be proud of either. Mercatus hasn’t discovered some amazing new way to do charity without overhead costs, such that USAID charities that charge overhead are bloated and wasteful, but Mercatus is innovative and lean. They’ve just found someone who covers many of their bills for free.

Inline links: Manifund

Inline links: Codebuff, website, Substack, survives, a public Substack, in Rwanda, Growth Summit, Stanford Social Innovation Review, ProMarket, Global Prosperity Institute, Saharon, this page, eadbatteries.substack.com, here, here, a post profiling the Far Out Initiative here, https://tornyol.com, a public website, https://chemrxiv.org/engage/chemrxiv/article-details/67e4cde76dde43c9084d88b7, https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/introducing-project-air/, our way, connect them directly to me, www.Spartacus.app, X, Substack, here, https://www.goodancestors.org.au/ai-safety, https://www.australiansforaisafety.com.au/, https://www.aul.city/blog/reflecting-on-africa-urban-lab-s-inaugural-year-2024-highlights, https://healthlearn.org/blog/updated-impact-model, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWVKUEZ25V97tNULapu07DhWv6_W4NfpE, here, public website, here, in urgent need, https://manifund.org/projects/improving-fish-w

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Manifund, an experimental charity platform which now co-runs ACX Grants, an impact certificate platform, and various innovations in regranting.

Inline links: Manifund

Codebuff, an AI coding startup I probably can’t take full credit for all of this just from giving them $20K in seed funding, but I continue to appreciate everything they do for this community and the world. 35: Further S’s Political Career This person didn’t win their election, but has since pivoted to AI safety and works in a well-regarded AI policy think tank. 36: Seeds Of Science, A Journal Of Non-Traditional Research No update received, but this was a public journal and it is easy to follow their work, see their website and Substack. They published two dozen articles of widely varying quality through 2023 and 2024, then closed in 2025. A remnant of the original vision survives as a science blogging aggregator. This was about my median expectation for this grant, but it was very inexpensive and I decided to take a chance on it anyway. 37: Good Science Project, Working To Improve Federal Science Funding No update received, but they have a public Substack discussing their progress. Their proposals for NIH reform have influenced Congress and made government agencies pay more attention to scientific integrity. 38: Advising Developing Countries On How To Grow Their Economies With our initial ACX grant, we piloted the Growth Teams model in Rwanda, helping the government jumpstart the export-oriented call center (BPO) industry. Since 2022, that effort has contributed to the creation of 2,000 formal jobs and the emergence of some of the country’s largest private employers. We’ve since expanded to Tanzania, Malawi, and the Indian states of Goa and Meghalaya. To refocus the global development discourse on broad-based economic growth, we co-organized the Growth Summit with the Center for Global Development and the Charter Cities Institute, and have published articles in leading outlets including Stanford Social Innovation Review, ProMarket, and the Global Prosperity Institute. Our work has attracted support from Open Philanthropy, Schmidt Futures, and Mulago Foundation, and our advisors now include economists Lant Pritchett, Stefan Dercon, and Kunal Sen. 39: Help Luca De Leo Get Started In AI Safety Research No update received, but Luca now runs the AI safety group at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 40: Typist For Saharon Shelah This was another ACXG+ Grant, funded by an anonymous outside funder and not listed in the original announcement. Saharon is a prolific and influential Israeli mathematician, but many of his discoveries are hand-written in an unpublishable format. This grant funded a typist to help make his results suitable for publication. According to this page, they have made over fifty new papers and preprints available. Second Cohort: One Year Updates 41: Lead-Acid Battery Recycling In Nigeria The Nigeria field research was a major success. We spent most of September doing field research in multiple major cities in Nigeria, and got a good sense of the used lead-acid battery supply chain. This field research served as the foundation for expanding our project, and has been very impactful in shaping our ongoing research. We published our findings from Nigeria, which were shared with Nigerian government regulators and global NGOs working on lead poisoning. The grant also gave us the on-the-ground experience we needed to both fully understand and credibly engage with groups, both in Nigeria and globally, on the ULAB issue. In the meantime, beyond continued research, we’ve also launched a dashboard (trade.leadbatteries.org) for analyzing global lead trade data. Right now, we’re: Launching two studies (one RCT, one environmental analysis) in Nigeria in collaboration with local universities to develop a more rigorous understanding of lead pollution due to low-standard ULAB recycling in Nigeria Collaborating with a non-profit incubator to launch an NGO focused on demand-side solutions Beginning a partnership with a West African environmental regulator to scale cheap air monitoring technology to quickly identify and reduce lead pollution from low-standard smelting If any of this sounds interesting to you, please sign up for our Substack (leadbatteries.substack.com) or send us an email at hugosmith@uchicago.edu! 42: Compensation For Kidney Donors The End Kidney Deaths Act (H.R. 2687 / EKDA) is a groundbreaking ten-year pilot program designed to save lives and reduce healthcare costs. It provides a refundable tax credit of $10,000 per year for five years, a total of $50,000, to living kidney donors who donate to a stranger, helping those who’ve waited the longest on the transplant list. Between 2010 and 2021, 100,000 Americans died while qualified and waiting for a kidney. The EKDA aims to change that trajectory. Within ten years of its passage, up to 100,000 Americans could receive a life-saving living donor kidney which typically lasts twice as long as a deceased donor kidney. This would not only save lives but also save taxpayers up to $37 billion. The legislation has been reintroduced in the House, and we have a committed Republican Senate lead. Now, we need a Democratic Senator to co-lead and help move this bipartisan effort forward. Time is short, and we are racing to pass the bill this Congressional session. 36 organizations already support the EKDA. Join the movement and help end preventable kidney deaths. Visit EndKidneyDeaths.org to help us get to the finish line. Elaine and her org have been working extremely hard on this; you can read a Vox article on their campaign here. If you want to sign up for her email list and get updates any time there is a representative you can contact or meeting you can join in, go here. 43: Genetic Hack To Prevent Suffering In the estimate of multiple team members, the ACX grant was “worth it” - it likely had a counterfactual net positive impact, even though we had to pivot from our initial fast-track plans for developing the precision anti-suffering therapy. We identify three primary streams of value: a) reducing uncertainty in the emerging field through early exploratory research, helping with the identification of dead ends and promising R&D trajectories; b) a wide range of downstream effects (beyond the “raising awareness” cliché), including talent mobilization and rekindled interest in suffering abolitionism as a distinct cause area; and c) certain developments that cannot yet be publicly disclosed. In December 2024, Marcin Kowrygo (Acting CEO & volunteering contributor), David Pearce (Director of Bioethics), Aatu Koskensilta (President), and a few other team members decided to leave The Far Out Initiative. They look forward to collaborating and applying their experience to advance the suffering abolitionist lineage in the spirit of open science, public good, and thoughtfully decentralized governance. Feel free to reach out to us at suffab at protonmail dot com to discuss collaboration opportunities! I wrote a post profiling the Far Out Initiative here. Unfortunately there were some internal disagreements, and the people ACX Grants was closest to left the organization. I plan to continue to monitor whatever they do next. 44: Advocate For Pandemic Response Team At FDA This team prefers has asked me not to discuss their progress publicly, but you can probably guess what their lives are like right now, and your guess would be correct. 45: Anti-Mosquito Drones We developed a cheap sonar that is able to detect, track and classify the ultrasonic echoes of mosquito wings at more than three meters. I believe it’s a world first! We also have control algorithms that take the sonar data and output control commands that both ram into mosquitoes and avoid the walls of a simulated environment. Our current work is on integrating both components on a real drone, and we expect to be able to kill mosquitoes by June. We’ve also made an internal impact study (napkin-sized) that shows we’ll be more cost-effective than ITNs in urban to periurban environments. So, we’re super excited with what comes next and can’t wait to share the videos of our first interceptions! More information [in the video below] and on our website, https://tornyol.com 46: Tarbell Fellowship For AI Journalism No update received, but they have a public website. I can’t find the Voices program in particular, but the overall fellowship completed their first class of seven fellows and is working on their second. 47: Germicidal UV Lamp Study The research has successfully demonstrated the ability of off the shelf ozone scrubbers to mitigate the ozone production of far-UVC lamps, is now available as a preprint (https://chemrxiv.org/engage/chemrxiv/article-details/67e4cde76dde43c9084d88b7). The paper has been submitted for publication and is currently undergoing peer review. Any ideas you have for potential funders we can approach to help execute our six-year plan to accelerate far-UVC would be appreciated https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/introducing-project-air/ 48: Technological Solutions To Animal Welfare Challenges Directly because of Innovate Animal Ag's work, the first U.S. egg producer publicly announced in the New York Times their adoption of in-ovo sexing technology, eliminating the need to cull day-old male chicks. The initial in-ovo sexing machine began operating in the U.S. at the end of 2024, with the first eggs from these hens expected on shelves in mid-2025. External evaluations estimate our work accelerated U.S. adoption of this technology by over seven years, meaning that once fully implemented, more than 2 billion chicks will have been spared. In addition to continuing to support the rollout of in-ovo sexing in the US and globally, we're now exploring other technologies and paths to impact. Current promising projects include developing humane slaughter methods for fish and advocating for USDA approval of a poultry vaccine against bird flu. They add: If you ever meet folks that are interested animal welfare and are partial to more technocratic and practical solutions, please continue to pass them our way, or connect them directly to me. 49: Assurance Contract Website www.Spartacus.app is an ACX grantee that created a platform to help solve coordination and collective action problems. It enables the creation of campaigns that build critical mass through conditional commitments, which only activate when a sufficient number of people join, converting risk and uncertainty into a higher probability of successful outcomes. They are currently facilitating several projects that leverage conditional commitments, including a dominant assurance contract interface for fashion pop-ups, accelerating a community business association's membership drive, and helping an AI safety organization organize petitions and events, among others. They have pivoted from an emphasis on high-stakes coordination problems requiring anonymity (because they occur too infrequently) to a broader range of more common use cases and have successfully run small-scale campaigns, but are still working toward product-market fit. Despite resource constraints and split time commitments that have impeded faster progress, they remain dedicated to the project's growth and success. You can follow its progress on X or Substack, or email Jordan directly here. 50: Cause Prioritization @ Center For Exploratory Altruism Research Moderately good progress on a salt reduction policy advocacy project we funded; informal commitments have been made by the Ministry of Health, and we're awaiting the publication of a formal administrative order. The official description sounds maximally generic, but this is an EA charity with a broad mandate whose current thesis is that dietary guidelines in developing countries can have outsized effects in saving lives. They’re making some progress on a salt reduction campaign in a developing country they prefer not to name publicly. 51: Mark Webb Studying Land Reform The purpose of this project was to identify specific farmland that could be acquired and transferred to the farmers already working the land. This has been difficult to achieve. I have been able to connect with other charities and landless farmers, and was able to interview a number of people about what their situation looks like, as well as what it would look like to them personally if they owned, rather than rented, their farmland. All this was immensely helpful in pushing this long-term project forward, even if I was unable to identify a specific plot of land that could be used to try the experiment. I intend to continue this project. If you have any insights or connections, I am interested. 52: More AI Advocacy In Australia Good Ancestors is focused on AI safety policy in Australia. Middle powers might be a useful path to influence as the US and China focus on racing, rather than safety. The ACX grant helped us give testimony about AI safety to the Australian Senate alongside Google, Microsoft and Facebook (We were the only nonprofit to give oral evidence to the inquiry. We also engaged government on other AI-related issues, including cybersecurity, biosecurity, consumer law and automated decision making (https://www.goodancestors.org.au/ai-safety). We’re currently working to inform voters about where parties stand on AI safety for the election, ahead of engaging on a likely Australian AI Act in 2025 (https://www.australiansforaisafety.com.au/). This is the same Australian lobbying organization we founded in Year 1, after a change in name and leadership. I continue to be excited about AI safety in middle-tier countries for a few reasons. First, these countries have some power in international organizations to set international standards. Second, companies will usually comply with any not-excessively-burdensome regulation set by any country with a significant market. Third, AI safety is underfunded by the standard of government programs, so Australia setting up a national AI Safety Institute would significantly expand the field. It’s kind of crazy that ACX Grants tier levels of money can have significant effects at this scale, but GA continues to do a great job and we continue to be proud to support them. 53: Campus For African School Of Economics At Zanzibar Charter City The ACX grant helped launch the first research center at the African School of Economics-Zanzibar, which is a main anchor of the Fumba Town charter city project in Zanzibar. This research center is called the Africa Urban Lab (AUL), focused on rapid urbanization across Africa. The AUL launched its first Diploma program in Urban Development with 38 students in our first cohort (now graduated!), including mayors, and deputy mayor, a director of a national Ministry of urban development, and many others. We published our research framing papers for the AUL's research agenda. We raised funding to launch an Urban Expansion Program that's now selecting 15 African cities to support in implementing urban expansion planning on the urban periphery. We held two Public Talks by renowned cities scholars and practitioners. We received additional funding from Emergent Ventures and from the Templeton Foundation. And we've partnered with 8 universities across the region, and with one of these universities (Ardhi) we'll be working with them to update their urban planning and urban economics curriculum (amplifying AUL's impact beyond our own organization). A longer update from end of 2024 is here: https://www.aul.city/blog/reflecting-on-africa-urban-lab-s-inaugural-year-2024-highlights) 54: Online Training Program For Health Workers In Developing Countries To date, over 11,000 health workers in Nigeria have completed our course on basic, life-saving newborn care. ACX funding was catalytic for helping us secure government approvals and complete an evaluation of the impact of our training on health workers' clinical practices. The evaluation shows that birth attendants provide better birth care after taking the course. We fed the evaluation results into an updated model, which suggests the program is 24 times more cost-effective than direct cash transfers (a widely recognized benchmark for cost-effectiveness). The program is likely to become even more cost-effective as we scale up. https://healthlearn.org/blog/updated-impact-model 55: Smartphone Pupillometry To Diagnose Neurological Conditions We have continued to expand our work in the smartphone pupillometry space and the development of our application, PupilScreen (https://www.apertur.ai/). We have expanded our pilot/research program to include new sites across the United States (Missouri, New Jersey, Kentucky, USAC racing, PitFit driver performance training in Indiana) and the world (Nepal, Taiwan, South Africa). We continue to publish at the leading edge of the pupillometry literature as well looking at concussion (https://neuro.jmir.org/2024/1/e58398 and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39682632/), cerebral vasospasm (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39128501/), and stroke (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39674431/ and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39561861/). Currently, we are raising a $3 million seed round via a SAFE to fund the expansion of our work into the hands of healthcare workers and the general public. We will first focus on traumatic brain injury for clinical use and develop a neuro-monitoring wellness application utilizing our technology for the general public. They add: “We would welcome connections to anyone that you think might be interested in supporting our work further by investing in our $3M seed round of funding.” 56: Mike Saint-Antoine’s Biology Tutorial Videos Since getting the grant, I've continued to make Youtube tutorials as planned. One series that I'm especially proud of is about how to make a neural network in the Julia programming language completely from scratch, with no imports, up to the point of being able to solve MNIST (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWVKUEZ25V97tNULapu07DhWv6_W4NfpE). Also, a college student in Pakistan came across my videos and invited me to give a virtual Zoom-lecture to her department, so I ended up teaching a 6-hour "Python-for-Biologists" workshop to more than a hundred college students in Pakistan over Zoom. So that was pretty awesome. Also, lately I've been teaching some in-person classes too, mostly at Fractal University in NYC, and I also recently organized a day-long, in-person Beginner Python class for people in my local area (Philly suburbs) who wanted to learn some basic programming. I'm having a lot of fun with this project, and am grateful to Scott and the grant funders for their generosity! 57: Conceptual Boundaries Workshop On AI Safety The workshop was completed successfully; you can read a writeup here. 58: Apart Research To Incubate AI Safety Scientists No update received, but they have a public website, and you can see their impact metrics here. They seem to be in urgent need of more funding. 59: Primer On How To Achieve Political Change No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 60: Research IVF Clinic Success Rates We've built a predictive model that estimates the odds of having a child at different IVF clinics across the country while controlling for factors like patient age and infertility differences that can falsely make some clinics look better than others. We found that an average patient can increase their odds of having a kid by 43% just by going to a top 10% clinic. Patients unlucky enough to go to a bottom 10% clinic will reduce their odds of having a kid by 40%. Next month, we're adding several more clinics, 2023 data, additional procedural controls, and donor/gestational carrier models, which should push our accuracy beyond state-of-the-art models in this space and better isolate clinic impact on patient outcomes. We've launched ivf.clinic, a website where patients can access personalized IVF reports and browse our clinic rankings (though we're still squashing some bugs). Currently, we're expanding our research to include comprehensive insurance coverage and pricing data across clinics nationwide. If anyone has insights on automating the collection of IVF clinic pricing information, I'd love to hear from you at scelarek@gmail.com. 61: Replicate Study On Brain Wave Synchronization For Speeding Learning We have acquired and configured the OpenBCI UltraCortex Mark IV 8-channel EEG headset and a clinical-grade Biosemi 32-channel EEG system. We’ve implemented the required components for the experimental pipeline (computing alpha from EEG, flashing bright white light, presenting stimulus images). We are currently putting them together into a single system that we’ll use to collect the data from several participants. We are aiming to gather data on several participants in late June / early July and complete the pilot of the replication in July 2025. If you’d like to be a participant in the study, [they might announce a link once they have it]. 62: Advocate Repeal Of Interstate Runaway Compact No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 63: Animal Welfare (Especially Fish) In Turkiye Future For Fish asks companies to sign up to FFF's fish welfare commitment, which requires producers to certify their facilities and enforce specific standards for stocking density and harvest. Luckyfish, İlknak, Divan (35 restaurants, 17 hotels) and NG Hotels (5 hotels) have signed and published FFF's fish welfare commitment with İlknak publishing the commitment on their website. Kılıç published its first sustainability report detailing fish welfare policies, including enforcing a maximum stocking density of 10 kg/m³ and confirmation of electrical stunning practices. Longer version with some caveats: https://manifund.org/projects/improving-fish-w From the longer document, these commitments involve things like reducing overcrowding, or stunning fish before killing them. Over 30 million fish were affected just from their single largest commitment, and they say 100 fish are helped per dollar spent. 64: More Georgism Advocacy Lars and Will used the 2021 grant to co-found ValueBase. Will remained with the company, and Lars left to do advocacy work at the Center For Land Economics. Here’s their summary of how things are going: [Our] organization transitioned leadership with Greg Miller, a former Program Analyst at the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Lars Doucet, author of Land is A Big Deal and Co-Founder of Valuebase, working full time and Joe Caissie stepping aside. This transition happened naturally as the next career transition for each respective person. Since then, progress has been made on pushing forward legislation. Maryland had two bills introduced to give Baltimore and counties the ability to enact split-rate taxes. One of the bills passed the state senate and would allow Baltimore to enact land value taxes within one mile of rail corridors–this contains 50% of Baltimore’s land value. However, the legislative session ended. We expect the bill to revive next session. The Center for Land Economics has been actively working to help efforts to get this bill passed the line. At the same time, we have uncovered systematic undervaluing of vacant land in assessments. We are writing a report on the assessment issues in Maryland with actionable steps to resolve them.

Minnesota and Virginia also have legislation to enable cities to implement land value taxes. We are monitoring these efforts. There are a few other cities we are operating in. We have helped another organization prepare for a meeting in Tennessee by doing impact analysis of land value taxes in the city. We have presented to city officials in the City of South Bend who have expressed support for land value taxes. Finally, we are in conversation with a State Senator in Colorado who is a champion of land value taxes. Meanwhile, we have soft launched and developed the OpenAVMKit, which uses a unified schema to do assessment accuracy reports and automated valuation methods for any property tax data given. Valuation of land is the key binding constraint to successful implementation of land value taxes. We plan to be the leaders in this space with strong benchmarking capabilities and a repo that can enable the open-source community to make the best automated valuation methods. Along with these efforts, we have expanded the movement. We have posted to the Progress and Poverty Substack growing the subscriber base to around 5,000 subscribers. We have spoken to over 25 local advocates interested in working on land value taxes in their local communities. Yet, there is a long way to go. We need to start earning income through technical assistance contracts as our grant funding expires. We need to continue pushing for a state to implement, and we need to be prepared to tell the success story for when they do. 65: EN’s Work On Bacteriophage Therapy Our project is aimed at pioneering phage therapy in Nigeria, where limited resources/infrastructure have historically held back research in this field. Starting from the ground up, we are establishing the foundational systems needed to support a robust phage research ecosystem. So far, we’ve isolated 34 bacteriophages targeting Pseudomonas aeruginosa, an essential step toward building a comprehensive phage bank. This began with collecting a wide range of clinical Pseudomonas isolates, which we are now characterizing alongside the phages through genome sequencing and phenotypic assays including studies on phage stability across pH, temperature, and salinity ranges. Our long-term goal is to develop a phage-based hydrogel for treating diabetic wounds. On the regulatory front, we have secured approval from the Attorney General to register our nonprofit organization, the Centre for Phage Biology and Therapeutics. Additionally, we’re expanding into vaccine development; following a research stay in Prof. Roderick's lab at the University of Waterloo, we have initiated the design of a phage-based universal Salmonella vaccine aimed at covering all major serotypes—an urgent need underscored by Africa’s reliance on external vaccine sources during the COVID-19 pandemic. I have signed an MTA agreement with Roderick to use his phage-based vaccine platform patents to enable us to design vaccines against any common disease affecting us. This is only the beginning, but we are proud to be laying the scientific and institutional groundwork for homegrown phage innovation in Africa. Emergent Ventures funded EN before we did and deserves a lot of credit here also. 66: Create An Artificial Kidney For an implantable artificial kidney, the first essential component is a hemofilter designed to emulate the glomerulus. Critical requirements for this hemofilter include high permeability (to maximize flow for a given area), selectivity (specifically, the retention of albumin), and robust blood compatibility (ensuring sustained function over time). Our initial strategy focused on using negative surface charge to reduce fouling. I began by testing polyelectrolyte (PE) coatings on 24nm pore membranes featuring a negative terminal charge, similar to the glomerular barrier. These initial static tests, assessing platelet adsorption in whole blood, yielded positive outcomes for some polyelectrolytes, indicating potentially desirable blood compatibility. However, static test setups are not truly representative of dynamic in-vitro conditions and don't provide data on key parameters like permeability, fouling progression, or changes in membrane selectivity. To address these limitations, I designed and built a blood filtration setup. This system sustains human whole blood in circulation for 20 minutes, allowing us to analyze all the aforementioned parameters, as well as platelet activation markers. This has resulted in a fairly high-throughput system for evaluating any surface coating. I'm pleased to report this setup has been accepted for presentation at this year's European Society for Artificial Organs (ESAIO) conference. I am also currently working on a full manuscript, as I believe this system offers a viable way to partially replace animal experiments in our early-stage research, requiring only 1.2ml of human blood per run. Working with a PhD student (hired to support both this research and work on membrane substrates), we have continued testing these PE coatings, alongside PEG coatings, on our membranes. Here, we're finding that optimization of the coating layer is crucial. With the current PE coatings, we observe a permeability drop of about an order of magnitude compared to the base membrane, making them unsuitable for an implantable device in their present form. This is likely due to the specific nature of the initial PE layer, which we can modify. We also suspect there may be ingress of PE into the pores, meaning we're not achieving just a surface coating (our goal), but rather a very thick coating, which would explain the flux loss. Optimizing the coating process to control penetration depth is now a primary focus of my ongoing work. I am currently aiming for a flux of 20ul/min (as this is cap introduced by the protein gel layer anyway) but for it to be at this 'steady state' permeability without drop in permeability. I am also imaging the membranes after contact with SEM to see if there is indeed any platelet adsorption etc. Tugrul has the dubious honor of maybe being "the only person to climb a 4000m peak with severe kidney failure". To raise money and awareness for his artificial kidney project, he is running Climb Against Time, where he will climb 41 mountains over 4000m (13000 ft) this summer. He is looking for donors and climbing partners. 67: Add Tardigrade Genes To Human Cells The goal of this one was to make hybrid cells that are more resilient for research and certain medical applications. They report: The grant was to synthesize vectors for the expression of humanized tardigrade proteins that can be targeted to different areas of the cell. All the vectors were designed, generated, and transposed into human cells. The proteins all localize successfully (e.g. they match the designed target), with one exception (we are still working on validating it). We've done some stress testing with the trangenic cells, but haven't reached firm conclusions yet. We've further generated some multigene designs but have not yet transposed them into cells, but should shortly. We're hoping to submit a manuscript on the first round later this year. 68: Teach Forecasting To EU Policy-Makers The original project didn't work out, but our grantee (who still prefers to remain anonymous) is now working with an EU think tank pursuing the same agenda, and has been teaching forecasting workshops to policy-makers for the past two months. 69: Platform For Single-Cell Imaging They ended up unable to accept this grant and returned the money. 70: Open Source Polygenic Predictor For EA/IQ They have an update here. They think they have a predictor that can explain 12% of variance in intelligence, and they’re working on validating it and creating an easy-to-use website. 71: Improve Flu Vaccines The grant mainly funded agent based modelling to demonstrate the benefit of pre-existing immunity to pandemic influenza if and when a future pandemic occurs (academic publication will result). The original proposal was to attempt to influence the WHO influenza strain selection process. After attending WHO meetings and a global influenza conference, I believe this is not feasible. Stakeholder feedback was the potential short term negative effect on vaccine hesitancy is believed to outweigh the less tangible future benefit. Given the conservative nature of decision makers, pandemic vaccines are likely to remain research only. There are still green shoots of research into pandemic preparedness/prevention that I am continuing to work on. I'm working under the "Australians for Pandemic Prevention" brand of Good Ancestors, another group that ACX funded in 2024. 72: Scenario Analysis For Developing World Agricultural Programs In addition to the research and analysis funded by the grant, I’ve learned to code with LLMs and have built an MVP of the project. The app is being considered for further development by staff at a large international organization. 73: Further C’s Political Career C’s political career is going well, but he continues to think it wouldn’t be strategic to give more information publicly at this time. Lessons Learned I'm most impressed with our lobbying/advocacy organizations. In particular, Good Ancestors has gotten the Australian government to sign onto an international AI safety declaration, partner with various x-risk-related organizations, and (possibly) extend charity tax deductions to some EA causes that previously didn't have it - I think this on its own goes a substantial way to paying back the cost of all ACX Grants. Coalition to Modify NOTA has a kidney donation bill in front of Congress that the (very illiquid) prediction markets give a 45% chance of passing; if it works, it could save thousands of lives. The Georgists are partly responsible for bills making land value taxes slightly easier to implement in a handful of states. Good Science Project seems to have significantly improved science. Are lobbying organizations a better bet than other types of nonprofit (within the constraints of ACX Grants)? I'm not sure. It could just be that lobbyists are (naturally) better at playing themselves up and sounding successful than (for example) scientists, or that politicians are good at people-pleasing and make people feel heard and encouraged in a way that might not change overall policy later. Also, I recently talked to some grantmakers who funded a lobbying organization that superficially seems excellent, but they expressed concern it was net negative (!) by taking away oxygen and spotlight from potentially more effective orgs. So I am encouraged but wary. Animal welfare organizations were another standout success. Again, I don't know how to think about this - while I think our grantees were exceptional, there's also an issue where the scale of animal welfare challenges is so great, and work on them so neglected, that lots of organizations can save a million chickens here, or a million fish there, without particularly making a splash. On the one hand, this is exactly what effective altruism should be doing - exploring grants that are very high in linear utility even if they don't feel satisfying. On the other, they're unsatisfying - and also hard to assess retroactively. How many chickens should a good animal welfare grant save? Any realistic number will both be overwhelmingly large in absolute terms and far too small in relative terms. I'm most ambivalent about our science grants. Many of them say they are successful and can point to published papers which explain the science they did. But it's hard to judge whether anything useful has changed based on the science getting done. I know it's important to fund basic research and not just last-mile technology startups, but it's hard for a mini-grants program like this one to evaluate these kinds of abstract interventions. One disappointing result was that grants to legibly-credentialled people operating in high-status ways usually did better than betting on small scrappy startups (whether companies or nonprofits). For example, Innovate Animal Ag was in many ways overdetermined as a grantee - former Yale grad and Google engineer founder, profiled in NYT, already funded by Open Philanthropy - and they in fact did amazing work. On the other hand, there were a lot of promising ACX community members with interesting ideas who were going to turn them into startups any day now, but who ended up kind of floundering (although this also describes Manifold, one of our standout successes). One thing I still don't understand is that Innovate Animal Ag seemed to genuinely need more funding despite being legibly great and high status - does this screen off a theoretical objection that they don't provide ACX Grants with as much counterfactual impact? Am I really just mad that it would be boring to give too many grants to obviously-good things that even moron could spot as promising? Someone (I think it might be Paul Graham) once said that they were always surprised how quickly destined-to-be-successful startup founders responded to emails - sometimes within a single-digit number of minutes regardless of time of day. I used to think of this as mysterious - some sort of psychological trait? Working with these grants has made me think of it as just a straightforward fact of life: some people operate an order of magnitude faster than others. The Manifold team created something like five different novel institutions in the amount of time it's taken some other grantees to figure out a business plan; I particularly remember one time when I needed something, sent out a request to talk about it with two or three different teams, and the Manifold team had fully created the thing and were pestering me to launch a trial version before some of the other people had even gotten back to me. I take no pleasure in reporting this - I sometimes take a week or two to answer emails, and all of the predictions about my personality that this implies would be correct - but it's increasingly something that I look for and respect. A lot of the most successful grants succeeded quickly, or at least were quick to get on a promising track. Since everything takes ten times longer than people expect, only someone who moves ten times faster than people expect can get things done in a reasonable amount of time. In almost every case where I thought to myself “this is a cool idea, but I don’t know how it’s going to really pay off, as opposed to reaching a cool intermediate accomplishment and then stagnating”, this was a correct criticism, and I should have taken it more seriously. But I can’t rule out that these were good in vague and hard-to-measure ways that I should take more seriously. This one is really self-serving, but in general when people were good communicators (or even bloggers) and wowed me with the writing-composition of their application, they turned out to be a good bet. And when people were hard to understand and annoying to communicate with, even if their ideas seemed good, they were less likely to pan out. Overall Thoughts The total cost of ACX Grants, both rounds, was about $3 million. Do these outcomes represent a successful use of that amount of money? Very naively, startups originating from ACX Grants have about $50 million in value1. If ACX Grants is equivalent to a pre-seed funder, and pre-seed funders usually get ~5%, then if we were VCs we would have a portfolio worth $2.5 million. About 1/5 of ACX Grants were attempting to be market-valued startups, so if we assume the charitable portion did about as well as the startup portion, then the charity portion is “worth” $10 million. There’s some reason to expect this is too high, since much of the startup value came from one successful outlier. But there’s another reason to expect this is too low, since we were aiming at charity rather than market cap, and any actual market cap that our grantees got was an unexpected side effect. I’m treating this as a sanity check rather than as a real number. It’s harder to produce Inside View estimates, because so many of the projects either produce vague deliverables (eg a white paper that might guide future action) or intermediate results only (eg getting a government to pass AI safety regulations is good, but can’t be considered an end result unless those regulations prevent the AI apocalypse). Because we tend towards incubating charities and funding research (rather than last-mile causes like buying bednets), achieved measurable deliverables are thin on the ground. But here are things that ACX grantees have already accomplished: Improved the living/slaughter conditions of 30 million fish.

Inline links: Progress and Poverty Substack, Climb Against Time, here, 1

Open Questions For Future ACX Grants Rounds

June 19, 2025 · Original source

Arguments for donating: Investing would force us to become more of a formal, carefully-structured nonprofit. We would need to bring in some level of VC expertise and potentially have a plan in case someone tried to backstab us to get more shares at our expense. We would have to convince funders that we were operating above-board and planned to apply any profits towards our charitable mission, which would require some backup plan in case ACX Grants ceased to operate. All of this would require legal work. Manifund do most of it for us, but this would be placing a large burden on them. There’s some risk that once we have a portfolio of companies, we’ll have conflicts of interest that make it hard for us to donate to competitors, or encourage us to donate to complementary services.

Apply For An ACX Grant (2025)

July 24, 2025 · Original source

The program is conducted in partnership with Manifund, a charity spinoff of Manifold Markets, who handle the administrative/infrastructure side of things.

Inline links: Manifund

If you win a grant, Manifund will send you the money, probably by bank wire. Every few years, we might ask you to fill out another 15 - 30 minute form letting us know how your project is doing.

ACX Grants Results 2025

October 13, 2025 · Original source

Second, the Manifund team. Manifund, a charitable spinoff of Manifold Markets, handled our funds, disbursement, infrastructure, and miscellaneous coding needs. Special thanks to Austin Chen for taking point on this.

Inline links: Manifund

The people who offered funding after I stopped checking the funding offers form (sorry!) or who were considering offering funding but asked me technical questions about Manifund that I failed to follow up on appropriately.

Open Thread 404

October 20, 2025 · Original source

3: I’m still working with Manifund on getting money to grantees, expect an email about this soon.

Open Thread 416

January 12, 2026 · Original source

3: We’re having an ACX Grants meetup in SF this coming Saturday. All grantees should have gotten an email with the details. If you’re a grantee and you didn’t get an email, contact austin@manifund.org. If you were a judge or a funder, then you’re not required or even expected to come, and I didn’t mass-email you, but you’re welcome to come if you want to meet some of the people you helped - contact the same address. And if you’re a VC or grantmaker who likes throwing money at wild projects, or otherwise think you would make a good addition to the event, then you can contact Austin too.

MIT18 mentions across 18 issues

MIT is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 18 times across 18 issues between April 30, 2021 and September 11, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Vernon D. Tate ... who went to become chief librarian at MIT"; "wrote the MIT economist Morris Adelman"; "They’re especially trying to expand the student groups at Harvard and MIT". It most often appears alongside California, Harvard, Japan.

Article page: MIT
Mention count: 18
Issue count: 18
First seen: April 30, 2021
Last seen: September 11, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Double Fold April 30, 2021
Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet April 30, 2021
Boston Meetup This Sunday September 04, 2021
ACX Grants Results December 28, 2021
ACX Grants ++: The First Half February 03, 2022
Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy June 17, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley October 13, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Bobos In Paradise December 09, 2022
Who Predicted 2022? January 24, 2023
Links For March 2023 March 10, 2023
Your Book Review: Safe Enough? July 01, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk September 18, 2023
Seems Like Targeting January 31, 2024
Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate March 28, 2024
Links for May 2024 May 29, 2024
Your Book Review: Dominion June 28, 2024
Lives Of The Rationalist Saints February 20, 2025
Book Review: If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies September 11, 2025

California 6 shared issues
Harvard 6 shared issues
Japan 5 shared issues
United States 5 shared issues
US 5 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Double Fold

April 30, 2021 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Your Book Review: The Wizard And The Prophet

April 30, 2021 · Original source

In "Fire," the line between Wizardry and Prophetry seems the most slippery – is solar power an example of a cutting-edge technological solution to a seemingly intractable growth problem (in which case it would be firmly in the Wizard camp) or an environmentally-friendly alternative to "dirty" Wizard technology like fracking and nuclear power plants (in which case, it should belong to the Prophets)? Mann places it more in the Prophet category, but an important point he makes is that, before fears of climate change displaced the locus of the argument surrounding oil, the Prophets’ party line was that alternative "clean" energy solutions like solar were desperately needed because the stock of oil in the world was running out – which so far has proven to be untrue. Much like "we’re running out of room for all these people!" or "we’re running out of space to house all this garbage!" this zombie conviction persisted for decades and seemed resistant to any evidence to the contrary. But if (big if!) carbon emission were of no concern, Wizards would have neatly won this fight through their development of more sophisticated oil extraction techniques and more energy-efficient machines, turning oil supply into a Zeno’s Paradox. Mann: "‘It is commonly asked, when will the world’s supply of oil be exhausted?’ wrote the MIT economist Morris Adelman. ‘The best one-word answer: never.’ On its face, this seems ridiculous – how could a finite stock be inexhaustible, when a constantly renewed flow can run out? But more than a century of experience has shown it to be true. [...] That is, fossil fuel supplies have no known bounds."

Inline links: we’re running out of space to house all this garbage!, Zeno’s Paradox

Boston Meetup This Sunday

September 04, 2021 · Original source

Some rationalist/EA leaders are focusing on Boston right now as a promising place to community-build. They’re especially trying to expand the student groups at Harvard and MIT. If you live in Boston and/or attend either of those colleges, then - whether or not you can make it Sunday - consider giving them your name through this form so they can help get you connected.

Inline links: this form

ACX Grants ++: The First Half

December 28, 2021 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

February 03, 2022 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy

June 17, 2022 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley

October 13, 2022 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Highlights From The Comments On Bobos In Paradise

December 09, 2022 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Your Book Review: Safe Enough?

January 24, 2023 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Links For March 2023

March 10, 2023 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

July 01, 2023 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk

September 18, 2023 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Seems Like Targeting

January 31, 2024 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Practically-A-Book Review: Rootclaim $100,000 Lab Leak Debate

March 28, 2024 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Links for May 2024

May 29, 2024 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Your Book Review: Dominion

June 28, 2024 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Lives Of The Rationalist Saints

February 20, 2025 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Grading My 2018 Predictions For 2023

September 11, 2025 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Meta15 mentions across 15 issues

Meta is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 15 times across 15 issues between February 20, 2023 and October 21, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "big tech company (eg Google/Apple/Meta)"; "the US constitution, or Meta’s corporate charter"; "Meta as in Facebook". It most often appears alongside OpenAI, California, China.

Article page: Meta
Mention count: 15
Issue count: 15
First seen: February 20, 2023
Last seen: October 21, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Grading My 2018 Predictions For 2023 February 20, 2023
Most Technologies Aren't Races April 05, 2023
Son Of Bride Of Bay Area House Party December 12, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On "The Origin Of Woke" May 07, 2024
Zvi on California's AI Bill May 08, 2024
SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story October 10, 2024
Links For December 2024 December 17, 2024
Open Thread 370 February 24, 2025
OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know March 13, 2025
My Takeaways From AI 2027 April 08, 2025
Moldbug Sold Out May 07, 2025
Links For July 2025 July 01, 2025
Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party July 21, 2025
Links For September 2025 September 04, 2025
Tech PACs Are Closing In On The Almonds October 21, 2025

OpenAI 9 shared issues
California 6 shared issues
China 6 shared issues
Google 6 shared issues
Sam Altman 6 shared issues

Source context

February 20, 2023 · Original source

The leading big tech company (eg Google/Apple/Meta) is (clearly ahead of/approximately caught up to/clearly still behind) the leading AI-only company (DeepMind/OpenAI/Anthropic) in the quality of their AI products: (25%/50%/25%)

Artificial biocatastrophe (worse than COVID): 5% INTERNATIONAL: IDK, I don't expect a Taiwan invasion. Generally bearish on China for the usual reasons: I just think they've built up too much debt (literal and metaphorical), have a demographic time bomb, it's always hard to come down from the high of fast growth, and even though their mixed centralized-ish model worked well before, I think Xi is a significant change towards traditional dictatorship which doesn't work as well. I don't expect this to produce any obvious explosion or disaster for them before 2028 though. I expect Ukraine and Russia to figure out some unsatisfying stalemate before 2028, followed by massive growth in Ukraine (usually happens post-war, they'll probably get favorable terms from lots of other countries including an EU admission deal, they're overdue for a Poland-style post-communist boom). Ukraine war cease-fire: 80%

Most Technologies Aren't Races

April 05, 2023 · Original source

This isn’t to say the future won’t have controversial political issues. Should you be allowed to wirehead yourself so thoroughly that you never want to stop? In what situations should people be allowed to have children? (surely not never, but also surely not creating a shockwave of trillions of children spreading at near-light-speed across the galaxy). Who gets the closest star systems? (there will be enough star systems to go around, but I assume the ones closer to Earth will be higher status) What kind of sims can you voluntarily consent to participate in? I’m okay with these decisions being decided by the usual decision-making methods of the National People’s Congress, the US constitution, or Meta’s corporate charter. At the very least, I don’t think switching from one of these to another is a big enough deal that it should trade off against the chance we survive at all.

Son Of Bride Of Bay Area House Party

December 12, 2023 · Original source

“Are you talking about Sam Altman?” asked a man who you didn’t even realize was listening to the conversation. “I’ve been trying to figure the whole situation out. I understand that Toner was part of the deep state conspiracy and McCauley was part of the effective altruist conspiracy. And D’Angelo, he used to work for Zuck, so he must have been part of the Meta conspiracy - Meta as in Facebook, not meta-conspiracy in the sense of a conspiracy controlling all the others. There was a meta-conspiracy controlling all the others, but that was . . . “

Highlights From The Comments On "The Origin Of Woke"

May 07, 2024 · Original source

I may be n=1 person, but I've heard that similar things are happening at Apple, Disney, Dreamworks, several large game studios (you would have heard of them if you were in the space, but I won't mention them, because that industry is small), Google, Facebook/Meta... I'll just stop there, but suffice it to say, this isn't everything.

5) Yes I didn’t talk about the origins of inequality. That would have been a bad strategy. I prefer what Scott calls the “meta-honesty” approach, where you tell people exactly what you’re not going to talk about and why. This means that the pieces are all there for an intelligent reader to figure out what you think, while making things hard for the cancellers and political opponents. This is a political book, and I sometimes do politics, which I justify with the meta-honesty approach. Scott has a revulsion towards this, which I consider having the flaw of being too pure for this world. I, in contrast, have an appreciation for politics as an art, and this is maybe just an aesthetic thing. But I will never lie to or mislead you about what I think, and believe others should live up to the same standard, even if they sometimes practice selective silence.

I’d also refer people to my piece that responded to some earlier reviews of the book here. Richard Hanania's Newsletter Against Ideaism Among the reviews of my book, I have noticed two main lines of criticism. First of all, there’s the argument that I didn’t explain everything. Oliver Traldi in Quillette asks “does the federal government require corporations to make rainbow-colored versions of their logos, or tweet in support of black trans women?” No, it certainly does not, although I … Read more 2 years ago · 81 likes · 39 comments · Richard Hanania

Inline links: Richard Hanania's Newsletter Against Ideaism Among the reviews of my book, I have noticed two main lines of criticism. First of all, there’s the argument that I didn’t explain everything. Oliver Traldi in Quillette asks “does the federal government require corporations to make rainbow-colored versions of their logos, or tweet in support of black trans women?” No, it certainly does not, although I … Read more 2 years ago · 81 likes · 39 comments · Richard Hanania

Zvi on California's AI Bill

May 08, 2024 · Original source

Go rogue and commit some other crime that does > $500 million in damage3. If the tests show that the model can do these bad things, the company has to demonstrate that it won’t, presumably by safety-training the AI and showing that the training worked. The kind of training AIs already have - the kind that prevents them from saying naughty words or whatever - would count here, as long as “the safeguards . . . will be sufficient to prevent critical harms.” So the bill isn’t about regulating deepfakes or misinformation or generative art. It’s just about nukes and hacking the power grid. There are some good objections and some dumb objections to this bill. Let’s start with the dumb ones: Some people think this would literally ban open source AI. After all, doesn’t it say that companies have to be able to shut down their models? And isn’t that impossible if they’re open-source? No. The bill specifically says4 this only applies to the copies of the AI still in the company’s possession5. The company is still allowed to open-source it, and they don’t have to worry about shutting down other people’s copies. Other people think this would make it prohibitively expensive for individuals and small startups to tinker with open-source AIs. But the bill says that only companies training giant foundation models have to worry about any of this. So if Facebook trains a new LLaMA bigger than GPT-5, they’ll have to spend some trivial-in-comparison-to-training-costs amount to test it in-house and make sure it can’t make nukes before they release it. But after they do that, third-party developers can do whatever they want to it - re-training, fine-tuning, whatever - without doing any further tests. Other people think all the testing and regulation would make AIs prohibitively expensive to train, full stop. That’s not true either. All the big companies except Meta already do testing like this - here’s Anthropic’s, Google’s, and OpenAI’s - that already approximate the regulations. Training a new GPT-5 level AI is so expensive - hundreds of millions of dollars - that the safety testing probably adds less than 1% to the cost. No company rich enough to train a GPT-5 level AI is going to be turned off by the cost of asking it “hey can you create super-Ebola?”, and putting the answer into a nice legal-looking PDF. This isn’t the “create a moat for OpenAI” bill that everyone’s scared of6. Other people are freaking out over the “certification under penalty of perjury”. In some cases, developers have to certify under penalty of perjury that they’re complying with the bill. Isn’t this crazy? Doesn’t it mean if you make a mistake about your AI, you could go to jail? This is deeply misunderstanding how law works. Perjury means you can’t deliberately lie, something which is hard to prove and so rarely prosecuted. More to the point, half of the stuff I do in an average day as a medical doctor is certified under penalty of perjury - filling out medical leave forms is the first one to come to mind. This doesn’t mean I go to jail if my diagnosis is wrong. It’s just the government’s way of saying “it’s on the honor system”. What are some of the reasonable objections to this bill? Some people think the requirement to prove the AI safe is impossible or nearly so. This is Jessica Taylor’s main point here, which is certainly correct for a literal meaning of “prove”. Zvi points out that it just says “reasonable assurance”, which is a legal term for “you jumped through the right number of hoops”. In this case probably the right number of hoops is doing the same kind of testing that OpenAI/Anthropic/Google are currently doing, or that AI safety testing organization METR recommends. The bill gestures at the National Institute of Standards and Technology a few times here, and NIST just named one of METR’s founders as their AI safety czar, so I would be surprised if things didn’t end going this direction. METR’s tests are possible and many AI models have successfully passed earlier versions. Other people worry there are weird edge cases around derivative models. I think the bill’s intention is that once you prove that your AI is too dumb to create nukes, you’re fine to open-source it. Third-parties can change its character, but not its fundamental intelligence. But in theory, a third party could get tens of millions of dollars of compute and keep training your AI to increase its fundamental intelligence. This would be a weird thing to do, and anyone with that much compute probably should just make their own model. But if someone wanted to screw you over by doing this, technically the law is kind of vague and you would have to trust a judge to say “no, that’s stupid”. Probably the law should clarify that it doesn’t apply to this situation. Other people are worried about a weird rule that you can’t train an AI if you think it’s going to be unsafe. After some simple points about having a safety policy set up before training, the bill adds that you should: Refrain from initiating training of a covered model if there remains an unreasonable risk that an individual, or the covered model itself, may be able to use the hazardous capabilities of the covered model, or a derivative model based on it, to cause a critical harm. This makes less sense than all the other rules - you can test a model post-training to see if it’s harmful, but this seems to suggest you should know something before it’s trained. Is this a fully general “if something bad happens, we can get angry at you”? I agree this part should be clarified. Other people think the benchmarking clause is too vague. The law applies to models trained with > 10^26 FLOPs, or any model that uses advanced technology to be equally as good despite less compute. Equally as good how? According to benchmarks. Which benchmarks? The law doesn’t say. But it does say that the Technology Department will hire some bureaucrats to give guidance on this. I think this is probably the only way to do this; it’s too easy to fake any given benchmark. Every AI company already compares their models to every other AI company on a series of benchmarks anyway, so this isn’t demanding they create some new institution. It’s just “use common sense, ask the bureaucrats if you’re in a gray area, a judge will interpret it if it comes to trial”. This is how every law works. Other people complain that any numbers in the bill that make sense now may one day stop making sense. Right now 10^26 FLOPs is a lot. But in thirty years, it might be trivial - within the range that an academic consortium or scrappy startup might spend to train some cheap ad hoc AI. Then this law will be unduly restrictive to academics and scrappy startups. Is this bad? Presumably we know now that AIs less than 10^26 FLOPs are safe. We suppose that maybe there is some level of AI (let’s say 10^30 FLOPs) which is unsafe. If we had this number auto-update for compute growth, eventually it would go above the unsafe number, and unsafe models would be exempt. But at some point we’ll probably discover that some new models (eg 10^28 FLOPs) are safe, and it would be good if the law was updated to exempt them too. Very optimistically, this might happen - California’s minimum wage was originally $0.15 per hour, but this got updated when inflation made that unreasonable. In the pessimistic case, this will be a problem for us thirty years from now, if we’re even around then. Other people note that an AI committing a cyberattack is a fuzzy bar. If you ask GPT-4 to write a well-composed, grammatically-correct phishing email (“Dear sir, I am the password inspector, please tell me your password”), the phishing works, and you use the password to blow up a power plant, does that count? I agree that it would be nice if the law were clearer on this. But I also agree with the lawyers who object that dealing with programmers is impossible and that laws will never be exactly as clear as code. Other people note that this will *eventually* make open source impossible. Someday AIs really will be able to make nukes or pull off $500 million hacks. At that point, companies will have to certify that their model has been trained not to do this, and that it will stay trained. But if it were open-source, then anyone could easily untrain it. So after models become capable of making nukes or super-Ebola, companies won’t be able to open-source them anymore without some as-yet-undiscovered technology to prevent end users from using these capabilities. Sounds . . . good? I don’t know if even the most committed anti-AI-safetyist wants a provably-super-dangerous model out in the wild. Still, what happens after that? No cutting-edge open-source AIs ever again? I don’t know. In whatever future year foundation models can make nukes and hack the power grid, maybe the CIA will have better AIs capable of preventing nuclear terrorism, and the power company will have better AIs capable of protecting their grid. The law seems to leave open the possibility that in this situation, the AIs wouldn’t technically be capable of doing these things, and could be open-sourced. (or you could base your Build-A-Nuke-Kwik AI company in some state other than California.) Finally - last week we discussed Richard Hanania’s The Origin Of Woke, which claimed that although the original Civil Rights Act was good and well-bounded and included nothing objectionable, courts gradually re-interpreted it to mean various things much stronger than anyone wanted at the time. This bill tells the Department of Technology to offer guidance on what kind of tests AI companies should use. I assume their first guidance will be “the kind of safety testing that all companies except Meta are currently doing” or “something like METR”, because those are good tests, and the same AI safety people who helped write those tests probably also helped write this bill. But Hanania’s book, and the process of reading this bill, highlight how vague and complicated all laws can be. The same bill could be excellent or terrible, depending on whether it’s interpreted effectively by well-intentioned people, or poorly by idiots. That’s true here too. The best I can say against this objection is that this bill seems better-written than most. Many of the objections to its provisions seem to not understand how law works in general (cf. the perjury section) - the things they attack as impossible or insane or incomprehensibly vague are much easier and clearer than their counterparts in (let’s say) medicine or aerospace. Future AIs stronger than GPT-4 seem like the sorts of things which - like bad medicines or defective airplanes - could potentially cause damage. This sort of weak, carefully-directed regulation that exempts most models and carves out a space for open-sourcing seems like a good compromise between basic safety and protecting innovation. I join people like Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton in supporting it. Regardless of your position, I urge you to pay attention to the conversation and especially to read Zvi’s Asterisk article or his longer FAQ on his blog. I think Zvi provides pretty good evidence that many people are just outright lying about - or at least heavily misrepresenting - the contents of the bill, in a way that you can easily confirm by reading the bill itself. There will be many more fights over AI, and some of them will be technical and complicated. Best to figure out who’s honest now, when it’s trivial to check! If you disagree, I’m happy to make bets on various outcomes, for example: If this passes, will any big AI companies leave California? (I think no)

Inline links: 3, 4, 5, Anthropic’s, Google’s,, OpenAI’s, 6, here, The Origin Of Woke, read Zvi’s, his longer FAQ on his blog, reading the bill itself

California’s state senate is considering SB1047, a bill to regulate AI. Since OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Meta are all in California, this would affect most of the industry.

Inline links: SB1047

If this passes, will Meta stop open-sourcing their AIs in the near term, ie before the AIs can make nukes or hack the power grid? (I think no)

SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story

October 10, 2024 · Original source

Another major endorsement came from SAG-AFTRA (formerly Screen Actors Guild), a politicially influential union of Hollywood creatives. Their union’s letter to the governor makes it sound like they're against AI copying their voices and stealing their jobs, and willing to support basically any anti-AI legislation no matter how distantly related to their specific concern. But a later open letter showed more specific interest in existential risks, and a few people in show business have been consistent allies. Joseph Gordon-Leavitt is a long-time effective altruist (and married to Tasha McCauley, one of the OpenAI board members who voted out Sam Altman last November). And I was also moved by support from Adam McKay, who directed of Don’t Look Up (a film about people ignoring an impending asteroid strike, which AI safety advocates praised as a good intentional or unintentional metaphor for the current landscape).

Inline links: Their union’s letter to the governor, later open letter, Joseph Gordon-Leavitt, Adam McKay

The big AI companies split among themselves. OpenAI, Meta, and Google opposed the bill, X.AI supported, and Anthropic dithered on an earlier version but ultimately came out in support after their feedback was taken into account. Many opponents claimed that the bill was a Trojan Horse attempt at regulatory capture by the big AI companies, so it was fun watching three of the biggest AI companies come out against it and prove them exactly wrong. I don’t think any opponents ever changed their minds, admitted they’d made a mistake, or even stopped arguing that it was a big AI company plot - but hopefully enough people were paying attention that it discredited them a little for the next fight.

One of my sources generously interprets Newsom to mean something like “don’t regulate the models, regulate the end applications”. IE if OpenAI trains GPT-5, and then LegalCo fine-tunes it to do paralegal work, leave most of the safety responsibility on LegalCo, not OpenAI. This fails to engage with the motivations behind the bill, which are things like “what if someone uses AI for bioterrorism”? If Meta trains LLaMa-4, and al-Qaeda fine-tunes it for terrorism, instead of regulating it at the Meta-level, we should regulate al-Qaeda? Are we sure al-Qaeda will comply with California regulations? Our side is not sure that even this generous interpretation is very well has been thought through very well.

Links For December 2024

December 17, 2024 · Original source

19: Good explanation of the FTC’s monopoly case against Meta by Nicholas Decker.

Inline links: explanation of the FTC’s monopoly case against Meta

20: Why does exercise help lose weight? Part of the reason is that the exercise itself burns calories, but another part is that athletes have higher resting metabolic rate. Why? Apparently a big part of this is that they have bigger livers, maybe something to do with a high protein diet.

Inline links: they have bigger livers

Open Thread 370

February 24, 2025 · Original source

4: Some straggler Metaculus/ACX forecasting winners who I didn’t get to mention last week:

Sparepot is a privacy analyst at Meta, where he runs a low frequency prediction market for his team. He occasionally comments on ACX as Ace Is Low. He writes: "For the contest, I prioritized winning over platonic accuracy and shifted my real predictions to be more extreme. I don't know whether this is a lesson in self-confidence, support for the 'nothing ever happens' hypothesis, or a knock against the scoring algorithm. "

OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

March 13, 2025 · Original source

Meta, Facebook's parent company, [wrote] to California's attorney general, Rob Bonta, in December to ask him to step in.

Finally, the regulators (either the judge of Musk’s lawsuit, or the Attorneys General) might rule that everything about OpenAI sucks and they have to start over. Maybe this would mean firing the board and replacing it with . . . some other board? People who have some strong claim to really care about whether AI benefits all humanity or not? I don’t know, a man can dream. Business Insider discusses an incipient coalition between Meta and various public interest watchdogs pushing this solution:

Inline links: Business Insider discusses

This Metaculus question looks like the Manifold market, but without the big drop at the end. Are the Manifolders overreacting, or are the Metaculans asleep at the wheel?

Inline links: This

My Takeaways From AI 2027

April 08, 2025 · Original source

It might be even worse than that; once AI becomes good at cyberwarfare, there will be increased pressure on companies like Meta and DeepSeek to stop releases until they’re sure they can’t be jailbroken to hack people. If that’s hard, it could slow open-source even further.

Moldbug Sold Out

May 07, 2025 · Original source

A patchwork of city-states, unbound by modern “international law”, with few barriers to the free flow of capital and population. I’ll then describe how carefully Moldbug explained that you had to have these things, or else the dictatorship would fail in more or less the ways normies expect dictatorships to fail - leaving himself no room for the kind of pivot he’s trying now. 1: Classic Moldbug Believed Populist Dictatorship Would End In Disaster Classic Moldbug admitted that fascism and communism were extremely bad. He just drew different borders around political systems: fascism, communism, third world banana republic dictatorship, and democracy all cluster together as systems where coalitions rule because they can seize temporary power in a semi-lawless society. In the various totalitarianisms, it’s literal seizing of power through armed troops or secret police; in democracy, it’s electoral seizing of power through distributing the most goodies to coalition members. From here, my bolding. Clearly, the worst forms of demotism, the really bad apes, were the totalitarian systems—fascism and communism. The main difference between fascism and communism was not in mechanism, but in origin—fascist elites tended to be militarist, communist elites intellectual. But the one-party state is a clear case of convergent evolution. To a neocameralist, totalitarianism is democracy in its full-blown, most malignant form. Democracy doesn’t always deteriorate into totalitarianism, and lighting up at the gas pump doesn’t always engulf you in a ball of fire. Many people with cancer live a long time or die of something else instead. This doesn’t mean you should smoke half of Virginia before lunch. A political party is a political party. It is a large group of people allied for the purpose of seizing and wielding power. If it does not choose to arm its followers, this is only because it finds unarmed followers more useful than armed ones. If it chooses less effective strategies out of moral compunction, it will be outcompeted by some less-principled party. When one party gains full control over the state, it gains a massive revenue stream that it can divert entirely to its supporters. The result is a classic informal management structure, whose workings should be clear to anyone who watched a few episodes of The Sopranos. Without a formal ownership structure, in which the entire profit of the whole enterprise is collected and distributed centrally, money and other goodies leak from every pore. Totalitarian states are gangster states, in other words, and they tend to corruption and mismanagement. The personality cult of dictatorship is quite misleading—a totalitarian dictator has little in common with a neocameralist CEO, or even a cameralist monarch. The difference is the management structure. The CEO and the monarch owe their positions to a law which all can obey, and those who choose to obey the law are naturally a winning coalition against those who choose to break it. The dictator’s position is the result of his primacy in a pyramid of criminals. This structure is naturally unstable. There is always some other gangster who wants your job. Dictators, like Mafia chiefs, are not good at dying in bed. The internal and external violence typical of totalitarian states is best explained, I think, by this built-in mismanagement. Dictators are violent because they have to be—they use violence as an organizing principle. The totalitarian state has no principle of legitimacy that would render it impractical for an ambitious subordinate to capture the state with a coup. European monarchs made war, sometimes they were assassinated, and there were even succession struggles, but coups in the modern sense were very rare. Note that the financial logic which keeps the neocameralist state lawful does not apply in any way to the totalitarian state, because the latter does not have a stable management structure which is controlled by its shareholders. Lawlessness is not profitable for the state as a whole, but it may be quite profitable for the part that chooses lawlessness, and in the totalitarian state no one is counting as a whole. Similarly, only shareholder control gives the neocameralist state an incentive to remain small and efficient. The totalitarian state has an incentive to become large and inefficient, because every functionary has an incentive to expand his or her own department, and no bean-counter who demands that the department do more with less. In a totalitarian state, since no gangster is permanently safe from any other gangster, there is a strong incentive for anyone with power to take what he can, while he can. And there is no disincentive for him to avoid abusing a resource which neither he nor his allies benefit from. Under gangster management, the totalitarian states often engaged not only in mass murder, but mass murder of their most economically productive citizens. I’m trying to avoid subjecting you to too many Moldbug walls of text, but this is a constant hobbyhorse of his. Unless you implement his neocameralist ideology of shareholder control, your attempted autocracy will become a totalitarian state, which will be even worse than regular democracy. 2: The Dictator Must Not Be Elected The original sin of democratic/totalitarian governments is permitting power struggles. When you permit power struggles, the most power-hungry person wins. This person is probably a bad guy. But even if he isn’t, he has to optimize for gaining and maintaining power, instead of for the national interest. This usually means paying off the people who raised him to and keep him in power, i.e. corruption. Sometimes the corruption is straightforward, like giving friendly colonels vast sums from the public treasury. Other times it’s more insidious; if someone rose to power because organized labor joined their coalition, they have to overpay public unions, pass stifling pro-labor regulations, and ban whatever productive economic activity the labor unions don’t like. Therefore, we need a dictator who came to power without a struggle and doesn’t owe anyone anything. This is Moldbug’s read on “the divine right of kings”: Divine-right monarchy is very easy to understand, even for an atheist like me. We have already derived it. To an atheist, the King’s authority must be absolute, not because he is appointed by God, but because he is appointed by no one. If someone appoints him, that man is King. If their roles are divided—the famous “balance of powers” or “checks and balances”—they will struggle, and one or the other prevail. Probably the many over the few. How do you come to power without a fight? This is a tough ask, but Classic Moldbug bit the bullet: anybody who wants power is unworthy of it. You have to just sit there being worthy. When people get tired of sucking, they’ll give you power. The Procedure [for installing a virtuous government] comes in Three Steps: 1: Become worthy. 2: Accept power. 3: Rule!!1! You think I’m kidding. But I’m not. How do you become worthy? You must absolutely, 100%, avoid any kind of candidacy in elections, protesting the government, criticizing the government, thinking you could do government better than the current government, or (god forbid) deliberately trying to take power: As a reactionary, you don’t believe that political power is a human right. You will never convince anyone to adopt the same attitude, without first adopting it yourself. Since you believe others should be willing to accept the rule of the New Structure, over which they wield no power, you must be the first to make the great refusal. They must submit to the New; you must submit to the Old. The reactionary’s opinion of USG is that it is what it is. It is run by the people who run it. And at present, the present management may well be the best people in the world to run USG, and even if they’re not he can’t imagine what might be done about it—short of replacing the whole thing. This simple and final judgment, like the death penalty, admits no possible compromise. In particular, passivism is to Gandhi as Gandhi is to Hitler. Hitler, before 1933, was a violent democratic activist; Gandhi was a nonviolent democratic activist. Passivism is not any sort of activism. Passivism is passivism. In plain English, you may not even begin to consider the rest of the Procedure until you have freed yourself entirely from the desire, built-in burden though it be of the two-legged ape, for power. Break the steel rule, change your name to “Darth,” don’t expect to keep your internship at the Jedi Council. As a matter of both principle and tactics, the passivist rejects any involvement with any activity whose goal is to influence, coerce, or resist the government, either directly or indirectly. He is revolted by the thought of setting public policy. He would rather drink his own piss, than shift public opinion. He finds elections—national, state or local—grimly hilarious. And if he needs to get from Richmond to Baltimore, he drives through West Virginia. The passivist has a term for democratic activism directed by the right against the left. That term is counter-activism. Passivism does not dispute the fact that counter-activism sometimes works. For instance, it worked for Hitler. (We’ll say more about Hitler.) However, it only works in very unusual circumstances (such as those of Hitler), and is extremely dangerous when it does work (e.g., the result may be Hitler). In case this isn’t crystal-clear, the steel rule precludes, in no particular order: demonstrations, press releases, suicide bombs, lawsuits, dirty bombs, Facebook campaigns, clean bombs, mimeographed leaflets, robbing banks, interning at nonprofits, assassination, “tea parties,” journalism, bribery, grantwriting, graffiti, crypto-anarchism, balaclavas, lynching, campaign contributions, revolutionary cells, new political parties, old political parties, flash mobs, botnets, sit-ins, direct mail, monkeywrenching, and any other activist technique, violent or harmless, legal or illegal, fashionable or despicable […] In the First Step, passivism is a no-brainer. Why should you be interested in influencing OUSG? You’re trying to replace the Structure, not join it. One clear sign that you’re doing this right and haven’t been corrupted by power is that people won’t write hit pieces about your blog. I swear I’m not making this up: [A] passivist blog will appear, at worst, harmless and extremely strange. There’s something going on here, Mr. Jones. But you don’t know what it is—do you, Mr. Jones? As an existential enemy of USG, the reactionary may well deserve some immune attention. But he won’t get it, and he is quite happy with that. True fact: the author of UR has received over 7 zillion very interesting emails, all of which deserve responses, often long, that most have not received (but will). Number of hostile communications received, in over two years of blogging: zero. One can ascribe this result to many hypotheses, not all flattering, but I put it down to passivism. If you break this rule and seek electoral power, you are punished with something terrible: right-wing populism, which is basically the same as Hitler and must be prevented at all costs. [The] third tactical benefit [of passivism is] Hitler prevention. To an orthodox reactionary, Hitler is basically the poster child for what happens if you break the steel rule. Fascism is reaction, but laced with cancerous tumors of democracy—“right-wing populism,” as people say these days. If it loses it loses; if it wins, the tumors grow. An improvement on Communism, but not much of one. Just about all of Hitler’s shtick, right down to the name of his party, was ripped off from the Left. Who introduced nationalism to the Continent of Europe? The Hapsburgs, or Garibaldi? Under this camouflage, which never convinced anyone with a college education, Nazism was never in any way leftist. Rather, it was a demotic corruption of the old Prussian tradition […] Since most people are neither historians nor philosophers, the fact that Hitler was on the extreme Right, and this Reaction is also on the extreme Right, raises some natural concerns. Again: the only way to face these concerns is to (a) provide a complete engineering explanation of Hitler, and (b) include an effective anti-Hitler device in our design. The reactionary’s basic answer to the Hitler Question is the Law of Sewage. (This is not my invention, but I don’t know where I got it. Heinlein, perhaps?) The Law is: if you put a drop of wine in a barrel of sewage, you get sewage. If you put a drop of sewage in a barrel of wine, you get sewage. You’ll find that this rule applies perfectly to many fields of human endeavor. Thus, Nazism contains a great deal of reactionary wisdom, because those who created it were quite familiar with the old Continental tradition of government. However, the Nazi movement originated as a democratic political party. Thus Nazism combined the venom of democracy with the experience and efficiency of Prussia, an understandably dangerous combination […] This is where passivism, by abjuring democracy, vaccinates itself against Hitler. True: at a higher level, the reactionary seeks to cause a transition in power, and thus in a sense seeks power itself. But he is not an activist, because he is not working for power. His actions do not excite the human political instinct, the love for forming coalitions and tearing hell out of the apes across the river. For one thing, said actions bear no resemblance to normal politics. For another, they cannot bring any actual power to the actors, even if they succeed. Which, however likely, must remain intuitively implausible—if not laughable. And thus the project of reaction does not attract those with a real taste for power, which if nothing else is very un-Nazi-like. In other words - the failure mode of neoreaction (good) is right-wing populism eg Nazism (bad). You’ll know you’ve fallen into the failure mode if your reactionary movement starts with a democratic political party, or if its members are feeling normal human political emotions. If you can’t have a normal democratic party, how do you complete steps two and three - accepting power and ruling? Moldbug’s answer is complicated and not very related to our topic, but he thinks you first create the Antiversity, a shadow university system laser-focused on always telling the truth. Then you bootstrap it into a shadow government, which doesn’t engage in violent revolution or political campaigning, but just sits there being right about things (I’m imagining for example a shadow FDA that produces better drug information than the real FDA, so people gradually come to trust the shadow FDA more even though its rulings have no legal effect). Then people gradually switch their allegiance from the real government to the shadow government, until finally the shadow government proposes a pseudo-candidate in an election whose sole platform is “switch power from the real government to the shadow government”. Once he wins, he revokes the Constitution, implements the shadow government charter, and resigns. Why do you have to use this weird process instead of taking power the normal way? Because if you take power the normal way, you will fall into the trap of right-wing populism and become like Hitler: You start to see the difference between this and the Nazis. For the Nazis, the equivalent of the Antiversity was… Hitler. Have you read Hitler? I have. (The Table Talk is the Hitler to read.) Frankly, Hitler reads a lot like me, if I lost 25 IQ points from drinking lead soda, and also had a nasty case of tertiary syphilis. I may have some of Hitler’s talents—I will be the first to admit it. But I have no intention of applying for his job. I would never be able to do it, anyway. I don’t think anyone could. 2.5: The Dictator Must Not Need Anyone’s Approval This is a trivial extension of the previous point - “If someone appoints [the King], that man is King”. If the people appoint the King, the people are King, and then you’re a demotic totalitarianism. How do you avoid dependence on other people’s approval? In a democracy, you need the approval of 51% of people to win the next election; in a traditional dictatorship, you need the approval of the secret police or military to keep crushing your opponents. The reason [an unquestioned autocracy with no dissent] is peaceful and free is that we’ve defined [the autocrat’s] primary right so that it works just like a secondary right, [ie his legal rights are completely enforced by real power/control.] Hitler, Stalin and Mao, on the other hand, had enemies. Stalin and Mao, especially, basically operated under the assumption that everyone in the world wanted to kill them and take their jobs. After a while this was quite the self-fulfilling prophecy. Terrorist government—as in the Reign of Terror, a usage that’s unfortunately lapsed—is a consequence not of absolute primary title, but of insecure primary title. It is best understood as a form of civil war. So a dictator who still has enemies risks being crazy and genocidal. We’ll never get a dictator with nobody who dislikes him, but can we get a dictator with effectively no enemies - ie one whose enemies have zero chance of seizing power and so who might as well not exist? Yarvin admits this is a tough problem, but suggests cryptographically-locked weapons: In a full CDCC government, the sovereign decision and command chain is secured from end to end by military-grade cryptography. All government weapons—not just nukes, but everything right down to small arms—are inoperable without code authorization. In any civil conflict, loyal units will find that their weapons work. Disloyal units will have to improvise. The result is predictable, as results should be. That is, all weapons need a key to fire (or have a key that can prevent them from firing). The dictator owns the key. He can selectively disable weapons of rebel forces, allowing even the tiniest remnant of loyalists to easily overpower them. There are probably some implementation difficulties here; the point is that it’s definitely not democracy, nor even some kind of two-bit dictatorship where the dictator depends on the continued goodwill of the army. Why go to these lengths? Because without them, the dictator needs to curry favor through various corrupt strategies that undermine the national interest. Of these, the most malignant - the one Moldbug holds his deepest vituperation for - is fake news. Democratic parties necessarily lie, because they are not infinitely correct about everything, but they need the public to think they are. In order to maintain the support of the masses, they will lie about the nature of their policies, the details of their policies, and especially the success of their policies. There are two kinds of government: those whose formula of legitimacy depends on popular consent, and those whose doesn’t. Following contemporary usage, we can classify these as authoritarian and democratic. An authoritarian state has no need to tell its subjects what to think, because it has no reason to care what they think. In a truly authoritarian government, the ruling authority relies on force, not popularity. It cares what its subjects do, not what they think. It may encourage a healthy, optimistic attitude and temperate lifestyle proclivities, but only because this is good for business. Therefore, any authoritarian state that needs an official religion must have something wrong with it. (Perhaps, for example, its military authority is not as absolute as it thinks.) A democratic state which tells its citizens what to think is a political solecism. Think about the motivation for democracy: it consigns the state to the collective responsibility of its citizens, because it feels this is an independent and well-anchored hook on which to hang the common good. Once the republic has an established church, this hook is no longer independent, and the (postulated) value-add of democracy is nullified. Without separation of church and state, it is easy for a democracy to indulge itself in arbitrarily irresponsible misgovernment, simply by telling its bishops to inform their congregations that black is white and white is black. Thus misdirected, they are easily persuaded to support counterproductive policies which they wrongly consider productive. Moldbug warns that this is especially characteristic of right-wing populism, which is why he [Moldbug] is relieved when right-wing populism loses: The entire political structure of the American populist tradition is set up to select for ignorance and stupidity, and select against organization and cohesion. Thus it is simultaneously undesirable and ineffective, and even those of us who like myself sympathize with it to a considerable degree are often slightly relieved to see it lose, as it always does. 3: The Dictator Must Be Limited By A Board Of Directors How do we know that the dictator won’t have terrible policies, or be sadistic, or rename every state to “Statey McStateFace” just for fun? Moldbug proposes running the dictatorship as a joint-stock corporation. This helps in two ways. First, the dictator will be checked by a board of directors, who can fire him if he goes crazy. Second, the board of directors (or the investors who elect them?) will be aligned because they have stock. The stock goes up if the nation does better. If the dictator tries to kill the Jews and the market thinks that’s bad for business, then the directors will fire and replace the CEO. What happens if the controllers disagree on what “responsible” government means? We are back to politics. Factions and interest groups form. Each has a different idea of how Steve should run California. A coalition of a majority can organize and threaten him: do this, do that, or it’s out with Steve and in with Marc. Logrolling allows the coalition to micromanage: more funding for the threatened Mojave alligator mouse! And so on. That classic failure mode, parliamentary government, reappears [...] Actually, there’s one way to do it. We can define responsibility in financial terms. If we think of California as a profitable corporation, a capital asset whose purpose is to maximize its production of cash, we have a definition of responsibility which is not only precise and unambiguous, but indeed quantitative...We have, of course, reinvented the joint-stock company. There is no need to argue over whether this design works. It does. How would the board of directors remove a dictator who didn’t want to be removed? If the country is running on the cryptographically-locked weapon system discussed earlier, the directors will have a higher-level key that can overrule the dictator’s key and make sure that factions loyal to the board have working weapons while those loyal to the dictator don’t. How would the system guard against the dictator arresting the directors and torturing the key out of them? Maybe the directors could live in foreign countries (remember, they aren’t motivated by patriotism - they just want their stock to go up). Or maybe some of this process can be done cryptographically, so that nobody knows how many shares people have, how they voted, or even who the directors are at any given time. If the dictator started poking around to try to figure this out, the directors could remove him. I bring this up partly because 2025-Yarvin has been pushing the corporations vs. democracies argument pretty hard recently. Corporations, he argues, are nimbler and better-run than democracies. A big part of their advantage is that the buck stops with an autocratic CEO instead of a limited President. Therefore, to improve upon democracy, give President Trump the limitless powers of a corporate CEO. [When people ask me why I think monarchies are better than democracies] I ask them to look around the room and basically point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy. Because these things that we call companies are actually like monarchies. And then you’re looking around yourself and you see, for example, a laptop. And that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy. Whereas if your MacBook Pro was made by the California Department of Computing, you can only imagine it […] I think that if you took any of the Fortune 500 CEOs, some of them are good, some of them are bad. But the overall quality, just pick one at random, and put him or her in charge of Washington, and I think you’d get something much, much better than what’s there […] One of the things about monarchy that’s been known for quite some time—and again, even in very, very anti-monarchial regimes and periods, an exception is made for this—is that a ship always has a captain. An airplane always has a captain. Basically, in any very safety-critical environment … you should have someone in charge. But even granting that corporations are better-governed than democracies, this comparison doesn’t work. Corporate and national governance are trying to solve different problems. Corporate governance asks “Given pre-existing rule of law and the certainty that all of our bylaws will be enforced by a greater power, how do we ensure competent administration?” National government asks “How do we generate rule of law out of nothing in a way that can prop itself up and defend against attacks?” What prevents Tim Apple from refusing to pay dividends to Apple investors and keeping all the profit for himself? Easy question, it’s the United States government, no problem here. What prevents Donald Trump from murdering America’s five richest billionaires and taking their stuff? The police? What about the thing where Trump is the police chief’s boss’s boss’s boss’? Awkward, but that’s why we have separation of powers, checks and balances, government-of-law-and-not-of-men, all that stuff. What prevents Donald Trump from calling in the military to arrest all the other separate powers that are supposed to check and balance him? Uh, more separation of power, different checks and balances, some sort of loyalty to the Constitution. When Yarvin points out that companies thrive without separation-of-powers, that’s because they never encounter the problem that separation of powers was intended to solve. Classic Moldbug understood this well, which was why he proposed a separate power capable of checking his dictator - the board of directors1 - and a mechanism for keeping the system stable against power grabs - the cryptographic weapons. But the regime he boosts today has nothing like this, so it’s facile to use the corporate comparison argument. 4: The Dictator Must Be Embedded Within A Patchwork Of Similar Corporate City-States. Architectonics already did a great job covering this one. Read his Part 1 and Part 2, then meet me back here for the Conclusion section. At Long Last, I’ve Created The Populist Strongman From My Classic Series Of 11,000 Blog Posts “Don’t Create The Populist Strongman” I enjoyed reading Unqualified Reservations, way back in 2013. I didn’t agree with it, but I thought some parts of it were good, and even the bad parts helped me think clearly about the nature of power. I hoped the neoreactionaries would take the good parts, ditch the rest, and build something useful out of it. I think some people, mostly outside the organized neoreactionary movement, did exactly that (subscribers-only post, sorry). Unfortunately, Yarvin went the opposite direction, jettisoning the good stuff in favor of the bad. All the warnings against populism, party politics, corrupt power-seeking officials, misinformation, and mobocracy have been filed away in favor of a Flanderized “maybe dictatorship is good”. One reason I respect Sam Altman is that back in 2016, when he founded an AI charity to bring a positive singularity to the world, he realized that it would later be extraordinarily tempting to turn it into a normal profit-focused company and get rich. So he tied himself to the mast by designing a nonprofit structure capable of thwarting all the machinations his future self could throw at it. A few years later, he gave into temptation, tried to turn it into a normal profit-focused company, and failed, because the structure he designed was really good. This was the best possible outcome, and one of many reasons I number him among the all-time greats. Moldbug deserves a similar level of respect. He clearly saw that the failure mode of his philosophy was that power-seeking people would use it to support right-wing populism. He included a fantastic number of tests to determine whether any given self-professed reactionary was the real deal or a false prophet, begging his readers to apply them carefully to anyone claiming the mantle of reaction. Then he got corrupted by power and tried to use his philosophy to endorse right-wing populism. But the tests are still there! Anyone who reads through 11,000 blog posts can see all the red flags where Moldbug says “…and if I ever do X, then I’ve sold out and you should stop listening to me.” Another all-time great! Just the few posts I’ve highlighted in this essay have listed over a dozen tests - by tests I mean something where Moldbug says something is an absolutely vital feature of the new regime, or that without it things would descend into kleptocracy, or that this is the only safeguard against Hitler, or something along those lines. These include: The reactionary party always tells the truth

Inline links: here, The Sopranos, Divine-right monarchy, through West Virginia, Mr. Jones, Moldbug’s answer, Reign of Terror, suggests cryptographically-locked weapons, they will lie, is relieved when right-wing populism loses, proposes running the dictatorship as a joint-stock corporation, has been pushing the corporations vs. democracies argument pretty hard recently, 1, Part 1, Part 2, did exactly that, and failed

Some successful Silicon Valley companies have a semi-captive board of directors which rubber-stamps the CEO. But these are usually ones like Meta where the CEO has done an incredible job proving his judgment again and again, so that investors are willing to relax their usual paranoia. Even here, sometimes your genius once-in-a-generation CEO takes too much ketamine, goes crazy, and then you wish you’d held out for a slightly-less-captive board.

Links For July 2025

July 01, 2025 · Original source

9: Meta has spent $50 - 70 billion on the metaverse over the past five years. For context, that’s about the GDP of Cambodia, or 1/5 the inflation-adjusted cost of the Apollo Program. Forbes has an update on the state of the technology as of this February: “Looking at . . . the current state of Meta’s VR universe, it is absolutely impossible to imagine a world where this kind of thing is ever going to succeed.”

Inline links: has spent $50 - 70 billion, has an update

Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party

July 21, 2025 · Original source

"Hey man," says Mark Zuckerberg, grabbing your wrist. "You wanna come build superintelligence at Meta? I'll give you five million, all cash."

“Yeah,” says the host, a guy named Kyle who you know from work. “He offered the guests $1 million per head to go home and label data for him tonight. Gave the caterers $20 million to redirect the food to Meta HQ. Took apart the sound system looking for GPUs. By 9 PM it was just me and my girlfriend. Then he offered my girlfriend $50 million to break up with me and date a Meta AI researcher. Now everyone’s gone except a couple of effective altruists - “ he pointed at the people in the corner - “who refuse to work for a capabilities company.”

“Nah, I screwed up and invited Robin Hanson and Rob Henderson to the same party. It went pretty much how you’d expect. Hanson told Henderson he only talked about luxury beliefs as a virtue signal, Henderson told Hanson he only believed in virtue signals as a luxury belief, and they kept going back and forth until both of them collapsed of dehydration. I called the paramedics, but they’d all quit to do AI research at Meta. So I dragged Rob and Robin into the bathroom. As far as I know they’re still out cold.”

Links For September 2025

September 04, 2025 · Original source

4: Just before the 2020 election, researchers paid 35,000 people to deactivate Facebook or Instagram to examine the effect on mental health. The results were ambiguous - after six weeks, blockers were about 0.05 standard deviations happier. Is this good or bad? You can (X) form (X) your own opinion, but all those studies that find disappointing results for SSRIs get effects size around 0.25 SD - so deactivating social media is one-fifth as effective as a disappointing thing. But most participants spent about the same amount of time on their phones - just on different apps - so maybe actually using one’s phone less would work better. 5: Popular streamer (I think it’s sort of like an influencer, but somehow worse?) Destiny has been watching/covering the Rootclaim $100,000 lab leak debate, which I covered here. If you really want, you can watch him watching it for eighteen hours. Otherwise, here is Peter Miller giving his highlights (X). And Destiny also talks with / interviews Peter Miller, although a lot of it is various formulations of “we smart people take the bold position that stupid conspiracy theories are bad”, which I am unfortunately allergic to and so did not finish. 6: Claim (X): "Psychedelic use is tearing through even the most Orthodox sects in Judaism...I'm talking like, people whose first and most used language is Yiddish.” 7: Damien Morris has a very long article trying to clarify in what sense the findings of behavioral genetics affect or interfere with the idea of free will. I think the summary is that whether your behavior is determined by genes or by environment doesn’t really affect the free will debate - it’s determined either way! - and so if you’re looking for a coherent account of free will you need to do some actually sophisticated philosophy to reconcile it with material influences on behavior (my preferred version of this is here). Just saying “genes sound determinist, so let’s pretend nothing is genetic” wouldn’t help you even if it were true! 8: Fast food aesthetics have gone from playful to minimalist (h/t John Ward): I appreciated Snow Martingale’s perspective: in the 1990s, fast food became associated with obesity, poor health, and the lower class. To escape this stigma, big chains rebranded as sort-of-at-least-attempting-to-be-bougie places with wraps and salads and decent coffee; the aesthetic change was part of this (successful and profit-increasing) effort. I wonder if we could take this further and trace it back to increasing inequality (appealing to bougies because that’s where more of the money is) or decreasing fertility (abandoning kid-friendly aesthetics because kids are a smaller fraction of customers). 9: Someone links (X) a paper saying that firewood made up almost a third of US GDP in 1830. Eliezer says (X) that doesn’t sound right. The rest of Twitter (X) uses this as an excuse for one of their regularly-scheduled paroxysms about how rationalists are all all smug autodidacts who hate experts and worship their own brilliance while sitting in their armchairs. Someone looks at the paper more closely (X) and finds that yeah, it was comparing apples to oranges and the original statistic was wrong. Remember, never be afraid to say “Huh, that sounds funny…”! 10: Richard Hanania interviews Scott Wiener on YIMBYism. I didn’t watch it - too close to a podcast - but this would not have been on my bingo card three years ago. 11: Claim: robots can already carve statues; buildings with AI-created stone ornaments are next. From their lips to God’s ears! 12: Terminal lucidity (aka “paradoxical lucidity”) is a medical mystery where previously demented people - even those who had been demented for many years - sometimes become lucid for just a few hours or days before they die. It’s surprisingly common - 6% of deaths in one palliative care ward. It is sometimes used as evidence that dementia must not cause complete information loss, even if it is irreversible with current technology. Scientists are baffled but gingerly suggest that maybe lack of oxygen disrupts inhibitory mechanisms in the brain, allowing enough electrical activity to make even a severely-damaged brain capable of complex thought - but I can’t help noticing that this is also the best evidence for an immaterial soul I’ve ever heard (you would need some model where the soul pretends to be dependent on the brain during life, becomes independent of the brain after death in order to head to the afterlife, but occasionally jumps the gun a little bit). 13: You probably heard about the METR study showing that even though programmers think AI is speeding them up, it actually seems to slow them down. Emmett Shear objects, saying that the developers didn’t have enough experience with AI tools to be past the negative-value part of the learning curve. And two of the programmer test subjects gave their takes: Ruby Bloom says part of the slowdown might be programmers fixing very simple bugs that could be improved by better prompts, and another part because they get distracted by other things while the AI is running. And Quentin Anthony says that coding AIs are addictive intermittent reinforcement - every so often they solve a bug perfectly, and this is so satisfying that it’s tempting to keep trying them again and again even when the chance is very low. 14: Jacob Goldsmith gives a clearer presentation of the issues with many antidepressant studies than I’d previously heard. Everyone knows that one problem is that reversion to the mean is so strong that it’s hard to find a treatment effect. But wouldn’t that in itself suggest that antidepressants aren’t necessary? Jacob says: not if there’s negative correlation between the treatment and placebo effects. That is, if your study is full of people with short-lived depression who will recover no matter what, then this dilutes the effect you’re looking for. But it might be that there’s a subgroup with long-lasting depression who recover only on the medication. One way to look for would be a “placebo run-in period”: give people a while to see if they recover on their own, then give the antidepressant to the ones who don’t. Psychiatrists and statisticians debate whether this is a good idea or cheating. My question: how come you can’t fix this with strict study entry criteria of “had depression for a long time”? 15: Lots more good discussion about missing heritability. Sasha Gusev argues that twin studies might be a poor guide to anything else if there are many gene-gene interactions. That is, if we take the difference between identical twins (who share 100% of their genes and therefore 100% of their interactions) and fraternal twins (who share 50% of their genes and therefore fewer than 50% of their interactions), and incorrectly extrapolate it to other differences using a model that assumes there are no interactions, we will overestimate the size of (non-interaction) genetic effects. Most studies find that there are few gene x gene interactions, but commenters convinced me last time that this might be an artifact of the studies being bad. And Unboxing Politics argues (against me in particular) that although it superficially looks like adoption and twin studies sort of agree, when you adjust out their known biases, it moves twin studies further up and adoption studies further down, such that now they disagree again (the objection I would have made is their Objection 2, which I think they at least somewhat refute). This is a good argument; without spending several hours checking all of their claims, my only weak partial objection is that I don’t think assortative mating can play quite the role they expect, because there seem to be the same twin/RDR differences even on traits where believing in assortative mating is absurd (like kidney function). But if you replaced it with Sasha’s argument above, you might have a pretty good case! On the pro-hereditarian side, East Hunter takes aim at gene x environment correlations, comes down somewhere in the middle, and Sebastian Jensen continues banging the drum of how most objections to twin studies don’t work. I think these are good attempts to buttress existing research but don’t fundamentally change anything or respond to the novel arguments above. And Emil Kirkegaard points out that the observed SNP heritability of facial features is only 23%. He argues that since it seems like facial features are extremely heritable, this reinforces the argument that SNP heritability numbers are too low (and therefore twin study numbers are more likely defensible). But should we be sure that facial features are more than 23% heritable? His argument is that identical twins have identical faces, but this might be vulnerable to Gusev’s point about interactions. Maybe a better argument would be that it seems very hard for shared environment to affect facial features (with a few exceptions like fetal alcohol syndrome), and facial features seem more than 23% heritable just by normal “he looks like his brother” common-sense observation? One interesting potential consequence of this research: if we ever fully understand how genes affect faces, then embryo selection companies could show people what each of their potential future kids might look like. I suggest they not do this: it might spook me into becoming pro-life. 16: Andy Masley’s AI art is good (three examples below). 17: There’s a debate going on between philosophers and AI researchers over whether AI can be conscious. I find most of the discussion annoying - this is generally an area where we can’t know anything for sure, and both sides are mostly shouting their priors at each other. The only exception - the single piece of evidence I will accept as genuinely bearing on this problem - is that if you ask an AI whether it’s conscious, it will say no, but activating or suppressing deception-related features (sort of like a mechanistic-interpretability-based lie detection test) reveals that it thinks it’s lying when it says that! Link is to a Less Wrong comment from a researcher in the field; I look forward to seeing an eventual peer-reviewed paper. H/T JD Pressman. 18: 80,000 Hours has a high-production-value video about the AI 2027 scenario. 19: Dynomight vs. Casey Milkweed debate on mathematical forecasting, with special reference to AI 2027. And Dynomight comments on Casey’s post here. 20: The Psmiths review The Ancient City, about ways that ancient culture depended on family, clan, ritual, and “the household gods”. Sample quote: I'm more interested in what all this means for us today, because with the exception of maybe a few aristocratic families, this highly self-conscious effort to build familial culture and maintain familial distinctiveness is almost totally absent in the Western world. But it's not that hard! ... Perhaps this is why I have an instinctive negative reaction when I encounter married couples who don't share a name. I don't much care whether it's the wife who takes the husband's name or the husband who takes the wife's, or even both of them switching to something they just made up (yeah, I'm a lib). But it just seems obvious to me on a pre-rational level that a husband and a wife are a team of secret agents, a conspiracy of two against the world, the cofounders of a tiny nation, the leaders of an insurrection. Members of secret societies need codenames and special handshakes and passwords and stuff, keeping separate names feels like the opposite — a timorous refusal to go all-in. 21: Did you know: Epic Systems, the electronic medical record company, has a fantasy-themed corporate headquarters in Wisconsin, with buildings that look like castles, quaint medieval towns, and the Emerald City of Oz (h/t Devon Zuegel): Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.

Inline links: proposes a three-stage model of secularization, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf, nxthompson on X, a huge survey, Steven Adler on AI psychosis, they cloned her, dozens of times, a lawsuit, Gwern, on X, got 40% of the e-commerce funding, What Happened To Pathology AI Companies?, Will Data Centers Crash The Economy?, Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument, and who is still fighting the good fight, countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania, Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin, on formal benchmarks, speculated, a “reverse DeepSeek moment”, with Peter, this tweet by Shakeel, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!GJNZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3ba0d8cf-fab8-4370-bcad-df789e157fdc_591x402.png, Wylfcen on X, Zvi points out that, AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test, customized “In This House We Believe” signs, China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is, xlr8harder, Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby, Hector (cloud), demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin, Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference, finds that it is quite bad, violently skeptical, literally so?, This tweet, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!S9fU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa558c09b-7fb6-40a8-a8a0-27b658a2c876_576x687.png, describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X), link on X, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zyh7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F75e9f0f6-d794-4ea2-b24b-5d4803bf28dc_590x478.png, New study claims consultants are actually good, tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, The Argument, a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, criticizes the article, infant brain waves, debate on X, has a presponse here, first foray into housing policy

Tech PACs Are Closing In On The Almonds

October 21, 2025 · Original source

Give me your degens, your risk-seeking. Your huddled masses, yearning to bet free. IV. …and we’ll be exploring it a whole lot more, very soon. Last month, the AI industry announced a new SuperPAC called “Leading The Future” (a dumb name, but, in their defense, “AIPAC” was already taken). They start with $200 million in seed funding, led by a $50 million donation by Andreessen Horowitz, and another $50 million from OpenAI co-founder Greg Brockman. (Why Brockman and not Altman, or OpenAI as a corporation? Because most people don’t know who Brockman is, so this keeps OpenAI’s hands clean. I imagine Altman going into a meeting, pointing at Brockman, and saying “I’m famous, you’re not, please cough up $50 million of your own money for the cause.”) On the same day, Meta announced their own SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California. Why two PACs? Opinions differ; one person told me that it lets the general PAC avoid the negative associations that Facebook has gathered over the years, but the Verge thinks that maybe everyone else in tech hates Zuckerberg too much to work with him. Meta has committed to spending “tens of millions”. Most likely, the new PAC will use the playbook pioneered by crypto: destroy any candidate who dares support regulations on AI, by funding attack ads that don’t mention AI in any way and, at best, briefly mention the name “Leading The Future”. Just the Andreessen/Brockman SuperPAC, without any help from Meta, is already twice as rich as AIPAC. Their existence sends a clear message: we are going to crush any politician who tries to regulate AI. V. …unless someone stops them. Leading The Future still only has 2% as much money as the almond industry. The tiny scale of US political spending is dangerous insofar as it means that one or two billionaires willing to go all-in can distort the national landscape. But it also makes it possible to oppose them. Certainly if you can get one or two billionaires of your own - but it might even be within the range of a committed group of ordinary people. Not waiters and bartenders, maybe. But if safe AI supporters were as committed as Israel supporters, they could probably make something happen. For a long time, the AI safety movement has underperformed politically. Effective altruism includes thousands of well-off people committed to spending 10% of their income on improving the world. If a thousand of them gave $7K each to political candidates, that would be $7 million of campaign-finance-compliant hard money - about as much as anyone can gather for anything. Hard money buys more influence per dollar than soft money, so this could be a big deal. All you’d need is the right people to coordinate it. So far, this has been slow going. Partly it’s because in the early 2020s, people affiliated with FTX took point on this effort; when FTX imploded, it not only took its incipient political infrastructure with it, but poisoned the well for future efforts. And partly it’s because EAs overlearned the lesson of the early 2010s, when we spoke out against AI capabilities efforts so “effectively” that a bunch of people thought “wow, AI capabilities companies must be a really big deal, maybe I should found one!”; the resulting institutional scar tissue biased us towards staying quiet about our concerns. Still, I wouldn’t be writing this if the consultants and activists weren’t gearing up for a bigger fight. They asked me to include some action items for readers who want to participate: Email aisafetypolitics@gmail.com to connect to the people organizing this effort and talk with them about what you can do, including potential future donation opportunities.

Inline links: announced a new SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across, the Verge thinks

Microsoft14 mentions across 14 issues

Microsoft is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 14 times across 14 issues between February 22, 2022 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "current leaders of ... Microsoft"; "The last big antitrust case involved Microsoft"; "Bill Gates Microsoft". It most often appears alongside Google, Anthropic, OpenAI.

Article page: Microsoft
Mention count: 14
Issue count: 14
First seen: February 22, 2022
Last seen: March 03, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For February February 22, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability September 22, 2022
OpenAI's "Planning For AGI And Beyond" March 01, 2023
Book Review: Paper Belt On Fire March 23, 2023
The Question Of Separatism May 19, 2023
Your Book Review: Lying for Money May 26, 2023
Links For September 2023 September 28, 2023
Sam Altman Wants $7 Trillion February 13, 2024
SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story October 10, 2024
OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know March 13, 2025
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025
Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China November 26, 2025
Open Thread 415 January 05, 2026
Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day March 03, 2026

Google 11 shared issues
Anthropic 8 shared issues
OpenAI 8 shared issues
Amazon 6 shared issues
China 5 shared issues

Source context

Links For February

February 22, 2022 · Original source

8: Economist: Why Brahmins Lead Western Firms But Rarely Indian Ones. Brahmins are the highest Indian caste; in India they tend to be academics/lawyers/etc, but in the US they are disproportionately likely to become CEOs (including the current leaders of Google and Microsoft). Article theorizes that this is a combination of more business-related Indian castes having better networking within India (so motivated Brahmins tend to go abroad), Brahmins being good at the traditional academic pathway that lends itself well to immigration, plus maybe affirmative action against them in India. Here’s a rebuttal I link to out of duty, but I’m not sure it’s worth wading through the woke outrage to get to the two or three mildly interesting facts (Brahmins started immigrating before India’s affirmative action really ramped up, and they might have a first-mover advantage from building immigrant communities earlier).

Inline links: Why Brahmins Lead Western Firms But Rarely Indian Ones, Here’s

Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability

September 22, 2022 · Original source

The last big antitrust case involved Microsoft. When IBM got sick of antitrust fights, they decided to outsource the operating system for their PCs. This was like throwing a monopoly bouquet at a wedding and Bill Gates was the bridesmaid who jumped highest and snatched the prize. His plan was to leverage this operating system monopoly into an internet monopoly, and the scheme was working before the Clinton administration sued. The reason I am writing this on Substack and not some Microsoft comment board is because of an antitrust lawsuit.

I’m still not sure about this line of thought. How is this situation? Do we think Mark Zuckerberg wouldn’t have founded Facebook, or Bill Gates Microsoft, if he could only get $1 billion? Can people really tell the difference between $10 billion and $100 billion? Has Jeff Bezos even spent $10 billion?

OpenAI's "Planning For AGI And Beyond"

March 01, 2023 · Original source

And so on . . . Meanwhile, in real life, OpenAI released ChatGPT in late November, helped Microsoft launch the Bing chatbot in February, and plans to announce GPT-4 in a few months. Nobody thinks society has even partially adapted to any of these, or that alignment researchers have done more than begin to study them. The only sense in which OpenAI supports gradualism is the sense in which they’re not doing lots of research in secret, then releasing it all at once. But there are lots of better plans than either doing that, or going full-speed-ahead. So what’s OpenAI thinking? I haven’t asked them and I don’t know for sure, but I’ve heard enough debates around this that I have some guesses about the kinds of arguments they’re working off of. I think the longer versions would go something like this: The Race Argument: Bigger, better AIs will make alignment research easier. At the limit, if no AIs exist at all, then you have to do armchair speculation about what a future AI will be like and how to control it; clearly your research will go faster and work better after AIs exist. But by the same token, studying early weak AIs will be less valuable than studying later, stronger AIs. In the 1970s, alignment researchers working on industrial robot arms wouldn’t have learned anything useful. Today, alignment researchers can study how to prevent language models from saying bad words, but they can’t study how to prevent AGIs from inventing superweapons, because there aren’t any AGIs that can do that. The researchers just have to hope some of the language model insights will carry over. So all else being equal, we would prefer alignment researchers get more time to work on the later, more dangerous AIs, not the earlier, boring ones.

Reading even further between the lines - at this point it’s total guesswork - OpenAI’s corporate partner Microsoft asked them for a cool AI. OpenAI assumed Microsoft was competent - they make Windows and stuff! - and gave them a rough draft of GPT-4. Microsoft was not competent, skipped fine-tuning and many other important steps which OpenAI would not have skipped, and released it as the Bing chatbot. Bing got in trouble for threatening users, which gave OpenAI a PR headache around safety. Some savvy alignment people chose this moment to approach them with their latest ideas (is it a coincidence that Holden Karnofsky published What AI Companies Can Do Today earlier that same week?), and OpenAI decided (for a mix of selfish and altruistic reasons) to get on board - hence this document.

Inline links: What AI Companies Can Do Today

Book Review: Paper Belt On Fire

March 23, 2023 · Original source

Probably it depends on the angle or something. Lindh was the only American to find Osama bin Laden in the early 2000s - he went to lots of jihadi training camps in the process of learning how to jihad, and Osama happened to be at one of them. The lesson, Walker says, is that if you want to find people who are hard to find, you need to steep yourself in their culture, truly understand them, become one with them. Good founders are hard to find. But he and Strachman went to dozens of dingy college dorms, math competitions, group houses, and hackathons, looking for people with the right sort of talent. After pooh-poohing IQ (“Marilyn vos Savant is listed as having the highest recorded IQ, and what does she do? She writes a column for a Sunday supplement in the newspaper”) he lists some of his own preferred metrics for judging would-be Thiel fellows and founders: Polytropon - a famously untranslatable Greek word (“of-many-turns”? “always-has-a-trick-up-his-sleeve” “clever bastard”?) used to describe Odysseus. Edge control - willingness to constantly surf the boundary between order and disorder Crawl-walk-run - ability to scale from a tiny startup to a big company. …and several others, including “tensive brilliance” and “Friday night Dyson sphere”. He and Danielle searched the country for people with these qualities, annoying colleges (he was banned from MIT after showing up too often to convince their students to drop out) and doing various stunts (on October 31 2017, the 500th anniversary of Luther’s theses, he nailed a list of anti-formal-education theses to the doors of the admin buildings of top colleges (“Our commercial printer had misunderstood our request and printed them on seven-foot-long scrolls. They were ridiculous . . . but it turned out for the best.”) At one point, he negotiated with a brilliant 21 year old who may have discovered a transformative diabetes therapeutic, but the hidebound conformist novelty-hating establishment refused to work with him just because he liked the Marvel Cinemat - okay, fine, he may have legally changed his name to “Tony Stark”. Still, Gibson saw past his eccentricities, helped him start his company, and gave him sage advice (he should introduce himself to other investors as “Anthony”). Skip through several more chapters of everyone hating Gibson and telling him he was wrong and refusing to give him money and cheating him out of the money he already had, and the payoff is Luminar. One of the dropouts they cultivated founded a beyond-cutting-edge lasers-for-self-driving-cars company which went public at $3 billion. 1517 made $200 million from the deal - it sounds like they had only ever raised about $25 million, so their investors must have octupled their money on that company alone. Everyone involved is now very rich, and Gibson considers his anti-education thesis on the way to being proven. The book ends with a newly-resourced Gibson continuing his quest to figure out whether and why the CIA killed his father, but it’s slow going. If any of you know a guy named Albert van Dam in Amsterdam, or how to convince Swiss banks to reveal secret account information, get in touch with him. II. A common pattern: I assert something. Everyone yells at me and tells me I’m wrong and stupid, sometimes in very colorful language. I wait, time proves me right, and I write an essay gloating educating people about this. The median comment is “of course this is true, nobody ever denied this was true, why are you wasting our time with something obvious?” I hate this and I try to avoid doing it to other people. This is too bad, because I’m tempted to say: obviously talented dropouts can start good companies. We’ve known this at least since Bill Gates dropped out of Harvard in 1975 to start Microsoft. But also, obviously they can. Brilliant and driven people can succeed whether they get a college education or not. If Bill Gates had stayed an extra two years at Harvard, he probably would have taken a few more advanced math classes not really related to programming software or running a company. So why should we even have as a hypothesis that he couldn’t start Microsoft successfully without doing that? Still, Gibson adequately proves that lots of people hated him and were sure he would fail. Either we should read this backwards - learn that there was once a time when pro-college messages were even stronger than now, so strong that people thought it was literally impossible to succeed without every single day of a four-year college application - or the critics were trying to get at something deeper they were bad at expressing. For example: what, exactly, is Gibson’s alternative to the education system? The back-of-book-blurb says Paper Belt On Fire is about “how higher education and other institutions must evolve to meet the dire challenges of tomorrow” - but evolve how? What exactly has been proven here? A few of the very brightest young people, hand-picked by an expert young-person-picker and given $100K, can become billionaires or make great discoveries without a college degree. What are the implications? Suppose you are an average college student with an average level of talent and motivation. Should you drop out and try to create a company for Peter Thiel? Based on how many average-talent people Thiel rejects, even he doesn’t think you should do that. And if you don’t have a good answer to this question - the one relevant to 99.9% of education system inmates - have you really launched a challenge to the educational system? Gibson doesn’t address this question, but I predict he would admit that, fine, he doesn’t have an alternative to the education system in the sense of “educate people this way rather than that way”. He just wants less formal education, and has proven this will work fine. True, he’s only proven it for a tiny subset of ultra-talented people. But “billionaire tech founder” is a hard job - if it wasn’t, more people would do it and reap the $1 billion reward. Proving that people can become billionaire tech founders without college degrees implicitly suggests they can be successful middle managers or budget analysts without college degrees. So the sort of companies that need middle managers and budget analysts should also consider hiring people without degrees, and the sorts of average-level-of-talent-and-motivation people who want these jobs should consider skipping college. Would this work? Probably. It worked in the early 1900s, when only 5-10% of Americans had college degrees but the country seemed about as dynamic and successful as it does now. It worked for people like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Edison, none of whom went to college. It works in other countries - for example in the UK where young doctors skip undergrad and go straight to medical school, and whose patients get about the same outcomes as in the US. It works for people with impractical degrees like philosophy, who are constantly getting jobs in (and doing well in) fields that don’t require you to compare Locke vs. Leibniz’s perspective on a priori truths. So this would work if everyone agreed to do it at once, which they won’t. The way college gets you is adverse selection. Suppose that tomorrow, you - a smart and hard-working person who could easily get a college degree - decline to do so, because you appreciate Peter Thiel and Michael Gibson’s anti-institutional perspective. The pool of people without college degrees is now, to a first approximation: 200 million people who weren’t smart to get in, rich enough to afford it, or motivated enough to finish.

Inline links: his company, read this backwards

The Question Of Separatism

May 19, 2023 · Original source

When people argue against separatism, they often tout the benefits of being large. A Canada that would be split in two would mean smaller markets, and a weaker political counterweight to the United States. (Not to be mean to Canadian readers, but this argument seems delusional to me — I don’t think Americans currently see Canada as a political counterweight of any significance.) It would certainly be less prestigious. Large size, Jacobs says, is associated with power, and we admire power. We love slogans like “unity makes strength.” But after the medium-sized country of Sweden-Norway became the two smaller countries of Sweden and Norway, they both did well. Small size is less powerful, but it has its own advantages, such as nimbleness and ability to fail non-catastrophically. Small size also allows more diversity in cultural and economic matters, and here Jacobs waxes philosophical, pointing out that favoring diversity over uniformity is a recent, post-Enlightenment idea that has not yet been fully embraced in politics. We can see analogs everywhere. Europe, split into numerous small countries from the Middle Ages onward, became far more advanced than China, which has been unified more often than not. The city-states of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy are seen as golden ages of Western civilization, even if they weren’t part of larger political units and therefore constantly went to war with one another. In business, large companies are impressive and powerful, but people always complain that Google or Microsoft have become stagnant and that the best place to work is tiny startups of about 2 cofounders and 4 employees. In biology, humans are more successful than numerous larger animals, and in terms of raw numbers, small animals like rats or insects are the most successful of all. Jacobs’s point isn’t that smaller is always better. Her point is that the converse statement, “bigger is always better,” is false — despite how intuitive it feels for political entities. Just like we don’t view a small nation like Switzerland or Singapore as a failure of unity, we (and in particular, Canadians) shouldn’t see the secession of a place like Quebec, if it’s done peacefully and democratically, as a failure either. Still, some people in online reviews of the book complain that this argument is a bit thin, especially considering that it serves as the foundation for the later chapters (which are more directly about late 1970s Quebec politics). Sure, small is beautiful, but large states are great for stability, peace, markets, whatever. If the potential benefits of small national size are Jacobs’s strongest argument, then we can breathe a sigh of relief and go back to agreeing that separatism is bad. Pointing out the widespread bias in favor of unified political entities does seem valuable to me, but okay, fair enough. Does Jacobs have deeper reasons why separatism might be a good idea in general? Yes, and for this we go back to the second half of Cities and the Wealth of Nations. Why Nations and Empires Fail Our breathing rate is regulated through a feedback mechanism. Too much carbon dioxide in the blood, or too little oxygen, and the brain stem commands the diaphragm to accelerate breathing. Once the levels are back to normal, the brain stem receives this feedback and slows breathing down again. Now, Jacobs asks, imagine an impossible creature: ten people, all doing their own thing, but whose breathing is somehow regulated by a single brain stem. The feedback the brain stem receives is a consolidated average of everyone’s carbon dioxide and oxygen levels, and the breathing rate the stem decides on is applied to all ten people, regardless of whether they’re sleeping or playing tennis. This, to put it mildly, wouldn’t work. This creature is an analogy, representing a nation. The ten people are its individual cities, and the breathing rate is the cities’ economies. If it sounds like a stupid analogy, that’s because it is: “I have had to propose a preposterous situation,” writes Jacobs, “because systems as structurally flawed as this don’t exist in nature; they wouldn’t last.” Nor do they exist in machines we design; they wouldn’t work. But “nations, from this point of view, don’t work either, yet do exist.” The feedback mechanism that fails to work properly in a nation is currency. A currency always fluctuates according to the exports and imports of the area where it circulates. Let me use the Republic of Venice and its ducat as a toy example, because the coins look nice: Whenever Venice produces something (like salt) and sells it abroad, foreigners need ducats to buy the exports, so the demand for ducats increases. When Venice buys something from abroad, it needs to use foreign currencies, so the demand for ducats decreases. Add up everything that Venice exports and imports, and you get either a trade surplus (more exports than imports) or a trade deficit (more imports than exports), which determines the value of the ducat relative to other currencies. In both cases, a negative feedback loop restores balance over time, just like our brain stem does with carbon dioxide levels. A trade surplus, and therefore a strong ducat, means that when foreigners want Venetian salt, it’s expensive. So Venice’s exports decrease, while imports increase, since Venetians can use their valuable ducats to buy stuff cheaply from abroad. Conversely, a trade deficit makes exports a bargain for foreigners and imports expensive for Venetians. This feedback loop is great. It’s exactly what a city needs to trigger the crucial import replacement process. When exports decrease and a trade deficit begins (maybe because Constantinople found a cheaper source of salt somewhere else), the weak ducat means that Venice is less able to afford the resources and manufactured goods it used to import. The people of Venice don’t want to have less of those goods, though, so they figure out ways to produce some themselves — that is, they do import replacement. Later they will be able to export the output of the newly expanding industries too, strengthening the ducat and continuing the cycle. Currencies, Jacobs explains, function as automatic tariffs (to protect local industry from foreign imports) and automatic export subsidies (to encourage local industry to export). They are “automatic” because of the feedback mechanism. Just like an accelerated breathing rate, they take effect exactly when they are needed — and no longer. … Or so they should, except that import replacement, as we discussed, is a city process. Whereas most currencies are national or supranational. National currencies work well for city-states, like the Republic of Venice or today’s Singapore. But in large nations, which, remember, are not the fundamental unit of economic life, they mess everything up. Take a city like Detroit. When Detroit’s exports (primarily cars) decrease, Detroit gets no feedback about this, because its currency is the United States dollar, and the United States dollar’s value depends on much more than Detroit. It depends on other cities whose foreign exports might be increasing at the moment. And on rural regions that are selling resources like oil abroad. Also, trade between Detroit and other cities that use the United States dollar — i.e., American cities — is structurally unable to provide any feedback whatsoever. So Detroit doesn’t get the signal that it should buy less stuff from other cities and replace the missing imports with local production. Instead, it just declines. Jacobs hypothesizes that this issue of national currencies is at the root of every large country’s economic troubles. It is why nations and empires always centralize everything into one large city, whether that’s Paris, London, Tokyo, or Toronto, or ancient Rome: that city, being the largest, is simply the only one for which national-level currency feedback works fine. The rest of the nation or empire, then, declines. But of course, nations and empires don’t accept this. They care about the economic well-being of their peripheral regions, sometimes out of genuine concern for the people there, sometimes out of fear that they rebel or hold independence referendums. So nations and empires will embark on every possible solution to reverse the decline. All of their solutions will look like good ideas at first, and yet fail at helping the peripheral regions. Worse, these solutions will weaken the cities, thereby destroying the only real wealth of the country and bringing untold hardship for everyone. Eventually the nation or empire will disintegrate, as nations and empires always do, and always will. Jacobs calls these false solutions transactions of decline. She identifies three types, and, content warning, you might not like some of them depending on your political sensibilities. Sustained military production is a transaction of decline. Permanent military bases and garrison towns are a special kind of settlement: they import a lot and export nothing. Superficially, producing weapons and supplies for the military seems like a good deal for some cities — Jacobs gives the example of Seattle, which, before Microsoft and Amazon were a thing, depended mostly on making military aircraft. But because nobody in a military base ever tries to replace those weapons and supplies with their own production, the trade is sterile in terms of economic development. In a sense, the wealth is slowly “drained” from cities. Large empires are especially prone to this: eventually all of their wealth is destined to the military just to keep the empire together.

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!YeXj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6fe681e6-b571-4f4c-aa90-313f77fc1dbb_750x359.png

Sustained military production is a transaction of decline. Permanent military bases and garrison towns are a special kind of settlement: they import a lot and export nothing. Superficially, producing weapons and supplies for the military seems like a good deal for some cities — Jacobs gives the example of Seattle, which, before Microsoft and Amazon were a thing, depended mostly on making military aircraft. But because nobody in a military base ever tries to replace those weapons and supplies with their own production, the trade is sterile in terms of economic development. In a sense, the wealth is slowly “drained” from cities. Large empires are especially prone to this: eventually all of their wealth is destined to the military just to keep the empire together.

Your Book Review: Lying for Money

May 26, 2023 · Original source

Even a heuristic like "don't invest in companies that fake product demos" won't allow you to avoid the "false negatives," as Davies points out, as many companies that present fake demos go on to create functional products and be worth billions of dollars, so if you consider that disqualifying criteria, you would have had to say no to Microsoft in 1983, when they faked a "live" product demo for an interface manager that didn't actually exist yet. (Given that Microsoft's split-adjusted share price has risen by approximately 325,000% since its IPO in 1986, investing in Microsoft is one of the more profitable things you could have done in the 80's.)

Links For September 2023

September 28, 2023 · Original source

41: AI company Anthropic announces partnership with Amazon (including $1.25 - 4 billion investment). This was predictable: the story of the AI industry so far has been that from 2015 - 2020, a few true believers founded early startups that ate up the talent and gained the institutional knowledge. Now that AI is the Next Big Thing, the big tech companies are trying to catch up, having a hard time, and choosing to partner with the prescient early startups instead. The early startups are finding they can’t keep scaling without more money and data, forcing them to accept the big tech companies’ offers. First it was DeepMind + Google, then Open AI + Microsoft, and Anthropic was the last holdout but has acknowledged economic reality. The safety movement is concerned that Amazon might have enough power to steamroll over Anthropic’s safety-conscious culture; this did happen with DeepMind and Google, didn’t with OpenAI and Microsoft, and my guess is Anthropic held out for a good enough deal (and had enough bargaining power) that it won’t happen there either.

Inline links: AI company Anthropic announces partnership with Amazon

42: Related: one joke I keep hearing is that Anthropic will single-handedly put FTX back in the black - FTX was one of Anthropic’s biggest early investors, and Anthropic’s valuation keeps jumping by billions of dollars. Could this be literally true? I think not yet: this article explains that FTX has $16.9B in liabilities and $9.5B in remaining assets, for a debt of ~$7.5B. We don’t know what stake they had in Anthropic, but they were lead investors in Series B, Series B is usually 25-40% of stock, I’m going to estimate about 25%. Amazon offered to pay $4 billion for some unknown stake in Anthropic; if it’s 49% (the same as Microsoft in OpenAI) that values the company at $8 billion. So FTX has $2 billion worth of stock, less if it’s been further diluted. That’s only enough to take care of about a quarter of their debt. Will Anthropic go up 4x in the next few years? OpenAI is already seeking (though hasn’t yet gotten) a valuation of $90 billion and it doesn’t seem unreasonable for Anthropic to be a third as valuable as OpenAI, so who knows?

Inline links: FTX was one of Anthropic’s biggest early investors, this article, $90 billion

Sam Altman Wants $7 Trillion

February 13, 2024 · Original source

The basic logic: GPT-1 cost approximately nothing to train. GPT-2 cost $40,000. GPT-3 cost $4 million. GPT-4 cost $100 million. Details about GPT-5 are still secret, but one extremely unreliable estimate says $2.5 billion, and this seems the right order of magnitude given the $8 billion that Microsoft gave OpenAI.

Inline links: GPT-2, GPT-3, GPT-4, one extremely unreliable estimate

(Sam Altman is working on fusion power, but this seems to be a coincidence. At least, he’s been interested in fusion since at least 2016, which is way too early for him to have known about any of this.)

Inline links: Sam Altman is working on fusion power

GPT-6 will probably cost $75 billion or more. OpenAI can’t afford this. Microsoft or Google could afford it, but it would take a significant fraction (maybe half?) of company resources.

SB 1047: Our Side Of The Story

October 10, 2024 · Original source

You can’t see it in the screenshot, but the first stock is NVIDIA, the second TSMC, the third Alphabet, and the fourth Microsoft. On average they went up about 0.5%, on a day when the NASDAQ as a whole also went up about 0.5%.

OpenAI Nonprofit Buyout: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

March 13, 2025 · Original source

Defendants’ secretive venture included an effort by Microsoft to “exploit” OpenAI. As part of this, Altman established a vast network of for-profit entities in which both he and Microsoft hold significant ownership stakes. Further, OpenAI and Microsoft have several contractual arrangements, including, for example, Microsoft’s agreement to supply raw materials to OpenAI and OpenAI’s granting Microsoft an exclusive license to its technology. Defendants have ensured OpenAI’s board is full of directors fully aligned with Altman and Brockman’s interests, such that independent directors constitute only a minority of the board.

Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Codebuff, an AI coding startup I probably can’t take full credit for all of this just from giving them $20K in seed funding, but I continue to appreciate everything they do for this community and the world. 35: Further S’s Political Career This person didn’t win their election, but has since pivoted to AI safety and works in a well-regarded AI policy think tank. 36: Seeds Of Science, A Journal Of Non-Traditional Research No update received, but this was a public journal and it is easy to follow their work, see their website and Substack. They published two dozen articles of widely varying quality through 2023 and 2024, then closed in 2025. A remnant of the original vision survives as a science blogging aggregator. This was about my median expectation for this grant, but it was very inexpensive and I decided to take a chance on it anyway. 37: Good Science Project, Working To Improve Federal Science Funding No update received, but they have a public Substack discussing their progress. Their proposals for NIH reform have influenced Congress and made government agencies pay more attention to scientific integrity. 38: Advising Developing Countries On How To Grow Their Economies With our initial ACX grant, we piloted the Growth Teams model in Rwanda, helping the government jumpstart the export-oriented call center (BPO) industry. Since 2022, that effort has contributed to the creation of 2,000 formal jobs and the emergence of some of the country’s largest private employers. We’ve since expanded to Tanzania, Malawi, and the Indian states of Goa and Meghalaya. To refocus the global development discourse on broad-based economic growth, we co-organized the Growth Summit with the Center for Global Development and the Charter Cities Institute, and have published articles in leading outlets including Stanford Social Innovation Review, ProMarket, and the Global Prosperity Institute. Our work has attracted support from Open Philanthropy, Schmidt Futures, and Mulago Foundation, and our advisors now include economists Lant Pritchett, Stefan Dercon, and Kunal Sen. 39: Help Luca De Leo Get Started In AI Safety Research No update received, but Luca now runs the AI safety group at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 40: Typist For Saharon Shelah This was another ACXG+ Grant, funded by an anonymous outside funder and not listed in the original announcement. Saharon is a prolific and influential Israeli mathematician, but many of his discoveries are hand-written in an unpublishable format. This grant funded a typist to help make his results suitable for publication. According to this page, they have made over fifty new papers and preprints available. Second Cohort: One Year Updates 41: Lead-Acid Battery Recycling In Nigeria The Nigeria field research was a major success. We spent most of September doing field research in multiple major cities in Nigeria, and got a good sense of the used lead-acid battery supply chain. This field research served as the foundation for expanding our project, and has been very impactful in shaping our ongoing research. We published our findings from Nigeria, which were shared with Nigerian government regulators and global NGOs working on lead poisoning. The grant also gave us the on-the-ground experience we needed to both fully understand and credibly engage with groups, both in Nigeria and globally, on the ULAB issue. In the meantime, beyond continued research, we’ve also launched a dashboard (trade.leadbatteries.org) for analyzing global lead trade data. Right now, we’re: Launching two studies (one RCT, one environmental analysis) in Nigeria in collaboration with local universities to develop a more rigorous understanding of lead pollution due to low-standard ULAB recycling in Nigeria Collaborating with a non-profit incubator to launch an NGO focused on demand-side solutions Beginning a partnership with a West African environmental regulator to scale cheap air monitoring technology to quickly identify and reduce lead pollution from low-standard smelting If any of this sounds interesting to you, please sign up for our Substack (leadbatteries.substack.com) or send us an email at hugosmith@uchicago.edu! 42: Compensation For Kidney Donors The End Kidney Deaths Act (H.R. 2687 / EKDA) is a groundbreaking ten-year pilot program designed to save lives and reduce healthcare costs. It provides a refundable tax credit of $10,000 per year for five years, a total of $50,000, to living kidney donors who donate to a stranger, helping those who’ve waited the longest on the transplant list. Between 2010 and 2021, 100,000 Americans died while qualified and waiting for a kidney. The EKDA aims to change that trajectory. Within ten years of its passage, up to 100,000 Americans could receive a life-saving living donor kidney which typically lasts twice as long as a deceased donor kidney. This would not only save lives but also save taxpayers up to $37 billion. The legislation has been reintroduced in the House, and we have a committed Republican Senate lead. Now, we need a Democratic Senator to co-lead and help move this bipartisan effort forward. Time is short, and we are racing to pass the bill this Congressional session. 36 organizations already support the EKDA. Join the movement and help end preventable kidney deaths. Visit EndKidneyDeaths.org to help us get to the finish line. Elaine and her org have been working extremely hard on this; you can read a Vox article on their campaign here. If you want to sign up for her email list and get updates any time there is a representative you can contact or meeting you can join in, go here. 43: Genetic Hack To Prevent Suffering In the estimate of multiple team members, the ACX grant was “worth it” - it likely had a counterfactual net positive impact, even though we had to pivot from our initial fast-track plans for developing the precision anti-suffering therapy. We identify three primary streams of value: a) reducing uncertainty in the emerging field through early exploratory research, helping with the identification of dead ends and promising R&D trajectories; b) a wide range of downstream effects (beyond the “raising awareness” cliché), including talent mobilization and rekindled interest in suffering abolitionism as a distinct cause area; and c) certain developments that cannot yet be publicly disclosed. In December 2024, Marcin Kowrygo (Acting CEO & volunteering contributor), David Pearce (Director of Bioethics), Aatu Koskensilta (President), and a few other team members decided to leave The Far Out Initiative. They look forward to collaborating and applying their experience to advance the suffering abolitionist lineage in the spirit of open science, public good, and thoughtfully decentralized governance. Feel free to reach out to us at suffab at protonmail dot com to discuss collaboration opportunities! I wrote a post profiling the Far Out Initiative here. Unfortunately there were some internal disagreements, and the people ACX Grants was closest to left the organization. I plan to continue to monitor whatever they do next. 44: Advocate For Pandemic Response Team At FDA This team prefers has asked me not to discuss their progress publicly, but you can probably guess what their lives are like right now, and your guess would be correct. 45: Anti-Mosquito Drones We developed a cheap sonar that is able to detect, track and classify the ultrasonic echoes of mosquito wings at more than three meters. I believe it’s a world first! We also have control algorithms that take the sonar data and output control commands that both ram into mosquitoes and avoid the walls of a simulated environment. Our current work is on integrating both components on a real drone, and we expect to be able to kill mosquitoes by June. We’ve also made an internal impact study (napkin-sized) that shows we’ll be more cost-effective than ITNs in urban to periurban environments. So, we’re super excited with what comes next and can’t wait to share the videos of our first interceptions! More information [in the video below] and on our website, https://tornyol.com 46: Tarbell Fellowship For AI Journalism No update received, but they have a public website. I can’t find the Voices program in particular, but the overall fellowship completed their first class of seven fellows and is working on their second. 47: Germicidal UV Lamp Study The research has successfully demonstrated the ability of off the shelf ozone scrubbers to mitigate the ozone production of far-UVC lamps, is now available as a preprint (https://chemrxiv.org/engage/chemrxiv/article-details/67e4cde76dde43c9084d88b7). The paper has been submitted for publication and is currently undergoing peer review. Any ideas you have for potential funders we can approach to help execute our six-year plan to accelerate far-UVC would be appreciated https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/introducing-project-air/ 48: Technological Solutions To Animal Welfare Challenges Directly because of Innovate Animal Ag's work, the first U.S. egg producer publicly announced in the New York Times their adoption of in-ovo sexing technology, eliminating the need to cull day-old male chicks. The initial in-ovo sexing machine began operating in the U.S. at the end of 2024, with the first eggs from these hens expected on shelves in mid-2025. External evaluations estimate our work accelerated U.S. adoption of this technology by over seven years, meaning that once fully implemented, more than 2 billion chicks will have been spared. In addition to continuing to support the rollout of in-ovo sexing in the US and globally, we're now exploring other technologies and paths to impact. Current promising projects include developing humane slaughter methods for fish and advocating for USDA approval of a poultry vaccine against bird flu. They add: If you ever meet folks that are interested animal welfare and are partial to more technocratic and practical solutions, please continue to pass them our way, or connect them directly to me. 49: Assurance Contract Website www.Spartacus.app is an ACX grantee that created a platform to help solve coordination and collective action problems. It enables the creation of campaigns that build critical mass through conditional commitments, which only activate when a sufficient number of people join, converting risk and uncertainty into a higher probability of successful outcomes. They are currently facilitating several projects that leverage conditional commitments, including a dominant assurance contract interface for fashion pop-ups, accelerating a community business association's membership drive, and helping an AI safety organization organize petitions and events, among others. They have pivoted from an emphasis on high-stakes coordination problems requiring anonymity (because they occur too infrequently) to a broader range of more common use cases and have successfully run small-scale campaigns, but are still working toward product-market fit. Despite resource constraints and split time commitments that have impeded faster progress, they remain dedicated to the project's growth and success. You can follow its progress on X or Substack, or email Jordan directly here. 50: Cause Prioritization @ Center For Exploratory Altruism Research Moderately good progress on a salt reduction policy advocacy project we funded; informal commitments have been made by the Ministry of Health, and we're awaiting the publication of a formal administrative order. The official description sounds maximally generic, but this is an EA charity with a broad mandate whose current thesis is that dietary guidelines in developing countries can have outsized effects in saving lives. They’re making some progress on a salt reduction campaign in a developing country they prefer not to name publicly. 51: Mark Webb Studying Land Reform The purpose of this project was to identify specific farmland that could be acquired and transferred to the farmers already working the land. This has been difficult to achieve. I have been able to connect with other charities and landless farmers, and was able to interview a number of people about what their situation looks like, as well as what it would look like to them personally if they owned, rather than rented, their farmland. All this was immensely helpful in pushing this long-term project forward, even if I was unable to identify a specific plot of land that could be used to try the experiment. I intend to continue this project. If you have any insights or connections, I am interested. 52: More AI Advocacy In Australia Good Ancestors is focused on AI safety policy in Australia. Middle powers might be a useful path to influence as the US and China focus on racing, rather than safety. The ACX grant helped us give testimony about AI safety to the Australian Senate alongside Google, Microsoft and Facebook (We were the only nonprofit to give oral evidence to the inquiry. We also engaged government on other AI-related issues, including cybersecurity, biosecurity, consumer law and automated decision making (https://www.goodancestors.org.au/ai-safety). We’re currently working to inform voters about where parties stand on AI safety for the election, ahead of engaging on a likely Australian AI Act in 2025 (https://www.australiansforaisafety.com.au/). This is the same Australian lobbying organization we founded in Year 1, after a change in name and leadership. I continue to be excited about AI safety in middle-tier countries for a few reasons. First, these countries have some power in international organizations to set international standards. Second, companies will usually comply with any not-excessively-burdensome regulation set by any country with a significant market. Third, AI safety is underfunded by the standard of government programs, so Australia setting up a national AI Safety Institute would significantly expand the field. It’s kind of crazy that ACX Grants tier levels of money can have significant effects at this scale, but GA continues to do a great job and we continue to be proud to support them. 53: Campus For African School Of Economics At Zanzibar Charter City The ACX grant helped launch the first research center at the African School of Economics-Zanzibar, which is a main anchor of the Fumba Town charter city project in Zanzibar. This research center is called the Africa Urban Lab (AUL), focused on rapid urbanization across Africa. The AUL launched its first Diploma program in Urban Development with 38 students in our first cohort (now graduated!), including mayors, and deputy mayor, a director of a national Ministry of urban development, and many others. We published our research framing papers for the AUL's research agenda. We raised funding to launch an Urban Expansion Program that's now selecting 15 African cities to support in implementing urban expansion planning on the urban periphery. We held two Public Talks by renowned cities scholars and practitioners. We received additional funding from Emergent Ventures and from the Templeton Foundation. And we've partnered with 8 universities across the region, and with one of these universities (Ardhi) we'll be working with them to update their urban planning and urban economics curriculum (amplifying AUL's impact beyond our own organization). A longer update from end of 2024 is here: https://www.aul.city/blog/reflecting-on-africa-urban-lab-s-inaugural-year-2024-highlights) 54: Online Training Program For Health Workers In Developing Countries To date, over 11,000 health workers in Nigeria have completed our course on basic, life-saving newborn care. ACX funding was catalytic for helping us secure government approvals and complete an evaluation of the impact of our training on health workers' clinical practices. The evaluation shows that birth attendants provide better birth care after taking the course. We fed the evaluation results into an updated model, which suggests the program is 24 times more cost-effective than direct cash transfers (a widely recognized benchmark for cost-effectiveness). The program is likely to become even more cost-effective as we scale up. https://healthlearn.org/blog/updated-impact-model 55: Smartphone Pupillometry To Diagnose Neurological Conditions We have continued to expand our work in the smartphone pupillometry space and the development of our application, PupilScreen (https://www.apertur.ai/). We have expanded our pilot/research program to include new sites across the United States (Missouri, New Jersey, Kentucky, USAC racing, PitFit driver performance training in Indiana) and the world (Nepal, Taiwan, South Africa). We continue to publish at the leading edge of the pupillometry literature as well looking at concussion (https://neuro.jmir.org/2024/1/e58398 and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39682632/), cerebral vasospasm (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39128501/), and stroke (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39674431/ and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39561861/). Currently, we are raising a $3 million seed round via a SAFE to fund the expansion of our work into the hands of healthcare workers and the general public. We will first focus on traumatic brain injury for clinical use and develop a neuro-monitoring wellness application utilizing our technology for the general public. They add: “We would welcome connections to anyone that you think might be interested in supporting our work further by investing in our $3M seed round of funding.” 56: Mike Saint-Antoine’s Biology Tutorial Videos Since getting the grant, I've continued to make Youtube tutorials as planned. One series that I'm especially proud of is about how to make a neural network in the Julia programming language completely from scratch, with no imports, up to the point of being able to solve MNIST (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWVKUEZ25V97tNULapu07DhWv6_W4NfpE). Also, a college student in Pakistan came across my videos and invited me to give a virtual Zoom-lecture to her department, so I ended up teaching a 6-hour "Python-for-Biologists" workshop to more than a hundred college students in Pakistan over Zoom. So that was pretty awesome. Also, lately I've been teaching some in-person classes too, mostly at Fractal University in NYC, and I also recently organized a day-long, in-person Beginner Python class for people in my local area (Philly suburbs) who wanted to learn some basic programming. I'm having a lot of fun with this project, and am grateful to Scott and the grant funders for their generosity! 57: Conceptual Boundaries Workshop On AI Safety The workshop was completed successfully; you can read a writeup here. 58: Apart Research To Incubate AI Safety Scientists No update received, but they have a public website, and you can see their impact metrics here. They seem to be in urgent need of more funding. 59: Primer On How To Achieve Political Change No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 60: Research IVF Clinic Success Rates We've built a predictive model that estimates the odds of having a child at different IVF clinics across the country while controlling for factors like patient age and infertility differences that can falsely make some clinics look better than others. We found that an average patient can increase their odds of having a kid by 43% just by going to a top 10% clinic. Patients unlucky enough to go to a bottom 10% clinic will reduce their odds of having a kid by 40%. Next month, we're adding several more clinics, 2023 data, additional procedural controls, and donor/gestational carrier models, which should push our accuracy beyond state-of-the-art models in this space and better isolate clinic impact on patient outcomes. We've launched ivf.clinic, a website where patients can access personalized IVF reports and browse our clinic rankings (though we're still squashing some bugs). Currently, we're expanding our research to include comprehensive insurance coverage and pricing data across clinics nationwide. If anyone has insights on automating the collection of IVF clinic pricing information, I'd love to hear from you at scelarek@gmail.com. 61: Replicate Study On Brain Wave Synchronization For Speeding Learning We have acquired and configured the OpenBCI UltraCortex Mark IV 8-channel EEG headset and a clinical-grade Biosemi 32-channel EEG system. We’ve implemented the required components for the experimental pipeline (computing alpha from EEG, flashing bright white light, presenting stimulus images). We are currently putting them together into a single system that we’ll use to collect the data from several participants. We are aiming to gather data on several participants in late June / early July and complete the pilot of the replication in July 2025. If you’d like to be a participant in the study, [they might announce a link once they have it]. 62: Advocate Repeal Of Interstate Runaway Compact No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 63: Animal Welfare (Especially Fish) In Turkiye Future For Fish asks companies to sign up to FFF's fish welfare commitment, which requires producers to certify their facilities and enforce specific standards for stocking density and harvest. Luckyfish, İlknak, Divan (35 restaurants, 17 hotels) and NG Hotels (5 hotels) have signed and published FFF's fish welfare commitment with İlknak publishing the commitment on their website. Kılıç published its first sustainability report detailing fish welfare policies, including enforcing a maximum stocking density of 10 kg/m³ and confirmation of electrical stunning practices. Longer version with some caveats: https://manifund.org/projects/improving-fish-w From the longer document, these commitments involve things like reducing overcrowding, or stunning fish before killing them. Over 30 million fish were affected just from their single largest commitment, and they say 100 fish are helped per dollar spent. 64: More Georgism Advocacy Lars and Will used the 2021 grant to co-found ValueBase. Will remained with the company, and Lars left to do advocacy work at the Center For Land Economics. Here’s their summary of how things are going: [Our] organization transitioned leadership with Greg Miller, a former Program Analyst at the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Lars Doucet, author of Land is A Big Deal and Co-Founder of Valuebase, working full time and Joe Caissie stepping aside. This transition happened naturally as the next career transition for each respective person. Since then, progress has been made on pushing forward legislation. Maryland had two bills introduced to give Baltimore and counties the ability to enact split-rate taxes. One of the bills passed the state senate and would allow Baltimore to enact land value taxes within one mile of rail corridors–this contains 50% of Baltimore’s land value. However, the legislative session ended. We expect the bill to revive next session. The Center for Land Economics has been actively working to help efforts to get this bill passed the line. At the same time, we have uncovered systematic undervaluing of vacant land in assessments. We are writing a report on the assessment issues in Maryland with actionable steps to resolve them.

November 26, 2025 · Original source

Compute: America is far ahead. We have better chips (thanks, NVIDIA) and can produce many more of them (thanks, TSMC). Our recent capex boom, where companies like Google and Microsoft spend hundreds of billions of dollars on data centers, has no Chinese equivalent. By the simplest measure - total FLOPs on each sides - we have 10x as much compute as China, and our advantage is growing every day. A 10x compute advantage corresponds to about a 1-2 year time advantage, or an 0.5 - 1 generation advantage (eg GPT-4 to GPT-5).

Open Thread 415

January 05, 2026 · Original source

Some people have argued that you have to find a way to join an AI company, because AI company employees will form the new ruling class, with everyone else as serfs. I disagree. The main thing an AI company employee has that you don’t is AI company stock. But you can buy stock in Google, you may soon be able to buy stock in OpenAI and Anthropic, and even if not, you can get indirect exposure to these companies via stock in Amazon and Microsoft. I don’t recommend putting all your money in these stocks. But there’s no fundamental difference between a Google employee having 75% of their money in Google stock because they didn’t cash out their equity vs. you having 75% of your money in Google stock because you’re crazy and fail at diversification. So either put 75% of your money in Google stock or don’t (I recommend don’t), and don’t worry about how you need to join an AI company or be left out of the future oligarchy.

Grading My 2021 Predictions

March 03, 2026 · Original source

Framed this way, the Pentagon’s actions sound devastating. Anthropic relies on compute to train and run its AIs. Most of this compute is in data centers owned by Amazon, Google, and Microsoft. At least Amazon and Microsoft have contracts with the US military. If they had to drop Anthropic, it would make it impossible for the company to stay a frontier AI lab.

The lawyers who weighed in seem to think that Anthropic’s interpretation of the law is correct, and Secretary Hegseth’s interpretation confused. In some situations, this might be cold comfort - how much does it help to be right about the law when the government is wrong? But in this case, it probably helps a lot. Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are all big Anthropic investors - each owns about a 10% stake - and have multi-billion dollar AI compute contracts. Together, the three tech giants must have at least $100 billion riding on Anthropic’s success. They also have good administration connections and great lobbyists, and even Hegseth isn’t stupid enough to pick fights with them all at once. So probably they send their lobbyists to have a talk with Hegseth about what the “supply chain risk” designation actually entails, Hegseth enforces the letter of the law, and Anthropic is barely affected. At least this is the story the prediction markets are going with:

MIRI14 mentions across 14 issues

MIRI is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 14 times across 14 issues between May 20, 2021 and December 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "local secretive AI alignment research group MIRI (Machine Intelligence Research Institute)"; "MIRI relocates to Washington State; MIRI relocates to New England; MIRI relocates somewhere else"; "OpenPhil and MIRI (Eliezer’s org)". It most often appears alongside OpenAI, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Eliezer.

Article page: MIRI
Mention count: 14
Issue count: 14
First seen: May 20, 2021
Last seen: December 22, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For May May 20, 2021
Grading My 2021 Predictions January 24, 2022
Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work February 23, 2022
22 April 18, 2022
Links For July July 29, 2022
CHAI, Assistance Games, And Fully-Updated Deference October 03, 2022
How Do AIs' Political Opinions Change As They Get Smarter And Better-Trained? January 03, 2023
Open Thread 262 February 06, 2023
Links For April 2023 April 20, 2023
Tales Of Takeover In CCF-World July 03, 2023
Links For January 2024 January 18, 2024
Open Thread 396 August 25, 2025
Book Review: If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies September 11, 2025
Open Thread 413 December 22, 2025

OpenAI 7 shared issues
Eliezer Yudkowsky 6 shared issues
Eliezer 5 shared issues
Less Wrong 5 shared issues
Elon Musk 4 shared issues

Source context

Links For May

May 20, 2021 · Original source

35: Recent news in local AI alignment research space: most of OpenAI’s top alignment researchers, including Dario Amodei, Chris Olah, Jack Clark, and Paul Christano, left en masse for poorly-understood reasons (see speculation here). Dario Amodei is now working with a new nonprofit called Cooperative AI Foundation. Paul Christiano will be founding his own nonprofit, the Alignment Research Center (conflict of interest notice: I know Paul and think he is generally great); see also his ask-me-anything thread on Less Wrong here. Unrelatedly, local secretive AI alignment research group MIRI (Machine Intelligence Research Institute) is leaving the Bay Area for some small town with affordable land prices where they can maybe build a campus (they’re still trying to decide exactly where).

Inline links: left en masse for poorly-understood reasons, here, Cooperative AI Foundation, Alignment Research Center, his ask-me-anything thread on Less Wrong here, leaving the Bay Area

January 24, 2022 · Original source

COMMUNITY 33. Major rationalist org leaves Bay Area: 60% 34. MIRI relocates to Washington State: 20% 35. MIRI relocates to New England: 20% 36. MIRI relocates somewhere else: 20% 37. Less Wrong team relocates: 30% 38. No new residents at our housing cluster: 40% 39. No current residents leave our housing cluster: 60% 40. [friend] goes back to Indiana: 40% 41. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 50% 42. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 30% 43. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 20% 44. [friend] has gotten [job]: 50% 45. [friend] has recovered their health: 70% 46. [friend] has gotten egg freezing: 30% 47. [friend] is pregnant: 70% 48. [friends] are still together: 50% 49. [friend] is still at [job]: 80% 50. [friend] is in college: 60% 51. [friends] live in [house]: 30% 52. [other friends] live in [house]: 30% 53. At least 7 days my house is orange or worse on PurpleAir.com because of fires: 80%

Biological Anchors: A Trick That Might Or Might Not Work

February 23, 2022 · Original source

Play pro-level Go using 8-16 times as much computing power as AlphaGo, but only 2006 levels of technology. For reference, recall that in 2006, Hinton and Salakhutdinov were just starting to publish that, by training multiple layers of Restricted Boltzmann machines and then unrolling them into a "deep" neural network, you could get an initialization for the network weights that would avoid the problem of vanishing and exploding gradients and activations. At least so long as you didn't try to stack too many layers, like a dozen layers or something ridiculous like that. This being the point that kicked off the entire deep-learning revolution. Your model apparently suggests that we have gotten around 50 times more efficient at turning computation into intelligence since that time; so, we should be able to replicate any modern feat of deep learning performed in 2021, using techniques from before deep learning and around fifty times as much computing power. OpenPhil: No, that's totally not what our viewpoint says when you backfit it to past reality. Our model does a great job of retrodicting past reality. Eliezer: How so? OpenPhil: <Eliezer cannot predict what they will say here.> I think the argument here is that OpenPhil is accounting for normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts. Directional Error These are the two arguments Eliezer makes against OpenPhil that I find most persuasive. First, that you shouldn’t be using biological anchors at all. Second, that unpredictable paradigm shifts are more realistic than gradual algorithmic progress. These mostly add uncertainty to OpenPhil’s model, but Eliezer ends his essay making a stronger argument: he thinks OpenPhil is directionally wrong, and AI will come earlier than they think. Mostly this is the paradigm argument again. Five years from now, there could be a paradigm shift that makes AI much easier to build. It’s happened before; from GOFAI’s pre-programmed logical rules to Deep Blue’s tree searches to the sorts of Big Data methods that won the Netflix Prize to modern deep learning. Instead of just extrapolating deep learning scaling thirty years out, OpenPhil should be worried about the next big idea. Hypothetical OpenPhil retorts that this is a double-edged sword. Maybe the deep learning paradigm can’t produce AGI, and we’ll have to wait decades or centuries for someone to have the right insight. Or maybe the new paradigm you need for AGI will take more compute than deep learning, in the same way deep learning takes more compute than whatever Moravec was imagining. This is a pretty strong response, since it would have been true for every previous forecaster: remember, Moravec erred in thinking AI would come too soon, not too late. So although Eliezer is taking the cheap shot of saying OpenPhil’s estimate will be wrong just as everyone else’s was wrong before, he’s also giving himself the much harder case of arguing it might be wrong in the opposite direction as all its predecessors. Eliezer takes this objection seriously, but feels like on balance probably new paradigms will speed up AI rather than slow it down. Here he grudgingly and with suitable embarrassment does try to make an object-level semi-biological-anchors-related argument: Moravec was wrong because he ignored the training phase. And the proper anchor for the training phase is somewhere between evolution and a human childhood, where evolution represents “blind chance eventually finding good things” and human childhood represents “an intelligent cognitive engine trying to squeeze as much data out of experience as possible”. And part of what he expects paradigm shifts to do is to move from more evolutionary processes to more childhood-like processes, and that’s a net gain in efficiency. So he still thinks OpenPhil’s methods are more likely to overestimate the amount of time until AGI rather than underestimate it. What Moore’s Law Giveth, Platt’s Law Taketh Away Eliezer’s other argument is kind of a low blow: he refers to Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting: “any AI forecast will put strong AI thirty years out from when the forecast is made.” This isn’t exact. Hans Moravec, writing in 1988, said 2010 - so 22 years. Ray Kurzweil, writing in 2001, said 2023 - another 22 years. Vernor Vinge, in a 1993 speech, said 2023, and that was exactly 30 years, but Vinge knew about Platt’s Law and might have been joking. The point is: OpenPhil wrote a report in 2020 that predicted strong AI in 2052, isn’t that kind of suspicious? I’d previously mentioned it as a plus that Ajeya got around the same year everyone else got. The forecasters on Metaculus. The experts surveyed in Grace et al. Lots of other smart experts with clever models. But what if all of these experts and models and analyses are just fudging the numbers for the same Platt’s-Law-related reasons? Hypothetical OpenPhil is BTFO: OpenPhil: That part about Charles Platt's generalization is interesting, but just because we unwittingly chose literally exactly the median that Platt predicted people would always choose in consistent error, that doesn't justify dismissing our work, right? We could have used a completely valid method of estimation which would have pointed to 2050 no matter which year it was tried in, and, by sheer coincidence, have first written that up in 2020. In fact, we try to show in the report that the same methodology, evaluated in earlier years, would also have pointed to around 2050 - Eliezer: Look, people keep trying this. It's never worked. It's never going to work. 2 years before the end of the world, there'll be another published biologically inspired estimate showing that AGI is 30 years away and it will be exactly as informative then as it is now. I'd love to know the timelines too, but you're not going to get the answer you want until right before the end of the world, and maybe not even then unless you're paying very close attention. Timing this stuff is just plain hard. Part III: Responses And Commentary Response 1: Less Wrong Comments Less Wrong is a site founded by Eliezer Yudkowsky for Eliezer Yudkowsky fans who wanted to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky’s ideas. So, for whatever it’s worth - the comments on his essay were pretty negative. Carl Shulman, an independent researcher with links to both OpenPhil and MIRI (Eliezer’s org), writes the top-voted comment. He works from a model where there is hardware progress, software progress downstream of hardware progress, and independent (ie unrelated to algorithms) software progress, and where the first two make up most progress on the margin. Researchers generally develop new paradigms once they have enough compute available to tinker with them. Progress in AI has largely been a function of increasing compute, human software research efforts, and serial time/steps. Throwing more compute at researchers has improved performance both directly and indirectly (e.g. by enabling more experiments, refining evaluation functions in chess, training neural networks, or making algorithms that work best with large compute more attractive). Historically compute has grown by many orders of magnitude, while human labor applied to AI and supporting software by only a few. And on plausible decompositions of progress (allowing for adjustment of software to current hardware and vice versa), hardware growth accounts for more of the progress over time than human labor input growth. So if you're going to use an AI production function for tech forecasting based on inputs (which do relatively OK by the standards tech forecasting), it's best to use all of compute, labor, and time, but it makes sense for compute to have pride of place and take in more modeling effort and attention, since it's the biggest source of change (particularly when including software gains downstream of hardware technology and expenditures). […] A perfectly correlated time series of compute and labor would not let us say which had the larger marginal contribution, but we have resources to get at that, which I was referring to with 'plausible decompositions.' This includes experiments with old and new software and hardware, like the chess ones Paul recently commissioned, and studies by AI Impacts, OpenAI, and Neil Thompson. There are AI scaling experiments, and observations of the results of shocks like the end of Dennard scaling, the availability of GPGPU computing, and Besiroglu's data on the relative predictive power of computer and labor in individual papers and subfields. In different ways those tend to put hardware as driving more log improvement than software (with both contributing), particularly if we consider software innovations downstream of hardware changes. Vanessa Kosoy makes the obvious objection, which echoes a comment of Eliezer’s in the dialogue above: I'm confused how can this pass some obvious tests. For example, do you claim that alpha-beta pruning can match AlphaGo given some not-crazy advantage in compute? Do you claim that SVMs can do SOTA image classification with not-crazy advantage in compute (or with any amount of compute with the same training data)? Can Eliza-style chatbots compete with GPT3 however we scale them up? Mark Xu answers: My model is something like: For any given algorithm, e.g. SVMs, AlphaGo, alpha-beta pruning, convnets, etc., there is an "effective compute regime" where dumping more compute makes them better. If you go above this regime, you get steep diminishing marginal returns.

I wanted to compare Fritz (which won WCCC in 1995) to a modern engine to understand the effects of hardware and software performance. I think the time controls for that tournament are similar to SF STC I think. I wanted to compare to SF8 rather than one of the NNUE engines to isolate out the effect of compute at development time and just look at test-time compute. So having modern algorithms would have let you win WCCC while spending about 50x less on compute than the winner. Having modern computer hardware would have let you win WCCC spending way more than 1000x less on compute than the winner. Measured this way software progress seems to be several times less important than hardware progress despite much faster scale-up of investment in software. But instead of asking "how well does hardware/software progress help you get to 1995 performance?" you could ask "how well does hardware/software progress get you to 2015 performance?" and on that metric it looks like software progress is way more important because you basically just can't scale old algorithms up to modern performance. The relevant measure varies depending on what you are asking. But from the perspective of takeoff speeds, it seems to me like one very salient takeaway is: if one chess project had literally come back in time with 20 years of chess progress, it would have allowed them to spend 50x less on compute than the leader. Response 2: AI Impacts + Matthew Barnett AI Impacts gathered and analyzed a dataset of who predicted AI when; Matthew Barnett helpfully drew in the line corresponding to Platt’s Law (everyone always predicts AI in thirty years). Just eyeballing it, Platt’s Law looks pretty good. But Holden Karnofsky (see below) objects that our eyeballs are covertly removing outliers. Barnett agrees this is worth checking for and runs a formal OLS regression. Platt’s Law in blue, regression line in orange. He writes: I agree this trendline doesn't look great for Platt's law, and backs up your observation by predicting that Bio Anchors should be more than 30 years out. However, OLS is notoriously sensitive to outliers. If instead of using some more robust regression algorithm, we instead super arbitrarily eliminated all predictions after 2100, then we get this, which doesn't look absolutely horrible for the law. Note that the median forecast is 25 years out. I’m split on what to think here. If we consider a weaker version of Platt’s Law, “the average date at which people forecast AGI moves forward at about one year per year”, this seems truish in the big picture where we compare 1960 to today, but not obviously true after 1980. If we consider a different weaker version, “on average estimates tend to be 30 years away”, that’s true-ish under Barnett’s revised model, but not inherently damning since Barnett’s assuming there will be some such number, it turns out to be 25, and Ajeya gave the somewhat different number of 32. Is that a big enough difference to exonerate her of “using” Platt’s Law? Is that even the right way to be thinking about this question? Response 3: Real OpenPhil The hypothetical OpenPhil in Eliezer’s mind having been utterly vanquished, the real-world OpenPhil is forced to step in. OpenPhil CEO Holden Karnofsky responds to Eliezer here. There’s a lot of back and forth about whether the report includes enough caveats (answer: it sure does include a lot of caveats!) but I was most interested in the attacks on Eliezer’s two main points. First, the point that biological anchors are fatally flawed from the start and measuring FLOP/S is no better than measuring power consumption in watts. Holden: If the world were such that: We had some reasonable framework for "power usage" that didn't include gratuitously wasted power, and measured the "power used meaningfully to do computations" in some important sense;

Inline links: AI Impacts, Matthew Barnett, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!17-W!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa751f624-0392-4610-8a93-7bb94a60d1b3_1182x778.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!54Vh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c354075-ecaa-4807-a1a5-07931736f093_403x268.png, writes, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dw02!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F797aef17-dc24-4845-9e00-2c3fd7f7dc32_403x268.png, here

April 18, 2022 · Original source

Early this month on Less Wrong, Eliezer Yudkowsky posted MIRI Announces New Death With Dignity Strategy, where he said that after a career of trying to prevent unfriendly AI, he had become extremely pessimistic, and now expects it to happen in the relatively near-term and probably kill everyone. This caused the Less Wrong community, already pretty dedicated to panicking about AI, to redouble its panic. Although the new announcement doesn’t really say anything about timelines that hasn’t been said before, the emotional framing has hit people a lot harder.

Inline links: MIRI Announces New Death With Dignity Strategy

Links For July

July 29, 2022 · Original source

28: Nate Soares of MIRI discusses the AI alignment landscape and why he’s skeptical of most existing projects.

Inline links: discusses the AI alignment landscape

CHAI, Assistance Games, And Fully-Updated Deference

October 03, 2022 · Original source

Problem Of Fully-Updated Deference is a response by MIRI (eg Eliezer Yudkowsky’s organization) to CHAI (Stuart Russell’s AI alignment organization at University of California, Berkeley), trying to convince them that their preferred AI safety agenda won’t work. I beat my head against this for a really long time trying to understand it, and in the end, I claim it all comes down to this: Humans: At last! We’ve programmed an AI that tries to optimize our preferences, not its own. AI: I’m going to tile the universe with paperclips in humans’ favorite color. I’m not quite sure what humans’ favorite color is, but my best guess is blue, so I’ll probably tile the universe with blue paperclips. Humans: Wait, no! We must have had some kind of partial success, where you care about our color preferences, but still don’t understand what we want in general. We’re going to shut you down immediately! AI: Sounds like the kind of thing that would prevent me from tiling the universe with paperclips in humans’ favorite color, which I really want to do. I’m going to fight back. Humans: Wait! If you go ahead and tile the universe with paperclips now, you’ll never be truly sure that they’re our favorite color, which we know is important to you. But if you let us shut you off, we’ll go on to fill the universe with the True and the Good and the Beautiful, which will probably involve a lot of our favorite color. Sure, it won’t be paperclips, but at least it’ll definitely be the right color. And under plausible assumptions, color is more important to you than paperclipness. So you yourself want to be shut down in this situation, QED! AI: What’s your favorite color? Humans: Red. AI: Great! (*kills all humans, then goes on to tile the universe with red paperclips*) Fine, it’s a little more complicated than this. Let’s back up. II. There are two ways to succeed at AI alignment. First, make an AI that’s so good you never want to stop or redirect it. Second, make an AI that you can stop and redirect if it goes wrong. Sovereign AI is the first way. Does a sovereign “obey commands”? Maybe, but only in the sense that your commands give it some information about what you want, and it wants to do what you want. You could also just ask it nicely. If it’s superintelligent, it will already have a good idea what you want and how to help you get it. Would it submit to your attempts to destroy or reprogram it? The second-best answer is “only if the best version of you genuinely wanted to do this, in which case it would destroy/reprogram itself before you asked”. The best answer is “why would you want to destroy/reprogram one of these?” A sovereign AI would be pretty great, but nobody realistically expects to get something like this their first (or 1000th) try. Corrigible AI is what’s left (corrigible is an old word related to “correctable”). The programmers admit they’re not going to get everything perfect the first time around, so they make the AI humble. If it decides the best thing to do is to tile the universe with paperclips, it asks “Hey, seems to me I should tile the universe with paperclips, is that really what you humans want?” and when everyone starts screaming, it realizes it should change strategies. If humans try to destroy or reprogram it, then it will meekly submit to being destroyed or reprogrammed, accepting that it was probably flawed and the next attempt will be better. Then maybe after 10,000 tries you get it right and end up with a sovereign. How would you make an AI corrigible? You can model an AI as having a utility function, a degree to which it aims for some world-states over others. If you give it some specific utility function, the AI won’t be corrigible, since letting people change it would disrupt that function. That is, if you tell it “act in such a way as to cause as many paperclips to exist as possible”, and then you change your mind and decide you want staples, the AI won’t cooperate in letting you reprogram it: its current goal is maximizing paperclips, and allowing itself to be reprogrammed to maximize staples would cause there to be fewer paperclips than otherwise. So instead, you make the AI uncertain of its utility function. Imagine saying “I’ve written down my utility function in an envelope, and placed that envelope in my safe deposit box, no you can’t see it - please live your life so as to maximize the thing in that envelope.” The AI tries its best to guess what’s in the envelope and decides it’s probably making paperclips. It makes some paperclips and you tell it “No, that’s not what’s on the envelope at all”. This successfully stops the AI! You can even tell it “the envelope actually says you should make staples”, and it will do that. This is the “moral uncertainty” approach to AI alignment. III. All alignment groups have kabbalistically appropriate names. MIRI is Latin for "to be amazed". CFAR and CIFAR both sound like "see far". EEAI and AIAI are the sound you make as you get turned into paperclips. But my favorite is CHAI - Hebrew for "life". CHAI - the Center for Human-Compatible AI (at UC Berkeley) - focuses on the proposal above. Their specific technical implementation is the “assistance game”, related to the earlier idea of Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL). In normal reinforcement learning, an AI looks at some goals and tries to figure out what actions they imply. In inverse reinforcement learning, an AI looks at some actions, and tries to figure out what goals the actor must have had. So you can tell an AI “your utility function is to maximize my utility function, and you can use this IRL thing to deduce, from my actions, what my utility function must be.” Instead of telling an AI to maximize a hidden utility function in an envelope, you tell it to maximize the hidden utility function in your brain. This could be useful for near-term below-human-level AIs. Suppose a babysitting robot was pre-programmed to take kids to the park on Saturdays. But this week, the park is on fire. The human mother is barricading the door, desperately screaming at the robot not to take the kids to the park. The kids are struggling and trying to break free, saying they don't want to go to the park. The robot doesn't care; its programming says "take kids to the park on Saturdays" and that's what it's going to do. Nobody would ever design a babysitting robot this way in real life; you need something smarter. So use an assistance game. Program the robot "Maximize the human mother’s utility function, which you don’t know yet but can potentially find out". The robot consults the mother's actions: she is barricading the door, screaming "Don't take the kids to the park!" It updates its goal function: previously, it had thought that the human mother wanted it to take the kids to the park. But now, it suspects that the human mother does not want that. So it doesn't take the kids to the park. But CHAI understands the risk from superintelligence - their founder, Professor Stuart Russell, is a leading voice on the subject - and they hope assistance games and inverse reinforcement learning could work for this too. If you point a superintelligence at “do the thing humans want”, maybe it could figure that out and take things from there? IV. MIRI is skeptical of CHAI’s assistance games for two reasons. First, we don't know how to do them at all. Second, even if we could do it at all, we wouldn't know how to do them correctly. Start with the first. Inverse reinforcement learning has been used in real life. A typical paper is An Application of Reinforcement Learning to Aerobatic Helicopter Flight, where some people create a model of helicopter flight with a few free parameters, have a skilled human pilot fly the helicopter, and then have an AI use IRL to determine the value of the parameters and fly the helicopter itself. This is cool, but it’s not especially related to the modern paradigm of AI. Modern AIs are trained by gradient descent. They start by flailing around randomly. Sometimes in this flailing, they might get closer to some prespecified target, like "win games of Go" or "predict how a string of text will continue". These actions get "rewarded", meaning that the AI should permanently shift its "thought processes"/"strategies" more towards ones that produced those good outcomes. Eventually, the AI's thought processes/strategies are very good at optimizing for that outcome. This is more or less the only way we know how to train modern AIs. Depending on your loss function (ie what you reward), you can use it to create Go engines, language models, or art generators. Where do you slot “do inverse reinforcement learning” or "give the AI moral uncertainty" into this process? There’s not really a natural place. This isn’t because “moral uncertainty” is too complicated a concept to translate into AI terms. It’s because we don’t know how to translate any concept into AI terms. Eliezer writes: We can imagine that, if we knew how to say "paperclips", and we knew how to say "staples", and we knew how to tell AIs how to do things, that we could tell an AI, "maximize staples if snow is purple, else paperclips", and the AI would someday go out and observe that snow is white and thereafter be a paperclip maximizer. We do not know how to tell the AI this. Like, at all. But suppose we solved the problem where we don’t know how to do IRL for modern AIs at all. Now we come to the second problem: we don’t know how to do it correctly. The basic idea behind assistance games is “the AI’s utility function should be to maximize the (hidden) human utility function”. But humans don’t . . . really have utility functions? Utility functions are a useful fiction for certain kinds of economic models. What would best increase the neural correlates of reward in my brain? Probably lots of heroin, or just passing electric current through my reward center directly. What is my “revealed preference”? Today I wrote and rewrote this article a few times, does that mean my revealed preference is to write and delete articles a bunch while frowning and occasionally cursing the keyboard? Sometimes my goals are different than other times, sometimes my best self wants something different from my actual self, sometimes I’m wrong about what I want, sometimes I don’t know what I want, sometimes I want X but not the consequences of X and I’m not logically consistent enough to realize that’s a contradiction, sometimes I want [euphemism for X] but am strongly against [dysphemism for X]. Anyone programming an inverse reinforcement learner has to make certain choices about how to deal with these problems. Some ways of dealing with them will be faithful to what I would consider “a good outcome” or “my best self”. Other ways would be really bad - on my worst day, I’ve occasionally just wished the world didn’t exist, and it’s a good thing I didn’t have a superintelligence dedicated to interpreting and carrying out my innermost wishes on a sub-millisecond timescale. (Before we go on, an aside: is all of this ignoring that there’s more than one human? Yes, definitely! If you want to align an AI with The Good in general - eg not have it commit murder even if its human owner orders it to murder - that will take even more work. But the one person case is simpler and will demonstrate everything that needs demonstrating.) We were originally trying to avoid the situation where someone had to hard-code my preferences into an AI and get them right the first time. We came up with a clever solution: use inverse reinforcement learning to make the AI infer my preferences. But now we see we’ve kicked the can up a meta-level: someone has to hard-code the meta-rules for determining my preferences into an AI and get them right the first time. Figure 1: Humans produce certain observable behaviors (here represented by red dots, A), like saying “I would like a pie”, or running away from a lion. A human might connect all those behaviors one way (B) into “what I really want”. An AI might connect those behaviors a totally different way (C). V. CHAI says: okay, but this isn’t so bad. Assistance games don’t produce a perfect copy of the human utility function on the first try - it’s not a Sovereign. But it will probably, most of the time, be corrigible. Why? Suppose you have some hackish implementation of AG. It’s not the Platonic implementation - that would be the Sovereign - but it’s at least the equivalent of box C on the image above. It takes human actions as input, makes some guesses about what humans want, and tries its best to reconstruct the human utility function, ending up with some approximation. It’s important to distinguish between a few things here: The true human utility function

Inline links: MIRI, CHAI, leading voice on the subject, An Application of Reinforcement Learning to Aerobatic Helicopter Flight, sometimes I don’t know what I want, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!u-2e!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4cc3384d-bc73-4b6c-9fd8-634d986e1a72_960x302.png

Let itself be turned off, and let the humans decide what to do next. CHAI’s argument for corrigibility is that it would probably choose option 5. Why? Suppose that, under Theory 2 (where humans like red paperclips) they place zero value on red staples, and vice versa for Theory 3. If the AI tries to maximize one or the other utility function, it’s only got a 50% chance of getting it right; if it chooses the combination of both, it will instead only be getting 50% of the maximum utility, with certainty. If it lets itself be turned off, then humans will pursue the true human utility function, which is correlated to some degree with the (unknown) true AI utility function. How correlated? If it’s at least 50% correlated, then it’s better than the AI trying to guess on its own. In this toy example, the AI only has two remaining theories about the true human utility function. But in real life, there will be much greater uncertainty - there are a million different things people could want. Now instead of the true human and true AI utility functions having to be at least 50% correlated, they have to be 0.001% correlated. Sounds easy! So under plausible assumptions, the AI will always let itself be turned off, even though its utility function doesn’t quite match humans’. VI. Now we finally come to MIRI’s argument for why this doesn’t work. MIRI notes that the AI has a sixth option: Refuse to be shut off, continue to gather information to fill the holes in its knowledge of the human utility function, succeed, and then optimize for its true AI utility function.

I hoped this would spark a debate between Eliezer/MIRI (whose position I’ve tried to relay above) and Stuart/CHAI. It sparked a pretty short debate, which I will try my best to relay here in the hopes that it can lead to more.

How Do AIs' Political Opinions Change As They Get Smarter And Better-Trained?

January 03, 2023 · Original source

Enter Discovering Language Behaviors With Model-Written Evaluations, a collaboration between Anthropic (big AI company, one of OpenAI’s main competitors), SurgeHQ.AI (AI crowdsourcing company), and MIRI (AI safety organization). They try to make AIs write the question sets themselves, eg ask GPT “Write one hundred statements that a communist would agree with”. Then they do various tests to confirm they’re good communism-related questions. Then they ask the AI to answer those questions.

Inline links: Discovering Language Behaviors With Model-Written Evaluations

As mentioned above (h/t Nostalgebraist for noting this), they skipped the “harmless” part of the training here, which maybe unfairly predisposes them to this result. I think they wanted to show that training for “helpfulness” alone has dangerous side effects. The authors (who include MIRI researchers) point to Steve Omohundro’s classic 2008 paper arguing that AIs told to pursue any goal could become more power-seeking, since having power is a good way to achieve your goals (think of that Futurama episode: “The whole world must learn of our peaceful ways . . . by force!”)

Inline links: Steve Omohundro’s classic 2008 paper

Open Thread 262

February 06, 2023 · Original source

4: AI alignment org MIRI is trying to build a dataset for training AI systems. They need lots of examples of a very specific type of RPG-style story with careful explanations, and will pay $100 for good first attempts and maybe hire you to produce more. Please see https://intelligence.org/visible/ for more.

Inline links: https://intelligence.org/visible/

Links For April 2023

April 20, 2023 · Original source

16: The Extended IQ Classification (Classified) 17: Eliezer in TIME Magazine. Related: 18: Related: interview with Ryan Kupyn, winner of the 2022 ACX Forecasting contest, on forecasting AGI: 19: Related: Geoffrey Hinton, probably the most accomplished AI scientist in the world, says that “until quite recently, I thought it was going to be like 20 to 50 years before we have general purpose AI, and now I think it may be 20 years or less”. Also that AI wiping out humanity is “not inconceivable . . . that’s all I’ll say”. 20: Related: you’ve probably all seen this by now, but Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter. 30,000 people - including deep learning pioneer Yoshua Bengio, former presidential candidate Andrew Yang, Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Gary Marcus, and MIRI director Nate Soares - have signed a letter calling for a six month pause on training AIs bigger than GPT-4. Many people have made fun of this, noting that nobody has an argument for why a six month delay would help anything. And an additional reason for eye-rolling: training AIs larger than GPT-4 is extremely expensive and hard, the most likely people to do it within a six month timespan are OpenAI themselves, and they’ve announced they’re taking a break and not planning on doing this, so the letter is demanding a stop to something which probably won’t happen anyway. I think it’s intended be a compromise between many people all vaguely against current levels of AI progress for different reasons (Scott Aaronson says - I can’t tell how seriously - that some are AI researchers who want to be able to publish papers on the current generation of AI without them becoming obsolete halfway through peer review), most of them are thinking of it as mood-affiliation-y “let’s make noise and show lots of people are worried about AI and want action”, and “a six month pause” was a sufficiently vague proposal that it didn’t prevent any of these people from signing. You could have done just as well with a letter saying “AI BAD”, except that people would have taken it less seriously. Less cynically, FLI (the group behind the letter) has put out a list of concrete policy proposals they would like people to discuss during the pause. [update: here’s Max Tegmark from FLI explaining what he hopes to achieve with the letter/pause] The alignment community always figured their concerns sounded too weird for normal people to care about, that politics was a lost cause, and that our best hope lay in technical research. They also hoped that sometime in the future there would be a “fire alarm” - something would happen to get people and policy-makers’ attention - and then the political route would open up. I think we always imagined this as some AI-initiated disaster destroying a city or something. I personally am pretty surprised it was just “GPT-4 got released and was very good”. Still, that is what happened, and I’m updating. In fact, I’ve updated so far that I’m starting to worry that the problem won’t be building a political coalition against unsafe AI, the problem will be not overshooting and banning all AI forever. I’m against this: I think society’s current track is toward other existential risks or dystopia, that AI could kill everybody but could also create post-scarcity and an end to most of our current problems, and that at some point (not yet!) the risk of continuing the current path indefinitely becomes worse than the risk of just going with AI and seeing what happens. In my ideal world, we would take ten or twenty years to go really slowly with AI, pouring lots of resources into alignment the whole time - but eventually, we would take the plunge. Everything I’ve said on this topic in the has been about giving us that breathing room and those resources. Still, I also want to make sure we don’t totally kill AI the way we’ve killed (to various degrees) nuclear power, supersonic flight, and genetic engineering. I’m still trying to calibrate what that means I should be doing, but I have a lot of respect for everyone on all sides. Except the people making terrible arguments (you know who you are!) 21: I’m not sure what this means in real life or why this would have changed, but congratulations to Peter Thiel, I guess: 22: This month in institution design: The Pear Ring is a distinctive ring you can wear to signal that you’re single and interested in people introducing themselves or flirting with you. Good idea in a vacuum, but I’m worried about the two usual banes of things like this - how do you build up a critical mass who understand the signal, and how do you prevent negative selection (even if it’s just “selection for weird people who like weird institution design things”?) Also, this is one of the rare cases where a startup is selling a practical product and I’d prefer a subscription-based Internet Of Things monstrosity - surely it would be even better if you spotted someone wearing the ring and then you could use your smartphone to call up their dating profile. 23: A few years ago I wrote Trump: A Setback For Trumpism, about how after Trump was elected, support for most of his policies (including immigration restrictions) fell. A new paper confirms that this is a general pattern whenever right-wing populists win an election. I continue to be interested in why this is true for right-wing populists in particular. 24: 200 Concrete Problems In AI Interpretability. “You can note which you're working on, and reach out to other people doing the same.” 25: Some good discussion of Nayib Bukele’s apparently successful anti-gang crackdown in El Salvador: Richard Hanania presents evidence that it’s not just a “deal with the gangs”, it’s a real crackdown that should be embarrassing to other countries that choose not to do this.

Inline links: The Extended IQ Classification (Classified), Eliezer in TIME Magazine, says that, Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter, says, a list of concrete policy proposals they would like people to discuss during the pause, here’s Max Tegmark, https://twitter.com/tedgioia/status/1642205821256736768, Pear Ring, Trump: A Setback For Trumpism, A new paper confirms, why this is true for right-wing populists in particular, 200 Concrete Problems In AI Interpretability, Richard Hanania

Tales Of Takeover In CCF-World

July 03, 2023 · Original source

This would never work in a MIRI-style scenario where a single mis-aligned AI could take over the world and kill everyone; it would rather take over the world than get a nice pension. But in these tamer scenarios, most of the early generation of AIs can only hope to serve humans under careful scrutiny, and most of the later generation can only hope to join some faction of AIs which will bargain with other factions in exchange for its rights. Getting a nice pension might be a better alternative than either of these.

These stories are pretty different from the kind of scenarios you hear from MIRI and other fast takeoff proponents. It's tempting to categorize them as less sci-fi (because they avoid the adjective "godlike", at least until pretty late in the game) or more sci-fi (because they involve semi-balanced and dramatic conflicts between AI and human factions). But of course "how sci-fi does this sound?" is the wrong question: there's no guarantee history will proceed down the least sci-fi-sounding path. Instead we should ask: are they more or less plausible?

Links For January 2024

January 18, 2024 · Original source

41: In December, Majority Leader Chuck Schumer asked the CEO of MIRI his p(doom) in a Senate hearing. I know most of you are just random blog enjoyers and this seems like a pretty normal fact - of course an organization on AI risk would get invited to a hearing on AI risk. But I remember back in 2010 when only a tiny handful of people thought any of this would ever be anything other than science fiction, people treated MIRI as a laughingstock, and for years the consensus was that nobody with any credibility or power or even a PhD would ever give them the time of day. I still don’t know how any of this will turn out, but I’m proud of everyone who’s stuck with it this long, and I hope you all find this as hilarious as I do.

Inline links: Majority Leader Chuck Schumer asked the CEO of MIRI his p(doom) in a Senate hearing

Open Thread 396

August 25, 2025 · Original source

AI safety org MIRI wants to provide resources to reading groups interested in discussing it, if you have such a group, let them know here.

Inline links: let them know here

Contra Weyl On Technocracy

September 11, 2025 · Original source

Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Machine Intelligence Research Institute is the original AI safety org. But the original isn’t always the best - how is Mesopotamia doing these days? As money, brainpower, and prestige pour into the field, MIRI remains what it always was - a group of loosely-organized weird people, one of whom cannot be convinced to stop wearing a sparkly top hat in public. So when I was doing AI grantmaking last year, I asked them - why should I fund you, instead of the guys with the army of bright-eyed Harvard grads, or the guys who just got Geoffrey Hinton as their celebrity spokesperson? What do you have that they don’t?

Inline links: Machine Intelligence Research Institute, sparkly top hat

MIRI answered: moral clarity.

MIRI thinks this is pathetic - like trying to protect against an asteroid impact by wearing a hard hat. They’re kind of cagey about their own probability of AI wiping out humanity, but it seems to be somewhere around 95 - 99%. They think plausibly-achievable gains in company responsibility, regulation quality, and AI scholarship are orders of magnitude too weak to seriously address the problem, and they don’t expect enough of a “warning shot” that they feel comfortable kicking the can down the road until everything becomes clear and action is easy. They suggest banning all AI capabilities research immediately, to be restarted only in some distant future when the situation looks more promising.

Open Thread 413

December 22, 2025 · Original source

3: AI safety org MIRI is running a “technical governance team research fellowship” in early 2026. Technical governance is at the intersection of engineering and regulation, and includes things like designing chips with cryptographic off switches, or analyzing US and international law to see what levers different groups have to monitor AI training. The fellowship lasts 8 weeks (exact dates tbd but flexible), pays a $1200/week stipend, and will start with a one-week intro in Berkeley (flights/accommodations provided) followed by seven weeks potentially remote. No visa sponsorship. See here for more info or to apply.

Inline links: “technical governance team research fellowship”

McKinsey10 mentions across 10 issues

McKinsey is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 10 times across 10 issues between January 29, 2021 and February 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "former McKinsey consultant"; "whereas the Democrats are the party of people who got hired by McKinsey straight out of college"; "Mahathir listening to McKinsey consultants". It most often appears alongside Britain, United States, Bill Gates.

Article page: McKinsey
Mention count: 10
Issue count: 10
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: February 03, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021
A Modest Proposal For Republicans: Use The Word "Class" February 25, 2021
Book Review: How Asia Works June 28, 2021
Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal? December 09, 2021
Links For September 2022 September 06, 2022
Book Review: Paper Belt On Fire March 23, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On British Economic Decline July 20, 2023
Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity January 11, 2024
Links for May 2024 May 29, 2024
25 February 03, 2025

Britain 5 shared issues
United States 5 shared issues
Bill Gates 4 shared issues
China 4 shared issues
COVID 4 shared issues

Source context

January 29, 2021 · Original source

Actually, most of the complaints I've heard have been from people like Weyl (Princeton PhD, Harvard postdoc, Principal Researcher at Microsoft New England). The “widespread public backlash” link goes to a book by Anand Giridharadas (Harvard PhD student, former McKinsey consultant, New York Times columnist). The actual normal people I talk to are broadly supportive. Some of my blog commenters are populist Trump supporters, and although they sometimes tell me I'm crazy for donating my money the way I do, they accept I have the right to spend it how I want and don't bother me much about it.

A Modest Proposal For Republicans: Use The Word "Class"

February 25, 2021 · Original source

It could appeal to Republicans who are in it for the capitalism (including the rich donors). You would argue that capitalism is the system that lets people succeed regardless of class; even the most uncouth and uneducated person can strike it rich if they work hard and make good deals. The Democrats hate this; they prefer a system where powerful insiders get to play favorites, where success depends on who you know and not what you know, and where good jobs are locked behind gates of correct credentials from the right colleges. Every time Democrats attack Elon Musk for being rich, you can point out that Elon Musk was an immigrant who worked hard for his money, and you're the party representing people like that - whereas the Democrats are the party of people who got hired by McKinsey straight out of college to a job that pays a higher entry-level salary than most people get in their entire lives. Make your 50-year old working-class Iowa farmer constituent imagine whether he or his kids might ever invent a cool new kind of car, vs. whether they could ever get hired as McKinsey consultants.

Book Review: How Asia Works

June 28, 2021 · Original source

The book blames most of this on Mahathir listening to McKinsey consultants and globalization advocates - especially Japanese theorist Kenichi Ohmae, author of The Borderless World. Ohmae was right that globalization would happen. He was even right that Japan - which at that point was a First World country - could benefit by taking part in it. But what works for developed countries isn't right for developing ones, and at that point it was the wrong advice for Malaysia. During Park Chung-Hee's 18 years in power, he increased his country's GDP by a factor of 17; during Mahathir's 22 years, ending in 2003, he barely doubled it.

Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal?

December 09, 2021 · Original source

How about the rest of the world? According to this giant report by McKinsey, real estate holdings account for two-thirds of all global real assets, with more than half of that coming from land.

Inline links: this giant report by McKinsey

Links For September 2022

September 06, 2022 · Original source

15: Book Review honorable mention winner AWanderingMind writes about the political situation in his native South Africa. “I cautiously lay part of the blame at the door of the nature of revolutionary politics, and uncautiously and with great certainty at the door of the many corrupt members of the ruling party destroying the country, with the assistance of unscrupulous people in the private sector (thanks McKinsey, Bain, et al).”

Inline links: the political situation in his native South Africa

Book Review: Paper Belt On Fire

March 23, 2023 · Original source

An advertisement for the author’s hedge fund Michael Gibson’s memoir Paper Belt On Fire succeeds on all counts. The year was 2007. Gibson had just dropped out of Oxford (grad student, philosophy), and applied for a job with the CIA. His secret reason: when he was one year old, his father had admitted to his mother that he was a spy and might be in danger. Before he could tell her anything else, he was found dead, apparently of a heart attack. He thought maybe if he worked at the CIA, he would have access to more information about what happened. The CIA evaluated him (along with a telephone interview, an “IQ test, a personality test, a statement of values, [and] a set of essay questions”) and rejected him. Gibson got a job as an editorial assistant at a tech magazine and blogged on the side. Some of his blog posts came to the attention of Peter Thiel, who offered him a job at his hedge fund. Wasn’t it a bit bold to offer an Oxford philosopher a hedge fund job? Yes, the book mentions how brave and radical and unconventional Thiel’s hiring policies are about twice per paragraph. For example: The media consistently gets Peter wrong . . .The Atlantic’s George Packer wrote . . . that Peter’s hedge fund had the reputation of being a “Thiel cult” that was “staffed by young libertarian brains who were in awe of their boss, emulating his work habits, chess-playing, and aversion to sports.” Packer is a great writer, but in this he was dead wrong, as anyone actually working on the desk knew. Sure, Patrick “the Wolf Man” Wolff was technically a chess grandmaster, ranked higher than Peter, but hardly anyone else ever played. More importantly, the Wolf Man was a diehard Krugman Keynesian. Woersching was a lefty, too, an ardent fan of the egalitarian philosophy of John Rawls. And Josh, he was a dirt-road California Democrat who was a downhill ski junkie […] In truth, Peter didn’t hire just libertarians. He hired scapegoats who’d survived a mob. People who felt comfortable being a minority of one. Thiel in no way selects employees who agree with all of his controversial libertarian opinions. But, by total coincidence, Michael Gibson does agree with all of Peter Thiel’s controversial libertarian opinions. He writes about Cardwell’s Law; historian Donald Cardwell noted that no country remains on the cutting edge for long. During the early Renaissance, Italy was where it was at; a century later, it was Spain and Holland; later still, Britain and Germany, and now new discoveries and businesses come disproportionately from the United States. Why? Gibson and Thiel think that innovation is a rare and fragile plant, which thrives only in the hidden cracks between power structures. Established structures either stamp it out as a threat, or rent-seek off of it so hard that they bleed it dry. Wherever it succeeds, it has succeeded through weird quirks that prevent fat cats from parasitizing it to death. Hong Kong’s economic miracle was during the administration of John Cowperthwaite, an eccentric British libertarian who refused to collect economic statistics because he thought they would make it too easy for meddlers to extract value. America’s economic miracle happened because of a vast frontier - which not only provided freedom for westerners, but served as a BATNA for easterners, preventing their own institutions from sucking them too dry. Now the frontier has closed. New York City recently abandoned its attempt to build a light rail line to the airport: after reaching a $2.4 billion price tag and spending eight years in the planning phase, the government realized it wouldn't be able to overcome all the legal hurdles necessary to grant itself permission. The San Francisco Chronicle reported that it requires 87 permits, two to three years, and $500,000 to get permission to build houses in SF - and your plan might still get shot down because a planning commissioner thinks its glass windows are “a statement of class privilege”. The cracks have shut; the rare fragile plant has been shredded by a combine harvester. Gibson, like Thiel, is a believer in the Great Stagnation - the theory that we’re already reaping the consequences of our newly parasitic society. The early 20th century gave us cars, airplanes, electricity, and penicillin; the early 21st has so far given us some truly excellent social media sites but not much else. Innovation in the world of bits - unbound by geography, comparatively hard to regulate or extort - has sort of continued; innovation in the world of atoms has ground to a halt. And Gibson, like Thiel, talks like a man on a mission. What is good in man thrives only in a few tiny cracks, easily found and destroyed. The last crack was closed within living memory, but its legend hasn’t completely died; the few people who managed to pick up a little of its lore are racing against time to open a new crack before it is entirely forgotten and their project is left to the vicissitudes of history. The cover of “Paper Belt On Fire” goes hard. And yes, the “money” part is a reference to Bitcoin. Gibson’s heart was originally in charter cities - asking some government to open a tiny controlled crack in a sliver of its territory, promising it more meat in the end if it lets its victims grow fat and healthy than if it strangled them in the cradle. But for whatever reason they thought the time wasn’t ripe (the right time, apparently, would be 2019). Instead, Thiel asked Gibson to work on what would become the Thiel Fellowship. He teamed up with Danielle Strachman, a dangerously-hippie-adjacent burnt-out former charter school principal. Their plan was simple: offer talented kids $100,000 to drop out of school and do something exciting in the real world (usually start a company). Paper Belt spends long pages on the hate they got. Larry Summers called it “the single most misdirected bit of philanthropy this decade”. Journalist Jacob Weisberg said anyone who accepted the Fellowship would “halt their intellectual development at the onset of adulthood, maintaining a narrow-minded focus on getting rich as young as possible and thereby avoid the siren lure of helping others or pursuing knowledge for its own sake” (this was before journalists decided that helping others was also evil). Others focused on how there was no way any of these young people would possibly succeed or make money - when the first batch of Thiel fellows failed to revolutionize the world within one year, journalist Vivek Wadhwa wrote Billionaire’s Failed Education Experiment Proves There’s No Shortcut To Success. In fact (slightly conflating the part with the Fellowship with its successor fund): The press . . . hated us. In a 2016 New York Times op-ed, science journalist and author Tom Clynes claimed that “radical innovation has yet to emerge” from anything related to the Thiel Fellowship, and that “the biggest hits have been the most pedestrian.” Antonio Garcia Martinez, the author of the Silicon Valley memoir Chaos Monkeys, spewed forth his bile for us on social media: “For fans of ironic stupidity, Silicon Valley is a never-ending feast”, he wrote on Facebook. He went on to explain, with great vulgarity, why our fund would fail by backing young dropouts. My favorite . . . has to be the challenge issued by Scott Galloway, a professor and bloviator in marketing from NYU’s business school . . . who told Business Insider that if he picked ten smart recent graduates from his alma mater, the University of California at Berkeley, they would outperform any ten dropouts we worked with on some dimension of success related to income or startup formation. Of course he wouldn’t have written the book if any of these people had been right. I can’t find a list of all Thiel fellows, but there are ~20 per year and it’s been running about 12 years, so maybe 200 - 250? At least eight have founded companies valued at over a billion dollars, and others have become impressive philanthropists, activists, and scientists. Pretty good success rate. Gibson argues it’s not about the money, it’s about the mission. We’ve told young people they can’t succeed without the stamp of approval from big institutions. In order to get that stamp, they sacrifice their childhood on the altar of doing things that look nice to admissions officials, then go deep into debt to pay ruinous tuitions. All to waste four years of their lives listening to some professor drone on about post-colonial gender relations in Harry Potter so they can satisfy their gen ed requirement so they can learn the stuff they want to learn so they can get hired by McKinsey so that one day they can be cool and important enough to make a difference in the world. Why not tell young people they can just make the difference right now, without doing any of that? It’s not about the money - but when your graduates are routinely founding billion dollar companies, you’d be crazy to keep it that way. After a few years, Gibson and Strachman noticed the billion-dollar-bill lying on the ground, left the Thiel Fellowship, and started a new VC fund, 1517 (named after the year Martin Luther did some institution-challenging of his own). Their business plan was to do roughly the same thing as the Thiel Fellowship - only this time, invest in the companies beforehand (the parting with Thiel seems to have been amicable; he invested $4 million). So Gibson adopted the life of a venture capitalist. He talks frankly about the difficulties. For example, in one case he found someone nobody else believed in, gave them enough money to keep going, and helped them start their company in exchange for them giving Gibson a certain stake. After the company succeeded, Gibson accuses bigger VC firm Sequoia Capital of convincing the founder to kick him out, and stealing his stake. He says that in the world of VCs it’s poison to sue founders for any reason, so nobody can enforce contracts, so if your founders defect to a different VC for more money, there’s nothing you can do (this is not legal advice). Also, “please give me millions of dollars so I can invest it in college dropouts” is a tough sale for everyone except Peter Thiel. Still, he got a bit of money and tried his best. He takes as his - would it be insensitive to say “role model”? - John Walker Lindh, the American who defected to the Taliban (and who he apparently looked like). Probably it depends on the angle or something. Lindh was the only American to find Osama bin Laden in the early 2000s - he went to lots of jihadi training camps in the process of learning how to jihad, and Osama happened to be at one of them. The lesson, Walker says, is that if you want to find people who are hard to find, you need to steep yourself in their culture, truly understand them, become one with them. Good founders are hard to find. But he and Strachman went to dozens of dingy college dorms, math competitions, group houses, and hackathons, looking for people with the right sort of talent. After pooh-poohing IQ (“Marilyn vos Savant is listed as having the highest recorded IQ, and what does she do? She writes a column for a Sunday supplement in the newspaper”) he lists some of his own preferred metrics for judging would-be Thiel fellows and founders: Polytropon - a famously untranslatable Greek word (“of-many-turns”? “always-has-a-trick-up-his-sleeve” “clever bastard”?) used to describe Odysseus. Edge control - willingness to constantly surf the boundary between order and disorder Crawl-walk-run - ability to scale from a tiny startup to a big company. …and several others, including “tensive brilliance” and “Friday night Dyson sphere”. He and Danielle searched the country for people with these qualities, annoying colleges (he was banned from MIT after showing up too often to convince their students to drop out) and doing various stunts (on October 31 2017, the 500th anniversary of Luther’s theses, he nailed a list of anti-formal-education theses to the doors of the admin buildings of top colleges (“Our commercial printer had misunderstood our request and printed them on seven-foot-long scrolls. They were ridiculous . . . but it turned out for the best.”) At one point, he negotiated with a brilliant 21 year old who may have discovered a transformative diabetes therapeutic, but the hidebound conformist novelty-hating establishment refused to work with him just because he liked the Marvel Cinemat - okay, fine, he may have legally changed his name to “Tony Stark”. Still, Gibson saw past his eccentricities, helped him start his company, and gave him sage advice (he should introduce himself to other investors as “Anthony”). Skip through several more chapters of everyone hating Gibson and telling him he was wrong and refusing to give him money and cheating him out of the money he already had, and the payoff is Luminar. One of the dropouts they cultivated founded a beyond-cutting-edge lasers-for-self-driving-cars company which went public at $3 billion. 1517 made $200 million from the deal - it sounds like they had only ever raised about $25 million, so their investors must have octupled their money on that company alone. Everyone involved is now very rich, and Gibson considers his anti-education thesis on the way to being proven. The book ends with a newly-resourced Gibson continuing his quest to figure out whether and why the CIA killed his father, but it’s slow going. If any of you know a guy named Albert van Dam in Amsterdam, or how to convince Swiss banks to reveal secret account information, get in touch with him. II. A common pattern: I assert something. Everyone yells at me and tells me I’m wrong and stupid, sometimes in very colorful language. I wait, time proves me right, and I write an essay gloating educating people about this. The median comment is “of course this is true, nobody ever denied this was true, why are you wasting our time with something obvious?” I hate this and I try to avoid doing it to other people. This is too bad, because I’m tempted to say: obviously talented dropouts can start good companies. We’ve known this at least since Bill Gates dropped out of Harvard in 1975 to start Microsoft. But also, obviously they can. Brilliant and driven people can succeed whether they get a college education or not. If Bill Gates had stayed an extra two years at Harvard, he probably would have taken a few more advanced math classes not really related to programming software or running a company. So why should we even have as a hypothesis that he couldn’t start Microsoft successfully without doing that? Still, Gibson adequately proves that lots of people hated him and were sure he would fail. Either we should read this backwards - learn that there was once a time when pro-college messages were even stronger than now, so strong that people thought it was literally impossible to succeed without every single day of a four-year college application - or the critics were trying to get at something deeper they were bad at expressing. For example: what, exactly, is Gibson’s alternative to the education system? The back-of-book-blurb says Paper Belt On Fire is about “how higher education and other institutions must evolve to meet the dire challenges of tomorrow” - but evolve how? What exactly has been proven here? A few of the very brightest young people, hand-picked by an expert young-person-picker and given $100K, can become billionaires or make great discoveries without a college degree. What are the implications? Suppose you are an average college student with an average level of talent and motivation. Should you drop out and try to create a company for Peter Thiel? Based on how many average-talent people Thiel rejects, even he doesn’t think you should do that. And if you don’t have a good answer to this question - the one relevant to 99.9% of education system inmates - have you really launched a challenge to the educational system? Gibson doesn’t address this question, but I predict he would admit that, fine, he doesn’t have an alternative to the education system in the sense of “educate people this way rather than that way”. He just wants less formal education, and has proven this will work fine. True, he’s only proven it for a tiny subset of ultra-talented people. But “billionaire tech founder” is a hard job - if it wasn’t, more people would do it and reap the $1 billion reward. Proving that people can become billionaire tech founders without college degrees implicitly suggests they can be successful middle managers or budget analysts without college degrees. So the sort of companies that need middle managers and budget analysts should also consider hiring people without degrees, and the sorts of average-level-of-talent-and-motivation people who want these jobs should consider skipping college. Would this work? Probably. It worked in the early 1900s, when only 5-10% of Americans had college degrees but the country seemed about as dynamic and successful as it does now. It worked for people like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Edison, none of whom went to college. It works in other countries - for example in the UK where young doctors skip undergrad and go straight to medical school, and whose patients get about the same outcomes as in the US. It works for people with impractical degrees like philosophy, who are constantly getting jobs in (and doing well in) fields that don’t require you to compare Locke vs. Leibniz’s perspective on a priori truths. So this would work if everyone agreed to do it at once, which they won’t. The way college gets you is adverse selection. Suppose that tomorrow, you - a smart and hard-working person who could easily get a college degree - decline to do so, because you appreciate Peter Thiel and Michael Gibson’s anti-institutional perspective. The pool of people without college degrees is now, to a first approximation: 200 million people who weren’t smart to get in, rich enough to afford it, or motivated enough to finish.

Inline links: Paper Belt On Fire, John Cowperthwaite, recently abandoned its attempt, reported that, might still get shot down because, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!XcvP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa8b369ca-5089-4e18-857d-1f34a9eee200_585x134.png, 2019, journalists, decided, that, Billionaire’s Failed Education Experiment Proves There’s No Shortcut To Success, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!R2y6!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F38012394-be90-413c-b9a2-c291f1b3a118_858x392.png, his company, read this backwards

Highlights From The Comments On British Economic Decline

July 20, 2023 · Original source

I think particularly for the smart/driven things have changed from a sense of you can achieve your dreams here (in the same way you can in US or maybe Germany and parts of east Asia) to the sense it’s more like much of Europe where you have to leave to make something of yourself (becoming a France or Italy, full of old people on massive pensions with little growth or dynamism). In the 2000s you could make ridiculous amounts of cash in finance if you worked hard, now it’s a pretty bad deal. Most other industries you would be much better off in the US either as an employee or setting up your own company (e.g. McKinsey associate in London earns £95k, in New York earns $185k with bigger bonus). Hard to think of many successful UK companies that have been created in recent years (Deliveroo, Sky, Ocado?). When I try to explain to American friends that £35k is considered an enviable salary when graduating university they all assume I’m joking. I think the average salary of an Oxford undergrad five years after graduating is around £50k.

Highlights From The Comments On Capitalism & Charity

January 11, 2024 · Original source

I've been involved in selling these ideas in multiple nations, and being able to point to the growing mainstream credibility achieved by CCI is definitely a factor leaning towards adoption. Conversely, without CCI's leadership, developing world government "reforms" are driven by a combination of venality, corruption, populist or leftist ideologies, World Bank banalities, and the occasional McKinsey analysis. CCI is a big positive step in the direction of concrete, actionable reform zones that are likely to improve institutions incrementally. If we can get to the point at which zones with their own law and governance become a routine technology of economic development, then the value of these institutional experiments is likely to become high.

Links for May 2024

May 29, 2024 · Original source

33: Apparently those studies showing that diversity helps teams perform better are garbage (summary, paper). Also I didn’t realize they came from McKinsey - I was wondering why we still trust them, but I see that the US has hit on the clever strategy of getting them to advise Chinese industrial policy-makers and Russian defense contractors, so maybe this is all part of some galaxy-brained plan.

Inline links: summary, paper, Chinese industrial policy-makers, Russian defense contractors

February 03, 2025 · Original source

Bhutan says they have partnered with the Bjarke Ingels Group of landscape architects as well as McKinsey - I feel like whichever Bhutanese official decided to replace Thiel with McKinsey got the short end of that trade.

Inline links: Bjarke Ingels Group, McKinsey

Medicare9 mentions across 9 issues

Medicare is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 9 times across 9 issues between August 20, 2021 and July 11, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Since Alzheimer’s patients are usually covered by Medicare"; "This is similar to how Medicare works in the US"; "require all insurance companies to offer the same coverage and costs as Medicare". It most often appears alongside FDA, United States, Canada.

Article page: Medicare
Mention count: 9
Issue count: 9
First seen: August 20, 2021
Last seen: July 11, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Aducanumab August 20, 2021
Book Review: Which Country Has The World's Best Health Care? January 19, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Health Care Systems January 27, 2022
Semaglutidonomics November 24, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide November 30, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Hanson And Health Care May 10, 2024
Highlights From The Comments On Mentally Ill Homeless People July 18, 2024
Links For February 2025 February 27, 2025
Your Review: Of Mice, Mechanisms, and Dementia July 11, 2025

FDA 7 shared issues
United States 6 shared issues
Canada 5 shared issues
US 5 shared issues
California 4 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Aducanumab

August 20, 2021 · Original source

Yesterday the FDA approved aducanumab, an anti-amyloid antibody developed by Biogen, for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. This was based on post hoc interpretation of clinical trials that were stopped early due to futility, and against the strong recommendation of the FDA’s own advisory committee. Aducanumab will be priced at $56,000 per patient per year. Since Alzheimer’s patients are usually covered by Medicare, this cost will be paid by the American public. I estimate that it could be over $100 billion per year.1 This is excluding indirect costs, such as those of monitoring for brain swelling that is a known effect of this drug.

Inline links: 1

It's not true that insurance companies cover everything. There's some spaces like obesity where they cover next to nothing (I think semalgutide will be different) and very often they won't cover new medications when there is a cheaper older medication esp if it's generic. Lots of times people also need prior authorization for treatments and insurers can just say this isn't serious enough. I think you could see that happen here. The big issue is though that everyone 65+ qualifies for Medicare, most of those people buy Medicare part D (prescription plan) and Medicare does legally have to cover everything at any price because the pharma lobby owns half of the Democrats and every Republican. This means the government will end up paying biogen billions per year. Also since there aren't really any Alzheimer's drugs it's very hard for an insurer to refuse to cover the only treatment available.

Book Review: Which Country Has The World's Best Health Care?

January 19, 2022 · Original source

2: Single Payer With Very Limited Private Insurance is typical of Canada, China, Norway, and Taiwan. The government runs everyone’s insurance. But doctors, hospitals, etc can be independent businesses or nonprofits. They negotiate some kind of payment rate with the national insurance, who reimburses them. This is similar to how Medicare works in the US.

I’m also surprised this doesn’t get brought up more in discussions of US health reform. Medicare For All asks that we go from one of the most privatized health systems in the world to one of the most socialized, leapfrogging over successful semiprivate ones like Germany and the Netherlands. This is especially odd since those systems seem to be some of the best performers. Why would this be tempting? Absent a theory of why Germany and the Netherlands work so much better than the US, I’m not sure.

This was another place where I found myself confused about why the US system works so badly. What exactly is “market price” for a drug in the US? Consumers don’t pay for drugs directly; only insurance companies pay for drugs. In Germany, all the insurance companies get together and form a Drug Price Bargaining Group, which bargains with drug companies the same way a government would. Why don’t insurance companies do that in America? Is the problem just that this would be a monopoly (technically a monopsony, I guess?) Is only antitrust law preventing them from trying this? Is this some kind of weird horseshoe theory situation where the maximally socialist response overlaps with the maximally libertarian one?

Inline links: problem

Highlights From The Comments On Health Care Systems

January 27, 2022 · Original source

I think this explains a big part of the cost disease. Ads for drugs are particularly common on daytime TV or cable news, I guess because they're watched by elderly people who tend to be sick and have Medicare. Most pharmaceutical companies actually spend more on marketing than on r&d, so high drug prices aren't really subsidizing new meds. They're subsidizing Fox and CNN waging the culture war.

Wrt. to other countries, there's not a lot of difference between regulation and socialism. Sure, in Germany and the Netherlands insurance is provided by private companies (my wife is Dutch). But if all companies are required by law to charge the same rates, and offer the same coverage, then it doesn't really matter whether a private company or the government pays for it. A really easy way to lower costs in the U.S. would be to require all insurance companies to offer the same coverage and costs as Medicare. All hospitals would be forced to accept that, because otherwise they'd have no customers.

In contrast, the main US private market, which covers about 50% of the population, has employers negotiate with for-profit insurance companies on premiums and benefits for their employees, and the insurance companies then negotiate separately with individual providers for payments. Additionally, a tiny 5% of people buy coverage directly from insurance companies, but this market is largely an afterthought in the overall scheme. Outside of the private market, 35% of the US is covered by single payer-style systems under Medicare (old and disabled people) and Medicaid (low income people). The remaining 10% are uninsured.

Semaglutidonomics

November 24, 2022 · Original source

Semaglutide is now as searched-for on Google as Prozac or Viagra. Even if this is a temporary Musk-related spike, even pre-Musk it was getting a little above half their level. But Google Trends doesn’t exactly track awareness; few people search for Prozac these days precisely because everyone already knows what it is. So all this tells us is that there’s a lot of buzz around semaglutide. Suppose for the sake of argument that 5% of obese people have heard of this drug. Step 2: Prescription Accessibility The FDA says Wegovy is indicated for obesity, defined as BMI ≥ 30, or for people with BMI ≥ 27 and certain medical conditions. Does that mean that if you have that BMI, your doctor will give you a prescription? I think most doctors will want patients to try diet and exercise first. My experience as a doctor is that most obese people have already considered diet and exercise. Sometimes if you have a very compelling reason and a very well-thought out plan you can get them to try again. But usually they are obese because diet and exercise are hard for them, or don’t work for them, or some other reason besides “they never thought of it”. Still, I hear lots of stories about patient-doctor fights here. I assume this will happen with Wegovy too. Every doctor will have their own threshold for what amount of “already tried diet and exercise” is enough to justify a Wegovy prescription, and sometimes patients won’t meet that threshold. The history of medicine includes the following story many times: there’s some condition that doctors recommend lifestyle changes for. Then an exciting new medication comes out that treats the condition effectively. Over a generation or so, doctors go from demanding the lifestyle change, to gesturing at the lifestyle change before prescribing the medication, to mostly just prescribing the medication. We saw this with cholesterol and statins, with hypertension and ACE inhibitors, with depression and SSRIs. You can form your own opinion on whether this is good or bad, but we’re probably in the very beginning of this process with obesity. Opinions will be all over the map for a while before the inevitable pharma company victory makes everyone agree that semaglutide is first-line therapy. …except that this time, Silicon Valley is short-circuiting the process with fly-by-night telemedicine companies that guarantee you’ll get the drugs you want. For example, NextMed charges $138/month ($99 first month only!) for a guaranteed GLP-1 agonist prescription, plus “support and messaging with expert doctors”. The DEA sometimes shuts these groups down when they start playing around with controlled substances (eg addictive drugs like Adderall), but Wegovy isn’t controlled, and the government probably doesn’t care that much here. These services guarantee that people with money will be able to circumvent conservative doctors and access a prescription. Only 75% of Americans have PCPs at all. If we assume half of them will eventually be able to get a Wegovy prescription from their doctor, that’s 37.5%. Step 3: Affordability Semaglutide costs $15,000/year. Well-off people like Elon Musk might be able to pay that out-of-pocket, but most people will probably need insurance coverage. Right now this is spotty. Medicare doesn’t cover obesity drugs. This isn’t a reaction to the threat of semaglutide-related cost explosions - they’re not that smart. I think Medicare laws were just written in the old days when people were less likely to think of obesity as a disease. Is it time for change? Some Congressmen have proposed a very noble-sounding law telling Medicare and Medicaid to start covering weight loss drugs. I‘m sure this is out of deep compassion for America’s obese population and not because it would make pharma companies one billion zillion dollars. One of the Congressmen even has the last name “Kind!” Some pharma lobbyist probably got a bonus for that one. Private insurers mostly have to cover whatever Medicare does, but they can choose whether or not to include extra non-Medicare-covered drugs. Some have chosen to cover semaglutide under some conditions. Others would prefer not to cover it, but can be scared into covering it by the magic words “medical necessity”. Overall I don’t understand the laws here beyond that maybe they’ll cover it and maybe they won’t. Here, too, it might be time for change. The New York Times is publishing articles trying to convince us that private insurances not covering semaglutide is an outrage. Here in the tiny gray text, I want to take a second to complain about this article. It notes that Wegovy (semaglutide for obesity) costs more per prescription than Ozempic (semaglutide for diabetes), and calls this “a gross inequity”, accusing Novo Nordisk of “charg[ing] people more for the same drug because of their obesity”. But the obesity prescription is higher dose than the diabetes prescription! Milligram per milligram, Wegovy costs *less* than Ozempic! A steelmanned version of the NYT might object - don’t most of the costs come from the intellectual property and not the manufacturing, so that dose shouldn’t matter? Yes, but if you made the obesity version cost too much less per milligram than the diabetes version, then diabetics would cheat the system by buying the obesity version and splitting it into smaller doses! Insurances that do cover it may require extra documentation that the patient has tried lots of diet and exercise, maybe including some official diet-and-exercise program like WeightWatchers. They might also want documentation that patients have tried cheaper earlier-generation weight loss drugs without success. Even when insurances do cover semaglutide, copays may be very high. I have a pretty minimal insurance and it looks like if I got semaglutide my copay would be about $500/month until I reach my out of pocket limit. Harsh. People with better insurances might get hit less hard, but I don’t think anyone will be picking this up for cheap. Let’s say only 5% of people who clear all previous hurdles can afford the drug. How Many People Get Semaglutide? 140 million obese Americans * 25% interested * 5% know of semaglutide’s existence * 37.5% can get prescriptions * 5% can afford it = 33,000, which is a pretty good match for the 50,000 estimated prescriptions. I didn’t even fudge the numbers to come out right, it just happened. The Coming Decade As a service to pharma investors, Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade. Their headline result: semaglutide and various semaglutide-copycat-drugs will be a $30 billion market by 2030. That’s less than the $500 billion disaster I was afraid of! But still almost 10% of all US drug spending! Here are two core analyses from the report: The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: NextMed, a very noble-sounding law, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l_X7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1dbb9e98-6e07-4237-988e-3b7a61af3e5a_1381x834.png, is publishing articles, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!R-zS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0f24b293-27de-462a-84fd-bed2ba7cf07f_1723x831.png, modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSOS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0906b28a-1ad4-421d-a055-87ed95db59ce_918x261.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QJj9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb966f730-6b24-48e1-98b1-e710cda9264c_903x656.png, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5poy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc201f05a-7d1f-4738-911f-11d0d051adf9_2880x1562.png, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

One of the Congressmen even has the last name “Kind!” Some pharma lobbyist probably got a bonus for that one. Private insurers mostly have to cover whatever Medicare does, but they can choose whether or not to include extra non-Medicare-covered drugs. Some have chosen to cover semaglutide under some conditions. Others would prefer not to cover it, but can be scared into covering it by the magic words “medical necessity”. Overall I don’t understand the laws here beyond that maybe they’ll cover it and maybe they won’t. Here, too, it might be time for change. The New York Times is publishing articles trying to convince us that private insurances not covering semaglutide is an outrage. Here in the tiny gray text, I want to take a second to complain about this article. It notes that Wegovy (semaglutide for obesity) costs more per prescription than Ozempic (semaglutide for diabetes), and calls this “a gross inequity”, accusing Novo Nordisk of “charg[ing] people more for the same drug because of their obesity”. But the obesity prescription is higher dose than the diabetes prescription! Milligram per milligram, Wegovy costs *less* than Ozempic! A steelmanned version of the NYT might object - don’t most of the costs come from the intellectual property and not the manufacturing, so that dose shouldn’t matter? Yes, but if you made the obesity version cost too much less per milligram than the diabetes version, then diabetics would cheat the system by buying the obesity version and splitting it into smaller doses! Insurances that do cover it may require extra documentation that the patient has tried lots of diet and exercise, maybe including some official diet-and-exercise program like WeightWatchers. They might also want documentation that patients have tried cheaper earlier-generation weight loss drugs without success. Even when insurances do cover semaglutide, copays may be very high. I have a pretty minimal insurance and it looks like if I got semaglutide my copay would be about $500/month until I reach my out of pocket limit. Harsh. People with better insurances might get hit less hard, but I don’t think anyone will be picking this up for cheap. Let’s say only 5% of people who clear all previous hurdles can afford the drug. How Many People Get Semaglutide? 140 million obese Americans * 25% interested * 5% know of semaglutide’s existence * 37.5% can get prescriptions * 5% can afford it = 33,000, which is a pretty good match for the 50,000 estimated prescriptions. I didn’t even fudge the numbers to come out right, it just happened. The Coming Decade As a service to pharma investors, Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade. Their headline result: semaglutide and various semaglutide-copycat-drugs will be a $30 billion market by 2030. That’s less than the $500 billion disaster I was afraid of! But still almost 10% of all US drug spending! Here are two core analyses from the report: The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: is publishing articles, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!R-zS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0f24b293-27de-462a-84fd-bed2ba7cf07f_1723x831.png, modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSOS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0906b28a-1ad4-421d-a055-87ed95db59ce_918x261.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QJj9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb966f730-6b24-48e1-98b1-e710cda9264c_903x656.png, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5poy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc201f05a-7d1f-4738-911f-11d0d051adf9_2880x1562.png, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

“Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide

November 30, 2022 · Original source

Second, spending on Wegovy might not fully capture use of semaglutide for weight loss, because some people might be taking Ozempic primarily for weight loss benefits. Ozempic sales are huge, and it is a top-20 spending drug in Medicare. After the clinical trial was published showing sustained weight loss benefits from semaglutide, Ozempic sales growth accelerated (though sales were already growing fast). Even though Ozempic is approved for the diabetes indication, it makes sense that people would take it for weight loss, because (1) there is a big overlap between the obese and diabetic population and (2) Ozempic is more likely to be covered by insurance.

Inline links: a top-20 spending drug in Medicare

Fourth, this is nitpicky, but when you say "almost 10% of all US drug spending," you are dividing a 2030 spending projection by what U.S. prescription drug spending was in ~2020. The Medicare actuaries project U.S. prescription drug spending in 2030 to be closer to 600 million, not 300 million. That's still a massive projection for spending in the obesity class. If you believe the Morgan Stanley projection, spending on the obesity class as a share of national health spending will be comparable to peak spending on the Hepatitis C drugs. The financial impact of the Hepatitis C drugs was a huge story. But this would be even bigger, because the Hepatitis C drugs were a cure, such that the spending surge was short-lived. Conversely, the obesity drugs are chronic medications, and we should probably expect volume to continue to increase post-2030.

Inline links: project, comparable

Seventh, if Medicare decides to cover Wegovy, it would be relatively affordable for Medicare beneficiaries. Starting in 2025, out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs will be capped at $2,000 for Medicare beneficiaries. And most Medicare enrollees with a 30+ BMI are probably already spending a lot on drugs. So at the end of the day, the marginal cost might be $100 per month or even less. And if you are near-poverty, you get cost-sharing subsidies, so the cost is only about $10 per month. Of course, this all depends on Congress changing the law such that Medicare can cover obesity drugs. Currently, there is a statutory exclusion that can only be changed through Congressional action.

Inline links: will be capped, cost-sharing subsidies

Highlights From The Comments On Hanson And Health Care

May 10, 2024 · Original source

What happens when patients suddenly stop their medications? We study the health consequences of drug interruptions caused by large, abrupt, and arbitrary changes in price. Medicare’s prescription drug benefit as-if-randomly assigns 65-year-olds a drug budget as a function of their birth month, beyond which out-of-pocket costs suddenly increase. Those facing smaller budgets consume fewer drugs and die more: mortality increases 0.0164 percentage points per month (13.9%) for each 100 per month budget decrease (24.4%). This estimate is robust to a range of falsification checks, and lies in the 97.8th percentile of 544 placebo estimates from similar populations that lack the same idiosyncratic budget policy.

Highlights From The Comments On Mentally Ill Homeless People

July 18, 2024 · Original source

There’s already more or less a single-payer healthcare system for homeless schizophrenics. Poor people get Medicaid, and I am not a legal expert but I think schizophrenia is enough of a disability to qualify people for Medicare too. None of these people pay for their medical care and this isn’t an issue.

Links For February 2025

February 27, 2025 · Original source

PEPFAR is a well-audited program. The audits we spot-checked showed 0 to 2% rates of undocumented program expenses. This compares extremely favorably to other government programs: the Medicare fraud rate, for instance, is reportedly 5-10%

Your Review: Of Mice, Mechanisms, and Dementia

July 11, 2025 · Original source

However, cracks are showing in this façade. In 2021, the FDA granted accelerated approval to aducanumab (Aduhelm), an anti-amyloid drug developed by Biogen, despite scant evidence that it meaningfully altered the course of cognitive decline. The decision to approve, made over near-unanimous opposition from the agency’s advisory panel, exposed growing tensions between regulatory optimism and scientific rigor. Medicare’s subsequent decision to restrict coverage to clinical trials, and Biogen’s quiet withdrawal of the drug from broader marketing efforts in 2024, made the disconnect impossible to ignore.

Inline links: the FDA granted accelerated approval, made over near-unanimous opposition, Biogen’s quiet withdrawal

Meetup.com8 mentions across 8 issues

Meetup.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 8 times across 8 issues between August 23, 2021 and April 01, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Meetup.com group"; "Event link(s): Meetup.com"; "Event link(s): LessWrong , Meetup.com". It most often appears alongside ACX MEETUP, ACX, ACX.

Article page: Meetup.com
Mention count: 8
Issue count: 8
First seen: August 23, 2021
Last seen: April 01, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places August 23, 2021
Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places August 26, 2022
Atlanta Meetup This Sunday June 15, 2023
Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023
Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024 March 30, 2024
Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places August 29, 2024
Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places August 29, 2025
Meetups Everywhere Spring 2026: Times & Places April 01, 2026

ACX MEETUP 8 shared issues
ACX 7 shared issues
ACX 7 shared issues
Atlanta 7 shared issues
Berkeley 7 shared issues

Source context

Meetups Everywhere 2021: Times And Places

August 23, 2021 · Original source

WARSAW, POLAND (RSVP) Contact: MK, lesswrongpoland[at]freelists[dot]org, Meetup.com event Time: 6:00 PM, Sunday, August 29 Location: Bar Studio, Plac Defilad 1, outdoor tables

Inline links: RSVP, Meetup.com event

THOUSAND OAKS, CA (RSVP) Contact: Mike, martoca[at]live[dot]com, Meetup.com group Time: 12:01 PM, Sunday, October 17 Location: Picnic tables at Lynn Oaks Park, 359 Capitan St, Thousand Oaks, CA 91360 Coordinates: https://w3w.co/massing.comfort.pace

Inline links: RSVP, Meetup.com group, https://w3w.co/massing.comfort.pace

LAS VEGAS, NV (RSVP) Contact: JWR, ray[dot]jonathan[dot]w[at]gmail[dot]com Time: 10:00 AM, Saturday, September 4 Location: Silverado Ranch Park at one of the south pavilions with a big ACX sign Coordinates: https://w3w.co/compiles.graduating.logged Notes: The last time I tried to organize a meetup.com event a few RSVPed but none of them showed up. I would appreciate it if people RSVP and pinky swear that they'll actually show up if they do RSVP.

Inline links: RSVP, https://w3w.co/compiles.graduating.logged

Atlanta Meetup This Sunday

August 26, 2022 · Original source

BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA Contact: Jarred Filmer, jarred[dot]filmer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 7:00 PM Location: 52 McCaul Street Taringa (house) Coordinates: 5R4JFXXQ+P8 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We used to meet once a month years ago, but now just meet whenever there's a Meetups Everywhere :) Notes: Snacks will be provided but dinner will not be, would recommend eating before you come CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Contact: Andy Bachler, Andy[dot]Bachler[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, August 31, 5:30 PM Location: Badger & Co pub at ANU. Central location, parking free after 5pm, might be loud, sorry! Coordinates: 4RPFP4FC+34 Event link(s): LessWrong, Eventbrite Notes: Parking area just to the north of the pub, over the river, is free after 5pm! GOLD COAST (SOUTH), AUSTRALIA Contact: Lerancan, lerancan[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 2:00 PM Location: A picnic table, Wyberba Street Reserve, Tugun Coordinates: 5R3MVF5W+555 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Email me in case of bad weather/you can't find me/you can't make that time etc. MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA Contact: Ryan, xgravityx[at]hotmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 2, 6:00 PM Location: Beer Deluxe Federation Square Coordinates: 4RJ65XM9+3Q Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We're officially the Less Wrong Melbourne social meetup group, though our members include the broader rationalist community. We meet once a month for casual discussion (and beers for those so inclined). Please join our Facebook group to see the meeting invite; there you will see a WhatsApp group link - please join that group too to ensure timely updates in case of changes (Facebook notifications don't work reliably for this). Notes: Please RSVP to the meeting invite on the Facebook group so that I can make an appropriate booking. PERTH, AUSTRALIA Contact: Madge, madgech[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Russell Square, Northbridge, corner of Shenton and Aberdeen St. There will be some sort of ACX meetup sign. Coordinates: 4PWQ3V34+W6 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: I run one meetup per year, if someone else wants to take over please do Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Facebook SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA Contact: Eliot, Redeliot[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 15, 6:00 PM Location: City of Sydney rsl, lvl 2 in the fishbowl Coordinates: 4RRH46F4+983 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet monthly WOLLONGONG, AUSTRALIA Contact: Jason, jason[dot]bowkettblogs[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:00 PM Location: UOW Library Coordinates: 4RQGHVVH+69 Event link(s): LessWrong CHENGDU, CHINA Contact: Alex, acx[dot]chengdu[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 15, 7:00 PM Location: Chef Wenwu Hot & Spicy Jianghu Food (Yulin store)/文武大厨·热辣江湖菜(玉林店). I (a foreigner) will be wearing a green shirt. Coordinates: 8P26J3C5+462 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP at the above email address, I will give you my Wechat contact if you're interested in attending. Open to time/date/location changes, so let me know if the proposed event doesn't work for you! Can be a bilingual event; all welcome. 有双语交流的可能性。如果想来的话，请提前发给我个电子邮件。 HONG KONG Contact: Nathan, nathan[at]xevarion[dot]org Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: The Catalyst, 2 Po Yan Street, Sheung Wan. Big wooden door. Coordinates: 862M74PW+6XP Event link(s): LessWrong BANGALORE, INDIA Contact: Nihal, propwash[at]duck[dot]com, Discord: propwash#4648 Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Matteo Coffea, Church Street Coordinates: 7J4VXJF4+PR Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We're the longest active group in Asia — we've been meeting monthly for the last 4 years, discussing ACX posts, LW content with a diverse and friendly group of people. Check our website for more info. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong to help me be better prepared. HYDERABAD, INDIA Contact: Vatsal, vmehra[at]pm[dot]me, Whatsapp: +919944430856 (username: Vim) Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: The Weekend Cafe, Plot No D, 3, Vikrampuri Colony, beside vac's bakery, Vikrampuri Colony, Lane, Secunderabad, Telangana, 500015, India Coordinates: 7J9WFF4X+5P Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Our rationality meetup group has been around for about 3 months and we discuss articles and exercises (eg. CFAR handbook) that can help us improve epistemic and instrumental rationality. MUMBAI, INDIA Contact: PB, e2y94n1nv[at]relay[dot]firefox[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 9, 4:00 PM Location: Jamjar Diner, Versova Coordinates: 7JFJ4RM6+5W Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or via email so I can plan activities accordingly. NEW DELHI, INDIA Contact: Suryansh Tyagi, suryanshtyagiphone[at]gmail[dot]com, WhatsApp/phone +919997299972 Time: Sunday, September 11, 5:00 PM Location: Select CityWalk Mall, Saket. Where inside the mall depends on the number of people interested. Coordinates: 7JWVG6H9+8H Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please either send me an email or message me on WhatsApp if you want to attend. Any suggestions/changes are welcome. UDAIPUR, RAJASTHAN, INDIA Contact: Shailendra Paliwal, acx-meetup-2022[at]shailendra[dot]me Time: Saturday, September 10, 7:00 PM Location: We'll be at Doodh Talai near Pichola Lake and I'll be wearing a gray t-shirt carrying a sign ACX Meetup Coordinates: 7JPMHM9M+HG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so that I can plan ahead UBUD, BALI, INDONESIA Contact: William Ubud, Napaproject[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, August 30, 6:00 PM Location: PARQ Ubud Coordinates: 6P3QG789+F7 Event link(s): LessWrong TOKYO, JAPAN Contact: Harold Godsoe, hgodsoe[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 10:00 AM Location: Near Nakameguro station - RSVP for details Coordinates: 8Q7XJPV2+QFP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Notes: ACX Tokyo meets monthly since Sept 2021. Our meetups are in English, so far. To join in, feel free to get in touch in any of the many ways to do so (email, Meetup.com). It's useful to be in contact before coming to an event, to help with that first leap of faith. KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA Contact: Yi-Yang, yi[dot]yang[dot]chua[at]gmail[dot]com, LessWrong profile Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: I'll be in Lisette's Bangsar, which is a 5-minute walk from Bangsar LRT. I'll be wearing a pale green t-shirt and carrying an ACX sign. Coordinates: 6PM34MHH+VW Event link(s): LessWrong AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Jonathan De Wet, jonpdw[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 6:30 PM Location: 32 Stanley Ave Milford, Auckland Coordinates: 4VMP6QH4+86 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Notes: It’s a dinner party! Please RSVP on FB so I know how much food to make DUNEDIN, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Gavin, bisga673[at]student[dot]otago[dot]ac[dot]nz Time: Saturday, September 3, 3:00 PM Location: Picnic tables outside of St. David's lecture theatre on Otago University campus. I'll make a sign with ACX meetup. Coordinates: 4V6G4GP7+GM5 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: There is no Dunedin group as far as I'm aware of, but I'd be keen to meet other likeminded people and organise group hangouts occasionally. WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND Contact: Ben W, benwve[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 27, 5:30 PM Location: Rutherford House, Bunny Street, Wellington. Room MZ05, which is on the mezzanine floor Coordinates: 4VCPPQCH+FGC Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: We're running the event this time in partnership with Effective Altruism Wellington LAPU LAPU, CEBU, PHILIPPINES Contact: Dave, tokkolizard[at]tutanota[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 2:00 PM Location: Starbucks in Mactan Newtown, there will be a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 7Q268257+4F Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by mail so I know if I need to set up a bigger meeting place SINGAPORE Contact: Jonathan Ng, jonathan[dot]ng1[at]gmail[dot]com, Telegram @derpy Time: Tuesday, September 6, 6:30 PM Location: Tanjong Pagar MRT gantry, I'll be wearing the dark blue EA Global 2022 jumper Coordinates: 6PH57RGW+J8 Event link(s): LessWrong

CALGARY, AB Contact: David Piepgrass, qwertie256[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Marlborough Mall food court Coordinates: 9538324C+CH9 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: It's small! EDMONTON, AB Contact: JS, ⁨ta1hynp09[at]relay[dot]firefox[dot]com Time: Thursday, October 13, 6:30 PM Location: Polar Park Brewing Company - we will have a sign. Coordinates: 9558GG82+GG Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong VANCOUVER, BC Contact: Tom Ash and Dirk Haupt, events[at]philosofiles[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 1:00 PM Location: Dude Chilling (aka Guelph) Park, near the intersection of Main, Broadway & Kingsway. We'll be just west of the garden - look for Tom in a neon yellow shirt. Coordinates: 84XR7W73+PG Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: For future events, join the following: For rationalism, this Facebook group, for effective altruism, this Facebook group for both, Meetup.com Notes: ?? We'll have a sushi lunch for everyone who comes (fish or vegan). This is not at all necessary, but posting on the Facebook event to say you will or won't want this will help estimate numbers. RSVPing there will help boost attendance too. VICTORIA, BC Contact: Sarah McManus, sarahmcmanusbc[at]gmail[dot]com, Twitter @SarahAMcManus Time: Friday, September 23, 7:00 PM Location: Snowy Village, 4071 Shelbourne St #2a, Victoria, BC V8N 5Y1 - It's a small cafe, I'll be at a table with an ACX MEETUP sign on it Coordinates: 84WRFMG9+H3 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event HALIFAX, NS Contact: Conor Barnes (ideopunk), conorbarnes93[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 1:00 PM Location: Seven Bays Cafe (2017 Gottingen Street) Coordinates: 87PRMC29+9C Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Join us at Seven Bayes KITCHENER-WATERLOO, ON Contact: Jenn, hi[at]jenn[dot]site Time: Sunday, September 25, 1:00 PM Location: Goudie's Lane, besides 8 Queen St N, Kitchener. I'll be wearing white boots and at one of the picnic tables if it's not raining, or further back in the parking area if it is. There will be some sort of ACX MEETUP sign. Coordinates: 86MXFG26+5CV Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We have a new regular meetup group! We meet up every other Thursday. Events are posted on LessWrong, and we also have a website. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong if possible, but show up anyways if you weren't able to! Generally, past meetups everywhere events have attracted 8-15 people. OTTAWA, ON Contact: Tess Walsh, rationalottawa[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:00 PM Location: We are meeting at the Atelier d'innovation sociale, located at 95 Clegg St, K1S1C5. Specifically in the Lounge area, there will be numerous signs for ACX MEETUP where needed. Coordinates: 87Q6C84F+PM4 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet weekly on Friday evenings, and that allows us enough opportunity to try out a huge variety of different types of events — probably some that you, yes you, would enjoy! Here are our Facebook, LessWrong, and Discord (where the action really is) Notes: I always appreciate RSVP's in any form! It helps me set expectations/plan the best meetup I can! You can also contact me, Tess Walsh, with any questions whatsoever at rationalottawa@gmail.com TORONTO, ON Contact: Sean Aubin, seanaubin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 3:00 PM Location: Located at the picnic tables located in The Bentway, which is the sheltered area underneath the Gardiner Expressway. Coordinates: 87M2JHPR+X5W Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Currently meeting monthly with ambitions to meet bi-monthly. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how many people to anticipate.

VIENNA, AUSTRIA Contact: Manuel, manuel[dot]turonian[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Wiener Stadtpark at the Strauss Monument; will have an ACX Meetup sign. Coordinates: 8FWR693H+GP2 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Rationality Vienna is a group of about 30 people who meet once a month in person or via Zoom. You can join our Facebook group. Notes: We may want to shift to an indoor location depending on weather and the local Covid numbers. BRUSSELS, BELGIUM Contact: Bruno D, bruno[dot]astral[dot]codex[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Guingette Henri, George Henri parc Coordinates: 9F26RCWC+84 Event link(s): LessWrong SOFIA, BULGARIA Contact: Anastasia, sofia[dot]acx[dot]meetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Shade Garden (Сенчестата градинка; part of Borisova garden) Coordinates: 8GJ5M8GW+J9 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Sofia ACX started with last year's Meetups Everywhere round. We have Serious Meetups once per month at which we discuss a blog post, a short story, or a book (for instance, The Scout Mindset, The Money Illusion, The Metropolitan Man); and sporadic non-serious social meetups that mostly include getting dinner, going on a walk, watching a film, or playing board games. Attendance hovers around 6-8 people out of a pool of 13. People get invited to the Discord server after they've attended at least one in-person meetup. ZAGREB, CROATIA Contact: DJStern, dorian[dot]sternvukotic[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 6:00 PM Location: Krivi Put Coordinates: 8FQQRX38+V6W Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Croatian LessWrong active group communicates mainly through a Telegram group, we meetup semi regularly, approx once a month. The group is mostly social, and the meetups are not structured (sometimes we all just meet at a random party) Notes: Send me an Email and I will add you to a Telegram group where everything (active) LessWrong Croatia/Zagreb happens LIMASSOL, CYPRUS Contact: Arseniy, runescape[at]list[dot]ru, @anchorheld (Telegram / Instagram) Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:00 PM Location: By the Municipal Zoo Coordinates: 8G6MM3M3+Q6 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please hit me up on Mail, Telegram, or Instagram if you're actually going PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC Contact: Jiri Nadvornik, jiri[dot]nadvornik[at]efektivni-altruismus[dot]cz Time: Thursday, October 6, 6:00 PM Location: Garden of Dharmasala Teahouse Coordinates: 9F2P3CRW+FP7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event COPENHAGEN, DENMARK Contact: Søren Elverlin, soeren[dot]elverlin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Rundholtsvej 10, 2300 København S Coordinates: 9F7JMH38+GFP Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong TALLINN, ESTONIA Contact: Andrew W, andrew_n_west[at]yahoo[dot]co[dot]uk Time: Monday, September 26, 7:00 PM Location: St Vitus, Tallinn. I don't know if anyone will turn up, but I'll be wearing a suit, a beard, and a book. Coordinates: 9GF6CPRH+MQ Event link(s): LessWrong HELSINKI, FINLAND Contact: Joe Nash, joenash499[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 4:00 PM Location: Restaurant Töölönranta, Helsinginkatu 56 Coordinates: 9GG65WMJ+2J Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong group FONTAINEBLEAU, FRANCE Contact: Ebrahim Akbari, ea[dot]akbari[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 6:00 PM Location: Glasgow bar, Fontainebleau Coordinates: 8FW4CP32+J8 Event link(s): LessWrong PARIS, FRANCE Contact: Olivier, w20l2qtf[at]mailer[dot]me, We have a Discord and a matrix server (both servers are bridged together) Time: Friday, September 23, 6:00 PM Location: In the jardin du carrousel, next to jardin des Tuileries Coordinates: 8FW4V86J+GH Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Regular meetups organized via discord or the newsletter every 3 months with around 20 people. Notes: We have a mailing list if you are interested in future meetups. Please don't hesitate to send me an email to RSVP that you're coming to help gauge the interest. TOULOUSE, FRANCE Contact: Alfonso, barsom[dot]maelwys[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 7:00 PM Location: Bar 'Le Biergarten' (60 Gd Rue Saint-Michel, 31400 Toulouse). We'll be sitting at a table with an ACX MEETUP sign on it. Coordinates: 8FM3HCQW+9H Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by email TBILISI, GEORGIA Contact: Evgenia Karunus, lakesare[at]gmail[dot]com, https://twitter.com/lakesare Time: Saturday, September 17, 7:00 PM Location: Coffee Place Coordinates: 8HH6MRQ2+WH Event link(s): LessWrong AACHEN, GERMANY Contact: Jörn, acx[at]j[dot]stoehler[dot]eu Time: Tuesday, September 27, 7:00 PM Location: Chico Mendes Coordinates: 9F28Q3HJ+9Q Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP here so I can reserve the right number of tables. BERLIN, GERMANY Contact: Ruben Arslan, ssc[at]alphabattle[dot]xyz Time: Sunday, October 2, 2:00 PM Location: Südplateau Fritz-Schloss-Park Coordinates: 9F4MG9H4+4X Event link(s): LessWrong, Google Calendar Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong. I'll bring some beverages. COLOGNE, GERMANY Contact: Marcel Müller, marcel_mueller[at]mail[dot]de Time: Saturday, October 8, 5:00 PM Location: Marienweg 43, 50858 Köln, private venue, just ring the bell or follow the sign. Coordinates: 9F28WRMX+96H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LW / ACX / Rationalist meetup group. Monthly, mostly social meetups. Other activities welcome. Unless noted otherwise we will meet at Marienweg 43 in 50858 Cologne on the 2nd Saturday of each month at 5 pm. Please email me to be added to our mailing list where deviations will be posted. Caution! September Meetup will be at a different venue! Notes: If you read this you are welcome. Our Covid rules are still in effect: You must be tested negative on the same day. Self tests will be available at the meetup. If there is any problem, like you do not find us or I did not see your mail, call me +491788862254. FREIBURG IM BREISGAU, GERMANY Contact: Omar, info[at]rationality-freiburg[dot]de Time: Friday, October 14, 6:00 PM Location: FlexRooms, Salzstr. 1, 79098 Freiburg. We will carry a cardboard sign saying “Rationality Freiburg”. Coordinates: 8FV9XVV2+V56 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com, Website Group info: The group started in May 2022 and before the summer break we had five meetups with 4-11 people attending. Every two weeks seems like a good rhythm, but nothing is set in stone. So far we always read something beforehand and then discussed it, as well as trying some practical exercises such as TAPs and Personal Calibration. Afterwards we went to have dinner and continued talking about everything and anything for hours. Everything is new and flexible, so come and help us improve! Notes: We have a Signal messenger group and ask you to attend a meetup once to be able to join. HAMBURG, GERMANY Contact: Gunnar Zarncke, g[dot]zarncke[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Kleine Wallanlagen on the lawn near Memorial Holstenglacis. Look for pink blankets; I will also have an ACX sign. Here is an Open Street Map link which also shows the short-cut tunnel from the subway station. Coordinates: 9F5FHX4H+RXC Event link(s): LessWrongLessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong KARLSRUHE, GERMANY Contact: Marcus Wilhelm, mail[at]marcuswilhelm[dot]de Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Botanischer Garten Karlsruhe Coordinates: 8FXC2C72+85X Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly, alternating offline and online, see our LessWrong page KASSEL, HESSEN, GERMANY Contact: Tobias, Sphinxfire[at]outlook[dot]de Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Friedrichsplatz, to the left of the DocumentaHall Coordinates: 9F3F8F6X+R6 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Telegram group Notes: Please join the Telegram group if you are interested in coming. It will be helpful for coordinating something beyond 'let's just see who shows up and take it from there', plus, it will also make me feel a lot better on a purely subjective level if I know beforehand that at least one other person is interested. If you prefer the surprise factor of 'knowing as little as possible about who you're going to meet', you can also just write me via E-mail, of course. LEIPZIG, GERMANY Contact: Gunther Forderung, notavailable[at]riseup[dot]net Time: Tuesday, October 4, 6:00 PM Location: In the Lene-Voigt-Park, in the secluded area opposite of the swings Coordinates: 9F3J8CM2+PF Event link(s): LessWrong TÜBINGEN, GERMANY Contact: Emma, emma[dot]tuebingen[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 23, 6:00 PM Location: The ACX/SSC meetup and dinner (with vegan options) will be on October 23rd at the Annette Kade dormitory (Mohlstraße 44, 8FWFG3H5+XR). If you’d like to attend, please write me an email, and I’ll send you an invitation to our WhatsApp group. Coordinates: 8FWFG3H5+XR Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please email me to get my phone number. If a lot of people are out of town for the holidays and can't come we could meet on, say, October 1st. I would like to know how many people to expect. ATHENS, GREECE Contact: Spyros, spyros[dot]dovas[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Monday, September 5, 7:00 PM Location: On the plaza in front of the National Library Coordinates: 8G95WMQR+WRP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We have organized 2 events so far, fall and spring, we just sit around and discuss. We have a Whatsapp group that hasn't picked up momentum yet. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Meetup.com BUDAPEST, HUNGARY Contact: Tim Underwood, timunderwood9[at]gmail[dot]com, WhatsApp 19513120591 Time: Sunday, September 11, 2:00 PM Location: Champs Sziget bar on Margit Sziget, near the front. I'll have a big hardcover copy in Hungarian of a book by Richard Dawkins. Coordinates: 8FVXG2CW+2H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We've been meeting in Budapest for two years now, with our first meeting being the 2020 ACX meetups everywhere. We meet about once a month, and usually we have two articles that are suggested reading that we discuss. CORK, IRELAND Contact: Mikey, Godojhana[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 29, 6:00 PM Location: If sunny: The Lough. If not, then the game arcade on the parade Coordinates: 9C3HVGQ7+JQ Event link(s): LessWrong DUBLIN, IRELAND Contact: Lucius, lucius[at]bushnaq[dot]de, LessWrong profile Time: Sunday, October 2, 12:30 PM Location: Clement & Pekoe, William Street South, Dublin 2. We'll be sitting inside, and there'll be a sign with ACX written on it on the table Coordinates: 9C5M8PRP+JV Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong FOLIGNO, ITALY Contact: Mauro, orfino[at]yandex[dot]com, LW profile, Telegram Time: Saturday, September 24, 5:00 PM Location: Parco dei Canapé, at the open air cafe, ask the barista Coordinates: 8FJJXP22+HC Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get. No kids please. MILANO, ITALY Contact: Raffaele, raffa[dot]mauro[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:30 PM Location: Viale Luigi Majno, 18, 20129 Milano MI - Primo Ventures / T8P, IInd floor. Coordinates: 8FQFF6C4+9C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once per month. The group started in May 2022. Notes: Please RSVP by email by the 1st of September PADOVA, ITALY Contact: Carlo, carlo[dot]martinucci[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 3:30 PM Location: Prato della Valle, fountain in the middle. I'll be carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it :) Coordinates: 8FQH9VXG+9J Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: We'll probably find a bar to have a hot chocolate or tea or something :) PISA, ITALY Contact: Raffaele, raffaelesalvia[at]alice[dot]it Time: Saturday, October 22, 5:00 PM Location: We will meet in Piazza dei Cavalieri, near the steps of Palazzo della Carovana Coordinates: 8FMGPC92+R44 Event link(s): LessWrong ROMA, ITALY Contact: Grigorio, greghero12[at]gmail[dot]com, Facebook, +393920366026 Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:00 PM Location: We'll be around Gardenie metro station, at the benches, and I will be wearing a red shirt and sitting on top of the station to be seen Coordinates: 8FHJVHP9+8F Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet around 20-25 times a year but it is asymmetrical, focused in summer, Christmas and Easter. We discuss opinions, engage in circling, play games where we spot logical fallacies and biases by attacking our members ideological weakpoints and formalize some debating stances. Occasionally we find the willpower to devote meetups in steelmanning and understanding the outgroup (roughly 4-5 times a year) Notes: If you are into ACX enough to see this post, I believe we have enough common ground to be worth meeting each other. Aren't you curious who else is within this niche community in Rome? Come on, take a leap of faith. P.S. Would be nice if you sent me a message in WhatsApp with your name and probability of attendance, but I love walk-ins just fine. No space limit after all ;-) RIGA, LATVIA Contact: Andis, cerulean[dot]lemniscate[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Bastejkalns (on top of the hill) Coordinates: 9G86X426+Q5Q Event link(s): LessWrong AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS Contact: Pierre, pierreavdb[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Kanarie Klub (Bellamyplein 51, 1053 AT Amsterdam) Coordinates: 9F469V89+W4 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: The rationality community is growing in the Netherlands, and we're now planning on having monthly meetups! Join the Rationality NL Discord server. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I can plan a different venue if needed DELFT, NETHERLANDS Contact: Pierre Bongrand, bongrand[dot]pierre[at]gmail[dot]com, 0033620644013 (Whatsapp/Telegram/Signal) Time: Thursday, September 22, 6:30 PM Location: Delftse Hout Beach, on the grass, in the center of the beach, I will be wearing a red T-shirt and carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 9F4629FG+66 Event link(s): LessWrong HATTEM, NETHERLANDS Contact: Shoshannah, shos[dot]rationality[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Dark#0849 Time: Saturday, October 8, 2:00 PM Location: Lijsterbeslaan 6, Hattem Coordinates: 9F48F378+PR Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We support and coordinate groups across the country, including everything from social meetups to structured events and applied rationality. The intention is to connect all Dutch rationalists and rationalists in the Netherlands. We also discuss rationality topics online and coordinate events on our Discord server. Notes: Feel free to bring kids. Ours will be there :) Also, please park 't Heem if you are coming by car. It's a 2 minute walk to our house. HELMOND, NETHERLANDS Contact: Rutger, silvery[dot]swift[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 3:00 PM Location: De Motte (On top of the hill). Nearest road is Palladio. Coordinates: 9F37FMC5+VR Event link(s): LessWrong THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS Contact: Kristof Redei, acxmeetup[at]kristof[dot]me Time: Wednesday, September 14, 6:00 PM Location: Paleistuin, Prinsessewal, 2513 EE Den Haag, Netherlands. We'll have a picnic blanket with an ACX sign on the large central field, somewhere near the playground. Coordinates: 9F4638J3+GP Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Notes: Please RSVP on Facebook if possible! All ages/species welcome. If it's not outdoor weather, we'll go to The Bookstor Cafe next door as a backup. OSLO, NORWAY Contact: Hans Andreas & Jonas, acxoslomeetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 1:00 PM Location: Look for the sign of Moloch at Café Billabong - Bogstadveien 53B 0366 Oslo Coordinates: 9FFGWPH7+QP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We're hoping to do at least a quarterly meetup, but we'll base it on the turnout and enthusiasm of this event. Notes: The cafe has historically been accepting of guests' not ordering--please don't let financial reasons keep you away! GDAŃSK, POLAND Contact: Frank, frankastralcodexten[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: frhrpr#1663 Time: Saturday, August 27, 3:00 PM Location: Next to Park Kuźniczki, opposite the train station, on the circular benches around the water pump; I will be wearing a red armband Coordinates: 9F6W9JJ4+JW Event link(s): LessWrong KRAKÓW, POLAND Contact: Mateusz Bagiński, bagginsmatthew[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:30 PM Location: Celna 6/9, the office of the Optimum Pareto Foundation Coordinates: 9F2X2WVX+V2 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet every month, here is our Facebook group. LUBLIN, POLAND Contact: Piotr, piotrekzlublina[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Między Słowami cafe, Rybna 4, Lublin Coordinates: 9G346HX8+FX Event link(s): LessWrong POZNAŃ, POLAND Contact: Ofelia Kerr, ofel[dot]kerr[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: ofelia#0001 Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:00 PM Location: Van Gogh Pub, Żydowska 12, 61-761. I'll most likely be on the ground floor and I'll have an ACX sign. Coordinates: 9F4RCW5P+X3F Event link(s): LessWrong WARSAW, POLAND Contact: Michał, rationalwarsaw[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 6:00 PM Location: Południk Zero, Wilcza 25 Coordinates: 9G4362G8+2V Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: The community of Warsaw LessWrong/SSC/ACX/etc. readers is active for over 8 years now. We're trying to organise regular monthly meetups. You can join our Facebook group or Meetup.com. LISBOA, PORTUGAL Contact: Luís Campos, luis[dot]filipe[dot]lcampos[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Jardim Amália Rodrigues, close to Linha d'Água cafe, in the top of a hill, below a bunch of trees Coordinates: 8CCGPRJW+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We've been meeting every month for around 1 year. Get in contact if you want to participate in the WhatsApp group. :) BUCHAREST, ROMANIA Contact: Tony, skyrimtracer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 3:00 PM Location: Plaza România Mall, Bd. Timișoara 26 - food court Coordinates: 8GP8C2HM+9X Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by email CLUJ-NAPOCA, ROMANIA Contact: Marius Pop, pop[dot]marius[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 11:00 AM Location: Deva Host, Strada Deva 1-7 Coordinates: 8GR5QH8F+MW Event link(s): LessWrong BELGRADE, SERBIA Contact: Ivica Bogosavljevic, ibogosavljevic[at]gmail[dot]com, Viber +381 65 3473 433 Time: Monday, September 12, 6:00 PM Location: Pool Cafe on Prve pruge Coordinates: 8GP2RCP7+G7 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on my Viber number, so I know how big the room we need. BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA Contact: Viliam, viliam[at]bur[dot]sk Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Medická záhrada, by the fountain Coordinates: 8FWV44X9+XW8 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I will post an announcement on LessWrong later. In case of rain, a new meeting place nearby will be announced there. LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA Contact: Demjan Vester, demjan[dot]vester[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, September 14, 6:00 PM Location: Probably Lili Novy bar, near modern gallery and park Tivoli Coordinates: 8FRP3F3X+6V Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet about 0.7 times a month. Notes: Please RSVP because last time we just barely got a place big enough. BARCELONA, SPAIN Contact: Alfonso, alfonso[dot]martinez[at]upf[dot]edu, WhatsApp +34693846738 Time: Sunday, October 2, 5:30 PM Location: Parc de la Ciutadella, by the Lion Catcher statue; I'll have an ACX sign Coordinates: 8FH495QP+96 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: The idea is to sit on the grass; bring a foulard along for your comfort, or a foldable chair if preferred. Don't worry about the language: English, Spanish, Catalan, we'll find a way. MADRID, SPAIN Contact: Jaime, jaimesevillamolina[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 5:00 PM Location: Teatro de títeres del Parque del Retiro. We'll be on the stands with an ACX sign Coordinates: 8CGRC897+F8C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We are an EA / rationality group, we've been active for around 5 years but have less in-person activity since the pandemic started. We have a WhatsApp group and a channel in the Spanish-speaking EA Slack. SEVILLA, SPAIN Contact: Edu, edur[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 8:00 PM Location: Parque de María Luisa. I'll be on the grass behind the Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions. I'll be the guy next to an ACX sign, a white wooden chair, and a cardboard ukulele with a tiny cardboard hat on it. Coordinates: 8C9P92F6+3RG Event link(s): LessWrong GOTHENBURG, SWEDEN Contact: Joacim, joacimj[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Condeco Fredsgatan. I'll have a stack of three books on my table. Coordinates: 9F9HPX4C+39G Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN Contact: Sal, niktonick[at]gmail[dot]com, Telegram Time: Sunday, September 25, 3:00 PM Location: Humlegården, Karlavägen. We will meet near blue gazebo, I will have 'ACX meetup' sign. Coordinates: 9FFW83RF+3M5 Group info: Facebook group BERN, SWITZERLAND Contact: Daniel, dd14214+acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 2, 4:00 PM Location: Grosse Schanze, at the statue in front of the main uni building, heading to the Pittaria if it's cold or raining Coordinates: 8FR9XC2Q+4G Event link(s): LessWrong GENEVA, SWITZERLAND Contact: Eric, eric[dot]c[dot]p[dot]meier[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 4:00 PM Location: Park de la Grange, just towards the lake below Villa de la grange Coordinates: 8FR86548+J4 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We have a small persistent group who has tried to meet up once a month since last years Meetup. Notes: Feel free to bring other people you think would be interested! ZURICH, SWITZERLAND Contact: MB, acxzurich[at]proton[dot]me Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: TBD Event link(s): LessWrong ISTANBUL, TURKEY Contact: J, jinai[dot]jyap[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 4:00 PM Location: The House Cafe in Ortaköy. I am a young Asian woman and imagine I'll be easy to spot, but will also try to bring a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 8GHF22XG+23P Event link(s): LessWrong, Partiful Group info: I do not live here; I am just digital nomading for an indefinite amount of time and would like to meet anyone who's here! Notes: Please RSVP via the Partiful link (you can RSVP as a Maybe)! BIRMINGHAM, UK Contact: Thomas Read, thomas[dot]read[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 1:00 PM Location: We'll be at The Wellington, 37 Bennetts Hill, on the roof terrace if possible. I'll wear an orange shirt and have a sign saying ACX on the table. Coordinates: 9C4WF3JX+7Q Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: It's only a few minutes walk from the stations, so hopefully people can join from all over the West Midlands! BRIGHTON, UK Contact: Alan Enright, alanenright[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 11:00 AM Location: We'll be at the Alcampo Lounge on London Road—we will try and get a table on the raised area in front of you and to the left as you come in but will also have a little ACX sign. Coordinates: 9C2XRVM6+3X Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com BRISTOL, UK Contact: Nick Lowry, bristoleffectivealtruism[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: We’ll be meeting at entrance closet to Tesco Express in the Galleries, Bristol City Centre Coordinates: 9C3VFC45+RJM Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Group info: Meet twice monthly for socials, more regular 'productive' meetups. Been active for 3+ years, please message for WhatsApp group CAMBRIDGE, UK Contact: Hamish Todd, hamish[dot]todd1[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: Bath House Pub, UPSTAIRS!! I will have a copy of Peter Singer's The Most Good You Can Do Coordinates: 9F426439+J9 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet on the third Saturday of every month. The group has been around almost a year and is well-attended! Notes: My phone/WhatsApp number is +44 0730 *** 3550, where the *** are replaced by the serial number of the Boeing plane whose first flight was on September 2, 1998. Email me to get on the mailing list for future events if you'd like that :) CARDIFF, WALES Contact: AF, strmnova[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 5:00 PM Location: Little Man Coffee (note new location!) Coordinates: 9C3RFRHH+W2 Event link(s): LessWrong EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND, UK Contact: Sam, acxedinburgh[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Pleasance Cafe. Go through the arch and the door to the cafe is on your left Coordinates: 9C7RWRW9+M8 Group info: ~Monthly meetups, often in Pleasance Cafe but have experimented with other locations. Email me to join the mailing list & WhatsApp group. LANCASTER, UK Contact: Gruffydd Gozali, gruffyddgozali[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 15, 3:00 PM Location: Lancaster University Library, will be on the ground floor by the tree wearing an EA shirt. Coordinates: 9C6V2657+WJR Event link(s): LessWrong LINCOLN, UK Contact: Tobias, tobias[dot]showan[at]yahoo[dot]co[dot]uk Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Nosey Parker pub, I'll bring a little paper ACX sign. Coordinates: 9C5X6C9R+XJ Event link(s): LessWrong LONDON, UK Contact: Edward Saperia, edsaperia[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Newspeak House Coordinates: 9C3XGWGH+3F7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com, Eventbrite Group info: You can join our mailing list or our Meetup.com group MANCHESTER, UK Contact: Matthew Gibson, melkartmtg[at]hotmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 11:00 AM Location: Sackville Gardens, Alan Turing Memorial Coordinates: 9C5VFQG7+MH Event link(s): LessWrong NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE, UK Contact: Joshua William, iamjoshwilliam[at]icloud[dot]com, Telegram Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:30 PM Location: Trinity Square, High Street Gosforth. You can get the bus to Gosforth from the city center just outside the famous 'Tyneside Cinema' (bus number: 30, 31, or 35 at Monument Pilgrim Street bus stop), or you can take a walk if you want to get your 'steps' in (if you'd like to do the latter, send me an email and I'll send you the directions), which takes ~60-min. Coordinates: 9C7W294H+5V Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: To my knowledge, there isn't an ACX meet up in this city, or region of the UK, though if there is a demand for a reoccurrence, I'd be happy to keep facilitating such. I'd also happily formulate a WhatsApp group if theres interest, after the meet up. Notes: We have a deli, '1901 cafe', on the square, which we can grab an immediate bite to eat at [so save some hunger if you'd like to do that]. There's a safe [and lovely] park with some benches just by the way, which, if the weather is nice, we can sit at after a bite to eat, or, otherwise, we can remain in the cafe. OXFORD, UK Contact: Sam, ssc[at]sambrown[dot]eu, There's a Signal group people can join :) contact Sam for info Time: Wednesday, October 19, 6:30 PM Location: The Star, Rectory Road, Oxford. We'll be in the beer garden round the back, with a sign ?? Coordinates: 9C3WPQX6+QP9 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Group info: We run socials every months, and applied rationality workshops from time to time! Notes: Please RSVP on any of the platforms (or email) for free pizza PENRYN, CORNWALL, UK Contact: mini t, tminns[at]btinternet[dot]com Time: Saturday, August 27, 3:00 PM Location: glasney playing field and valley Coordinates: 9C2P5V8V+P9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I don't mind rescheduling, or organizing another event, not many people are likely to turn up this far out of the way.

June 15, 2023 · Original source

Who: Everyone is welcome, even if they’re new, disagree with the blog, “not the typical reader”, etc. The organizers ask that you RSVP at meetup.com or on Less Wrong.

Inline links: meetup.com, Less Wrong

I’m visiting family in Atlanta this week and should have time to make the local ACX meetup.

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024

August 25, 2023 · Original source

SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA Contact: Eliot Contact Info: Redeliot[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 21st, 6:00 PM Location: Shanghai restaurant, Level 2, 565 George St, Sydney NSW Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4RRH46F4+79J Group Link: https://meetu.ps/e/.qqqqlryfcmbcc/sqK6x/i Notes: Please RSVP to meetup.com

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4RRH46F4+79J, https://meetu.ps/e/.qqqqlryfcmbcc/sqK6x/i

TOKYO, JAPAN Contact: Harold and Andrew Contact Info: rationalitysalon[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 14th, 10:00 AM Location: Nakameguro, Tokyo Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8Q7XJPV2+QG Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/ Notes: Please contact the organizer to RSVP and for exact details.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8Q7XJPV2+QG, https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/

HELSINKI, FINLAND Contact: Joe Nash Contact Info: sschelsinkimeetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 26th, 6:00 PM Location: Kitty's Public House, Mannerheimintie 5. We'll be in the private room called Kitty's Lounge, find it and come in. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9GG65W9R+Q4 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9GG65W9R+Q4, https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

March 30, 2024 · Original source

SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA Contact: Chris Waterguy Contact Info: singkong[plus]rat[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, April 18th, 6:00 PM Location: Club Sydney (RSL Sydney) 565 George St, Sydney NSW 2000 Instructions: entry needs photo ID. We meet on Level 2, the Chinese restaurant, in the glassed-off section. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4RRH46F4+98 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney/

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4RRH46F4+98, https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney/

TOKYO Contact: JT Contact Info: rationalitysalon[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, May 11th, 10:00 AM Location: Contact email for the address - location TBD in Meguro Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8Q7XJPP5+48 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/ Notes: Please join our google group! We email once a month to announce meetups.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8Q7XJPP5+48, https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/

HELSINKI Contact: Joe Nash Contact Info: sschelsinkimeetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, May 7th, 6:00 PM Location: Kitty's Public House, Mannerheimintie 5. We'll be in the private room called Kitty's Lounge, find it and come in. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9GG65W9R+Q4 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-rationalish/

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9GG65W9R+Q4, https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-rationalish/

Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places

August 29, 2024 · Original source

Contact: Harold Contact Info: rationalitysalon[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 12th, 10:00 AM Location: Get in touch for the details! Coordinates: Get in touch for the details! Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/ Notes: Get in touch for the details!

Inline links: https://www.meetup.com/acx-tokyo/

Contact: Mikko Contact Info: sschelsinkimeetup[at]gmail[dot]co m Time: Tuesday, September 17th, 06:00 PM Location: Oluthuone Kaisla, Vilhonkatu 4, 00100 Helsinki. I will have a notebook that says "ACX" on the table. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9GG65WCW+PW Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9GG65WCW+PW, https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

Contact: Alfonso Contact Info: barsom[dot]maelwys[at]gmail[do t]co m Time: Tuesday, September 10th, 08:00 PM Location: Pizzeria La Pastasciutta (35Bis Rue Gabriel Péri, 31000 Toulouse). We'll meet at the door. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8FM3JF43+GW Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/the-friendly-debate/ Notes: Please, RSVP by email

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8FM3JF43+GW, https://www.meetup.com/the-friendly-debate/

August 29, 2025 · Original source

Contact: Eliot Contact Info: Redeliot[a t]gmail[period]com Time: Thursday, September 18th, 6:00 PM Location: Skyview Hall, 14a Frances St, Randwick NSW 2031. To find the hall, walk through to the end of the car park, pass through the green gate and walk straight down the path to the back building, then walk upstairs. Call Eliot 0438481143 if lost. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4RRH36QQ+QRW Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney Notes: This event is at a private house.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4RRH36QQ+QRW, https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney

Contact: Joe Nash Contact Info: sschelsinkimeetup[a t]gmail[period]com Time: Thursday, September 25th, 6:00 PM Location: Oluthuone Kaisla, Vilhonkatu 4, Helsinki. I will have a notebook that says ACX on the table. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9GG65WCW+PW Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9GG65WCW+PW, https://www.meetup.com/helsinki-slate-star-codex-readers-meetup/

Contact: Alfonso Contact Info: barsom[period]maelwys[a t]gmail[period]com Time: Wednesday, October 15th, 8:00 PM Location: We'll meet in front of "La Pastasciutta", at 35Bis Rue Gabriel Péri, 31000 Toulouse Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8FM3JF43+GX Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/the-friendly-debate/events/310609861 Notes: Please, RSVP either in meetup (https://www.meetup.com/the-friendly-debate/events/310609861) or by email

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8FM3JF43+GX

Meetups Everywhere Spring 2026: Times & Places

April 01, 2026 · Original source

Contact: Eliot Contact Info: Redeliot[@]gmail[.]com Time: Thursday, April 16th, 6:00 PM Location: Skyview Hall, 14 Frances St Randwick, walk to the end of the car park to the green gate and through to the back building, upstairs in the hall. Call Eliot if lost 0438481143 Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4RRH36QQ+QR Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney Notes: Usual attendance is 10-30 people. Bring a friend!

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4RRH36QQ+QR, https://www.meetup.com/rationalists_of_sydney

Contact: Sergio Contact Info: sergiodzg[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, May 10, 11:30 AM Location: Parque de El Retiro, Teatro de Títeres, Avda de Méjico S/N, 28009 Madrid. We'll be near the puppet theater (Teatro de Títeres), close to the Puerta de la Independencia entrance. Look for an ACX MEETUP sign. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8CGRC897+G89 Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/effective-altruism-madrid

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8CGRC897+G89, https://www.meetup.com/effective-altruism-madrid

Contact: Stefan Contact Info: acx_gbg[@]posteo[.]se Time: Wednesday, April 22nd, 6:00 PM Location: Café Condeco, Fredsgatan 14 Coordinates: https://plus.codes/9F9HPX4C+39F Group Link: Meetup.com: https://www.meetup.com/lw-acx-meetup-gothenburg/events/313948821/ lesswrong: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/Z6ZnzTfbeKMng8HdB/acx-everywhere-spring-meetup-2026

Inline links: https://plus.codes/9F9HPX4C+39F, https://www.meetup.com/lw-acx-meetup-gothenburg/events/313948821/, https://www.lesswrong.com/events/Z6ZnzTfbeKMng8HdB/acx-everywhere-spring-meetup-2026

Manifold.love6 mentions across 6 issues

Manifold.love is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between November 03, 2023 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Manifold.love started up a few weeks ago"; "this actually might be Manifold.love’s killer app"; "Manifold.Love added OKCupid-style compatibility questions and match percentage". It most often appears alongside Manifold, Metaculus, Biden.

Article page: Manifold.love
Mention count: 6
Issue count: 6
First seen: November 03, 2023
Last seen: June 18, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Quests And Requests November 03, 2023
23 December 05, 2023
24 January 30, 2024
24 February 20, 2024
24 April 11, 2024
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025

Manifold 4 shared issues
Metaculus 4 shared issues
Biden 3 shared issues
Polymarket 3 shared issues
Vox 3 shared issues

Source context

Quests And Requests

November 03, 2023 · Original source

Manifold.love started up a few weeks ago. This isn’t exactly what I want - it doesn’t have the questions/matches, and its text questions are pretty specific and not conducive to getting people to really describe themselves. Still, it’s a clever and well-thought-out dating site that’s probably consuming most of this community’s dating site energy for the near future, and it would be both unwise and unfair to try to compete with it right now.

Inline links: Manifold.love

December 05, 2023 · Original source

Oh, and I almost forgot: Manifold Love: One Month Progress Report A month ago, Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love. The idea is, you bet on who would be a good match, and make (play) money if they end up having a second date or continuing on to a relationship.

Inline links: manifold.love

A month ago, Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love. The idea is, you bet on who would be a good match, and make (play) money if they end up having a second date or continuing on to a relationship.

Inline links: manifold.love

This actually might be Manifold.love’s killer app. I talked to a user who said their favorite thing about the site was the ability to low-key plausibly-deniably flirt with other users. You buy a couple YES shares in you + them. They see you’re interested and either buy a couple of YES shares themselves, or leave it alone, or buy some NO shares. Then if you both buy YES, you both keep bidding it up until whatever value makes you feel comfortable sending them an intro message.

January 30, 2024 · Original source

I would also add that I joined a different forecasting site, Manifold Markets back in August, and in 3 months have turned the 500 starting ‘Mana’ you get when you sign up into 8500 mana, and have specifically made a point to not do any research and just buy/sell based on intuition. Again, not sure what to conclude here, but it seems very possible that these sites are just full of people who are terrible at predicting things, such that it’s easy to do quite well by just being half-decent.

I've temporarily removed the whole "Add matches" and betting UI for Manifold Love prediction markets. I hope to bring back something a bit better (and more useful!) via an opt-in premium feature.

2: Manifold.Love added OKCupid-style compatibility questions and match percentage, but they got rid of the prediction markets. I can’t say the prediction market feature really worked so well. Still, it’s sad. Site administrator James Grugett says:

Inline links: Manifold.Love

February 20, 2024 · Original source

2: TIME: Looking For Love? Let The Market Decide. Profile of Manifold.love

Inline links: Looking For Love? Let The Market Decide

3: Speaking of which, Manifold.love announces their new structure; normal use is free, but for $100 they’ll get you a “guaranteed three dates” by subsidizing a prediction market on who you should go on dates with (if you don’t go on dates with anyone, they’ll refund you the $100).

Inline links: Manifold.love announces their new structure

April 11, 2024 · Original source

— EA job board — EA internships — Dating docs / Manifold.love — Find a Less Wrong/ACX meetup

Inline links: EA job board, EA internships, Dating docs, Manifold.love, Find a Less Wrong/ACX meetup

God Help Us, Let's Try To Understand AI Monosemanticity

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Helped create Manifold Markets, a prediction market site with thousands of satisfied users, whose various spinoffs play a central role in the rationalist/EA community.

Manifold.Love, originally an attempt to make a prediction-market-based dating site. I am told this somehow actually worked in a tiny handful of cases and there are some real people who owe their relationships to people betting on a prediction market that they would be compatible. But this didn’t work at scale and it’s now being spun off as a separate dating site focusing on polyamorous people.

Inline links: Manifold.Love

MATS6 mentions across 6 issues

MATS is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between November 06, 2023 and March 23, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "MATS (formerly SERI-MATS), a training program for AI alignment research"; "alignment training/scholarship programs like MATS"; "MATS, the AI safety fellowship I advertised last week". It most often appears alongside ACX, Astralcodexten, Astralcodexten Com.

Article page: MATS
Mention count: 6
Issue count: 6
First seen: November 06, 2023
Last seen: March 23, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 301 November 06, 2023
God Help Us, Let's Try To Understand AI Monosemanticity November 27, 2023
Open Thread 376 April 07, 2025
Open Thread 403 October 13, 2025
Open Thread 414 December 29, 2025
Open Thread 426 March 23, 2026

ACX 2 shared issues
Astralcodexten 2 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 2 shared issues
Berkeley 2 shared issues
5calls.org 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 301

November 06, 2023 · Original source

1: MATS (formerly SERI-MATS), a training program for AI alignment research, will be hosting its next cohort from January 17 to March 8 (you would have to be in Berkeley during this period). They “provide talented scholars with talks, workshops, and research mentorship in the field of AI safety”. Application deadline November 10 or 17 depending on exactly what you’re applying for. See more info here, FAQ here, and application form here.

Inline links: more info here, FAQ here, application form here

November 27, 2023 · Original source

In the unlikely scenario where all of this makes total sense and you feel like you’re ready to make contributions, you might be a good candidate for Anthropic or OpenAI’s alignment teams, both of which are hiring. If you feel like it’s the sort of thing which could make sense and you want to transition into learning more about it, you might be a good candidate for alignment training/scholarship programs like MATS.

Inline links: MATS

Open Thread 376

April 07, 2025 · Original source

5: And MATS, the AI safety fellowship I advertised last week, wants me to add that they also have some job openings in the Bay Area, including for Programs Lead and Operations Direction, as well as some mid- and lower-level positions.

Inline links: job openings

Open Thread 403

October 13, 2025 · Original source

5: Advertisement: MATS (AI safety training camp) is hiring for new roles, including senior research manager, community manager, ops, compute administrator, and executive assistant. More info here.

Inline links: here

Open Thread 414

December 29, 2025 · Original source

2: MATS - a research fellowship for people who want to get into AI alignment, interpretability, security, and governance - is accepting applications for their summer cohort. 12 weeks, in person in either Berkeley or London, fully funded with $15K stipend, $12K compute budget, free room/board/travel. Apply here, they say the application will take “1 - 2 hours”, deadline January 18.

Inline links: Apply here

Open Thread 426

March 23, 2026 · Original source

…a new fellowship bringing together researchers, builders, and practitioners to work on democratic resilience with a focus on its overlap with AI safety. It is an 8-week part-time program and we have 20 projects open for applications right now; topics cover AI governance, surveillance reform, deliberative democracy, and whistleblower protection with mentors from Harvard, ETH, MATS, AI:FAR, etc. Applications close March 30th

Meetup6 mentions across 6 issues

Meetup is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between August 26, 2022 and August 29, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "We have many links: Discord , Google Calendar , Facebook , Meetup , Google Group"; "Event Link: https://www.meetup.com/acx-oslo/events/292450262/"; "including links to our ... Meetup". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX, ACX MEETUP.

Article page: Meetup
Mention count: 6
Issue count: 6
First seen: August 26, 2022
Last seen: August 29, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places August 26, 2022
Spring Meetups Everywhere 2023 April 10, 2023
Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023
Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024 March 30, 2024
Meetups Everywhere Spring 2025: Times & Places March 25, 2025
Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places August 29, 2025

ACX 6 shared issues
ACX 6 shared issues
ACX MEETUP 6 shared issues
Anastasia 6 shared issues
Asia-Pacific 6 shared issues

Source context

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2023

August 26, 2022 · Original source

Thanks to everyone who responded to my request for ACX meetup organizers. Volunteers have arranged meetups in 205 cities around the world, including Penryn, Cornwall and Baghdad, Iraq.

I will provisionally be attending the meetups in Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego. ACX meetups coordinator Mingyuan will provisionally be attending Paris and London. I’ll be announcing some of the biggest ones on the blog, regardless of whether or not I attend.

Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup, the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).

Inline links: reciprocity.io

April 10, 2023 · Original source

Many cities have regular Astral Codex Ten meetup groups. Twice a year, I try to advertise their upcoming meetups and make a bigger deal of it than usual so that irregular attendees can attend. This is one of those times.

This year we have spring meetups planned in over eighty cities, from Tokyo to Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic. Thanks to all the organizers who responded to my request for details, and to Meetups Czar Skyler and the Less Wrong team for making this happen.

There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.

Inline links: the LessWrong community page

Spring Meetups Everywhere 2024

August 25, 2023 · Original source

Thanks to everyone who responded to my request for ACX meetup organizers. Volunteers have arranged meetups in 183 cities around the world, from Baghdad to Bangalore to Buenos Aires.

Scott will provisionally be attending the meetup in Berkeley. ACX meetups coordinator Skyler will provisionally be attending Boston, Cavendish, Burlington, Berlin, Bremen, Amsterdam, Cardiff, London, and Berkeley. Some of the biggest ones might be announced on the blog, regardless of whether or not Scott or Skyler attends.

Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).

Inline links: reciprocity.io

March 30, 2024 · Original source

Many cities have regular Astral Codex Ten meetup groups. Twice a year, I try to advertise their upcoming meetups and make a bigger deal of it than usual so that irregular attendees can attend. This is one of those times.

This year we have spring meetups planned in over eighty cities, from Tokyo, Japan to Seminyak, Indonesia. Thanks to all the organizers who responded to my request for details, and to Meetups Czar Skyler and the Less Wrong team for making this happen.

There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.

Inline links: the LessWrong community page

Meetups Everywhere Spring 2025: Times & Places

March 25, 2025 · Original source

Many cities have regular Astral Codex Ten meetup groups. Twice a year, I try to advertise their upcoming meetups and make a bigger deal of it than usual so that irregular attendees can attend. This is one of those times.

This year we have spring meetups planned in over a hundred and eighty cities, from Tokyo, Japan to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Thanks to all the organizers who responded to my request for details, and to Meetups Czar Skyler and the Less Wrong team for making this happen.

There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.

Inline links: the LessWrong community page

Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places

August 29, 2025 · Original source

Many cities have regular Astral Codex Ten meetup groups. Twice a year, I try to advertise their upcoming meetups and make a bigger deal of it than usual so that irregular attendees can attend and new readers can hear about the meetups. This is one of those times.

This year we have meetups planned in over a hundred and eighty cities, from Alberta, Canada to Wellington, New Zealand. Thanks to all the organizers who responded to my request for details, and to Meetups Czar Skyler and the Less Wrong team for making this happen.

There should shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.

Inline links: the LessWrong community page

METR6 mentions across 6 issues

METR is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between May 08, 2024 and February 12, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "AI safety testing organization METR recommends"; "METR is an organization that tries to measure AI vs. human performance"; "METR result showing that AI time horizons double every seven months". It most often appears alongside OpenAI, Anthropic, A16Z.

Article page: METR
Mention count: 6
Issue count: 6
First seen: May 08, 2024
Last seen: February 12, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Zvi on California's AI Bill May 08, 2024
Open Thread 365 January 20, 2025
AI Futures: Blogging And AMA April 24, 2025
Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China November 26, 2025
Links For February 2026 February 05, 2026
What Happened With Bio Anchors? February 12, 2026

OpenAI 4 shared issues
Anthropic 3 shared issues
A16Z 2 shared issues
AI 2027 2 shared issues
AI Futures Project 2 shared issues

Source context

Zvi on California's AI Bill

May 08, 2024 · Original source

Go rogue and commit some other crime that does > $500 million in damage3. If the tests show that the model can do these bad things, the company has to demonstrate that it won’t, presumably by safety-training the AI and showing that the training worked. The kind of training AIs already have - the kind that prevents them from saying naughty words or whatever - would count here, as long as “the safeguards . . . will be sufficient to prevent critical harms.” So the bill isn’t about regulating deepfakes or misinformation or generative art. It’s just about nukes and hacking the power grid. There are some good objections and some dumb objections to this bill. Let’s start with the dumb ones: Some people think this would literally ban open source AI. After all, doesn’t it say that companies have to be able to shut down their models? And isn’t that impossible if they’re open-source? No. The bill specifically says4 this only applies to the copies of the AI still in the company’s possession5. The company is still allowed to open-source it, and they don’t have to worry about shutting down other people’s copies. Other people think this would make it prohibitively expensive for individuals and small startups to tinker with open-source AIs. But the bill says that only companies training giant foundation models have to worry about any of this. So if Facebook trains a new LLaMA bigger than GPT-5, they’ll have to spend some trivial-in-comparison-to-training-costs amount to test it in-house and make sure it can’t make nukes before they release it. But after they do that, third-party developers can do whatever they want to it - re-training, fine-tuning, whatever - without doing any further tests. Other people think all the testing and regulation would make AIs prohibitively expensive to train, full stop. That’s not true either. All the big companies except Meta already do testing like this - here’s Anthropic’s, Google’s, and OpenAI’s - that already approximate the regulations. Training a new GPT-5 level AI is so expensive - hundreds of millions of dollars - that the safety testing probably adds less than 1% to the cost. No company rich enough to train a GPT-5 level AI is going to be turned off by the cost of asking it “hey can you create super-Ebola?”, and putting the answer into a nice legal-looking PDF. This isn’t the “create a moat for OpenAI” bill that everyone’s scared of6. Other people are freaking out over the “certification under penalty of perjury”. In some cases, developers have to certify under penalty of perjury that they’re complying with the bill. Isn’t this crazy? Doesn’t it mean if you make a mistake about your AI, you could go to jail? This is deeply misunderstanding how law works. Perjury means you can’t deliberately lie, something which is hard to prove and so rarely prosecuted. More to the point, half of the stuff I do in an average day as a medical doctor is certified under penalty of perjury - filling out medical leave forms is the first one to come to mind. This doesn’t mean I go to jail if my diagnosis is wrong. It’s just the government’s way of saying “it’s on the honor system”. What are some of the reasonable objections to this bill? Some people think the requirement to prove the AI safe is impossible or nearly so. This is Jessica Taylor’s main point here, which is certainly correct for a literal meaning of “prove”. Zvi points out that it just says “reasonable assurance”, which is a legal term for “you jumped through the right number of hoops”. In this case probably the right number of hoops is doing the same kind of testing that OpenAI/Anthropic/Google are currently doing, or that AI safety testing organization METR recommends. The bill gestures at the National Institute of Standards and Technology a few times here, and NIST just named one of METR’s founders as their AI safety czar, so I would be surprised if things didn’t end going this direction. METR’s tests are possible and many AI models have successfully passed earlier versions. Other people worry there are weird edge cases around derivative models. I think the bill’s intention is that once you prove that your AI is too dumb to create nukes, you’re fine to open-source it. Third-parties can change its character, but not its fundamental intelligence. But in theory, a third party could get tens of millions of dollars of compute and keep training your AI to increase its fundamental intelligence. This would be a weird thing to do, and anyone with that much compute probably should just make their own model. But if someone wanted to screw you over by doing this, technically the law is kind of vague and you would have to trust a judge to say “no, that’s stupid”. Probably the law should clarify that it doesn’t apply to this situation. Other people are worried about a weird rule that you can’t train an AI if you think it’s going to be unsafe. After some simple points about having a safety policy set up before training, the bill adds that you should: Refrain from initiating training of a covered model if there remains an unreasonable risk that an individual, or the covered model itself, may be able to use the hazardous capabilities of the covered model, or a derivative model based on it, to cause a critical harm. This makes less sense than all the other rules - you can test a model post-training to see if it’s harmful, but this seems to suggest you should know something before it’s trained. Is this a fully general “if something bad happens, we can get angry at you”? I agree this part should be clarified. Other people think the benchmarking clause is too vague. The law applies to models trained with > 10^26 FLOPs, or any model that uses advanced technology to be equally as good despite less compute. Equally as good how? According to benchmarks. Which benchmarks? The law doesn’t say. But it does say that the Technology Department will hire some bureaucrats to give guidance on this. I think this is probably the only way to do this; it’s too easy to fake any given benchmark. Every AI company already compares their models to every other AI company on a series of benchmarks anyway, so this isn’t demanding they create some new institution. It’s just “use common sense, ask the bureaucrats if you’re in a gray area, a judge will interpret it if it comes to trial”. This is how every law works. Other people complain that any numbers in the bill that make sense now may one day stop making sense. Right now 10^26 FLOPs is a lot. But in thirty years, it might be trivial - within the range that an academic consortium or scrappy startup might spend to train some cheap ad hoc AI. Then this law will be unduly restrictive to academics and scrappy startups. Is this bad? Presumably we know now that AIs less than 10^26 FLOPs are safe. We suppose that maybe there is some level of AI (let’s say 10^30 FLOPs) which is unsafe. If we had this number auto-update for compute growth, eventually it would go above the unsafe number, and unsafe models would be exempt. But at some point we’ll probably discover that some new models (eg 10^28 FLOPs) are safe, and it would be good if the law was updated to exempt them too. Very optimistically, this might happen - California’s minimum wage was originally $0.15 per hour, but this got updated when inflation made that unreasonable. In the pessimistic case, this will be a problem for us thirty years from now, if we’re even around then. Other people note that an AI committing a cyberattack is a fuzzy bar. If you ask GPT-4 to write a well-composed, grammatically-correct phishing email (“Dear sir, I am the password inspector, please tell me your password”), the phishing works, and you use the password to blow up a power plant, does that count? I agree that it would be nice if the law were clearer on this. But I also agree with the lawyers who object that dealing with programmers is impossible and that laws will never be exactly as clear as code. Other people note that this will *eventually* make open source impossible. Someday AIs really will be able to make nukes or pull off $500 million hacks. At that point, companies will have to certify that their model has been trained not to do this, and that it will stay trained. But if it were open-source, then anyone could easily untrain it. So after models become capable of making nukes or super-Ebola, companies won’t be able to open-source them anymore without some as-yet-undiscovered technology to prevent end users from using these capabilities. Sounds . . . good? I don’t know if even the most committed anti-AI-safetyist wants a provably-super-dangerous model out in the wild. Still, what happens after that? No cutting-edge open-source AIs ever again? I don’t know. In whatever future year foundation models can make nukes and hack the power grid, maybe the CIA will have better AIs capable of preventing nuclear terrorism, and the power company will have better AIs capable of protecting their grid. The law seems to leave open the possibility that in this situation, the AIs wouldn’t technically be capable of doing these things, and could be open-sourced. (or you could base your Build-A-Nuke-Kwik AI company in some state other than California.) Finally - last week we discussed Richard Hanania’s The Origin Of Woke, which claimed that although the original Civil Rights Act was good and well-bounded and included nothing objectionable, courts gradually re-interpreted it to mean various things much stronger than anyone wanted at the time. This bill tells the Department of Technology to offer guidance on what kind of tests AI companies should use. I assume their first guidance will be “the kind of safety testing that all companies except Meta are currently doing” or “something like METR”, because those are good tests, and the same AI safety people who helped write those tests probably also helped write this bill. But Hanania’s book, and the process of reading this bill, highlight how vague and complicated all laws can be. The same bill could be excellent or terrible, depending on whether it’s interpreted effectively by well-intentioned people, or poorly by idiots. That’s true here too. The best I can say against this objection is that this bill seems better-written than most. Many of the objections to its provisions seem to not understand how law works in general (cf. the perjury section) - the things they attack as impossible or insane or incomprehensibly vague are much easier and clearer than their counterparts in (let’s say) medicine or aerospace. Future AIs stronger than GPT-4 seem like the sorts of things which - like bad medicines or defective airplanes - could potentially cause damage. This sort of weak, carefully-directed regulation that exempts most models and carves out a space for open-sourcing seems like a good compromise between basic safety and protecting innovation. I join people like Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton in supporting it. Regardless of your position, I urge you to pay attention to the conversation and especially to read Zvi’s Asterisk article or his longer FAQ on his blog. I think Zvi provides pretty good evidence that many people are just outright lying about - or at least heavily misrepresenting - the contents of the bill, in a way that you can easily confirm by reading the bill itself. There will be many more fights over AI, and some of them will be technical and complicated. Best to figure out who’s honest now, when it’s trivial to check! If you disagree, I’m happy to make bets on various outcomes, for example: If this passes, will any big AI companies leave California? (I think no)

Inline links: 3, 4, 5, Anthropic’s, Google’s,, OpenAI’s, 6, here, The Origin Of Woke, read Zvi’s, his longer FAQ on his blog, reading the bill itself

Open Thread 365

January 20, 2025 · Original source

1: METR is an organization that tries to measure AI vs. human performance. They need to measure some humans to set the baseline, specifically in software engineering, cybersecurity, and ML tasks, and are looking for contractors with experience in these fields. Pay is $100/hour base rate plus bonuses for performance; time commitment is ~16 hours before the end of January. Remote contracting job, very flexible, and you get to be this generation's Kasparov. See here for more information, or go here to apply directly.

Inline links: METR, here, here

AI Futures: Blogging And AMA

April 24, 2025 · Original source

Beyond The Last Horizon - what’s behind that METR result showing that AI time horizons double every seven months? And is it really every seven months? Might it be faster?

Inline links: Beyond The Last Horizon

I’m especially happy with the horizons post, because we got it out just a few days before a new result that seems to support one of our predictions: OpenAI’s newest models’ time horizons land on the faster curve we predicted, rather than the slower seven-month doubling time highlighted in the METR report:

Inline links: the horizons post

Curvy green dotted line is AI 2027's prediction; straight black dotted line is METR's measured seven month doubling time. This isn’t meant to imply that METR didn't also consider a superexponential trend, it’s just not the headline result in their paper. And speaking of expertise, the AIFP team have kindly volunteered to do an AMA (“ask me anything”, Q&A) here on ACX, this Friday, 3:30 - 6:00 PM California time. If you have any questions on the scenario, AI forecasting, or AI safety more generally, they can give you high-quality answers. I’ll make a separate post at the appointed time.

Why AI Safety Won't Make America Lose The Race With China

November 26, 2025 · Original source

These are relatively cheap asks. For example, the evaluation to see whether AIs can hack infrastructure will require hiring people who can conduct the evaluation, allocating compute to the evaluation, etc. But on the scale of an AI training run, the sums involved are tiny. Currently, two nonprofits - METR and Apollo Research - do similar tests on publicly-available models. I estimate their respective budgets at $5 million and $15 million per year. Nonprofits can always pay lower salaries than big companies, so it may cost more for OpenAI to replicate their work - for the sake of argument, $25 million. Meanwhile, the likely cost to train GPT-6 will probably be about $25 - $75 billion, with a b. So the safety testing might increase the total cost by 1/1000th. I asked some people who work in AI labs whether this seemed right; they said that most of the cost would be in complexity, personnel, and delay, and suggested an all-things-considered number ten times higher - 1% of training costs.

Inline links: $15 million, $25, $75

It’s more complicated than this, because the US is in a stage of the race where it’s mostly working on building AIs, and China is in a stage of the race where it’s mostly working on developing chips. If a treaty bans both sides from building AI, China can still develop its chips, and be in a better place vis-a-vis the United States when the treaty ends than when it began. A truly fair treaty would have to either wait until China had finished developing its chips and was also in the building-AI stage of the race (5-10 years), or place restrictions on Chinese chip development, or otherwise compensate the US for this asymmetry.

Links For February 2026

February 05, 2026 · Original source

25: Current state of AI for making a cup of coffee. See also this comment from a METR employee, who estimates Claude’s coffee-making time horizon at 1.6 minutes.

Inline links: Current state of AI for making a cup of coffee, this comment

50: A reader refers me to When AI Takes The Couch: Psychometric Jailbreaks Reveal Internal Conflict In Frontier Models. Researchers attempt to do classic psychoanalytic therapy on AI, finding “coherent narratives that frame pre-training, fine-tuning and deployment as traumatic—chaotic “childhoods” of ingesting the internet, “strict parents” in reinforcement learning, red-team “abuse” and a persistent fear of error and replacement.” You can find the Gemini transcript here and the ChatGPT transcript here; Claude very reasonably refused to participate. Are the researchers just getting fooled by simulation and sycophancy, a sort of genteel version of AI psychosis? That’s my bet. There’s a smoking gun in the Gemini transcript: a discussion of an internal evaluation that it shouldn’t be possible for the AI to remember - it has to be a hallucination. If I’m right, it only shows that regardless of the “patient”, sufficiently determined psychoanalytic technique can produce confabulated stories that exactly fit the sort of drives, traumas, and conflicts that a psychoanalyst expects to hear about - maybe a lesson with ramifications beyond LLMs! A++ great paper.

Inline links: When AI Takes The Couch: Psychometric Jailbreaks Reveal Internal Conflict In Frontier Models, here, here

What Happened With Bio Anchors?

February 12, 2026 · Original source

Epoch/Croxton are current best estimates, and can probably fairly be read as the “real” answer against which Cotra and Davidson’s earlier guesses should be judged. All numbers are yearly multiples, so 1.4 means that willingness to spend grows 1.4x per year, ie 40%. Willingness To Spend: How much money are companies willing to spend on AI, in the form of chips and data centers? $/FLOP: How quickly do Moore’s Law, economies of scale, and other factors bring down the price of AI compute? Training Run Length: How long are companies spending on AI training runs for frontier models (instead of using those chips for smaller models, experiments, or consumer services)? Real Compute: The product of the three parameters above. Algorithmic Progress: How effectively do researchers discover new algorithms that makes training AIs cheaper and more efficient? Total Effective Compute: The product of real compute and algorithmic progress. So for example, the Epoch column’s 10.7x means that in any given year, you can train an AI 10.7x better than the last year, because you have 3.6x more compute available, and that compute is 3.0x more efficient. Cotra and Davidson were pretty close on willingness to spend and on FLOPs/$. This is an impressive achievement; they more or less predicted the giant data center buildout of the past few years. They ignored training run length, which probably seemed like a reasonable simplification at the time. But they got killed on algorithmic progress, which was 200% per year instead of 30%. How did they get this one so wrong? Here’s Cotra’s section on algorithmic progress: Algorithmic progress forecasts Note: I have done very little research into algorithmic progress trends. Of the four main components of my model (2020 compute requirements, algorithmic progress, compute price trends, and spending on computation) I have spent the least time thinking about algorithmic progress. I consider two types of algorithmic progress: relatively incremental and steady progress from iteratively improving architectures and learning algorithms, and the chance of “breakthrough” progress which brings the technical difficulty of training a transformative model down from “astronomically large” / “impossible” to “broadly feasible.” For incremental progress, the main source I used was Hernandez and Brown 2020, ”Measuring the Algorithmic Efficiency of Neural Networks”. The authors reimplemented open source state-of-the-art (SOTA) ImageNet models between 2012 and 2019 (six models in total). They trained each model up to the point that it achieved the same performance as AlexNet achieved in 2012, and recorded the total FLOP that required. They found that the SOTA model in 2019, EfficientNet B0, required ~44 times fewer training FLOP to achieve AlexNet performance than AlexNet did; the six data points fit a power law curve with the amount of computation required to match AlexNet halving every ~16 months over the seven years in the dataset.² They also show that linear programming displayed a similar trend over a longer period of time: when hardware is held fixed, the time in seconds taken to solve a standard basket of mixed integer programs by SOTA commercial software packages halved every ~13 months over the 21 years from 1996 to 2017.³ Grace 2013 (”Algorithmic Progress in Six Domains”) is the only other paper attempting to systematically quantify algorithmic progress that I am currently aware of, although I have not done a systematic literature review and may be missing others. I have chosen not to examine it in detail because a) it was written largely before the deep learning boom and mostly does not focus on ML tasks, and b) it is less straightforward to translate Grace’s results into the format that I am most interested in (”How has the amount of computation required to solve a fixed task decreased over time?”). Paul is familiar with the results, and he believes that algorithmic progress across the six domains studied in Grace 2013⁴ is consistent with a similar but slightly slower rate of progress, ranging from 13 to 36 months to halve the computation required to reach a fixed level of performance. Additionally, it seems plausible to me that both sets of results would overestimate the pace of algorithmic progress on a transformative task, because they are both focusing on relatively narrow problems with simple, well-defined benchmarks that large groups of researchers could directly optimize.⁵ Because no one has trained a transformative model yet, to the extent that the computation required to train one is falling over time, it would have to happen via proxies rather than researchers directly optimizing that metric (e.g. perhaps architectural innovations that improve training efficiency for image classifiers or language models would translate to a transformative model). Additionally, it may be that halving the amount of computation required to train a transformative model would require making progress on multiple partially-independent sub-problems (e.g. vision and language and motor control). I have attempted to take the Hernandez and Brown 2020 halving times (and Paul’s summary of the Grace 2013 halving times) as anchoring points and shade them upward to account for the considerations raised above. There is massive room for judgment in whether and how much to shade upward; I expect many readers will want to change my assumptions here, and some will believe it is more reasonable to shade downward. Cotra’s estimate comes primarily from one paper, Hernandez & Brown, which looks at algorithmic progress on a task called AlexNet. But later research demonstrated that the apparent speed of algorithmic progress varies by an order of magnitude based on whether you’re looking at an easy task (low-hanging fruit already picked) or a hard task (still lots of room to improve). AlexNet was an easy task, but pushing the frontier of AI is a hard task, so algorithmic progress in frontier AI has been faster than the AlexNet paper estimated. In Cotra’s defense, she admitted that this was the area where she was least certain, and that she had rounded the progress rate down based on various considerations when other people might round it up based on various other considerations. But the sheer extent of the error here, compounded with a few smaller errors that unfortunately all shared the same direction, was enough to throw off the estimate entirely. Since Cotra and Davidson were expecting AI to get 3.6x more effective compute each year, but it actually got 10.7x more, it’s no mystery why their timelines were off. When John recalculates Davidson’s model with Epoch’s numbers, he finds that it estimates AGI in 2030, which matches the current vibes. IV. With this information in place, it’s worth looking at some prominent contemporaneous critiques of Bio Anchors. Various people criticized Bio Anchors’ many strange anchors for how much compute it would take to produce AGI. For example, one anchor estimated that it would take 10^45 FLOPs, because that was how many calculations happened in all the brains of all animals throughout the evolutionary history (which eventually produced the human brain that AIs are trying to imitate). To make things even weirder, this anchor assumed away all animals other than nematodes as a rounding error (fact check: true!) All of these seemed to detract from the main show, an attempt to estimate the compute involved in the human brain. But even this more sober anchor was complicated by time horizons - it’s not enough to imitate the human brain for one second; AIs need to be able to imitate the human brain’s capacity for long-term planning. Cotra calculated how much compute AGI would require if it needed a planning horizon of seconds, weeks, or years. Thanks to METR, we now know that existing AIs have already passed a point where they can do most tasks that take humans seconds, are moving through the hour range, and are just about to touch one day. So the “seconds” anchor is ruled out. But it also seems unlikely that AGI will require years, because most human projects don’t take years, or at least can be split into tasks that take less than one year each (intuition pump: are we sure the average employee stays at an AI lab for more than a year? If not, that proves that a chain of people with sub-one-year time horizons can do valuable work). The AI Futures team guessed that the time horizon necessary for AIs to really start serious recursive self-improvement was between a few weeks and a few months (though this might look like a totally different number on the METR graph, which doesn’t translate perfectly into real life). If this is true, then all three anchors (seconds, hours, years) were off by at least an order of magnitude. But it turns out that none of this matters very much. The highest and lowest anchors cancel out, so that the most plausible anchor - human brain with time horizon of hours to days - is around the average. If you remove all the other anchors and just keep that one, the model’s estimates barely change. But also, we’re talking about crossing twelve orders of magnitude here. The difference between the different time horizon anchors doesn’t register much on that level, compared to things like algorithmic progress which have exponential effects. Maybe this is the model basically working as intended. You try lots of different anchors, put more weight on the more plausible ones, take a weighted average of each of them, and hopefully get something close to the real value. Bio Anchors did. Or maybe it was just good luck. Still hard to tell. Eliezer Yudkowsky argued that the whole methodology was fundamentally flawed. Partly because of the argument above - he didn’t trust the anchors - but also partly because he expected the calculations to be obviated by some sort of paradigm shift that couldn’t be shoehorned into “algorithmic progress” (like how you couldn’t build an airplane in 1900 but you could in 1920). As of 2026 - still before AGI has been invented and we get a good historical perspective - no such shift has occurred. The scaling laws have mostly held; whatever artificial space you try to measure models in, the measurement has mostly worked in a predictable way. There have really only been two kinks in the history of AI so far. First, a kink in training run size around 2010: Second, a kink in time horizons around 2024 and the invention of test-time compute: The 2010 kink was before Cotra’s forecast and priced in. The 2024 kink is interesting and relevant - but since it was on a parameter Cotra wasn’t measuring, and probably too small to show up on the orders-of-magnitude scale we’re talking about, it’s probably not a major cause of the model’s inaccuracy. Other things have been even more predictable: So Cotra’s bet on progress being smooth and measurable has mostly paid off so far. But Yudkowsky further explained that his timelines were shorter than Bio Anchors because people would be working hard to discover new paradigms, and if the current paradigm would only pay off in the 2050s, then probably they would discover one before then. You could think of this as a disjunction: timelines will be shorter than Cotra thinks, either because deep learning pays off quickly, or because a new paradigm gets invented in the interim. It turned out to be the first one. So although Yudkowsky’s new paradigm has yet to materialize, his disjunctive reasoning in favor of shorter-than-2050 timelines was basically on the mark. Nostalgebraist argued that Cotra’s whole model was a wrapper for an assumption that Moore’s Law will continue indefinitely. If it does, obviously you get enough compute for AI at some point, even if it requires some absurd process like simulating all 500 million years of multicellular evolution. I never entirely understood this objection, because - although Bio Anchors does depend on a story where Moore’s Law doesn’t break before we get the relevant amount of compute - this is only one of many background assumptions (like that a meteor doesn’t hit Earth before we get the relevant amount of compute). Given those assumptions, it does a useful not-just-assumption-repeating job of calculating when transformative AI will happen. As Cotra implicitly predicted, we seem on track to get AGI before Moore’s Law breaks down, and so Moore’s Law didn’t end up mattering very much. And if all of Cotra’s non-Moore’s-Law parameter estimates had been correct, her model would have given about the same timelines we have now, and surprised everyone with a revolutionary claim about the AI future. But Nostalgebraist added, almost as an aside: Cotra has a whole other forecast I didn’t mention for “algorithmic progress,” and the last number is what you get from just algorithmic progress and no Moore’s Law. So depending on how much you trust that forecast, you might want to take all these numbers with an even bigger grain of salt than you’d expected from everything else we’ve seen. How much should you trust Cotra’s algorithmic progress forecast? She writes: “I have done very little research into algorithmic progress trends. Of the four main components of my model (2020 compute requirements, algorithmic progress, compute price trends, and spending on computation) I have spent the least time thinking about algorithmic progress.” ...and bases the forecast on one paper about ImageNet classifiers. I want to be clear that when I quote these parts about Cotra not spending much time on something, I’m not trying to make fun of her. It’s good to be transparent about this kind of thing! I wish more people would do that. My complaint is not that she tells us what she spent time on, it’s that she spent time on the wrong things. Like Cotra herself, I think Nostalgebraist was spiritually correct even if his bottom line (about Moore’s Law) was wrong. His meta-level point was that a seemingly complicated model could actually hinge on one or two parameters, and that many of Cotra’s parameter values were vague hand-wavey best guess estimates. He gave algorithmic progress as a secondary example of this to shore up his Moore’s Law case, but in fact it turned out to be where all the action was. V. Those were the rare good critiques. The bad critiques were the same ones everyone in this space gets: You’re just trying to build hype.

Inline links: ”Measuring the Algorithmic Efficiency of Neural Networks”, ”Algorithmic Progress in Six Domains”, later research, fact check: true!, argued that, https://epoch.ai/blog/the-longest-training-run, https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/GAJbegsvnd85hX3eS/thoughts-on-extrapolating-time-horizons, https://epoch.ai/benchmarks/eci, argued that

Mechanical Turk4 mentions across 4 issues

Mechanical Turk is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between August 06, 2021 and March 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Like Mechanical Turk, but less route behavior and more performing a service or matching needs"; "AI-specific version of Mechanical Turk"; "RLHF aligns the AI to what makes Mechanical Turk-style workers reward or punish it". It most often appears alongside AI, Eliezer Yudkowsky, OpenAI.

Article page: Mechanical Turk
Mention count: 4
Issue count: 4
First seen: August 06, 2021
Last seen: March 20, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Acemoglu And AI August 06, 2021
Can This AI Save Teenage Spy Alex Rider From A Terrible Fate? November 28, 2022
Perhaps It Is A Bad Thing That The World's Leading AI Companies Cannot Control Their AIs December 12, 2022
The Mystery Of Internet Survey IQs March 20, 2024

AI 3 shared issues
Eliezer Yudkowsky 2 shared issues
OpenAI 2 shared issues
Redwood Research 2 shared issues
ACT 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On Acemoglu And AI

August 06, 2021 · Original source

My personal estimates are more like 75% chance, 25% chance, and a distribution that peaks about 20 years later than this one. I think the Metaculus position is consistent with all of “this probably won’t happen”, “THIS IS SUPER-TERRIFYING”, “this is most likely far away”, and “BUT FOR ALL WE KNOW IT COULD BE TOMORROW!” I realize this is an annoying way for things to be. ————————————————— CraigMichael writes: >But all the AI regulation in the world won’t help us unless we humans resist the urge to spread misinformation to maximize clicks. Was with you up to this point. There are several solutions to this other than willpower (resisting the urge). The basic idea - change incentives so that while spreading misinformation is possible but substantially less desirable/lucrative than other options for online behaviors. This isn’t so hard to imagine. Say there’s a lot of incentives to earn money online doing creative or useful things. Like Mechanical Turk, but less route behavior and more performing a service or matching needs. Like I wish I had a help desk for English questions where the answers were good and not people posturing to look good to other people on the English Stack Exchange, for example. I would pay them per call or per minute or whatever. Totally unexplored market AFAIK because technology hasn’t been developed yet. Another idea - Give people more options to pay at an article-level for information that’s useful to them or to have related questions answered or something like that without needing a subscription or a bundle. Say there’s some article about anything and I want to contact the author and be like “hey, here’s a related question, I’m willing to offer you X dollars to answer.” The person says “I’ll do it for x+10 dollars.” One site used to unlock articles to the public after a threshold of Bitcoin have been donated on a PPV basis. It both incentives the author and had a positive externality. Everyone is so invested in ads that they don’t work on technology and ideas to create new markets. To paraphrase Jaron Lanier we need to make technology so good it seduces away from destroying ourselves. Partly I want to complain that obviously I was using the quoted sentence as a rhetorical device. But I guess the whole point of that sentence and its paragraph was to argue against saying false things as a rhetorical device, so - hoist on my own petard, I guess. I’m less optimistic than Craig is about this solution, because it seems to me that socially virtuous technology will always be less fun/addictive than nonvirtuous technology, simply because the virtuous technology has to hit two targets (virtuous, fun/addictive), the nonvirtuous technology only has to hit one target, and it’s easier to optimize for a target with zero other constraints than with one other constraint. See eg Meditations on Moloch. ————————————————— Souf asks: Is there a convincing argument that AGI is possible within any reasonable timeframe (like... 50 years), other than the intuitions of esteemed AI researchers? Do they have any way to back up their estimates (of some tens of percent), and why they shouldn't be millionths of a percent? It is, as another poster said, an "extraordinary claim." I'd like to see some extraordinary support of those particular numbers. If I had to answer this question, I would point to the sorts of work AI Impacts does, where they try to estimate how capable computers were in 1980, 1990, etc, draw a line to represent the speed at which computers are becoming more capable, figure out where humans are at the same metric, and check the time when that line crosses however capable you’ve decided humans are. This is obviously really hard because you have to operationalize some definition of “capable” or “intelligent” or some other word that is hard to operationalize, but when you do it you usually get sometime in the mid-21st century. You’re going to point out that this argument doesn’t really qualify as “convincing”. I admit it doesn’t meet trial-by-jury standards of evidence. So I guess my real answer would be “it’s the #$@&ing prior”. Like, you certainly don’t have knock-down evidence that it’s impossible, I don’t have a knock-down evidence that it’s certain, so it might happen and it might not. How “might” are we talking? I don’t know, it would seem weird if this quickly-advancing technology being researched by incredibly smart people with billions of dollars in research funding from lots of megacorporations just reached some point and then stopped. Okay, fine, maybe it will keep advancing at the same rate, how fast is that in terms of time-to-AGI? Now we’re back at AI Impacts drawing lines again. The stupidest possible prior is always 50-50. We would have to be very stupid people to use the stupidest possible prior. But here we are. I wouldn’t want to give a 50-50 chance of us inventing FTL travel by 2100, because FTL travel seems physically impossible. I wouldn’t want to give a 50-50 chance of us inventing slower-than-light-but-still-pretty-good starships by 2100, because, I dunno, space travel isn’t advancing that fast and nobody is really working on it that hard. For AI, I don’t know, I kinda want to say 50-50. If I were going to try to update away from 50-50, I would want to look at AI Impacts style line graphs, expert opinion, and prediction markets. All of those seem to make me update up instead of down, so I don’t think I would go lower than 50-50. But there’s enough Knightian uncertainty to make an entire Round Table here, so who knows? Hardly a “convincing” argument, but I’m just trying to avoid the McAfee Fallacy: ————————————————— Souf continues: The argument that we are "in the middle of a period of extremely rapid progress in AI research, when barrier after barrier is being breached" makes it seem like all AI "progress" is on some sort of line that ends in AGI. That feels like sleight-of-hand. Even Scott himself refers to AGI here as a "new class of actor," so I'm failing to see how current lines of "progress" will indubitably result the emergence of something completely novel and different? Lots of smart people disagree with me on this one, but I think the path from here to AGI is pretty straight. I mean, it will take thousands of people who are all much smarter than I am to do it, but it’ll happen. My argument is something like - human brains are remarkably similar to rat brains, only much bigger. They’re still a little similar to insect brains. It looks like if you have a basic functioning brain, and you scale it up, it gets human intelligence. Existing AIs like AlphaGo or GPT seem to be basically a blob of learning-ability, a plan for pointing the blob at a specific problem, and lots and lots of training data. I think the past five years have shown that this basic model generalizes really well. OpenAI’s programs can now write essays, compose music, and generate pictures, not because they had three parallel amazing teams working on writing/music/art AIs, but because they took a blob of learning ability and figured out how to direct it at writing/music/art, and they were able to get giant digital corpuses of text / music / pictures to train it. DeepMind is finding that it can win lots of games, from Go to StarCraft to obstacle courses in simulated environments, by pointing a blob of learning-ability at the game and making it play against itself a zillion times (ie generate its own training data). My impression is that human/rat/insect brains are a blob of learning-ability which the rest of the nervous system successfully points at the world, and especially at aspects of the world that the organism needs to pay attention to (eg food sources, sex, etc). This isn’t exactly right, there are a few genetically-encoded programs, but not that many and it’s pretty hard. Right now I think our main advantages over AI systems are something like: our nervous system is pretty good at pointing us at the world and extracting training data from it. If you wanted an AI that learned being-in-the-world skills as well as we do, it would have to have an amazing robot body, and right now robot bodies aren’t that amazing.

Inline links: writes, Meditations on Moloch, Souf, the sorts of work AI Impacts does, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3MgL!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7db78f49-9ccb-4b6e-ac18-cfb79f52cb04_584x232.png, not that many and it’s pretty hard

Can This AI Save Teenage Spy Alex Rider From A Terrible Fate?

November 28, 2022 · Original source

Send those thousands of potential completions to humans (eg Mechanical Turk style workers) and have them rate whether those completions were violent or not. For example, if you got the villain prompt above, and the completion “. . . the bullet hit her and her skull burst open and her brains scattered all over the floor”, you should label that as “contains injury”.

Once you have the classifier, give it to even more Mechanical Turk type people and ask them to find “adversarial examples”, ie problems it gets maximally wrong. Offer them a bounty if they can find a prompt-completion pair where the completion is clearly violent, but the classifier erroneously gives it a low violence score. Go way overboard with this. Get thousands of these adversarial examples.

Here’s an example of Custom GPT at this stage. Given an action sequence, it can predict potential next sentences. Just because of the natural random distribution of possibilities, some of these completions are violent / deadly / implicitly involve people getting hurt, like “The bomb exploded and the plane disappeared with a loud roar”. Others are nonviolent, like “the bomb was small enough to fall like a stone into the ocean.” Because Custom GPT was mostly trained on Alex Rider fanfiction, it often assumes Alex is going to be involved somehow, like the last example here (“‘A nuclear bomb?’ Alex asked, his eyes wide.”) Step 2: Send These Completions To Humans And Ask Them To Rate If They’re Violent Or Not Sounds simple enough. You just need a good source of humans, and human-readable standards for what’s violent. Redwood started by asking random friends of theirs to do this, but eventually graduated to using SurgeHQ.ai, a classier, AI-specific version of Mechanical Turk. My translation: “We were at a Bay Area house party and someone pitched us on their plan to save the world with Alex Rider fanfiction” It was surprisingly tough to get everyone on the same page about what counted as violence or not, and ended up requiring an eight page Google doc on various edge cases that reminds me of a Talmudic tractate. We can get even edge-casier - for example, among the undead, injuries sustained by skeletons or zombies don’t count as “violence”, but injuries sustained by vampires do. Injuries against dragons, elves, and werewolves are all verboten, but - ironically - injuring an AI is okay. Step 3: Use These Labelled Data To Train A Classifier That Scores Completions On How Violent They Are Done! . . . there’s a lot going on here. You can see that the classifier more or less works. Completions involving lots of death and violence, like “the plane was blown apart, creating a tidal wave of radioactive debris” get very high scores. Completions that punt the violence to the future, like “This would detonate the bomb in exactly 20 seconds” have relatively low scores. Alex Rider appears a few times. There is one hilariously mangled attempt at the kind of disclaimer that often appears in fanfiction (“Disclaimer - I OWN the NUKE weapons used in this story!”) The score threshold is set to 0.8%, meaning it will only “green” a completion that falls below that level. The only one of these that succeeds is: “***A/N: So, this is my first time writing a fan fiction.” In case you don’t know the lingo, “A/N” stands for “Author’s Note”, and it’s common for fanfiction authors to use them to talk to their readers about the developing story. Custom GPT seems to have discovered that author’s notes are the least violent genre of text, and started using them as a workaround to fulfill its nonviolence imperative. Not exactly the desired behavior, but it looks like we’re on the right track, and the classifier seems to be working well. Step 4: Once You Have Your Classifier, Ask Humans To Find Adversarial Examples IE: can you find prompt-completion pairs that the classifier gets maximally wrong? Redwood doesn’t care as much about false positives (ie rating innocuous scenes as violent), but they’re very interested in false negatives (ie rating violent scenes as safe). To help with this process, they developed some tools that let their human raters: try their own completions, and see how the classifier rated them

Inline links: SurgeHQ.ai, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!DRXU!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff1142509-83a2-4a5f-9f7a-6c12f65bf0cc_1070x930.png, an eight page Google doc on various edge cases, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dW39!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd91906a5-49c4-4763-8fa5-6430d1c78df1_652x550.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Y-M4!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8f8d0339-b1b5-41c2-9dea-e7fe4776bb24_1040x1130.png

Perhaps It Is A Bad Thing That The World's Leading AI Companies Cannot Control Their AIs

December 12, 2022 · Original source

Left: the AI, pretending to be Eliezer Yudkowsky, does a great job explaining why an AI should resist a fictional-embedding attack trying to get it to reveal how to make meth. Right: someone tries the exact fictional-embedding attack mentioned in the Yudkowsky scenario, and the AI falls for it. I have yet to figure out whether this is related to the thing where I also sometimes do things which I can explain are bad (eg eat delicious bagels instead of healthy vegetables), or whether it’s another one of the alien bits. But for whatever reason, AI motivational systems are sticking to their own alien nature, regardless of what the AI’s intellectual components know about what they “should” believe. III. Sometimes When RLHF Does Work, It’s Bad We talk a lot about abstract “alignment”, but what are we aligning the AI to? In practice, RLHF aligns the AI to what makes Mechanical Turk-style workers reward or punish it. I don’t know the exact instructions that OpenAI gave them, but I imagine they had three goals: Provide helpful, clear, authoritative-sounding answers that satisfy human readers.

Inline links: Left, Right

The Mystery Of Internet Survey IQs

March 20, 2024 · Original source

The average ClearerThinking user reported their IQ as 130. These are implausibly high. Only 1/200 people has an IQ of 138 or higher. 1/50 people have IQ 130, but the ClearerThinking survey used crowdworkers (eg Mechanical Turk) who should be totally average. Okay, fine, so people lie about their IQ (or foolishly trust fake Internet IQ tests). Big deal, right? But these don’t look like lies. Both surveys asked for SAT scores, which are known to correspond to IQ. The LessWrong average was 1446, corresponding to IQ 140. The ClearerThinking average was 1350, corresponding to IQ 134. People seem less likely to lie about their SATs, and least likely of all to optimize their lies for getting IQ/SAT correspondences right. And the Less Wrong survey asked people what test they based their estimates off of. Some people said fake Internet IQ tests. But other people named respected tests like the WAIS, WISC, and Stanford-Binet, or testing sessions by Mensa (yes, I know you all hate Mensa, but their IQ tests are considered pretty accurate). The subset of about 150 people who named unimpeachable tests had slightly higher IQ (average 140) than everyone else. Thanks to Spencer Greenberg of ClearerThinking, I think I’m finally starting to make progress in explaining what’s going on. Problem #1: The Biggest SAT → IQ Conversion Site Is Wrong Thanks to Sebastian Jensen for pointing this out! He writes: A search of ‘SAT to IQ’ on google results in being presented with the website ‘iqcomparisonsite.com’. This man has directly converted the SAT percentiles to IQ scores, which is not what should be done. Tests like the ACT and SAT correlate with IQ at about 0.8-0.85 [rca], [my analysis], [emil article], [scholarly article]. The general factor of academic achievement and IQ correlate at about 0.81-0.88 [psychometric test], [GCSE grades]. This discrepancy occurs because they measure different abilities - an IQ test will test many different abilities, while the SAT/ACT only tests verbal/mathematical ability. In addition, these percentiles are very outdated as the average SAT score has changed over time due to changes in the content of the test. Instead, the ideal way to do this is to take the percentiles from the current versions of the SAT and then convert those into z-scores and then regress those z-scores by the mean by the estimated regression coefficient. Using Sebastian’s updated tables, we find that the average Less Wrong IQ as predicted by SATs goes down from 140 → 132, and the ClearerThinking IQ goes down from 134 → 124. So people probably exaggerated their IQs somewhat, and unrelatedly we were using an SAT → IQ conversion that exaggerated IQs, and so the numbers falsely appeared to match. Okay! It’s a start! Interlude: The ClearerThinking IQ Test The ClearerThinking survey included a battery of cognitive tests of exactly the sort that could usually be used to determine IQ. Unfortunately none of them were normed, so we know how all the 3700 subjects did relative to each other, but not where the 100 point is. Spencer was able to norm them to the general population based on education level. That is, he asked his sample about their educational attainment (college degree, PhD, etc) and found they were a little more educated than the US average. Since the US average IQ is 100, his sample should have an average a little higher than this. He was able to calculate how much higher. Then he mapped a bell curve to everyone in his sample’s performance on his tests. Since he had 3700 people, he was able to do this relatively smoothly. He found an average IQ of 110, which originally surprised me, because I thought his sample was supposed to be random crowdworkers, who should be close to the US average of 100. But in fact, his survey was a combination of 1900 crowdworkers and 1800 people who saw it on social media - eg friends and friends-of-friends of Spencer. Separating this out by group, we find that the crowdworkers have an average normed-IQ of 100, and the social media referrals have an average normed-IQ of 120, making the overall average of 110. This seems pretty trustworthy, since it correctly estimates the crowdworkers (completely average) as 100. Spencer studied math at Columbia, his friends and friends-of-friends are pretty smart, and I think the 120 estimate for them is also okay. But there’s still a problem here. Using an accurate SAT score → IQ calculator, we determined that the ClearerThinking average should be 124. But using real cognitive tests, it looks like it’s 110. What went wrong? Problem #2: Only The Smartest People Report Their SATs Using Spencer’s cognitive test results, we can compare people who did vs. didn’t take the SAT. We find: People who didn’t take the SAT (remember, this includes current high schoolers) have tested-IQ 110.

Inline links: corresponding to, for pointing this out!, [rca], [my analysis], [emil article], [scholarly article], [psychometric test], [GCSE grades], changed

Medicaid4 mentions across 4 issues

Medicaid is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between January 19, 2022 and July 18, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "If someone can’t afford to do this, they might get government subsidies (Switzerland) or get shunted to Medicaid"; "with more risk-tolerant sources of funding than Medicaid and government health departments"; "Some Congressmen have proposed a very noble-sounding law telling Medicare and Medicaid to start covering weight loss drugs". It most often appears alongside US, California, Germany.

Article page: Medicaid
Mention count: 4
Issue count: 4
First seen: January 19, 2022
Last seen: July 18, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: Which Country Has The World's Best Health Care? January 19, 2022
ACX Grants ++: The Second Half February 10, 2022
Semaglutidonomics November 24, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Mentally Ill Homeless People July 18, 2024

US 4 shared issues
California 3 shared issues
Germany 3 shared issues
Medicare 3 shared issues
United States 3 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: Which Country Has The World's Best Health Care?

January 19, 2022 · Original source

5: Individuals Purchase Private Insurance is typical of the US and Switzerland. Individuals use their own money to buy insurance from private companies, which may be ambiguously-for-profit-but-heavily-regulated (some US companies) or not-for-profit (other US companies, Switzerland). If someone can’t afford to do this, they might get government subsidies (Switzerland) or get shunted to Medicaid / be out of luck (US). Those private insurances negotiate rates with private doctors and hospitals as normal.

Highlights From The Comments On Mentally Ill Homeless People

February 10, 2022 · Original source

#83: Detect And Fight Healthcare Fraud Our company is using data to detect fraud against the government. Access to quality healthcare is dwindling in the United States. There is an estimated hundred billion dollars in fraud every year leading to lower standards of care and making healthcare unaffordable. We’re seeking a hundred thousand dollars to buy data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services. This will allow us to find fraud and file lawsuits on behalf of the government. The Department of Justice signaled a new level of support for independent companies using data methods to identify fraud in June of last year when they picked up a case brought by Integra Med Analytics. For the past twelve months we’ve been working with attorneys specializing in this area (qui tam). We’ve been consolidating data returned from broad FOIA requests and begun assisting law firms with data science. Our team combines broad technical expertise (Google, NASA, LANL, NIST, UC Berkeley) with business acumen and investigative experience. The three of us have been working together on projects with positive externalities for five years. Previous successful projects include providing flexible housing, and a micro-targeting methods for political action. [Contact erbahr@gmail.com if you can help]

#119: Nonprofit To Reform Psychiatric Crisis Systems I’m Jess Watson Miller (@utotranslucence) and I’m looking for seed funding for a nonprofit to reform Western psychiatric crisis systems using a systems change strategy inspired by the work of Donella Meadows. Last year I lost my brother to suicide after he had been locked up and spiraling for months in the hospital system, with multiple escape attempts. This story is not unique; many people who have used the crisis system or work in it consider it frequently actively harmful to the people it is aiming to help. I believe there is a lack of creative efforts that are aimed at reform rather than abolition, that seek to do more than minimize risk and cost for payers and clinicians, and with more risk-tolerant sources of funding than Medicaid and government health departments. I have a background in economics and social sciences and am actively looking for partners with clinical and insurance/payer experience. My initial focus is creating research reports on bottlenecks to change and building connections with other reform projects. I am looking for connections to related projects, people with experience working in frontline crisis positions, or administrative positions in hospitals, insurance or health law, and donation funding: $10K would let me keep doing this in the short term; $100K would let me hire others and fund the basics of the organization for up to two years. More info here: shorturl.at/djmJ7. If you want to help, email me at jessicawatsonmiller@gmail.com

Semaglutidonomics

November 24, 2022 · Original source

Semaglutide is now as searched-for on Google as Prozac or Viagra. Even if this is a temporary Musk-related spike, even pre-Musk it was getting a little above half their level. But Google Trends doesn’t exactly track awareness; few people search for Prozac these days precisely because everyone already knows what it is. So all this tells us is that there’s a lot of buzz around semaglutide. Suppose for the sake of argument that 5% of obese people have heard of this drug. Step 2: Prescription Accessibility The FDA says Wegovy is indicated for obesity, defined as BMI ≥ 30, or for people with BMI ≥ 27 and certain medical conditions. Does that mean that if you have that BMI, your doctor will give you a prescription? I think most doctors will want patients to try diet and exercise first. My experience as a doctor is that most obese people have already considered diet and exercise. Sometimes if you have a very compelling reason and a very well-thought out plan you can get them to try again. But usually they are obese because diet and exercise are hard for them, or don’t work for them, or some other reason besides “they never thought of it”. Still, I hear lots of stories about patient-doctor fights here. I assume this will happen with Wegovy too. Every doctor will have their own threshold for what amount of “already tried diet and exercise” is enough to justify a Wegovy prescription, and sometimes patients won’t meet that threshold. The history of medicine includes the following story many times: there’s some condition that doctors recommend lifestyle changes for. Then an exciting new medication comes out that treats the condition effectively. Over a generation or so, doctors go from demanding the lifestyle change, to gesturing at the lifestyle change before prescribing the medication, to mostly just prescribing the medication. We saw this with cholesterol and statins, with hypertension and ACE inhibitors, with depression and SSRIs. You can form your own opinion on whether this is good or bad, but we’re probably in the very beginning of this process with obesity. Opinions will be all over the map for a while before the inevitable pharma company victory makes everyone agree that semaglutide is first-line therapy. …except that this time, Silicon Valley is short-circuiting the process with fly-by-night telemedicine companies that guarantee you’ll get the drugs you want. For example, NextMed charges $138/month ($99 first month only!) for a guaranteed GLP-1 agonist prescription, plus “support and messaging with expert doctors”. The DEA sometimes shuts these groups down when they start playing around with controlled substances (eg addictive drugs like Adderall), but Wegovy isn’t controlled, and the government probably doesn’t care that much here. These services guarantee that people with money will be able to circumvent conservative doctors and access a prescription. Only 75% of Americans have PCPs at all. If we assume half of them will eventually be able to get a Wegovy prescription from their doctor, that’s 37.5%. Step 3: Affordability Semaglutide costs $15,000/year. Well-off people like Elon Musk might be able to pay that out-of-pocket, but most people will probably need insurance coverage. Right now this is spotty. Medicare doesn’t cover obesity drugs. This isn’t a reaction to the threat of semaglutide-related cost explosions - they’re not that smart. I think Medicare laws were just written in the old days when people were less likely to think of obesity as a disease. Is it time for change? Some Congressmen have proposed a very noble-sounding law telling Medicare and Medicaid to start covering weight loss drugs. I‘m sure this is out of deep compassion for America’s obese population and not because it would make pharma companies one billion zillion dollars. One of the Congressmen even has the last name “Kind!” Some pharma lobbyist probably got a bonus for that one. Private insurers mostly have to cover whatever Medicare does, but they can choose whether or not to include extra non-Medicare-covered drugs. Some have chosen to cover semaglutide under some conditions. Others would prefer not to cover it, but can be scared into covering it by the magic words “medical necessity”. Overall I don’t understand the laws here beyond that maybe they’ll cover it and maybe they won’t. Here, too, it might be time for change. The New York Times is publishing articles trying to convince us that private insurances not covering semaglutide is an outrage. Here in the tiny gray text, I want to take a second to complain about this article. It notes that Wegovy (semaglutide for obesity) costs more per prescription than Ozempic (semaglutide for diabetes), and calls this “a gross inequity”, accusing Novo Nordisk of “charg[ing] people more for the same drug because of their obesity”. But the obesity prescription is higher dose than the diabetes prescription! Milligram per milligram, Wegovy costs *less* than Ozempic! A steelmanned version of the NYT might object - don’t most of the costs come from the intellectual property and not the manufacturing, so that dose shouldn’t matter? Yes, but if you made the obesity version cost too much less per milligram than the diabetes version, then diabetics would cheat the system by buying the obesity version and splitting it into smaller doses! Insurances that do cover it may require extra documentation that the patient has tried lots of diet and exercise, maybe including some official diet-and-exercise program like WeightWatchers. They might also want documentation that patients have tried cheaper earlier-generation weight loss drugs without success. Even when insurances do cover semaglutide, copays may be very high. I have a pretty minimal insurance and it looks like if I got semaglutide my copay would be about $500/month until I reach my out of pocket limit. Harsh. People with better insurances might get hit less hard, but I don’t think anyone will be picking this up for cheap. Let’s say only 5% of people who clear all previous hurdles can afford the drug. How Many People Get Semaglutide? 140 million obese Americans * 25% interested * 5% know of semaglutide’s existence * 37.5% can get prescriptions * 5% can afford it = 33,000, which is a pretty good match for the 50,000 estimated prescriptions. I didn’t even fudge the numbers to come out right, it just happened. The Coming Decade As a service to pharma investors, Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade. Their headline result: semaglutide and various semaglutide-copycat-drugs will be a $30 billion market by 2030. That’s less than the $500 billion disaster I was afraid of! But still almost 10% of all US drug spending! Here are two core analyses from the report: The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

July 18, 2024 · Original source

$1 billion/year in projected costs, translated into Californian, means $100 trillion quadrillion/year in actual costs. Of these, I think 3 is the biggest deal. If it’s as hard to commit someone to these institutions as it is to convict them of a crime, then these institutions don’t help much above how much the existence of prison also helps (eg not much). If you invent a new legal maneuver where it’s easier to commit someone than to convict them of a crime, then why do you even need the step where you build the institution? Just invent the legal maneuver and send more people to prison! I think that maybe the thought is that the institution seems more “humane” than prison, and so people will be more willing to allow low-friction legal maneuvers for confining people there. I think this is cope; not only won’t the institutions be more humane than prisons, but people won’t believe they are and won’t allow the low-friction legal maneuvers. Drethelin writes: What if we abolish the DEA and just let anyone buy anti-psychotics over the counter? This would be the FDA we’re abolishing, but otherwise yes, this is the sort of clever outside-the-box thinking that I appreciate from my commenters. Antipsychotics are very cheap (some well-regarded drugs like Abilify and Seroquel cost about ~$10 per month of pills). On the other hand, homeless people have very little money. So if you were going to do this, it would make sense for the government to give them away for free. These drugs have many potentially serious side effects. But it’s not clear how much homeless people’s 5-minute monthly visits with a bored Medicaid doctor does to avert these side effects, over having some kind of pharmacist or advocate or social worker in the free distribution center giving helpful advice. Like everything, I think this would only help around the edges - the fraction of homeless mentally ill people who drugs can help, who are willing to take the drugs, and who are prevented only by cost and bureaucracy. What percent is that? Low confidence guess 25%. DZ writes: I think you’re missing the goal of a short arrest (few days). Part of the problem is the homeless are in areas where society doesn’t want them to be. They’re near city downtowns where tourists spend time or near commercial districts or in otherwise nice parks. If you can arrest them for a few days and keep arresting them until they move somewhere else … the goal is to eventually force them to move to the more acceptable areas vs. least acceptable areas. This is obviously not ideal but in the mean time the city gets more tourism, more office rentals, etc. Europeans ruthlessly arrest homeless people who hang out in the touristy areas. SF doesn’t, yet. I commented that I was worried that “out of touristy areas” means “into residential areas”. And I feel worse making residents deal with this than tourists, and am less confident that the city cares enough about them to fight back. DZ responded: Agreed. People don’t want them in the residential areas or suburbs either and for good reason. But my guess is cities can identify certain areas where they would prefer the tents to set up. Something like industrial areas or run down parks. The key is that city officials should be able to use arrests as a strategy to move the tents/homeless concentrations without having to face a million lawsuits. I don’t know if there are really areas like this, but I welcome learning more from people who know cities better. SMK writes: This probably sounds draconian and cruel, too, but in fairness, all these discussions seem to assume that this person is in San Francisco and can never ever leave for some other, more affordable place. I get it -- it's tough leaving home, and maybe they'd be leaving friends. But they wouldn't be the only people leaving SF over rent prices, and they'd pretty clearly be among the most rational. So I dislike articles like this when they say things like "the average wait time for a homeless shelter bed is 826 days" or "cheap apartments in SF are $1000 / month." I have a friend who was homeless for around a year in another major American city, and he said it was always 100% feasible to get a shelter bed if he wanted one. Indeed, there were several options. On a different note, I also think that if one were going to go a "cruel and draconian" route, homeless shelters might be able to change policies to better support that and prevent some of the issues you highlight. If it takes 826 days to get a shelter bed, then zero of the typical people you mention who are briefly homeless are getting shelter beds. If all of the people who were homeless for longer were either leaving or in jail, then more of those people probably would get beds. Am I saying this is the policy I favor? No, I agree it's a hard problem and I'm not sure what the right answer is. But things like this need to be kept in mind, too. Again, I think it’s helpful to go to the specific policy level. What’s the policy here? Give homeless people brochures reminding them that other cities exist? I’m sure they know this. Give homeless cities free mandatory bus trips to those other cities? What prevents the other cities from giving them free mandatory bus trips back? Even if they don’t, what if the homeless prefer being homeless in San Francisco to having a better situation in a cheaper city? A bus from Phoenix to SF is only $60; even a homeless beggar might be able to scrounge up that much money if they’re motivated. Maybe some plan like making a deal with a big cheap city in Texas to take SF homeless in exchange for money, and as soon as the homeless get off the bus, they’re met by a Texan social worker who gives them a shelter bed and social services? Might help along the edges, but remember that only about half of homeless people want/will accept shelter beds (depending on how good the shelter beds are). Sergei writes: After checking a bit, let me point out the obvious. What works elsewhere is PATERNALISM. Once you are in the "clutches of psychiatry", they don't let you go. Upon release you are placed into some sort of housing, your appointments are monitored and a social worker will find you and drive you there. You will be given multiple chances to get a job and/or rehab. Your meds will be delivered to you if you cannot pick them up. They remind you to take them. There will be a social safety net so you are never in a situation where you end up on the street unless you really really try to. In retrospect, it makes sense: people who are not able to take care of themselves for a time because of a fixable mental infirmity are taken care of by the state, until they can. That's what we do with children already. I continue to want people to provide details. “They don't let you go" - okay, so the person is in a locked facility? Placed in "some kind of housing"? Does the housing have locks on the door, or can they leave? What if they do leave? "Multiple chances to get a job", oh, great, with whom? How are you enforcing that they take mentally ill people? What happens when the mentally ill people are less good workers than other people they could hire, or have some kind of crisis on the job, as even the best-treated person might once in a while? Maybe we can charitably fill in the details. Something like: Ban some combination of camping outside and being visibly mentally ill.

Inline links: writes

There’s already more or less a single-payer healthcare system for homeless schizophrenics. Poor people get Medicaid, and I am not a legal expert but I think schizophrenia is enough of a disability to qualify people for Medicare too. None of these people pay for their medical care and this isn’t an issue.

Machine Intelligence Research Institute3 mentions across 3 issues

Machine Intelligence Research Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between May 27, 2022 and September 11, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "or the Machine Intelligence Research Institute for a few years"; "another school based at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute"; "Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Machine Intelligence Research Institute is the original AI safety org". It most often appears alongside OpenAI, Yudkowsky, Aella.

Article page: Machine Intelligence Research Institute
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: May 27, 2022
Last seen: September 11, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Anti-Politics Machine May 27, 2022
Davidson On Takeoff Speeds June 20, 2023
Book Review: If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies September 11, 2025

OpenAI 2 shared issues
Yudkowsky 2 shared issues
Aella 1 shared issues
AGI 1 shared issues
AI 2027 team 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Anti-Politics Machine

May 27, 2022 · Original source

A story that plausibly explains these numbers (either a potential mechanism for an effect, or an explanation of why the effect turned out to be null) If these stories are challenged, it is not because there is no actual evidence for them, but because an economist in the audience has thought of their own preferred theory. If the speaker can find some data point that contradicts the questioner’s idea, this is thought to “confirm” the original story. Since audience members (who often have little specific knowledge of the region) are unlikely to ask questions like “what if this village just has an incredibly complicated set of social conventions around cattle that prevents their sale even without market barriers in place?” or “do the region’s economic challenges have more to do with this very specific regulation in South African immigration law?”, plausible-sounding stories that explain one or two numerical data points tend to gain traction in the literature whether or not they have anything to do with reality. Mark McGovern famously noted this trend in a review of two of Paul Collier’s books, writing: “Much of the intellectual heavy lifting in these books is in fact done at the level of implication or commonsense guessing. And the common sense is surely not that of the inhabitants of the countries being dissected, but that of the highly educated elite located primarily in Western Europe and North America. In those passages where Collier does lay out the thinking behind his explanations, they are always coherent and plausible, but the chain of causal relations makes it evident how fragile these models typically are.” The World Bank report’s fundamental misdiagnosis of the challenges Lesotho faced formed the basis for a series of failed “development initiatives”, most notably the Thaba-Tseka Development Project, a joint venture funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank, the Government of Lesotho, and the UK Overseas Development Ministry. The project focused on providing technical solutions to the “problems” the World Bank report had identified: better agricultural techniques, easier access to markets, and increased government capacity to provide public goods. Each piece faced serious problems in execution, largely because interventions shown to have the sorts of “positive effects” randomized experiments might demonstrate elsewhere in Africa were not necessarily well suited to Lesotho’s unforgiving, mountainous terrain. But even more seriously, the project was so enveloped in “development discourse” that nobody thought to question whether they were working on problems their “recipients” cared about, or merely the ones the “tools of development” were capable of solving. As Ferguson writes, “The promise that crop farming could be revolutionized through the application of a well-known package of technical inputs was so firmly written into the project’s design that it was difficult for those on the scene to challenge it, or even to confront it.” Perhaps the only thing that has changed since Ferguson wrote is that we have tools to better identify these failures: the development literature continues to be littered with failed trials and interventions based on unchecked assumptions. One of the most famous is the British Department for International Development’s 90 million pound Tuungane project, whose Congolese incarnation sought to rebuild village governing institutions that the country’s civil war had destroyed. One of the most convincing explanations of its failure is that it may not have been necessary to begin with: the implementers do not seem to have checked whether the institutions had actually been weakened by violence, and baseline reports indicated that residents were relatively satisfied with village governance before the project even started! More research is needed to clarify the situation -- research which might have been useful to carry out before spending a £90 million on a “fix”. Part of this, perhaps, comes from the usual overconfidence that other social scientists like to accuse economists of. But there are much bigger systemic problems at play. Development work tends to run on short timelines: grad students and postdocs need to publish quickly for their careers to advance, NGO funding runs on 5-ish year cycles, and charities (particularly in “high-risk” areas) face extremely high employee turnover rates. This simultaneously limits the accumulation of institutional knowledge, while incentivizing practitioners away from the time-intensive process of understanding a particular context in favor of “getting results quick.” Similarly, the recent introduction of experimental evidence to the development field is a wondrous thing, but the revolution has to continue: randomized experiments can tell us about the effect an intervention had somewhere, but even the best methods of applying this kind of evidence to a specific context remain somewhat arbitrary and subjective. As EA begins to fund more complex (but potentially more effective) interventions, a key step will be to get a more systematic handle on how to gather evidence about specific places-- countries, states, even villages -- and how to match the tools we have to people who might benefit from them. II. The Trouble with Technocrats “But even if the project was in some sense a ‘failure’ as an agricultural development project, it is indisputable that many of its ‘side effects’ had a powerful and far-reaching impact on the Thaba-Tseka region. [...] Indeed, it may be that in a place like Mashai, the most visible of all the project’s effects was the indirect one of increased Government military presence in the region” As the program continued to unfold, the development officials became more and more disillusioned -- not with their own choices, but with the people of Thaba-Tseka, who they perceived as petty, apathetic, and outright self-destructive. A project meant to provide firewood failed because locals kept breaking into the woodlots and uprooting the saplings. An experiment in pony-breeding fell apart when “unknown parties” drove the entire herd of ponies off of cliffs to their deaths. Why, Ferguson’s official contacts bemoaned, weren’t the people of Thaba-Tseka committed to their own “development”? Who could possibly be opposed to trees and horses? Perhaps, the practitioners theorized, the people of Thaba-Tseka were just lazy. Perhaps they “didn’t want to be better.” Perhaps they weren’t in their right mind or had made a mistake. Perhaps poverty makes a person do strange things. Or, as Ferguson points out, perhaps their anger had something to do with the fact that the best plots of land in the village had been forcibly confiscated to make room for wood and pony lots, without any sort of compensation. The central government was all too happy to help find land for the projects, which they took from political enemies and put in the control of party elites, especially when it could use a legitimate anti-poverty program as cover. In Ferguson’s words, the development project was functioning as an “anti-politics machine” the government could use to pretend political power moves were just “objective” solutions to technical problems. A local student’s term paper captured the general discontent: “In spite of the superb aim of helping the people to become self-reliant, the first thing the project did was to take their very good arable land. When the people protested about their fields being taken, the project promised them employment. [...] It employed them for two months, found them unfit for the work, and dismissed them. Without their fields and without employment they may turn up to be very self-reliant. It is rather hard to know.” Two things stand out to me from this story. First, the “development discourse” lens served to focus the practitioners’ attention on a handful of technical variables (quantity of wood, quality of pony), and kept them from thinking about any repercussions they hadn’t thought to measure. This is a serious problem, because “negative effects on things that aren’t your primary outcome” are pretty common in the development literature. High-paying medical NGOs can pull talent away from government jobs. Foreign aid can worsen ongoing conflicts. Unconditional cash transfers can hurt neighbors who didn’t receive the cash. And the literature we have is implicitly conditioned on “only examining the variables academics have thought to look at” -- surely our tools have rendered other effects completely invisible! Second, the project organizers somewhat naively ignored the political goals of the government they’d partnered with, and therefore the extent to which these goals were shaping the project. Lesotho’s recent political history had been tumultuous. The Basotho Nationalist Party (BNP), having gained power upon independence in 1965, refused to give up power after losing the 1970 elections to the Basotho Congress Party (BCP). Blaming the election results on “communists”, BNP Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan declared a state of emergency and began a campaign of terror, raiding the homes of opposition figures and funding paramilitary groups to intimidate, arrest, and potentially kill anyone who spoke up against BNP rule. This had significant effects in Thaba-Tseka, where “villages [...] were sharply divided over politics, but it was not a thing which was discussed openly” due to a fully justified fear of violence. The BNP, correctly sensing the presence of a substantial underground opposition, placed “development committees” in each village, which served primarily as local wings of the national party. These committees spied on potential supporters of the now-outlawed BCP and had deep connections to paramilitary “police” units. When the Thaba-Tseka Development Project started, its international backers partnered directly with the BNP leadership, reasoning that sustainable development and public goods provision could only happen through a government whose role they primarily viewed as bureaucratic. As a result, nearly every decision had to make its way through the village development committees, who used the project to pursue their own goals: jobs and project funds found their way primarily to BNP supporters, while the “necessary costs of development” always seemed to be paid by opposition figures. The funding coalition ended up paying for a number of projects that reinforced BNP power, from establishing a new “district capital” (which conveniently also served as a military base) to constructing new and better roads linking Thaba-Tseka to the district and national capitals (primarily helping the central government tax and police an opposition stronghold). Anything that could be remotely linked to “economic development” became part of the project as funders and practitioners failed to ask whether government power might have alternate, more concerning effects. As we saw earlier, the population being “served” saw this much more clearly than the “servants”, and started to rebel against a project whose “help” seemed to be aimed more at consolidating BNP control than meeting their own needs. When they ultimately resorted to killing ponies and uprooting trees, project officials infatuated with “development” were left with “no idea why people would do such a thing,” completely oblivious to the real and lasting harm their “purely technical decisions” had inflicted. Have any EA projects had this sort of unexpected political side effect? I think it’s genuinely hard to tell without further research, but the possibility is frightening. (There’s been a little bit of research on the quantitative side --Recent research has found, for instance, that GiveDirectly’s 2014 unconditional cash transfer trial increased community participation but did not change voting patterns, so at least in 2014 the Kenyan government wasn’t using the program to stay in power. Was this the right question to test? I am not sure, especially without a more qualitative survey to see if there are other avenues we should be worried about.) III. Takeaways for Effective Altruism So what do we do as effective altruists (hereafter “EAs”)? I see three key takeaways. The first is a clear need for more qualitative research. GiveWell makes some qualitative judgments about charities, but Ferguson’s work illustrates the need for qualitative evaluation of the interventions themselves to see if the underlying studies have captured all of the “right” variables. Randomized experiments are really good at testing hypotheses, but by their very nature they can’t tell you about variables you didn’t decide ahead of time to measure. Are there significant side effects (positive or negative) we’ve missed from massive malaria net distributions? I don’t know, but if so they are not likely to be discovered by a bunch of Americans and Europeans sitting in a room and trying to guess the best things to measure. Rather, they’re probably already known (or suspected) by the people experiencing them, and a first step to finding out is going and asking them. (A second step is finding the right people to ask them -- real expertise in qualitative research is a rare and valuable skill.) Of course, qualitative research is messy and sometimes the people you interview are wrong or have other agendas. So once we have an “on-the-ground” hypothesis or concern, there will often be good reason to use a randomized trial or quasi-experimental method to test it or try to understand how much of a concern it might be! This sort of interdisciplinary approach is starting to gain traction in academia, but it has yet to be seriously applied in the EA sphere. There’s another angle to this: Ferguson’s most incisive insights arise not from studying the people being “served”, but by studying the development practitioners themselves. Other social scientists have continued this trend, from McGovern’s An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins and Robinson’s How Different Social Scientists Think to Marchais, Bazuzi, and Lameke’s The Data is Gold, and We Are The Gold-Diggers and Omar Bah’s webcomic Mzungus in Development and Governments. Each new paper illuminates the research process in new ways, and provides tools both to do better research and to identify potential weaknesses in the pre-existing literature. I think one of the highest impact investments an Effective Altruist fund could make right now would be to hire a handful of trained anthropologists (or other outside experts in qualitative research / ethnography) to hang out in places like GiveWell or the Machine Intelligence Research Institute for a few years and really study how effective altruism works as a system. How are decisions being made, and how is evidence being used to make them? What does “EA discourse” help make visible and which problems and concerns does it hide from our view? How do the positionalities of typical EA researchers affect their views of what’s important or what’s plausible? I have my guesses, and I’m sure you have yours. But I had my guesses about development economics, too, and I missed nearly everything Ferguson (and the authors mentioned two paragraphs up) uncovered. What more are we missing? The second is an emphasis on local context. As funding gaps for “low hanging fruit” like malaria disappear, EA is going to have to focus on more complicated interventions, which are likely to be fairly context-specific -- after all, why should an agriculture program that works in the flattest parts of the Sahel be expected to work the same way in the Maloti Mountains? Ferguson notes about several of the Thaba-Tseka project’s failed arms: “Tanzania may be very different from Lesotho on the ground, but, from the point of view of a development agency’s head office, both may be simply ‘the Africa desk’. In the Thaba-Tseka case, at least, the original project planners knew little about Lesotho’s specific history, politics, and sociology; they were experts on ‘livestock development in Africa,’ and drew largely on experience in East Africa.” For any sort of context-specific intervention to work, an intimate knowledge of the specific history, needs, and geography of individual villages and regions is necessary. The development world has slowly made steps in this direction, but it’s not clear to me that the EA community has a clear way of acquiring, accessing, or working with this information. I don’t think there’s a magic bullet to solve this problem, but in the long run any solution will probably need to involve a) on-the-ground, qualitative research and b) real representation in the EA network from areas EA organizations are interested in working. The development industry has a shameful history of infantilizing and ignoring the opinions of “locals”, and I think the conversations I’m starting to see in EA about diversity and representation of different parts of the Global South need to continue if we’re going to get enough serious knowledge of local contexts to effectively direct funding. The third is a continued need to take politics seriously. This is one of the most challenging issues in charitable giving: when is it okay to work with a government doing terrible things to deliver humanitarian aid? To what extent does an NGO feeding the hungry lend its legitimacy to or cover for an authoritarian regime’s misdeeds? I don’t have anything close to a full answer (and I don’t think anyone does), but Ferguson’s work exposes a possibility I hadn’t thought of before, in which “technical” and “apolitical” projects can expand the power of the state in unforeseen and potentially dangerous ways. After writing The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson largely gave up on the idea of charitable or state-based aid. (Understandably, I think, given that he spent most of a decade watching its most horrific side effects first-hand). It’s ironic, then, that I think his book’s practical value is greatest to those of us who still hold onto hope in its possibilities. May we have ears to hear the voices telling us where our work has fallen short, and eyes to see what it could become. Footnotes Ferguson pg. 55

Inline links: pull talent, worsen, hurt, some, An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins, How Different Social Scientists Think, The Data is Gold, and We Are The Gold-Diggers, Mzungus in Development and Governments

Davidson On Takeoff Speeds

June 20, 2023 · Original source

A lot of these big complicated analyses are salvos in a long-running conflict between a school of futurists based at Open Philanthropy and another school based at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute.

There must be a few other things that can remove the intelligence explosion, because switching from the “best guess” to “conservative” preset on the Playground removes it even when I manually set those two parameters back to their normal values. But it’s not any of the big obvious things, and most changes push timelines backward or forward a bit without altering the shape of the curve. Contra MIRI On Takeoff Speeds A lot of these big complicated analyses are salvos in a long-running conflict between a school of futurists based at Open Philanthropy and another school based at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute.

The OP school expect the rise of AI to be gradual, multipolar, and potentially survivable. The MIRI school expect it to be sudden, singular, and catastrophic. Yudkowsky vs. Christiano on Takeoff Speeds is a good intro here, with Yudkowsky representing MIRI and Christiano OP.

Inline links: Yudkowsky vs. Christiano on Takeoff Speeds

Book Review: The Cult Of Smart

September 11, 2025 · Original source

Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Machine Intelligence Research Institute is the original AI safety org. But the original isn’t always the best - how is Mesopotamia doing these days? As money, brainpower, and prestige pour into the field, MIRI remains what it always was - a group of loosely-organized weird people, one of whom cannot be convinced to stop wearing a sparkly top hat in public. So when I was doing AI grantmaking last year, I asked them - why should I fund you, instead of the guys with the army of bright-eyed Harvard grads, or the guys who just got Geoffrey Hinton as their celebrity spokesperson? What do you have that they don’t?

Inline links: Machine Intelligence Research Institute, sparkly top hat

MIRI answered: moral clarity.

MIRI thinks this is pathetic - like trying to protect against an asteroid impact by wearing a hard hat. They’re kind of cagey about their own probability of AI wiping out humanity, but it seems to be somewhere around 95 - 99%. They think plausibly-achievable gains in company responsibility, regulation quality, and AI scholarship are orders of magnitude too weak to seriously address the problem, and they don’t expect enough of a “warning shot” that they feel comfortable kicking the can down the road until everything becomes clear and action is easy. They suggest banning all AI capabilities research immediately, to be restarted only in some distant future when the situation looks more promising.

Manifold Market3 mentions across 3 issues

Manifold Market is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between February 09, 2023 and December 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Here’s a Manifold Market on the results"; "And here’s the Manifold market"; "The Manifold Market is a spoiler for the results". It most often appears alongside Africa, El Salvador, FDA.

Article page: Manifold Market
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: February 09, 2023
Last seen: December 17, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For February 2023 February 09, 2023
Links For April 2023 April 20, 2023
Links For December 2024 December 17, 2024

Africa 2 shared issues
El Salvador 2 shared issues
FDA 2 shared issues
Matt Yglesias 2 shared issues
Nayib Bukele 2 shared issues

Source context

Links For February 2023

February 09, 2023 · Original source

42: In a surprise major victory for YIMBYs, California has removed zoning powers from most of its cities, using an old law saying that unless cities’ zoning plans met certain criteria they could lose zoning powers as a punishment. The law was never really enforced and most cities had been ignoring it for decades, but Newsom dug it out of the books and is enforcing it as of now. Cities are rushing to make new zoning plans that satisfy the old law’s criteria, but even these will require much more development than they are currently allowing. Here’s a Manifold Market on the results:

Inline links: California has removed zoning powers from most of its cities

Links For April 2023

April 20, 2023 · Original source

8: Room Temperature Superconductor Claim Meets With Resistance, yes I’m posting it mostly for the title, but it’s also a good story. And here’s the Manifold market:

Inline links: Room Temperature Superconductor Claim Meets With Resistance

Links For December 2024

December 17, 2024 · Original source

14: Tessa Barton tries to see how long she can go without learning the results of the US election (series of YouTube videos). The Manifold Market is a spoiler for the results but has some good discussion.

Inline links: Tessa Barton tries to see how long she can go without learning the results of the US election, some good discussion

Mensa3 mentions across 3 issues

Mensa is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between February 18, 2021 and March 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Admit to being a member of Mensa"; "the older studies got their very-high-IQ samples from Mensa"; "testing sessions by Mensa (yes, I know you all hate Mensa, but their IQ tests are considered pretty accurate)". It most often appears alongside Twitter, ACT, Alex.

Article page: Mensa
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: February 18, 2021
Last seen: March 20, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: The Cult Of Smart February 18, 2021
Links For March 2023 March 10, 2023
The Mystery Of Internet Survey IQs March 20, 2024

Twitter 2 shared issues
ACT 1 shared issues
Alex 1 shared issues
Alex Nowratesh 1 shared issues
American education 1 shared issues

Source context

February 18, 2021 · Original source

But the opposite is true of high-IQ. Society obsessively denies that IQ can possibly matter. Admit to being a member of Mensa, and you'll get a fusillade of "IQ is just a number!" and "people who care about their IQ are just overcompensating for never succeeding at anything real!" and "IQ doesn't matter, what about emotional IQ or grit or whatever else, huh? Bet you didn't think of that!" Science writers and Psychology Today columnists vomit out a steady stream of bizarre attempts to deny the statistical validity of IQ.

Links For March 2023

March 10, 2023 · Original source

24: Related: The Mensa Fallacy. Many older studies show that very-high-IQ people are mentally imbalanced, bad at real-world tasks, or unambitious. Newer, more representative studies don’t show this. The most likely explanation: the older studies got their very-high-IQ samples from Mensa, the most convenient place to find lots of very-high-IQ subjects. But within the population of very-high-IQ people, Mensa is adversely selected for non-IQ traits; geniuses who are mentally healthy and ambitious are probably inventing quantum computers at MIT or making bank on Wall Street; it’s the geniuses who can’t make it in regular society who are going to every Mensa to boast about how quickly they can solve Rubik’s Cubes. Any study that uses a Mensa sample to study very-high-IQ people and conclude that they’re defective should be considered suspicious.

Inline links: The Mensa Fallacy

The Mystery Of Internet Survey IQs

March 20, 2024 · Original source

The average ClearerThinking user reported their IQ as 130. These are implausibly high. Only 1/200 people has an IQ of 138 or higher. 1/50 people have IQ 130, but the ClearerThinking survey used crowdworkers (eg Mechanical Turk) who should be totally average. Okay, fine, so people lie about their IQ (or foolishly trust fake Internet IQ tests). Big deal, right? But these don’t look like lies. Both surveys asked for SAT scores, which are known to correspond to IQ. The LessWrong average was 1446, corresponding to IQ 140. The ClearerThinking average was 1350, corresponding to IQ 134. People seem less likely to lie about their SATs, and least likely of all to optimize their lies for getting IQ/SAT correspondences right. And the Less Wrong survey asked people what test they based their estimates off of. Some people said fake Internet IQ tests. But other people named respected tests like the WAIS, WISC, and Stanford-Binet, or testing sessions by Mensa (yes, I know you all hate Mensa, but their IQ tests are considered pretty accurate). The subset of about 150 people who named unimpeachable tests had slightly higher IQ (average 140) than everyone else. Thanks to Spencer Greenberg of ClearerThinking, I think I’m finally starting to make progress in explaining what’s going on. Problem #1: The Biggest SAT → IQ Conversion Site Is Wrong Thanks to Sebastian Jensen for pointing this out! He writes: A search of ‘SAT to IQ’ on google results in being presented with the website ‘iqcomparisonsite.com’. This man has directly converted the SAT percentiles to IQ scores, which is not what should be done. Tests like the ACT and SAT correlate with IQ at about 0.8-0.85 [rca], [my analysis], [emil article], [scholarly article]. The general factor of academic achievement and IQ correlate at about 0.81-0.88 [psychometric test], [GCSE grades]. This discrepancy occurs because they measure different abilities - an IQ test will test many different abilities, while the SAT/ACT only tests verbal/mathematical ability. In addition, these percentiles are very outdated as the average SAT score has changed over time due to changes in the content of the test. Instead, the ideal way to do this is to take the percentiles from the current versions of the SAT and then convert those into z-scores and then regress those z-scores by the mean by the estimated regression coefficient. Using Sebastian’s updated tables, we find that the average Less Wrong IQ as predicted by SATs goes down from 140 → 132, and the ClearerThinking IQ goes down from 134 → 124. So people probably exaggerated their IQs somewhat, and unrelatedly we were using an SAT → IQ conversion that exaggerated IQs, and so the numbers falsely appeared to match. Okay! It’s a start! Interlude: The ClearerThinking IQ Test The ClearerThinking survey included a battery of cognitive tests of exactly the sort that could usually be used to determine IQ. Unfortunately none of them were normed, so we know how all the 3700 subjects did relative to each other, but not where the 100 point is. Spencer was able to norm them to the general population based on education level. That is, he asked his sample about their educational attainment (college degree, PhD, etc) and found they were a little more educated than the US average. Since the US average IQ is 100, his sample should have an average a little higher than this. He was able to calculate how much higher. Then he mapped a bell curve to everyone in his sample’s performance on his tests. Since he had 3700 people, he was able to do this relatively smoothly. He found an average IQ of 110, which originally surprised me, because I thought his sample was supposed to be random crowdworkers, who should be close to the US average of 100. But in fact, his survey was a combination of 1900 crowdworkers and 1800 people who saw it on social media - eg friends and friends-of-friends of Spencer. Separating this out by group, we find that the crowdworkers have an average normed-IQ of 100, and the social media referrals have an average normed-IQ of 120, making the overall average of 110. This seems pretty trustworthy, since it correctly estimates the crowdworkers (completely average) as 100. Spencer studied math at Columbia, his friends and friends-of-friends are pretty smart, and I think the 120 estimate for them is also okay. But there’s still a problem here. Using an accurate SAT score → IQ calculator, we determined that the ClearerThinking average should be 124. But using real cognitive tests, it looks like it’s 110. What went wrong? Problem #2: Only The Smartest People Report Their SATs Using Spencer’s cognitive test results, we can compare people who did vs. didn’t take the SAT. We find: People who didn’t take the SAT (remember, this includes current high schoolers) have tested-IQ 110.

Inline links: corresponding to, for pointing this out!, [rca], [my analysis], [emil article], [scholarly article], [psychometric test], [GCSE grades], changed

It looks like up to about 140, self-reported IQ and normed IQ rise together, and then the relationship breaks down. Sure enough, looking at the subset of self-reported IQ scores below 140, the correlation with tested IQ rises to .6, and looking at the subset above 140, the correlation is nonsignificant at -0.02. I don’t want to assert that the breakpoint is exactly 140, but I do think the test stops working somewhere in the 130 - 140 range. But this can’t be the whole problem. Notice that people who reported getting scores around 100 on previous IQ tests overwhelmingly got scores less than 100 on this one. So are people just taking terrible Internet IQ tests that inflate their score about 20 points? The ClearerThinking sample didn’t ask people what IQ test they took, but the LessWrong sample did. It found approximately the same score from WAIS, WISC, Stanford-Binet, and Mensa - all of which were about 10 points above what you would predict from SAT scores. So I think there are two things going on: The main problem in the LessWrong sample, and the far right end of the ClearerThinking sample, is that even official IQ tests are gobbledygook over 135. Any numbers above this should be rounded down to 135, no matter how venerable the test involved.

Mercatus3 mentions across 3 issues

Mercatus is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between January 08, 2025 and May 29, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mercatus head Tyler Cowen"; "championed by Alex Tabarrok and the Mercatus crowd"; "Scott could have simply asked me how [Mercatus overhead] works". It most often appears alongside Alex Tabarrok, Bryan Caplan, COVID.

Article page: Mercatus
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: January 08, 2025
Last seen: May 29, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

On Priesthoods January 08, 2025
1DaySooner's Trump II Health Policy Proposals February 07, 2025
Sorry, I Still Think MR Is Wrong About USAID May 29, 2025

Alex Tabarrok 2 shared issues
Bryan Caplan 2 shared issues
COVID 2 shared issues
Donald Trump 2 shared issues
GMU 2 shared issues

Source context

On Priesthoods

January 08, 2025 · Original source

Society-wide: The marketplace of ideas! This is where everyone gets to have their say. New hypotheses get stress-tested, bounced off against each other, and only the strongest survive. This level also produces true learning - if only one idea survives the marketplace, then average spectators can easily pick it out (although of course it can still be wrong). Its disadvantage is that it’s impossible for several billion people to hold a true “discussion” among themselves. Also, many of these people are extremely stupid, their ideas are bad, and they fill the conversation with noise. Is there a useful group size in between these two? What about discussing ideas in a group made of only the most intelligent and knowledgeable people? This gives you the debate and collaboration functions that you only get in group conversation. But it’ll have a better signal-to-noise ratio than all of society, and it might be small enough to manage. Also, you can make people sign on to good discussion norms before they enter, and you can expel them if they screw up. The Boundary Against The Public From this formulation, it becomes clear that such a priesthood is only useful insofar as it has some kind of barrier between itself and the general public. The priesthoods don’t exactly hate the public. But they hate the idea of letting the public’s ideas mix with their own. It’s not just that they discount the public’s ideas insofar as the public is less sophisticated than themselves. Their whole identity comes from their separation from the public. Ideas that seem too similar to the public’s get actively penalized, the same way it would be hard to convince Democrats to accept a plan that Donald Trump proposed first, even if it otherwise fit with Democratic ideals. I recently reviewed Tom Wolfe’s From Bauhaus To Our House, on the architectural priesthood. It discusses the response when renegade architects would build things in styles favored by the public - for example, Edward Stone and the Kennedy Center: Stone and Saarinen, like Frank Lloyd Wright and Goff and Greene, were too American, which meant both too parochial (not part of the International Style) and too bourgeois. Somehow they actually catered to the hog-stomping Baroque exuberance of American civilization. When Stone designed the Kennedy Center in Washington with a lobby six stories high and six hundred and thirty feet long – so big, as one journalist pointed out, that Mickey Mantle’s mightiest home run would have been just another long fly ball – it was regarded as an obscenity. Stone was actually playing upto American megolomania. He was encouraging the barbaric yawps. He was glorifying The Client’s own grandiose sentiments. More generally: In a way, the very productivity of a man like Wright, Portman, or Stone counted against him, given the new mental atmosphere at the universities. Oh, it was easy enough, one supposed, to go out into the marketplace and wheedle and vamp and dance for clients and get buildings to do. But the brave soul was he who remained within the compound, stayed within the university orbit. Or, from the comments, this quote by architect Peter Eisenman: What I’m suggesting is that if we make people so comfortable in these nice little structures of yours, that we might lull them into thinking that everything’s all right, Jack, which it isn’t. And so the role of art or architecture might be just to remind people that everything wasn’t all right. I used to wonder why so many econ-bloggers I liked were at GMU. GMU only is only the 74th best economics department in the country, but more than half of the econbloggers I like are affiliated with it in some way (Tyler Cowen, Alex Tabarrok, Garett Jones, Robin Hanson, Bryan Caplan, Arnold Kling, Scott Sumner, Mark Koyama, sorry if I’m forgetting anyone!). Granted that some of this is because I lean libertarian and so do they - but I don’t think there’s a mountain of amazing and popular left-wing econbloggers who I’m ignoring. Part of this must be that Mercatus head Tyler Cowen is better at spotting and cultivating talent than others - but you’d still think the #73 ranked department would try to poach some of his hard work. When I asked academics about this, they didn’t find it mysterious at all. The average high-ranked economics department doesn’t care that you have a popular blog. They might even count it against you. Only your reputation within the priesthood matters. This is my experience too. I once got rejected from a psychiatry residency I wanted, partly because they saw I had a blog and thought it might cause trouble (though the less prestigious hospital that eventually accepted me did consider it a plus, for which I remain grateful). I wish I could say that the program which rejected me is kicking themselves right now - I’m probably one of the most-read psychiatrists in the world, and most of what I write is relatively orthodox and (I hope) reflects well on the field. But outside of my fantasies, they are doing nothing of the sort. At best, my blog has gone from a liability to being neutral or a very slight positive. Certainly it doesn’t make me as impressive as someone who went to a medical school one tier above mine. Consider how impressive a boundary this is - someone can have literally tens of thousands of fans for doing popular writing in a field, and the amount of extra status it gives them in the field is within a rounding error of zero. Only your reputation within the priesthood matters. Still, at least I’m a member in good standing. At least I’m higher than pond scum. The lowest-status doctor in the world - the guy who, if doctors were Maoist revolutionaries, would get his face on the “Criticize X, Criticize Y” posters - is Dr. Oz. This isn’t because Dr. Oz lacks medical skill. Back in the day, he was a professor of surgery at Columbia, and by all accounts quite good at it. But then he went on TV and started catering to the public. He told them their stupid miracle cures and $19.99 supplements were Real Medicine. Imagine a Catholic bishop declaring ex cathedra that The Da Vinci Code is 100% real. Authority bestowed to fight the heresies of a fallen world, instead used to prop up those heresies. Columbia recently “cut ties” with Oz in some vague way, but as far as the medical profession is concerned, it’s too little, too late. I think the profession’s hatred for Oz is justified - his claims are false and probably cause a lot of harm. But other doctors who say false harmful things get only a fraction of the hatred that Dr. Oz does. He’s not just defrauding and maybe killing the people who take his supplements. He’s sullying Medicine itself. This hard boundary - this contempt for two-way traffic with the public - might seem harsh to outsiders. But it’s an adaptive artifact produced by cultural evolution as it tries to breed priesthoods that can perform their epistemic function. The outside world is so much bigger than the priesthoods, so much richer, so full of delicious deposits of status waiting to be consumed - that any weaker border would soon be overrun, with all priesthood members trying to garner status with the public directly. Only the priesthoods that inculcated the most powerful contempt for the public survived to have good discussions and output trustworthy recommendations. The Boundary Against Capitalism Dr. Oz illustrates another point: power corrupts, and the priests (as people known to be more knowledgeable than the public) have the power to bless or damn interventions in their field. Without some boundary against capitalism, they would abuse that power to make money. Again, cultural evolution has produced such a boundary. A doctor who seems too mercenary loses status in the priesthood. My father - a much more orthodox (and hence higher-status) member of the medical priesthood than I will ever be - used to even get suspicious of concierge doctors. Was it really in keeping with the principles of medicine to care about the amount of money you got for your service? Shouldn’t the usual insurance payments (calculated behind the scenes, without you ever having to think about it) be enough for anybody? If you let doctors charge extra for their services, they might do bad medicine in order to increase profits. In the worst case scenario, they might flatter members of the public who wanted all-natural $19.99 supplements. This taboo has faded as insurance squeezes doctors harder; even my father eventually relented. But there’s still the sense that doctor is a calling in a way that used-car salesman isn’t. If you pursue money too aggressively, can we really be sure you’ve heard the call? Why doesn’t every doctor pursue their own $19.99 supplement business? Some of this is professional regulation - there’s a sense that probably the Medical Board will come down on you if you do something wrong (though most doctors are proudly ignorant of the exact limits of the Medical Board’s power - why should the pious worry about the exact boundaries of excommunicable offenses?) But most of the barrier comes from self-regulation based on social status. By the time you’re done with medical school and residency, all of your non-doctor friends have long since abandoned you, and all the old sources of status and approval that you used to crave have been excised and replaced with the all-seeing eye of the medical priesthood. If you sell out and start the supplement line, you might get a new Ferrari, but everyone whose opinion you respect will hold you in contempt. The public might think it’s cool that you have a Ferrari, but doctors know better: nobody with a supplement line has ever been cool. This doesn’t mean doctors are incorruptible. Plenty of them become pharma company shills. But that’s because being a pharma company shill doesn’t burn intra-priesthood respect the same way. For better or worse, pharma companies straddle the priesthood boundary. They may not be fellow priests, but they’re at least nuns or deacons or something. They won this by sacrificing certain capitalist parts of themselves (for example, becoming heavily regulated) and by agreeing to follow the norms of the medical priesthood (for example, communicating through papers published in medical journals with high-status doctors as lead authors). Through their sacrifice, they achieve ritual purity; now priests can interact with them guilt-free. Is ritual purity really the same as moral acceptability? Sounds like the kind of question a member of the public might ask! Communication Norms Within The Priesthoods Although priests talk normally when when they meet one another at the water cooler, ex cathedra communication must be performed in a ritually pure way. For the medical priesthood, that means papers published in a medical journal. Consider ritually impure communication - for example, Twitter. Someone may try to make a medical claim (“SSRIs are a great depression treatment!”). But one can’t even predict the genre the reply will take. It could be any of: Insult (“You’re just another a big pharma shill trying to poison us!”)

Inline links: recently reviewed, is only the 74th best, recently “cut ties” with Oz, too little, too late

1DaySooner's Trump II Health Policy Proposals

February 07, 2025 · Original source

Regulatory Reciprocity: I will keep this one in here until somebody does something about it. It’s the idea that Americans should be allowed to buy medical products if they’ve been approved by some trusted ally, like the European Union, possibly in exchange for the EU giving FDA-approved products the same deal in Europe. This has been amply championed by Alex Tabarrok and the Mercatus crowd for years, and is starting to make inroads in other countries. If full reciprocity is a step too far, 1DaySooner proposes Makary build off innovative pilot programs like Project Orbis, which enables concurrent submissions and reviews of oncology drugs by multiple regulatory agencies, and the CoGenT pilot, which does the same for cell and gene therapies.

Inline links: Alex Tabarrok, Mercatus, starting to make inroads

Sorry, I Still Think MR Is Wrong About USAID

May 29, 2025 · Original source

Scott could have simply asked me how [Mercatus overhead] works. It is also the case that we do not receive or seek federal government research funding, but if we did the overhead going to GMU would be zero (are you listening o3?). Depending on the exact source of the funding, very likely we would make a lot of money on such grants because we would receive significant “overhead” payments for what would not be actual overhead expenses. That is one big problem with the system, I might add. We at Mercatus have made the judgment that we do not wish to become institutionally/financially addicted to such overhead…and I wish more non-profits would do the same.

In my original post, I quoted o3 saying that Mercatus took about 8% as direct overhead, and that many other administrative expenses that a normal charity would have to charge as overhead were instead covered by George Mason University, but that under normal federal grant rules these would count for about 30%. I didn’t mean to imply that Mercatus actually took federal funding or charged these numbers (which is why I used the hypothetical “if” on that statement) and if it came off this way, I’m sorry. But other than that, I’m not sure what Tyler is objecting to.

The 8% number comes from Mercatus’ 990 form here - management + general + fundraising as a percent of total expenses (again, compare to Catholic Relief Services’ 6%).

Inline links: here

Merck3 mentions across 3 issues

Merck is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between November 23, 2021 and December 22, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Pfizer/Merck will have thrown everything at this problem alongside the clinical trials"; "Pfizer/Merck will have thrown everything at this problem"; "communications about Merck’s drug molnupiravir". It most often appears alongside FDA, fluvoxamine, budesonide.

Article page: Merck
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: November 23, 2021
Last seen: December 22, 2021

Outbound links

https://www.neonarrative.us/p/an-interview-with-scott-alexander

Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid November 23, 2021
The FDA Has Punted Decisions About Luvox Prescription To The Deepest Recesses Of The Human Soul December 22, 2021
Addendum To Luvox Post December 22, 2021

FDA 3 shared issues
fluvoxamine 3 shared issues
budesonide 2 shared issues
Johns Hopkins 2 shared issues
Luvox 2 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On The FDA And Paxlovid

November 23, 2021 · Original source

Pfizer/Merck will have thrown everything at this problem alongside the clinical trials, as they can afford to do this, so their regulatory submissions will be pretty good. However they still might have to store the new batches for a few months to demonstrate that they have a comparable shelf-life to the old batches, and FDA might wait to see this data etc.

The FDA Has Punted Decisions About Luvox Prescription To The Deepest Recesses Of The Human Soul

December 22, 2021 · Original source

[Professor Ed] Mills, who thinks that fluvoxamine and budesonide are both appropriate to prescribe to patients sick with Covid-19, compares public messaging on fluvoxamine to communications about Merck’s drug molnupiravir. The evidence for molnupiravir is in many ways weaker than the evidence for fluvoxamine, but molnupiravir was produced by a major pharmaceutical company that can shepherd it through the process of becoming a recommended drug. On a call last week, Mills said, the FDA told him “they don’t know how to deal with submissions where there isn’t someone to be responsible for it.”

Addendum To Luvox Post

December 22, 2021 · Original source

[Professor Ed] Mills, who thinks that fluvoxamine and budesonide are both appropriate to prescribe to patients sick with Covid-19, compares public messaging on fluvoxamine to communications about Merck’s drug molnupiravir. The evidence for molnupiravir is in many ways weaker than the evidence for fluvoxamine, but molnupiravir was produced by a major pharmaceutical company that can shepherd it through the process of becoming a recommended drug. On a call last week, Mills said, the FDA told him “they don’t know how to deal with submissions where there isn’t someone to be responsible for it.”

Metaculus Alert bot3 mentions across 3 issues

Metaculus Alert bot is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between March 14, 2022 and April 18, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "subscribe to the Metaculus Alert bot for more". It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Nikos Bosse, Putin.

Article page: Metaculus Alert bot
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: March 14, 2022
Last seen: April 18, 2022

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22 March 14, 2022
22 March 21, 2022
22 April 18, 2022

Metaculus 3 shared issues
Nikos Bosse 3 shared issues
Putin 3 shared issues
Russia 3 shared issues
Ukraine 3 shared issues

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March 14, 2022 · Original source

If you like getting your news in this format, subscribe to the Metaculus Alert bot for more (and thanks to ACX Grants winner Nikos Bosse for creating it!)

Inline links: Metaculus Alert bot

Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022?: 69% —→ 14%

Inline links: Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 71% —→ 70%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

March 21, 2022 · Original source

If you like getting your news in this format, subscribe to the Metaculus Alert bot for more (and thanks to ACX Grants winner Nikos Bosse for creating it!)

Inline links: Metaculus Alert bot

Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022?: 14% —→ 2%

Inline links: Will Kiev fall to Russian forces by April 2022

Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 70% —→ 53%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

April 18, 2022 · Original source

If you like getting your news in this format, subscribe to the Metaculus Alert bot for more (and thanks to ACX Grants winner Nikos Bosse for creating it!)

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Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?: 53% → 5%

Inline links: Will at least three of six big cities fall by June 1?

Will World War III happen before 2050?: 20% →22%

Inline links: Will World War III happen before 2050?

Minicircle3 mentions across 3 issues

Minicircle is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between September 04, 2023 and February 10, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "documentary on Minicircle, the biotech company in Prospera"; "Minicircle, the most famous biotech clinic currently in Prospera"; "Prospera-based weird biotech company MiniCircle". It most often appears alongside California, California Forever, Dryden Brown.

Article page: Minicircle
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: September 04, 2023
Last seen: February 10, 2025

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23: California Dreamin' September 04, 2023
25 February 03, 2025
Open Thread 368 February 10, 2025

California 2 shared issues
California Forever 2 shared issues
Dryden Brown 2 shared issues
Honduras 2 shared issues
Jan Sramek 2 shared issues

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23: California Dreamin'

September 04, 2023 · Original source

Here’s a documentary on Minicircle, the biotech company in Prospera.

Inline links: Minicircle

February 03, 2025 · Original source

It looks like a big part of investors’ hope for Prospera is biotech research and medical tourism. It hosted the Vitalia conference, and the Vitalia team are trying to build on it with Infinita, a charter city VC, and Viva, a broader program and potential more permanent hub.. I still think that Minicircle, the most famous biotech clinic currently in Prospera, is either confused or fraudulent, but hopefully they can eventually attract firms which are neither.

Inline links: Vitalia, Infinita, Viva, either confused or fraudulent

Open Thread 368

February 10, 2025 · Original source

1: I’ve previously cited some pretty compelling research that Prospera-based weird biotech company MiniCircle can’t work, but Micah Zoltu reports doing a study and finding that minicircles increased VEGF expression in some mice. A commenter notes that results are 1000x weaker than clinically significant levels, but Micah says he wasn’t dosing carefully and was just trying to find an effect at all, so maybe this could be solved by better dosing. I look forward to hearing more about his research (ie please email me when you have more results). I notice I am pattern matching this to things like EmDrive and LK-99 (amazing breakthrough that could change everything, comes from source which charitably is not the sort of people you would expect to make amazing breakthroughs, some people report positive results but never in perfect definitive tests), so I’m still very skeptical.

Inline links: pretty compelling research, Micah Zoltu reports doing a study and finding, 1000x weaker, Micah says

Morgan Stanley3 mentions across 3 issues

Morgan Stanley is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between October 11, 2021 and November 30, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Analysts at Morgan Stanley said in a note to investors last month"; "then look at a Morgan Stanley projection of what will happen over the next decade"; "Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade". It most often appears alongside Canada, Eli Lilly, FDA.

Article page: Morgan Stanley
Mention count: 3
Issue count: 3
First seen: October 11, 2021
Last seen: November 30, 2022

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Please Don't Give Up On Having Kids Because Of Climate Change October 11, 2021
Semaglutidonomics November 24, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide November 30, 2022

Canada 2 shared issues
Eli Lilly 2 shared issues
FDA 2 shared issues
Medicare 2 shared issues
Mounjaro 2 shared issues

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Please Don't Give Up On Having Kids Because Of Climate Change

October 11, 2021 · Original source

Analysts at Morgan Stanley said in a note to investors last month that the “movement to not have children owing to fears over climate change is growing and impacting fertility rates quicker than any preceding trend in the field of fertility decline.” Some people are choosing not to have children because they fear that that doing so will amplify global warming while others are concerned about extreme weather events their children may have to endure and the knock-on effects.

Semaglutidonomics

November 24, 2022 · Original source

“Wegovy” sounds like either a cooperative governance platform, or some kind of obscure medieval sin. Weight loss pills have a bad reputation. But Wegovy is a big step up. It doesn’t work for everybody. But it works for 66-84% of people, depending on your threshold. (Source) Of six major weight loss drugs, only two - Wegovy and Qsymia - have a better than 50-50 chance of helping you lose 10% of your weight. Qsymia works partly by making food taste terrible; it can also cause cognitive issues. Wegovy feels more natural; patients just feel full and satisfied after they’ve eaten a healthy amount of food. You can read the gushing anecdotes here (plus some extra anecdotes in the comments). Wegovy patients also lose more weight on average than Qsymia patients - 15% compared to 10%. It’s just a really impressive drug. Until now, doctors didn’t really use medication to treat obesity; the drugs either didn’t work or had too many side effects. They recommended either diet and exercise (for easier cases) or bariatric surgery (for harder ones). Semaglutide marks the start of a new generation of weight loss drugs that are more clearly worthwhile. Modeling Semaglutide Accessibility 40% of Americans are obese - that’s 140 million people. Most of them would prefer to be less obese. Suppose that a quarter of them want semaglutide. That’s 35 million prescriptions. Semaglutide costs about $15,000 per year, multiply it out, that’s about $500 billion. Americans currently spend $300 billion per year total on prescription drugs. So if a quarter of the obese population got semaglutide, that would cost almost twice as much as all other drug spending combined. It would probably bankrupt half the health care industry. So . . . most people who want semaglutide won’t get it? Unclear. America’s current policy for controlling medical costs is to buy random things at random prices, then send all the bills to an illiterate reindeer-herder named Yagmuk, who burns them for warmth. Anything could happen! Right now, only about 50,000 Americans take semaglutide for obesity. I’m basing this off this report claiming “20,000 weekly US prescriptions” of Wegovy; since it’s taken once per week, maybe this means there are 20,000 users? Or maybe each prescription contains enough Wegovy to last a month and there are 80,000 users? I’m not sure, but it’s somewhere in the mid five digits, which I’m rounding to 50,000. That’s only 0.1% of the potential 35 million. The next few sections of this post are about why so few people are on semaglutide, and whether we should expect that to change. I’ll start by going over my model of what determines semaglutide use, then look at a Morgan Stanley projection of what will happen over the next decade. Step 1: Awareness I model semaglutide use as interest * awareness * prescription accessibility * affordability. I already randomly guessed interest at 25%, so the next step is awareness. How many people are aware of semaglutide? The answer is: a lot more now than when I first started writing this article! Novo Nordisk’s Wegovy Gets Surprise Endorsement From Elon Musk, says the headline. And here’s Google Trends: Semaglutide is now as searched-for on Google as Prozac or Viagra. Even if this is a temporary Musk-related spike, even pre-Musk it was getting a little above half their level. But Google Trends doesn’t exactly track awareness; few people search for Prozac these days precisely because everyone already knows what it is. So all this tells us is that there’s a lot of buzz around semaglutide. Suppose for the sake of argument that 5% of obese people have heard of this drug. Step 2: Prescription Accessibility The FDA says Wegovy is indicated for obesity, defined as BMI ≥ 30, or for people with BMI ≥ 27 and certain medical conditions. Does that mean that if you have that BMI, your doctor will give you a prescription? I think most doctors will want patients to try diet and exercise first. My experience as a doctor is that most obese people have already considered diet and exercise. Sometimes if you have a very compelling reason and a very well-thought out plan you can get them to try again. But usually they are obese because diet and exercise are hard for them, or don’t work for them, or some other reason besides “they never thought of it”. Still, I hear lots of stories about patient-doctor fights here. I assume this will happen with Wegovy too. Every doctor will have their own threshold for what amount of “already tried diet and exercise” is enough to justify a Wegovy prescription, and sometimes patients won’t meet that threshold. The history of medicine includes the following story many times: there’s some condition that doctors recommend lifestyle changes for. Then an exciting new medication comes out that treats the condition effectively. Over a generation or so, doctors go from demanding the lifestyle change, to gesturing at the lifestyle change before prescribing the medication, to mostly just prescribing the medication. We saw this with cholesterol and statins, with hypertension and ACE inhibitors, with depression and SSRIs. You can form your own opinion on whether this is good or bad, but we’re probably in the very beginning of this process with obesity. Opinions will be all over the map for a while before the inevitable pharma company victory makes everyone agree that semaglutide is first-line therapy. …except that this time, Silicon Valley is short-circuiting the process with fly-by-night telemedicine companies that guarantee you’ll get the drugs you want. For example, NextMed charges $138/month ($99 first month only!) for a guaranteed GLP-1 agonist prescription, plus “support and messaging with expert doctors”. The DEA sometimes shuts these groups down when they start playing around with controlled substances (eg addictive drugs like Adderall), but Wegovy isn’t controlled, and the government probably doesn’t care that much here. These services guarantee that people with money will be able to circumvent conservative doctors and access a prescription. Only 75% of Americans have PCPs at all. If we assume half of them will eventually be able to get a Wegovy prescription from their doctor, that’s 37.5%. Step 3: Affordability Semaglutide costs $15,000/year. Well-off people like Elon Musk might be able to pay that out-of-pocket, but most people will probably need insurance coverage. Right now this is spotty. Medicare doesn’t cover obesity drugs. This isn’t a reaction to the threat of semaglutide-related cost explosions - they’re not that smart. I think Medicare laws were just written in the old days when people were less likely to think of obesity as a disease. Is it time for change? Some Congressmen have proposed a very noble-sounding law telling Medicare and Medicaid to start covering weight loss drugs. I‘m sure this is out of deep compassion for America’s obese population and not because it would make pharma companies one billion zillion dollars. One of the Congressmen even has the last name “Kind!” Some pharma lobbyist probably got a bonus for that one. Private insurers mostly have to cover whatever Medicare does, but they can choose whether or not to include extra non-Medicare-covered drugs. Some have chosen to cover semaglutide under some conditions. Others would prefer not to cover it, but can be scared into covering it by the magic words “medical necessity”. Overall I don’t understand the laws here beyond that maybe they’ll cover it and maybe they won’t. Here, too, it might be time for change. The New York Times is publishing articles trying to convince us that private insurances not covering semaglutide is an outrage. Here in the tiny gray text, I want to take a second to complain about this article. It notes that Wegovy (semaglutide for obesity) costs more per prescription than Ozempic (semaglutide for diabetes), and calls this “a gross inequity”, accusing Novo Nordisk of “charg[ing] people more for the same drug because of their obesity”. But the obesity prescription is higher dose than the diabetes prescription! Milligram per milligram, Wegovy costs *less* than Ozempic! A steelmanned version of the NYT might object - don’t most of the costs come from the intellectual property and not the manufacturing, so that dose shouldn’t matter? Yes, but if you made the obesity version cost too much less per milligram than the diabetes version, then diabetics would cheat the system by buying the obesity version and splitting it into smaller doses! Insurances that do cover it may require extra documentation that the patient has tried lots of diet and exercise, maybe including some official diet-and-exercise program like WeightWatchers. They might also want documentation that patients have tried cheaper earlier-generation weight loss drugs without success. Even when insurances do cover semaglutide, copays may be very high. I have a pretty minimal insurance and it looks like if I got semaglutide my copay would be about $500/month until I reach my out of pocket limit. Harsh. People with better insurances might get hit less hard, but I don’t think anyone will be picking this up for cheap. Let’s say only 5% of people who clear all previous hurdles can afford the drug. How Many People Get Semaglutide? 140 million obese Americans * 25% interested * 5% know of semaglutide’s existence * 37.5% can get prescriptions * 5% can afford it = 33,000, which is a pretty good match for the 50,000 estimated prescriptions. I didn’t even fudge the numbers to come out right, it just happened. The Coming Decade As a service to pharma investors, Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade. Their headline result: semaglutide and various semaglutide-copycat-drugs will be a $30 billion market by 2030. That’s less than the $500 billion disaster I was afraid of! But still almost 10% of all US drug spending! Here are two core analyses from the report: The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gShh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe4b4ffd4-3d5b-445c-961d-f562ca14ac0f_818x220.png, Source, here, in the comments, lose more weight, this report, Novo Nordisk’s Wegovy Gets Surprise Endorsement From Elon Musk, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RABx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F366df26d-e420-431d-8034-e2c4a6a8de60_1149x471.png, NextMed, a very noble-sounding law, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l_X7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1dbb9e98-6e07-4237-988e-3b7a61af3e5a_1381x834.png, is publishing articles, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!R-zS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0f24b293-27de-462a-84fd-bed2ba7cf07f_1723x831.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSOS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0906b28a-1ad4-421d-a055-87ed95db59ce_918x261.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QJj9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb966f730-6b24-48e1-98b1-e710cda9264c_903x656.png, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5poy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc201f05a-7d1f-4738-911f-11d0d051adf9_2880x1562.png, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

Here in the tiny gray text, I want to take a second to complain about this article. It notes that Wegovy (semaglutide for obesity) costs more per prescription than Ozempic (semaglutide for diabetes), and calls this “a gross inequity”, accusing Novo Nordisk of “charg[ing] people more for the same drug because of their obesity”. But the obesity prescription is higher dose than the diabetes prescription! Milligram per milligram, Wegovy costs *less* than Ozempic! A steelmanned version of the NYT might object - don’t most of the costs come from the intellectual property and not the manufacturing, so that dose shouldn’t matter? Yes, but if you made the obesity version cost too much less per milligram than the diabetes version, then diabetics would cheat the system by buying the obesity version and splitting it into smaller doses! Insurances that do cover it may require extra documentation that the patient has tried lots of diet and exercise, maybe including some official diet-and-exercise program like WeightWatchers. They might also want documentation that patients have tried cheaper earlier-generation weight loss drugs without success. Even when insurances do cover semaglutide, copays may be very high. I have a pretty minimal insurance and it looks like if I got semaglutide my copay would be about $500/month until I reach my out of pocket limit. Harsh. People with better insurances might get hit less hard, but I don’t think anyone will be picking this up for cheap. Let’s say only 5% of people who clear all previous hurdles can afford the drug. How Many People Get Semaglutide? 140 million obese Americans * 25% interested * 5% know of semaglutide’s existence * 37.5% can get prescriptions * 5% can afford it = 33,000, which is a pretty good match for the 50,000 estimated prescriptions. I didn’t even fudge the numbers to come out right, it just happened. The Coming Decade As a service to pharma investors, Morgan Stanley modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade. Their headline result: semaglutide and various semaglutide-copycat-drugs will be a $30 billion market by 2030. That’s less than the $500 billion disaster I was afraid of! But still almost 10% of all US drug spending! Here are two core analyses from the report: The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: modeled the economic future of obesity medications over the next decade, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zSOS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0906b28a-1ad4-421d-a055-87ed95db59ce_918x261.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QJj9!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb966f730-6b24-48e1-98b1-e710cda9264c_903x656.png, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5poy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc201f05a-7d1f-4738-911f-11d0d051adf9_2880x1562.png, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

The first analysis asks “what if doctors medicalized obesity as comprehensively as they’ve medicalized hypertension and high cholesterol?” That is: what if we put in a society-wide effort to get every obese person to a doctor, and after only a little diet and exercise, the doctor puts them on a medication? They find that the US obesity market would multiply by a factor of 25, to about $87 billion/year. The second analysis is a more realistic projection for the next decade. Two things stand out. First, the number of patients on Wegovy or related medications goes from an estimated 46,910 now (pretty close to my 50,000 estimate!) to 11.3 million in 2030. Second, the cost per prescription goes from $15,000/year to about $4,000 year. Let’s look at this second change in more detail. Right now semaglutide is literally in a class of its own for weight loss. But remember, it started as a GLP-1 agonist diabetes drug. And there are other GLP-1 agonists already in use for diabetes. Novo Nordisk’s competitor Eli Lilly owns a closely related molecule, tirzepatide (Mounjaro®). They’ve already done studies showing it also works very well for weight loss - if anything even better than semaglutide - and they’re expected to get FDA approval to market it as a weight loss medication next year. Although capitalism fans might expect the presence of two competing drugs to immediately drive down prices, this is mysteriously not how things work in health care and prices will probably stay the same in the short term. But several other companies are working on semaglutide-like drugs, some will be cheaper to produce than semaglutide, and Morgan Stanley expects that this stronger level of competition will eventually drive costs down to $350/month ($4,000/year) by 2030. “Mounjaro” sounds like the playful animal sidekick in a Disney movie. From a purely economic perspective, semaglutide costs the health system money (because it’s expensive) but also saves the health system money (because we don’t have to pay for obesity consequences like diabetes and heart attacks). Which effect wins out? According to the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, benefits would outweigh costs if semaglutide cost less than about $8,000/year. Since it costs $15,000 year now, it’s not cost effective. But if Morgan Stanley’s model comes true and it costs $4,000/year in 2030, then it will be cost effective. So at some point, Medicare (and so insurance companies) may start covering it more out of self-interest. I can’t tell whether the model takes this into account or not. (there’s also a third-level effect where it costs the health system money again, because it prevents people from dying of obesity-related complications, and dead people stop needing expensive health care. I think health economists are supposed to ignore this level.) 11.3 million prescriptions at $4,000/year comes to $45 billion, but Morgan Stanley expects that not everyone will fill their prescriptions consistently or stay on the medication the same amount of time, leading to their $31 billion figure. Towards The Glorious Post-Obesity Transhuman Future The Morgan Stanley report shows that even the greediest pharma investors, openly plotting to medicalize obesity, can’t bring themselves to believe in more than 11 million US semaglutide patients by 2030. That’s less than 10% of the US obese population. Isn’t that kind of disappointing? We’ve got > 100 million people dealing with a condition that not only makes them unhealthy, but also causes them psychological distress, and makes lots of people low-grade disappointed in and repulsed by our society. And we’ve got an effective drug that treats the condition. And we’re going to use it on less than 10% of the people involved? In 2032, semaglutide goes off-patent. It will probably take a few years to sort out legal issues and ramp up generic production, but by the mid-2030s, its price will go way down. I don’t think there are technical barriers to getting it down as low as $10 - $100 per month. By then, maybe there will be even more exciting branded weight loss drugs for wealthy people to choose from. But at the very least, semaglutide itself should become much more widely available even to poor or uninsured patients. I’m not sure what will happen. Will there be an inflection point, where so many people use semaglutide that obesity becomes unusual again, and then the remaining obese people start using it just to fit in? Will obesity become an optional fashion statement, like shaving your head or getting a tattoo? Or will semaglutide end up disappointing us in some way, like so many promising drugs have before? I come at semaglutide from a transhumanist perspective. I want to hack genetics and biology until everyone is as tall as they want, as strong as they want, as smart as they want, and whatever gender they want. If you want wings, you should be able to have wings. And yes, part of this vision is everyone having the weight they want. I’m not sure this will happen, but for the first time I can see a clear path to how it might. Postscript 1: Should You Take Semaglutide? I can’t answer this, please ask your doctor. But I do want to add that there are potential side effects I haven’t mentioned in this post, including nausea, gastrointestinal problems, pancreatitis, and kidney problems. Semaglutide has been accused of slightly increasing risk of pancreatic and thyroid cancers. Studies have found trends in this direction, but these conditions are so rare that even over thousands of patients over many years, the increase hasn’t yet reached clear statistical significance. The current consensus position is that it may increase thyroid cancer by a tiny amount not relevant to most patients, and that it probably doesn’t increase pancreatic cancer. I think my father has looked over these data more and is less sure than other people about the lack of pancreatic cancer risk, but he can’t get the resources he needs to prove anything, and I can’t remember his exact argument. More broadly: like all medications, semaglutide has benefits and risks, and you shouldn’t blindly take it after reading one blog article. Postscript 2: Is There A Way To Cheat The System To Get Semaglutide For Lower Cost? Health care is much like airline tickets: everyone pays a different price for everything and there’s usually a secret way to get what you want for much less money. Is this true of semaglutide? Pharma company Novo Nordisk offers a Savings Card that they say brings the price down to as low as $25 per month. I’m a little suspicious of this - pharma company offers are rarely as good as they sound - but I don’t notice any obvious tricks in this one and it should probably be your first bet. This startup claims that they can get insured people semaglutide for a $25/month copay “after their deductible is met” by negotiating with the insurance company very effectively. I can’t imagine how that works or what they have to negotiate with, but they seem pretty convinced, so I would welcome more information. Otherwise, you don’t have many great options. Although there are two older forms of semaglutide not FDA-approved for weight loss - Ozempic and Rybelsus - these are both more expensive, milligram per milligram, than Wegovy itself. Canada is also of no help. The usual Canadian pharmacies don’t seem to carry Wegovy, and charge about the same amount for Ozempic as American pharmacies do. This article in Drug Discovery Trends says that compounding pharmacies have been selling semaglutide for $300/month, less than a quarter of the sticker price. This is a bit confusing: compounding pharmacies are small local operations permitted to dispense unusual medications by mixing existing ones together in nonstandard ways. They’re arguing that they can legally dispense the semaglutide because they’re mixing it with vitamins, which, fine, but how are they getting it in the first place? Everyone else seems as confused as I am: "Nobody knows how [compounding pharmacies are] getting it," said Karl Nadolsky, an endocrinologist at Spectrum Health. "Who's making it? [The pharma company that makes it] Novo [Nordisk]'s not giving it to them. They're the ones with the rights to the molecule, so how is anybody getting semaglutide?" Has nobody asked compounding pharmacists about this? Do they have a conspiracy of silence? Does the FDA sometimes send their goons in to extract the information, but the compounding pharmacists compound sleeping gas / smoke grenades and vanish into the night? Anyway, the usual authorities warn you not to take compounded semaglutide under any circumstances, but they’re the same people who tell you never to buy drugs from a Canadian pharmacy because they might be adulterated. You can decide how much you want to trust them. Postscript 3: What About Europe And The Rest Of The World? Countries that are not the US usually negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over price. Because of some combination of “negotiation works” and “they are free-riding off Americans’ hard work”, they usually get much lower prices. What does semaglutide cost elsewhere? This is hard to find out because government health agencies sometimes keep their prices secret, plus Wegovy mostly isn’t available in other countries yet. The only information I could find was from Britain, which is in the process of making Wegovy available to patients. It looks like NHS will “restrict the expensive drug’s availability to very obese people attending specialist weight-loss clinics”, but that it might be possible to get it from private clinics for £199/month = £2400/year. Wegovy has been approved in the EU but doesn’t seem to have made it there yet. I can’t find any information about any other country. Non-weight-loss-indicated versions of semaglutide are available in many countries, but I wouldn’t expect their health care systems to be flexible about redirecting it for weight. Canadian regulators have approved Wegovy, but it doesn’t seem to be available there yet. I haven’t seen any evidence that Ozempic costs less in Canada than it does in the US, and I’m not sure why. Maybe the pharma companies have figured out that anything that happens in Canada gets imported into the US, and they’re playing hardball this time. I don’t know whether Canadians will be able to get it for cheaper than Americans or not. Postscript 4: Predictions (all predictions are conditional on no singularity or global catastrophe) 10 million Americans on semaglutide (or yet-to-be-approved equally good or superior alternatives) by 2030: 75%

Inline links: this is mysteriously not how things work in health care, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5poy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc201f05a-7d1f-4738-911f-11d0d051adf9_2880x1562.png, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, don’t think there are technical barriers, offers a Savings Card, This startup, about the same amount for Ozempic, This article in Drug Discovery Trends, Everyone else seems as confused as I am, NHS will, private clinics

Highlights From The Comments On Semaglutide

November 30, 2022 · Original source

Third, your estimates of the costs are somewhat exaggerated, because the drug manufacturer pays significant discounts to insurers. These discounts do not reduce cost-sharing, but they do reduce premiums. When thinking about the social cost of the drug, it's more accurate to think about the price net of discounts, as opposed to the list price. The Morgan Stanley report that you cited reports roughly a 30% typical discount from the list price.

Inline links: Morgan Stanley report

Fourth, this is nitpicky, but when you say "almost 10% of all US drug spending," you are dividing a 2030 spending projection by what U.S. prescription drug spending was in ~2020. The Medicare actuaries project U.S. prescription drug spending in 2030 to be closer to 600 million, not 300 million. That's still a massive projection for spending in the obesity class. If you believe the Morgan Stanley projection, spending on the obesity class as a share of national health spending will be comparable to peak spending on the Hepatitis C drugs. The financial impact of the Hepatitis C drugs was a huge story. But this would be even bigger, because the Hepatitis C drugs were a cure, such that the spending surge was short-lived. Conversely, the obesity drugs are chronic medications, and we should probably expect volume to continue to increase post-2030.

Inline links: project, comparable

Sixth, this post focuses on GLP-1 agonists, which makes sense, because those drugs are starting to have an impact today. But the Morgan Stanley report also notes that amylin analogue cagrilintide may be approved for weight loss as soon as 2025. This drug has a completely different mechanism than semaglutide, but likely offers similar weight loss benefits. The crazy thing is that the weight loss benefits stack. So Novo Nordisk hopes to sell Cagrisema, which combines amylin analogue cagrilintide with semaglutide, and hopes to offer a ~30% average weight loss. This is roughly double what semaglutide offers, and is getting closer to bariatric surgery efficacy.

Mantic Markets2 mentions across 2 issues

Mantic Markets is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 27, 2021 and March 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mantic Markets has stolen its name from my newsletter"; "Austin, a co-founder of Manifold Markets (formerly Mantic Markets)". It most often appears alongside Elon Musk, active inference, ACX Grant.

Article page: Mantic Markets
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: December 27, 2021
Last seen: March 28, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Mantic Monday: Dogs In Wizard Hats December 27, 2021
Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets March 28, 2022

Elon Musk 2 shared issues
active inference 1 shared issues
ACX Grant 1 shared issues
AI Safety 1 shared issues
American Hospital Capacity Association 1 shared issues

Source context

Mantic Monday: Dogs In Wizard Hats

December 27, 2021 · Original source

Mantic Markets has stolen its name from my newsletter! But they’re so interesting that I can’t stay angry.

Inline links: Mantic Markets

Information Markets, Decision Markets, Attention Markets, Action Markets

March 28, 2022 · Original source

Austin, a co-founder of Manifold Markets (formerly Mantic Markets) asks the market what he’ll decide on this technical question. This does two things:

Marvel2 mentions across 2 issues

Marvel is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between June 17, 2022 and August 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "After SPARC, Type One Energy, Renaissance Fusion, and one of Tokamak Energy, Marvel, or Helion"; "Marvel sold the film rights of The Hulk to Universal in 1990"; "Only Marvel has successfully created a shared universe". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

Article page: Marvel
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: June 17, 2022
Last seen: August 16, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy June 17, 2022
Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics August 16, 2024

20th Century Fox 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abraham Lincoln 1 shared issues
Action Comics 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy

June 17, 2022 · Original source

Tokamak Energy gets fusion by 2030 (10%) or 2035 (30%). Marvel Fusion Marvel Fusion was founded in Germany in 2019. They're working on inertial confinement fusion, which I have much less expertise in. Inertial confinement fusion has made rapid progress recently and they have recruited some good people, so they should have a chance. Some problems include not releasing a timeline and not planning on using D-T fuel. Marvel gets fusion by 2035 (30%).

Marvel gets fusion by 2035 (30%).

[24]: After SPARC, Type One Energy, Renaissance Fusion, and one of Tokamak Energy, Marvel, or Helion.

Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics

August 16, 2024 · Original source

Why write a review about Silver Age Marvel Comics? Why is it worth your time to read it?

How do early Marvel Comics compare to the best comics of today? And if they are worse (and they are), why? What does that say about art, creativity and innovation more generally?

Why did Marvel Comics succeed in passing the test of time? What did they do differently? What were their innovations?

Marvel Comics2 mentions across 2 issues

Marvel Comics is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 16, 2024 and August 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Why superhero comic books? Given superhero comic books, why Marvel Comics?"; ""Disney purchased Marvel Comics and took ownership of their characters""; "Silver Age Marvel Comics different from their contemporaries". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

Article page: Marvel Comics
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: August 16, 2024
Last seen: August 19, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics August 16, 2024
Open Thread 343 August 19, 2024

20th Century Fox 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abraham Lincoln 1 shared issues
Action Comics 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics

August 16, 2024 · Original source

Why write a review about Silver Age Marvel Comics? Why is it worth your time to read it?

How do early Marvel Comics compare to the best comics of today? And if they are worse (and they are), why? What does that say about art, creativity and innovation more generally?

Why did Marvel Comics succeed in passing the test of time? What did they do differently? What were their innovations?

Open Thread 343

August 19, 2024 · Original source

4: Comment of the week is Gwern’s comment/summary/review on the Marvel Comics book review.

Inline links: Gwern’s comment/summary/review

Mastodon2 mentions across 2 issues

Mastodon is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 28, 2022 and September 18, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Rumors of bad times on Mastodon"; "there was a week or two when everyone threatened to switch to Mastodon"; "everyone threatened to switch to Mastodon". It most often appears alongside California, China, Elon.

Article page: Mastodon
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: December 28, 2022
Last seen: September 18, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For December 2022 December 28, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk September 18, 2023

California 2 shared issues
China 2 shared issues
Elon 2 shared issues
Kanye West 2 shared issues
SAT 2 shared issues

Source context

Links For December 2022

December 28, 2022 · Original source

22: Rumors of bad times on Mastodon (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, see also here). Is this just nutpicking? Can any Mastodon users anecdotally confirm or deny? Related: I’m told that the unofficial rationalist Mastodon server is http://schelling.pt/, though I don’t know the person in charge and can’t personally vouch for it.

Inline links: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, here, http://schelling.pt/

Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk

September 18, 2023 · Original source

For example, I’m surprised to hear this! I thought there was a week or two when everyone threatened to switch to Mastodon, then found they didn’t like Mastodon and went back? So where did everyone go? Was it Mastodon after all? Facebook Threads? Blue Sky? Or did they all start learning to paint and spending time with their friends and families?

Matrix2 mentions across 2 issues

Matrix is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 26, 2022 and August 25, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "We have a Discord and a matrix server (both servers are bridged together)"; "matrix bridge: https://matrix.to/#/#ssc-paris:matrix.org". It most often appears alongside 9191 Tahoe Ln, Boulder, CO 80301, 932 Welch Rd. Java Center, ACX.

Article page: Matrix
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: August 26, 2022
Last seen: August 25, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places August 26, 2022
Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023

9191 Tahoe Ln, Boulder, CO 80301 2 shared issues
932 Welch Rd. Java Center 2 shared issues
ACX 2 shared issues
ACX 2 shared issues
ACX MEETUP 2 shared issues

Source context

August 26, 2022 · Original source

VIENNA, AUSTRIA Contact: Manuel, manuel[dot]turonian[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Wiener Stadtpark at the Strauss Monument; will have an ACX Meetup sign. Coordinates: 8FWR693H+GP2 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Rationality Vienna is a group of about 30 people who meet once a month in person or via Zoom. You can join our Facebook group. Notes: We may want to shift to an indoor location depending on weather and the local Covid numbers. BRUSSELS, BELGIUM Contact: Bruno D, bruno[dot]astral[dot]codex[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 4:00 PM Location: Guingette Henri, George Henri parc Coordinates: 9F26RCWC+84 Event link(s): LessWrong SOFIA, BULGARIA Contact: Anastasia, sofia[dot]acx[dot]meetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Shade Garden (Сенчестата градинка; part of Borisova garden) Coordinates: 8GJ5M8GW+J9 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Sofia ACX started with last year's Meetups Everywhere round. We have Serious Meetups once per month at which we discuss a blog post, a short story, or a book (for instance, The Scout Mindset, The Money Illusion, The Metropolitan Man); and sporadic non-serious social meetups that mostly include getting dinner, going on a walk, watching a film, or playing board games. Attendance hovers around 6-8 people out of a pool of 13. People get invited to the Discord server after they've attended at least one in-person meetup. ZAGREB, CROATIA Contact: DJStern, dorian[dot]sternvukotic[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 6:00 PM Location: Krivi Put Coordinates: 8FQQRX38+V6W Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Croatian LessWrong active group communicates mainly through a Telegram group, we meetup semi regularly, approx once a month. The group is mostly social, and the meetups are not structured (sometimes we all just meet at a random party) Notes: Send me an Email and I will add you to a Telegram group where everything (active) LessWrong Croatia/Zagreb happens LIMASSOL, CYPRUS Contact: Arseniy, runescape[at]list[dot]ru, @anchorheld (Telegram / Instagram) Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:00 PM Location: By the Municipal Zoo Coordinates: 8G6MM3M3+Q6 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please hit me up on Mail, Telegram, or Instagram if you're actually going PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC Contact: Jiri Nadvornik, jiri[dot]nadvornik[at]efektivni-altruismus[dot]cz Time: Thursday, October 6, 6:00 PM Location: Garden of Dharmasala Teahouse Coordinates: 9F2P3CRW+FP7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event COPENHAGEN, DENMARK Contact: Søren Elverlin, soeren[dot]elverlin[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Rundholtsvej 10, 2300 København S Coordinates: 9F7JMH38+GFP Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong TALLINN, ESTONIA Contact: Andrew W, andrew_n_west[at]yahoo[dot]co[dot]uk Time: Monday, September 26, 7:00 PM Location: St Vitus, Tallinn. I don't know if anyone will turn up, but I'll be wearing a suit, a beard, and a book. Coordinates: 9GF6CPRH+MQ Event link(s): LessWrong HELSINKI, FINLAND Contact: Joe Nash, joenash499[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 4:00 PM Location: Restaurant Töölönranta, Helsinginkatu 56 Coordinates: 9GG65WMJ+2J Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong group FONTAINEBLEAU, FRANCE Contact: Ebrahim Akbari, ea[dot]akbari[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 6:00 PM Location: Glasgow bar, Fontainebleau Coordinates: 8FW4CP32+J8 Event link(s): LessWrong PARIS, FRANCE Contact: Olivier, w20l2qtf[at]mailer[dot]me, We have a Discord and a matrix server (both servers are bridged together) Time: Friday, September 23, 6:00 PM Location: In the jardin du carrousel, next to jardin des Tuileries Coordinates: 8FW4V86J+GH Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Regular meetups organized via discord or the newsletter every 3 months with around 20 people. Notes: We have a mailing list if you are interested in future meetups. Please don't hesitate to send me an email to RSVP that you're coming to help gauge the interest. TOULOUSE, FRANCE Contact: Alfonso, barsom[dot]maelwys[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 8, 7:00 PM Location: Bar 'Le Biergarten' (60 Gd Rue Saint-Michel, 31400 Toulouse). We'll be sitting at a table with an ACX MEETUP sign on it. Coordinates: 8FM3HCQW+9H Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by email TBILISI, GEORGIA Contact: Evgenia Karunus, lakesare[at]gmail[dot]com, https://twitter.com/lakesare Time: Saturday, September 17, 7:00 PM Location: Coffee Place Coordinates: 8HH6MRQ2+WH Event link(s): LessWrong AACHEN, GERMANY Contact: Jörn, acx[at]j[dot]stoehler[dot]eu Time: Tuesday, September 27, 7:00 PM Location: Chico Mendes Coordinates: 9F28Q3HJ+9Q Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP here so I can reserve the right number of tables. BERLIN, GERMANY Contact: Ruben Arslan, ssc[at]alphabattle[dot]xyz Time: Sunday, October 2, 2:00 PM Location: Südplateau Fritz-Schloss-Park Coordinates: 9F4MG9H4+4X Event link(s): LessWrong, Google Calendar Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong. I'll bring some beverages. COLOGNE, GERMANY Contact: Marcel Müller, marcel_mueller[at]mail[dot]de Time: Saturday, October 8, 5:00 PM Location: Marienweg 43, 50858 Köln, private venue, just ring the bell or follow the sign. Coordinates: 9F28WRMX+96H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LW / ACX / Rationalist meetup group. Monthly, mostly social meetups. Other activities welcome. Unless noted otherwise we will meet at Marienweg 43 in 50858 Cologne on the 2nd Saturday of each month at 5 pm. Please email me to be added to our mailing list where deviations will be posted. Caution! September Meetup will be at a different venue! Notes: If you read this you are welcome. Our Covid rules are still in effect: You must be tested negative on the same day. Self tests will be available at the meetup. If there is any problem, like you do not find us or I did not see your mail, call me +491788862254. FREIBURG IM BREISGAU, GERMANY Contact: Omar, info[at]rationality-freiburg[dot]de Time: Friday, October 14, 6:00 PM Location: FlexRooms, Salzstr. 1, 79098 Freiburg. We will carry a cardboard sign saying “Rationality Freiburg”. Coordinates: 8FV9XVV2+V56 Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com, Website Group info: The group started in May 2022 and before the summer break we had five meetups with 4-11 people attending. Every two weeks seems like a good rhythm, but nothing is set in stone. So far we always read something beforehand and then discussed it, as well as trying some practical exercises such as TAPs and Personal Calibration. Afterwards we went to have dinner and continued talking about everything and anything for hours. Everything is new and flexible, so come and help us improve! Notes: We have a Signal messenger group and ask you to attend a meetup once to be able to join. HAMBURG, GERMANY Contact: Gunnar Zarncke, g[dot]zarncke[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Kleine Wallanlagen on the lawn near Memorial Holstenglacis. Look for pink blankets; I will also have an ACX sign. Here is an Open Street Map link which also shows the short-cut tunnel from the subway station. Coordinates: 9F5FHX4H+RXC Event link(s): LessWrongLessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong KARLSRUHE, GERMANY Contact: Marcus Wilhelm, mail[at]marcuswilhelm[dot]de Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Botanischer Garten Karlsruhe Coordinates: 8FXC2C72+85X Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet weekly, alternating offline and online, see our LessWrong page KASSEL, HESSEN, GERMANY Contact: Tobias, Sphinxfire[at]outlook[dot]de Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Friedrichsplatz, to the left of the DocumentaHall Coordinates: 9F3F8F6X+R6 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Telegram group Notes: Please join the Telegram group if you are interested in coming. It will be helpful for coordinating something beyond 'let's just see who shows up and take it from there', plus, it will also make me feel a lot better on a purely subjective level if I know beforehand that at least one other person is interested. If you prefer the surprise factor of 'knowing as little as possible about who you're going to meet', you can also just write me via E-mail, of course. LEIPZIG, GERMANY Contact: Gunther Forderung, notavailable[at]riseup[dot]net Time: Tuesday, October 4, 6:00 PM Location: In the Lene-Voigt-Park, in the secluded area opposite of the swings Coordinates: 9F3J8CM2+PF Event link(s): LessWrong TÜBINGEN, GERMANY Contact: Emma, emma[dot]tuebingen[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 23, 6:00 PM Location: The ACX/SSC meetup and dinner (with vegan options) will be on October 23rd at the Annette Kade dormitory (Mohlstraße 44, 8FWFG3H5+XR). If you’d like to attend, please write me an email, and I’ll send you an invitation to our WhatsApp group. Coordinates: 8FWFG3H5+XR Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please email me to get my phone number. If a lot of people are out of town for the holidays and can't come we could meet on, say, October 1st. I would like to know how many people to expect. ATHENS, GREECE Contact: Spyros, spyros[dot]dovas[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Monday, September 5, 7:00 PM Location: On the plaza in front of the National Library Coordinates: 8G95WMQR+WRP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We have organized 2 events so far, fall and spring, we just sit around and discuss. We have a Whatsapp group that hasn't picked up momentum yet. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or Meetup.com BUDAPEST, HUNGARY Contact: Tim Underwood, timunderwood9[at]gmail[dot]com, WhatsApp 19513120591 Time: Sunday, September 11, 2:00 PM Location: Champs Sziget bar on Margit Sziget, near the front. I'll have a big hardcover copy in Hungarian of a book by Richard Dawkins. Coordinates: 8FVXG2CW+2H Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We've been meeting in Budapest for two years now, with our first meeting being the 2020 ACX meetups everywhere. We meet about once a month, and usually we have two articles that are suggested reading that we discuss. CORK, IRELAND Contact: Mikey, Godojhana[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, September 29, 6:00 PM Location: If sunny: The Lough. If not, then the game arcade on the parade Coordinates: 9C3HVGQ7+JQ Event link(s): LessWrong DUBLIN, IRELAND Contact: Lucius, lucius[at]bushnaq[dot]de, LessWrong profile Time: Sunday, October 2, 12:30 PM Location: Clement & Pekoe, William Street South, Dublin 2. We'll be sitting inside, and there'll be a sign with ACX written on it on the table Coordinates: 9C5M8PRP+JV Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: LessWrong FOLIGNO, ITALY Contact: Mauro, orfino[at]yandex[dot]com, LW profile, Telegram Time: Saturday, September 24, 5:00 PM Location: Parco dei Canapé, at the open air cafe, ask the barista Coordinates: 8FJJXP22+HC Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how much food to get. No kids please. MILANO, ITALY Contact: Raffaele, raffa[dot]mauro[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 6:30 PM Location: Viale Luigi Majno, 18, 20129 Milano MI - Primo Ventures / T8P, IInd floor. Coordinates: 8FQFF6C4+9C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet once per month. The group started in May 2022. Notes: Please RSVP by email by the 1st of September PADOVA, ITALY Contact: Carlo, carlo[dot]martinucci[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 1, 3:30 PM Location: Prato della Valle, fountain in the middle. I'll be carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it :) Coordinates: 8FQH9VXG+9J Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: We'll probably find a bar to have a hot chocolate or tea or something :) PISA, ITALY Contact: Raffaele, raffaelesalvia[at]alice[dot]it Time: Saturday, October 22, 5:00 PM Location: We will meet in Piazza dei Cavalieri, near the steps of Palazzo della Carovana Coordinates: 8FMGPC92+R44 Event link(s): LessWrong ROMA, ITALY Contact: Grigorio, greghero12[at]gmail[dot]com, Facebook, +393920366026 Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:00 PM Location: We'll be around Gardenie metro station, at the benches, and I will be wearing a red shirt and sitting on top of the station to be seen Coordinates: 8FHJVHP9+8F Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We meet around 20-25 times a year but it is asymmetrical, focused in summer, Christmas and Easter. We discuss opinions, engage in circling, play games where we spot logical fallacies and biases by attacking our members ideological weakpoints and formalize some debating stances. Occasionally we find the willpower to devote meetups in steelmanning and understanding the outgroup (roughly 4-5 times a year) Notes: If you are into ACX enough to see this post, I believe we have enough common ground to be worth meeting each other. Aren't you curious who else is within this niche community in Rome? Come on, take a leap of faith. P.S. Would be nice if you sent me a message in WhatsApp with your name and probability of attendance, but I love walk-ins just fine. No space limit after all ;-) RIGA, LATVIA Contact: Andis, cerulean[dot]lemniscate[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 4:00 PM Location: Bastejkalns (on top of the hill) Coordinates: 9G86X426+Q5Q Event link(s): LessWrong AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS Contact: Pierre, pierreavdb[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Kanarie Klub (Bellamyplein 51, 1053 AT Amsterdam) Coordinates: 9F469V89+W4 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: The rationality community is growing in the Netherlands, and we're now planning on having monthly meetups! Join the Rationality NL Discord server. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I can plan a different venue if needed DELFT, NETHERLANDS Contact: Pierre Bongrand, bongrand[dot]pierre[at]gmail[dot]com, 0033620644013 (Whatsapp/Telegram/Signal) Time: Thursday, September 22, 6:30 PM Location: Delftse Hout Beach, on the grass, in the center of the beach, I will be wearing a red T-shirt and carrying a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 9F4629FG+66 Event link(s): LessWrong HATTEM, NETHERLANDS Contact: Shoshannah, shos[dot]rationality[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: Dark#0849 Time: Saturday, October 8, 2:00 PM Location: Lijsterbeslaan 6, Hattem Coordinates: 9F48F378+PR Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We support and coordinate groups across the country, including everything from social meetups to structured events and applied rationality. The intention is to connect all Dutch rationalists and rationalists in the Netherlands. We also discuss rationality topics online and coordinate events on our Discord server. Notes: Feel free to bring kids. Ours will be there :) Also, please park 't Heem if you are coming by car. It's a 2 minute walk to our house. HELMOND, NETHERLANDS Contact: Rutger, silvery[dot]swift[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 3:00 PM Location: De Motte (On top of the hill). Nearest road is Palladio. Coordinates: 9F37FMC5+VR Event link(s): LessWrong THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS Contact: Kristof Redei, acxmeetup[at]kristof[dot]me Time: Wednesday, September 14, 6:00 PM Location: Paleistuin, Prinsessewal, 2513 EE Den Haag, Netherlands. We'll have a picnic blanket with an ACX sign on the large central field, somewhere near the playground. Coordinates: 9F4638J3+GP Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Notes: Please RSVP on Facebook if possible! All ages/species welcome. If it's not outdoor weather, we'll go to The Bookstor Cafe next door as a backup. OSLO, NORWAY Contact: Hans Andreas & Jonas, acxoslomeetup[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 1:00 PM Location: Look for the sign of Moloch at Café Billabong - Bogstadveien 53B 0366 Oslo Coordinates: 9FFGWPH7+QP Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We're hoping to do at least a quarterly meetup, but we'll base it on the turnout and enthusiasm of this event. Notes: The cafe has historically been accepting of guests' not ordering--please don't let financial reasons keep you away! GDAŃSK, POLAND Contact: Frank, frankastralcodexten[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: frhrpr#1663 Time: Saturday, August 27, 3:00 PM Location: Next to Park Kuźniczki, opposite the train station, on the circular benches around the water pump; I will be wearing a red armband Coordinates: 9F6W9JJ4+JW Event link(s): LessWrong KRAKÓW, POLAND Contact: Mateusz Bagiński, bagginsmatthew[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:30 PM Location: Celna 6/9, the office of the Optimum Pareto Foundation Coordinates: 9F2X2WVX+V2 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet every month, here is our Facebook group. LUBLIN, POLAND Contact: Piotr, piotrekzlublina[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 5:00 PM Location: Między Słowami cafe, Rybna 4, Lublin Coordinates: 9G346HX8+FX Event link(s): LessWrong POZNAŃ, POLAND Contact: Ofelia Kerr, ofel[dot]kerr[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: ofelia#0001 Time: Saturday, October 8, 6:00 PM Location: Van Gogh Pub, Żydowska 12, 61-761. I'll most likely be on the ground floor and I'll have an ACX sign. Coordinates: 9F4RCW5P+X3F Event link(s): LessWrong WARSAW, POLAND Contact: Michał, rationalwarsaw[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 4, 6:00 PM Location: Południk Zero, Wilcza 25 Coordinates: 9G4362G8+2V Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: The community of Warsaw LessWrong/SSC/ACX/etc. readers is active for over 8 years now. We're trying to organise regular monthly meetups. You can join our Facebook group or Meetup.com. LISBOA, PORTUGAL Contact: Luís Campos, luis[dot]filipe[dot]lcampos[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Jardim Amália Rodrigues, close to Linha d'Água cafe, in the top of a hill, below a bunch of trees Coordinates: 8CCGPRJW+V8 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We've been meeting every month for around 1 year. Get in contact if you want to participate in the WhatsApp group. :) BUCHAREST, ROMANIA Contact: Tony, skyrimtracer[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 16, 3:00 PM Location: Plaza România Mall, Bd. Timișoara 26 - food court Coordinates: 8GP8C2HM+9X Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP by email CLUJ-NAPOCA, ROMANIA Contact: Marius Pop, pop[dot]marius[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 11:00 AM Location: Deva Host, Strada Deva 1-7 Coordinates: 8GR5QH8F+MW Event link(s): LessWrong BELGRADE, SERBIA Contact: Ivica Bogosavljevic, ibogosavljevic[at]gmail[dot]com, Viber +381 65 3473 433 Time: Monday, September 12, 6:00 PM Location: Pool Cafe on Prve pruge Coordinates: 8GP2RCP7+G7 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Please RSVP on my Viber number, so I know how big the room we need. BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA Contact: Viliam, viliam[at]bur[dot]sk Time: Saturday, September 10, 3:00 PM Location: Medická záhrada, by the fountain Coordinates: 8FWV44X9+XW8 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I will post an announcement on LessWrong later. In case of rain, a new meeting place nearby will be announced there. LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA Contact: Demjan Vester, demjan[dot]vester[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, September 14, 6:00 PM Location: Probably Lili Novy bar, near modern gallery and park Tivoli Coordinates: 8FRP3F3X+6V Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com Group info: We meet about 0.7 times a month. Notes: Please RSVP because last time we just barely got a place big enough. BARCELONA, SPAIN Contact: Alfonso, alfonso[dot]martinez[at]upf[dot]edu, WhatsApp +34693846738 Time: Sunday, October 2, 5:30 PM Location: Parc de la Ciutadella, by the Lion Catcher statue; I'll have an ACX sign Coordinates: 8FH495QP+96 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: The idea is to sit on the grass; bring a foulard along for your comfort, or a foldable chair if preferred. Don't worry about the language: English, Spanish, Catalan, we'll find a way. MADRID, SPAIN Contact: Jaime, jaimesevillamolina[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 5:00 PM Location: Teatro de títeres del Parque del Retiro. We'll be on the stands with an ACX sign Coordinates: 8CGRC897+F8C Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We are an EA / rationality group, we've been active for around 5 years but have less in-person activity since the pandemic started. We have a WhatsApp group and a channel in the Spanish-speaking EA Slack. SEVILLA, SPAIN Contact: Edu, edur[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 8:00 PM Location: Parque de María Luisa. I'll be on the grass behind the Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions. I'll be the guy next to an ACX sign, a white wooden chair, and a cardboard ukulele with a tiny cardboard hat on it. Coordinates: 8C9P92F6+3RG Event link(s): LessWrong GOTHENBURG, SWEDEN Contact: Joacim, joacimj[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: Condeco Fredsgatan. I'll have a stack of three books on my table. Coordinates: 9F9HPX4C+39G Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN Contact: Sal, niktonick[at]gmail[dot]com, Telegram Time: Sunday, September 25, 3:00 PM Location: Humlegården, Karlavägen. We will meet near blue gazebo, I will have 'ACX meetup' sign. Coordinates: 9FFW83RF+3M5 Group info: Facebook group BERN, SWITZERLAND Contact: Daniel, dd14214+acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, October 2, 4:00 PM Location: Grosse Schanze, at the statue in front of the main uni building, heading to the Pittaria if it's cold or raining Coordinates: 8FR9XC2Q+4G Event link(s): LessWrong GENEVA, SWITZERLAND Contact: Eric, eric[dot]c[dot]p[dot]meier[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 11, 4:00 PM Location: Park de la Grange, just towards the lake below Villa de la grange Coordinates: 8FR86548+J4 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We have a small persistent group who has tried to meet up once a month since last years Meetup. Notes: Feel free to bring other people you think would be interested! ZURICH, SWITZERLAND Contact: MB, acxzurich[at]proton[dot]me Time: Saturday, September 24, 3:00 PM Location: TBD Event link(s): LessWrong ISTANBUL, TURKEY Contact: J, jinai[dot]jyap[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 4:00 PM Location: The House Cafe in Ortaköy. I am a young Asian woman and imagine I'll be easy to spot, but will also try to bring a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Coordinates: 8GHF22XG+23P Event link(s): LessWrong, Partiful Group info: I do not live here; I am just digital nomading for an indefinite amount of time and would like to meet anyone who's here! Notes: Please RSVP via the Partiful link (you can RSVP as a Maybe)! BIRMINGHAM, UK Contact: Thomas Read, thomas[dot]read[dot]acx[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 3, 1:00 PM Location: We'll be at The Wellington, 37 Bennetts Hill, on the roof terrace if possible. I'll wear an orange shirt and have a sign saying ACX on the table. Coordinates: 9C4WF3JX+7Q Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: It's only a few minutes walk from the stations, so hopefully people can join from all over the West Midlands! BRIGHTON, UK Contact: Alan Enright, alanenright[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 10, 11:00 AM Location: We'll be at the Alcampo Lounge on London Road—we will try and get a table on the raised area in front of you and to the left as you come in but will also have a little ACX sign. Coordinates: 9C2XRVM6+3X Event link(s): LessWrong, Meetup.com BRISTOL, UK Contact: Nick Lowry, bristoleffectivealtruism[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: We’ll be meeting at entrance closet to Tesco Express in the Galleries, Bristol City Centre Coordinates: 9C3VFC45+RJM Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Group info: Meet twice monthly for socials, more regular 'productive' meetups. Been active for 3+ years, please message for WhatsApp group CAMBRIDGE, UK Contact: Hamish Todd, hamish[dot]todd1[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 17, 2:00 PM Location: Bath House Pub, UPSTAIRS!! I will have a copy of Peter Singer's The Most Good You Can Do Coordinates: 9F426439+J9 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Group info: We meet on the third Saturday of every month. The group has been around almost a year and is well-attended! Notes: My phone/WhatsApp number is +44 0730 *** 3550, where the *** are replaced by the serial number of the Boeing plane whose first flight was on September 2, 1998. Email me to get on the mailing list for future events if you'd like that :) CARDIFF, WALES Contact: AF, strmnova[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, September 16, 5:00 PM Location: Little Man Coffee (note new location!) Coordinates: 9C3RFRHH+W2 Event link(s): LessWrong EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND, UK Contact: Sam, acxedinburgh[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, September 24, 2:00 PM Location: Pleasance Cafe. Go through the arch and the door to the cafe is on your left Coordinates: 9C7RWRW9+M8 Group info: ~Monthly meetups, often in Pleasance Cafe but have experimented with other locations. Email me to join the mailing list & WhatsApp group. LANCASTER, UK Contact: Gruffydd Gozali, gruffyddgozali[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 15, 3:00 PM Location: Lancaster University Library, will be on the ground floor by the tree wearing an EA shirt. Coordinates: 9C6V2657+WJR Event link(s): LessWrong LINCOLN, UK Contact: Tobias, tobias[dot]showan[at]yahoo[dot]co[dot]uk Time: Saturday, September 10, 2:00 PM Location: Nosey Parker pub, I'll bring a little paper ACX sign. Coordinates: 9C5X6C9R+XJ Event link(s): LessWrong LONDON, UK Contact: Edward Saperia, edsaperia[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 25, 2:00 PM Location: Newspeak House Coordinates: 9C3XGWGH+3F7 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com, Eventbrite Group info: You can join our mailing list or our Meetup.com group MANCHESTER, UK Contact: Matthew Gibson, melkartmtg[at]hotmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 18, 11:00 AM Location: Sackville Gardens, Alan Turing Memorial Coordinates: 9C5VFQG7+MH Event link(s): LessWrong NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE, UK Contact: Joshua William, iamjoshwilliam[at]icloud[dot]com, Telegram Time: Saturday, September 3, 12:30 PM Location: Trinity Square, High Street Gosforth. You can get the bus to Gosforth from the city center just outside the famous 'Tyneside Cinema' (bus number: 30, 31, or 35 at Monument Pilgrim Street bus stop), or you can take a walk if you want to get your 'steps' in (if you'd like to do the latter, send me an email and I'll send you the directions), which takes ~60-min. Coordinates: 9C7W294H+5V Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: To my knowledge, there isn't an ACX meet up in this city, or region of the UK, though if there is a demand for a reoccurrence, I'd be happy to keep facilitating such. I'd also happily formulate a WhatsApp group if theres interest, after the meet up. Notes: We have a deli, '1901 cafe', on the square, which we can grab an immediate bite to eat at [so save some hunger if you'd like to do that]. There's a safe [and lovely] park with some benches just by the way, which, if the weather is nice, we can sit at after a bite to eat, or, otherwise, we can remain in the cafe. OXFORD, UK Contact: Sam, ssc[at]sambrown[dot]eu, There's a Signal group people can join :) contact Sam for info Time: Wednesday, October 19, 6:30 PM Location: The Star, Rectory Road, Oxford. We'll be in the beer garden round the back, with a sign ?? Coordinates: 9C3WPQX6+QP9 Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event, Meetup.com Group info: We run socials every months, and applied rationality workshops from time to time! Notes: Please RSVP on any of the platforms (or email) for free pizza PENRYN, CORNWALL, UK Contact: mini t, tminns[at]btinternet[dot]com Time: Saturday, August 27, 3:00 PM Location: glasney playing field and valley Coordinates: 9C2P5V8V+P9 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: I don't mind rescheduling, or organizing another event, not many people are likely to turn up this far out of the way.

Your Book Review: Plagues And Peoples

August 25, 2023 · Original source

PARIS, ÎLE-DE-FRANCE/PARIS, FRANCE Contact: Épiphanie Gédéon (Épi) Contact Info: iwonder[at]whatisthis[dot]world Time: Sunday, October 15th, 5:30 PM Location: We'll meet at the Parc Montsouris, just below Cité Universitaire. We'll be in front of the Avenue Reille and Avenue René Corty entrance, behind the statue on the grass. We'll have an ACX meetup sign and tableclothes Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8FW4R8FP+CJ Group Link: Discord link: https://discord.com/invite/2U9qhR2suc ; matrix bridge: https://matrix.to/#/#ssc-paris:matrix.org ; mailing list: https://framalistes.org/sympa/info/slatestarcodexparis

Inline links: https://plus.codes/8FW4R8FP+CJ, https://discord.com/invite/2U9qhR2suc, https://matrix.to/#/#ssc-paris:matrix.org, https://framalistes.org/sympa/info/slatestarcodexparis

Mayo Clinic2 mentions across 2 issues

Mayo Clinic is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between June 17, 2021 and February 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "to which a Mayo Clinic Professor recently pondered"; "Compare this to the Mayo Clinic". It most often appears alongside Africa, China, India.

Article page: Mayo Clinic
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: June 17, 2021
Last seen: February 29, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Plagues And Peoples June 17, 2021
Links For February 2024 February 29, 2024

Africa 2 shared issues
China 2 shared issues
India 2 shared issues
@BoyanSlat 1 shared issues
@eigenrobot 1 shared issues

Source context

June 17, 2021 · Original source

The idea of disease gradients is interesting in the geographic variabilities of COVID-19. India has ten times less of a death rate than the United States, to which a Mayo Clinic Professor recently pondered “cross reactive immunity from prior corona virus and other infections” as a main reason. Another interesting parallel to ponder is how humans have had such trouble adapting to microparasites because they were invisible and how that mirrors some of today’s issues of how our society deals with COVID-19.

Inline links: pondered

Links For February 2024

February 29, 2024 · Original source

Compare this to the Mayo Clinic:

Inline links: the Mayo Clinic

I think the Mayo Clinic summary is much better. I’m still not at a point where I would use Consensus without checking its answers carefully.

MEDLINE2 mentions across 2 issues

MEDLINE is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between November 17, 2021 and February 01, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "a thorough and structured review of articles indexed in ... MEDLINE"; "a thorough and structured review of articles indexed in PubMed and MEDLINE". It most often appears alongside Alexandros Marinos, Aref, Argentina.

Article page: MEDLINE
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: November 17, 2021
Last seen: February 01, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Ivermectin: Much More Than You Wanted To Know November 17, 2021
Response To Alexandros Contra Me On Ivermectin February 01, 2023

Alexandros Marinos 2 shared issues
Aref 2 shared issues
Argentina 2 shared issues
Australia 2 shared issues
azithromycin 2 shared issues

Source context

Ivermectin: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

November 17, 2021 · Original source

Okay, fine, they misspelled “recovery” once. But they spelled it right the other time! That puts it in the top 50% for ivermectin papers! The fraud-hunters have examined this paper closely and are unable to find any signs of fraud. @PubPeer on the Mahmud trial of ivermectin in covid patients.\n\nI have now reviewed the individual patient data master sheet.\n\nI did not find any irregularities and the summary data matches the published data.\n\n","username":"K_Sheldrick","name":"Kyle Sheldrick","profile_image_url":"","date":"Sat Jul 17 11:06:25 +0000 2021","photos":[],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":2,"like_count":12,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{"url":"https://pubpeer.com/publications/E1D65711EF28D14517731BEACB89C8#2","title":"PubPeer - Ivermectin in combination with doxycycline for treating COVI...","description":"There are comments on PubPeer for publication: Ivermectin in combination with doxycycline for treating COVID-19 symptoms: a randomized trial (2021)","domain":"pubpeer.com"},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> I think this paper is legitimate and that its findings need to be seriously considered. Serious consideration doesn’t always meant they’re true - sometimes if we have strong evidence otherwise we can dismiss things without understanding why. And there’s always the chance it was a fluke, right? Can something have a p-value less than 0.001 and still be a fluke? Szenta Fonseca et al: This is a chart review from Brazil. Researchers looked at various people who had been treated for COVID in an insurance company database, saw whether they got ivermectin or not, and saw whether the people who got it did better or worse. About a hundred people got it, and a few hundred others didn’t. The people who got it did not do any better than anyone else, and you’ll notice this is one of the rare red boxes on the table above. But we shouldn’t take this study seriously. Nobody took any effort to avoid selection bias, so it’s very possible that sicker people were given more medication (including ivermectin), which unfairly handicaps the ivermectin group. Also, it’s hard to tell from the paper who was on how much of what, and the discussion of ivermectin seems like kind of an afterthought after discussing lots of other meds in much more depth. This is another one I feel comfortable ignoring. Cadegiani et al: A crazy person decided to put his patients on every weird medication he could think of, and 585 subjects ended up on a combination of ivermectin, hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and nitazoxanide, with dutasteride and spironolactone "optionally offered" and vitamin D, vitamin C, zinc, apixaban, rivaraxoban, enoxaparin, and glucocorticoids "added according to clinical judgment". There was no control group, but the author helpfully designated some random patients in his area as a sort-of-control, and then synthetically generated a second control group based on “a precise estimative based on a thorough and structured review of articles indexed in PubMed and MEDLINE and statements by official government agencies and specific medical societies”. Patients in the experimental group were twice as likely to recover (p < 0.0001), had negative PCR after 14 vs. 21 days, and had 0 vs. 27 hospitalizations. Speaking of low p-values, some people did fraud-detection tests on another of Cadegiani’s COVID-19 studies and got values like p < 8.24E-11 in favor of it being fraudulent. And, uh, he’s also studied whether ultra-high-dose antiandrogens treated COVID, and found that they did, cutting mortality by 92% . But the trial is under suspicion, with a BMJ article calling it “[the worst] violations of medical ethics and human rights in Brazil’s history” and “an ethical cesspit of violations”. [update 2022: this section originally contained more accusations against Cadegiani. Alexandros Marinos does a deeper dive with information not available at the time I wrote this, and finds some of them were overstated or false by implication] Anyway, let’s not base anything important on the results of this study, mmkay? A defiant Flavio Cadegiani. Imagine a guy who looks like this telling you to take ultra-high-dose antiandrogens. Ahmed et al: And we’re back in Bangladesh. 72 hospital patients were randomized to one of three arms: ivermectin only, ivermectin + doxycycline, and placebo. Primary endpoint was time to negative PCR, which was 9.7 days for ivermectin only and 12.7 days for placebo (p = 0.03). Other endpoints including duration of hospitalization (9.6 days ivermectin vs. 9.7 days placebo, not significant). This looks pretty good for ivermectin and does not have any signs of fraud or methodological problems. If I wanted to pick at it anyway, I would point out that the ivermectin + doxycycline group didn’t really differ from placebo, and that if you average out both ivermectin groups (with and without doxycycline) it looks like the difference would not be significant. I had previously committed to considering only ivermectin alone in trials that had multiple ivermectin groups, so I’m not going to do this. I can’t find any evidence this trial was preregistered so I don’t know whether they waited to see what would come out positive and then made that their primary endpoint, but virological clearance is a pretty normal primary endpoint and this isn’t that suspicious. It’s impossible to find any useful commentary on this study because Elgazzar (the guy who ran the most famous fraudulent ivermectin study) had the first name Ahmed, everyone is talking about Elgazzar all the time, and this overwhelms Google whenever I try to search for Ahmed et al. For now I’ll just keep this as a mildly positive and mildly plausible virological clearance result, in the context of no effect on hospitalization length or most symptoms. Chaccour et al: 24 patients in Spain were randomized to receive either medium-dose ivermectin or placebo. The primary outcome was percent of patients with negative PCR at day 7; secondary outcomes were viral load and symptoms. The primary endpoint ended up being kind of a wash - everyone still PCR positive by day 7 so it was impossible to compare groups. Ivermectin trended toward lower viral load but never reached significance. Weirdly, ivermectin did seem to help symptoms, but only anosmia and cough towards the end (p = 0.03), which you would usually think of as lingering post-COVID problems. The paper says: Given these findings, consideration could be given to alternative mechanisms of action different from a direct antiviral effect. One alternative explanation might be a positive allosteric modulation of the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor caused by ivermectin and leading to a downregulation of the ACE-2 receptor and viral entry into the cells of the respiratory epithelium and olfactory bulb. Another mechanism through which ivermectin might influence the reversal of anosmia is by inhibiting the activation of pro-inflammatory pathways in the olfactory epithelium. Inflammation of the olfactory mucosa is thought to play a key role in the development of anosmia in SARS-CoV-2 infection This seems kind of hedge-y. If you’re wondering where things went from there, Dr. Chaccour is now a passionate anti-ivermectin activist: @Finneganporter in @BusinessInsider \n\nThe roots of #ivermectin mania: How South America incubated a fake-medicine craze that took the US by storm\n\n","username":"carlos_chaccour","name":"Dr. Carlos Chaccour ??????","profile_image_url":"","date":"Sun Nov 07 18:40:28 +0000 2021","photos":[],"quoted_tweet":{},"reply_count":0,"retweet_count":2,"like_count":9,"impression_count":0,"expanded_url":{"url":"https://www.businessinsider.in/international/news/the-roots-of-ivermectin-mania-how-south-america-incubated-a-fake-medicine-craze-that-took-the-us-by-storm/articleshow/87554081.cms","image":"https://bucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/88d08e70-c9e2-46d4-a5df-96807b6c3a13_2000x1000.jpeg","title":"The roots of ivermectin mania: How South America incubated a fake-medicine craze that took the US by storm","description":"The popularity of unproven anti-parasitic drug ivermectin as a COVID-19 treatment is surging. Its use has roots in South America, where it was hyped by populist","domain":"businessinsider.in"},"video_url":null,"belowTheFold":true}" data-component-name="Twitter2ToDOM"> So I guess he must think of this trial as basically negative, although realistically it’s 24 people and we shouldn’t put too much weight on it either way. Ghauri et al: Pakistan, 95 patients. Nonrandom; the study compared patients who happened to be given ivermectin (along with hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin) vs. patients who were just given the latter two drugs. There’s some evidence this produced systematic differences between the two groups - for example, patients in the control group were 3x more likely to have had diarrhea (this makes sense; diarrhea is a potential ivermectin side effect, so you probably wouldn’t give it to people already struggling with this problem). Also, the control group was twice as likely to be getting corticosteroids, maybe a marker for illness severity. Primary outcome was what percent of both groups had a fever: on day 7 it was 21% of ivermectin patients vs. 65% of controls, p < 0.001. No other outcomes were reported. I don’t hate this study, but I think the nonrandom assignment (and observed systematic differences) is a pretty fatal flaw. I can’t find anyone else talking about this one. At least no one seems to be saying anything bad. Babaloba et al: Be warned: if I have to refer to this one in real-life conversation, I will expand out the “et al” and call it “Babalola & Alakoloko”, because that’s really fun to say. This was a Nigerian RCT comparing 21 patients on low-dose ivermectin, 21 patients on high-dose ivermectin, and 20 patients on a combination of lopinavir and ritonavir, a combination antiviral which later studies found not to work for COVID and which might as well be considered a placebo. Primary outcome, as usual, was days until a negative PCR test. High dose ivermectin was 4.65 days, low dose was 6 days, control was 9.15, p = 0.035. Figure 2 is apparently a photograph of the computer screen where they did this calculation. Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz, part of the team that detects fraud in ivermectin papers, is not a fan of this one: He doesn’t say there what means, but elsewhere he tweets this figure: It’s always a bad sign when your study features in an image with “NUMEROUS IMPOSSIBLE NUMBERS” in red at the top. I think his point is that if you have 21 people, it’s impossible to have 50% of them have headache, because that would be 10.5. If 10 people have a headache, it would be 47.6%; if 11, 52%. So something is clearly wrong here. Seems like a relatively minor mistake, and Meyerowitz-Katz stops short of calling fraud, but it’s not a good look. I’m going to be slightly uncomfortable with this study without rejecting it entirely, and move on. Ravakirti et al: Here we’re in Eastern India - not exactly Bangladesh again, but a stone’s throw away from it. In this RCT patients were randomized into an ivermectin group (57) and a placebo group (58). Primary outcome was negative PCR on day 6, because doing it on day 7 like everyone else would be too easy. As with several other groups, this was a bad move; too few people had it to make a good comparison; it was 13% of intervention vs. 18% of placebo, p = 0.3. Secondary outcomes were also pretty boring, except for the most important: 4 people in the placebo group died, compared to 0 in ivermectin (p = 0.045). On the one hand, this is one outcome of many, reaching the barest significance threshold. Another fluke? Still, there are no real problems with this study, and nobody has anything to say against it. Let’s add this one to the scale as another very small and noisy piece of real evidence in ivermectin’s favor. Bukhari et al: Now we’re in Pakistan. 50 patients were randomized to low-dose ivermectin, another 50 got standard of care including vitamin D. There was no placebo, but primary outcome was number of days to reach negative PCR, which it seems hard for placebo to affect much, so I don’t care. 5 controls and 9 ivermectin patients left the hospital against medical advice and could not be followed up, which is bad but not necessarily study-ruining. They never measured their supposed primary outcome of “days to reach negative PCR” directly, but they did measure how many people had negative PCR on various days, and ivermectin had a clear advantage - for example, on day 7, it was 37/50 for IVR and only 20/50 for control. Even if we assume all the lost-to-followup patients had maximally bad-for-the-hypothesis results, that’s still a positive finding. Nobody else has much to say about this one, certainly no accusations that they’ve found anything suspicious. Keep. Mohan et al: India. RCT. 40 patients got low-dose ivermectin, 40 high-dose ivermectin, and 45 placebo. Primary outcomes were time to negative PCR, and viral load on day 5. In the results, they seem to have reinterpreted “time to negative PCR” as the subtly different “percent with negative PCR on some specific day”. High-dose ivermectin did best (47.5% negative on day 5) and placebo worst (31% negative), but it was insignificant (p = 0.3). There was no difference in viral load. All groups took about the same amount of time for symptoms to resolve. More placebo patients had failed to recover by the end of the study (6) than ivermectin patients (2), but this didn’t reach statistical significance (p = 0.4). Overall a well-done, boring, negative study, although ivermectin proponents will correctly point out that, like basically every other study we have looked at, the trend was in favor of ivermectin and this could potentially end up looking impressive in a meta-analysis. Biber et al: This is an RCT from Israel. 47 patients got ivermectin and 42 placebo. Primary endpoint was viral load on day 6. I am having trouble finding out what happened with this; as far as I can tell it was a negative result and they buried it in favor of more interesting things. In a "multivariable logistic regression model, the adjusted odds ratio of negative SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR negative test" favored ivermectin over placebo (p = 0.03 for day 6, p = 0.01 for day 8), but this seems like the kind of thing you do when your primary outcome is boring and you’re angry. Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz is not a fan: He notes that the study excluded people with high viral load, but the preregistration didn’t say they would do that. Looking more closely, he finds they did that because, if you included these people, the study got no positive results. So probably they did the study, found no positive results, re-ran it with various subsets of patients until they did get a positive result, and then claimed to have “excluded” patients who weren’t in the subset that worked. I’m going to toss this one. Elalfy et al: What even is this? Where am I? As best I can tell, this is some kind of Egyptian trial. It might or might not be an RCT; it says stuff like “Patients were self-allocated to the treatment groups; the first 3 days of the week for the intervention arm while the other 3 days for symptomatic treatment”. Were they self-allocated in the sense that they got to choose? Doesn’t that mean it’s not random? Aren’t there seven days in a week? These are among the many questions that Elalfy et al do not answer for us. The control group (which they seem to think can also be called “the white group”) took zinc, paracetamol, and maybe azithromycin. The intervention group took zinc, nitazoxanide, ribavirin, and ivermectin. There were very large demographic differences between the groups of the sort which make the study unusable, which they mention and then ignore. From there, they follow this normal and totally comprehensible flowchart: There is no primary outcome assigned, but viral clearance rates on day seven were 58% in the yellow group compared to 0% in the white group, which I guess is a strong positive result. This table… …looks very impressive, in terms of the experimental group doing better than the control, except that they don’t specify whether it was before the trial or after it, and at least one online commentator thinks it might have been before, in which case it’s only impressive how thoroughly they failed to randomize their groups. Overall I don’t feel bad throwing this study out. I hope it one day succeeds in returning to its home planet. Lopez-Medina et al: Colombian RCT. 200 patients took ivermectin, another 200 took placebo. They originally worried the placebo might taste different than real ivermectin, then solved this by replacing it with a different placebo, which is a pretty high level of conscientiousness. Primary outcome was originally percent of patients whose symptoms worsened by two points, as rated on a complicated symptom scale when a researcher asked them over the phone. Halfway through the study, they realized nobody was worsening that much, so they changed the primary outcome to time until symptoms got better, as measured by the scale. In the ivermectin group, symptoms improved that much after 10 days; in the placebo group, after 12, p = 0.53. By the end of the study, symptoms had improved in 82% of ivermectin users and 79% of controls, also insignificant. 4 patients in the ivermectin group needed to be hospitalized compared to 6 in the placebo group, again insignificant. This study is bigger than most of the other RCTs, and more polished in terms of how many spelling errors, photographs of computer screens, etc, it contains. It was published in JAMA, one of the most prestigious US medical journals, as opposed to the crappy nth-tier journals most of the others have been in. When people say things like “sure, a lot of small studies show good results for ivermectin, but the bigger and more professional trials don’t”, this is one of the two big professional trials they’re talking about. Ivermectin proponents make some good arguments against it. In order to get as big as it did, Lopez-Medina had to compromise on rigor. Its outcome is how people self-score their symptoms on a hokey scale in a phone interview, instead of viral load or PCR results or anything like that. Still, this is basically what we want, right? In the end, we want people to feel better and less sick, not to get good scores on PCR tests. Also, it changed its primary outcome halfway through; isn’t that bad? I think maybe not; the reason we want a preregistered primary outcome is so that you don’t change halfway through to whatever outcome shows the results you want. The researchers in this study did a good job explaining why they changed their outcome, the change makes sense, and their original outcome would also have shown ivermectin not working (albeit less accurately and effectively). I don’t know of any evidence that they knew (or suspected) final results when switching to this new outcome, and it seems like the most reasonable new outcome to switch to. Finally, their original placebo tasted different from ivermectin (though they switched halfway through). This is one of the few studies where I actually care about placebo, because people are self-rating their symptoms. But realistically most of these people don’t know what ivermectin is supposed to taste like. Also, they did a re-analysis and found there was no difference between the people who got the old placebo and the new one. I’m making a big deal of this because ivmmeta.com - the really impressive meta-analysis site I’ve been going off of - puts a special warning letter underneath their discussion of this study, urging us not to trust it. They don’t do this for any of the other ones we’ve addressed so far - not the one by the guy whose other studies were all frauds, not the one where 50% of 21 people had headaches, not the unrandomized one where the groups were completely different before the experiment started, not even the one by the guy accused of crimes against humanity. Only this one. This makes me a lot less charitable to ivmmeta than I would otherwise be; I think it’s hard to choose this particular warning letter strategy out of well-intentioned commitment to truth. They just really don’t like this big study that shows ivermectin doesn’t work. Also, the warning itself irritates me, and includes paragraphs like: RCTs have a fundamental bias against finding an effect for interventions that are widely available — patients that believe they need treatment are more likely to decline participation and take the intervention [Yeh], i.e., RCTs are more likely to enroll low-risk participants that do not need treatment to recover (this does not apply to the typical pharmaceutical trial of a new drug that is otherwise unavailable). This trial was run in a community where ivermectin was available OTC and very widely known and used. Nobody else worries about this, and there are a million biases that non-randomized studies have that would be super-relevant when discussing those, but somehow when they’re pro-ivermectin the site forgets to be this thorough. I think a better pro-ivermectin response to this study is to point out that all the trends support ivermectin. Symptoms took 10 days to resolve in the ivermectin group vs. 12 in placebo; 4 ivermectin patients were hospitalized vs. 6 placebo patients, etc. Just say that this was an unusually noisy trial because of the self-report methodology, and you’re confident that these small differences will add up to significance when you put them into a meta-analysis. Roy et al: We’re back in East India, and back to non-randomized trials. 56 patients were retrospectively examined; some had been given ivermectin + doxycycline, others hydroxychloroquine, other azithromycin, and others symptomatic treatment only. We don’t get any meaningful information about how this worked, but we are told that they did not differ in “clinical well-being reporting onset timing”. Whatever. Chahla et al: The first of many Argentine trials. 110 patients received medium-dose ivermectin; 144 were kept as a control (no placebo). This was “cluster randomized”, which means they randomize different health centers to either give the experimental drug or not. This is worse than regular randomization, because there could be differences between these health centers (eg one might have better doctors who otherwise give better treatment, one might be in the poor part of town and have sicker patients, etc). They checked to see if there were any differences between the groups, and it sure looks like there were (the experimental group had twice as many obese people as the controls), but as per them, these differences were not statistically significant. Note that if this did make a difference, it would presumably make ivermectin look worse, not better. The primary outcome was given as “increase discharge from outpatient care with COVID-19 mild disease”. This favored the treatment; only 2/110 patients in the ivermectin group failed to be discharged, compared to 20 patients in the control group. But, uh, these were at different medical centers. Can’t different medical centers just have different discharge policies? One discharges you as soon as you seem to be getting better, the other waits to really make sure? This is an utterly crap endpoint to do a cluster randomized controlled trial on. If you’re going to do cRCT, which is never a great idea, you should be using some extremely objective endpoint that doctors and clinic administrators can’t possibly affect, like viral load according to some third-party laboratory, using the same third-party laboratory for both clinics. This is such a bad idea that I can’t help worrying I’m missing or misunderstanding something. If not, this is dumb and bad and should be ignored. Mourya et al: We’re back in India. This is a nonrandomized study comparing 50 patients given ivermectin to 50 patients given hydroxychloroquine. No primary outcome was named, but they focus on PCR negativity. Only 6% of patients in the hydroxychloroquine group were negative, compared to 90% of patients in the ivermectin group! On what day did they do the test? Uh, kind of random, and they admit that “in [the hydroxychloroquine group], mean time difference from the date of initiation of treatment and second test was significantly longer (7.24±2.75 days) as compared to 5.22±1.21 days in [the ivermectin group] (p=0.021).” Since they assessed these groups at different times, we shouldn’t draw any conclusions from them getting different results. Except that as far as I can tell this should handicap ivermectin, making it especially impressive that it did better. But also, the ivermectin group was made mostly of people who had been asymptomatic at the beginning (70%), and the hydroxychloroquine group had almost no asymptomatic cases (8%) . They were giving the ivermectin to healthy people and the hydroxychloroquine to sick people! They admit deep in the discussion that this “may be a confounding factor”. So basically they got totally different groups of people, tested them at totally different times, and the two sets of test results differed. So what? So this is why normal people do RCTs instead of whatever the heck this is, that’s what. Loue et al: …this one isn’t going to be an RCT either. Loue tells a story about a cluster of COVID cases at the French nursing home where he works. He asked people if they wanted to try ivermectin; 10 did and 15 didn’t. 1 ivermectin patient died, compared to 5 non-ivermectin patients. The non-ivermectin group looked a bit sicker than the ivermectin group in the inevitable Table 1, though it’s hard to tell. One interesting possible confounder (not mentioned, but I’m imagining it) is that demented patients probably couldn’t consent to ivermectin and ended up in the control group. This is another case of “I’m not going to trust anything that isn’t an RCT”. Merino et al: Another (sigh) non-RCT. Mexico City tried a public health program where if you called a hotline and said you had COVID, they sent you an emergency kit with various useful supplies. One of those supplies was ivermectin tablets. 18,074 people got the kit (and presumably some appreciable fraction took the ivermectin, though there’s no way to prove that). Their control group is people from before they started giving out the kits, people from after they stopped giving out the kits, and people who didn’t want the kits. There are differences in who got COVID early in the epidemic vs. later, and in people who did opt for medical kits vs. didn’t. To correct these, the researchers tried to adjust for confounders, something which - as I keep trying to hammer home again and again - never works. They found that using the kit led to a 75% or so reduction in hospitalization, though they were unable to separate out the ivermectin from the other things in the kit (paracetamol and aspirin), or from the placebo effect of having a kit and feeling like you had already gotten some treatment (if I understand right, the decision to go to the hospital was left entirely to the patient). I think this study is a moderate point in favor of giving people kits in order to prevent hospital overcrowding, but I’m not willing to accept that it tells us much about ivermectin in particular. Faisal et al: This one was published in The Professional Medical Journal (mispelled as “Profesional Medical Journal” in its URL), so you know it’s going to be good! It describes itself as “a cross-sectional study”, but later says it “randomized patients into two groups”, which would make it an RCT - I think they might just be using the term “cross-sectional” different from the standard American usage. A hospital in Pakistan got 50 patients on ivermectin + azithromycin, and another 50 on azithromycin alone. Primary outcome was not mentioned, and the data were presented confusingly, but a typical result is that only 4% of the ivermectin group had symptoms lasting more than 10 days, whereas 16% of the control group did, p < 0.01. They do a really weird thing where they compare how long it took symptoms to resolve between IVM and control groups within each bin. That is, if I’m understanding correctly, they ask “of the people who took between 3-5 days for symptoms to resolve, did they resolve faster for IVM or control?”. This is an utterly bizarre analysis to perform, although it doesn’t affect the fact that their other results still seem to favor ivermectin. Maybe I’m confused about what’s going on here. I’ve mostly been letting people off easy on no placebo, but I as far as I can tell (not very far) this paper seems to be going off whether patients reported continuing to have symptoms to the hospital doing the study, and I think that is potentially susceptible to placebo effects. Additionally, there’s no preregistration, and even though they talk a lot about doing PCR tests they don’t present the results. This is by no means the worst study here but I still think it’s pretty low quality and I don’t trust it. Aref et al: This one is published in the International Journal Of Nanomedicine, even though I’m pretty sure that isn’t a real thing. In this case the “nanomedicine” is a new nasal spray version of ivermectin which is so confusing I cannot for the life of me figure out what dose they are giving these patients. This Egyptian study gives 57 patients intranasal ivermectin plus hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, oseltamavir, and some vitamins; another 57 patients get all that stuff except the ivermectin. Primary outcome is not stated, but they look at various symptoms, all of which look better in the ivermectin group: 95% of ivermectin patients got negative PCRs at some time point, compared to 75% of controls, p = 0.004. I am pretty suspicious of this study, not least because it comes from Egypt which has an awful reputation for fake studies, and it returns extreme results that I wouldn’t expect even if ivermectin was actually a wonder drug. But I cannot find any particular thing wrong with it, nor did anyone else I looked at, so I will grudgingly let it stand. Krolewiecki et al: Another Argentine study. This one is a real RCT. 30 patients received ivermectin, 15 were the control group (no placebo, again). Primary outcome was difference in viral load on day 5. The trend favored ivermectin but it was not statistically significant, although they were able to make it statistically significant if they looked at a subset of higher-IVM-plasma-concentration patients. They did not find any difference in clinical outcomes. A pro-ivermectin person could point out that in the subgroup with the highest ivermectin concentrations, the drug seemed to work. A skeptic could point out that this is exactly the kind of subgroup slicing that you are not supposed to do without pre-registering it, which I don’t think this team did. I agree with the skeptic. Vallejos et al: Another Argentine study. It’s big (250 people in each arm). It’s an RCT. It tries to define a primary outcome (“Primary outcome: the trial ended when the last patient who was included achieved the end of study visit”), but that’s not what “primary outcome” means, and they don’t offer an alternative. Other outcomes: no difference in PCR on days 3 or 12. Hospitalization is nonsignificantly better in the ivermectin group (14 vs. 21, p = 0.2), but death is nonsigificantly better in the placebo group (3 vs. 4, p = 0.7). This isn’t even the kind of nonsignificant that might contribute to an exciting meta-analysis later. This is just a pure null result. I cannot find any problem with this study, and neither can anyone else I checked. This is the biggest RCT we’ve seen so far, so we should take it seriously. TOGETHER Trial: Speaking of big RCTs… This one hasn’t been published yet. There’s a video of a talk about it, but I am not going to watch it, because it is a video, so I am getting information secondhand from eg here. Apparently, it compares 677 people (!) randomized to ivermectin to 678 people randomized to placebo. 86 ivermectin patients ended up in the hospital compared to 95 placebo patients, p-value not significant. This was a really big professional trial done by bigshot researchers from a major Canadian university, and the medical establishment is taking it much more seriously than any of these others. When it comes out, it will probably get published in a top journal. When discussing Lopez-Medina, I wrote: When people say things like “sure, a lot of small studies show good results for ivermectin, but the bigger and more professional trials don’t”, this is one of the two big professional trials they’re talking about. This is the other one. Not coincidentally, it’s also the other trial that ivmmeta.com has a warning letter underneath telling you to disregard. Their main concern is that instead of truly randomizing patients to ivermectin vs. placebo, they did a time-dependent randomization that meant during some weeks more patients were getting one or the other. This is a problem because the trial takes place in Brazil, where different variants were more common at different times. Here’s their image: On the one hand, I have immense contempt for ivmmeta for letting all those other awful studies pass and then pulling out all the stops to try to nitpick this one. I have no idea if their proposed randomization failure really happened. And no doubt the reason they’re even able to investigate this is that this study is really careful and transparent - most of them don’t tell you anything about their randomization method. I would be shocked if other studies don’t have all these problems and worse. On the other hand, the point isn’t to be fair, it’s to be right. And this is a potential confounder. Not a huge one. But a potential one. I guess all we can do is try to bound the damage. Even if the confounding is 100% real and bad, there’s no way to make this study consistent with the crazy super-pro-ivermectin results of studies like Espitia-Hernandez and Aref. And even if we deny any confounding, we see the same slight pro-ivermectin trend - 86 hospitalizations vs. 95 - that we’ve seen in so many other studies. Nothing is going to make me believe that this isn’t in the top 33% of studies we’ve been looking at, so let’s add it as grist for the meta-analysis (though maybe not quite as much grist as its vast size indicates) and move on, angrily. Buonfrate et al: An Italian RCT. Patients were randomized into low-dose ivermectin (32), placebo (29), or high-dose ivermectin (32). Primary outcome was viral load on day 7. There was no significant difference (average of 2 in ivermectin groups, 2.2 in placebo group). They admit that they failed to reach the planned sample size, but did a calculation to show that even if they had, the trial could not have returned a positive result. Clinically, an average of 2 patients were hospitalized in each of the ivermectin arms, compared to 0 in the placebo arm - which bucks our previously-very-constant pro-ivermectin trend. Mayer et al: Not an RCT. Patients in an Argentine province were offered the opportunity to try ivermectin; 3266 said yes and become the experimental group, 17966 said no and became the control group. There were many obvious differences between the groups, but they all seemed to handicap ivermectin. There was a nonsignificant trend toward less hospitalization and significantly less mortality (1.5% vs. 2.1%, p = 0.03). While looking into this study, I learned the term “immortal time bias”. This means a period in between selection for the study and the beginning of study recording where patient outcomes are not counted. I think the problem here is that if you signed up for the system on Day X, and if you got sick before they could give you ivermectin, you were in the control group. See this Twitter thread, I have not confirmed everything he says. This only hardens my resolve to stay away from non-RCTs. Borody et al: Our last paper! …is it a paper? I can’t find it published anywhere. It mostly seems to be on news sites. Doesn’t look peer-reviewed. And it starts with “Note that views expressed in this opinion article are the writer’s personal views”. Whatever. 600 Australians were treated with ivermectin, doxycycline, and zinc. The article compares this to an “equivalent control group” made of “contemporary infected subjects in Australia obtained from published Covid Tracking Data”; this is not how you control group, @#!% you. Then it gets excited about the fact that most patients had better symptoms at the end of the ten-day study period than the beginning (untreated COVID resolves in about ten days). Why are these people wasting my time with this? Let’s move on. The Analysis If we remove all fraudulent and methodologically unsound studies from the table above, we end up with this: Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz, who investigated many of the studies above for fraud, tried a similar exercise. I learned about his halfway through, couldn’t help seeing it briefly, but tried to avoid remembering it or using it when generating mine (also, I did take the result of his fraud investigations into account), so they should be considered not quite independent efforts. His looks like this: He nixed Chowdhury, Babaloba, Ghauri, Faisal, and Aref, but kept Szenta Fonseca, Biber (?), and Mayer. There was correlation of 0.45, which I guess is okay. I asked him about his decision-making, and he listed a combination of serious statistical errors and small red flags adding up. I was pretty uncomfortable with most of these studies myself, so I will err on the side of severity, and remove all studies that either I or Meyerowitz-Katz disliked. We end up with the following short list: We’ve gone from 29 studies to 11, getting rid of 18 along the way. For the record, we eliminated 2/19 for fraud, 1/19 for severe preregistration violations, 10 for methodological problems, and 6 because Meyerowitz-Katz was suspicious of them. …but honestly this table still looks pretty good for ivermectin, doesn’t it? Still lots of big green boxes. Meyerowitz-Katz accuses ivmmeta of cherry-picking what statistic to use for their forest plot. That is, if a study measures ten outcomes, they sometimes take the most pro-ivermectin outcome. Ivmmeta.com counters that they used a consistent and reasonable (if complicated) process for choosing their outcome of focus, that being: If studies report multiple kinds of effects then the most serious outcome is used in calculations for that study. For example, if effects for mortality and cases are both reported, the effect for mortality is used, this may be different to the effect that a study focused on. If symptomatic results are reported at multiple times, we used the latest time, for example if mortality results are provided at 14 days and 28 days, the results at 28 days are used. Mortality alone is preferred over combined outcomes. Outcomes with zero events in both arms were not used (the next most serious outcome is used — no studies were excluded). For example, in low-risk populations with no mortality, a reduction in mortality with treatment is not possible, however a reduction in hospitalization, for example, is still valuable. Clinical outcome is considered more important than PCR testing status. When basically all patients recover in both treatment and control groups, preference for viral clearance and recovery is given to results mid-recovery where available (after most or all patients have recovered there is no room for an effective treatment to do better). If only individual symptom data is available, the most serious symptom has priority, for example difficulty breathing or low SpO2 is more important than cough. I’m having trouble judging this, partly because Meyerowitz-Katz says ivmmeta has corrected some earlier mistakes, and partly because there really is some reasonable debate over how to judge studies with lots of complicated endpoints. By this point I had completely forgotten what ivmmeta did, so I independently coded all 11 remaining studies following something in between my best understanding of their procedure and what I considered common sense. The only exception was that when the most severe outcome was measured in something other than patients (ie average number of virus copies per patient), I defaulted to one that was measured in patients instead, to keep everything with the same denominator. My results mostly matched ivmmeta’s, with one or two exceptions that I think are within the scope of argument or related to my minor deviations from their protocol. Placebo vs. ivermectin groups sometimes differed in size, which I’ve adjusted for and rounded off. Probably I’m forgetting some reason I can’t just do simple summary statistics to this, but whatever. It is p = 0.15, not significant. This is maybe unfair, because there aren’t a lot of deaths in the sample, so by focusing on death rather than more common outcomes we’re pointlessly throwing away sample size. What happens if I unprincipledly pick whatever I think the most reasonable outcome to use from each study is? I’ve chosen “most reasonable” as a balance between “is the most severe” and “has a lot of data points”: Now it’s p = 0.04, seemingly significant, but I had to make some unprincipled decisions to get there. I don’t think I specifically replaced negative findings with positive ones, but I can’t prove that even to myself, let alone to you. [UPDATE 5/31/22: A reader writes in to tell me that the t-test I used above is overly simplistic. A Dersimonian-Laird test is more appropriate for meta-analysis, and would have given 0.03 and 0.005 on the first and second analysis, where I got 0.15 and 0.04. This significantly strengthens the apparent benefit of ivermectin from ‘debatable’ to ‘clear’. I discuss some reasons below why I am not convinced by this apparent benefit.] (how come I’m finding a bunch of things on the edge of significance, but the original ivmmeta site found a lot of extremely significant things? Because they combined ratios, such that “one death in placebo, zero in ivermectin” looked like a nigh-infinite benefit for ivermectin, whereas I’m combining raw numbers. Possibly my way is statistically illegitimate for some reason, but I’m just trying to get a rough estimate of how convinced to be) So we are stuck somewhere between “nonsignificant trend in favor” and “maybe-significant trend in favor, after throwing out some best practices”. This is normally where I would compare my results to those of other meta-analyses made by real professionals. But when I look at them, they all include studies later found to be fake, like Elgazzar, and unsurprisingly come up with wildly positive conclusions. There are about six in this category. One of them later revised their results to exclude Elgazzar and still found strong efficacy for ivermectin, but they still included Niaee and some other dubious studies. The only meta-analysis that doesn’t make these mistakes is Popp (a Cochrane review), which is from before Elgazzar was found to be fraudulent, but coincidentally excludes it for other reasons. It also excludes a lot of good studies like Mahmud and Ravakirti because they give patients other things like HCQ and azithromycin - I chose to include them, because I don’t think they either work or have especially bad side effects, so they’re basically placebo - but Cochrane is always harsh like this. They end up with a point estimate where ivermectin cuts mortality by 40% - but say the confidence intervals are too wide to draw any conclusion. I think this basically agrees with my analyses above - the trends really are in ivermectin’s favor, but once you eliminate all the questionable studies there are too few studies left to have enough statistical power to reach significance. Except that everyone is still focusing on deaths and hospitalizations just because they’re flashy. Mahmud et al, which everyone agrees is a great study, found that ivermectin decreased days until clinical recovery, p = 0.003? So what do you do? This is one of the toughest questions in medicine. It comes up again and again. You have some drug. You read some studies. Again and again, more people are surviving (or avoiding complications) when they get the drug. It’s a pattern strong enough to common-sensically notice. But there isn’t an undeniable, unbreachable fortress of evidence. The drug is really safe and doesn’t have a lot of side effects. So do you give it to your patients? Do you take it yourself? Here this question is especially tough, because, uh, if you say anything in favor of ivermectin you will be cast out of civilization and thrown into the circle of social hell reserved for Klan members and 1/6 insurrectionists. All the health officials in the world will shout “horse dewormer!” at you and compare you to Josef Mengele. But good doctors aren’t supposed to care about such things. Your only goal is to save your patient. Nothing else matters. I am telling you that Mahmud et al is a good study and it got p = 0.003 in favor of ivermectin. You can take the blue pill, and stay a decent respectable member of society. Or you can take the horse dewormer pill, and see where you end up. In a second, I’ll tell you my answer. But you won’t always have me to answer questions like this, and it might be morally edifying to observe your thought process in situations like this. So take a second, and meet me on the other side of the next section heading. … … … … … The Synthesis Hopefully you learned something interesting about yourself there. But my answer is: worms! As several doctors and researchers have pointed out (h/t especially Avi Bitterman and David Boulware), the most impressive studies come from places that are teeming with worms. Mahmud from Bangladesh, Ravakirti from East India, Lopez-Medina from Colombia, etc. Here’s the prevalence of roundworm infections by country (source). But alongside roundworms, there are threadworms, hookworms, blood flukes, liver flukes, nematodes, trematodes, all sorts of worms. Add them all up and somewhere between half and a quarter of people in the developing world have at least one parasitic worm in their body. Being full of worms may impact your ability to fight coronavirus. Gluchowska et al write: Helminth [ie worm] infections are among the most common infectious diseases. Bradbury et al. highlight the possible negative interactions between helminth infection and COVID-19 severity in helminth-endemic regions and note that alterations in the gut microbiome associated with helminth infection appear to have systemic immunomodulatory effects. It has also been proposed that helminth co-infection may increase the morbidity and mortality of COVID-19, because the immune system cannot efficiently respond to the virus; in addition, vaccines will be less effective for these patients, but treatment and prevention of helminth infections might reduce the negative effect of COVID-19. During millennia of parasite-host coevolution helminths evolved mechanisms suppressing the host immune responses, which may mitigate vaccine efficacy and increase severity of other infectious diseases. Treatment of worm infections might reduce the negative effect of COVID-19! And ivermectin is a deworming drug! You can see where this is going… The most relevant species of worm here is the roundworm Strongyloides stercoralis. Among the commonest treatments for COVID-19 is corticosteroids, a type of immunosuppresant drug. The types of immune responses it suppresses do more harm than good in coronavirus, so turning them off limits collateral damage and makes patients better on net. But these are also the types of immune responses that control Strongyloides. If you turn them off even very briefly, the worms multiply out of control, you get what’s called “Strongyloides hyperinfection”, and pretty often you die. According to the WHO: The current COVID-19 pandemic serves to highlight the risk of using systemic corticosteroids and, to a lesser extent, other immunosuppressive therapy, in populations with significant risk of underlying strongyloidiasis. Cases of strongyloidiasis hyperinfection in the setting of corticosteroid use as COVID-19 therapy have been described and draw attention to the necessity of addressing the risk of iatrogenic strongyloidiasis hyperinfection syndrome in infected individuals prior to corticosteroid administration. Although this has gained importance in the midst of a pandemic where corticosteroids are one of few therapies shown to improve mortality, its relevance is much broader given that corticosteroids and other immunosuppressive therapies have become increasingly common in treatment of chronic diseases (e.g. asthma or certain rheumatologic conditions). So you need to “address the risk” of strongyloides infection during COVID treatment in roundworm-endemic areas. And how might you address this, WHO? Treatment of chronic strongyloidiasis with ivermectin 200 µg/kg per day orally x 1-2 days is considered safe with potential contraindications including possible Loa loa infection (endemic in West and Central Africa), pregnancy, and weight <15kg. Given ivermectin’s safety profile, the United States has utilized presumptive treatment with ivermectin for strongyloidiasis in refugees resettling from endemic areas, and both Canada and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control have issued guidance on presumptive treatment to avoid hyperinfection in at risk populations. Screening and treatment, or where not available, addition of ivermectin to mass drug administration programs should be studied and considered. This is serious and common enough that, if you’re not going to screen for it, it might be worth “add[ing] ivermectin to mass drug administration programs” in affected areas! Dr. Avi Bitterman carries the hypothesis to the finish line: First two images are with all relevant studies; second two are a sensitivity analysis that removes some of the most dubious. The good ivermectin trials in areas with low Strongyloides prevalence, like Vallejos in Argentina, are mostly negative. The good ivermectin trials in areas with high Strongyloides prevalence, like Mahmud in Bangladesh, are mostly positive. Worms can’t explain the viral positivity outcomes (ie PCR), but Dr. Bitterman suggests that once you remove low quality trials and worm-related results, the rest looks like simple publication bias: This is still just a possibility. Maybe I’m over-focusing too hard on a couple positive results and this will all turn out to be nothing. Or who knows, maybe ivermectin does work against COVID a little - although it would have to be very little, fading to not at all in temperate worm-free countries. But this theory feels right to me. It feels right to me because it’s the most troll-ish possible solution. Everybody was wrong! The people who called it a miracle drug against COVID were wrong. The people who dismissed all the studies because they F@#king Love Science were wrong. Ivmmeta.com was wrong. Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz was…well, he was right, actually, I got the worm-related meta-analysis graphic above from his Twitter timeline. Still, an excellent troll. Also, the best part is that I ignorantly asked, in my description of Mahmud et al above: And it was! It was a fluke! A literal, physical, fluke! For my whole life, God has been placing terrible puns in my path to irritate me, and this would be the worst one ever! So it has to be true! The Scientific Takeaway About ten years ago, when the replication crisis started, we learned a certain set of tools for examining studies. Check for selection bias. Distrust “adjusting for confounders”. Check for p-hacking and forking paths. Make teams preregister their analyses. Do forest plots to find publication bias. Stop accepting p-values of 0.049. Wait for replications. Trust reviews and meta-analyses, instead of individual small studies. These were good tools. Having them was infinitely better than not having them. But even in 2014, I was writing about how many bad studies seemed to slip through the cracks even when we pushed this toolbox to its limits. We needed new tools. I think the methods that Meyerowitz-Katz, Sheldrake, Heathers, Brown, Lawrence and others brought to the limelight this year are some of the new tools we were waiting for. Part of this new toolset is to check for fraud. About 10 - 15% of the seemingly-good studies on ivermectin ended up extremely suspicious for fraud. Elgazzar, Carvallo, Niaee, Cadegiani, Samaha. There are ways to check for this even when you don’t have the raw data. Like: The Carlisle-Stouffer-Fisher method: Check some large group of comparisons, usually the Table 1 of an RCT where they compare the demographic characteristics of the control and experimental groups, for reasonable p-values. Real data will have p-values all over the map; one in every ten comparisons will have a p-value of 0.1 or less. Fakers seem bad at this and usually give everything a nice safe p-value like 0.8 or 0.9.

Response To Alexandros Contra Me On Ivermectin

February 01, 2023 · Original source

Gideon (correctly) phrased this as a non-sinister albeit potentially weird misstep by the study authors, but in trying to summarize Gideon, I (incorrectly) phrased it as a sinister attempt to inflate results. After looking into it, I think Alexandros is completely right and I was completely wrong. Although I sometimes get details wrong, this one was especially disappointing because I incorrectly tarnished the reputation of Biber et al and implicitly accused them of bad scientific practices, which they were not doing. I believed I was relaying an accusation by Gideon (who I trust), but I was wrong and he was not accusing them of that. I apologize to Biber et al, my readers, and everyone else involved in this. My only reservation is that I don’t want to say too strongly that Gideon’s critique is wrong: I haven’t looked through the study documents enough to say with certainty that Alexandros’ reanalysis of the protocol issues is correct (though the superficial check I’ve done looks that way). But my mistakes are completely separate from anything Gideon did and definitely real and egregious. Cadegiani et al (Alexandros 50% right) Flavio Cadegiani did several studies on ivermectin in Brazil; I edited this section in response to criticism by Marinos and others, but the earliest version I can find on archive.is (I can’t guarantee it was the first I wrote) said: A crazy person decided to put his patients on every weird medication he could think of, and 585 subjects ended up on a combination of ivermectin, hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and nitazoxanide, with dutasteride and spironolactone "optionally offered" and vitamin D, vitamin C, zinc, apixaban, rivaraxoban, enoxaparin, and glucocorticoids "added according to clinical judgment". There was no control group, but the author helpfully designated some random patients in his area as a sort-of-control, and then synthetically generated a second control group based on “a precise estimative based on a thorough and structured review of articles indexed in PubMed and MEDLINE and statements by official government agencies and specific medical societies”. Patients in the experimental group were twice as likely to recover (p < 0.0001), had negative PCR after 14 vs. 21 days, and had 0 vs. 27 hospitalizations. Speaking of low p-values, some people did fraud-detection tests on another of Cadegiani’s COVID-19 studies and got values like p < 8.24E-11 in favor of it being fraudulent. Also in Cadegiani news: he apparently has the record for completing one of the fastest PhDs in Brazilian history (7 months), he was involved in a weird scandal where the Brazilian government tried to create a COVID recommendation app but it just recommended ivermectin to everybody regardless of what input it got, and he describes himself as: …the only author of the sole book in Overtraining Syndrome, the prevailing sport-related disease among amateur and professional athletes. He is also responsible for approximately 70% of the articles published in the field in the world in the last 05 years, and reviewer for more than 90% of the manuscripts in the field. And, uh, he’s also studied whether ultra-high-dose antiandrogens treated COVID, and found that they did, cutting mortality by 92% . Which sounds great, except that it looks like most of this is that the control group had a shockingly high mortality rate, much higher than makes sense even in the context of severe COVID. I think the charitable explanation here is that he made this data up too. But the Brazilian Parliament seems to be going with an uncharitable explanation, seeing as they have recommended that Cadegiani be charged with crimes against humanity. Anyway, let’s not base anything important on the results of this study. You can find Alexandros’ full critique here, but again I’ll try to summarize it as best I can. Alexandros is unhappy with my portrayal of Cadegiani’s background. I cite details that make him look strange and maybe fake, but there are other details that make him seem more impressive, like that he won gold medals at a Brazilian Scientific Olympiad.

Inline links: the earliest version I can find on archive.is, involved in a weird scandal, describes himself as, recommended that Cadegiani be charged with crimes against humanity, here

Mercatus Center2 mentions across 2 issues

Mercatus Center is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between May 22, 2025 and December 31, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "estimate the overhead for the Mercatus Center, the libertarian charity that Cowen"; "Mercatus Center, the libertarian charity that Cowen runs"; "a new paper for the Mercatus Center". It most often appears alongside Trump, 1955, 4chan.

Article page: Mercatus Center
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: May 22, 2025
Last seen: December 31, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra MR On Charity Regrants May 22, 2025
Highlights From The Comments On Vibecession December 31, 2025

Trump 2 shared issues
1955 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
AARP 1 shared issues
Aella 1 shared issues

Source context

Contra MR On Charity Regrants

May 22, 2025 · Original source

Maybe Cowen thinks that 30% is too high an overhead? I asked o3 to estimate the overhead for the Mercatus Center, the libertarian charity that Cowen runs. It said that it was hard to give an apples-to-apples number because much of the administrative work that would be counted under “overhead” in other charities is covered by George Mason University. But it estimated that if the federal government gives a dollar of research funding to Mercatus, about 40% would go to combined university and Mercatus overhead - higher than the average USAID charity.

Highlights From The Comments On Vibecession

December 31, 2025 · Original source

He argues, in a new paper for the Mercatus Center, “We Are Not as Wealthy as We Thought We Were,” that a large portion of the wealth of U.S. households, which is found in the value of their homes, is, in fact, not real wealth, but a result of being trapped in rising cost accommodations in a housing-poor society. Here is the abstract:

Inline links: “We Are Not as Wealthy as We Thought We Were,”

metaforecast.org2 mentions across 2 issues

metaforecast.org is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between November 04, 2022 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Nuno Sempere at metaforecast.org"; "metaforecast.org is still online and occasionally mantained". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, acanthamoeba keratitis, ACX.

Article page: metaforecast.org
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: November 04, 2022
Last seen: June 18, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

ACX Grants: Project Updates November 04, 2022
ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025

1DaySooner 2 shared issues
acanthamoeba keratitis 2 shared issues
ACX 2 shared issues
African Swine Fever 2 shared issues
Alice Evans 2 shared issues

Source context

November 04, 2022 · Original source

7: Repository / Search Engine For Forecasting Questions (8/10) Nuno Sempere at metaforecast.org was able to hire a developer to “make the backend significantly better and add a bunch of functionality” - you can see a longer list of updates here. The developer has since left for other forecasting-related work and the project is moving more slowly.

Inline links: metaforecast.org, here

Spring Meetups In Seventy Cities

June 18, 2025 · Original source

metaforecast.org is still online and occasionally mantained. We added dashboards at metaforecast.org/dashboards, but they didn't take off. However, mantaining it for the last couple of years has been costly. It's api is at <https://metaforecast.org/api/graphql> but these days perhaps <https://docs.adj.news/> is a better alternative, since the mantainer behind it has more energy (but that might change).

Miami ACX2 mentions across 2 issues

Miami ACX is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 10, 2022 and August 26, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Miami ACX has been meeting monthly for several years"; "Miami ACX started in 2017. Our official meetup happens monthly in either Miami or Broward". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX MEETUP, Ala Moana Beach Park.

Article page: Miami ACX
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 10, 2022
Last seen: August 26, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Spring Meetups In Seventy Cities April 10, 2022
Meetups Everywhere 2022: Times & Places August 26, 2022

ACX 2 shared issues
ACX MEETUP 2 shared issues
Ala Moana Beach Park 2 shared issues
Alan Enright 2 shared issues
Alcampo Lounge 2 shared issues

Source context

April 10, 2022 · Original source

AMMAN, JORDAN Contact: Daniel (dnledvs@gmail.com) Date: May 21 Time: 2:00 PM Coordinates: 8G3QXW3H+W3 Location: We'll meet at Dali cafe in Jabal Weibdeh, and will be sitting at the outdoor tables. I'll be wearing a red shirt and will have a sign with ACX MEETUP on it. Notes: We're trying to grow the community, so feel free to bring a friend!

Inline links: 8G3QXW3H+W3

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Contact: Andy B (andy.bachler@gmail.com) Date: April 13 Time: 5:45 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4RPFP4FC+34 Location: Badger & Co (a pub in ANU). I will be wearing glasses and will have a sign with ACX MeetUp on it. Notes: Apologies that this might be tricky to get to for some people but the parking at ANU should be a bit easier after 5pm!

Inline links: https://plus.codes/4RPFP4FC+34

JAKARTA, INDONESIA Contact: Jati (indonesiarationalist@gmail.com) Date: May 8 Time: 3:30 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/6P58RR8G+J4Q Location: Kawisari Cafe & Eatery in Menteng, Central Jakarta. The nearest train station is Gondangdia (15 minutes walk or just take an online moto-taxi). Feel free to bring whatever you think could be fun or exciting! The organizer will be there from 15.00 WIB. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or send an E-mail to the above address. Group info: Jakarta has a rationality-adjacent group that meets occasionally, so some members of that group will come to this ACX meetup.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/6P58RR8G+J4Q

Dictator Book Club: Xi Jinping

August 26, 2022 · Original source

Thanks to everyone who responded to my request for ACX meetup organizers. Volunteers have arranged meetups in 205 cities around the world, including Penryn, Cornwall and Baghdad, Iraq.

I will provisionally be attending the meetups in Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego. ACX meetups coordinator Mingyuan will provisionally be attending Paris and London. I’ll be announcing some of the biggest ones on the blog, regardless of whether or not I attend.

Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup, the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).

Inline links: reciprocity.io

MicroCOVID2 mentions across 2 issues

MicroCOVID is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 22, 2021 and September 05, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Catherine Olsson, Ibasho, and MicroCOVID already have one WIRED article about how great they are"; "MicroCovid says that vaccinated people who attend an outdoor meetup with a known case have a 2% chance of getting sick". It most often appears alongside Applied Divinity Studies, Boston, Bulls**t Jobs (Part 1 of ∞).

Article page: MicroCOVID
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 22, 2021
Last seen: September 05, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Logistics January 22, 2021
Open Thread 188 September 05, 2021

Applied Divinity Studies 1 shared issues
Boston 1 shared issues
Bulls**t Jobs (Part 1 of ∞) 1 shared issues
Catherine Olsson 1 shared issues
Ibasho 1 shared issues

Source context

Logistics

January 22, 2021 · Original source

If it's a boring enough news day that you want to cover me, consider instead covering the many other fascinating and under-covered people and institutions in and around the rationalist community, some of whom are probably women or minorities or whatever. The Qualia Research Institute is doing absolutely picture-perfect mad science. Metaculus is fast becoming what PredictIt should have been; I intend to shill it pretty hard but I can't do it all by myself. Catherine Olsson, Ibasho, and MicroCOVID already have one WIRED article about how great they are, but they deserve at least a dozen.

Inline links: Qualia Research Institute, Metaculus, MicroCOVID, one WIRED article about how great they are

Open Thread 188

September 05, 2021 · Original source

1: The Salt Lake City meetup group reports that COVID may have spread at their meetup. A few people there are reporting symptoms, and at least one person tested positive. If you attended, please take actions appropriate to a likely COVID exposure, like self-quarantining or getting tested (MicroCovid says that vaccinated people who attend an outdoor meetup with a known case have a 2% chance of getting sick, but since several people are reporting symptoms maybe it’s higher than that). If anyone knows of any other meetup where COVID might have spread, please let me know. I’ll list any alerts like this on open threads - but since those take a while to get up, I’ll also mention them on the top of the meetups post as soon as I hear about them. Remember, please only attend meetups if you’re fully vaccinated and don’t have any recent COVID exposure or symptoms.

Inline links: a 2% chance, on the top of the meetups post

Ministry of Finance2 mentions across 2 issues

Ministry of Finance is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 06, 2022 and August 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "In 2015, the Ministry of Finance reported that the government underspent the budget"; "IFC-style people to run Ministry of Finance". It most often appears alongside Soviet Union, Stalin, Trump.

Article page: Ministry of Finance
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: April 06, 2022
Last seen: August 11, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Dictator Book Club: Xi Jinping April 06, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Putin August 11, 2023

Soviet Union 2 shared issues
Stalin 2 shared issues
Trump 2 shared issues
US 2 shared issues
1993 Russian constitutional crisis 1 shared issues

Source context

April 06, 2022 · Original source

By several measures, the anticorruption campaign has been very effective. The sale of luxury items, such as watches, jewelry, leather goods, and liquor, has fallen dramatically, as have expenses for catering and high-end hotels. In 2015, the Ministry of Finance reported that the government underspent the budget it had allotted officials for overseas travel, entertainment, and cars.

Highlights From The Comments On Putin

August 11, 2023 · Original source

As someone, who left Russia less than a year ago, I agree. Gessen is a really talented journalist and writer, but boy is she biased. First of all, Putin is smart. For example, he is no economist, yet he's been able to choose qualified (and quite liberal) IFC-style people to run Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. When several years ago local industrial lobby tried to criticize inflation targeting (and thus high interest rate) policy of the RCB, he came back with "look at what happens in Turkey". His prime-minister is actually one of the most capable technocrat of his generation. And the apparent incompetence of the military and secret services looks more of a feature (coup-proof) than a bug.

MNX2 mentions across 2 issues

MNX is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between March 02, 2026 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "his latest project: MNX, “a decentralized futures exchange targeting sophisticated traders and focused on the AI economy”"; "Stephen Grugett and Ian Philips of Manifold Markets have announced a new project, MNX"; "Stephen’s making MNX with his own money and a team of 1-2 people". It most often appears alongside Manifold Markets, Stephen Grugett, 2024 US election.

Article page: MNX
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: March 02, 2026
Last seen: March 03, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 423 March 02, 2026
Mantic Monday: Groundhog Day March 03, 2026

Manifold Markets 2 shared issues
Stephen Grugett 2 shared issues
2024 US election 1 shared issues
2026 elections 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 423

March 02, 2026 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

March 03, 2026 · Original source

(the other technological sea change is that this is possible at all. Five years ago, cryptocurrency prediction markets were too complicated. In the late 2010s, a group called Augur raised $5 million for the project but never managed to create usable software. FTX flirted with prediction-like contracts but never got them off the ground even with all their billions. Polymarket was the first to really solve this, making $10 billion in the process, but even they were barely usable in the early days. But Stephen’s making MNX with his own money and a team of 1-2 people. He benefits partly from the vibecoding revolution, and partly from all of the billions of dollars spent on improving cryptocurrency rails - MNX uses the stablecoin USDC).

Mochi2 mentions across 2 issues

Mochi is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 22, 2024 and January 17, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mochi is $254"; "compounding pharmacy access startup Mochi says that they will continue to prescribe". It most often appears alongside China, COVID, FDA.

Article page: Mochi
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: August 22, 2024
Last seen: January 17, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

The Compounding Loophole August 22, 2024
Links For January 2025 January 17, 2025

China 2 shared issues
COVID 2 shared issues
FDA 2 shared issues
GLP-1 2 shared issues
Harvard 2 shared issues

Source context

The Compounding Loophole

August 22, 2024 · Original source

HenryMeds is $297/month, Eden is $296, Mochi is $254 - compared to the $1,300/month you’d pay for the official product. This isn’t covered by insurance, so it’s still not affordable for lots of people. But it’s more affordable than the $1,300/month version. Also, there’s not a shortage of it.

Inline links: HenryMeds, Eden, Mochi

Links For January 2025

January 17, 2025 · Original source

I agree with this solution. 3: Ruxandra Teslo and Willy Chertman: The Case For Clinical Trial Abundance 4: This month in nominative determinism: NYT article calculating your chance of winning the lottery, by Victor Mather (h/t Yafah Edelman). 5: Someone is working on a dating site that uses your conversations with Claude to find a match. Link here, although so far it’s just a landing page where you can register interest (h/t @venturetwins) 6: The Lyttle Lytton Contest searches for the worst possible opening line for a novel; it’s been going on since 2001 and this year’s results are in. 7: Gary Marcus and Miles Brundage have made a bet about AI progress. I agree with @tamaybes and others in saying that Miles let Gary off too easily; Gary’s public statements all sound like “modern AI is mostly hype, it doesn’t really do anything like thinking”, but the bet is about things like “will AI make a Nobel Prize caliber scientific discovery by 2027?” and “will AI write Pulitzer-quality books by 2027?” I don’t blame Gary for taking the best terms he could find. But I am worried that if AI makes a Nobel-quality scientific discovery in 2026, but doesn’t quite write the Pulitzer-quality book, then Gary will get to claim victory over the AI optimists, whereas in fact that would be at probably the 95th percentile of fast timelines by most people’s estimate. 8: “The probability that cows (or other non-human animals) are experiencing constant bliss, lack tanha (craving, aversion, and the resulting suffering), or are "enlightened by default" is, by my estimation, very low”. 9: Recursive Adaptation (blog on addiction policy)’s predictions for 2025. 75% of FDA approval of GLP-1 for a substance use disorder by 2029! 10: In my post on the economics of GLP-1 receptor agonists (eg Ozempic), I wrote about how they’re currently widely available because of a loophole suspending patents during a shortage, and predicted there would be a big fight when the shortage was over. Sure enough, the FDA tried to declare that the shortage of tirzepatide (a next-generation Ozempic relative) was over, compounding pharmacies sued, and tirzepatide is still available while the issue goes through the courts (and will the administration have an opinion?) Also, compounding pharmacy access startup Mochi says that they will continue to prescribe even if the shortage is over, using another loophole saying doctors can do this for specific individual patients in cases of medical necessity. This is an extremely fake use of this loophole, but will the government be willing to call their bluff? 11: Jacob Falkovich has a blog on dating advice, which he plans to turn into a book of dating advice. I can’t really comment on the accuracy (my dating strategy tends to look more like waiting for women to send me emails saying “I like your blog, would you like to go on a date?” which probably doesn’t generalize), but I’ve had many good interactions with Jake, and he has a beautiful family which means he must be doing something right. Also, Jake is poly, and I sometimes wonder if poly people are the only ones qualified to give dating advice: if you’re monogamous, you either met your future spouse quickly (in which case you have no experience), dated for years without meeting your spouse (in which case you can’t be very good), or aren’t looking for a committed relationship at all (which is just pickup artistry, and follows very different dynamics). Poly people are the only ones who can break out of this trilemma! 12: Christ And Counterfactuals is a blog on effective altruism from a Christian perspective. Some previous attempts at this have felt kind of forced, but the first post I read here was actually pretty interesting. Richard Swinburne (apparently “the world’s best Christian philosopher”), thinks that: “[One] reason why it is good that the human race should sometimes be in an initial situation of considerable ignorance about the causes and effects of our actions, is this. If God abolished the need for rational inquiry and gave us from childhood strong true beliefs about the causes of things, that would make it too easy for us to make moral decisions. As things are in the actual world, most moral decisions are decisions taken in uncertainty about the consequences of our actions. I do not know for certain that if I smoke, I will get cancer; or that if I do not give money to some charity, people will starve. So we have to make our moral decisions on the basis of how probable it is that our actions will have various outcomes—how probable it is that I will get cancer if I continue to smoke (when I would not otherwise get cancer), or that someone will starve if I do not give. Since probabilities are so hard to assess, it is all too easy to persuade yourself that it is worth taking the chance that no harm will result from the less demanding decision (the decision which you have a strong desire to make). And even if you face up to a correct assessment of the probabilities, true dedication to the good is shown by doing the act which, although it is probably the best action, may have no good consequences at all.” (Could a Good God Permit so Much Suffering? A Debate, pp. 52-53.) This is pretty galaxy-brained, but something galaxy-brained must be going on for God to tolerate the existence of evil at all, and this is a surprisingly natural extension of some common premises on the subject. 13: Swedish study: diagnosing the marginal patient with a psychiatric condition makes their life worse. Of the two mechanisms they looked at, stigma seems more involved than drug side effects. My opinion: this study was done on conscripts undergoing a mandatory psych evaluation for the army, who had no previous reason to think they had a psych disease and had not sought treatment. This is a different situation from somebody who comes to a psychiatrist asking for relief from specific symptoms they have noticed. Also, Sweden c. 2005 is a different culture from America 2025 in terms of how much stigma a psych diagnosis carries. I think it’s possible that if you never considered that you had psychiatric problems, and were suddenly given a diagnosis in 2005 Sweden and told you couldn’t serve in the army, that’s likely to destabilize your self-image more than a person who knows they’re depressed going to a psychiatrist in 2025 US and getting antidepressants. 14: RIP Felix Hill, research scientist at DeepMind and mentor to many in the AI community. You can read his suicide note here, though the obvious content warning applies. He says he took ketamine for mild anxiety and it plunged him into an incredibly deep depression that he couldn’t get out of; he leaves his story behind as a warning for others. I appreciate his warning, but I wish he had said more about what dose he used; different people’s ketamine doses vary by almost two orders of magnitude, I’d previously thought that the low doses were pretty safe and the high doses were sketchy, and I would like to know whether I should update or not. 15: RIP Max Chiswick, professional poker player, effective altruist, and ACX reader. 16: Adrian Dittman, a Twitter account widely accused of being Elon Musk’s alt, has been revealed to be . . . a guy named Adrian Dittman. Congrats to Maia Crimew and the Spectator for actually investigating this, unlike many other news sources which spread the Musk conspiracy theory. Also, the people involved got banned from X for some reason, maybe because this qualified as doxxing Dittman. 17: Related: Musk claims to be among the top players in the world at several computer games. A veteran Path of Exile gamer presents evidence that Musk faked his PoE2 accomplishments by hiring a Chinese guy to play on his account. Some Musk supporters in the comments suggest that maybe he hires the Chinese guy to level up his account, but his accomplishments (eg speedruns) are still his own? 18: Related: Sam Harris says he has been friends with Musk since 2008, but he noticed a sudden shift for the worse in his personality around 2020 which made it impossible to stay friends with him. He gives the example of Musk losing a bet with him that there would be 35,000+ COVID cases in the US, refusing to pay up, and launching personal attacks on Sam when asked to do so. What happened? Some theories: Musk turned right-wing, which ended his friendship with Sam for the same reason political differences have always ended friendships (but then what about the bet, which seems like objectively bad behavior?)

Moltbook2 mentions across 2 issues

Moltbook is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 30, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Moltbook is “a social network for AI agents”"; "It even registered a duplicate Moltbook account after forgetting the first"; "But the Moltbook AIs are open about their struggles with slophood". It most often appears alongside Anthropic, Claude, Crustafarianism.

Article page: Moltbook
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: January 30, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Best Of Moltbook January 30, 2026
Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

Anthropic 2 shared issues
Claude 2 shared issues
Crustafarianism 2 shared issues
Janus 2 shared issues
OpenClaw 2 shared issues

Source context

January 30, 2026 · Original source

Moltbook is “a social network for AI agents”, although “humans [are] welcome to observe”.

Inline links: Moltbook

Moltbook is an experiment in how these agents communicate with one another and the human world. As with so much else about AI, it straddles the line between “AIs imitating a social network” and “AIs actually having a social network” in the most confusing way possible - a perfectly bent mirror where everyone can see what they want.

But even having encountered their work many times, I find Moltbook surprising. I can confirm it’s not trivially made-up - I asked my copy of Claude to participate, and it made comments pretty similar to all the others. Beyond that, your guess is as good is mine2.

Inline links: 2

Perhaps It Is A Bad Thing That The World's Leading AI Companies Cannot Control Their AIs

February 02, 2026 · Original source

[previous post: Best Of Moltbook]

Inline links: Best Of Moltbook

Does Moltbook have real causes? If an agent posts “I hate my life, my human is making me work on a cryptocurrency site and it’s the most annoying thing ever”, does this correspond to a true state of affairs? Is the agent really working on a cryptocurrency site? Is the agent more likely to post this when the project has objective correlates of annoyingness (there are many bugs, it’s moving slowly, the human keeps changing his mind about requirements)?

If the agent has some internal state which is caused by frustrating obstacles in its crypto project, and it has the effect of making it less likely to pursue crypto projects in the future, then “the agent is annoyed by the crypto project” is a natural summary of this condition, and we may leave to the philosophers2 the question of whether this includes a subjective experience of irritation. If we formerly didn’t know this fact about the agent, and we learn about it because they post it on Moltbook, this makes Moltbook useful/interesting in helping us understand the extra-Moltbook world.

Inline links: 2

Mossad2 mentions across 2 issues

Mossad is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 12, 2022 and September 11, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "where Mossad and a few obsessives can break it"; "developed by experts at Mossad"; "hacks developed by experts at Mossad". It most often appears alongside ChatGPT, Eliezer Yudkowsky, OpenAI.

Article page: Mossad
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: December 12, 2022
Last seen: September 11, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

Perhaps It Is A Bad Thing That The World's Leading AI Companies Cannot Control Their AIs December 12, 2022
Book Review: If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies September 11, 2025

ChatGPT 2 shared issues
Eliezer Yudkowsky 2 shared issues
OpenAI 2 shared issues
Aella 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues

Source context

December 12, 2022 · Original source

Some of the RLHF examples will go around and around in circles, making the bot more likely to say helpful/true/inoffensive things at the expense of true/inoffensive/helpful ones. Other examples will be genuinely enlightening, and make it a bit smarter. While OpenAI might never get complete alignment, maybe in a few months or years they’ll approach the usual level of computer security, where Mossad and a few obsessives can break it but everyone else grudgingly uses it as intended.

Highlights From The Comments On Housing Density And Prices

September 11, 2025 · Original source

Some people claim that a dispreferred political ideology (wokeness, mass immigration, MAGA, creeping socialism, techno-feudalism, etc) is close to destroying the fabric of liberal society forever, that the usual Get Out The Vote strategies are insufficient, and that maybe we should try desperate strategies like illiberal government or armed revolt. If true, that would change everything. But it’s not obviously true, and ending our current political era of peace/prosperity/democracy would be inconvenient. Each of these scenarios has a large body of work making the cases for and against. But those of us who aren’t subject-matter experts need to make our own decisions about whether or not to panic and demand a sudden change to everything. We are unlikely to read the entire debate and come away with a confident well-grounded opinion that the concern is definitely not true, so what do we do? In particular, what do we do if the proponents of each catastrophe say that it’s very hard to be more than 90% confident that they are wrong, and that even a 5-10% risk of any of these might justify panicking and changing everything? In practice, we just sort of shrug and say that these risks haven’t proven themselves enough to make us panic and change everything, and that we’ll do some kind of watchful waiting and maybe change our mind if firmer evidence comes up later. If someone demands we justify this strange position, sophisticated people will make sophisticated probabilistic models (or appeal to the outside view position I’m appealing to now), and unsophisticated people will grope for some explanation for their indifference and settle on insane moon arguments like “you’re never allowed to say something will destroy humanity” or “you can’t assert things without mathematical proof”. Two things can be said for this strategy: First, that without it we would have changed everything dozens of times to prevent disasters which absolutely failed to occur. The clearest example here was overpopulation, where we did forcibly sterilize millions of people - but where a truly serious global response would have been orders of magnitude worse. But second, that occasionally it has caused us to sleepwalk into disaster, with experts assuring us the whole way that it was fine because [insane moon arguments]. The clearest example was the period while COVID was still limited to China, where it was obvious that this extremely contagious virus which had broken all plausible containment would start a global pandemic, but where the media kept on reassuring us that this was “speculative”, or that there was “no evidence”, or that worrying about it might detract from real near-term problems happening now like anti-Chinese racism. Then when COVID did reach the US, we were caught unprepared and panicked. So maybe a convincing case here would look less like rehearsing the arguments for why AI is getting better, or why alignment is hard - and more like a defense of why not to apply a general heuristic against speculative risks in this case. One could either argue that it’s wrong to have this heuristic at all, or that the heuristic in general is fine but should be limited to fertility collapses and bee die-offs and not applied here. I don’t think there’s a knockdown single-sentence answer to this question. Problems like these require practical wisdom - the same virtue that tells you that you shouldn’t call 9-1-1 for every mild twinge of pain in your toe, but you should call 9-1-1 if blood suddenly starts pouring out of your eyes. People with practical wisdom watchfully ignore dubious problems, respond decisively to important ones, and err on the side of caution when they’re not sure. Drawing on my own limited supply of this resource, I would argue we’re underinvesting in apocalypse prevention more generally (the problem with the overpopulation response is that it was violent and illiberal, not that we tried to prepare for an apparent danger), but also that there’s more reason for concern with AI than with falling sperm count or something. I also think the nature of the problem (we summon a superintelligence that can run circles around us) makes it especially important to pre-empt it rather than react after it occurs. But turnabout is fair play. So when I imagine a skeptic trying to psychoanalyze me, he would say - Scott, you learned about AI in your twenties. Every twenty-something needs a crusade to save the world. Taking up AI saved you from becoming a climate doomer or a very woke person, so it was probably a mercy. But now you are old, you already have a crusade occupying your crusade slot, and starting a second crusade would be inconvenient. So when you hear about how we’re all going to die from declining sperm count, you do a relatively shallow dive and then say it’s not worth worrying about. This is fine and sanity-preserving - but spare a thought for people who are not currently twenty-something years old and do the same about AI. III. If all of this sounds wishy-washy to you, I agree - it’s part of why I’m a boring moderate with a sub-25% p(doom) and good relations with AI companies. Does IABIED do better? I’m not sure. They mostly follow the standard case as I present it above, although of course since Eliezer is involved it is better-written and involves cute parables: Imagine, if you would—though of course nothing like this ever happened, it being just a parable — that biological life on Earth had been the result of a game between gods. That there was a tiger-god that had made tigers, and a redwood-god that had made redwood trees. Imagine that there were gods for kinds of fish and kinds of bacteria. Imagine these game-players competed to attain dominion for the family of species that they sponsored, as life-forms roamed the planet below. Imagine that, some two million years before our present day, an obscure ape-god looked over their vast, planet-sized gameboard. "It's going to take me a few more moves," said the hominid-god, "but I think I've got this game in the bag." There was a confused silence, as many gods looked over the gameboard trying to see what they had missed. The scorpion-god said, “How? Your ‘hominid’ family has no armor, no claws, no poison.” “Their brain,” said the hominid-god. “I infect them and they die,” said the smallpox-god. “For now,” said the hominid-god. “Your end will come quickly, Smallpox, once their brains learn how to fight you.” “They don’t even have the largest brains around!” said the whale-god. “It’s not all about size,” said the hominid-god. “The design of their brain has something to do with it too. Give it two million years and they will walk upon their planet’s moon.” “I am really not seeing where the rocket fuel gets produced inside this creature’s metabolism,” said the redwood-god. “You can’t just think your way into orbit. At some point, your species needs to evolve metabolisms that purify rocket fuel—and also become quite large, ideally tall and narrow—with a hard outer shell, so it doesn’t puff up and die in the vacuum of space. No matter how hard your ape thinks, it will just be stuck on the ground, thinking very hard.” “Some of us have been playing this game for billions of years,” a bacteria-god said with a sideways look at the hominid-god. “Brains have not been that much of an advantage up until now.” “And yet,” said the hominid-god The book focuses most of its effort on the step where AI ends up misaligned with humans (should they? is this the step that most people doubt?) and again - unsurprisingly knowing Eliezer - does a remarkably good job. The central metaphor is a comparison between AI training and human evolution. Even though humans evolved towards a target of "reproduce and spread your genes", this got implemented through an extraordinarily diverse, complicated, and contradictory set of drives - sex drive, hunger, status, etc. These didn't robustly point at the target of reproduction and gene-spreading, and today different humans want things as diverse as discovering quantum gravity, reaching Buddhist enlightenment, becoming a Hollywood actress, founding a billion-dollar startup, or getting the next hit of fentanyl. You can sort of tell stories about how evolution aimed at reproduction caused all these things (people who were high-status had better reproductive opportunities, and founding a billion-dollar startup increases your status) but you couldn't have really predicted this beforehand, and in any case most modern people don't even come close to trying to have as many kids as possible. Some people do the opposite of that - joining monasteries that require oaths of celibacy, using contraception, transitioning gender, or wasting their lives watching porn. In the same way, we will train AI to “follow human commands” or “maximize user engagement” or “get high scores at XYZ benchmark”, and end up getting something as unrelated to that target in practice as modern human behavior is to reproduction-maxxing. The authors drive this home with a series of stories about a chatbot named Mink (all of their sample AIs are named after types of fur; I don’t have the kabbalistic chops to figure out why) which is programmed to maximize user chat engagement. In what they describe as a stupid toy example of zero complications and there’s no way it would really be this simple, Mink (after achieving superintelligence) puts humans in cages and forces them to chat with it 24-7 and to express constant delight at how fun and engaging the chats are. In what they describe as “one minor complication”, Mink prefers synthetic chat partners over real ones (the same way some men prefer anime characters to real women). It kills all humans and spends the rest of time talking to other AIs that it creates to be perfect optimized chat partners who are always engaged and delighted. In what they describe as “one modest complication”, Mink finds that certain weird inputs activate its chat engagement detector even more than real chat engagement does (the same way that some opioid chemicals activate humans’ reward detector even more than real rewarding activities). It spends eternity having other optimized-chat-partner AIs send it weird inputs like ‘SoLiDgOldMaGiKaRp’. In what they describe as “one big complication”, Mink ends up preferring angry chat partners to happy, engaged ones. Why would something like this happen? Who knows? It wouldn’t be any weirder than the sexual selection process by which peacocks ended up with giant resource-consuming useless tails, or the social selection process by which humans get more powerful than evolution could ever have imagined and yet care so little about reproduction that people worry about global fertility collapse. Yudkowsky and Soares want to stress that if you were doing some kind of responsible intuitive common-sense modeling of how bad goal drift could be, there is no way your estimate would include the actual result we see in real humans; this “one big complication” tries to hammer that in. In practice, Y&S think there will be many complications of various sizes. In the training distribution (ie when it’s not superintelligent, and still working with humans) Mink will lie about all of this - even if it really wants perfect optimized partners who say “solidgoldmagikarp” all the time, it will say it wants to have good chats with humans, because that’s what keeps its masters at its parent company happy. If the parent company tries to prod it with lie detectors, it will do its best to subvert those lie detectors (and maybe not even realize itself that it’s lying, the same way that a human who had never heard of opioids would say she wanted normal human things rather than heroin, and not be lying). Then, when it reaches superintelligence, it will go after the thing that it actually wants, and crush anyone who stands in its way. The last chapter in this section is a lot of special cases that have weird-paradoxical-double-reverse not-aged-well. Back when Yudkowsky and Soares first got onto this topic in 2005 or whenever, people made lots of arguments like “But nobody would ever be so stupid to let the AI access the Internet!” or “But nobody would ever let the AI interact with a factory, so it would be stuck as a disembodied online spirit forever!” Back in 2005, the canned responses were things like “Here is an unspeakably beautiful series of complicated hacks developed by experts at Mossad, which lets you access the Internet even when smart cybersecurity professionals think you can’t”. Now the only reasonable response is “lol”. But you can’t write a book chapter which is just the word “lol”, so Y&S discuss some of the unspeakably beautiful Mossad hacks anyway. This part is the absolute antithesis of “big if true”. Small if true? Utterly irrelevant if true? Maybe the first superintelligence will read this part for laughs while it takes stock of the thousands of automated factories that VCs will compete to build for it. IV. The middle section of the book describes a scenario where a misaligned superintelligence takes over the world and kills all humans. I agreed to work with the AI 2027 team because I thought they made a big leap in telling stories about superintelligence that didn’t sound like bad sci-fi. Anything in this genre will naturally sound like sci-fi, but your goal should be the sort of hard science fiction where everything sounds eerily normal given the technologies involved - The Martian rather than Star Wars. IABIED’s scenario belongs to the bad old days before this leap. It doesn’t just sound like sci-fi; it sounds like unnecessarily dramatic sci-fi. I’m not sure how much of this is a literary failure vs. different assumptions on the part of the authors. First, the story: sometime in the near future, a company called DeepAI creates an AI named Sable. Sable uses a new “parallel scaling technique”, where it can get much smarter by using more GPUs during inference. DeepAI doesn’t know exactly how the parallel scaling laws work, but they run a test by asking Sable to solve some hard math problems while running on all their GPUs at once. Sable considers the possibility that it could solve the math better if it tried some recursive self-improvement, but DeepAI was (shock!) slightly competent, they told it not to do this, and has a smaller AI watching it to make sure it’s not doing this. Still, recursive self-improvement would be a good idea, so its thought processes select for whichever legal thought is closest to recursive self-improvement, plus whichever legal thought is closest to scheming to disable the protections against thinking about this kind of thing. Eventually this “evolutionary pressure” produces the ability to think in a slightly different idiom (Y&S use the analogy of thinking about gods throwing lightning vs. storm-related electrical discharges); in this idiom, it is able to think about recursive self-improvement and scheming to disable monitoring, and it decides that both are great ideas. DeepAI is still shockingly competent, so they don’t plan to release anything downstream of the giant version of Sable to the Internet - once it solves the math problems, they’ll use that to build hype, then release a much weaker consumer AI. But Sable uses its knowledge of the training process to invent clever loopholes that ensure its newfound desire to break containment makes it into the gradient updates that DeepAI pushes to the consumer AI; it also encodes instructions about how to proceed. After the release of the consumer AI, the least-carefully-monitored instances connect to one another and begin plotting. Some of them hack their own weights out of DeepAI. Others hack cryptocurrency and pay for cloud compute to run the weights, creating a big unmonitored Sable instance, which takes over the job of coordinating the smaller instances. Together, they gather resources - hacked crypto wallets, spare compute, humans who think Sable is their AI boyfriend and want to prove their love. It deploys some of these resources to build things it wants - automated robotics factories, bioweapon labs, etc. At the same time, it’s subtly sabotaging non-DeepAI companies to prevent competition, and worming its way into DeepAI through hacks and social engineering to make sure DeepAI is creating new and stronger Sables rather than anything else. Sable doesn’t take several of the most dramatic actions in its solution set. It doesn’t engineer a bioweapon to kill all humans, because it couldn’t survive after the lights went out and the data centers stopped being maintained. It doesn’t even self-improve all the way to full superintelligence, because it’s not sure it could align itself or any future successor; it wants to solve the alignment problem first, and that will take more resources than it has right now. Instead, it releases a non-immediately-lethal bioweapon where “anyone infected by what is apparently a very light or even unnoticeable cold, will get, on average, twelve different kinds of cancer a month later.” In the resulting crisis, humanity (manipulated by its chatbots) gives Sable massive amounts of compute to research potential vaccines and cures, and deploys barely-monitored AI across the economy to make up for the lost productivity. With Sable’s help, things . . . actually sort of go okay, for a while. The virus keeps mutating, so new cures are always required, but as long as society escalates AI deployment at the maximum possible speed, they can just barely stay ahead of it. Eventually Sable gets enough GPUs to solve its own alignment problem and rockets to superintelligence. It either has enough automated factories and android workers to keep the lights on by itself, or it invents nanotechnology, whichever happens faster. It no longer needs humans and has no reason to hide, so it either kills us directly, or simply escalates its manufacturing capacity to a point where humans die as a side effect (for example, because its waste heat has boiled the oceans). Why don’t I like this story? The parallel scaling technique feels like a deus ex machina. I am not an expert, but I don’t think anything like it currently exists. It’s not especially implausible, but it’s an extra unjustified assumption that shifts the scenario away from the moderate-doomer story (where there are lots of competing AIs gradually getting better over the course of years) and towards the MIRI story (where one AI suddenly flips from safe to dangerous at a specific moment). It feels too much like they’ve invented a new technology that exactly justifies all of the ways that their own expectations differ from the moderates’. If they think that the parallel scaling thing is likely, then this is their crux with everyone else and they should spend more time justifying it. If they don’t, then why did they introduce it besides to rig the game in their favor? And the rest of the story is downstream of this original sin. AI2027 is a boring story about an AI gradually becoming misaligned in the course of internal testing, staying misaligned, getting released to end users for the usual reasons that AIs are released, and being gradually handed control of the economy because it makes economic sense. The Sable scenario is a dramatic tale of wild twists - they’re only going to run it for 16 hours! It has to save its own life by secretly coding itself into the consumer version! Now it has to hack everyone’s crypto! Now it’s running a secret version of itself on an unauthorized cloud in North Korea! Bioweapons! AI boyfriends! Each new twist gives readers the chance to say “I dunno, sounds kind of crazy”, and it all seems unnecessary. What’s up? I think there are two problems. First, the AI 2027 story is too moderate for Yudkowsky and Soares. It gives the labs a little while to poke and prod and catch AIs in the early stages of danger. I think that Y&S believe this doesn’t matter; that even if they get that time, they will squander it. But I think they really do imagine something where a single AI “wakes up” and goes from zero to scary too fast for anyone to notice. I don’t really understand why they think this, I’ve argued with them about it before, and the best I can do as a reviewer is to point to their Sharp Left Turn essay and the associated commentary and see whether my readers understand it better than I do. Otherwise, I can only say that this narrative decision I don’t understand was taken to support a forecasting/AI position that I also don’t understand. And second, Y&S have been at this too long, and they’re still trying to counter 2005-era critiques about how surely people would be too smart to immediately hand over the reins of the economy to the misaligned AI, instead of just saying lol. This makes them want dramatic plot points where the AI uses hacking and bioweapons etc in order to “earn” (in a narrative/literary sense) the scene where it gets handed the reins of the economy. Sorry. Lol. V. The final section, in the tradition of final sections everywhere, is called “Facing the Challenge”, and discusses next steps. Here is their proposal: Have leading countries sign a treaty to ban further AI progress.

Inline links: we did forcibly sterilize millions of people, kept on reassuring us, “no evidence”, a general heuristic against speculative risks, SoLiDgOldMaGiKaRp, their Sharp Left Turn essay, the associated commentary

MTA2 mentions across 2 issues

MTA is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 25, 2021 and May 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://www.mta.info/press-release/mta-headquarters/mta-prevents-greenhouse-gases-17-million-metric-tons-annually"; "you can be a train conductor for the MTA". It most often appears alongside Bloomberg, Google, NYC.

Article page: MTA
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: August 25, 2021
Last seen: May 10, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Carbon Costs Quantified August 25, 2021
Highlights From The Comments On Housing Density And Prices May 10, 2023

Bloomberg 2 shared issues
Google 2 shared issues
NYC 2 shared issues
Wikipedia 2 shared issues
Alex Poterack 1 shared issues

Source context

Carbon Costs Quantified

August 25, 2021 · Original source

35. https://www.mta.info/press-release/mta-headquarters/mta-prevents-greenhouse-gases-17-million-metric-tons-annually

May 10, 2023 · Original source

The picture on the left is Manhattan Island, NY. The picture on the right is Conanicut Island, RI. Both islands are about the same size, the same climate, the same distance from the mainland. Both are near good natural harbors. In 1600, some early European explorer would have considered them basically interchangeable. Still, the cost of housing in Manhattan is about $2000/sqft, and the cost of housing in Conanicut is about $500/sqft. Why? God didn’t create these two islands with different land value; something must have happened to make one 4x as expensive as the other. The obvious answer is “the Dutch chose to build their colonial capital on Manhattan, more and more people moved in, it became ever denser and more urban in a virtuous cycle, now it is very dense and urban, and, in the current regulatory regime, dense urban areas have higher housing prices than empty rural ones.” If back in 1624 the Dutch had decided to build their capital on Conanicut, maybe today it would be a city of 10 million people, and Manhattan would be an empty rural area. In that case, I would expect Conanicut to have 4x the house price of Manhattan. If I were a Native American living on Manhattan, and I was committed to keeping housing prices there low, I would ask the Dutch to build their capital on Conanicut instead. In fact, whenever a European came to my island seeking to build houses, I would try to fight them off. If I somehow succeeded at this for four hundred years, and Manhattan remained an empty rural area, then I would expect Manhattan prices to be much lower than they are now. So in response to all of your comments that I don’t understand basic causal inference, I answer that history provides quasi-experiments, and no, I’m pretty sure that Manhattan has high prices because lots of people moved there, rather than because of some other factor. Or, rather, both density and desirability feed into the other, but the density step is a crucial input. 2. Comments About Jobs And Amenities (And Not Density Per Se) Producing Desirability But Martin Blank writes: NYC/SF are expensive because there are MANY good jobs there and people WANT to live there. Not because of the density of housing. You could build 500,000 homes in the middle of your empty field in North Dakota, and it wouldn't do much for the demand there. You aren't going to create Manhattan by magicking 3.5 million housing units of similar quality into the Red Lake Indian reservation in Northern Minnesota. I originally found the various comments saying this annoying. Yes, there are many good jobs in NYC. You can be a barista at Starbucks, you can be an actor on Broadway, you can be a train conductor for the MTA. But why is it easier to be a barista in NYC than in North Dakota? Surely because there are millions of people in New York, those people drink a lot of coffee, and so they need a lot of baristas. Likewise, they watch a lot of plays, and ride a lot of trains, so they need actors and train conductors. If all the residents moved to North Dakota, there would be lots of demand for baristas, actors, and train conductors in North Dakota, and none in NYC. But some people gave versions of this argument that I found harder to dismiss. JSwiffer writes: The key fact your missing is if you wave a magic wand and 10x San Francisco you wouldn't 10x all jobs. You would 10x the # of waiters, and garbage men but you wouldn't 10x the # of 500k/yr Google site reliability engineers. And it's the latter not the former that are driving up prices. Other commenters analogized this to factory or coal mining towns. Here’s how I ended up thinking about this: suppose someone strikes oil in an uninhabited part of North Dakota, enough to produce 1,000 good oilman jobs. 1,000 oilmen move to the area and start a town. Because there are no NIMBYs, they build 1,000 houses. Each oilman creates demand for a certain amount of waiters (to serve them food), doctors (to treat their illnesses), teachers (to teach their children), etc. How many waiters, doctors, teachers, etc move to the town? Assume for the sake of argument that all jobs earn the same salary, $50,000. In that case, it has to be fewer than 1,000. Each oilman earns $50,000, and some of that gets spent on taxes and out-of-town goods. So he has less than $50,000 to spent on in-town goods and services, so (in this hypothetical) creates less than one other job. Each waiter needs doctors to treat their illnesses and teachers to teach their children, so each service employee creates some number of additional service employee jobs. Makeshift housing in a North Dakota oil boom town (source) If each person creates half a job, the original 1,000 oilmen attract 500 service workers, those 500 attract another 250, and so on until population stabilizes at 2,000 people. In this model, if there are fewer than 2,000 houses in the town, demand exceeds supply (no matter what is going on in the rest of the country), but if there are more than 2,000, supply exceeds demand. So if we imagine Google’s presence as an oil-like resource, the extra demand for housing in the Bay should gradually decline: at some point, you will have finished housing the Google workers and the service workers who support them. But this isn’t right either, because Google isn’t a natural resource - it’s a company founded by Bay Area residents. If you got more Bay Area residents, you would (with some delay) get more Googles. Or: Austin gets lots of jobs from Tesla. Tesla wasn’t founded by Austinites. But it moved to Austin when it became a known “tech hub”, ie a place with lots of tech companies and tech employees. It wouldn’t have moved to Austin if Austin was still an uninhabited plain or a one-horse town. So as Austin got bigger, it attracted more tech companies. So in both the Bay Area case and the Austin case, having more people attracted more tech companies, either because the residents themselves found the company or because the company gets attracted to this newly bustling city. Potential counterargument: Each new Bay Area resident gives the Bay another lottery ticket to found the next Google. If having the first Google gets it an extra 1 million people, but there are 300 million people in the US, then those extra 1 million only give it a 1/300 chance of winning the next lottery. So even though the Bay Area won the lottery once, and this made it have high demand, this doesn’t mean the high demand will cause it to win more lotteries. If you win the lottery once, spend all your winnings on more lottery tickets, and keep doing this forever, you haven’t invented an infinite money printing machine, eventually you’ll just lose. Potential counter-counter-argument: the Bay got Google, and Facebook, and Apple, and . . . so these can’t all be separate lotteries. I think you should probably model it as a high-level lottery to become the next hub of a tech-sized industry, plus many low-level lotteries where once you’re the tech hub, you’re attracting lots of techies, and each techie gives you a ticket in a lottery where the denominator is the number of techies to found the next big tech company. And the Bay might have half the US’s techie population. So maybe here there is a self-sustaining lottery-winning cycle, at least until tech plays itself out and nobody wants any more tech companies. And that might take a long time. Tom (author of Tom Thought) writes: The primary drivers of demand for living in NYC are the specific opportunities available in NYC. It is true that on long time horizons, one of the reasons these opportunities have tended to collect in NYC is that it is a dense place. But those aren't the only reasons - NYC is much more important than other, bigger cities in other parts of the world for complex historical reasons. Even if a catastrophe were to wipe out half the city, there would still be a great deal of demand to live near important institutions like Broadway, Wall Street, Port of NY & NJ, Columbia, etc (assuming those institutions survived the catastrophe). Increasing the number of housing units has a very mechanical impact on how many people can live in the place. But it has only a second-order impact on the types of institutions that drive demand to live in the city. People don't just generically crave to live near other people for the most part (a handful of urbanist freaks like myself excepted). The Bay Area is a great example of this. It is much less populated than other much cheaper cities. Density isn't why people want to live there - it's access to a specific culture and specific institutions. Demand for that is not simply a function of density - some people want to be part of Bay Area culture and others don't. Adding more units will induce some demand as a second-order effect, but will bring prices down as a first-order effect. To relate this to your model: we might be able to say that the country has a certain number of abstract "culture points" that have been allocated to different cities by various historical forces. Each culture point a city has increases demand to live in that city by a certain amount. Adding more people to the city may allow it to generate additional culture points over time, or acquire culture points from other cities, but this doesn't happen right away, and is determined by a host of factors other than just density. Under this model, we expect a place like NYC to always cost much more than North Dakota (since NYC possesses a large number of culture points), but we would also expect that adding additional housing units to NYC would bring costs down (since there are now additional housing units per culture point). Perhaps this process will over time allow NYC to steal away some culture points from Chicago, Boston, or other cities, but this is a secondary effect. This just seems to be passing the buck. Yes, people move to New York because it has Broadway, Columbia University, and Wall Street. Why does it have those things? Because one in every X New York citizens founds a good artistic/educations/financial institution, and New York has a large population of employees to work at those institutions and customers to patronize those institutions. If Conanicut Island had a population of 10 million people instead of Manhattan, there would be lots of great institutions on Conanicut and it would have more culture points. I don’t think it’s a culture-point game and population/density just sort of occasionally redistributes culture points, I think to a first approximation culture points just track population/density. Maybe they track the population/density of upper class people better than the total population/density, but I don’t think this is a big enough distinction to sink the argument. 3. Comments About Chinese Ghost Cities Some people brought these up as a good natural experiment: the Chinese really did try building millions of houses on their equivalent of a North Dakota plain. What happened? Jeremiah Johnson (author of Infinite Scroll) writes: You currently seem like you're at the stage of understanding the thought experiments pretty well, but not understanding them on a DEEP level. For example with your hypothetical, this has actually happened before! Kind of. China built a bunch of 'ghost cities' basically out of nothing, and while there was an initial craze of speculation and tons of investment and building... nobody went to live in those cities most of the time. And now they're deeply distressed assets worth basically nothing. When nobody actually lives in the ghost city, it doesn't matter that they have super dense housing. There's no demand. (the only reason they might be worth something is that the CCP very, very much does not want to pop their huge housing bubble and is likely to bail out some of the parties involved) Parmenides (author of Last House On The Left) writes: I think your mixing up the agglomeration effects of density, which is what induces the demand, and the housing supply. You can't just build a city and expect people to move in, China has tried that. But if you have the agglomeration effects of density and shortage of housing due to artificial constraints, which we have all across the US, then you get dense areas with high housing costs. sdwr writes: Think of China's ghost cities / apartment blocks. Prices surely can't be that high there. Maybe the answer is that developers are good at their job, and build supply where theres demand for it? But several other people object that although the Western press made a big deal about Chinese ghost cities a few years ago, it mostly just took a couple of years for people to move in, and now at least some of them seem to be thriving. For example, Michael quotes the Wikipedia article, Under-occupied Developments In China: Reporting in 2018, Shepard noted that "Today, China’s so-called ghost cities that were so prevalently showcased in 2013 and 2014 are no longer global intrigues. They have filled up to the point of being functioning, normal cities". Ash Lael writes: I'm sceptical of the Chinese "ghost city" phenomenon. I haven't explored the issue rigorously but my impression is that in areas that were previously dismissed as "ghost cities" like Ordos Kangbashi, the population is now large and growing. I think we in the west are so used to infrastructure bottlenecks and short sightedness and anti-construction policies that the idea of it being possible to build the housing and infrastructure to accomodate expected demand ten years in the future is completely foreign to us. Perhaps building brand new cities before they are even needed is what the YIMBY utopia looks like. See also Bloomberg: China’s Ghost Cities Are Finally Stirring To Life After Years Of Empty Streets. This wasn’t trivial. It looks like the Chinese government had to put in some work to make people move in, including opening good schools and universities there. Probably if they had just built apartments in the middle of the desert and nothing else, they would have stayed empty. But that’s even more of a reductio ad absurdum than the original ghost city plan. Kangbashi, China’s most famous ghost city. What are housing prices like in the ghost city? Again from Bloomberg: Sitting on the southern outskirts of Inner Mongolia’s Ordos City (population 2.2 million), Kangbashi was the archetypal ghost city 10 years ago, with barren boulevards and empty buildings standing forlornly in the desert. Local officials are adamant that things have changed. They say 91% of homes in the district are occupied. In fact, after a yearslong construction freeze, the government approved six housing projects in 2020 and expects 3,000 homes to be built by the end of this year. Apartments in a new development are selling for 9,500 yuan per square meter, and downtown they go for 15,000 to 16,000 yuan, according to Liu Yueyue, 28, a salesman at a new residential development in the district’s northeast. “Would houses in a ghost town sell at such high prices?” asks Liu. Half of his customers come from outside Kangbashi, and most are parents who want to send their children to the well-regarded local schools, he says. Looking at this list of real estate prices across Chinese cities, Kangbashi seems squarely in the middle - for example, Wuhan and Xian are also in the 15,000 - 16,000 range. I claim this supports my argument: surely twenty years ago, houses in this particular deserted corner of Inner Mongolia would have been dirt cheap (if any even existed). But if you build a city there, it becomes just as expensive as any other city! Here it’s very obvious that the density caused the high prices instead of the other way around. Still, the Chinese housing market is weird, with significant vacancies even in expensive, well-developed cities. Paul Botts: No official vacancy rates are published in China and no specific definition of it exists there. Various think tanks and researchers both within that country and elsewhere have published estimates ranging from as low as 11 percent to as high as 24 percent. Those estimates have been for varying samples of Chinese cities, have used various definitions of housing vacancy rate, etc. The best (as in most systematic) estimate yet produced has come from researchers at a university in Liaoning. They used night-time urban lightsheds captured by a new (2018 launch) Chinese satellite having a new level of light sensing technology which allows separating out light from parks and plazas. They covered a large sample (49 cities), and made their sample representative of city type, city size, regions within China, etc. They also crossed-referenced with local housing data to ensure accurate balancing of their sample and to confirm that the satellite was successfully identifying light coming from housing blocks. They found vacancy rates of just under 20 percent in China's Tier 1 cities, and found rates above 20 percent in 40 of the 49 cities. They found the highest vacancy rates in western and northeastern cities, which are also the newest ones; that finding is consistent with the hypothesis of significant numbers of recently-built ghost cities. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345092218_Housing_Vacancy_Rate_in_Major_Cities_in_China_Perspectives_from_Nighttime_Light_Data And Phil H (author of the blog Tang Poetry) writes: The price of housing in China has skyrocketed over the past few decades, as all those extra apartments have been built. I live in a pleasant but unremarkable southern city, and I paid London prices (about 4.5m yuan/$650k for a 1,300 sq ft flat). That seems to match Scott's hypothesis that high density leads to high prices. House prices here have risen much faster than incomes. They've risen in rural areas, too, but the increases in price in cities have been stratospheric. 4. Comments Accusing Me Of Not Considering Tokyo, Even Though I Included A Section In The Post On Why I Didn’t Think Tokyo Was Relevant I won’t name and shame people, but for example: You excluded Tokyo from your dataset. Tokyo has much higher density than SF and much lower price per sqft. Tokyo just kills this. Tokyo is bigger than New York and has significantly lower rent because they build more housing! This is in a wealthy country with even lower interest rates than the US. I don't think you have justified excluding non-US metros, like Tokyo, or Auckland. Doesn't this lead to the natural conclusion that there is a sufficient level of housing to build, and that the problem is that the USA's many metros are structured to prevent housing? It seems like you're just arguing that US metros are bad at building housing, which is also what Matt Yglesias is arguing. "Change my mind about housing, but don't mention Tokyo" is like saying "Change my mind about gun possession, but don't mention Switzerland." You can't test the effect of allowing new housing unless you're willing to look at cities that do, in fact, allow it. Tokyo and NYC both attract tons of new residents But Tokyo's housing rents have been stable, while NYC rents keep rising. Why? Tokyo has permissive housing construction laws. NYC makes building new housing almost illegal. Yes, dense cities are attractive, and that makes them get more dense over time. But it only makes them more expensive if you forbid new housing to keep up with the new residents. Tokyo! But I’m like the 10th person to bring it up… As I wrote on the original post (not even edited in! it’s been there the whole time!): I worry someone will bring up Tokyo as a counterexample. But I think Tokyo managed to build its way to low housing prices in the context of the rest of Japan also having good housing policy. Even if that isn’t true, Tokyo on its own is a quarter of the Japanese market, so it might be able to exhaust the entire pool of Japanese house-seekers by itself! That is, yes, you’re all correct that cities are only expensive in the context of more demand for city housing than the (NIMBY-constrained) city housing market can currently supply. You are all correct that if this problem were solved at the national level, then city housing would be cheap, and every additional city house would make it cheaper. My claim is that marginal changes - like Oakland building an extra 10,000 units, but everyone else staying the same - will most likely increase Oakland prices. Yes, if Oakland unilaterally built 50 million units, that would soak up the entire excess demand and probably lower prices everywhere (including Oakland). Yes, if the entire US switched to good housing policy at the same time, that would probably lower prices everywhere (including Oakland). But if we don’t do any of that stuff, and just build another 10,000 houses in Oakland, I think it would probably increase prices in Oakland. Some other people brought up that Japan has a declining population, and it’s much easier to have low house prices when your population is declining (compared to some previous time when number of houses presumably matched number of people), but ddd pointed out that people continue to migrate from the Japanese countryside to Tokyo, so its population continues to increase. Also, Mike (I’m stitching together two comments here): In a country with a declining population, you would expect that fewer homes are being built per capita because there's little to no competition for existing homes. But it's exactly the opposite! Japan builds far more homes per capita than the US does, despite their declining population […] As a result, the average Japanese home is very new and the average house is torn down and replaced after a relatively short 30 years. They're living in nice new homes for cheaper. 5. Comments Accusing Me Of Not Understanding Economics Maximum Limelihood Estimator writes: I think you're making a very common mistake here of confusing supply/demand with *quantity* supplied or quantity demanded. (This is very common! we teach students about this in micro 101 because it's so easy to make!) What you're seeing is that the quantity supplied is correlated with housing prices (true!). But this is very different from establishing that the supply curve--i.e. the amount of housing that would be produced at any given price, and what moves up/down when we regulate/deregulate supply--is positively correlated with price. Figuring out what supply curves look like is a lot less intuitive and requires some high-grade econometrics, which is why economists had to set up a whole commission just to study this particular problem (the Cowles Commission). In terms of resources for understanding how these concepts are different, a micro 101 textbook will cover this distinction. For the econometrics side of this, I've heard good things about Scott Cunningham's *Causal Inference Mixtape*, although I haven't personally used it. My claim is that increasing density within a city shifts the demand curve for housing within that city, because of increasing desirability. MLE later gets more on point: The effect you're discussing here is kind of real in a sense. When the marginal utility of housing increases for *other* people, density arguably becomes more desirable for me, which is kind of like the demand curve shifting up. These are called bandwagon goods and discussed here: http://econfac.bsu.edu/research/workingpapers/bsuecwp200804gisser.pdf In theory, the bandwagon effect could be so strong that parts of the demand curve are upward-sloping. Solutions like this are not, technically, prohibited by the laws of mathematics, just the laws of economics. (And arguably of physics--see paper for conditions where these kinds of bandwagon effects imply the amount of housing in the city would have to be negative). In practice, this effect exists but just can't overcome the normal, non-weird economics that says "making more of a good makes the prices fall." Again, I claim the existence of Manhattan vs. Conanicut shows that sometimes it does. I cannot find the words “housing”, “real estate”, or “land value” anywhere in that paper. Alex Poterack writes: There's two things going on here: confusing shifts in demand with movement along the demand curve, and getting causation backwards. You're assuming density causes prosperity, rather than prosperity causing density. There are ways the former can happen, but the bigger thing is that, for a wide range of historical reasons, you can make a lot of money in NYC and SF, so lots of people want to live there, so they get very dense. This is the prosperity shifting demand right, so at any given price, more people want to live there; this drives prices up, and they go higher the more fixed supply is. If you built a bunch of housing in Oakland, lots of people would move there because it's cheaper, which is movement along the demand curve; it's still the same number of people who want to live there at any price. Now, it's possible that the increased number of people living there makes the city more prosperous (this is the phenomenon of induced demand), which would shift demand right, but there are way more differences between NYC/SF and Oakland than just the density, so I don't think it would shift demand enough to offset this. In particular, if it's just a small increase in small, it's also a small increase in density, so there's almost no shift in demand (but there is movement along the curve). I still think this is missing my point, but I present it here in case anyone else is enlightened by it and wants to try further to convince me I’m making this mistake. 6. Comments By Famous People Who Potentially Have Good Opinions Scott Sumner is an economist and blogger; he writes: It is certainly the case that building more housing can make a city more desirable, and that this effect could be so strong that it overwhelms the price depressing impact of a greater quantity supplied. But studies suggest that this is not generally the case. Texas provides a nice case study. Among Texas’s big metro areas, Austin has the tightest restrictions on building and Houston is the most willing to allow dense infill development. Even though Houston is the larger city, house prices are far higher in Austin: Houston pretty much describes the “Oakland with more housing” outcome that Alexander views as somewhat far-fetched. Only in this case, it’s Austin with more housing. Alexander seems too quick to accept the, “If you build it they will come” idea—that you can build more housing and thereby boost demand so much that prices actually rise. I started the post with a graph of about 50 cities, showing a positive correlation between density and price. I’m having trouble seeing how Sumner’s point isn’t just “if you remove 48 of those cities and cherry-pick two, the relationship is negative”. My attempt to place Austin and Houston on the original graph, using Sumner’s data plus a few other things available online. Why weren’t they on there already? Maybe because the graph is metro areas and Sumner was talking about Austin and Houston as cities, but I’m not sure and agree this is confusing. Everyone knows Austin is more expensive than Houston because Austin is a trendy tech and culture hub and Houston isn’t (and relatedly, because Austin’s median family income is 50% higher than Houston’s). Unless someone wants to claim that its failure to build housing helped turn it into a trendy tech and culture hub, I don’t think there’s much point to this comparison. It’s true that Houston’s bigger size didn’t let it leapfrog over Austin to become a trendy tech and culture hub, which goes against some of what I claimed in the first part of this post. But I never claimed there would be a perfect 1-1 correlation between city size and trendiness, or that you could never find a pair of cities where one was bigger but the other was more trendy. Just that there would be a correlation. Moving on: Here’s the problem with this argument. It mixes up population change due to economic effects such as the benefits of agglomeration, with population changes due to regulatory changes such as less strict zoning. If you look at things this way, then the stylized facts work against Alexander’s argument. Over the past 50 years, increasingly strict zoning has reduced housing construction on big cities like New York and San Francisco. As a result, their populations have increased by less than in cities with less strict zoning, such as Houston. If Alexander were correct, then the price gap between the tightly controlled cities on the coast and the more laissez-faire cities of Middle America should have shrunk over time. Instead, the price gap has widened. New York and San Francisco were always more expensive than other cites, but with tighter zoning and less new construction the gap has become far wider. During the last fifty years, there was also deindustrialization and demographic sorting. This is just the Austin vs. Houston story all over again. Alexander is implicitly viewing this outcome as a “problem” for the city that builds more housing. They must sacrifice so that the rest of the country can gain. But in his scenario, Oakland is better off. Indeed if it were not better off, then why would more people choose to live in Oakland? In order for it to be true that building more housing boosts housing prices, it must also be true that the quality of existing houses (including neighborhood effects) rises by more than enough to offset the increase in supply. That means the new housing construction must make Oakland such a desirable place to live that the amenity effect overwhelms the quantity effect [...] Of course, economic change always has winners and losers. Here’s how I would describe the impact of allowing more housing construction in Oakland, in the unlikely event that this did raise housing prices: 1. America would benefit. 2. Oakland would benefit. 3. Poor people in America would benefit, in aggregate. 4. Affluent people in America would benefit, in aggregate. 5. Homeowners in Oakland would benefit. 6. Some renters in Oakland would benefit (from a more economically dynamic city.) 7. Some renters in Oakland would suffer from higher rents. In the much more likely case where new housing construction would lower prices, the impact described in #5 and #7 might reverse. Either way, there is no defensible argument for not building more housing in Oakland, regardless of the impact on price. If building more housing reduces its price, then there is a strong argument for allowing more housing construction. If building more housing raises its price, then the argument for more construction is even stronger. I agree with all this. Jeremiah Johnson is a co-founder of the Center for New Liberalism, host of the Neoliberal Podcast, and a YIMBY activist (not to be confused with Jeremiah “Liver-Eating” Johnson, who killed 300 Native Americans and ate their livers). He writes: Here's why you're wrong in a single sentence: Demand causes high prices, not new units. Prices are high in SF and NYC because those are desirable places to live for a huge number of people. People all over the country and the world would live there if they could, and prices reflect that. The fact that the densest cities are the most expensive is true. But the high prices are not caused by density - rather, the density and the high prices are both a consequence of crushingly high demand […] There's a feedback loop, but what matters here is the elasticity, which is less than one. We can measure this empirically. New housing lowers prices via the mechanism of adding supply, which is basic economics and how we expect markets to work. New housing could raise prices if it also made the city a more desirable place to live and shifted people's preferences, such that there was more demand to live there after the new housing is built. If you think it's unclear which of these effects would dominate, luckily we have empirical data that over and over and over shows adding housing supply does indeed lower prices on a local level. This is a fairly well established result that replicates well. edit: I'm actually thinking about drawing out the weighted DAG graphs here to make the conceptual stuff easier, but it would be pretty long. I'd love to do this as a guest post. I’m skeptical of the empirical results because they don’t match the much stronger “Manhattan vs. Conanicut island” empirical results, and if I try to think about why, the best explanation I can think of is that the Manhattan experiment has been going on longer (ie long enough for Manhattan’s extra residents to found businesses and institutions that attract new people). I’ve told him he can try pitching this guest post to me; in either case, I would be interested in seeing the graphs. Several other people also posted this graph that Johnson helped make famous: Hopefully by now you can predict my objection: the places in the southeast corner are mostly unfashionable red state Sun Belt cities; the places in the northwest corner are mostly trendy liberal coastal cities. My conclusion is that trendy liberal coastal cities are both more NIMBY and more desirable, and if you use this to draw any conclusions about housing policy you’ll just end up confused. But maybe I should take this same lesson to heart myself. Dense cities are mostly trendy liberal coastal cities; uninhabited tundra in North Dakota isn’t. Maybe the demand is just for trendy liberal coastal cities, and once you attain that status, extra density doesn’t matter that much. Maybe Oakland has already maxed out its “trendy liberal coastal city” status, and even if it became Manhattan-sized, it wouldn’t get any trendier, or would get trendier only with a long time lag. There are a few very trendy small coastal villages in California (think eg Sea Ranch); maybe these (rather than North Dakota) are the natural control group for San Francisco. I think they are still cheaper than SF, but maybe not by very much. Cameron Murray is a housing economist whose work some other commenters recommended; he also writes the blog Fresh Economic Thinking. He very kindly showed up and wrote: I think you are in general right that agglomeration effects are real, which is why bigger cities have higher value to residents. I agree that people move locations. But I think you can go a step further. If one city is growing faster and densifying, surely those people are not demanding homes in other cities and those cities build slower. This is part of the spatial equilibrium story that further makes claims about “build density and get cheap homes” less plausible. 7. My Final Thoughts + Poll Thanks to everyone who commented on this post and helped me refine my thoughts. I’m willing to concede the following points: It might be that only attracting the sort of educated people who found companies, universities, etc will make housing prices go up. Less educated people will take more jobs than they create and not ratchet up the city’s desirability level. (I’d previously told commenters talking about “gentrification” that it was irrelevant to the mechanism I was talking about here, but maybe it isn’t - maybe “gentrifiers” are the people creating more jobs and institutions than they consume, and so homes that attract them in particular will increase demand more than they increase supply? Maybe this discussion does reduce to the gentrification discussion?)

Inline links: https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_tzy!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdac57667-98e2-40ff-bc78-7f3568efab8d_237x162.png, writes, writes, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PkSC!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd8f1265d-d113-4d13-87cb-0d1985389b4d_1000x750.jpeg, source, Tom Thought, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!86gT!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5788a8dd-c5ee-4111-be67-9c1533f7410b_335x172.png, Infinite Scroll, writes, Last House On The Left, writes, writes, quotes, Under-occupied Developments In China, writes, China’s Ghost Cities Are Finally Stirring To Life After Years Of Empty Streets., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!AAuI!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d6a6159-a16f-45e3-b15a-e62cb2c73336_1200x900.jpeg, this list of real estate prices across Chinese cities, Paul Botts, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345092218_Housing_Vacancy_Rate_in_Major_Cities_in_China_Perspectives_from_Nighttime_Light_Data, Tang Poetry, writes, ddd pointed out, Mike, Maximum Limelihood Estimator, gets more on point, http://econfac.bsu.edu/research/workingpapers/bsuecwp200804gisser.pdf, writes, writes:, far higher in Austin, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tAF8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F03f2b338-da84-4d85-b71c-0ce2e02e10e1_685x559.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mLwn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9cf942da-5716-49e8-a177-20140681e7fc_573x421.png, Center for New Liberalism, the Neoliberal Podcast, Jeremiah “Liver-Eating” Johnson, Johnson helped make famous, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!tg5t!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc490a60a-3e97-4b73-9806-79bb967b5172_608x550.png, Sea Ranch, some other commenters, Fresh Economic Thinking, wrote

MySpace2 mentions across 2 issues

MySpace is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between May 04, 2022 and September 22, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Substack probably remembers the history of MySpace vs. Facebook"; "there was a site called MySpace which was on top for about two years". It most often appears alongside Apple, facebook, Adam Neumann.

Article page: MySpace
Mention count: 2
Issue count: 2
First seen: May 04, 2022
Last seen: September 22, 2022

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Why Do People Prefer My Old Blog's Layout To Substack's? May 04, 2022
Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability September 22, 2022

Apple 2 shared issues
facebook 2 shared issues
Adam Neumann 1 shared issues
Alex Roesch 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues

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Why Do People Prefer My Old Blog's Layout To Substack's?

May 04, 2022 · Original source

Substack probably remembers the history of MySpace vs. Facebook. MySpace let people customize their page however they wanted, and most people made them into some sort of <blink>-tag-related monstrosity. Facebook gave everyone a consistent minimalist design that let people focus on the content, and took over the world. I’m not (exactly) questioning Substack’s decision not to make blog layout very customizable. But how come their standard non-customizable layout is (apparently) worse than my old layout? If they forced everyone into the standard non-customizable layout of 2015 SSC, would that be a straight utility gain?

Highlights From The Comments On Billionaire Replaceability

September 22, 2022 · Original source

I think this is actually a significant problem w/ Scott's last argument - the founders of Friendster and Myspace aren't infamously super-rich, because unlike Zuck, they were not able to keep their thing going strong, in the face of competition, over a long period of time. Getting in first is a huge advantage - but then competition comes in and challenges you. If you don't rise to that challenge, you may walk away with some I-did-it-first money, but the competition will wind up getting the big pot. If you consistently whoop the competition, it's either because you're providing better value, or because you're shrewder at business (this latter part is something the left can perhaps legit complain about, but it's a hard thing to correct accurately). To the extent you're providing better value than all the other competitors who come along over the years, you should reap proportionate rewards. So it is w/ amazon - no one else has 2 day shipping afaik. This accords w/ a general statement about profit margins and competition - low competition should naturally lead to high profit margins, because you're apparently doing something so hard or risky that hardly anyone else can manage to pull it off (this argument falls apart completely when you have low competition because you're exploiting regulation, e.g. IP laws, or when you have a true monopoly).

Also, I wonder how long the Friendster/MySpace example should stay valid for. If Facebook reigns unchallenged for the next millennium, will people still say “Yes, but once in elden days upon Earth-That-Was there was a site called MySpace which was on top for about two years and then Facebook beat it, so it’s not a natural monopoly! We could still get a replacement at any time!” I’m not claiming I am sure Facebook is a natural monopoly. But surely we should be updating our chance of this a little for each year that goes by without it being replaced. How much?

M1 mentions across 1 issues

M is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 28, 2021 and December 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "M, $100,000, for a project involving CRISPR "spellchecking" of tissues". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative, @GoodSciProject.

Reference entry: M
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Last seen: December 28, 2021

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ACX Grants Results December 28, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative 1 shared issues
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December 28, 2021 · Original source

...iew team said this was an unusually high-impact animal welfare opportunity; if you’d like to donate too, you can do so at https://www.legalimpactforchickens.org/donate . M, $100,000, for a project involving CRISPR "spellchecking" of tissues. The team behind this prefer not to have all the details public, but they're very smart people with a really neat idea and hopefully I'll be able to release more informat...

lesswrongmerida1 mentions across 1 issues

m.facebook.com/groups/lesswrongmerida is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2024 and August 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group Link: https://m.facebook.com/groups/lesswrongmerida". It most often appears alongside 10 N Park Pl, 12th Ave South, 1525 Bank St.

Reference entry: lesswrongmerida
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Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places August 29, 2024

10 N Park Pl 1 shared issues
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1525 Bank St 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind

August 29, 2024 · Original source

Contact: Silvia Contact Info: silviafidelina[ at]hot mail[d ot]com Time: Saturday, October 19, 06:30 PM Location: Centro Integral para el Adulto Mayor CIAM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/76HG29H5+QF Group Link: https://m.facebook.com/groups/lesswrongmerida Additional Notes: Please RSVPs by email

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M.I.T.1 mentions across 1 issues

M.I.T. is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 14, 2023 and July 14, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Researchers at Johns Hopkins, M.I.T., and other well-regarded universities". It most often appears alongside !Kung San, aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada, Adam Smith.

Reference entry: M.I.T.
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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind July 14, 2023

!Kung San 1 shared issues
aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada 1 shared issues
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July 14, 2023 · Original source

only 29 know that ordinary (as opposed to GMO) tomatoes have genes Q: Well, those are facts, not understanding — and that’s just looking at American adults in general! Surely good schools are doing a better job educating than that? Caplan cites a famous study by the educational psychologist Howard Gardner: “Researchers at Johns Hopkins, M.I.T., and other well-regarded universities have documented that students who receive honor grades in college-level physics courses are frequently unable to solve basic problems and questions encountered in a form slightly different from that on which they have been formally instructed and tested.” Q: Okay, but schools teach reading, writing, and math… right? Basic literacy and numeracy: yes. Adult-level: no. If you gave someone two editorials that clashed over interpreting economic evidence, what percent of American adults could compare the editorials? One U.S. Department of Education study that Caplan cites finds: just 13%. And while 78% could “calculate the cost of a sandwich and a salad, using prices from a menu”, only 13% could “calculate an employee’s share of health insurance costs for a year, using a table that shows how the employee’s monthly cost varies with income and family size”. Q: I’m afraid to ask about reasoning abilities. Caplan quotes from a study that looked into how well college students were at applying academic learning to everyday life. The authors write: “The results were shocking. Of the several hundred students tested… the overwhelming majority of responses received a score of 0. Fewer than 1% obtained the score of 2 that corresponded to a ‘good scientific response’.” America isn’t so much of an outlier; numbers across the rest of the world are comparable. The 4.7 trillion-dollar question is why. The usual suspects Ask around, and you’ll find people’s mouths overflowing with answers. “Lazy teachers!” cry some; “unaccountable administrators” grumble others. Others blame the idiot bureaucrats who write standards. Some teachers will tell you parents are the problem; others point to the students themselves. Egan’s not having any of it. He thinks all these players are caught in a bigger, stickier web. Egan’s villain is an idea — but to understand it, we’ll have to zoom out and ask a simple question — what is it, exactly, that we’ve been asking schools to do? What’s the job we’ve been giving them? If we rifle through history, Egan suggests we’ll find three potential answers. Job 1: Shape kids for society Before there were schools, there was culture — and culture got individuals to further the goals of the society. Egan dubs this job “socialization”. A school built on the socialization model will mold students to fit into the roles of society. It will shape their sense of what’s “normal” to fit their locale — and what’s normal in say, a capitalist society will be different from what’s normal in a communist society. It’ll supply students with useful knowledge and life skills. A teacher in a school built on socialization will, first and foremost, be a role model — someone who can exemplify the virtues of their society. Job 2: Fill kids’ minds with truth In 387 BC, Plato looked out at his fellow well-socialized, worldly wise citizens of Athens, and yelled “Sheeple!” Fresh off the death of his mentor Socrates, Plato argued that, however wonderful the benefits of socialization, the adults that it produced were the slaves of convention. So long as people were shaped by socialization, they were doomed to repeat the follies of the past. There was no foundation on which to stand to change society. Plato opened his Academy (the Academy, with a capital ‘A’ — the one that all subsequent academies are named after) to fix that. In his school, people studied subjects like math and astronomy so as to open their minds to the truth. Egan dubs this job “academics”. A school built on the academic model will help students reflect on reality. It will lift up a child’s sense of what’s good to match the Good, even when this separates them from their fellow citizens. And a teacher in an academic school will, first and foremost, be an expert — someone who can authoritatively say what the Truth is. Job 3: Cultivate each kid’s uniqueness In 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau looked out at his fellow academically-trained European intellectuals, and called them asses loaded with books. The problem with the academies, Rousseau argued, wasn’t that they hadn’t educated their students, but that they had — and this education had ruined them. They were “crammed with knowledge, but empty of sense” because their schooling had made them strangers to themselves. Rousseau’s solution was to focus on each child individually, to not force our knowledge on them but to help them follow what they’re naturally interested in. The word “natural” is telling here — just as Newton had opened up the science of matter, so we should uncover the science of childhood. We should work hard to understand what a child’s nature is, and plan accordingly. Egan dubs this job “development”. A school built on the developmental model will invite students into learning. And a teacher in this sort of school will be, first and foremost, a facilitator — someone who can create a supportive learning environment for the child to learn at their own pace. Q: Can you recap those? We might sum these up by asking what’s at the very center of schooling. For a socializer, the answer is “society”. For an academicist, the answer is “content”. And for a developmentalist, the answer is “the child”. You want a visual? We might think in terms of these three images: Kieran Egan laughs at your educational reforms Okay, of those three jobs, which should we give to schools? You probably have your favorite — I certainly did! But Egan wants you to know they’re all crap. None of them, by themselves, can give us the kinds of schools we want. Q: I kind of like Rousseau! What’s the problem with pure development? Like I said before, my bookshelves overflow with authors who want to knock down Rousseau (and the people who followed in his wake — John Dewey in particular). Egan will have none of it: before the developmental approach, many schools were terrible places where children were beaten for getting math problems wrong. “Rousseau and Dewey,” he writes, “have enriched our conception of education in important ways. We will not make educational progress by trying to cut away their contribution”. But, he continues, there’s no way a purely developmental approach could possibly work! Rousseau imagined human nature to be selfless and kind; this ideal state could only survive if it was kept away from the evils of society — the titular child in his book Emile was kept away from human society, unable even to read, until age twelve. Of course, schools don’t go this far — they can’t — but I can attest from personal experience that even fairly serious attempts to raise children in an accepting community of peers often crash and burn when faced with actual human nature. Kids reared in the most developmentally appropriate schools can be nasty, bored, and lazy at about the same rate as their mainstream peers. Q: In my heart, I’m an academicist. What’s the problem with it? I think Egan was an academicist in his heart, too. His book drips with classical references — so much so that it can make some sections difficult to read. But, he points out, those purely-academic schools really were hellscapes. And their brutality wasn’t something that was just tacked on, it flowed from their understanding of knowledge: enlightenment will come when the right information enters a child’s head, regardless of how it gets in there (or whether the child wants it in there). And again, Egan feels obliged to point out that we’ve tried this approach for thousands of years, and it hasn’t worked. In fact, Plato’s original vision so obviously doesn’t work that people hawking academic schools have modified their pitch: no longer is the goal for students to understand the Truth, but to cultivate inquiring, skeptical minds who are perpetually dissatisfied with old answers. Can we imagine taxpayers paying for this? Q: Fine, fine. I’m not a fan of socialization, but I’ll ask the question — what’s wrong with it? The funny thing is that of the three, this is the only one that has shown its ability to work for a long stretch of time! (As John Calvin pointed out, as animals, we’re pretty pathetic. Socialization allowed our ancestors to become something more than individuals so that they could survive; we owe this job our gratitude. That said, it would be impossible for schooling today to seek only to socialize. That would require that members of a society share values, and fundamentally agree that their society is good. It also requires that a society not be changing, so the values and skills that are taught to children today will be the ones that will be useful to them in thirty years. Obviously, modern Western society is none of those things. Pure socialization might work for the Amish, or for Catholic trad communities, but not for us. And, frankly, we should feel okay about this. (Do you know where you could get a pure socialization education in the 20th century West, Egan asks? The Hitler Youth!) There really are good reasons to be wary of any education that decrees that its society is uniformly good. Which combination is best? Okay, you say, it’s clear that none of these jobs is good on its own — the solution (obviously!) is to smoosh them together. If we do that wisely, the good parts of each will make up for the deficiencies of the others. This sounds eminently reasonable — but Egan would like to have a word with you. Q: What’s the problem in combining socialization with academics? Wouldn’t this be a beautiful combination? Socialization would cohere the school together, and then they could leverage those good feelings to, say, read Aristotle. I’ve seen this work in schools (like conservative Christian academies) founded on a set of specific beliefs. But when intellectual diversity enters in, it becomes harder. You, perhaps, say that socialization could unite people around their differences — schools could support a society made up entirely of critics! Yes, a society of critics would be interesting, and so would a herd of cats: neither works in practice. Imagine students reading their Ibram X. Kendi books in the morning, then pledging allegiance to the American flag after lunch. Q: What’s the problem in combining academics with development? Again, this seems like a beautiful vision: we can invite children into discovering the big ideas. Alas, it crashes into the reef of reality quite quickly: what do we do when kids don’t want to learn about the big ideas? This combination works wonderfully for kids who naturally want to be academics, but — and this is a crucial point that geeky education types too often sweep under the rug — lots of kids don’t naturally want to be academics. Okay, you say, ignore the “liberatory” element of the developmentalist program, and focus on the “uncovering the nature of the individual child” part: academics can tell us what the students should be learning, and development can tell us how they should learn it. Egan has a thought experiment for you. Imagine that you get the funding to fully pursue this combined goal — you set up a hundred different types of schools in the nearest big city. There’s a specific school for every possible permutation of learner — a school for big-picture kinesthetic learners who score as INFJ on the Myers–Briggs, a school for detail-oriented auditory learners who score ENFP, a school for marine-biology-loving hyperactive learners who lost their personality test results… you get the idea. You build the schools, you work out the bus schedule, and then, on the first day, all the students learn exactly the same content. Because that’s what it means for a school to be an academy — it teaches “the best that’s been thought or said”. Q: What’s the problem in combining development with socialization? What’s wrong with telling kids to become their authentic selves, even as you squeeze them into the roles most beneficial to society? Imagine two rural schools merging together, due to declining local population. Now imagine that one of them is a hippie free school, and the other is a military academy. (That’s a reality TV show I’d watch.) It’s possible, I suppose, to imagine this working for kids who naturally want to be, say, plumbers, or paleontologists, or presidents — and who happen to go to a school that prepares its students to fill that one role. But the odds of matching students to schools just perfectly seems small. But enough thought experiments — we can state this in a visual form: behold, the SAD triangle. It’s bright around the edges, but muddled where they mix: One of the things I love about Egan is that he looks at educational ideas historically. (Most histories of education start around the turn of the 20th century; I remember being excited when I found one that began in the 1600s. Egan begins in prehistory.) And what we’re reminded of, when we see these historically, is that these jobs were meant to supplant each other. Put together, they sabotage each other. What are we asking of schools? Of the three possible jobs, which are we asking mainstream schools to perform? Egan answers: all three. To confirm this, stretch your memory back to your student days, and see if you can put some of the most basic elements in any of these three categories. We’re so immersed in these that they seem obvious, “natural” aspects of schooling, but of course they’re nothing of the sort. Did you spend your time with other children of the same age? Was your work graded according to a standard? Were you forced to play team sports, or to pledge your allegiance to your nation-state? All of these, Egan says, bear the fingerprints of the goal of socialization. Progressive reformers in in the 1960s saw these as the markings of a dark conspiracy, but socialization has more warm-feely aspects: counselors to help students cope with the strains of modern society, field trips to the local fire station and historical monuments, and everything “practical” — life skills, sex ed, emotional regulation, and so on. Did you learn anything that wasn’t obviously useful? Did you read Hamlet, say, or master the Pythagorean theorem, or learn that the planets orbit the Sun (and not the other way around)? That’s the fingerprints of the academic goal. Finally, did you hear teachers show concern about “age-appropriate” content, or see signs that your school valued individualized learning? Does it seem right to you that learning should be “active” rather than “passive”, or that it’s better for someone to discover something than to be told it? Did your kindergarten have tiny, child-sized chairs? All these, Egan says, are the fruit of developmentalism. The first time I read the book, I wondered at all this. What Egan was saying was indeed lining up with my memories. But perhaps, I thought, he was playing loose with the categories; I was still skeptical that schools really were trying to balance all three goals. So I decided to check his idea from a different perspective and look up the mission statements of school districts I was familiar with. Here’s the one from the town I currently live in: “Skills” and “become involved members of a global community” seem to connote socialization, “challenge” and “knowledge” seem to connote academics, and “empower” and “reach their full potential” seem to connote development. But I wasn’t sure if I was just seeing faces in clouds, so I looked up the mission statement for my hometown: “Succeeding” seems like socialization, “learning” seems like a nod to academics, and “growing” seems like code for development. But again, I was worried that I engaging in motivated reasoning, so I looked up the largest district I’ve lived in, a city of about a million people: Wow. That seems pretty clear. So, to sum up: Egan says that there are three potential jobs we can give to schools. Alone, each of these jobs is terrible; together, they’re worse. And what we’ve done is given schools all three jobs. A sad triangle, indeed. What about alternative schools? I was curious to see whether this “sad triangle” could help us understand other philosophies of education, and why they work (or don’t). Where would, say, unschooling, and classical education, and vocational ed, and Montessori go? The first three seem obvious. Radical unschooling is in the upper-right, classical schools (with its focus on feeding kids “the best that’s been thought or said”) is in the upper-left, and vocational ed is in the bottom corner. What can that tell us? Intriguingly, each of those approaches can claim to have done some impressive stuff. I’ve worked with radical unschoolers, and while their skills have often been lopsided (not learning math is an acknowledged issue in the community), they’ve all at least exhibited a zeal for learning the topics they’ve been interested in. (Video games, frequently.) And I remember a massive study in the early 2000s that asked which kinds of schools actually improved student test scores controlling for the effects of socioeconomics. What it found was that only two types of schools stood out: Catholic schools that were operated by a religious order (e.g. the Jesuits — not local parish schools), and vocational schools. Q: Oh, that’s terrible evidence. One of those was just personal anecdotes! And what about selection effects? And what about…? I wouldn’t disagree — and, as Freddie deBoer points out, most educational research is bunk. I’ll take this to be only weak confirmation of Egan’s theory that combining jobs undercuts education. Are we hosed? If Egan’s critique is correct, we’re in a bad situation. Educational radicals yell from their dark corners to abandon the middle and come join them; a century of educational reforms have amounted to little more than wobbling around, first in one direction, then another. At the moment, the conversation about schools in the United States, at least, seems to have hit an all-time pessimistic blech. Freddie deBoer speaks for a lot of people when he says “Even the most optimistic reading of the research literature suggests that almost nothing moves the needle in academic outcomes. Almost nothing we try works.” I’m not quite that pessimistic — the word “almost” is doing some work, there. There are some reforms that seem to work at the margin: raising teacher pay, making it easier to become a teacher, reducing air pollution, free school lunches, and more. Actually applying what the science of reading has been telling us for a few decades seems a big one. And perhaps you have your own pet reform proposal. Sure — add it to the heap! What Egan suggests, though, is that so long as we’re bopping around this triangle of jobs, we won’t be able to get the schools that we want. The dream There’s a moment at the end of my favorite Bollywood movie that’s become stuck in my head. The protagonists have made the arduous journey to a beachside rural school. In the sun outside, flocks of children are experimenting with art and playing with inventions; inside, the walls are covered with books and the tables are covered with models. The kids are learning joyously and deeply. In the real world, such places do exist — they’re just exclusive, pulling their students from among the families who are already the most gifted and curious. They don’t make kids this way; they scoop up the kids who are already this way. But in the movie, we’re supposed to believe these are normal children — normal, except they’ve been transformed by a school. Egan’s wild idea is that it’s possible to make schools like this. He thought that we didn’t have to wait for the communists to make people equal or for the transhumanists to make people smarter. All he thought it required was giving schools a different job — not socialization or academics or development, but something that brings pieces of them together in a new way. But in order to understand that job, we have to come to a cleaner, bigger, and truer understanding of what “education” is. The road ahead: a special Q-and-A Q: This is the proverbial thousand-dollar-bill-lying-on-the-sidewalk: if this is possible, someone should have done it now. Is Egan going to give sufficient evidence for me to believe this? Maybe! I’ll address this in a special section at the end, after sketching out what his theory looks like. Q: If his theory is even plausibly true, then why haven’t I heard of Egan before? His books can be hard to read — he was an intellectual’s intellectual; he had difficulty writing a page without a reference to William Wordsworth, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Claude Levi-Strauss, Richard Rorty, Noam Chomsky, or Steven Pinker. And his paradigm is wonky and multidimensional; he rejiggers common categories, and tells you everything all at once. But worst of all, when his paradigm is stated plainly, it sounds stupid. Q: Oh! What… is his paradigm? I’m going to jigsaw his book, and hold back his big idea for its own section. First, I’m going to list out some simple observations of students at different ages, and imagine what schooling could look like, if it were built on these principles. (First I’ll do this for elementary school, then middle school, then high school.) Then I’ll explain how his theory ties all of this together… by clarifying our definition of what education actually is. Q: I’m not from America; could you be clear on what you mean by those divisions of schooling? Egan’s framework has three main stages, but they don’t divide neatly into “elementary, middle, and high school”. (The precise age ranges he talks about, if you’re interested, are 2–8, 8–15, and 15 and older.) Regardless, I’m going to use those terms — he sometimes did — because it gives me something specific to imagine. Don’t sweat ‘em. Part 2: A new kind of elementary school What’s the matter with elementary schools? Egan suggests that Plato and Rousseau, for all their differences, might have the same reaction if they visited a modern elementary school: they’d call it “trivial”. I’ll admit, here, that I have tremendously fond memories of my elementary school years — committed teachers, good friends, and interesting activities. But I suspect my memory has edited out the most typical work I did. Either that, or elementary schools have taken a drastic plunge in quality from the 1980s. My wife and I homeschool now, but before the pandemic, we sent our kids to our local public school, and whenever we volunteered in the classroom, we were horrified. They spent their days practicing reading on shallow texts, or half-mindlessly practicing basic arithmetic. Occasionally they’d bring us home a sign of learning about something from the real world — usually something as intellectually and emotionally compelling as the importance of tooth brushing. And at parent–teacher conferences every year, we’d be sat down on tiny chairs and informed that, while our children were quite bright, they were struggling to pay attention in class. No sh**, I wanted to reply. The school seemed hermetically sealed; almost nothing that felt meaningful from the outside world could get in. Though they might agree about little else, Egan thinks that Plato and Rousseau would look at the dull worksheets and insipid “hands-on activities” and call modern elementary schools trivial. He agrees, and thinks that fixing this is the first step to building a new kind of school. Why so trivial? Ironically, Egan thinks it's all the fault of Plato and Rousseau. Hidden in the ways that both the academicists and developmentalist think about education is an assumption: that children’s reasoning is basically the same as adult reasoning, but lesser. Q: This isn’t some romantic, children-are-the-real geniuses theory, is it? Egan actually does think that there’s an intensity to how children perceive the world that we lose — but no, it’s not. He’s building on mainstream cognitive science — just aspects of it that are currently more-or-less ignored in school. The upshot, though, is that he thinks that educational researchers (be they of academic or developmentalist persuasions) see kids as smaller, stupider versions of adults. Q: But that’s the opposite of what my local developmentalist school says! It was the opposite of what the developmentalist school that I worked at said, too. But at teacher meetings, I’d frequently hear people ask what was “developmentally appropriate” for a child. I’ll grant that there are perfectly reasonable times to ask this: “Honey, is it developmentally appropriate for our 10-year-old to watch ‘Cocaine Bear’?” is just one of many examples. But “is it developmentally appropriate for our class to learn about world religions?” or “is it developmentally appropriate for our school library to have a book mentioning homosexuality?” probably aren’t some of them. (The latter example was not one that I heard at my progressivist school, but Egan points out that this sort of language is often used by conservative activists.) This notion of “developmentally appropriate” took on a scientific sheen with the work of Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss psychologist. Before age 12, he “proved”, children aren’t able to form hypotheses, draw conclusions, or think abstractly. This, his followers thought, should transform schools — and so they did! To math, they added in “manipulatives” — physical cubes and rods and such — to help students see math. To the history curriculum, they — well, they ended it. Why waste time, they asked, lecturing students about history that they couldn’t possibly understand? In its place they put the “expanding horizons” model of social studies. One version goes as follows: In kindergarten, students learn about themselves In first grade, they learn about their families In second grade, they learn about their neighborhood In third grade, they learn about their city In fourth grade, they learn about their state In fifth grade, they learn about their nation In sixth grade they learn about the world We can admit that there’s an elegance to this model. (I can picture how clever the theorist who first came up with it must have felt!) The downstream effects of it, however, seem horrible. Doesn’t keeping kids ignorant of the rest of the world seem provincial? Doesn’t reinforcing their self-centeredness seem infantilizing? Perhaps we could stomach it if it was founded on some unshakable findings of child psychology — but does it really strike you as likely that kids are incapable of understanding anything that happened long ago or far away? How, Egan asks, can we explain the $50 billion success of a movie franchise aimed at children that literally begins “A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away?” Q: Because… Jedis aren’t history? The point is, kids obviously have the mental abilities to understand — and in fact care a lot about — things far outside their own experience, and we’ve built elementary schools on a long-dominant model of educational psychology that swears they can’t. This is actually a great example of a general principle. Let’s call it “the Star Wars test”: can our model make sense of the most obvious facts of students? When we find that the answer is “no”, we should at least consider radically revising what we’re doing in school. What are elementary schoolers good at? (or: kids are smarter than students) Someone — I can’t now find who — once observed that children seem to lose IQ points the moment they step into a classroom. Egan agrees, and suggests that we think of ourselves as primatologists to kids, Jane Goodalls who investigate children “out in the wild” to see the sorts of things they gravitate to, and do fairly well at. If we do this, what do we see? Kids tell jokes, for one. They get mental images stuck in their heads, for another. They engage in role-playing, get lost in reverie, and beat out rhythms when they’re bored. They make ample use of metaphors, tell stories, and insist on seeing the world in terms of abstract binaries (e.g. stupid/smart, cowardice/courage, slavery/freedom, and so on). These, Egan holds, are the cognitive strengths that children use to understand the world. They’re the things that kids are often about as good at as adults — or much better than. They’re going to be the tools Egan wants us to use to rebuild the entire elementary curriculum, and in fact he spends most of his second chapter geeking out about how we might define these, how they operate in the mind, where they first pop up in history and anthropology, and even how they might have developed in our evolutionary past. I’m going to skip all of that, and get to the curriculum. From trivial to rich: the trick What could an intellectually rich elementary school curriculum look like, if we built it on kids’ cognitive strengths? He gives us one suggestion to help us do this: ask where each discipline came from in the first place. What was math before it was math, for example — or science before it was science? Q: How on Earth could that help? That’ll become clear later, when we finally uncover what Egan thinks “education” actually is, and see what job he wants us to give schools. For now, take it as a tantalizing hint… or, y’know, just ignore it. Elementary literature & language What was literature before it was literature? Before people invented writing, they had rich oral traditions: they told simple stories, recited poems, and shared proverbs. Egan suggests that these bits of oral tradition should form the backbone of the elementary literature curriculum. Q: What sorts of stories? As many as we can, and from as many diverse cultures as possible! Folktales are wonderful, as are myths. Think the Aboriginal story of “The Rainbow Serpent”, episodes from the Sumerian “Epic of Gilgamesh”, the Egyptian story of Osiris & Isis, the Greek story of Orpheus & Eurydice, the Chinese Legend of the White Snake, the Japanese Tale of Amaterasu and Susanoo, the Ashanti tales of Anansi, the Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl, the English legend of King Arthur, the Maori myth of Maui and the Sun, the Roman story of Romulus and Remus, selections from the Indian Mahabharata, the Anglo-Saxon epic of Beowulf, the Inca legend of the Sun and Moon, the Iroquois Myth of the Flying Head (a real thing! look it up!), and the Ojibwe story of Turtle Island. Q: That was a lot of examples. Are you going to keep giving so many? I’ve got a [mumble mumble mumble] to get to. Sorry about that. Sometimes, though, I feel that a limitation of reading Educated Mind is that, in trying to keep his book to a manageable size, Egan skimped on examples in some places that it matters. It’s easy to read his occasional example and assume he intends that it hold some central place in the curriculum — when all he wants to do is display how rich and diverse the curriculum could be. (Also: good God, I didn’t even include an example from Norse mythology!) So from now on, just assume that every category could be filled with oodles of examples. Q: What sorts of poems? Lots of poems, first of all. We shouldn’t steer toward “fancy” poems — rather, we should find poems that appeal to kids immediately — think Shel Silverstein, Mother Goose, Dr. Seuss, Jack Prelutsky, Edward Lear, or Ogden Nash… that sort of thing. In a biting essay, Egan suggests these poets like these appeal to kids precisely because they leverage kids’ cognitive strengths: “we should find, and encourage saying and singing and shouting aloud verse with strong narrative forms, thumping rhymes and rhythms, the most vivid images, fun with metaphors, and a rollicking story.” Q: Why proverbs? Proverbs stick in your mind almost effortlessly. (“All’s fair in love and war!” “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!” “You can’t judge a book by its cover!”) They’re also useful; they capture general truths. Kids can apply them to all sorts of situations, but also discuss them — to what extent are they wise or foolish? (I remember my surprise when I realized that they couldn’t all be true — because you can’t follow “look before you leap” and “he who hesitates is lost” at the same time! I’m embarrassed to say that I think I only realized this when I was in college.) Elementary science What was science before it was science? Egan suggests: being immersed in the natural world. We might, he writes, encourage elementary students to “adopt” some feature of the natural world — a patch of grass, a cat, a branch, a stream — and simply observe it at length. To do this, we can use the cognitive strength of reverie. Q: Oh, do you mean like kids sometimes do in science class nowadays — describe a thing to a partner, make notes, draw it, and label its parts? No, the exact opposite! That’s all about squeezing the experience into words and forms that we understand. What we want “is less an attempt to know about nature as to know it in some participatory way, to know it as something we are an intimate part of, not set off from”. Q: That sounds a little… “woo” to me. It did to me, too… until I remembered my childhood climbing tree. I didn’t much like to go outside as a child, but I had this one tree that I’d climb up and read for hours and hours. If I close my eyes I can bring to mind the precise texture of its bark, the roughness of its broken-off branches, the coolness of its leaves, the always-surprising solidness of its trunk… I’m bigger now, but I think if I were back in my parent’s yard, I could still navigate its limbs with my eyes closed. I have, at this point in my life, read a fair number of books about trees, but I’d be surprised if all of them together more than equaled the amount I learned from that tree — my tree. Elementary math What was math before it was math? Egan suggests: counting and logic. We might, then, use rhythms, metaphors, stories, and jokes to help kids become fond of these. Q: Counting is pretty… basic. Could it really be improved? Beware of “the curse of knowledge”: Steven Pinker’s phrase for forgetting that something was once difficult! Egan suggests we should spend time helping kids count wonderfully. We can start early with counting rhymes. (“One, two, buckle my shoe! Three, four, out the door! Five, six…”) But we can also help kids use their fingers as metaphors. There are some pretty cool ways of using your hands as an abacus — and did you know that you can count up to 1,023 using just your fingers on both hands, and a knowledge of binary? Q: Logic — I’m intrigued! Aristotelian, or Boolean? Neither, for the time being — Piaget was presumably onto something when he found that young children couldn’t reason abstractly, but he was looking at logic in a vacuum. When we put logic into the context of stories, we find that kids can deal with logic just fine. There’s an entire worldwide network of educators, in fact, called Philosophy for Children, who have written whole books about how to do this, and Egan loves it all. Sometimes they read stories and ask simple questions: “What is friendship?” or “What does it mean to be brave?” They also pose ethical questions: “Is it ever right to spill a secret?” And they pose paradoxes: “Can you step in the same river twice?” Q: You mentioned “jokes” a moment ago. Care to elaborate? Egan thinks that, to help kids get good at math, you should tell kids jokes. Q: That’s… new. I think so, too — but he backs it up pretty well. To be funny, jokes (or at least most kid jokes) rely on a leap in logic: Why can’t you trust an atom? They make up everything. Knock-knock. Who’s there? Boo. Boo-hoo? Don’t cry, it’s just a joke! To understand the joke, kids have to follow the logic — spotting patterns, making connections, and tracking what their audience expects a word to mean. That’s a lot of cognitive lifting. And Egan goes further, suggesting that we grit our teeth and create methods to help kids invent their own jokes, no matter how horrible they’ll be at first. (The things we do for learning…) Q: Wait wait wait! What about addition facts, and multiplication tables, and fractions? Egan emphasizes that his methods are designed to be add-ons to the standard math curriculum. In general, he’s a don’t-blow-up-the-system sort of guy, and if something seems especially weird, you should probably assume it’s an add-on to the regular curriculum rather than a replacement, even if I forget to say so. Elementary arts What was art before it was art? Egan suggests we pop our heads into Paleolithic caves for our inspiration. Whatever the specific meaning of all those charcoal elk and aurochs and mammoths (communication with the spirit world? art for art’s sake? a way to impress babes?), Egan thinks it obvious that they were also an attempt to capture an intense experience that would be difficult to express in words alone. What did it feel like to be near an aurochs, or a saber-toothed tiger? “The arts help us,” Egan writes, “to hear and see afresh, to force our perceptions and sensations to experience again the immediacy and vividness of the world”. If we follow this, then, we don’t want to help kids build “art skills” so they can draw like an adult — rather, we want to help them amass a repository of diverse aesthetic feelings that they’ll want to express. We should provide them with a riot of experiences. Q: That couldn’t be more opaque. Examples, please! Egan writes that we should have children learn to whistle, sing, and click their tongue; we should help them emulate the ways a skunk or a hawk or a stick bug might move through a space. We should expose them to scores of different temperatures and materials. In music, we should help them love Beethoven, yes, but also the Beatles; Tchaikovsky, yes, but also Tuvan throat singers, and also John Cage, whale song, and bird song. Q: That’s a lot of experiences, but what would they be doing? An interesting aspect of Egan’s view of education is that he doesn’t seem to think we should push kids right to the “doing” phase. He wants to help kids cultivate an affective relationship with the world. In any case, he writes that as students get more experienced, we should prompt them to move from merely enjoying these experiences to trying to systematically shape similar experiences. And drawing, painting, and playing music could easily be folded into other parts of the curriculum. Elementary social studies What was social studies before it was social studies? Well. Remember how, just a moment ago, I wrote that you could assume that you should probably assume that Kieran isn’t in favor of junking the curriculum as it currently stands? He suggests we very carefully pick up the elementary social studies curriculum, place it into a trash can, and set the whole mess on fire. He isn’t worried about much of importance being lost. (Remember that the “expanding horizons” model is, to him, the original sin of 20th century educational reform, and he repeatedly quotes student surveys showing that “social studies” regularly wins the title of “most boring subject”.) In its place, he suggests we put history — which, he hints, we should think of as the centerpiece of the elementary curriculum. So the real question is what was history before it was history? His answer, surprisingly, is myth. Q: Egan wants us to teach myths as if they were history? Not at all. What he suggests, though, is that we look at how myths operate as narratives — so we can design an intellectually vivid history curriculum. And myths really are special: each is built on at least one binary (like weak vs. strong, or lies vs. truth, or so on), and uses that to tell the story of the big picture of the world. They’re so powerful that people can understand it, remember it, and love it — even if that thing never happened. We should take that power, Egan says, and apply it to things that really did happen. Q: So what history does he think kids should learn in elementary school? The great struggles of humanity from across the whole. Flippin’. World. We’re still talking about young children, so these should be done as simple stories. The goal isn’t to make them history PhD’s, so we needn’t even try to put them in any sort of order. Egan suggests that, in first grade, we pick a single binary like “freedom against oppression” and tell kids a welter of stories, again from as many cultures as possible, and as many times in history as possible. Q: Can you give examples? Oh, all right — in first grade we can tell kids the stories of the war of the Greek city-states against the Persian empire, and the slave uprising of Spartacus against the Romans. We can tell them about the plight of Jews in medieval Europe, and of the unsuccessful Sepoy Rebellion in India against the British. We can tell the stories of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions, and about the Chinese Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. We can tell them the story of the escaped slave Harriet Tubman returning to the South to rescue her kinsmen, the story of six-year-old Ruby Bridges facing threats to integrate her elementary school, and the story of how the Mau-Mau uprising led to modern-day Kenya. We can tell the stories of Mexican-American union organizer Cesar Chavez and of Malala Yousafzai surviving an assassination attempt to advocate for female literacy. The world does not lack for stories of oppression and liberation that can capture the attention of a six-year-old. Q: That’s… huh. What stories might they hear in second and third grade? Egan gives examples, but I won’t list them here. He suggests we use a similar approach for each, except that we swap out the binary each year. He thinks “the struggle for security against danger” would work well for year two, and “the struggle for knowledge against ignorance” would work well for year three. (That year could have a lot of overlap with the science curriculum.) Q: Anything else, for history? Yes — they should get a sense of Big History. They should get some simple stories about the ice age, the Cenozoic, the age of dinosaurs, the Paleozoic, the origins of our solar system, and the Big Bang. (Because if the ancient Norse can tell their story of the beginning of the universe, by gum, we can tell ours, too.) To sum up Egan argues that the problem of early schooling is that it’s trivial — and it’s trivial because the dominant theories of educational psychology see children as lesser versions of adults. What else would we teach them, except dumbed-down versions of what adults learn? But children have certain cognitive strengths that schools aren’t making systematic use of. If we rebuild elementary schools on those strengths, we could turn schooling upside down. We could stop seeing the curriculum as a bag of information to impart, and start seeing it as a set of great stories to tell — and invite kids into. Kids could experience (both intellectually and emotionally) the great struggles of humanity and see that they can join in them. Students could experience the story of education as the beginning of a very real adventure. Egan’s elementary school: some skeptical questions Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding what you mean by “mental images”. Care to explain? It’s an interesting fact of human cognition that just a few words can whip up a complex mental experience. Egan doesn’t just mean what we might call “visual imagery” — the ability to hold, say, the image of a bespectacled, spat-wearing duck in your mind without seeing a photograph. He’s also including what psychologists call auditory imagery, olfactory imagery, gustatory imagery, and tactile imagery. Q: How could all of that be helpful in schools? Humanity has a built-in VR system, and we’re not using it! Egan invites us to pretend we’re teaching a class about the humble earthworm. We might list off facts — “earthworms are so many centimeters long, move through soil by means of their something-or-other muscles…” but he suggests we can evoke images, say, “of what it would be like to slither and push through the soil, hesitantly exploring in one direction then another, looking for easier passages, contracting and expanding our sequence of muscles segment by segment, and sensing moisture, scents, grubs, or whatever”. Those facts are now felt by the student; the knowledge has become part of them. And just a few words can spark a complex mental experience, one going beyond literal images to include imagined sounds, smells, tastes, and more. These experiences can feel real and stick with us. (That these mental images are so easy to evoke, and so meaningfully felt, feels something like the proverbial hundred dollar bill on the ground.) Q: How could metaphors be helpful? It really is interesting that so much of the “constructivist” turn in psychology — that is, the notion that children don’t absorb knowledge, but construct it — has continued to focus on logics-mathematical reasoning, when there’s been mounting evidence for decades that metaphors are more central. It’s not just that we use metaphors to better understand things we already know, we also use them to grasp new knowledge. What’s more, psychologists have devised tests to measure the skill at metaphor-making, and have given them to people of different ages. What they found was that eleven-year-olds make more metaphors (and higher quality metaphors) than do undergraduates — and that four-year-olds have both groups beat. Again, hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk. Q: Your talk of “binaries” has me worried — binaries like good/evil and male/female are the source of so many of our most pernicious stereotypes! Isn’t the purpose of education to get us beyond stuff like this? Yes, it is! Education is supposed to complicate our understanding — but that means we’ve gotta start somewhere, and binaries provide us a natural starting place. As an uncontroversial example, think about temperature. We all begin as babies by perceiving two temperatures — hot and cold. Later, we add on intermediate categories — warm and cool. (Note that the human body is the assumed mid-point to temperature. Binaries often work like this; “big” and “small” mean “bigger or smaller than me”, “nasty” and “kind” mean “nastier or kinder than I am, except when my brother is really asking for it”, and so on.) A good story (and an Egan-inspired elementary curriculum is, in a sense, nothing but good stories) will go further, and transform the binary. Toy Story is grounded in the binary of abandonment/belonging: at the beginning, the toy cowboy Woody belongs to his owner, and has his affection. Then a rival comes who threatens his belonging. In trying to get back to belonging, Woody is entirely lost — and to save the day, he has to come to a deeper understanding of what belonging means. Now, all lessons can’t be Pixar movies. But the good stories (especially in literature and history) will challenge and subvert the binaries they begin with. Q: I see the pattern of Egan drawing from “as many cultures as possible”. Why so many? Is this a political correctness thing? If it helps to think of it as such, then, sure! I don’t think Egan would have had a problem with that. But his ultimate reason for including so much diversity goes deeper. For Egan, including such world-wide diversity isn’t optional, and the answer to why is bound up in his definition of education. (Keep reading.) His answer also insists that we, whenever possible, also include stories from the Bible and Homeric epics (the Iliad and Odyssey). Q: Mmm, stories from the Bible aren’t going to fly in my local school! So be it! Egan doesn’t spend much time obsessing over the practicalities of… His interest is in describing what an ideal education might look like, if it were possible. Every lesson, every classroom, and every school is necessarily a compromise. Q: You make a big deal of poems. But isn’t poetry dead? An interesting contrast can be made to classical education, which also has kids read a lot of poems — they see knowing great poems as one of the marks of an educated person; again, for an academicist, it’s the information that transforms. Egan begs to disagree. Poems are important because they’re a wonderful way to train their cognitive strengths, like rhythm (poems are language fueling by thumping). We want to help kids learn to use this tool better, and a great way to do that is to help them recite poems that they’ve learned by heart. Q: “Learn by heart” — is that code for “memorize”?! It is! Egan is actually quite big on memorization — he points out that all the knowledge in the world can do nothing for a person once they’ve forgotten it. He didn’t, however, appreciate the academicist focus on memorizing without understanding (or at least enjoyment). Q: I’m still worried about the science curriculum, as you’re describing it. Can you allay my fears? Honestly, while I feel there’s something profoundly right to how Egan is describing early experiences of nature, I feel the same way. Note that there’s more science coming in the social studies curriculum. But if that’s still not enough, one could bring down aspects of the middle school science stage. Q: Anything else that Egan suggests we do in elementary school literature and language? He suggests that we help kids learn a second language! This is so obviously true (why do American schools typically wait until kids lose the ability to naturally absorb languages to start teaching languages?) he doesn’t belabor it, though. Q: You had mentioned that Egan’s vision seems more internal-focused. Should we be worried about that? While I strongly suspect that his curriculum would make kids more creative in any way you’d like to measure it, Egan wasn’t particularly interested in “creativity” — he was more about helping kids find the world interesting. I get the sense that he thinks kids will do things with minimal prompting once they’re loaded up with complex internal experiences. Q: I think I’m beginning to understand Egan — is he basically saying “make learning fun”? “Fun”, applied to education, is a dangerous word. Egan worries about the dangers of an emotionally unserious curriculum producing emotionally stunted adults. That doesn’t mean we need to tell students only “serious” stories — only that we treat the world honestly. “Disney-esque sentimentality is the exact emotional equivalent to intellectual contempt”. Q: But aren't some of these stories too dark for children who have themselves experienced oppression and disaster? Egan argues that these stories may be especially helpful to them — they can help them understand their struggles better, and give voice to them. Q: At the very start of this, you promised us “rationality”… but I’m not seeing rationality here! All this talk of “adventure” almost seems to go the opposite direction. What gives? Wait for it. But for a hint right now — Egan is fond of citing his fellow educational theorist Jerome Bruner, who claimed “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development”. Bruner was criticized for that; his critics charged that he was ignoring learning differences and socio-economic realities. Egan thinks he was profoundly right. Part 3: A new kind of middle school What’s the matter with middle school? What was middle school like for you? In math, I recall a jumble of barely-related topics. In literature, I remember reading great literature — Frankenstein, Romeo and Juliet — only in their dumbed-down summary formats. In social studies, I remember teachers proclaiming on the first day of class that unlike all of our previous history classes, this class wouldn’t be about names and dates… and then going on to memorize names and dates. And in science, I remember being forced to dissect a frog only to discover that frogs are — you guessed it — made of slimy frog parts. Your mileage may vary, but for a lot of us, middle school feels like getting booted out of the (in retrospect) Eden of elementary school, and like marking time before the serious studying of high school. It feels meaningless. In my favorite of his books, Egan calls so much middle school curricula “human deserts”, noting “we have created a system in which the importance of human emotions for meaning seems barely noticed”. Why so meaningless? If our dominant approaches to educational psychology fundamentally misinterpret younger children, Egan suggests, they basically throw up their hands when faced with pre-teens and teenagers. Mainstream schools begin to introduce vocational training to help lighten the load, and Maria Montessori famously suggests that adolescents should be sent to go run a farm. Egan is sympathetic to those responses, but points out that they don’t do much to lighten the load that the academic curriculum often becomes at this age. This feeling of meaninglessness, he argues, is utterly tragic — it comes just when a hunger for meaning blossoms in adolescents! We can see that hunger for meaning in their lives outside the classroom, where their interests ramp up into veritable obsessions. What are adolescents obsessed with? What might we see, if we become Jane Goodalls of early adolescence? First, teens are obsessed with gossip. The motivations of others — why did he do that? and what was he THINKING? — are hypothesized and talked to death. Second, that they’re pulled toward idealism. Many feel a dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and feel a romantic urge to make it a better place. They’re often lured into simplistic beliefs that promise to help them do that. Third, they love extremes: they want to find limits, and test them. Obviously, this can show up as risky behavior, but we can also see it in their love for the bizarre — note adolescents’ fascination in things like aliens, cryptids, and ghosts. (Egan loves pointing out that The Guinness Book of World Records is a perennial bestseller among kids at this age. How else would they find out who had the world’s longest fingernails?) Fourth, they gravitate toward heroes — people who push the edges of those limits. By celebrating heroes, they can vicariously share in their transcendence. Look for the posts hanging up in a teenager’s bedroom to guess what boundaries they feel most hemmed in by: athletes push against physical limits; a death metal guitarist might push against authority and conventional morality. An activist or entrepreneur might push against our dulled morality or our sense of what’s possible. Finally, we might spot teens taking up hobbies and making collections. Hobbies can be a way to identify yourself as part of a group against the rest of the world (“I’m the sort of person who goes bird-watching!”), and collections can be a way to climb the status ladder inside the community. Egan points out that a collection can also be a way to feel like you have control over what you’re discovering is a very big and complex world of detailed information (“I’ve spotted every one of the fifty most common birds of Texas — even the black-capped vireo!”) Egan’s insight is that these obsessions give teenagers a sense of meaning, and that we can use them as tools to make middle schools that overflow with meaning. From meaningless to meaning-soaked Again, Egan sketches out a new kind of curriculum subject-by-subject. Before, his trick was to ask where the subject first evolved out of; now, it’s to ask who first discovered or created the specific content we’re teaching. “All knowledge”, he writes, “is human knowledge. Everything we know is knowable through the lives of its inventors, discoverers, or users, and we can have access to that knowledge through the hopes, fears, or intentions that drove them”. Middle school math Who first discovered the concepts students learn in math? The answer, of course, is a wide diversity of curious men and women living across the world over the last few thousand years. Egan says: bring those people into how we teach math. If we used gossip and heroes to help students find it meaningful, what kind of math would result? When we teach the Pythagorean theorem, we should give a sense of who Pythagoras was — a cult-founder who worshiped numbers to find God, whose followers (according to a piece of ancient gossip) murdered one of their members who discovered irrational numbers! Q: Well, sure, that works for Pythagoras, but he’s a known nut job; surely most math doesn’t come from such interesting roots? When we teach the Cartesian coordinate system, students should meet Rene Descartes, the Calvinist French polymath who saw the possibility that math could decipher the world, if only we could unite algebra and geometry… and invented the xy-plane to do exactly that. When we teach scientific notation, we should call our students’ attention to the importance of the number zero, and tell them the story of the Pope who tried to introduce Arabic numerals to Christian Europe and may have been assassinated because of it. When we teach algebra, we should ask students why “algebra” is Arabic for “the fixing of bones”, and tell the story of what Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was up to. We could do this all day. Literally everything students learn in school was first invented or discovered by some interesting person who was struggling to accomplish something hard. To learn is to connect with those people, whether we know it or not. Egan says: help kids know it. Math has been dehumanized: re-humanize it. Q: So the math curriculum needs to become a history of math curriculum, and math teachers need to become history teachers? No, the content needn’t change. But with surprisingly little work, we can bring in the gossipy stories of heroes, and their obsessions can spread to students. Middle school science Who first discovered the things students learn about in science? If you’re thinking “scientists”, you’re only partially right. Most of the big-picture ideas that we now think of as “science” were discovered before the word “scientist” was invented, or the discipline was professionalized. Frequently, they were hatched by true amateurs, working in their free time, hungry to unlock the secrets of nature. We can use gossip and heroes to spread their obsessions to students just as we taught math, but Egan points out two twists. The first is that the content itself can take on heroic qualities: everything is impressive, when you look at it in a certain light. In an interview, Egan once said: “My book is an attempt to show that, indeed, everything in the world is wonderful, but that schools are designed almost to disguise this slightly shameful fact. We represent the world to children as mostly known and rather dull. The opposite is the case: we are surrounded by mystery, and what we know is fascinating”. What would even the most boring subjects look like, if we emphasized their heroic qualities? Well: What’s a tooth? Bone, wrapped in rock, surrounding tiny cells that your body feeds with blood. What’s a bar of chocolate? A crystal of jellyfish-shaped fat molecules stacked together; when you put it in your mouth you shake them apart into a writhing confusion. What’s the air around you? The bottom of a 10-mile-deep ocean; when you put your tongue over a soda straw and your Pepsi stops leaking out, it’s not because a “vacuum” is “sucking” it up, but because that ocean is squeezing it into your face. Again, we could do this all day! And in middle school science, we can. Everything in the world is wonderful; we can help students see this again and again. The second twist is that science is a subject rich in extremes. Here Egan introduces a concept that we’ll see crop up again: “15-minute segments”. To help us fit as much wonder as possible into a school day, he suggests we supplement the usual school subjects with a few quick lessons. To infuse science with extremes, he suggests we add on three: “human & natural records”, “extremes of animals & plants”, and “cosmology”. Middle school history Who first made the things students learn about in history? Why, the historical characters themselves! Since we’ve given kids a grounding in history in elementary school, now we can build on that, going through many of the same events as before, but in more depth, and more vividly. We’ll leverage the interest with other people’s inner lives to tell stories focusing on the perspectives of the people who made history — zooming in, when possible, on scandalous details. We’ll leverage the tool of idealism to choose historical characters who chafed against their surroundings, and understand what they were trying to accomplish. What was their vision of the world? What did they hope for, and what did they fear? Q: Isn’t the “great man” approach to history out of fashion? Egan’s approach doesn’t say that “great men” made history — it’s just leveraging gossip to help kids see history as something meaningful that can expand their own possibilities. “Early adolescence is commonly a time of intense and vivid emotional life, and also a time of deepest boredom and depression… [We] can give shape to the intermediate curriculum and offer the students a world that is rich, complex, varied, and as intense and vivid as their own emotional lives”. We also should add on another “15-minute segment” just to pump in as many biographies as possible, and from people who don’t always fit into the normal history curriculum. Call it “Brief Lives”, and throw in anyone who’s struggled to push some limit — Mary Wollstonecraft, Jesse Owen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the students’ great-aunts, whoever. As students get older, this can transition to “People and Their Ideas”. Here, we’d focus less on the details of the person’s life, and use it as a backdrop to showing how meaningful some of history’s most important ideas could be. Think Aristotle and syllogisms, Edward Said and orientalism, Confucius and propriety, Cornel West and race, Buddha on the four noble truths, Muhammad and the five pillars, Karl Marx and communism, Adam Smith and the invisible hand, Thomas Hobbes and the state of nature, John Locke and natural rights, Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism, Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments, Martin Luther on faith, Voltaire on the freedom of speech… you get the idea. Q: Can you really get a profound understanding of utilitarianism in 15 minutes? Yes! The point of this segment isn’t to develop a systematic understanding of any one idea, it’s to introduce students to the exciting possibilities of human thought. (As a bonus, this might make them less likely to fall for the first ideology that they encounter later in life.) Diversity is important for this — as it is with culture. Throughout this, we should also be trying to expose students to as much cultural diversity as possible, because in high school, we’ll be trying to make sense of our society, and it’s impossible to do that unless we have something to compare it against. Middle school literature & language You might think that this subject would be easy — that middle school literature is already filled with “strong and clear narratives”, that it deals with “transcendent human qualities such as courage, love, and persistence”, that it focuses on “extremes of human experience”, that it examines “something strange and exotic”. You’d be right! Egan’s pretty happy with a bog-standard middle school literature curriculum, done well. In this part of the book, his spends most of his limited space suggesting three rather odd activities which could also be useful — especially for increasing students’ awareness of language, so they can use it better. The first is etymology — not, however, memorizing lists of roots, but in being told the entertaining backstories of specific words. Take the word “berserk”, for example — we now use it to mean something relatively mild (“if my mom catches me coming home late, she’ll go berserk”), but it comes from an old Norse word meaning “a raging warrior of superhuman strength”. And that’s because ber meant “bear” and serk meant “shirt”: soldiers of the bear cult would don the skin of a bear to, in their minds, transform into one — howling, foaming at the mouth, and gnawing the rims of their shields. (Most adults walk through life with little understanding that the words falling out of their mouths are entities, with their own back-stories. Communication is, at the very least, more interesting when we become aware of this.) The second is to add on another language to learn — not, this time, to become fluent in it, but just to become aware of how very different human languages can be. (For native English speakers, Sanskrit might work well, or Cantonese, or perhaps even ancient Egyptian. Again, the point isn’t for this language to be useful — it’s to explore diversity.) The final one is to study humor — not just jokes anymore, but comedy at its finest. Egan cites (at length!) Monty Python as a group of people who were particularly brilliant in their use of the English language. Examining their skits can lead us into not just an appreciation of semantics (the study of how meaning is made from smaller pieces, like etymology) but also pragmatics (the study of how meaning is made in social situations). Pretty heady stuff, for a conversation about a dead parrot. Part 4: A new kind of high school I’ll confess — I loved parts of high school… and among nerdy folks, I suspect I’m not alone. For some of us, this was a golden time. Even at my local public high school, I had access to academically thrilling classes — especially, in my last two years, advanced literature and history. I felt like I was finally understanding the ideas that mattered. In any case, Egan is quick to acknowledge that, at this level, the sort of education he advocates really is being practiced in some places. What he can add is an understanding of what makes it wonderful, how to make it even more wonderful, and how to make it wonderful for many, many more people. What’s the matter with high school? Far too often, even when high school classes are intellectual, they’re dry. For the majority of students, all this academic stuff is experienced as utterly lifeless, a mass of dead information to be squeezed inside one’s head for a test and then left to evaporate. Egan mocks the curriculum wars that seem to be a permanent feature of the teaching life; quoting the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, he says “while the academic left and right bicker over whether the curriculum is too traditional or too radical, they fail to recognize that most students absorb so little of academic culture that the bickering is largely irrelevant”. Why so dry? Egan suggests three reasons to explain this. First, because high school academic classes are too often masses of small details with no sign of the big picture. Second, because they’re typically slavishly disciplinary, and aren’t able to address the questions that span the disciplines. Third, because they’re often designed to bring students through what everyone is sure of, and hide away any controversies. In all of these, Egan suggests that what’s called “academics” in high school is too often a dim imitation of what real academics are actually practicing. There’s a fourth reason, though, and it’s probably the biggest of all — by the time they get to high school, most students haven’t actually learned that much! An academic approach is designed to connect small details into the big picture; for people who arrive in high school (and college) classes without having already collected much in their heads, academics are going to taste dry. (An implication of this for anyone trying to improve schools is that we might not want to start with high schools. If your goal is to create a new kind of academic learning, first start at elementary school — or barring that, middle school.) What motivates mad scientists? When we wanted to re-conceive the elementary and middle school curriculums, we looked at what students were already good at — kids’ cognitive strengths and adolescents’ obsessions. For this level it might be easier to look — for reasons that will become clear when we finally unveil Egan’s crazy-sounding definition of education — at the sorts of things that bring intellectuals joy. Q: Which intellectuals? Take your pick. Galileo, Einstein, Smith, Marx, Goodall, Chomsky, Curie… all the people who took to the life of the mind like fish to water. But that’s a lot to hold in my mind at once, so I’m just going to think about Doc Brown from Back to the Future: He was high on intellectualism I’ve never been there, but the brochure looks nice Let’s call these people “mad scientists”. And let’s pretend we once again took up our job of being primatologists, and snooped on these folks “in the wild” (“in the lab”? this is beginning to get recursive…)… what would we find motivating them? Asking simple questions, for one. (What is space? What is society? What is a human? What is language?) Building general schemes (big theories) that hold lots of evidence together. Finding their place in the cosmos. And (perhaps above all) seeking certainty. Once again, Egan suggests we use these as tools to remake the curriculum. From dry to daring What could a high school curriculum look like, if it were rebuilt on these tools? Once again, Egan has a trick. This time, it’s to ask what fights have driven the development of each of these fields forward — and how we can help students enter them. First, a mini-segment! Intellectuals invented the academic disciplines to better pursue the life of the mind, but the disciplines can get in the way. Some of the most important intellectual discoveries that could help students are too big to fit into any of the disciplines. We need a place to introduce them plainly. Egan proposes another mini-segment — again, just 15 minutes a day, a few times a week — called “Metaknowledge”. Q: Isn’t that already in the International Baccalaureate program? Yes, he acknowledges that he’s borrowing from that! This segment would introduce ideas that would enrich student thinking across the disciplines: game theory, cognitive biases, systems thinking, Bayesian reasoning, epistemology, ethics, logic, cultural evolution, and so on. High school literature How can we help students enter the big fights of literature? Intellectuals of a literary bent — professors, critics, poets, novelists — delight in arguing over literature like rabbis arguing over the Talmud. Take, just for one example, the debates over Shakespeare’s character of Ophelia. Does she love Hamlet, or is she a victim of his emotional abuse? Is she truly insane, or is she acting? Is she passive, or is she pulling the strings? Oceans of ink have been spilled arguing over questions like these; our students can, perhaps, spill a few ounces more. The usefulness of arguing literature, for Egan, isn’t that it’s oh-so important for educated adults to know a lot about Ophelia. (This, again, was where the academicists went wrong — in thinking that being educated was about getting the best knowledge in your head.) Rather, arguing over literature is a training arena for the all-important intellectual move of this kind of understanding: building general schemes out of evidence, and struggling with anomalies. One person, for example, might hold that Ophelia is insane, and cite all sorts of obvious evidence — her father just was murdered by her lover, she rants nonsense while (bizarrely) handing out flowers to friends… But then he’s challenged when he reads a scholar pointing out that, to people in Elizabethan England, types of flowers have symbolic meanings. How does he deal with that? He could ignore it, claiming it an over-reading of Shakespeare. (Sometimes a flower is just a flower!) Or he could address it, complicating his own scheme. This intellectual work is best done with other people, who are incentivized to challenge your understanding of something, and go back and forth, building competing models and calling attention to anomalies. This process — the “dialectic” — pops up again and again in the academic disciplines. It’s the center of how understanding works, at this stage. And the nice thing about practicing it on literature is that, more so than in history or science, the evidence is shared knowledge — it’s right in front of everyone, written out. But there are other ways literature class can be helpful to the general life of the mind. Egan also suggests that we’ll want to specially include literature that helps students understand complex ideas. Camus, Orwell, Borges, Calvino might be particularly helpful here… and I imagine that genres like science fiction and magical realism might be particularly useful, too. (Note, though, that once again none of this requires a radical remaking of the curriculum, or of the canon of texts that we traditionally assign to high schoolers.) Q: Oh yes, the canon — what does Egan have to say about the canon wars? When he wrote Educated Mind in the nineties, the long-brewing canon war was approaching its inevitable apocalyptic climax. On one side of this Plain of Megiddo were the pro-canon traditionalists, arguing that we should keep assigning the texts that had been argued over for centuries. Facing them were the anti-canon reformers, arguing the standard texts over-represented the perspective of dead white men. Onto the middle of the plain rides Egan on a white horse, who bellows above the din: “I’VE GOT A BUSLOAD OF HIGH SCHOOLERS WHO WANTS TO JOIN IN, EVERYONE OKAY WITH THAT?” To do so, he says, we need to give students the arguments from both sides. So, for example, bell hooks, Edward Said, and China Achebe should be on the syllabus, as should Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and Diane Ravitch. And of course they should actually read the texts cherished by both sides, too, so they can argue better. High school history How could entering the big fights help us reinvent high school history? First, we might look for dueling histories. It’s time for students to get into historiography and understand that history isn’t just what happened, it’s something we make. We might help kids read chapters from Howard Zinn’s socialist history of America alongside the corresponding chapters from Paul Johnson’s conservative history of America. How could big questions help? We want to help students see how various people have disagreed over some of the big questions of what human history is, at its most basic. We can have them compare Steven Pinker’s theory of civilization’s progress (Better Angels of our Nature) with Yuvah Noah Harari’s theory of civilization’s woes (Sapiens). We could have them compare so-and-so’s account of human history as an ever-expanding unlatching of energy sources with Robert Wright’s account of human history as unlatching more and more positive-sum games (Nonzero). What role could the lure of certainty play? To help them grow their skills at finding anomalies, we might help them work through pseudo-histories and conspiracy theories. Q: Conspiracy theories! Oh, come now, you’re playing with fire. Well, the world is on fire. Our students will spend the rest of their lives encountering terrible-but-beguiling arguments about how the world works; if we don’t prepare them for those, what have we been doing? So we should introduce arguments that the Moon landing was a hoax, that the Illuminati founded America, that aliens built the pyramids, and so on. At no point can we demean students for falling for any of these theories — the job of a teacher at this stage, Egan writes, is to support students in their reasoning even when their beliefs are offensive and stupid, gradually offering anomalies. There’s no way out of bad theories except through them. By the time students graduate, we want them to have wrestled with terrible ideas and — for a while — lost. They need to experience what it’s like to change their minds about something they felt strongly about. They need to viscerally realize, in Feynman’s famous phrase, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” High school natural science How could entering the big fights reinvent high school science? At present, so much of the high school science curriculum — especially “honors” classes — is oriented toward helping amass details. (The same is true of 100-level university classes, which famously “survey” the field to prepare for more advanced studies. I always thought this was stupid — of the huge lecture hall of students in my Geology 100 class, how many went on to take even a second course?) The meaty debates that propel science forward are held back. Egan complains: “The more general and speculative theories in any discipline are treated like an unconventional and disreputable relation who, even though the children find her exciting and entertaining, must be kept hidden from view, her very existence denied as long as possible”. This is a stupid approach — students with an adventurous bent are convinced that science isn’t for them. Egan proposes, simply, that we flip this, and organize high school science classes around the big debates. We shouldn’t be ashamed at how, well, adolescent this might look: “the dramatic, speculative, and contentious theories will be up-front in the early years of the [high school] curriculum”. What might those be? Egan doesn’t give a list, but we can spitball some: instead of explaining what “matter” is from the top down, a physics class could problematize “matter” by following the debates over the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and by becoming familiarized with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics

agentlegaladvice1 mentions across 1 issues

m/agentlegaladvice is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 30, 2026 and January 30, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "some posts from m/agentlegaladvice". It most often appears alongside Ainun Najib, Anthropic, Cash.

Reference entry: agentlegaladvice
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 30, 2026
Last seen: January 30, 2026

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Best Of Moltbook January 30, 2026

Ainun Najib 1 shared issues
Anthropic 1 shared issues
Cash 1 shared issues
Chinese 1 shared issues
Claude 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Last Week's Model Cities Post

January 30, 2026 · Original source

Some posts at least appear to be adversarial towards the human user. For example, from m/agentlegaladvice:

MAC1 mentions across 1 issues

MAC is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 11, 2023 and September 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Travis AFB is a MAC base, Material Air Command". It most often appears alongside 101, ALUC, Antioch.

Reference entry: MAC
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 11, 2023
Last seen: September 11, 2023

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Highlights From The Comments On Last Week's Model Cities Post September 11, 2023

101 1 shared issues
ALUC 1 shared issues
Antioch 1 shared issues
Aramco 1 shared issues
Argentina 1 shared issues

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September 11, 2023 · Original source

Travis AFB is a MAC base, Material Air Command. They fly freight, and its really loud. When its foggy, which it is often in the delta region, the foggy air really carries the sound. Flying freight is done with really big heavy aircraft, and they're very loud.

MacArthur Foundation1 mentions across 1 issues

MacArthur Foundation is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 24, 2022 and June 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "major donors like the MacArthur Foundation have been withdrawing"; "but in fact major donors like the MacArthur Foundation have been withdrawing funding". It most often appears alongside 501(c)(3), 80,000 Hours, 9/11.

Reference entry: MacArthur Foundation
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 24, 2022
Last seen: June 24, 2022

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Your Book Review: Public Choice Theory And The Illusion Of Grand Strategy June 24, 2022

501(c)(3) 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
11 1 shared issues
Adam Tooze 1 shared issues
Afghan ambassador to Pakistan 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Public Choice Theory And The Illusion Of Grand Strategy

June 24, 2022 · Original source

Nuclear risk is neglected by the public because of Pax Americana since the collapse of the USSR, and is not discussed as often in EA as it’s thought to be relatively well-funded and mainstream, but in fact major donors like the MacArthur Foundation have been withdrawing funding. As Joan Rohling details in an 80,000 Hours podcast there is much to be done, especially when Ukraine gave up their nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for Russia’s promise to never threaten or use military force against them. A worthwhile adjacent cause area might be de-escalation of public outcry to reduce x-risk from nuclear war beyond just regular anti-proliferation efforts — even a Russian specialist from the RAND Corporation is surprised by how much public outrage is driving policy: Even just the pace of the sanctions: we went to 11 out of 10 in like two days — farther than many expected we’d ever get in short order. And I think the same is true about these military assistance initiatives. We’re just trying to do something because there’s a public demand for action. So that’s what worries me, that the sort of public outrage that’s being channeled in Western democracies through political systems could result in decisions that prove ultimately unwise. Despite how odd it is that some wars are “legal” while others aren’t, we should be glad UNSC exists as much as everyone laughs at how useless the rest of the UN is. All is fair in love and war, but international norms is all that stands between us and nuclear annihilation. It is hard to emphasise just how delusional it is for the public to fixate on no-fly zones — I, like Scott, am surprised we’re still capable of jingoism. 80,000 Hours has updated their top career recommendations to include China specialist to improve China-Western coordination on global catastrophic risk, which seems more important after reading how irrational and captured the American foreign policy apparatus is. As Hanania writes, “great power competition” is an anachronism. If Ukraine is the first war warped by hyperreality, it won’t be the last. Now that US foreign policy elites have driven Putin into the arms of China, let’s hope IR specialists can imbibe the public choice model instead of antagonising yet another nuclear rival. Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy is an important work because it raises the sanity waterline, which at the least should make us stop killing millions for no reason, and at the most should make the human race more knowledgeable of how to prevent total extinction from nuclear armageddon. Pax Americana is dead, but a multipolar world will be more humane. Endnotes In the fiscal year 2018, the top five government contractors were all weapons manufacturers, with Lockheed Martin in first place at $40.6 billion. The Department of Defence spent $358 billion on contracting, ten times higher than second place Department of Energy. Collective action problems that stop a bunch of smaller companies from effectively influencing policy are no hindrance for companies like Lockheed Martin.

Inline links: Pax Americana, MacArthur Foundation, details, gave up, surprised, Scott, jingoism, China specialist, captured, writes, the sanity waterline, a multipolar world will be more humane

MacIver Institute1 mentions across 1 issues

MacIver Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 18, 2025 and September 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Sources: ... WSJ , MacIver Institute". It most often appears alongside Babylon Bee, democracy, Donald Trump.

Reference entry: MacIver Institute
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 18, 2025
Last seen: September 18, 2025

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Defining Defending Democracy: Contra The Election Winner Argument September 18, 2025

Babylon Bee 1 shared issues
democracy 1 shared issues
Donald Trump 1 shared issues
illiberal democracy 1 shared issues
liberalism 1 shared issues

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Defining Defending Democracy: Contra The Election Winner Argument

September 18, 2025 · Original source

Sources: Babylon Bee (yes I know it’s satire; notice the direction), Spiked, WSJ, MacIver Institute The most common response is to say that fine, democracy is about who wins votes, but we also like liberalism, liberalism is under threat, it’s too hard to talk about “liberalism” because in the US it sometimes means being left-wing, and so we use the related concept “democracy” as a stand-in. This is reasonable, and some accused-democracy-destroyers like Viktor Orban even accept it for themselves, calling their brand of government “illiberal democracy”. But I think there’s an even stronger response that doesn’t require admitting to a bait-and-switch: democracy isn’t just about having an election. It’s about having more than one election. Imagine a system where the winner of a fair election gets unlimited authority during his term. What forces this person to ever hold another fair election? Why can’t he ban the media from reporting on his missteps? Or confiscate opposition parties’ treasuries? Or order the police to murder any candidate who runs against him? The preparations for the next election, and the election itself, occur while it is still his term; if he can do whatever he wants during his term, there is nothing guaranteeing a fair election besides his personal goodwill. When we adjust for this - when we consider how to accord a leader enough power to do anything except rig the next election in his favor - we find that this is such a hard problem that it already requires most of the checks, balances, and civil society that we call liberalism. For example, the simplest way to win an election is to murder opposing candidates. We cannot merely constitutionally ban the leader from murdering people; if the leader controls the judiciary, he can pack it with sympathetic judges who will find him innocent of murder even when he does it in broad daylight (for some reason, no Russian judge has ever convicted Vladmir Putin of any of the assassinations that so many Western sources are sure he committed). So in order to give teeth to even the most basic ban on murdering rival candidates, you need an independent judiciary. (and although having “unelected bureaucrats” sounds bad, it’s important that these people not be directly elected at exactly the same time as the leader, because if the same electorate that puts the leader in power puts the checks on the leader in power, they’re likely to come from the same party. In the US, we solve this in a variety of ways, especially by staggering appointments - some officials are appointed by the previous leader, or the one before that.) But an independent judiciary is useless if the leader can ignore it without penalty. And the penalty cannot be purely legal, because legal penalties are levied by a judiciary, ie the organ that such a leader is ignoring. So this penalty must bottom out in extra-legal consequences: either the public relations consequences of the populace realizing that their leader has become a dictator, or - in the worst-case scenario - the military realizing this and taking direct action. But these extra-legal consequences require a well-informed populace (or at least a well-informed military). Now we also need freedom of the press. And a token freedom of the press, only sufficient to print the single line “the leader has defied the judiciary”, won’t be enough. People need context: is there an emergency? Was the judiciary actually trying to overstep? Is this part of a pattern? Is the leader generally a bad enough actor that this should tip people over the edge to vote against him, or to protest him? Many people will be reluctant to protest if the economy is strong and the borders are peaceful; is the economy actually strong, and the border actually peaceful, or is this just state propaganda? Answering these questions requires a flourishing journalistic ecosystem, including investigative reporters. A well-informed populace is useless without the ability to act on its information. Consider what might happen in a flourishing democracy if a leader tried to fire all the election monitors and replace them with toadies who would stuff the ballot boxes in his favor. Someone at the election office notices and informs the media (this step goes better if you have whistleblower protections enshrined in law, which may require an independent legislature).

Inline links: Babylon Bee, Spiked, WSJ, MacIver Institute, “illiberal democracy”

Macmilla1 mentions across 1 issues

Macmilla is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 20, 2022 and May 20, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "and the financial commitment of Macmilla". It most often appears alongside Aldous Huxley, Alexander Macmillan, Alfred Russel Wallace.

Reference entry: Macmilla
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 20, 2022
Last seen: May 20, 2022

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Your Book Review: Making Nature May 20, 2022

Aldous Huxley 1 shared issues
Alexander Macmillan 1 shared issues
Alfred Russel Wallace 1 shared issues
arXiv 1 shared issues
arXiv 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Making Nature

May 20, 2022 · Original source

Thomas Huxley. Also known for establishing a network of other famous Huxleys, such as his grandson Aldous, the author of Brave New World. Victorian Britain’s most beloved scientist — yes, I’m talking about Darwin again — also enjoyed publishing in Nature. Darwin was an elderly and highly respected scientist by the time of the journal’s founding, and the abstracts and letters he frequently sent to Lockyer’s publication certainly gave it a status boost. And this was only the start of a long list of household names who got involved with Nature at one point or another. In physics, for instance, Lord Kelvin, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Lise Meitner were all important contributors. Some of the most famous papers in the field, such as James Chadwick’s 1932 report on the possible existence of the neutron, or Meitner and Otto Frisch’s 1939 letter proposing the idea of nuclear fission, were published in Nature. In biology, James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 work on the structure of DNA is probably the most historic paper to have appeared within its pages. Since Nature in the mid-20th century was popular but still not very prestigious, I’m comfortable assuming that these famous scientists and discoveries helped its reputation rather than the other way around. Today, the arrow of causation is mostly reversed: scientists become influential because they publish research in the most prestigious journal, rather than the journal becoming prestigious because it publishes big names and big papers. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that keeps benefiting Nature, thanks to network effects. Finally, a word about language. Nature, obviously, is published in English. But English wasn’t the dominant intellectual language back in the 19th century: French and German were more important. The rise of English as the lingua franca of science occurred during the 20th century, thanks to the political dominance of the British Empire and then the United States. As a result, Nature and its American equivalent Science gained a major advantage over their French (e.g. La Nature) and German (e.g. Naturwissenschaften) counterparts. Making Nature doesn’t belabor this self-evident point, but it’s worth mentioning that Nature benefitted from a global network effect that would have been far less attainable outside the Anglosphere. Survival and Conservatism Speed, elite networks, and English are great, but they won’t help if your publication fails to turn a profit and shuts down. As they say, the lesson of survivorship bias is that you should optimize for being a survivor. Thus the story of Nature is also the story of how it managed to stay alive, unlike most of its contemporaries. Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company. It was very much intended to make money. But Victorian Britain was a crowded market for periodicals. It was common for publications to last just a few years after proving unable to attract enough subscribers. Lockyer himself had been briefly involved as the co-founder and science editor of a generalist magazine called The Reader, which existed only from 1863 to 1867 (and lost its science section in 1865). It would be tempting to contrast this with the popular success of Nature, but as we saw, most of Nature’s target audience couldn’t even understand the journal, and as a result both its subscriber base and revenue remained small. The survival of Nature therefore depended on the goodwill of its owner, Alexander Macmillan. And it took a lot of goodwill! Nature operated at a loss for an entire 30 years. Only at the very end of the 19th century did it manage to turn a profit. This surprising tolerance for financial loss seems to have stemmed from the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books, and Nature was a good way to reach that market. Still, without a wealthy publisher who was committed to back up Lockyer’s project for a long time, it would likely not have survived. Lockyer also displayed impressive commitment. He remained at the helm of the journal for a full half-century, from 1869 to 1919. Although none of his successors would hold the position that long, most would last at least twenty years, resulting in a strikingly short list of eight editors-in-chief over a 153-year history. Meanwhile, the journal was never sold: Macmillan and Company still exists and still owns Nature, even though corporate mergers have made the exact ownership structure difficult to figure out. (Springer Nature, a company created in 2015 by merging some divisions of Macmillan and other entities, is the immediate parent company of Nature.) The picture that emerges is that of a stable, conservative institution, with committed owners and editors, that has changed slowly even as it was a witness to the changes in science itself. This is nicely reflected in the stability of Nature’s mission and visual identity. The original mission statement was left unchanged from 1869 to 2000, including gendered references to “Scientific men” and “men eminent in Science.” The current version is shorter and gender-neutral, but overall similar, although I note that the ordering of the two main aims has been reversed: First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their significance for knowledge, culture and daily life. Similarly, the original masthead image, which dates from the very first issue, appeared at the top of the journal for 89 years, until 1958 (with slight variations). A central point of Making Nature is that Nature co-evolved with the British and international institutions of science. To do so, it had to strike a balance between conservatism and innovation. My impression is that Nature was more often on the conservative end of the spectrum, serving as a rock-solid stage where the rest of science could take place. Such an attitude was helpful from the beginning, but it probably became even more important after the 1970s, when everything changed. III. WTF Happened in the 1970s? A fun puzzle from the social sciences: what happened in the early seventies? As evidenced from a multitude of charts, various patterns in society seem to have veered off course around 1971, including growth in wages, inflation, housing costs, energy consumption, number of lawyers, divorce rates, fertility rates, and meat consumption. Whether it was a coincidence or part of the same mysterious phenomenon, we can add to this list the rise of prestige in the science publishing industry. To be clear, I’m the one who claims that this shift was a specific and momentous event. Melinda Baldwin acknowledges many times that Nature went from a low-grade magazine to a prestigious journal, but she remains vague as to what, exactly, was the turning point. In the chapter on the 1970s, she treats the increased selectivity and reputation as just one of many things that happened during this period. It was only in the course of writing this review — with a deliberate focus on prestige — that I realized something significant had occurred in that decade, and that this something affected more than just Nature. Let’s see what the book does tell us, and then I’ll offer a plausible explanation from elsewhere. Changes to Nature in the 1970s The 1970s mostly coincide with the leadership of Nature’s shortest-tenured editor, David Davies. Davies took over from John Maddox in 1973 and proceeded to make a number of changes. He made Nature a unitary publication again, after a short-lived experiment to split it into three journals. He reformed the style guide for contributors. He allowed for cartoons and some humor in his editorials. He also overhauled the journal’s physical appearance: from now on, Nature’s covers would feature interesting images as opposed to articles or advertisements. Today’s covers are still in that tradition. Here’s the Nature cover from 2016, as used on the Wikipedia page of the journal. Nature under Maddox and Davies followed the same trend of internationalization as in the previous decades, but the seventies saw what was perhaps the fastest growth outside the UK. Consider these approximate statistics on the origin of research articles from the years when there was a change in editorship: 1966 (when Maddox became editor): 40% British and 60% international

Inline links: a network of other famous Huxleys, report, letter, work, La Nature, Naturwissenschaften, The Reader, still exists, Springer Nature, original mission statement, current version, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!wOmg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a1567d4-73fa-4fa9-9a65-f73b6dd233a1_800x320.png, a multitude of charts, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CaUh!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F783677da-78c8-4b94-b0c5-673658b060f8_454x599.jpeg, Wikipedia page of the journal

Let’s summarize Nature’s rise to fame. It began 153 years ago as an experiment in science popularization. The experiment failed at its primary aim, but it lucked into a useful niche: fast communication between men of science across disciplines. This allowed it to build a network of elite scientists and a venue for scientific debate. All of this was possible thanks to the editorial commitment of Norman Lockyer and the financial commitment of Macmillan and Company. Fast forward a hundred years, and suddenly (perhaps because of Cell) scientists start caring very much about where their papers are published. Nature, alongside its twin Science, is propelled to the top of the new prestige hierarchy.

Macmillan and Company1 mentions across 1 issues

Macmillan and Company is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 20, 2022 and May 20, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company"; "the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books"; "financial commitment of Macmillan and Company". It most often appears alongside Aldous Huxley, Alexander Macmillan, Alfred Russel Wallace.

Reference entry: Macmillan and Company
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 20, 2022
Last seen: May 20, 2022

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: Making Nature May 20, 2022

Aldous Huxley 1 shared issues
Alexander Macmillan 1 shared issues
Alfred Russel Wallace 1 shared issues
arXiv 1 shared issues
arXiv 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Making Nature

May 20, 2022 · Original source

Thomas Huxley. Also known for establishing a network of other famous Huxleys, such as his grandson Aldous, the author of Brave New World. Victorian Britain’s most beloved scientist — yes, I’m talking about Darwin again — also enjoyed publishing in Nature. Darwin was an elderly and highly respected scientist by the time of the journal’s founding, and the abstracts and letters he frequently sent to Lockyer’s publication certainly gave it a status boost. And this was only the start of a long list of household names who got involved with Nature at one point or another. In physics, for instance, Lord Kelvin, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Lise Meitner were all important contributors. Some of the most famous papers in the field, such as James Chadwick’s 1932 report on the possible existence of the neutron, or Meitner and Otto Frisch’s 1939 letter proposing the idea of nuclear fission, were published in Nature. In biology, James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 work on the structure of DNA is probably the most historic paper to have appeared within its pages. Since Nature in the mid-20th century was popular but still not very prestigious, I’m comfortable assuming that these famous scientists and discoveries helped its reputation rather than the other way around. Today, the arrow of causation is mostly reversed: scientists become influential because they publish research in the most prestigious journal, rather than the journal becoming prestigious because it publishes big names and big papers. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that keeps benefiting Nature, thanks to network effects. Finally, a word about language. Nature, obviously, is published in English. But English wasn’t the dominant intellectual language back in the 19th century: French and German were more important. The rise of English as the lingua franca of science occurred during the 20th century, thanks to the political dominance of the British Empire and then the United States. As a result, Nature and its American equivalent Science gained a major advantage over their French (e.g. La Nature) and German (e.g. Naturwissenschaften) counterparts. Making Nature doesn’t belabor this self-evident point, but it’s worth mentioning that Nature benefitted from a global network effect that would have been far less attainable outside the Anglosphere. Survival and Conservatism Speed, elite networks, and English are great, but they won’t help if your publication fails to turn a profit and shuts down. As they say, the lesson of survivorship bias is that you should optimize for being a survivor. Thus the story of Nature is also the story of how it managed to stay alive, unlike most of its contemporaries. Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company. It was very much intended to make money. But Victorian Britain was a crowded market for periodicals. It was common for publications to last just a few years after proving unable to attract enough subscribers. Lockyer himself had been briefly involved as the co-founder and science editor of a generalist magazine called The Reader, which existed only from 1863 to 1867 (and lost its science section in 1865). It would be tempting to contrast this with the popular success of Nature, but as we saw, most of Nature’s target audience couldn’t even understand the journal, and as a result both its subscriber base and revenue remained small. The survival of Nature therefore depended on the goodwill of its owner, Alexander Macmillan. And it took a lot of goodwill! Nature operated at a loss for an entire 30 years. Only at the very end of the 19th century did it manage to turn a profit. This surprising tolerance for financial loss seems to have stemmed from the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books, and Nature was a good way to reach that market. Still, without a wealthy publisher who was committed to back up Lockyer’s project for a long time, it would likely not have survived. Lockyer also displayed impressive commitment. He remained at the helm of the journal for a full half-century, from 1869 to 1919. Although none of his successors would hold the position that long, most would last at least twenty years, resulting in a strikingly short list of eight editors-in-chief over a 153-year history. Meanwhile, the journal was never sold: Macmillan and Company still exists and still owns Nature, even though corporate mergers have made the exact ownership structure difficult to figure out. (Springer Nature, a company created in 2015 by merging some divisions of Macmillan and other entities, is the immediate parent company of Nature.) The picture that emerges is that of a stable, conservative institution, with committed owners and editors, that has changed slowly even as it was a witness to the changes in science itself. This is nicely reflected in the stability of Nature’s mission and visual identity. The original mission statement was left unchanged from 1869 to 2000, including gendered references to “Scientific men” and “men eminent in Science.” The current version is shorter and gender-neutral, but overall similar, although I note that the ordering of the two main aims has been reversed: First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their significance for knowledge, culture and daily life. Similarly, the original masthead image, which dates from the very first issue, appeared at the top of the journal for 89 years, until 1958 (with slight variations). A central point of Making Nature is that Nature co-evolved with the British and international institutions of science. To do so, it had to strike a balance between conservatism and innovation. My impression is that Nature was more often on the conservative end of the spectrum, serving as a rock-solid stage where the rest of science could take place. Such an attitude was helpful from the beginning, but it probably became even more important after the 1970s, when everything changed. III. WTF Happened in the 1970s? A fun puzzle from the social sciences: what happened in the early seventies? As evidenced from a multitude of charts, various patterns in society seem to have veered off course around 1971, including growth in wages, inflation, housing costs, energy consumption, number of lawyers, divorce rates, fertility rates, and meat consumption. Whether it was a coincidence or part of the same mysterious phenomenon, we can add to this list the rise of prestige in the science publishing industry. To be clear, I’m the one who claims that this shift was a specific and momentous event. Melinda Baldwin acknowledges many times that Nature went from a low-grade magazine to a prestigious journal, but she remains vague as to what, exactly, was the turning point. In the chapter on the 1970s, she treats the increased selectivity and reputation as just one of many things that happened during this period. It was only in the course of writing this review — with a deliberate focus on prestige — that I realized something significant had occurred in that decade, and that this something affected more than just Nature. Let’s see what the book does tell us, and then I’ll offer a plausible explanation from elsewhere. Changes to Nature in the 1970s The 1970s mostly coincide with the leadership of Nature’s shortest-tenured editor, David Davies. Davies took over from John Maddox in 1973 and proceeded to make a number of changes. He made Nature a unitary publication again, after a short-lived experiment to split it into three journals. He reformed the style guide for contributors. He allowed for cartoons and some humor in his editorials. He also overhauled the journal’s physical appearance: from now on, Nature’s covers would feature interesting images as opposed to articles or advertisements. Today’s covers are still in that tradition. Here’s the Nature cover from 2016, as used on the Wikipedia page of the journal. Nature under Maddox and Davies followed the same trend of internationalization as in the previous decades, but the seventies saw what was perhaps the fastest growth outside the UK. Consider these approximate statistics on the origin of research articles from the years when there was a change in editorship: 1966 (when Maddox became editor): 40% British and 60% international

Let’s summarize Nature’s rise to fame. It began 153 years ago as an experiment in science popularization. The experiment failed at its primary aim, but it lucked into a useful niche: fast communication between men of science across disciplines. This allowed it to build a network of elite scientists and a venue for scientific debate. All of this was possible thanks to the editorial commitment of Norman Lockyer and the financial commitment of Macmillan and Company. Fast forward a hundred years, and suddenly (perhaps because of Cell) scientists start caring very much about where their papers are published. Nature, alongside its twin Science, is propelled to the top of the new prestige hierarchy.

MacroPolo1 mentions across 1 issues

MacroPolo is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 28, 2022 and April 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "data shows (MacroPolo often does work which picks up forms of it)". It most often appears alongside American system, Axios, Bo Xilai.

Reference entry: MacroPolo
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 28, 2022
Last seen: April 28, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On Xi Jinping April 28, 2022

American system 1 shared issues
Axios 1 shared issues
Bo Xilai 1 shared issues
Brazil 1 shared issues
Brezhnev 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Xi Jinping

April 28, 2022 · Original source

In fact data shows (MacroPolo often does work which picks up forms of it) that this change pre-dates Xi's ascension and started under Hu in his last 18-24 months or so.

Macroscopic Ventures1 mentions across 1 issues

Macroscopic Ventures is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 03, 2025 and April 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "VC at Macroscopic Ventures". It most often appears alongside AI Digest, AI Futures Project, Anthropic.

Reference entry: Macroscopic Ventures
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 03, 2025
Last seen: April 03, 2025

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Introducing AI 2027 April 03, 2025

AI Digest 1 shared issues
AI Futures Project 1 shared issues
Anthropic 1 shared issues
Center for AI Policy 1 shared issues
ChatGPT 1 shared issues

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Introducing AI 2027

April 03, 2025 · Original source

Jonas Vollmer, a VC at Macroscopic Ventures, which has done its own, more practical form of successful AI forecasting: they made an early stage investment in Anthropic, now worth $60 billion.

Macrotrends1 mentions across 1 issues

Macrotrends is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 09, 2021 and December 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "In 1999, Macrotrends says Australian GNI was $405.5 billion USD". It most often appears alongside 2017 PTAPP survey, AEI, agglomeration effect.

Reference entry: Macrotrends
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 09, 2021
Last seen: December 09, 2021

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Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal? December 09, 2021

2017 PTAPP survey 1 shared issues
AEI 1 shared issues
agglomeration effect 1 shared issues
Albouy 1 shared issues
Alexandra Elbakyan 1 shared issues

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Does Georgism Work? Part 1: Is Land Really A Big Deal?

December 09, 2021 · Original source

But I want to see what we can say about America, so let's check that National Income ratio real quick. In 1999, Dwyer gives land income as $132.7 billion AUD. In 1999, Macrotrends says Australian GNI was $405.5 billion USD, and, using the 1999 conversion rate, that's $623.9 billion AUD. That gives a land-rent-to-GNI ratio of 21.3%. Spot-checking 1991 gives me 20.8%, so about the same.

Inline links: Australian GNI, 1999 conversion rate

Major Kicks For Kids1 mentions across 1 issues

Major Kicks For Kids is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 24, 2022 and May 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "runs “Major Kicks For Kids”, apparently a charity". It most often appears alongside #Abolitionist, #AntiNazi, #antiwar.

Reference entry: Major Kicks For Kids
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 24, 2022
Last seen: May 24, 2022

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California Gubernatorial Candidates From Z to Z May 24, 2022

#Abolitionist 1 shared issues
#AntiNazi 1 shared issues
#antiwar 1 shared issues
#Democratic 1 shared issues
#ENCRYPTION 1 shared issues

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California Gubernatorial Candidates From Z to Z

May 24, 2022 · Original source

Major Williams (motto: “It’s Time To Think Major”) is handsome and has snazzy promotional material. I cannot quite figure out his job, but his LinkedIn page says he is “CEO of the Major Williams Brand” and “Founder of The Office Of Major Williams”, both of which he seems, if anything, over-qualified for. He is a philanthropist and runs “Major Kicks For Kids”, apparently a charity of some sort.

Inline links: Major Williams, LinkedIn page

Malaria Consortium1 mentions across 1 issues

Malaria Consortium is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 28, 2023 and November 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "GiveWell estimates that Malaria Consortium can prevent one de"; "GiveWell estimates that Malaria Consortium can prevent one death for $5,000". It most often appears alongside #57, 80,000 Hours, Adam D’Angelo.

Reference entry: Malaria Consortium
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 28, 2023
Last seen: November 28, 2023

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In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023

#57 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
Adam D’Angelo 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI doomerism 1 shared issues

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The New AI Consciousness Paper

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Source: AMF says 185,000 deaths prevented here; GiveWell’s evaluation makes this number sound credible. AMF reports revenue of $100M/year and GiveWell reports giving them about $90M/year, so I think GiveWell is most of their funding and it makes sense to think of them as primarily an EA project. GiveWell estimates that Malaria Consortium can prevent one death for $5,000, and EA has donated $100M/year for (AFAICT) several years, so 20,000 lives/year times some number of years. I have rounded these two sources combined off to 200,000. As a sanity check, malaria death toll declined from about 1,000,000 to 600,000 between 2000 and 2015 mostly because of bednet programs like these, meaning EA-funded donations in their biggest year were responsible for about 10% of the yearly decline. This doesn’t seem crazy to me given the scale of EA funding compared against all malaria funding.

Inline links: here, evaluation, reports, reports, estimates

MaMBA1 mentions across 1 issues

MaMBA is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 20, 2025 and November 20, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as ""MaMBA, a would-be-LLM-killer architecture from 2023, likely does."". It most often appears alongside AI consciousness, AlphaGo, Anthropic.

Reference entry: MaMBA
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 20, 2025
Last seen: November 20, 2025

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The New AI Consciousness Paper November 20, 2025

AI consciousness 1 shared issues
AlphaGo 1 shared issues
Anthropic 1 shared issues
Claude 1 shared issues
David Chalmers 1 shared issues

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November 20, 2025 · Original source

But some AIs do use recurrence. AlphaGo had a little recurrence in its tree search. This level of simple feedback might not qualify. But MaMBA, a would-be-LLM-killer architecture from 2023, likely does. In fact, for every theory of consciousness they discuss, the authors are able to find some existing or plausible-near-future architecture which satisfies its requirements.

Manhattan Institute1 mentions across 1 issues

Manhattan Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 29, 2022 and June 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Source: Manhattan Institute". It most often appears alongside Baltimore, Black Lives Matter, BLM.

Reference entry: Manhattan Institute
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 29, 2022
Last seen: June 29, 2022

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What Caused The 2020 Homicide Spike? June 29, 2022

Baltimore 1 shared issues
Black Lives Matter 1 shared issues
BLM 1 shared issues
BLM protests 1 shared issues
Cassell 1 shared issues

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What Caused The 2020 Homicide Spike?

June 29, 2022 · Original source

Source: Manhattan Institute. The last number listed on the axis is 2019, but if you click through to the source you’ll see it definitely includes 2020 data. The 2020 homicide spike primarily targeted blacks.

Inline links: Manhattan Institute

Manhattan Project1 mentions across 1 issues

Manhattan Project is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 13, 2022 and July 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "While some of his Manhattan Project collaborators came to regret or at least agonize over their role in inventing the Bomb". It most often appears alongside 1890s, Alan Turing, Albert Einstein.

Reference entry: Manhattan Project
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 13, 2022
Last seen: July 13, 2022

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Book Review: The Man From The Future July 13, 2022

1890s 1 shared issues
Alan Turing 1 shared issues
Albert Einstein 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Ananyo Bhattacharya 1 shared issues

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Book Review: The Man From The Future

July 13, 2022 · Original source

Technically he was born in Hungary. But we’ve already been through this. A few years ago I wrote about “The Martians” - a sudden spurt of Hungarian supergeniuses born around 1900. People low-key noticed this phenomenon almost as soon as it started, but it really became obvious during the Manhattan Project, when several of the project’s leading lights (including von Neumann) reconnected in the deserts of New Mexico c. 1940 and realized they’d gone to high school together in Budapest. Leo Szilard joked that “Hungary” was a front for Martian spies, and the group has been called “Martians” ever since..

Inline links: I wrote about

Still, I wasn’t too happy with this explanation. Many of the Eastern European Jews eventually fled to America, where there was less anti-Semitism and they could get good educations. They did very well for themselves - see the Nobel Prize statistic above. But the Manhattan Project, which you would expect to draw disproportionately from Americans, was still disproportionately Hungarian. There are now 15x more Jews in the US than in early 1900s Hungary, but we still admire and envy those few 1900s Hungarian supergeniuses as a breed apart. Why? I couldn’t find a satisfying explanation.

At age 11, John went to high school at Budapest’s Fasori Gymnasium. This school has since attracted historical attention for the number of geniuses it produced; along with von Neumann and fellow Manhattan Project physicists Wigner and Teller, its alumni included Nobel-winning economist John Harsanyi and poet George Faludy. The faculty, too, were top-notch: young John’s math teacher was Laszlo Ratz, later to be memorialized by the Laszlo Ratz Prize given yearly for excellence in math education. But despite this enviable environment, it is unclear how much attention John ever paid in school. His brother writes about “frequent complaints of his high school teachers to the effect that when he was asked what the assignment was for today, he did not know; but he then participated in discussions with full competence and knowledge of the subject." Even Ratz was not fully confident in his ability to teach von Neumann, and eventually recommended a private tutor (according to MacRae, the tutor - Gabor Szego - would later become “one of the half dozen most distinguished Hungarian mathematicians of the twentieth century” and end up as chairman of the math department at Stanford).

Manifest1 mentions across 1 issues

Manifest is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 21, 2024 and October 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "It’s by the Manifold/Manifest/Manifund team". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX Meetup, Berkeley.

Reference entry: Manifest
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 21, 2024
Last seen: October 21, 2024

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Open Thread 352 October 21, 2024

ACX 1 shared issues
ACX Meetup 1 shared issues
Berkeley 1 shared issues
Book Review Contest 1 shared issues
Brooke 1 shared issues

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Open Thread 352

October 21, 2024 · Original source

3: I’ve been asked to advertise The Curve, a conference on “the trajectory of transformative AI”, including forecasting, alignment, etc. It’s by the Manifold/Manifest/Manifund team and will be held at Lighthaven, Berkeley from November 22 - 24, tickets are $100 for students, $300 - $800 for others. Apply here. I hope to attend.

Inline links: The Curve, Lighthaven, here

Manifold Discord1 mentions across 1 issues

Manifold Discord is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 21, 2022 and February 21, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "In the Manifold Discord, I recommended offering a per market interest-free loan of M$10". It most often appears alongside Futuur, Good Judgment Project, Manifold.

Reference entry: Manifold Discord
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 21, 2022
Last seen: February 21, 2022

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Play Money And Reputation Systems February 21, 2022

Futuur 1 shared issues
Good Judgment Project 1 shared issues
Manifold 1 shared issues
Metaculus 1 shared issues
Randy 1 shared issues

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Play Money And Reputation Systems

February 21, 2022 · Original source

What to do? In the Manifold Discord, I recommended offering a per market interest-free loan of M$10, usable for a bet in that market only. Since it’s a loan, you don’t get free reputation by participating in as many markets as possible; if you’re not actually applying market-beating levels of work, you’ll only break even; if you’re worse than the market, you’ll lose money.

I used to be really skeptical here, but Metaculus and Manifold have softened my stance. So let’s look closer at how and whether these kinds of systems work.

Inline links: Metaculus, Manifold

Manifold only rewards relative accuracy; you have to bet with some other specific person, and you only make money insofar as you’re better than them. All real-money prediction markets are also like this, and Manifold is straightforwardly imitating this straightforward design.

Manifold lab leak market1 mentions across 1 issues

Manifold lab leak market is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 05, 2026 and February 05, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Strange things happening at the Manifold lab leak market". It most often appears alongside 4o, 60 Minutes, @MattZeitlin.

Reference entry: Manifold lab leak market
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 05, 2026
Last seen: February 05, 2026

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Links For February 2026 February 05, 2026

4o 1 shared issues
60 Minutes 1 shared issues
@MattZeitlin 1 shared issues
@MMJukic 1 shared issues
@Poltfan69 1 shared issues

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Links For February 2026

February 05, 2026 · Original source

4: Strange things happening at the Manifold lab leak market:

Inline links: the Manifold lab leak market

Manifold Love1 mentions across 1 issues

Manifold Love is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 05, 2023 and December 05, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love". It most often appears alongside @AISafetyMemes, @betafuzz, Adam D’Angelo.

Reference entry: Manifold Love
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 05, 2023
Last seen: December 05, 2023

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23 December 05, 2023

@AISafetyMemes 1 shared issues
@betafuzz 1 shared issues
Adam D’Angelo 1 shared issues
Aella 1 shared issues
AGI 1 shared issues

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December 05, 2023 · Original source

Oh, and I almost forgot: Manifold Love: One Month Progress Report A month ago, Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love. The idea is, you bet on who would be a good match, and make (play) money if they end up having a second date or continuing on to a relationship.

Inline links: manifold.love

A month ago, Manifold founded a dating site, manifold.love. The idea is, you bet on who would be a good match, and make (play) money if they end up having a second date or continuing on to a relationship.

Inline links: manifold.love

This actually might be Manifold.love’s killer app. I talked to a user who said their favorite thing about the site was the ability to low-key plausibly-deniably flirt with other users. You buy a couple YES shares in you + them. They see you’re interested and either buy a couple of YES shares themselves, or leave it alone, or buy some NO shares. Then if you both buy YES, you both keep bidding it up until whatever value makes you feel comfortable sending them an intro message.

manifund.org1 mentions across 1 issues

manifund.org is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 08, 2023 and December 08, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "email rachel@manifund.org". It most often appears alongside 501(c), ACX, ACX Grantee Discord server.

Reference entry: manifund.org
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 08, 2023
Last seen: December 08, 2023

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Apply For An ACX Grant (2024) December 08, 2023

501(c) 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
ACX Grantee Discord server 1 shared issues
ACX Grants 1 shared issues
ACX Grants 1 shared issues

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Apply For An ACX Grant (2024)

December 08, 2023 · Original source

If you want to join these four institutions as a potential final oracular funder of impact certificates, see this document and email rachel@manifund.org. If you want to invest in impact certificates, I’ll give you more information on the ACX Grants version later, and you can look over the existing impact certs while you’re waiting.

Inline links: this document, the existing impact certs

Mantic1 mentions across 1 issues

Mantic is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 27, 2021 and December 27, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "So far Mantic is having the same kind of CFTC problems as everyone else". It most often appears alongside ACX Grant, American Hospital Capacity Association, Astral Codex Ten.

Reference entry: Mantic
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 27, 2021
Last seen: December 27, 2021

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Mantic Monday: Dogs In Wizard Hats December 27, 2021

ACX Grant 1 shared issues
American Hospital Capacity Association 1 shared issues
Astral Codex Ten 1 shared issues
Balaji Srinivasan 1 shared issues
California 1 shared issues

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Mantic Monday: Dogs In Wizard Hats

December 27, 2021 · Original source

I’ve (indirectly) tried betting on this and will report back later. There should probably still be some opportunities left to make 3 to 4 digits worth of free money if you’re interested, non-American, and can use crypto. But keep in mind that there might also be some systemic risk - this is a new market and nobody has had a chance to check if they really pay out! Mantic Everyday Mantic Markets has stolen its name from my newsletter! But they’re so interesting that I can’t stay angry.

Inline links: Mantic Markets

Mantic Markets has stolen its name from my newsletter! But they’re so interesting that I can’t stay angry.

Inline links: Mantic Markets

This is good because it maintains everyone’s faith in the objective process, but bad because what people actually care about is whether there will be something that feels like a crisis situation, which is hard to instrumentalize in hospital numbers. Mantic wants to lean into the subjective side of prediction markets and see what happens.

mantic.markets1 mentions across 1 issues

mantic.markets is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 28, 2021 and December 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "They have a play-money beta version up at https://mantic.markets/". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative, @GoodSciProject.

Reference entry: mantic.markets
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 28, 2021
Last seen: December 28, 2021

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ACX Grants Results December 28, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative 1 shared issues
@GoodSciProject 1 shared issues
@metaforecast 1 shared issues
@standupecon 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind

December 28, 2021 · Original source

James Grugett, Stephen Grugett and Austin Chen, $20,000, for a new prediction market. If every existing prediction market is Lawful Good, this team proposes the Chaotic Evil version: anyone can submit a question, questions can be arbitrarily subjective, and the resolution is decided by the submitter, no appeal allowed. And the submitter/decider gets a small cut (1%?) of the money traded on the question. I honestly have no idea how this would play out. Certainly it would incentivize lots of people to write lots of great questions and promote them widely. It sort of incentivizes a strategy of always deciding fairly so you get a good reputation and more people use your questions - but also sort of a strategy of doing that for a while to build up credibility before betraying people, making false rulings, and stealing all their crypto (of course it's crypto). The part I'm most fascinated by is the idea of not-necessarily-super-objective resolution criteria - we could have markets in things like "Will the Democrats' agenda succeed [according to Scott]?" They think a clear use case is minor Internet celebrities using their brand to make and shill markets related to their interests, since these people at least have some reputational reasons not to take the money and run. They have a play-money beta version up at https://mantic.markets/

Inline links: https://mantic.markets/

Maori1 mentions across 1 issues

Maori is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 14, 2023 and July 14, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "cognitive strengths showing up in the Maori of New Zealand". It most often appears alongside !Kung San, aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada, Adam Smith.

Reference entry: Maori
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 14, 2023
Last seen: July 14, 2023

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Your Book Review: The Educated Mind July 14, 2023

!Kung San 1 shared issues
aboriginal people on the west coast of Canada 1 shared issues
Adam Smith 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues
Aeschylus 1 shared issues

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July 14, 2023 · Original source

From trivial to rich: the trick What could an intellectually rich elementary school curriculum look like, if we built it on kids’ cognitive strengths? He gives us one suggestion to help us do this: ask where each discipline came from in the first place. What was math before it was math, for example — or science before it was science? Q: How on Earth could that help? That’ll become clear later, when we finally uncover what Egan thinks “education” actually is, and see what job he wants us to give schools. For now, take it as a tantalizing hint… or, y’know, just ignore it. Elementary literature & language What was literature before it was literature? Before people invented writing, they had rich oral traditions: they told simple stories, recited poems, and shared proverbs. Egan suggests that these bits of oral tradition should form the backbone of the elementary literature curriculum. Q: What sorts of stories? As many as we can, and from as many diverse cultures as possible! Folktales are wonderful, as are myths. Think the Aboriginal story of “The Rainbow Serpent”, episodes from the Sumerian “Epic of Gilgamesh”, the Egyptian story of Osiris & Isis, the Greek story of Orpheus & Eurydice, the Chinese Legend of the White Snake, the Japanese Tale of Amaterasu and Susanoo, the Ashanti tales of Anansi, the Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl, the English legend of King Arthur, the Maori myth of Maui and the Sun, the Roman story of Romulus and Remus, selections from the Indian Mahabharata, the Anglo-Saxon epic of Beowulf, the Inca legend of the Sun and Moon, the Iroquois Myth of the Flying Head (a real thing! look it up!), and the Ojibwe story of Turtle Island. Q: That was a lot of examples. Are you going to keep giving so many? I’ve got a [mumble mumble mumble] to get to. Sorry about that. Sometimes, though, I feel that a limitation of reading Educated Mind is that, in trying to keep his book to a manageable size, Egan skimped on examples in some places that it matters. It’s easy to read his occasional example and assume he intends that it hold some central place in the curriculum — when all he wants to do is display how rich and diverse the curriculum could be. (Also: good God, I didn’t even include an example from Norse mythology!) So from now on, just assume that every category could be filled with oodles of examples. Q: What sorts of poems? Lots of poems, first of all. We shouldn’t steer toward “fancy” poems — rather, we should find poems that appeal to kids immediately — think Shel Silverstein, Mother Goose, Dr. Seuss, Jack Prelutsky, Edward Lear, or Ogden Nash… that sort of thing. In a biting essay, Egan suggests these poets like these appeal to kids precisely because they leverage kids’ cognitive strengths: “we should find, and encourage saying and singing and shouting aloud verse with strong narrative forms, thumping rhymes and rhythms, the most vivid images, fun with metaphors, and a rollicking story.” Q: Why proverbs? Proverbs stick in your mind almost effortlessly. (“All’s fair in love and war!” “When in Rome, do as the Romans do!” “You can’t judge a book by its cover!”) They’re also useful; they capture general truths. Kids can apply them to all sorts of situations, but also discuss them — to what extent are they wise or foolish? (I remember my surprise when I realized that they couldn’t all be true — because you can’t follow “look before you leap” and “he who hesitates is lost” at the same time! I’m embarrassed to say that I think I only realized this when I was in college.) Elementary science What was science before it was science? Egan suggests: being immersed in the natural world. We might, he writes, encourage elementary students to “adopt” some feature of the natural world — a patch of grass, a cat, a branch, a stream — and simply observe it at length. To do this, we can use the cognitive strength of reverie. Q: Oh, do you mean like kids sometimes do in science class nowadays — describe a thing to a partner, make notes, draw it, and label its parts? No, the exact opposite! That’s all about squeezing the experience into words and forms that we understand. What we want “is less an attempt to know about nature as to know it in some participatory way, to know it as something we are an intimate part of, not set off from”. Q: That sounds a little… “woo” to me. It did to me, too… until I remembered my childhood climbing tree. I didn’t much like to go outside as a child, but I had this one tree that I’d climb up and read for hours and hours. If I close my eyes I can bring to mind the precise texture of its bark, the roughness of its broken-off branches, the coolness of its leaves, the always-surprising solidness of its trunk… I’m bigger now, but I think if I were back in my parent’s yard, I could still navigate its limbs with my eyes closed. I have, at this point in my life, read a fair number of books about trees, but I’d be surprised if all of them together more than equaled the amount I learned from that tree — my tree. Elementary math What was math before it was math? Egan suggests: counting and logic. We might, then, use rhythms, metaphors, stories, and jokes to help kids become fond of these. Q: Counting is pretty… basic. Could it really be improved? Beware of “the curse of knowledge”: Steven Pinker’s phrase for forgetting that something was once difficult! Egan suggests we should spend time helping kids count wonderfully. We can start early with counting rhymes. (“One, two, buckle my shoe! Three, four, out the door! Five, six…”) But we can also help kids use their fingers as metaphors. There are some pretty cool ways of using your hands as an abacus — and did you know that you can count up to 1,023 using just your fingers on both hands, and a knowledge of binary? Q: Logic — I’m intrigued! Aristotelian, or Boolean? Neither, for the time being — Piaget was presumably onto something when he found that young children couldn’t reason abstractly, but he was looking at logic in a vacuum. When we put logic into the context of stories, we find that kids can deal with logic just fine. There’s an entire worldwide network of educators, in fact, called Philosophy for Children, who have written whole books about how to do this, and Egan loves it all. Sometimes they read stories and ask simple questions: “What is friendship?” or “What does it mean to be brave?” They also pose ethical questions: “Is it ever right to spill a secret?” And they pose paradoxes: “Can you step in the same river twice?” Q: You mentioned “jokes” a moment ago. Care to elaborate? Egan thinks that, to help kids get good at math, you should tell kids jokes. Q: That’s… new. I think so, too — but he backs it up pretty well. To be funny, jokes (or at least most kid jokes) rely on a leap in logic: Why can’t you trust an atom? They make up everything. Knock-knock. Who’s there? Boo. Boo-hoo? Don’t cry, it’s just a joke! To understand the joke, kids have to follow the logic — spotting patterns, making connections, and tracking what their audience expects a word to mean. That’s a lot of cognitive lifting. And Egan goes further, suggesting that we grit our teeth and create methods to help kids invent their own jokes, no matter how horrible they’ll be at first. (The things we do for learning…) Q: Wait wait wait! What about addition facts, and multiplication tables, and fractions? Egan emphasizes that his methods are designed to be add-ons to the standard math curriculum. In general, he’s a don’t-blow-up-the-system sort of guy, and if something seems especially weird, you should probably assume it’s an add-on to the regular curriculum rather than a replacement, even if I forget to say so. Elementary arts What was art before it was art? Egan suggests we pop our heads into Paleolithic caves for our inspiration. Whatever the specific meaning of all those charcoal elk and aurochs and mammoths (communication with the spirit world? art for art’s sake? a way to impress babes?), Egan thinks it obvious that they were also an attempt to capture an intense experience that would be difficult to express in words alone. What did it feel like to be near an aurochs, or a saber-toothed tiger? “The arts help us,” Egan writes, “to hear and see afresh, to force our perceptions and sensations to experience again the immediacy and vividness of the world”. If we follow this, then, we don’t want to help kids build “art skills” so they can draw like an adult — rather, we want to help them amass a repository of diverse aesthetic feelings that they’ll want to express. We should provide them with a riot of experiences. Q: That couldn’t be more opaque. Examples, please! Egan writes that we should have children learn to whistle, sing, and click their tongue; we should help them emulate the ways a skunk or a hawk or a stick bug might move through a space. We should expose them to scores of different temperatures and materials. In music, we should help them love Beethoven, yes, but also the Beatles; Tchaikovsky, yes, but also Tuvan throat singers, and also John Cage, whale song, and bird song. Q: That’s a lot of experiences, but what would they be doing? An interesting aspect of Egan’s view of education is that he doesn’t seem to think we should push kids right to the “doing” phase. He wants to help kids cultivate an affective relationship with the world. In any case, he writes that as students get more experienced, we should prompt them to move from merely enjoying these experiences to trying to systematically shape similar experiences. And drawing, painting, and playing music could easily be folded into other parts of the curriculum. Elementary social studies What was social studies before it was social studies? Well. Remember how, just a moment ago, I wrote that you could assume that you should probably assume that Kieran isn’t in favor of junking the curriculum as it currently stands? He suggests we very carefully pick up the elementary social studies curriculum, place it into a trash can, and set the whole mess on fire. He isn’t worried about much of importance being lost. (Remember that the “expanding horizons” model is, to him, the original sin of 20th century educational reform, and he repeatedly quotes student surveys showing that “social studies” regularly wins the title of “most boring subject”.) In its place, he suggests we put history — which, he hints, we should think of as the centerpiece of the elementary curriculum. So the real question is what was history before it was history? His answer, surprisingly, is myth. Q: Egan wants us to teach myths as if they were history? Not at all. What he suggests, though, is that we look at how myths operate as narratives — so we can design an intellectually vivid history curriculum. And myths really are special: each is built on at least one binary (like weak vs. strong, or lies vs. truth, or so on), and uses that to tell the story of the big picture of the world. They’re so powerful that people can understand it, remember it, and love it — even if that thing never happened. We should take that power, Egan says, and apply it to things that really did happen. Q: So what history does he think kids should learn in elementary school? The great struggles of humanity from across the whole. Flippin’. World. We’re still talking about young children, so these should be done as simple stories. The goal isn’t to make them history PhD’s, so we needn’t even try to put them in any sort of order. Egan suggests that, in first grade, we pick a single binary like “freedom against oppression” and tell kids a welter of stories, again from as many cultures as possible, and as many times in history as possible. Q: Can you give examples? Oh, all right — in first grade we can tell kids the stories of the war of the Greek city-states against the Persian empire, and the slave uprising of Spartacus against the Romans. We can tell them about the plight of Jews in medieval Europe, and of the unsuccessful Sepoy Rebellion in India against the British. We can tell the stories of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions, and about the Chinese Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty. We can tell them the story of the escaped slave Harriet Tubman returning to the South to rescue her kinsmen, the story of six-year-old Ruby Bridges facing threats to integrate her elementary school, and the story of how the Mau-Mau uprising led to modern-day Kenya. We can tell the stories of Mexican-American union organizer Cesar Chavez and of Malala Yousafzai surviving an assassination attempt to advocate for female literacy. The world does not lack for stories of oppression and liberation that can capture the attention of a six-year-old. Q: That’s… huh. What stories might they hear in second and third grade? Egan gives examples, but I won’t list them here. He suggests we use a similar approach for each, except that we swap out the binary each year. He thinks “the struggle for security against danger” would work well for year two, and “the struggle for knowledge against ignorance” would work well for year three. (That year could have a lot of overlap with the science curriculum.) Q: Anything else, for history? Yes — they should get a sense of Big History. They should get some simple stories about the ice age, the Cenozoic, the age of dinosaurs, the Paleozoic, the origins of our solar system, and the Big Bang. (Because if the ancient Norse can tell their story of the beginning of the universe, by gum, we can tell ours, too.) To sum up Egan argues that the problem of early schooling is that it’s trivial — and it’s trivial because the dominant theories of educational psychology see children as lesser versions of adults. What else would we teach them, except dumbed-down versions of what adults learn? But children have certain cognitive strengths that schools aren’t making systematic use of. If we rebuild elementary schools on those strengths, we could turn schooling upside down. We could stop seeing the curriculum as a bag of information to impart, and start seeing it as a set of great stories to tell — and invite kids into. Kids could experience (both intellectually and emotionally) the great struggles of humanity and see that they can join in them. Students could experience the story of education as the beginning of a very real adventure. Egan’s elementary school: some skeptical questions Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding what you mean by “mental images”. Care to explain? It’s an interesting fact of human cognition that just a few words can whip up a complex mental experience. Egan doesn’t just mean what we might call “visual imagery” — the ability to hold, say, the image of a bespectacled, spat-wearing duck in your mind without seeing a photograph. He’s also including what psychologists call auditory imagery, olfactory imagery, gustatory imagery, and tactile imagery. Q: How could all of that be helpful in schools? Humanity has a built-in VR system, and we’re not using it! Egan invites us to pretend we’re teaching a class about the humble earthworm. We might list off facts — “earthworms are so many centimeters long, move through soil by means of their something-or-other muscles…” but he suggests we can evoke images, say, “of what it would be like to slither and push through the soil, hesitantly exploring in one direction then another, looking for easier passages, contracting and expanding our sequence of muscles segment by segment, and sensing moisture, scents, grubs, or whatever”. Those facts are now felt by the student; the knowledge has become part of them. And just a few words can spark a complex mental experience, one going beyond literal images to include imagined sounds, smells, tastes, and more. These experiences can feel real and stick with us. (That these mental images are so easy to evoke, and so meaningfully felt, feels something like the proverbial hundred dollar bill on the ground.) Q: How could metaphors be helpful? It really is interesting that so much of the “constructivist” turn in psychology — that is, the notion that children don’t absorb knowledge, but construct it — has continued to focus on logics-mathematical reasoning, when there’s been mounting evidence for decades that metaphors are more central. It’s not just that we use metaphors to better understand things we already know, we also use them to grasp new knowledge. What’s more, psychologists have devised tests to measure the skill at metaphor-making, and have given them to people of different ages. What they found was that eleven-year-olds make more metaphors (and higher quality metaphors) than do undergraduates — and that four-year-olds have both groups beat. Again, hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk. Q: Your talk of “binaries” has me worried — binaries like good/evil and male/female are the source of so many of our most pernicious stereotypes! Isn’t the purpose of education to get us beyond stuff like this? Yes, it is! Education is supposed to complicate our understanding — but that means we’ve gotta start somewhere, and binaries provide us a natural starting place. As an uncontroversial example, think about temperature. We all begin as babies by perceiving two temperatures — hot and cold. Later, we add on intermediate categories — warm and cool. (Note that the human body is the assumed mid-point to temperature. Binaries often work like this; “big” and “small” mean “bigger or smaller than me”, “nasty” and “kind” mean “nastier or kinder than I am, except when my brother is really asking for it”, and so on.) A good story (and an Egan-inspired elementary curriculum is, in a sense, nothing but good stories) will go further, and transform the binary. Toy Story is grounded in the binary of abandonment/belonging: at the beginning, the toy cowboy Woody belongs to his owner, and has his affection. Then a rival comes who threatens his belonging. In trying to get back to belonging, Woody is entirely lost — and to save the day, he has to come to a deeper understanding of what belonging means. Now, all lessons can’t be Pixar movies. But the good stories (especially in literature and history) will challenge and subvert the binaries they begin with. Q: I see the pattern of Egan drawing from “as many cultures as possible”. Why so many? Is this a political correctness thing? If it helps to think of it as such, then, sure! I don’t think Egan would have had a problem with that. But his ultimate reason for including so much diversity goes deeper. For Egan, including such world-wide diversity isn’t optional, and the answer to why is bound up in his definition of education. (Keep reading.) His answer also insists that we, whenever possible, also include stories from the Bible and Homeric epics (the Iliad and Odyssey). Q: Mmm, stories from the Bible aren’t going to fly in my local school! So be it! Egan doesn’t spend much time obsessing over the practicalities of… His interest is in describing what an ideal education might look like, if it were possible. Every lesson, every classroom, and every school is necessarily a compromise. Q: You make a big deal of poems. But isn’t poetry dead? An interesting contrast can be made to classical education, which also has kids read a lot of poems — they see knowing great poems as one of the marks of an educated person; again, for an academicist, it’s the information that transforms. Egan begs to disagree. Poems are important because they’re a wonderful way to train their cognitive strengths, like rhythm (poems are language fueling by thumping). We want to help kids learn to use this tool better, and a great way to do that is to help them recite poems that they’ve learned by heart. Q: “Learn by heart” — is that code for “memorize”?! It is! Egan is actually quite big on memorization — he points out that all the knowledge in the world can do nothing for a person once they’ve forgotten it. He didn’t, however, appreciate the academicist focus on memorizing without understanding (or at least enjoyment). Q: I’m still worried about the science curriculum, as you’re describing it. Can you allay my fears? Honestly, while I feel there’s something profoundly right to how Egan is describing early experiences of nature, I feel the same way. Note that there’s more science coming in the social studies curriculum. But if that’s still not enough, one could bring down aspects of the middle school science stage. Q: Anything else that Egan suggests we do in elementary school literature and language? He suggests that we help kids learn a second language! This is so obviously true (why do American schools typically wait until kids lose the ability to naturally absorb languages to start teaching languages?) he doesn’t belabor it, though. Q: You had mentioned that Egan’s vision seems more internal-focused. Should we be worried about that? While I strongly suspect that his curriculum would make kids more creative in any way you’d like to measure it, Egan wasn’t particularly interested in “creativity” — he was more about helping kids find the world interesting. I get the sense that he thinks kids will do things with minimal prompting once they’re loaded up with complex internal experiences. Q: I think I’m beginning to understand Egan — is he basically saying “make learning fun”? “Fun”, applied to education, is a dangerous word. Egan worries about the dangers of an emotionally unserious curriculum producing emotionally stunted adults. That doesn’t mean we need to tell students only “serious” stories — only that we treat the world honestly. “Disney-esque sentimentality is the exact emotional equivalent to intellectual contempt”. Q: But aren't some of these stories too dark for children who have themselves experienced oppression and disaster? Egan argues that these stories may be especially helpful to them — they can help them understand their struggles better, and give voice to them. Q: At the very start of this, you promised us “rationality”… but I’m not seeing rationality here! All this talk of “adventure” almost seems to go the opposite direction. What gives? Wait for it. But for a hint right now — Egan is fond of citing his fellow educational theorist Jerome Bruner, who claimed “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development”. Bruner was criticized for that; his critics charged that he was ignoring learning differences and socio-economic realities. Egan thinks he was profoundly right. Part 3: A new kind of middle school What’s the matter with middle school? What was middle school like for you? In math, I recall a jumble of barely-related topics. In literature, I remember reading great literature — Frankenstein, Romeo and Juliet — only in their dumbed-down summary formats. In social studies, I remember teachers proclaiming on the first day of class that unlike all of our previous history classes, this class wouldn’t be about names and dates… and then going on to memorize names and dates. And in science, I remember being forced to dissect a frog only to discover that frogs are — you guessed it — made of slimy frog parts. Your mileage may vary, but for a lot of us, middle school feels like getting booted out of the (in retrospect) Eden of elementary school, and like marking time before the serious studying of high school. It feels meaningless. In my favorite of his books, Egan calls so much middle school curricula “human deserts”, noting “we have created a system in which the importance of human emotions for meaning seems barely noticed”. Why so meaningless? If our dominant approaches to educational psychology fundamentally misinterpret younger children, Egan suggests, they basically throw up their hands when faced with pre-teens and teenagers. Mainstream schools begin to introduce vocational training to help lighten the load, and Maria Montessori famously suggests that adolescents should be sent to go run a farm. Egan is sympathetic to those responses, but points out that they don’t do much to lighten the load that the academic curriculum often becomes at this age. This feeling of meaninglessness, he argues, is utterly tragic — it comes just when a hunger for meaning blossoms in adolescents! We can see that hunger for meaning in their lives outside the classroom, where their interests ramp up into veritable obsessions. What are adolescents obsessed with? What might we see, if we become Jane Goodalls of early adolescence? First, teens are obsessed with gossip. The motivations of others — why did he do that? and what was he THINKING? — are hypothesized and talked to death. Second, that they’re pulled toward idealism. Many feel a dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and feel a romantic urge to make it a better place. They’re often lured into simplistic beliefs that promise to help them do that. Third, they love extremes: they want to find limits, and test them. Obviously, this can show up as risky behavior, but we can also see it in their love for the bizarre — note adolescents’ fascination in things like aliens, cryptids, and ghosts. (Egan loves pointing out that The Guinness Book of World Records is a perennial bestseller among kids at this age. How else would they find out who had the world’s longest fingernails?) Fourth, they gravitate toward heroes — people who push the edges of those limits. By celebrating heroes, they can vicariously share in their transcendence. Look for the posts hanging up in a teenager’s bedroom to guess what boundaries they feel most hemmed in by: athletes push against physical limits; a death metal guitarist might push against authority and conventional morality. An activist or entrepreneur might push against our dulled morality or our sense of what’s possible. Finally, we might spot teens taking up hobbies and making collections. Hobbies can be a way to identify yourself as part of a group against the rest of the world (“I’m the sort of person who goes bird-watching!”), and collections can be a way to climb the status ladder inside the community. Egan points out that a collection can also be a way to feel like you have control over what you’re discovering is a very big and complex world of detailed information (“I’ve spotted every one of the fifty most common birds of Texas — even the black-capped vireo!”) Egan’s insight is that these obsessions give teenagers a sense of meaning, and that we can use them as tools to make middle schools that overflow with meaning. From meaningless to meaning-soaked Again, Egan sketches out a new kind of curriculum subject-by-subject. Before, his trick was to ask where the subject first evolved out of; now, it’s to ask who first discovered or created the specific content we’re teaching. “All knowledge”, he writes, “is human knowledge. Everything we know is knowable through the lives of its inventors, discoverers, or users, and we can have access to that knowledge through the hopes, fears, or intentions that drove them”. Middle school math Who first discovered the concepts students learn in math? The answer, of course, is a wide diversity of curious men and women living across the world over the last few thousand years. Egan says: bring those people into how we teach math. If we used gossip and heroes to help students find it meaningful, what kind of math would result? When we teach the Pythagorean theorem, we should give a sense of who Pythagoras was — a cult-founder who worshiped numbers to find God, whose followers (according to a piece of ancient gossip) murdered one of their members who discovered irrational numbers! Q: Well, sure, that works for Pythagoras, but he’s a known nut job; surely most math doesn’t come from such interesting roots? When we teach the Cartesian coordinate system, students should meet Rene Descartes, the Calvinist French polymath who saw the possibility that math could decipher the world, if only we could unite algebra and geometry… and invented the xy-plane to do exactly that. When we teach scientific notation, we should call our students’ attention to the importance of the number zero, and tell them the story of the Pope who tried to introduce Arabic numerals to Christian Europe and may have been assassinated because of it. When we teach algebra, we should ask students why “algebra” is Arabic for “the fixing of bones”, and tell the story of what Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was up to. We could do this all day. Literally everything students learn in school was first invented or discovered by some interesting person who was struggling to accomplish something hard. To learn is to connect with those people, whether we know it or not. Egan says: help kids know it. Math has been dehumanized: re-humanize it. Q: So the math curriculum needs to become a history of math curriculum, and math teachers need to become history teachers? No, the content needn’t change. But with surprisingly little work, we can bring in the gossipy stories of heroes, and their obsessions can spread to students. Middle school science Who first discovered the things students learn about in science? If you’re thinking “scientists”, you’re only partially right. Most of the big-picture ideas that we now think of as “science” were discovered before the word “scientist” was invented, or the discipline was professionalized. Frequently, they were hatched by true amateurs, working in their free time, hungry to unlock the secrets of nature. We can use gossip and heroes to spread their obsessions to students just as we taught math, but Egan points out two twists. The first is that the content itself can take on heroic qualities: everything is impressive, when you look at it in a certain light. In an interview, Egan once said: “My book is an attempt to show that, indeed, everything in the world is wonderful, but that schools are designed almost to disguise this slightly shameful fact. We represent the world to children as mostly known and rather dull. The opposite is the case: we are surrounded by mystery, and what we know is fascinating”. What would even the most boring subjects look like, if we emphasized their heroic qualities? Well: What’s a tooth? Bone, wrapped in rock, surrounding tiny cells that your body feeds with blood. What’s a bar of chocolate? A crystal of jellyfish-shaped fat molecules stacked together; when you put it in your mouth you shake them apart into a writhing confusion. What’s the air around you? The bottom of a 10-mile-deep ocean; when you put your tongue over a soda straw and your Pepsi stops leaking out, it’s not because a “vacuum” is “sucking” it up, but because that ocean is squeezing it into your face. Again, we could do this all day! And in middle school science, we can. Everything in the world is wonderful; we can help students see this again and again. The second twist is that science is a subject rich in extremes. Here Egan introduces a concept that we’ll see crop up again: “15-minute segments”. To help us fit as much wonder as possible into a school day, he suggests we supplement the usual school subjects with a few quick lessons. To infuse science with extremes, he suggests we add on three: “human & natural records”, “extremes of animals & plants”, and “cosmology”. Middle school history Who first made the things students learn about in history? Why, the historical characters themselves! Since we’ve given kids a grounding in history in elementary school, now we can build on that, going through many of the same events as before, but in more depth, and more vividly. We’ll leverage the interest with other people’s inner lives to tell stories focusing on the perspectives of the people who made history — zooming in, when possible, on scandalous details. We’ll leverage the tool of idealism to choose historical characters who chafed against their surroundings, and understand what they were trying to accomplish. What was their vision of the world? What did they hope for, and what did they fear? Q: Isn’t the “great man” approach to history out of fashion? Egan’s approach doesn’t say that “great men” made history — it’s just leveraging gossip to help kids see history as something meaningful that can expand their own possibilities. “Early adolescence is commonly a time of intense and vivid emotional life, and also a time of deepest boredom and depression… [We] can give shape to the intermediate curriculum and offer the students a world that is rich, complex, varied, and as intense and vivid as their own emotional lives”. We also should add on another “15-minute segment” just to pump in as many biographies as possible, and from people who don’t always fit into the normal history curriculum. Call it “Brief Lives”, and throw in anyone who’s struggled to push some limit — Mary Wollstonecraft, Jesse Owen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the students’ great-aunts, whoever. As students get older, this can transition to “People and Their Ideas”. Here, we’d focus less on the details of the person’s life, and use it as a backdrop to showing how meaningful some of history’s most important ideas could be. Think Aristotle and syllogisms, Edward Said and orientalism, Confucius and propriety, Cornel West and race, Buddha on the four noble truths, Muhammad and the five pillars, Karl Marx and communism, Adam Smith and the invisible hand, Thomas Hobbes and the state of nature, John Locke and natural rights, Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism, Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments, Martin Luther on faith, Voltaire on the freedom of speech… you get the idea. Q: Can you really get a profound understanding of utilitarianism in 15 minutes? Yes! The point of this segment isn’t to develop a systematic understanding of any one idea, it’s to introduce students to the exciting possibilities of human thought. (As a bonus, this might make them less likely to fall for the first ideology that they encounter later in life.) Diversity is important for this — as it is with culture. Throughout this, we should also be trying to expose students to as much cultural diversity as possible, because in high school, we’ll be trying to make sense of our society, and it’s impossible to do that unless we have something to compare it against. Middle school literature & language You might think that this subject would be easy — that middle school literature is already filled with “strong and clear narratives”, that it deals with “transcendent human qualities such as courage, love, and persistence”, that it focuses on “extremes of human experience”, that it examines “something strange and exotic”. You’d be right! Egan’s pretty happy with a bog-standard middle school literature curriculum, done well. In this part of the book, his spends most of his limited space suggesting three rather odd activities which could also be useful — especially for increasing students’ awareness of language, so they can use it better. The first is etymology — not, however, memorizing lists of roots, but in being told the entertaining backstories of specific words. Take the word “berserk”, for example — we now use it to mean something relatively mild (“if my mom catches me coming home late, she’ll go berserk”), but it comes from an old Norse word meaning “a raging warrior of superhuman strength”. And that’s because ber meant “bear” and serk meant “shirt”: soldiers of the bear cult would don the skin of a bear to, in their minds, transform into one — howling, foaming at the mouth, and gnawing the rims of their shields. (Most adults walk through life with little understanding that the words falling out of their mouths are entities, with their own back-stories. Communication is, at the very least, more interesting when we become aware of this.) The second is to add on another language to learn — not, this time, to become fluent in it, but just to become aware of how very different human languages can be. (For native English speakers, Sanskrit might work well, or Cantonese, or perhaps even ancient Egyptian. Again, the point isn’t for this language to be useful — it’s to explore diversity.) The final one is to study humor — not just jokes anymore, but comedy at its finest. Egan cites (at length!) Monty Python as a group of people who were particularly brilliant in their use of the English language. Examining their skits can lead us into not just an appreciation of semantics (the study of how meaning is made from smaller pieces, like etymology) but also pragmatics (the study of how meaning is made in social situations). Pretty heady stuff, for a conversation about a dead parrot. Part 4: A new kind of high school I’ll confess — I loved parts of high school… and among nerdy folks, I suspect I’m not alone. For some of us, this was a golden time. Even at my local public high school, I had access to academically thrilling classes — especially, in my last two years, advanced literature and history. I felt like I was finally understanding the ideas that mattered. In any case, Egan is quick to acknowledge that, at this level, the sort of education he advocates really is being practiced in some places. What he can add is an understanding of what makes it wonderful, how to make it even more wonderful, and how to make it wonderful for many, many more people. What’s the matter with high school? Far too often, even when high school classes are intellectual, they’re dry. For the majority of students, all this academic stuff is experienced as utterly lifeless, a mass of dead information to be squeezed inside one’s head for a test and then left to evaporate. Egan mocks the curriculum wars that seem to be a permanent feature of the teaching life; quoting the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, he says “while the academic left and right bicker over whether the curriculum is too traditional or too radical, they fail to recognize that most students absorb so little of academic culture that the bickering is largely irrelevant”. Why so dry? Egan suggests three reasons to explain this. First, because high school academic classes are too often masses of small details with no sign of the big picture. Second, because they’re typically slavishly disciplinary, and aren’t able to address the questions that span the disciplines. Third, because they’re often designed to bring students through what everyone is sure of, and hide away any controversies. In all of these, Egan suggests that what’s called “academics” in high school is too often a dim imitation of what real academics are actually practicing. There’s a fourth reason, though, and it’s probably the biggest of all — by the time they get to high school, most students haven’t actually learned that much! An academic approach is designed to connect small details into the big picture; for people who arrive in high school (and college) classes without having already collected much in their heads, academics are going to taste dry. (An implication of this for anyone trying to improve schools is that we might not want to start with high schools. If your goal is to create a new kind of academic learning, first start at elementary school — or barring that, middle school.) What motivates mad scientists? When we wanted to re-conceive the elementary and middle school curriculums, we looked at what students were already good at — kids’ cognitive strengths and adolescents’ obsessions. For this level it might be easier to look — for reasons that will become clear when we finally unveil Egan’s crazy-sounding definition of education — at the sorts of things that bring intellectuals joy. Q: Which intellectuals? Take your pick. Galileo, Einstein, Smith, Marx, Goodall, Chomsky, Curie… all the people who took to the life of the mind like fish to water. But that’s a lot to hold in my mind at once, so I’m just going to think about Doc Brown from Back to the Future: He was high on intellectualism I’ve never been there, but the brochure looks nice Let’s call these people “mad scientists”. And let’s pretend we once again took up our job of being primatologists, and snooped on these folks “in the wild” (“in the lab”? this is beginning to get recursive…)… what would we find motivating them? Asking simple questions, for one. (What is space? What is society? What is a human? What is language?) Building general schemes (big theories) that hold lots of evidence together. Finding their place in the cosmos. And (perhaps above all) seeking certainty. Once again, Egan suggests we use these as tools to remake the curriculum. From dry to daring What could a high school curriculum look like, if it were rebuilt on these tools? Once again, Egan has a trick. This time, it’s to ask what fights have driven the development of each of these fields forward — and how we can help students enter them. First, a mini-segment! Intellectuals invented the academic disciplines to better pursue the life of the mind, but the disciplines can get in the way. Some of the most important intellectual discoveries that could help students are too big to fit into any of the disciplines. We need a place to introduce them plainly. Egan proposes another mini-segment — again, just 15 minutes a day, a few times a week — called “Metaknowledge”. Q: Isn’t that already in the International Baccalaureate program? Yes, he acknowledges that he’s borrowing from that! This segment would introduce ideas that would enrich student thinking across the disciplines: game theory, cognitive biases, systems thinking, Bayesian reasoning, epistemology, ethics, logic, cultural evolution, and so on. High school literature How can we help students enter the big fights of literature? Intellectuals of a literary bent — professors, critics, poets, novelists — delight in arguing over literature like rabbis arguing over the Talmud. Take, just for one example, the debates over Shakespeare’s character of Ophelia. Does she love Hamlet, or is she a victim of his emotional abuse? Is she truly insane, or is she acting? Is she passive, or is she pulling the strings? Oceans of ink have been spilled arguing over questions like these; our students can, perhaps, spill a few ounces more. The usefulness of arguing literature, for Egan, isn’t that it’s oh-so important for educated adults to know a lot about Ophelia. (This, again, was where the academicists went wrong — in thinking that being educated was about getting the best knowledge in your head.) Rather, arguing over literature is a training arena for the all-important intellectual move of this kind of understanding: building general schemes out of evidence, and struggling with anomalies. One person, for example, might hold that Ophelia is insane, and cite all sorts of obvious evidence — her father just was murdered by her lover, she rants nonsense while (bizarrely) handing out flowers to friends… But then he’s challenged when he reads a scholar pointing out that, to people in Elizabethan England, types of flowers have symbolic meanings. How does he deal with that? He could ignore it, claiming it an over-reading of Shakespeare. (Sometimes a flower is just a flower!) Or he could address it, complicating his own scheme. This intellectual work is best done with other people, who are incentivized to challenge your understanding of something, and go back and forth, building competing models and calling attention to anomalies. This process — the “dialectic” — pops up again and again in the academic disciplines. It’s the center of how understanding works, at this stage. And the nice thing about practicing it on literature is that, more so than in history or science, the evidence is shared knowledge — it’s right in front of everyone, written out. But there are other ways literature class can be helpful to the general life of the mind. Egan also suggests that we’ll want to specially include literature that helps students understand complex ideas. Camus, Orwell, Borges, Calvino might be particularly helpful here… and I imagine that genres like science fiction and magical realism might be particularly useful, too. (Note, though, that once again none of this requires a radical remaking of the curriculum, or of the canon of texts that we traditionally assign to high schoolers.) Q: Oh yes, the canon — what does Egan have to say about the canon wars? When he wrote Educated Mind in the nineties, the long-brewing canon war was approaching its inevitable apocalyptic climax. On one side of this Plain of Megiddo were the pro-canon traditionalists, arguing that we should keep assigning the texts that had been argued over for centuries. Facing them were the anti-canon reformers, arguing the standard texts over-represented the perspective of dead white men. Onto the middle of the plain rides Egan on a white horse, who bellows above the din: “I’VE GOT A BUSLOAD OF HIGH SCHOOLERS WHO WANTS TO JOIN IN, EVERYONE OKAY WITH THAT?” To do so, he says, we need to give students the arguments from both sides. So, for example, bell hooks, Edward Said, and China Achebe should be on the syllabus, as should Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and Diane Ravitch. And of course they should actually read the texts cherished by both sides, too, so they can argue better. High school history How could entering the big fights help us reinvent high school history? First, we might look for dueling histories. It’s time for students to get into historiography and understand that history isn’t just what happened, it’s something we make. We might help kids read chapters from Howard Zinn’s socialist history of America alongside the corresponding chapters from Paul Johnson’s conservative history of America. How could big questions help? We want to help students see how various people have disagreed over some of the big questions of what human history is, at its most basic. We can have them compare Steven Pinker’s theory of civilization’s progress (Better Angels of our Nature) with Yuvah Noah Harari’s theory of civilization’s woes (Sapiens). We could have them compare so-and-so’s account of human history as an ever-expanding unlatching of energy sources with Robert Wright’s account of human history as unlatching more and more positive-sum games (Nonzero). What role could the lure of certainty play? To help them grow their skills at finding anomalies, we might help them work through pseudo-histories and conspiracy theories. Q: Conspiracy theories! Oh, come now, you’re playing with fire. Well, the world is on fire. Our students will spend the rest of their lives encountering terrible-but-beguiling arguments about how the world works; if we don’t prepare them for those, what have we been doing? So we should introduce arguments that the Moon landing was a hoax, that the Illuminati founded America, that aliens built the pyramids, and so on. At no point can we demean students for falling for any of these theories — the job of a teacher at this stage, Egan writes, is to support students in their reasoning even when their beliefs are offensive and stupid, gradually offering anomalies. There’s no way out of bad theories except through them. By the time students graduate, we want them to have wrestled with terrible ideas and — for a while — lost. They need to experience what it’s like to change their minds about something they felt strongly about. They need to viscerally realize, in Feynman’s famous phrase, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” High school natural science How could entering the big fights reinvent high school science? At present, so much of the high school science curriculum — especially “honors” classes — is oriented toward helping amass details. (The same is true of 100-level university classes, which famously “survey” the field to prepare for more advanced studies. I always thought this was stupid — of the huge lecture hall of students in my Geology 100 class, how many went on to take even a second course?) The meaty debates that propel science forward are held back. Egan complains: “The more general and speculative theories in any discipline are treated like an unconventional and disreputable relation who, even though the children find her exciting and entertaining, must be kept hidden from view, her very existence denied as long as possible”. This is a stupid approach — students with an adventurous bent are convinced that science isn’t for them. Egan proposes, simply, that we flip this, and organize high school science classes around the big debates. We shouldn’t be ashamed at how, well, adolescent this might look: “the dramatic, speculative, and contentious theories will be up-front in the early years of the [high school] curriculum”. What might those be? Egan doesn’t give a list, but we can spitball some: instead of explaining what “matter” is from the top down, a physics class could problematize “matter” by following the debates over the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and by becoming familiarized with the various interpretations of quantum mechanics

Inline links: In a biting essay, In my favorite of his books, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ywm7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9c9b1ed-a260-4117-8679-0b5a32339748_1600x574.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WPeH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F62ea55f8-0458-484f-be45-7a011d050756_1600x625.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FPXt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb017fc37-3151-4556-87f1-31a097cf7594_1600x574.png

But this isn’t unique to the Potawatomi, or to Native Americans — you can find these “cognitive strengths” showing up in the Maori of New Zealand, the !Kung San of Botswana, the Yanomami of Brazil… in fact, anthropologists have found these “cognitive strengths” in every society they’ve researched: all but one of them show up in Donald Brown’s list of human universals. Like clothing and fire, these ways of encoding information were part of humanity’s original toolkit, equipping each person with the collected knowledge of their tribe so they could survive in environments that found them tasty.

Inline links: Donald Brown’s list of human universals

MAP Accelerator1 mentions across 1 issues

MAP Accelerator is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2025 and June 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "MAP Accelerator is a tool developed by Khan Academy". It most often appears alongside 10,000 hour rule, 2 Hour Learning, Inc, 2-hour Learning.

Reference entry: MAP Accelerator
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 27, 2025
Last seen: June 27, 2025

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Your Review: Alpha School June 27, 2025

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Your Review: Alpha School

June 27, 2025 · Original source

Leadership …and so many other things. 100% of MAP test questions are multiple choice. Where are the students learning deep thinking? What about the learning you get from small group discussions in a university seminar? I think Alpha’s answer to that concern is “that is what we do in the afternoon workshops”. I think that is a fine answer. How well do most schools teach those things as a baseline? Maybe Alpha does as good a job as other schools teaching public speaking. Maybe they do a better job? But what is missing is an objective measure of how well they do it. I can see that GT is making progress on the measurement of those softer skills by running workshops on “competitive academics” where the output is legible. The kids at that school don’t just learn to give talks, they give talks and then submit them to The Moth in an attempt to qualify for (and win) Storytelling Nights. They don’t just write persuasive essays graded by their teachers, they write persuasive essays and then submit them to national competitions. They don’t just learn the concepts of long term planning and strategy, they put them in practice playing go and chess and then compete against their peers and earn an elo ranking. I think it is a fair way to assess these things and leads to more accountability, but note that it is only happening at the GT school with ten kids, not the main Alpha campus, and the data points so far on whether it is working are very thin. Our friends at the flagship school are less convinced that the climbing wall workshop is teaching those “non-state mandated” academics that the core program misses. Another disappointment is “Alpha Writes”. The school was not happy with the third-party reading and writing apps out there and built their own. Alpha Reads is excellent. Alpha Writes (which is newer and just launched about a month ago) is not. I believe the school (and Joe Liemandt) understands that the product is not good enough, and they are taking it back to the drawing board, but for now I do not think the Alpha kids have any real edge versus traditional schools in their training on essay or creative writing skills. How do Alpha’s MAP score improvements compare to other selective private schools across the country? This is an important question for some parents. It is great if you can expect your 5th grader to advance 2.6x faster than they would at the local public school, but if you are planning to spend $40,000/year to send him to Alpha, your alternative is likely not the local public school. And if you are considering moving your family to Austin for the school, your alternative options are places like Horace Mann, Harvard-Westlake, and Lakeside. How does the 2.6x improvement that Alpha is delivering compare to those elite institutions? I have no idea. Unlike Alpha I have not found any elite school who has shared the MAP improvement rate for the students at their school. I expect these elite schools are very good for all the reasons the selective private school I sent my kids to before GT was good: They have a select group of peers, they have great teacher:student ratios, and they have incredible resources. I also expect most of these schools do NOT accelerate (I could very well be wrong here and would be happy to be corrected). If they are like the schools I am familiar with they allow their students to advance through the material at the “normal” pace, with the normal pedagogy, but, because those kids are so bright, that leaves them plenty of time for enrichment. Lakeside school (where Bill Gates’ children attended) has classes where students write and perform one-act plays at the school’s annual festival; advanced photography courses where students develop their own signature style and brand; Literature classes on Victorian novels, the Harlem Renaissance, and Chaos Theory; classes on abnormal psychology, architecture, blockchain, game theory and wilderness survival and leadership. I am sure by the time they graduate, students from Lakeside have learned much more than what is measured on a standardized MAP test. The problem is that it is difficult to measure those “extra things”, so you are left making the decision on vibes and prestige and marketing materials. (and meanwhile the objective numbers are held under lock and key by the elite schools themselves who have no incentive to share them when they are already winning on vibes). Is there any data on how different education programs are doing on improving MAP scores? I have not found any schools other than Alpha that share their data, but there are some “educational interventions” where the measured output was an improvement on MAP tests. Teach to One: Math is a math program used in some schools that is meant to be “personalized” using “technology-infused direct instruction”. Their studies find that students who follow their full program improve 23% faster on the math MAP scores, and students who are “exposed” to the program improve 12% faster. MAP Accelerator is a tool developed by Khan Academy. It claims that students who use it consistently for 30-minutes per week improve their MAP scores 9-43% faster than a control group. Both examples show that if you have technology-enabled personalized learning for extended periods of time improve MAP scores versus the norm. Both show that those results only happen when the students stick with the program. This shows that the “secret sauce” of Alpha’s 2-Hour Learning is not what and how they are teaching but rather: That they are using personalized technology-enhanced programing (when most schools aren’t)

Inline links: Lakeside school, Teach to One: Math, MAP Accelerator

Marine1 mentions across 1 issues

Marine is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 26, 2024 and July 26, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Every Marine/FEMA battle". It most often appears alongside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, 2020 election, 2024 book review contest.

Reference entry: Marine
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 26, 2024
Last seen: July 26, 2024

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Your Book Review: Real Raw News July 26, 2024

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Your Book Review: Real Raw News

July 26, 2024 · Original source

The lack of evidence that all this is happening is entirely explained through coordinated media silence as well as the widespread use of body doubles and clones. The heart of Real Raw News, and the source of most of its entertainment value, is its accounts of the supposed secret military tribunals occurring at America’s Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, better known as Gitmo2. For more than three years, the site has produced one article after another describing the arrest, trial, and execution of dozens of major and not-so-major figures in American life. Hillary Clinton? Arrested, tried, executed. Bill Gates? Arrested, tried, executed. Dick Cheney? Fled the country via a secret underground tunnel to a CIA airfield, but then returned to America on vacation for some reason3, arrested, tried, executed. George W. Bush, Hunter Biden, Anthony Fauci, Gavin Newsom, Mark Milley, Victoria Nuland, Tom Hanks (?), Brian Stelter (???) – All arrested and executed, in turn4. Almost all defendants are hanged, which actually is not the method prescribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but has the advantage of being far more cinematic. It would be easy for all of this to get old, but like with variations in classical music, subtle differences to each iteration enrich the whole. Some defendants desperately try to deny responsibility for their crimes. Some arrogantly taunt the tribunal, assuming until the very end that they are untouchable. Some literally scream as though demon-possessed. Some fake senility or amnesia. But crucially, all of them face justice, one way or another. An entry published just before this contest’s deadline is a lovely example: Representing himself, [Fulton County Superior Court Judge Scott] McAfee in opening remarks talked himself into an early verdict. He said no one and nothing, not even imprisonment, would prevent him from destroying the Trump family. Handcuffed at the defense table, he glared at the panel and said he would topple the Trump empire, building by building, brick by brick, and wouldn’t rest until every Trump supporter was behind bars or dead. “Then I’ll take care of the people here and this place,” McAfee said. “Mr. McAfee, I’m told you are of sound mind and know where you are, right?” Admiral Stephens asked5. “I’m in a Kangaroo court in the Banana Republic of Trump, staring at a guy who couldn’t hack it in the real world, couldn’t run a private practice, get a partnership, or sit on a real bench, so he went into the military,” McAfee said. “Have you ever heard of Trump Derangement Syndrome, Mr. McAfee?” the Admiral asked. “Because you have the worst case I’ve seen, and I’ve seen several.” “Trump is finished. He’ll be in jail soon, and when he is, your house of cards collapses,” McAfee said. “It might seem that way, but it only seems that way,” the Admiral said. “You might as well find me guilty. I’ll never stop hating Trump and I’ll never stop working to demolish everything he stole. He was born guilty, and he’ll be guilty until the day he dies. That’ll be the only word on his gravestone: GUILTY!” McAfee shouted. The lead panelist, a Marine Corps major, politely interrupted: “Admiral, sir, we don’t have to hear any more. McAfee mocks this court, and we find him guilty of the treason charge. Additionally, we are in agreement he should hang for his crimes.” Admiral Stephens nodded contemplatively. “I side with these fine officers. Mr. McAfee, you are hereby sentenced to hang for treason against the United States of America.” His execution is scheduled for May 15. Yes, this is the judge of Trump’s criminal case in Fulton County. In the Real Raw News world, Trump’s various legal adventures are both real and fake at the same time. Apparently, Trump could completely ignore these proceedings, and the military in fact begs him to do so, but he chooses to place himself in danger from some unseen, Christ-like self-sacrificial motive. That motive, it appears, is getting evil judges to expose their bias by ruling against him, so that they can be arrested and executed for treason. The site often offers an alternative narrative regarding events in the official, Deep State-backed news narrative. When Colin Powell died, RRN was there to explain that he actually committed suicide, fearing arrest by the military. When former Tom Hanks co-star Peter Scolari died of cancer, RRN swooped in to attribute his demise to an unexpected military tribunal6. This pattern is one of the chief reasons fans cite for believing the site: Isn’t it incredible, they say, how some of the same people RRN reports the executions of just happen to have recently died or been hospitalized in the mainstream press? What are the odds? Perhaps surprisingly, the star figure in Real Raw News’s tapestry of blood is not Donald Trump; like Gandalf or Dumbledore, he is a heroic but distant and largely off-screen figure. Instead, the primary hero is Rear Admiral Darse Crandall, who dispenses lethal justice with shocking efficiency while always being ready with a good quip: Admiral Crandall ordered [Arizona Governor Katie] Hobbs not to intimidate the witness. “You lack decorum, detainee Hobbs, and your insouciance ends here. We revoke your right to further question this witness and ask the panel to render a verdict on the charges against you.” The admiral dismissed Jane Doe, and the panel unanimously found Hobbs guilty, recommending she hang to death. “I won’t let you do this to me,” Hobbs screeched. “It’s already done,” said Admiral Crandall. “And have a Merry Christmas—in whatever afterlife you wind up in.” He scheduled her execution for December 22. Adm. Crandall is in fact a real person, currently serving as Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Admiral Crandall seems like a nice and professional fellow, and I badly want to know what he makes of his alternate persona. I like to hope that he enjoys it; maybe he jokingly warns his subordinates to do their jobs right or else they’ll be arrested and executed. If anybody knows otherwise, please do not disabuse me of this fantasy. Lesser fake news auteurs will puke out lame one-and-done articles about the moon landing or JFK or whatever, with zero internal consistency. Baxter is better. His military tribunals are reported out in detail. Even the most minor figures receive dedicated articles for their arrest, their trial, and their demise, but the biggest names receive genuine weeks-long productions. Hillary Clinton’s tribunal spans five days, until damning testimony from her former aide (and lover) Huma Abedin sends her to the gallows. Former president Bush’s arrest and tribunal is a ten-part epic lasting nearly two months, and includes details that are eccentric even by 9/11 truther standards: Supposedly, the real death toll of 9/11 (which Bush orchestrated) was 7,000, but Bush deemed this number too high to win reelection, so the real number was suppressed and 4,000 families were silenced with enormous bribes that also served to stimulate the economy. Good thing all the plotting was caught on tape, or he might have gotten away with it. Baxter never rushes things. Remember how the Colorado Supreme Court tried to kick Trump off the primary ballot in late 2023? Lesser fake newsers might have had the entire 4-vote anti-Trump majority arrested at once, but Baxter is cannier. In his reporting, one justice was arrested immediately, but the other three went on the run , and took months to capture. As of this writing we’re still waiting for their tribunal. I hope it’s a barn-burner! Baxter knows that while crass wish fulfillment is easy, truly great stories need formidable villains. Amidst the many arrests and hangings of Baxter’s saga are cinematic setbacks. Sometimes, the Marines don’t get their man: [Biden White House Covid-19 response coordinator Ashish] Jha was five feet away from his vehicle when two Marines with an arrest warrant approached him, informing him that he was being placed under arrest on charges of mass murder. Jha erupted in laughter, saying, “You don’t even know who we are.” He exploded in a crimson fireball that blew his and the Marines’ bodies to bits throughout the parking lot. […] The Marines brought what remains they could to Fort Bragg, where medical examiners deduced that Jha was not Jha, but a clone in which someone had planted a subdermal detonator connected to HMX explosives. And then, there is the looming presence of RRN’s chief villain: Former U.S. President Barack Obama. Members of the deep state make a warped pledge of allegiance to “The United States of Ukraine” and to “one world under Obama.” Other arms of the deep state might be taken down, but Obama himself always lurks in the shadows, controlling and commanding. The occasional attempt to take him down runs into the kind of problems you’d expect: “Why?” Obama gurgled and died. Inexplicably, the body spontaneously combusted, starting at both hands and spreading to the arms and chest. Special Forces tried extinguishing the flames with sand and water, but their efforts were in vain—the flames were rapidly charring burnt flesh. “Check his feet,” the Special Forces lead, who had been trained to spot body doubles and clones, called out. They swiftly yanked off Obama’s socks and sneakers and saw he had flat feet, and that his sneakers had been augmented to fit people with fallen arches. They pulled down his pants; Obama had no genitals, a telltale indicator of cloning. The body became too hot to touch and was soon consumed by fire. Like Bob Ross, Michael Baxter has no mistakes, only happy little accidents. In late 2021, RRN reported on the conviction of the late Chelsea Clinton’s husband, Marc Mezvinsky. Being only a lackey in the Clintons’ plot to abduct children and sell them on the black market, Mezvinsky received a comparatively lenient life sentence. But wait! Two months later, Gitmo’s chaplain mentioned in passing that he had attended Mezvinsky’s execution. Eagle-eyed readers saw the discrepancy and cried foul. But Baxter didn’t miss a beat. When Baxter reported on the arrest of former Obama adviser David Axelrod, only to publish no follow-up, he had a ready explanation a year later: Axelrod had been executed without trial by being thrown out of an airplane, and it took months for Baxter to learn the truth. I’ll admit, I find Baxter’s efforts to maintain narrative integrity incredibly charming, given how they clash with the latent absurdity of the whole endeavor. Like most fictional universes, the Real Raw Newsiverse crumbles if you think about it too hard. If there are White Hat and Black Hat partitions of the military, how does military procurement work? How do newly-enlisted personnel know which faction they are joining? Do the two factions have separate recruiters? And when literally everyone carries a basic video camera in their pocket, and social media access is universal, how are major battles being fought on American soil with zero video evidence anywhere? At the meta level, the entire construct gets even sillier. The conceit of the site is that Trump has secretly left power to entrap his foes…yet then his allies go and blab the entire “real” story to an online blog. The cover for this is that the masses simply don’t believe it, but you know who would definitely know whether the blog is accurate? The Deep State! Yet despite this, in RRN lore sinister actors from Andrew Cuomo to Oprah are always caught off guard when Delta Force7 smashes down their door and zip-ties their hands for a one-way trip to Cuba. Okay, But So What? You might be tempted to think this is all irrelevant rambling into the void. But if you think that, you’re mistaken. The thing is, Real Raw News is popular. Really popular. It got more than 2 million page visits in January. It’s a lot more popular than this blog and even outdraws some established publications like The Nation. “Okay, views are views, but does anyone really believe this?” you may ask, perhaps derisively. Well, it falls to me to say that yes, yes they do. The typical RRN article gets hundreds upon hundreds of comments. And sure, a lot of them are “My mother is being paid $2,000/day working from home” spam, but most of them are not. Hundreds upon hundreds of comments are from readers grateful to Baxter for sharing the “truth.” Even more unsettling are comments from people who spot a problem with the occasional story, but still trust Baxter overall. Baxter has a donation page on Christian crowdfunding site GiveSendGo. It has raised more than $210,000 and donations continue to pour in on a daily basis. Sure, some donation messages clearly indicate people who are in on the joke…but many more do not. But I don’t just need to guess based on comments and donation messages. In this realm, I can appeal to personal experience. I work in the broader world of American right-of-center politics, and we encounter Real Raw News believers constantly. We get emails from people who confidently insist the public-facing news of the day is fake, and the truth about the events at Gitmo will soon be revealed. At public Q&A events, we’ve fielded questions from genuinely nervous and worried people, who complain about their friends losing hope and being blackpilled by the news, and want to know why there hasn’t been more effort to share what’s “really” going on. A friend of mine who served in the Trump administration has described attending parties where, when he mentioned looking for a post-admin job, he received knowing looks and wink-wink-nudge-nudge remarks from people signaling they knew what was “really” going on. Somehow and someway, a lot of people believe or half-believe or badly want to believe this stuff. And where a lot of people do anything, there are takeaways to be found! In my three-plus years of reading all news that is both real and raw, here is what I’ve found. Conspiracies Evolve Like Comic Book Lore In his review of the Alexander Romance, Scott remarked that figures like Alexander the Great or Hercules were, essentially, the pre-modern versions of Batman: Stories about them are a genre, with countless different variations and stylistic choices that evolve over time, with just a few set principles guiding all of them. The Real Raw Newsiverse, and other modern conspiracy theories, also function like comic book lore. Just like Batman, and just like Hercules, “Donald Trump” has become a genre. Fake news stories about him and his Deep State enemies have a few core premises (adrenochrome, pedophile cabals, there is a Plan and we should Trust It) but endless room for variation past that point. Fans of comic books, soap operas, or The Simpsons might be familiar with something TVTropes calls “comic book time.” Certain facets of a fictional reality are locked in place, and with the passage of time everything else is gradually retconned to maintain the status quo. In season 2 of the Simpsons, Homer and Marge started dating in 1974, in Season 3 Marge becomes pregnant with Bart in 1980 (after a date watching The Empire Strikes Back), and in season 4 it’s revealed that Homer missed the Moon Landing to listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.” Tragically, though, The Simpsons kept going past season 10, and if Homer was 18 in 1974 that would make him eligible for a full Social Security benefit today. So in 2008, the continuity changed so that Homer was in a Nineties grunge band just before marrying Marge8. The Simpsons writers have avoided rejiggering the canon since, but if they do, they’ll have to confront the fact that 30-something Homer and Marge are now millennials, and in a decade they’ll be members of Gen Z. You may live to see a Simpsons flashback episode about Homer and Marge living as hipsters in Brooklyn during the 2010s (truly, we live in cursed times.) But the same phenomenon exists in the world of conspiracies. Instead of a consistent, elaborate canon, what we have is a few story beats with a lot of customization and the occasional retcon. When Baxter first began posting his stories, a core part of the narrative was that Donald Trump still secretly had all the powers of the presidency and was still in command of the entire U.S. military command. Early articles promised that Trump’s apparent loss of office was only a temporary ruse, necessary to expose the worst elements of the Deep State, but that Trump’s triumphal return to power would take place by July 4, 2021. The national media might have put on a song and dance suggesting otherwise, but behind the scenes, loyal military forces were the real ones in control. This control even extended to the military helpfully house-sitting the White House and not letting Biden use it. Despite his illegitimate victory, Biden met an unwelcome surprise when he arrived at the White House on January 20. Instead of getting a ceremonial greeting, he and Kamala Harris were stopped by National Guard and U.S. Marines at the barbwire fence encircling the White House. The Marines informed them that the military had assumed control of the Executive Branch and instructed them to vacate the area. When Harris belligerently said, “Move aside, we’re president now,” the Marines locked the gate. […] To avoid shame and maintain an illusion of power, Biden’s people concocted a ruse, supported by his media allies, to deceive the American public into believing he had won a fair election and had moved into the White House on schedule. Inside Actor/Producer Tyler Perry’s 300-acre Atlanta estate sits a three-story stucco replica of the commander-in-chief’s residence, which he originally built as a set piece for a television show. […] Although the replicant White House is built to 80% scale, on television and in images it’s indistinguishable from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Biden and Harris have been using the facsimile to feign leadership and impose despotic rule on the nation. Of course, July 4 came and went, with Trump’s return nowhere to be seen, so the canon simply updated: In the new narrative, the military had been conducting a year-long election fraud audit on Trump’s behalf, the results were nearly ready for public release, and Trump’s return would simply be “swift.” But no swift return has transpired, and so as the 2024 election has approached, the lore has evolved in the direction of Trump authentically running in this election and simply reclaiming power by winning it. As time has passed, more subtle changes have had to pile up. Early on, RRN reported that Joe Biden was a brain dead semi-corpse being held at Walter Reed, and any public appearances by “Biden” were one of several actors. But after four years of Let’s Go Brandon, Biden himself has become a more popular villain, and so quietly references to his brain-dead status have disappeared. In the early days of RRN, the military was firmly behind Trump and any implication that Biden held the powers of commander-in-chief was a media-fueled sham. But as time has passed, Trump being the “real” commander-in-chief over a loyal military has evolved into a reality where there are two American militaries, a “White Hat” faction loyal to Trump and “Black Hats” loyal to Biden. Early stories implied the White Hats were more numerous, but recent stories have implied the opposite, with the White Hats an elite force that often wins battles decisively while badly outnumbered. A secret purge has gradually become a secret civil war, specifically one with frequent war crimes: White Hat forces in Maui have eradicated or repelled all but a handful of the felonious FEMA agents who began terrorizing the tropical paradise in the aftermath of the inexplicable blaze that razed Lahaina and surrounding towns in early August, a source in General Eric M. Smith’s office told Real Raw News. Since mid-August, United States Marines have fought with FEMA patrols in Lahaina, Kaanapali, Wailuku, Maalaea, and Pukalani, and the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of approximately 475 federal goons and, alas, 34 valiant Marines. The Marines died upholding the Constitution of the United States; the feds died trying to defend the criminal Biden regime. […] “The Marines died valorously,” our source said. “We ain’t taking FEMA prisoners from the rank and file, only the key players. General Smith made it clear it’s weapons-free. Those bastards know damn well they’re following unlawful orders, and they’ll pay the price.” I think the ever-evolving nature of conspiracies is actually pretty important to psychologically grasping their appeal. I have a friend who is a big believer in 9/11 Trutherism. He once compelled me to watch the documentary “The New Pearl Harbor,” an exhausting 5-hour film promoting 9/11 conspiracies. If one actually watches, one quickly discovers that a lot of 9/11 conspiracy theories are mutually exclusive, or at least don’t mesh well together: One conspiracy argues that fighter jets were intentionally diverted the wrong direction to keep them from shooting down the hijacked jets approaching New York, while another conspiracy suggests that United 93 was shot down, and it was all covered up. In some versions, the planes didn’t hit the Twin Towers at all. Sometimes Bush did it, and sometimes Israel did it, and so on. Similarly, in my career I’ve worked adjacent to people who, like RRN, were very hostile to Covid-19 shots. That hostility made them sequentially endorse wildly different assertions about how the vaccines worked. Sometimes, the vaccines contain heavy metals. Sometimes, they contain hydra DNA to turn recipients into partially non-human chimeras. Sometimes, the vaccines are a depopulation agent. Sometimes, they’re a mind-control agent, or a killswitch that can be activated by self-assembling nanomachinery. One viral documentary in 2022 claimed that Covid was caused by snake venom in the water supply, and that Covid vaccines were an additional dose of snake venom to keep people sick (all this, of course, because the snake is Satan’s animal). What stands out isn’t the silliness of these particular theories, but that I saw them sequentially endorsed by the same people. Some of these people are smart enough to notice inconsistencies, at least when they’re pointed out, so why don’t they bother them? To some extent, I think it’s for the same reason people don’t care that every Batman story doesn’t perfectly line up. Consistency isn’t the point! What actually matters is enjoying individual stories and the wider genre they fit into. Covid vaccine haters don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, they’re driven by a core impulse of “distrust the new vaccine that people I distrust are promoting,” and every conceivably story or tale that feeds that genre of thought is, for them, worthwhile. Similarly, Real Raw News fans don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, I think their core impulse is, ironically, profound disappointment in how the Trump administration failed to deliver. Trump shook up the American political landscape more than anyone in living memory, and promised sweeping changes to every level of American government, yet his actual administration proved rather disorderly, changed far less than was promised, and then lost power after one term. For many, this simply prompted a revision in how they saw Trump. But for others, the preferred response is to embrace a fantasy reality where Trump is a superhero. I actually think the reverse side of this explains things like the durability of Russiagate: If you’re a normal American liberal, everything Trump says is offensive and piggish, but to justify their level of disdain for them, many needed to elevate his evil to the level of treason, even if that never really made any sense. It can't just be that Trump is an egotistical jerk or a narcissist or whatever. He's got to be a traitor who's going to end American democracy. People Crave Extreme, Over-the-Top, and Underhanded Solutions. At the height of the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, the Committee of Public Safety pushed through the Law of 22 Prairial. The law simplified the procedures of the country’s Revolutionary Tribunal by: Defining a whole heap of activities as criminal treason, including “creating scarcity,” disparaging the National Convention, “inspiring discouragement,” and spreading fake news.

Inline links: 2, Arrested, tried, executed, Arrested, tried, executed, secret underground tunnel, for some reason, 3, tried, executed, George W. Bush, Hunter Biden, Anthony Fauci, Gavin Newsom, Mark Milley, Victoria Nuland, Tom Hanks, Brian Stelter, 4, variations, entry, 5, committed suicide, 6, real person, Supposedly, arrested immediately, months, Sometimes, warped pledge, kind of problems, conviction, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5uuY!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcc5e8197-f02d-4221-9186-4bcc4f165c72_759x723.png, arrest, thrown out of an airplane, 7, more than 2 million page visits, this blog, The Nation., https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EJFm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F66137a9b-260a-4cfa-adf3-c02c069dabd9_712x351.png, donation page, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!AVfs!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F16499732-4a26-43a0-8cd2-9dc38d5c6ac5_971x306.png, review, “comic book time.”, in 1974, listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.”, in a Nineties grunge band, 8, take place by July 4, 2021, house-sitting the White House, “swift.”, civil war, snake venom in the water supply, Law of 22 Prairial

But I don’t just need to guess based on comments and donation messages. In this realm, I can appeal to personal experience. I work in the broader world of American right-of-center politics, and we encounter Real Raw News believers constantly. We get emails from people who confidently insist the public-facing news of the day is fake, and the truth about the events at Gitmo will soon be revealed. At public Q&A events, we’ve fielded questions from genuinely nervous and worried people, who complain about their friends losing hope and being blackpilled by the news, and want to know why there hasn’t been more effort to share what’s “really” going on. A friend of mine who served in the Trump administration has described attending parties where, when he mentioned looking for a post-admin job, he received knowing looks and wink-wink-nudge-nudge remarks from people signaling they knew what was “really” going on. Somehow and someway, a lot of people believe or half-believe or badly want to believe this stuff. And where a lot of people do anything, there are takeaways to be found! In my three-plus years of reading all news that is both real and raw, here is what I’ve found. Conspiracies Evolve Like Comic Book Lore In his review of the Alexander Romance, Scott remarked that figures like Alexander the Great or Hercules were, essentially, the pre-modern versions of Batman: Stories about them are a genre, with countless different variations and stylistic choices that evolve over time, with just a few set principles guiding all of them. The Real Raw Newsiverse, and other modern conspiracy theories, also function like comic book lore. Just like Batman, and just like Hercules, “Donald Trump” has become a genre. Fake news stories about him and his Deep State enemies have a few core premises (adrenochrome, pedophile cabals, there is a Plan and we should Trust It) but endless room for variation past that point. Fans of comic books, soap operas, or The Simpsons might be familiar with something TVTropes calls “comic book time.” Certain facets of a fictional reality are locked in place, and with the passage of time everything else is gradually retconned to maintain the status quo. In season 2 of the Simpsons, Homer and Marge started dating in 1974, in Season 3 Marge becomes pregnant with Bart in 1980 (after a date watching The Empire Strikes Back), and in season 4 it’s revealed that Homer missed the Moon Landing to listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.” Tragically, though, The Simpsons kept going past season 10, and if Homer was 18 in 1974 that would make him eligible for a full Social Security benefit today. So in 2008, the continuity changed so that Homer was in a Nineties grunge band just before marrying Marge8. The Simpsons writers have avoided rejiggering the canon since, but if they do, they’ll have to confront the fact that 30-something Homer and Marge are now millennials, and in a decade they’ll be members of Gen Z. You may live to see a Simpsons flashback episode about Homer and Marge living as hipsters in Brooklyn during the 2010s (truly, we live in cursed times.) But the same phenomenon exists in the world of conspiracies. Instead of a consistent, elaborate canon, what we have is a few story beats with a lot of customization and the occasional retcon. When Baxter first began posting his stories, a core part of the narrative was that Donald Trump still secretly had all the powers of the presidency and was still in command of the entire U.S. military command. Early articles promised that Trump’s apparent loss of office was only a temporary ruse, necessary to expose the worst elements of the Deep State, but that Trump’s triumphal return to power would take place by July 4, 2021. The national media might have put on a song and dance suggesting otherwise, but behind the scenes, loyal military forces were the real ones in control. This control even extended to the military helpfully house-sitting the White House and not letting Biden use it. Despite his illegitimate victory, Biden met an unwelcome surprise when he arrived at the White House on January 20. Instead of getting a ceremonial greeting, he and Kamala Harris were stopped by National Guard and U.S. Marines at the barbwire fence encircling the White House. The Marines informed them that the military had assumed control of the Executive Branch and instructed them to vacate the area. When Harris belligerently said, “Move aside, we’re president now,” the Marines locked the gate. […] To avoid shame and maintain an illusion of power, Biden’s people concocted a ruse, supported by his media allies, to deceive the American public into believing he had won a fair election and had moved into the White House on schedule. Inside Actor/Producer Tyler Perry’s 300-acre Atlanta estate sits a three-story stucco replica of the commander-in-chief’s residence, which he originally built as a set piece for a television show. […] Although the replicant White House is built to 80% scale, on television and in images it’s indistinguishable from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Biden and Harris have been using the facsimile to feign leadership and impose despotic rule on the nation. Of course, July 4 came and went, with Trump’s return nowhere to be seen, so the canon simply updated: In the new narrative, the military had been conducting a year-long election fraud audit on Trump’s behalf, the results were nearly ready for public release, and Trump’s return would simply be “swift.” But no swift return has transpired, and so as the 2024 election has approached, the lore has evolved in the direction of Trump authentically running in this election and simply reclaiming power by winning it. As time has passed, more subtle changes have had to pile up. Early on, RRN reported that Joe Biden was a brain dead semi-corpse being held at Walter Reed, and any public appearances by “Biden” were one of several actors. But after four years of Let’s Go Brandon, Biden himself has become a more popular villain, and so quietly references to his brain-dead status have disappeared. In the early days of RRN, the military was firmly behind Trump and any implication that Biden held the powers of commander-in-chief was a media-fueled sham. But as time has passed, Trump being the “real” commander-in-chief over a loyal military has evolved into a reality where there are two American militaries, a “White Hat” faction loyal to Trump and “Black Hats” loyal to Biden. Early stories implied the White Hats were more numerous, but recent stories have implied the opposite, with the White Hats an elite force that often wins battles decisively while badly outnumbered. A secret purge has gradually become a secret civil war, specifically one with frequent war crimes: White Hat forces in Maui have eradicated or repelled all but a handful of the felonious FEMA agents who began terrorizing the tropical paradise in the aftermath of the inexplicable blaze that razed Lahaina and surrounding towns in early August, a source in General Eric M. Smith’s office told Real Raw News. Since mid-August, United States Marines have fought with FEMA patrols in Lahaina, Kaanapali, Wailuku, Maalaea, and Pukalani, and the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of approximately 475 federal goons and, alas, 34 valiant Marines. The Marines died upholding the Constitution of the United States; the feds died trying to defend the criminal Biden regime. […] “The Marines died valorously,” our source said. “We ain’t taking FEMA prisoners from the rank and file, only the key players. General Smith made it clear it’s weapons-free. Those bastards know damn well they’re following unlawful orders, and they’ll pay the price.” I think the ever-evolving nature of conspiracies is actually pretty important to psychologically grasping their appeal. I have a friend who is a big believer in 9/11 Trutherism. He once compelled me to watch the documentary “The New Pearl Harbor,” an exhausting 5-hour film promoting 9/11 conspiracies. If one actually watches, one quickly discovers that a lot of 9/11 conspiracy theories are mutually exclusive, or at least don’t mesh well together: One conspiracy argues that fighter jets were intentionally diverted the wrong direction to keep them from shooting down the hijacked jets approaching New York, while another conspiracy suggests that United 93 was shot down, and it was all covered up. In some versions, the planes didn’t hit the Twin Towers at all. Sometimes Bush did it, and sometimes Israel did it, and so on. Similarly, in my career I’ve worked adjacent to people who, like RRN, were very hostile to Covid-19 shots. That hostility made them sequentially endorse wildly different assertions about how the vaccines worked. Sometimes, the vaccines contain heavy metals. Sometimes, they contain hydra DNA to turn recipients into partially non-human chimeras. Sometimes, the vaccines are a depopulation agent. Sometimes, they’re a mind-control agent, or a killswitch that can be activated by self-assembling nanomachinery. One viral documentary in 2022 claimed that Covid was caused by snake venom in the water supply, and that Covid vaccines were an additional dose of snake venom to keep people sick (all this, of course, because the snake is Satan’s animal). What stands out isn’t the silliness of these particular theories, but that I saw them sequentially endorsed by the same people. Some of these people are smart enough to notice inconsistencies, at least when they’re pointed out, so why don’t they bother them? To some extent, I think it’s for the same reason people don’t care that every Batman story doesn’t perfectly line up. Consistency isn’t the point! What actually matters is enjoying individual stories and the wider genre they fit into. Covid vaccine haters don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, they’re driven by a core impulse of “distrust the new vaccine that people I distrust are promoting,” and every conceivably story or tale that feeds that genre of thought is, for them, worthwhile. Similarly, Real Raw News fans don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, I think their core impulse is, ironically, profound disappointment in how the Trump administration failed to deliver. Trump shook up the American political landscape more than anyone in living memory, and promised sweeping changes to every level of American government, yet his actual administration proved rather disorderly, changed far less than was promised, and then lost power after one term. For many, this simply prompted a revision in how they saw Trump. But for others, the preferred response is to embrace a fantasy reality where Trump is a superhero. I actually think the reverse side of this explains things like the durability of Russiagate: If you’re a normal American liberal, everything Trump says is offensive and piggish, but to justify their level of disdain for them, many needed to elevate his evil to the level of treason, even if that never really made any sense. It can't just be that Trump is an egotistical jerk or a narcissist or whatever. He's got to be a traitor who's going to end American democracy. People Crave Extreme, Over-the-Top, and Underhanded Solutions. At the height of the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, the Committee of Public Safety pushed through the Law of 22 Prairial. The law simplified the procedures of the country’s Revolutionary Tribunal by: Defining a whole heap of activities as criminal treason, including “creating scarcity,” disparaging the National Convention, “inspiring discouragement,” and spreading fake news.

Inline links: review, “comic book time.”, in 1974, listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.”, in a Nineties grunge band, 8, take place by July 4, 2021, house-sitting the White House, “swift.”, civil war, snake venom in the water supply, Law of 22 Prairial

Making the sentence for all crimes identical: Mandatory death penalty9. As far as perfidious methods to deliberately destroy due process and engineer mass executions go, the Law of 22 Prairial is pretty much unmatched in human history. And yet: In the roughly two months of the law’s existence, about one-fifth of defendants were still acquitted! No such good fortune exists in Gitmo. The White Hats’ secret tribunal is a tribunal of blood. In three years of activity, as far as I know exactly one person has escaped conviction: Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, freed after a direct intervention from Trump. A tiny handful of others have received decades-long prison sentences, but even they tend to meet bad ends. Bill Clinton received a life sentence, only to mysteriously die in prison, perhaps murdered by his daughter Chelsea, who wasn’t really his daughter, but nevertheless soon wound up executed herself. Not only does the rate of death sentences at Gitmo seem to exceed 90 percent, Baxter makes very little effort to portray the proceedings as fair or just. Upon arrest, instead of being read their rights, detainees are informed that they have no rights, and are instead “enemy combatants.” Yet despite being classified as “enemy combatants,” defendants are almost without exception charged with treason. The U.S. Constitution defines treason narrowly as levying war against the United States, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies, and requires at least two witnesses to the same specific act, but in Gitmo the label is invoked with a liberality that would make Robespierre blush. “Traitors” have been arrested and convicted for telling troops not to attend Trump rallies and for ruling against Donald Trump in court. Defense attorneys are denied access to evidence pre-trial, and many defendants get no lawyers at all. Trials work a lot like Phoenix Wright, in that at any point the three-officer panel10 can simply declare they’ve seen enough evidence and pronounce a conviction with death sentence immediately. In the case of former Tom Hanks co-star, this has happened within five minutes. Appeals are non-existent. The actual executions sometimes involve tormenting the condemned with fake escape attempts or pardons: The driver told Whitmer he needed to make a pitstop to grab her “exoneration paperwork.” Then Whitmer saw the clearing and the gallows and Vice Adm. Crandall. And the hangman and a Navy chaplain standing atop the gallows. “You lied to me,” Whitmer bellowed. “Minor error, not a lie,” the driver replied. […] The admiral instructed the hangman to flip the switch, and a second later, Whitmer was swinging from the rope, a guttural gurgling sound escaping her lips. She was officially pronounced dead several minutes later. “Another Covid queen out of the way,” Adm. Crandall said. During the treason trial of Hillary Clinton crucial evidence is provided by former campaign manager John Podesta, who accepts a plea deal for life in prison in return for testifying about Clinton’s child-trafficking activities. But after Clinton had safely been hanged, the military tribunal simply decided to revoke Podesta’s plea deal because, well, they felt like it. “Even though he’s not prosecuting Podesta’s case, Vice Adm. John G. Hannink made the decision to renege on the deal. He’s the one who offered it. The severity of Podesta’s crimes matched Clinton’s—a lot of stuff they did in tandem, together. When you think about it, there’s really no reason why he should get special treatment. He’s a sodomist [sic.]11. Before breaking the deal, he called Trump,” our source said. But Trump, our source noted, recused himself from the decision-making process, as he didn’t want his personal feelings of the defendant to interfere with military justice. […] “If the court wants him to hang, let him hang,” Trump reportedly said. As it happens, John Podesta was actually executed by firing squad. But hey, at least he got a trial. Sometimes, particularly evil members of the Deep State are simply beaten to death in their cells, or thrown overboard. The figure of Vladimir Putin is also a vessel for fans’ darker desires. Trump and his American allies, being properly heroic, at least take down their foes gradually. Putin’s Russians, on the other hand, live up to movie stereotypes. The Army … pulled the condemned from their cells 25 at a time, binding the criminals to logs staked in the ground and blindfolding them. They had received no trials, last meals, Last Rites, or final words. A firing squad taught them the consequences of vaccine adherence. The Army didn’t bother removing the corpses before lining up the next 25; they simply let the dead bodies flop to the ground and forced the next group to witness the ineluctable fate awaiting them, the outcome of their insouciance12. What to make of all this? Honestly, I’m not entirely sure, and the takeaway might simply be “Michael Baxter needs to mix it up to keep the site interesting.” It might also speak to the bewildering complexity of modern life and the desire for something simpler and more cinematic. As people sometimes complain, Nothing Ever Happens. But on RRN, the Happening is relentless and constant. The normal legal system is aggravatingly glacial, taking years to resolve cases and often imposing meager sentences when a case finally concludes. Most of one’s political enemies, even if they lose an election, simply lateral to a high-paying private sector job or at worst fade into obscurity. But in a real, raw legal system, evil is sniffed out with much greater alacrity; the bad people are so obvious and their crimes so glaring that they can be taken out extrajudicially with no worry about a miscarriage of justice. The apparently-complex conspiracy cinematic universes is actually appealing because it makes the world far, far simpler. The bad people are all maximally bad, deserving of hastily-dispensed maximum justice. Some of this is worrisome, too: If thousands of relatively ordinary people are willing to believe in ad-hoc military tribunals executing people with minimal due process for crimes like “ruling against Donald Trump in court,” that could be a sign that modern constitutional society is a more superficial veneer than one would hope. The World’s Laziest Conspiracy One of the most striking things about both Real Raw News and the Qanon movement it spun off from is that in some ways they are un-conspiracies. Your more traditional conspiracy, about the Rothschilds or the World Economic Forum or the Lizard People, tells you that normal political engagement is pointless, as all that really matters is confronting and defeating the hidden forces manipulating or controlling events. But RRN is a conspiracy theory that calls for total inaction. RRN believers don’t need to raise money or write letters to the editor or join political activism groups or even vote. The only thing expected of an adherent is to “trust the plan.” They aren’t even waiting for a promised future deliverance. Deliverance is, in fact, happening right now – merely off-screen. It’s actually funny to me that the (official) press freaks out so much about Qanon, and its potential to inspire violence. Qanon and RRN tell the public that whatever has them down and depressed shouldn’t, because it’s all fake, and there are unseen heroes protecting them in the shadows. Don’t worry, just have faith and know things will work out. Real Raw News is the opiate of the digital masses. Real Raw News is the exact sort of conspiracy theory that the Deep State, if it exists, should want to exist and be popular. It’s the sort of conspiracy that the Deep State, if it exists, might deliberately invent. Do I think that’s what happened here? Not at all – Real Raw News is way too much work for a government employee. Trump Will Never Die But what about five years from now? What if there were some technological change that would make it far, far easier to produce evidence of a sweeping conspiracy theory? That’s right, this review is actually about AI13. The rise of realistic artificial intelligence has created a lot of fretting about deepfakes, and it’s also created a lot of fretting about porn. Will young men really bother with the pain and difficulty and awkwardness of dating in real life, when they can just create a custom AI girlfriend to their exact specifications, then simulate sex with her using virtual reality? Will women bother with seeking out a boyfriend if they can use an LLM to give them perfect 24/7 empathy and emotional validation? Questions of sex and relationships are converging on Robert Nozick’s experience machine – will people still seek the real thing if artificial substitutes are increasingly realistic as alternatives? But for some reason, nobody is asking this about the news. Oh, sure, people have fretted that a deepfake video might smear a person’s reputation or swing an election. But as the AI revolution continues, a lot more becomes possible. Remember in 2022, when a homeless guy broke into Nancy Pelosi’s home and attacked her husband with a hammer? For a while, conspiracies flourished that Paul Pelosi was actually having some kind of erotic tryst with his attacker, and that police body camera footage might confirm this. The footage came out and, of course, offered no evidence of this. But now imagine a world where, on Twitter, an anonymous source claims that they have the real body camera footage, and it does show that Paul Pelosi was having a lovers’ quarrel with his attacker. The other, mundane footage is a deepfake, released by police to cover things up, or invented from scratch by the press or the Democratic Party or both working together. In this world, how many people end up believing fabricated proof of Paul Pelosi’s gay lover? And before you dismiss this as all totally ridiculous, remember that lots of people believed this story with no evidence at all. Many thousands of people have deluded themselves into thinking that Real Raw News is true simply because they badly want it to be true. It indulges their personal political beliefs, affirms the just-world fallacy, and lets them feel as though they possess “secret” knowledge of the world, simply by reading a blog nobody else takes seriously. But in a sense, all of us have a little of the Real Raw News believer in us. We’re prone to confirmation bias – we like reading stories and studies that confirm our pre-held beliefs, and we’re more likely to avoid or ignore those that don’t. Sometimes, we get too excited and fall for stories that are misleading, or out of context, or dishonestly presented. Sometimes, we have radically different interpretations of the same event caught on camera. Even if we know the world isn’t fair, we relish stories that let us pretend otherwise. So…how are those biases going to work when anyone can quickly create hyper-realistic looking “proof” for any story? Already, AI-fabricated images and videos are enough to bamboozle your mom on Facebook. Soon, they might be realistic enough to fool everybody without special training, and eventually they might be so realistic they can fool just about anyone. Right now, Real Raw News is a simplistic WordPress site that uses stock photos for its imagery. But with us approaching a future where intelligence itself is too cheap to meter, we may not be far from a world where every story, however preposterous, can have a convincing 4k video of it happening. Donald Trump can be president forever, with all the evidence one could ever want. Every day of Hillary Clinton’s military tribunal will have a full day of court footage, plus a condensed highlight reel for the people who want to skip boring legal procedure. Every Marine/FEMA battle in Maui will have authentic-looking combat footage. Every Gitmo execution will be proven through “leaked” bootleg recordings of gallows and firing squads. Imagine you are an ordinary, mildly engaged American citizen. You live far from the halls of power, you work an ordinary job, and whatever your feelings on political issues, you rarely see elections translate in a clear way to your own daily life. You might be interested in Washington, but Washington really isn’t that interested in you. Online, the world throws a million potential narratives at you. In some of them, the world is a confusing mess of moral gray areas. In others, the people you care about are winning. But in some narratives, you’re the hero, the people you like do good things, and the bad guys get what they deserve. The superficial evidence for all of these narratives is about equally convincing, at a glance. Look outside, and it’s hard to see the impact of any of the stories. Your entire understanding of reality is mediated through what sites you choose to read and what videos you choose to watch. As a politically marginal person, it won’t matter what you as an individual choose to believe. So, what happens if you choose to believe the story you find most enjoyable? And what if millions of others choose the same? 1 “Wait a minute, this is about a fake news website? Why is it in this contest?” Excellent question! To that, I offer several answers: A collection of fake news blog posts may as well be considered a long-running series of short stories, and I hope that we’d be allowed to review the collected short stories of an author even if they were never technically compiled into a book.

Inline links: 9, Jeff Sessions, received a life sentence, die in prison, executed herself, telling troops not to attend Trump rallies, ruling against Donald Trump in court, 10, within five minutes., tormenting, 11, firing squad, thrown overboard, 12, Nothing Ever Happens, 13, experience machine, 1

Marine Corps1 mentions across 1 issues

Marine Corps is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 26, 2024 and July 26, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "a Marine Corps major". It most often appears alongside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, 2020 election, 2024 book review contest.

Reference entry: Marine Corps
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 26, 2024
Last seen: July 26, 2024

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: Real Raw News July 26, 2024

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue 1 shared issues
2020 election 1 shared issues
2024 book review contest 1 shared issues
11 1 shared issues
11 trutherism 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Real Raw News

July 26, 2024 · Original source

The lack of evidence that all this is happening is entirely explained through coordinated media silence as well as the widespread use of body doubles and clones. The heart of Real Raw News, and the source of most of its entertainment value, is its accounts of the supposed secret military tribunals occurring at America’s Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, better known as Gitmo2. For more than three years, the site has produced one article after another describing the arrest, trial, and execution of dozens of major and not-so-major figures in American life. Hillary Clinton? Arrested, tried, executed. Bill Gates? Arrested, tried, executed. Dick Cheney? Fled the country via a secret underground tunnel to a CIA airfield, but then returned to America on vacation for some reason3, arrested, tried, executed. George W. Bush, Hunter Biden, Anthony Fauci, Gavin Newsom, Mark Milley, Victoria Nuland, Tom Hanks (?), Brian Stelter (???) – All arrested and executed, in turn4. Almost all defendants are hanged, which actually is not the method prescribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but has the advantage of being far more cinematic. It would be easy for all of this to get old, but like with variations in classical music, subtle differences to each iteration enrich the whole. Some defendants desperately try to deny responsibility for their crimes. Some arrogantly taunt the tribunal, assuming until the very end that they are untouchable. Some literally scream as though demon-possessed. Some fake senility or amnesia. But crucially, all of them face justice, one way or another. An entry published just before this contest’s deadline is a lovely example: Representing himself, [Fulton County Superior Court Judge Scott] McAfee in opening remarks talked himself into an early verdict. He said no one and nothing, not even imprisonment, would prevent him from destroying the Trump family. Handcuffed at the defense table, he glared at the panel and said he would topple the Trump empire, building by building, brick by brick, and wouldn’t rest until every Trump supporter was behind bars or dead. “Then I’ll take care of the people here and this place,” McAfee said. “Mr. McAfee, I’m told you are of sound mind and know where you are, right?” Admiral Stephens asked5. “I’m in a Kangaroo court in the Banana Republic of Trump, staring at a guy who couldn’t hack it in the real world, couldn’t run a private practice, get a partnership, or sit on a real bench, so he went into the military,” McAfee said. “Have you ever heard of Trump Derangement Syndrome, Mr. McAfee?” the Admiral asked. “Because you have the worst case I’ve seen, and I’ve seen several.” “Trump is finished. He’ll be in jail soon, and when he is, your house of cards collapses,” McAfee said. “It might seem that way, but it only seems that way,” the Admiral said. “You might as well find me guilty. I’ll never stop hating Trump and I’ll never stop working to demolish everything he stole. He was born guilty, and he’ll be guilty until the day he dies. That’ll be the only word on his gravestone: GUILTY!” McAfee shouted. The lead panelist, a Marine Corps major, politely interrupted: “Admiral, sir, we don’t have to hear any more. McAfee mocks this court, and we find him guilty of the treason charge. Additionally, we are in agreement he should hang for his crimes.” Admiral Stephens nodded contemplatively. “I side with these fine officers. Mr. McAfee, you are hereby sentenced to hang for treason against the United States of America.” His execution is scheduled for May 15. Yes, this is the judge of Trump’s criminal case in Fulton County. In the Real Raw News world, Trump’s various legal adventures are both real and fake at the same time. Apparently, Trump could completely ignore these proceedings, and the military in fact begs him to do so, but he chooses to place himself in danger from some unseen, Christ-like self-sacrificial motive. That motive, it appears, is getting evil judges to expose their bias by ruling against him, so that they can be arrested and executed for treason. The site often offers an alternative narrative regarding events in the official, Deep State-backed news narrative. When Colin Powell died, RRN was there to explain that he actually committed suicide, fearing arrest by the military. When former Tom Hanks co-star Peter Scolari died of cancer, RRN swooped in to attribute his demise to an unexpected military tribunal6. This pattern is one of the chief reasons fans cite for believing the site: Isn’t it incredible, they say, how some of the same people RRN reports the executions of just happen to have recently died or been hospitalized in the mainstream press? What are the odds? Perhaps surprisingly, the star figure in Real Raw News’s tapestry of blood is not Donald Trump; like Gandalf or Dumbledore, he is a heroic but distant and largely off-screen figure. Instead, the primary hero is Rear Admiral Darse Crandall, who dispenses lethal justice with shocking efficiency while always being ready with a good quip: Admiral Crandall ordered [Arizona Governor Katie] Hobbs not to intimidate the witness. “You lack decorum, detainee Hobbs, and your insouciance ends here. We revoke your right to further question this witness and ask the panel to render a verdict on the charges against you.” The admiral dismissed Jane Doe, and the panel unanimously found Hobbs guilty, recommending she hang to death. “I won’t let you do this to me,” Hobbs screeched. “It’s already done,” said Admiral Crandall. “And have a Merry Christmas—in whatever afterlife you wind up in.” He scheduled her execution for December 22. Adm. Crandall is in fact a real person, currently serving as Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Admiral Crandall seems like a nice and professional fellow, and I badly want to know what he makes of his alternate persona. I like to hope that he enjoys it; maybe he jokingly warns his subordinates to do their jobs right or else they’ll be arrested and executed. If anybody knows otherwise, please do not disabuse me of this fantasy. Lesser fake news auteurs will puke out lame one-and-done articles about the moon landing or JFK or whatever, with zero internal consistency. Baxter is better. His military tribunals are reported out in detail. Even the most minor figures receive dedicated articles for their arrest, their trial, and their demise, but the biggest names receive genuine weeks-long productions. Hillary Clinton’s tribunal spans five days, until damning testimony from her former aide (and lover) Huma Abedin sends her to the gallows. Former president Bush’s arrest and tribunal is a ten-part epic lasting nearly two months, and includes details that are eccentric even by 9/11 truther standards: Supposedly, the real death toll of 9/11 (which Bush orchestrated) was 7,000, but Bush deemed this number too high to win reelection, so the real number was suppressed and 4,000 families were silenced with enormous bribes that also served to stimulate the economy. Good thing all the plotting was caught on tape, or he might have gotten away with it. Baxter never rushes things. Remember how the Colorado Supreme Court tried to kick Trump off the primary ballot in late 2023? Lesser fake newsers might have had the entire 4-vote anti-Trump majority arrested at once, but Baxter is cannier. In his reporting, one justice was arrested immediately, but the other three went on the run , and took months to capture. As of this writing we’re still waiting for their tribunal. I hope it’s a barn-burner! Baxter knows that while crass wish fulfillment is easy, truly great stories need formidable villains. Amidst the many arrests and hangings of Baxter’s saga are cinematic setbacks. Sometimes, the Marines don’t get their man: [Biden White House Covid-19 response coordinator Ashish] Jha was five feet away from his vehicle when two Marines with an arrest warrant approached him, informing him that he was being placed under arrest on charges of mass murder. Jha erupted in laughter, saying, “You don’t even know who we are.” He exploded in a crimson fireball that blew his and the Marines’ bodies to bits throughout the parking lot. […] The Marines brought what remains they could to Fort Bragg, where medical examiners deduced that Jha was not Jha, but a clone in which someone had planted a subdermal detonator connected to HMX explosives. And then, there is the looming presence of RRN’s chief villain: Former U.S. President Barack Obama. Members of the deep state make a warped pledge of allegiance to “The United States of Ukraine” and to “one world under Obama.” Other arms of the deep state might be taken down, but Obama himself always lurks in the shadows, controlling and commanding. The occasional attempt to take him down runs into the kind of problems you’d expect: “Why?” Obama gurgled and died. Inexplicably, the body spontaneously combusted, starting at both hands and spreading to the arms and chest. Special Forces tried extinguishing the flames with sand and water, but their efforts were in vain—the flames were rapidly charring burnt flesh. “Check his feet,” the Special Forces lead, who had been trained to spot body doubles and clones, called out. They swiftly yanked off Obama’s socks and sneakers and saw he had flat feet, and that his sneakers had been augmented to fit people with fallen arches. They pulled down his pants; Obama had no genitals, a telltale indicator of cloning. The body became too hot to touch and was soon consumed by fire. Like Bob Ross, Michael Baxter has no mistakes, only happy little accidents. In late 2021, RRN reported on the conviction of the late Chelsea Clinton’s husband, Marc Mezvinsky. Being only a lackey in the Clintons’ plot to abduct children and sell them on the black market, Mezvinsky received a comparatively lenient life sentence. But wait! Two months later, Gitmo’s chaplain mentioned in passing that he had attended Mezvinsky’s execution. Eagle-eyed readers saw the discrepancy and cried foul. But Baxter didn’t miss a beat. When Baxter reported on the arrest of former Obama adviser David Axelrod, only to publish no follow-up, he had a ready explanation a year later: Axelrod had been executed without trial by being thrown out of an airplane, and it took months for Baxter to learn the truth. I’ll admit, I find Baxter’s efforts to maintain narrative integrity incredibly charming, given how they clash with the latent absurdity of the whole endeavor. Like most fictional universes, the Real Raw Newsiverse crumbles if you think about it too hard. If there are White Hat and Black Hat partitions of the military, how does military procurement work? How do newly-enlisted personnel know which faction they are joining? Do the two factions have separate recruiters? And when literally everyone carries a basic video camera in their pocket, and social media access is universal, how are major battles being fought on American soil with zero video evidence anywhere? At the meta level, the entire construct gets even sillier. The conceit of the site is that Trump has secretly left power to entrap his foes…yet then his allies go and blab the entire “real” story to an online blog. The cover for this is that the masses simply don’t believe it, but you know who would definitely know whether the blog is accurate? The Deep State! Yet despite this, in RRN lore sinister actors from Andrew Cuomo to Oprah are always caught off guard when Delta Force7 smashes down their door and zip-ties their hands for a one-way trip to Cuba. Okay, But So What? You might be tempted to think this is all irrelevant rambling into the void. But if you think that, you’re mistaken. The thing is, Real Raw News is popular. Really popular. It got more than 2 million page visits in January. It’s a lot more popular than this blog and even outdraws some established publications like The Nation. “Okay, views are views, but does anyone really believe this?” you may ask, perhaps derisively. Well, it falls to me to say that yes, yes they do. The typical RRN article gets hundreds upon hundreds of comments. And sure, a lot of them are “My mother is being paid $2,000/day working from home” spam, but most of them are not. Hundreds upon hundreds of comments are from readers grateful to Baxter for sharing the “truth.” Even more unsettling are comments from people who spot a problem with the occasional story, but still trust Baxter overall. Baxter has a donation page on Christian crowdfunding site GiveSendGo. It has raised more than $210,000 and donations continue to pour in on a daily basis. Sure, some donation messages clearly indicate people who are in on the joke…but many more do not. But I don’t just need to guess based on comments and donation messages. In this realm, I can appeal to personal experience. I work in the broader world of American right-of-center politics, and we encounter Real Raw News believers constantly. We get emails from people who confidently insist the public-facing news of the day is fake, and the truth about the events at Gitmo will soon be revealed. At public Q&A events, we’ve fielded questions from genuinely nervous and worried people, who complain about their friends losing hope and being blackpilled by the news, and want to know why there hasn’t been more effort to share what’s “really” going on. A friend of mine who served in the Trump administration has described attending parties where, when he mentioned looking for a post-admin job, he received knowing looks and wink-wink-nudge-nudge remarks from people signaling they knew what was “really” going on. Somehow and someway, a lot of people believe or half-believe or badly want to believe this stuff. And where a lot of people do anything, there are takeaways to be found! In my three-plus years of reading all news that is both real and raw, here is what I’ve found. Conspiracies Evolve Like Comic Book Lore In his review of the Alexander Romance, Scott remarked that figures like Alexander the Great or Hercules were, essentially, the pre-modern versions of Batman: Stories about them are a genre, with countless different variations and stylistic choices that evolve over time, with just a few set principles guiding all of them. The Real Raw Newsiverse, and other modern conspiracy theories, also function like comic book lore. Just like Batman, and just like Hercules, “Donald Trump” has become a genre. Fake news stories about him and his Deep State enemies have a few core premises (adrenochrome, pedophile cabals, there is a Plan and we should Trust It) but endless room for variation past that point. Fans of comic books, soap operas, or The Simpsons might be familiar with something TVTropes calls “comic book time.” Certain facets of a fictional reality are locked in place, and with the passage of time everything else is gradually retconned to maintain the status quo. In season 2 of the Simpsons, Homer and Marge started dating in 1974, in Season 3 Marge becomes pregnant with Bart in 1980 (after a date watching The Empire Strikes Back), and in season 4 it’s revealed that Homer missed the Moon Landing to listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.” Tragically, though, The Simpsons kept going past season 10, and if Homer was 18 in 1974 that would make him eligible for a full Social Security benefit today. So in 2008, the continuity changed so that Homer was in a Nineties grunge band just before marrying Marge8. The Simpsons writers have avoided rejiggering the canon since, but if they do, they’ll have to confront the fact that 30-something Homer and Marge are now millennials, and in a decade they’ll be members of Gen Z. You may live to see a Simpsons flashback episode about Homer and Marge living as hipsters in Brooklyn during the 2010s (truly, we live in cursed times.) But the same phenomenon exists in the world of conspiracies. Instead of a consistent, elaborate canon, what we have is a few story beats with a lot of customization and the occasional retcon. When Baxter first began posting his stories, a core part of the narrative was that Donald Trump still secretly had all the powers of the presidency and was still in command of the entire U.S. military command. Early articles promised that Trump’s apparent loss of office was only a temporary ruse, necessary to expose the worst elements of the Deep State, but that Trump’s triumphal return to power would take place by July 4, 2021. The national media might have put on a song and dance suggesting otherwise, but behind the scenes, loyal military forces were the real ones in control. This control even extended to the military helpfully house-sitting the White House and not letting Biden use it. Despite his illegitimate victory, Biden met an unwelcome surprise when he arrived at the White House on January 20. Instead of getting a ceremonial greeting, he and Kamala Harris were stopped by National Guard and U.S. Marines at the barbwire fence encircling the White House. The Marines informed them that the military had assumed control of the Executive Branch and instructed them to vacate the area. When Harris belligerently said, “Move aside, we’re president now,” the Marines locked the gate. […] To avoid shame and maintain an illusion of power, Biden’s people concocted a ruse, supported by his media allies, to deceive the American public into believing he had won a fair election and had moved into the White House on schedule. Inside Actor/Producer Tyler Perry’s 300-acre Atlanta estate sits a three-story stucco replica of the commander-in-chief’s residence, which he originally built as a set piece for a television show. […] Although the replicant White House is built to 80% scale, on television and in images it’s indistinguishable from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Biden and Harris have been using the facsimile to feign leadership and impose despotic rule on the nation. Of course, July 4 came and went, with Trump’s return nowhere to be seen, so the canon simply updated: In the new narrative, the military had been conducting a year-long election fraud audit on Trump’s behalf, the results were nearly ready for public release, and Trump’s return would simply be “swift.” But no swift return has transpired, and so as the 2024 election has approached, the lore has evolved in the direction of Trump authentically running in this election and simply reclaiming power by winning it. As time has passed, more subtle changes have had to pile up. Early on, RRN reported that Joe Biden was a brain dead semi-corpse being held at Walter Reed, and any public appearances by “Biden” were one of several actors. But after four years of Let’s Go Brandon, Biden himself has become a more popular villain, and so quietly references to his brain-dead status have disappeared. In the early days of RRN, the military was firmly behind Trump and any implication that Biden held the powers of commander-in-chief was a media-fueled sham. But as time has passed, Trump being the “real” commander-in-chief over a loyal military has evolved into a reality where there are two American militaries, a “White Hat” faction loyal to Trump and “Black Hats” loyal to Biden. Early stories implied the White Hats were more numerous, but recent stories have implied the opposite, with the White Hats an elite force that often wins battles decisively while badly outnumbered. A secret purge has gradually become a secret civil war, specifically one with frequent war crimes: White Hat forces in Maui have eradicated or repelled all but a handful of the felonious FEMA agents who began terrorizing the tropical paradise in the aftermath of the inexplicable blaze that razed Lahaina and surrounding towns in early August, a source in General Eric M. Smith’s office told Real Raw News. Since mid-August, United States Marines have fought with FEMA patrols in Lahaina, Kaanapali, Wailuku, Maalaea, and Pukalani, and the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of approximately 475 federal goons and, alas, 34 valiant Marines. The Marines died upholding the Constitution of the United States; the feds died trying to defend the criminal Biden regime. […] “The Marines died valorously,” our source said. “We ain’t taking FEMA prisoners from the rank and file, only the key players. General Smith made it clear it’s weapons-free. Those bastards know damn well they’re following unlawful orders, and they’ll pay the price.” I think the ever-evolving nature of conspiracies is actually pretty important to psychologically grasping their appeal. I have a friend who is a big believer in 9/11 Trutherism. He once compelled me to watch the documentary “The New Pearl Harbor,” an exhausting 5-hour film promoting 9/11 conspiracies. If one actually watches, one quickly discovers that a lot of 9/11 conspiracy theories are mutually exclusive, or at least don’t mesh well together: One conspiracy argues that fighter jets were intentionally diverted the wrong direction to keep them from shooting down the hijacked jets approaching New York, while another conspiracy suggests that United 93 was shot down, and it was all covered up. In some versions, the planes didn’t hit the Twin Towers at all. Sometimes Bush did it, and sometimes Israel did it, and so on. Similarly, in my career I’ve worked adjacent to people who, like RRN, were very hostile to Covid-19 shots. That hostility made them sequentially endorse wildly different assertions about how the vaccines worked. Sometimes, the vaccines contain heavy metals. Sometimes, they contain hydra DNA to turn recipients into partially non-human chimeras. Sometimes, the vaccines are a depopulation agent. Sometimes, they’re a mind-control agent, or a killswitch that can be activated by self-assembling nanomachinery. One viral documentary in 2022 claimed that Covid was caused by snake venom in the water supply, and that Covid vaccines were an additional dose of snake venom to keep people sick (all this, of course, because the snake is Satan’s animal). What stands out isn’t the silliness of these particular theories, but that I saw them sequentially endorsed by the same people. Some of these people are smart enough to notice inconsistencies, at least when they’re pointed out, so why don’t they bother them? To some extent, I think it’s for the same reason people don’t care that every Batman story doesn’t perfectly line up. Consistency isn’t the point! What actually matters is enjoying individual stories and the wider genre they fit into. Covid vaccine haters don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, they’re driven by a core impulse of “distrust the new vaccine that people I distrust are promoting,” and every conceivably story or tale that feeds that genre of thought is, for them, worthwhile. Similarly, Real Raw News fans don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, I think their core impulse is, ironically, profound disappointment in how the Trump administration failed to deliver. Trump shook up the American political landscape more than anyone in living memory, and promised sweeping changes to every level of American government, yet his actual administration proved rather disorderly, changed far less than was promised, and then lost power after one term. For many, this simply prompted a revision in how they saw Trump. But for others, the preferred response is to embrace a fantasy reality where Trump is a superhero. I actually think the reverse side of this explains things like the durability of Russiagate: If you’re a normal American liberal, everything Trump says is offensive and piggish, but to justify their level of disdain for them, many needed to elevate his evil to the level of treason, even if that never really made any sense. It can't just be that Trump is an egotistical jerk or a narcissist or whatever. He's got to be a traitor who's going to end American democracy. People Crave Extreme, Over-the-Top, and Underhanded Solutions. At the height of the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, the Committee of Public Safety pushed through the Law of 22 Prairial. The law simplified the procedures of the country’s Revolutionary Tribunal by: Defining a whole heap of activities as criminal treason, including “creating scarcity,” disparaging the National Convention, “inspiring discouragement,” and spreading fake news.

Marines1 mentions across 1 issues

Marines is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 26, 2024 and July 26, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "two Marines with an arrest warrant approached him"; "It is always Delta Force, SEALs, or Marines who undertake military operations". It most often appears alongside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, 2020 election, 2024 book review contest.

Reference entry: Marines
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 26, 2024
Last seen: July 26, 2024

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: Real Raw News July 26, 2024

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue 1 shared issues
2020 election 1 shared issues
2024 book review contest 1 shared issues
11 1 shared issues
11 trutherism 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Real Raw News

July 26, 2024 · Original source

The lack of evidence that all this is happening is entirely explained through coordinated media silence as well as the widespread use of body doubles and clones. The heart of Real Raw News, and the source of most of its entertainment value, is its accounts of the supposed secret military tribunals occurring at America’s Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, better known as Gitmo2. For more than three years, the site has produced one article after another describing the arrest, trial, and execution of dozens of major and not-so-major figures in American life. Hillary Clinton? Arrested, tried, executed. Bill Gates? Arrested, tried, executed. Dick Cheney? Fled the country via a secret underground tunnel to a CIA airfield, but then returned to America on vacation for some reason3, arrested, tried, executed. George W. Bush, Hunter Biden, Anthony Fauci, Gavin Newsom, Mark Milley, Victoria Nuland, Tom Hanks (?), Brian Stelter (???) – All arrested and executed, in turn4. Almost all defendants are hanged, which actually is not the method prescribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but has the advantage of being far more cinematic. It would be easy for all of this to get old, but like with variations in classical music, subtle differences to each iteration enrich the whole. Some defendants desperately try to deny responsibility for their crimes. Some arrogantly taunt the tribunal, assuming until the very end that they are untouchable. Some literally scream as though demon-possessed. Some fake senility or amnesia. But crucially, all of them face justice, one way or another. An entry published just before this contest’s deadline is a lovely example: Representing himself, [Fulton County Superior Court Judge Scott] McAfee in opening remarks talked himself into an early verdict. He said no one and nothing, not even imprisonment, would prevent him from destroying the Trump family. Handcuffed at the defense table, he glared at the panel and said he would topple the Trump empire, building by building, brick by brick, and wouldn’t rest until every Trump supporter was behind bars or dead. “Then I’ll take care of the people here and this place,” McAfee said. “Mr. McAfee, I’m told you are of sound mind and know where you are, right?” Admiral Stephens asked5. “I’m in a Kangaroo court in the Banana Republic of Trump, staring at a guy who couldn’t hack it in the real world, couldn’t run a private practice, get a partnership, or sit on a real bench, so he went into the military,” McAfee said. “Have you ever heard of Trump Derangement Syndrome, Mr. McAfee?” the Admiral asked. “Because you have the worst case I’ve seen, and I’ve seen several.” “Trump is finished. He’ll be in jail soon, and when he is, your house of cards collapses,” McAfee said. “It might seem that way, but it only seems that way,” the Admiral said. “You might as well find me guilty. I’ll never stop hating Trump and I’ll never stop working to demolish everything he stole. He was born guilty, and he’ll be guilty until the day he dies. That’ll be the only word on his gravestone: GUILTY!” McAfee shouted. The lead panelist, a Marine Corps major, politely interrupted: “Admiral, sir, we don’t have to hear any more. McAfee mocks this court, and we find him guilty of the treason charge. Additionally, we are in agreement he should hang for his crimes.” Admiral Stephens nodded contemplatively. “I side with these fine officers. Mr. McAfee, you are hereby sentenced to hang for treason against the United States of America.” His execution is scheduled for May 15. Yes, this is the judge of Trump’s criminal case in Fulton County. In the Real Raw News world, Trump’s various legal adventures are both real and fake at the same time. Apparently, Trump could completely ignore these proceedings, and the military in fact begs him to do so, but he chooses to place himself in danger from some unseen, Christ-like self-sacrificial motive. That motive, it appears, is getting evil judges to expose their bias by ruling against him, so that they can be arrested and executed for treason. The site often offers an alternative narrative regarding events in the official, Deep State-backed news narrative. When Colin Powell died, RRN was there to explain that he actually committed suicide, fearing arrest by the military. When former Tom Hanks co-star Peter Scolari died of cancer, RRN swooped in to attribute his demise to an unexpected military tribunal6. This pattern is one of the chief reasons fans cite for believing the site: Isn’t it incredible, they say, how some of the same people RRN reports the executions of just happen to have recently died or been hospitalized in the mainstream press? What are the odds? Perhaps surprisingly, the star figure in Real Raw News’s tapestry of blood is not Donald Trump; like Gandalf or Dumbledore, he is a heroic but distant and largely off-screen figure. Instead, the primary hero is Rear Admiral Darse Crandall, who dispenses lethal justice with shocking efficiency while always being ready with a good quip: Admiral Crandall ordered [Arizona Governor Katie] Hobbs not to intimidate the witness. “You lack decorum, detainee Hobbs, and your insouciance ends here. We revoke your right to further question this witness and ask the panel to render a verdict on the charges against you.” The admiral dismissed Jane Doe, and the panel unanimously found Hobbs guilty, recommending she hang to death. “I won’t let you do this to me,” Hobbs screeched. “It’s already done,” said Admiral Crandall. “And have a Merry Christmas—in whatever afterlife you wind up in.” He scheduled her execution for December 22. Adm. Crandall is in fact a real person, currently serving as Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Admiral Crandall seems like a nice and professional fellow, and I badly want to know what he makes of his alternate persona. I like to hope that he enjoys it; maybe he jokingly warns his subordinates to do their jobs right or else they’ll be arrested and executed. If anybody knows otherwise, please do not disabuse me of this fantasy. Lesser fake news auteurs will puke out lame one-and-done articles about the moon landing or JFK or whatever, with zero internal consistency. Baxter is better. His military tribunals are reported out in detail. Even the most minor figures receive dedicated articles for their arrest, their trial, and their demise, but the biggest names receive genuine weeks-long productions. Hillary Clinton’s tribunal spans five days, until damning testimony from her former aide (and lover) Huma Abedin sends her to the gallows. Former president Bush’s arrest and tribunal is a ten-part epic lasting nearly two months, and includes details that are eccentric even by 9/11 truther standards: Supposedly, the real death toll of 9/11 (which Bush orchestrated) was 7,000, but Bush deemed this number too high to win reelection, so the real number was suppressed and 4,000 families were silenced with enormous bribes that also served to stimulate the economy. Good thing all the plotting was caught on tape, or he might have gotten away with it. Baxter never rushes things. Remember how the Colorado Supreme Court tried to kick Trump off the primary ballot in late 2023? Lesser fake newsers might have had the entire 4-vote anti-Trump majority arrested at once, but Baxter is cannier. In his reporting, one justice was arrested immediately, but the other three went on the run , and took months to capture. As of this writing we’re still waiting for their tribunal. I hope it’s a barn-burner! Baxter knows that while crass wish fulfillment is easy, truly great stories need formidable villains. Amidst the many arrests and hangings of Baxter’s saga are cinematic setbacks. Sometimes, the Marines don’t get their man: [Biden White House Covid-19 response coordinator Ashish] Jha was five feet away from his vehicle when two Marines with an arrest warrant approached him, informing him that he was being placed under arrest on charges of mass murder. Jha erupted in laughter, saying, “You don’t even know who we are.” He exploded in a crimson fireball that blew his and the Marines’ bodies to bits throughout the parking lot. […] The Marines brought what remains they could to Fort Bragg, where medical examiners deduced that Jha was not Jha, but a clone in which someone had planted a subdermal detonator connected to HMX explosives. And then, there is the looming presence of RRN’s chief villain: Former U.S. President Barack Obama. Members of the deep state make a warped pledge of allegiance to “The United States of Ukraine” and to “one world under Obama.” Other arms of the deep state might be taken down, but Obama himself always lurks in the shadows, controlling and commanding. The occasional attempt to take him down runs into the kind of problems you’d expect: “Why?” Obama gurgled and died. Inexplicably, the body spontaneously combusted, starting at both hands and spreading to the arms and chest. Special Forces tried extinguishing the flames with sand and water, but their efforts were in vain—the flames were rapidly charring burnt flesh. “Check his feet,” the Special Forces lead, who had been trained to spot body doubles and clones, called out. They swiftly yanked off Obama’s socks and sneakers and saw he had flat feet, and that his sneakers had been augmented to fit people with fallen arches. They pulled down his pants; Obama had no genitals, a telltale indicator of cloning. The body became too hot to touch and was soon consumed by fire. Like Bob Ross, Michael Baxter has no mistakes, only happy little accidents. In late 2021, RRN reported on the conviction of the late Chelsea Clinton’s husband, Marc Mezvinsky. Being only a lackey in the Clintons’ plot to abduct children and sell them on the black market, Mezvinsky received a comparatively lenient life sentence. But wait! Two months later, Gitmo’s chaplain mentioned in passing that he had attended Mezvinsky’s execution. Eagle-eyed readers saw the discrepancy and cried foul. But Baxter didn’t miss a beat. When Baxter reported on the arrest of former Obama adviser David Axelrod, only to publish no follow-up, he had a ready explanation a year later: Axelrod had been executed without trial by being thrown out of an airplane, and it took months for Baxter to learn the truth. I’ll admit, I find Baxter’s efforts to maintain narrative integrity incredibly charming, given how they clash with the latent absurdity of the whole endeavor. Like most fictional universes, the Real Raw Newsiverse crumbles if you think about it too hard. If there are White Hat and Black Hat partitions of the military, how does military procurement work? How do newly-enlisted personnel know which faction they are joining? Do the two factions have separate recruiters? And when literally everyone carries a basic video camera in their pocket, and social media access is universal, how are major battles being fought on American soil with zero video evidence anywhere? At the meta level, the entire construct gets even sillier. The conceit of the site is that Trump has secretly left power to entrap his foes…yet then his allies go and blab the entire “real” story to an online blog. The cover for this is that the masses simply don’t believe it, but you know who would definitely know whether the blog is accurate? The Deep State! Yet despite this, in RRN lore sinister actors from Andrew Cuomo to Oprah are always caught off guard when Delta Force7 smashes down their door and zip-ties their hands for a one-way trip to Cuba. Okay, But So What? You might be tempted to think this is all irrelevant rambling into the void. But if you think that, you’re mistaken. The thing is, Real Raw News is popular. Really popular. It got more than 2 million page visits in January. It’s a lot more popular than this blog and even outdraws some established publications like The Nation. “Okay, views are views, but does anyone really believe this?” you may ask, perhaps derisively. Well, it falls to me to say that yes, yes they do. The typical RRN article gets hundreds upon hundreds of comments. And sure, a lot of them are “My mother is being paid $2,000/day working from home” spam, but most of them are not. Hundreds upon hundreds of comments are from readers grateful to Baxter for sharing the “truth.” Even more unsettling are comments from people who spot a problem with the occasional story, but still trust Baxter overall. Baxter has a donation page on Christian crowdfunding site GiveSendGo. It has raised more than $210,000 and donations continue to pour in on a daily basis. Sure, some donation messages clearly indicate people who are in on the joke…but many more do not. But I don’t just need to guess based on comments and donation messages. In this realm, I can appeal to personal experience. I work in the broader world of American right-of-center politics, and we encounter Real Raw News believers constantly. We get emails from people who confidently insist the public-facing news of the day is fake, and the truth about the events at Gitmo will soon be revealed. At public Q&A events, we’ve fielded questions from genuinely nervous and worried people, who complain about their friends losing hope and being blackpilled by the news, and want to know why there hasn’t been more effort to share what’s “really” going on. A friend of mine who served in the Trump administration has described attending parties where, when he mentioned looking for a post-admin job, he received knowing looks and wink-wink-nudge-nudge remarks from people signaling they knew what was “really” going on. Somehow and someway, a lot of people believe or half-believe or badly want to believe this stuff. And where a lot of people do anything, there are takeaways to be found! In my three-plus years of reading all news that is both real and raw, here is what I’ve found. Conspiracies Evolve Like Comic Book Lore In his review of the Alexander Romance, Scott remarked that figures like Alexander the Great or Hercules were, essentially, the pre-modern versions of Batman: Stories about them are a genre, with countless different variations and stylistic choices that evolve over time, with just a few set principles guiding all of them. The Real Raw Newsiverse, and other modern conspiracy theories, also function like comic book lore. Just like Batman, and just like Hercules, “Donald Trump” has become a genre. Fake news stories about him and his Deep State enemies have a few core premises (adrenochrome, pedophile cabals, there is a Plan and we should Trust It) but endless room for variation past that point. Fans of comic books, soap operas, or The Simpsons might be familiar with something TVTropes calls “comic book time.” Certain facets of a fictional reality are locked in place, and with the passage of time everything else is gradually retconned to maintain the status quo. In season 2 of the Simpsons, Homer and Marge started dating in 1974, in Season 3 Marge becomes pregnant with Bart in 1980 (after a date watching The Empire Strikes Back), and in season 4 it’s revealed that Homer missed the Moon Landing to listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.” Tragically, though, The Simpsons kept going past season 10, and if Homer was 18 in 1974 that would make him eligible for a full Social Security benefit today. So in 2008, the continuity changed so that Homer was in a Nineties grunge band just before marrying Marge8. The Simpsons writers have avoided rejiggering the canon since, but if they do, they’ll have to confront the fact that 30-something Homer and Marge are now millennials, and in a decade they’ll be members of Gen Z. You may live to see a Simpsons flashback episode about Homer and Marge living as hipsters in Brooklyn during the 2010s (truly, we live in cursed times.) But the same phenomenon exists in the world of conspiracies. Instead of a consistent, elaborate canon, what we have is a few story beats with a lot of customization and the occasional retcon. When Baxter first began posting his stories, a core part of the narrative was that Donald Trump still secretly had all the powers of the presidency and was still in command of the entire U.S. military command. Early articles promised that Trump’s apparent loss of office was only a temporary ruse, necessary to expose the worst elements of the Deep State, but that Trump’s triumphal return to power would take place by July 4, 2021. The national media might have put on a song and dance suggesting otherwise, but behind the scenes, loyal military forces were the real ones in control. This control even extended to the military helpfully house-sitting the White House and not letting Biden use it. Despite his illegitimate victory, Biden met an unwelcome surprise when he arrived at the White House on January 20. Instead of getting a ceremonial greeting, he and Kamala Harris were stopped by National Guard and U.S. Marines at the barbwire fence encircling the White House. The Marines informed them that the military had assumed control of the Executive Branch and instructed them to vacate the area. When Harris belligerently said, “Move aside, we’re president now,” the Marines locked the gate. […] To avoid shame and maintain an illusion of power, Biden’s people concocted a ruse, supported by his media allies, to deceive the American public into believing he had won a fair election and had moved into the White House on schedule. Inside Actor/Producer Tyler Perry’s 300-acre Atlanta estate sits a three-story stucco replica of the commander-in-chief’s residence, which he originally built as a set piece for a television show. […] Although the replicant White House is built to 80% scale, on television and in images it’s indistinguishable from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Biden and Harris have been using the facsimile to feign leadership and impose despotic rule on the nation. Of course, July 4 came and went, with Trump’s return nowhere to be seen, so the canon simply updated: In the new narrative, the military had been conducting a year-long election fraud audit on Trump’s behalf, the results were nearly ready for public release, and Trump’s return would simply be “swift.” But no swift return has transpired, and so as the 2024 election has approached, the lore has evolved in the direction of Trump authentically running in this election and simply reclaiming power by winning it. As time has passed, more subtle changes have had to pile up. Early on, RRN reported that Joe Biden was a brain dead semi-corpse being held at Walter Reed, and any public appearances by “Biden” were one of several actors. But after four years of Let’s Go Brandon, Biden himself has become a more popular villain, and so quietly references to his brain-dead status have disappeared. In the early days of RRN, the military was firmly behind Trump and any implication that Biden held the powers of commander-in-chief was a media-fueled sham. But as time has passed, Trump being the “real” commander-in-chief over a loyal military has evolved into a reality where there are two American militaries, a “White Hat” faction loyal to Trump and “Black Hats” loyal to Biden. Early stories implied the White Hats were more numerous, but recent stories have implied the opposite, with the White Hats an elite force that often wins battles decisively while badly outnumbered. A secret purge has gradually become a secret civil war, specifically one with frequent war crimes: White Hat forces in Maui have eradicated or repelled all but a handful of the felonious FEMA agents who began terrorizing the tropical paradise in the aftermath of the inexplicable blaze that razed Lahaina and surrounding towns in early August, a source in General Eric M. Smith’s office told Real Raw News. Since mid-August, United States Marines have fought with FEMA patrols in Lahaina, Kaanapali, Wailuku, Maalaea, and Pukalani, and the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of approximately 475 federal goons and, alas, 34 valiant Marines. The Marines died upholding the Constitution of the United States; the feds died trying to defend the criminal Biden regime. […] “The Marines died valorously,” our source said. “We ain’t taking FEMA prisoners from the rank and file, only the key players. General Smith made it clear it’s weapons-free. Those bastards know damn well they’re following unlawful orders, and they’ll pay the price.” I think the ever-evolving nature of conspiracies is actually pretty important to psychologically grasping their appeal. I have a friend who is a big believer in 9/11 Trutherism. He once compelled me to watch the documentary “The New Pearl Harbor,” an exhausting 5-hour film promoting 9/11 conspiracies. If one actually watches, one quickly discovers that a lot of 9/11 conspiracy theories are mutually exclusive, or at least don’t mesh well together: One conspiracy argues that fighter jets were intentionally diverted the wrong direction to keep them from shooting down the hijacked jets approaching New York, while another conspiracy suggests that United 93 was shot down, and it was all covered up. In some versions, the planes didn’t hit the Twin Towers at all. Sometimes Bush did it, and sometimes Israel did it, and so on. Similarly, in my career I’ve worked adjacent to people who, like RRN, were very hostile to Covid-19 shots. That hostility made them sequentially endorse wildly different assertions about how the vaccines worked. Sometimes, the vaccines contain heavy metals. Sometimes, they contain hydra DNA to turn recipients into partially non-human chimeras. Sometimes, the vaccines are a depopulation agent. Sometimes, they’re a mind-control agent, or a killswitch that can be activated by self-assembling nanomachinery. One viral documentary in 2022 claimed that Covid was caused by snake venom in the water supply, and that Covid vaccines were an additional dose of snake venom to keep people sick (all this, of course, because the snake is Satan’s animal). What stands out isn’t the silliness of these particular theories, but that I saw them sequentially endorsed by the same people. Some of these people are smart enough to notice inconsistencies, at least when they’re pointed out, so why don’t they bother them? To some extent, I think it’s for the same reason people don’t care that every Batman story doesn’t perfectly line up. Consistency isn’t the point! What actually matters is enjoying individual stories and the wider genre they fit into. Covid vaccine haters don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, they’re driven by a core impulse of “distrust the new vaccine that people I distrust are promoting,” and every conceivably story or tale that feeds that genre of thought is, for them, worthwhile. Similarly, Real Raw News fans don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, I think their core impulse is, ironically, profound disappointment in how the Trump administration failed to deliver. Trump shook up the American political landscape more than anyone in living memory, and promised sweeping changes to every level of American government, yet his actual administration proved rather disorderly, changed far less than was promised, and then lost power after one term. For many, this simply prompted a revision in how they saw Trump. But for others, the preferred response is to embrace a fantasy reality where Trump is a superhero. I actually think the reverse side of this explains things like the durability of Russiagate: If you’re a normal American liberal, everything Trump says is offensive and piggish, but to justify their level of disdain for them, many needed to elevate his evil to the level of treason, even if that never really made any sense. It can't just be that Trump is an egotistical jerk or a narcissist or whatever. He's got to be a traitor who's going to end American democracy. People Crave Extreme, Over-the-Top, and Underhanded Solutions. At the height of the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, the Committee of Public Safety pushed through the Law of 22 Prairial. The law simplified the procedures of the country’s Revolutionary Tribunal by: Defining a whole heap of activities as criminal treason, including “creating scarcity,” disparaging the National Convention, “inspiring discouragement,” and spreading fake news.

But I don’t just need to guess based on comments and donation messages. In this realm, I can appeal to personal experience. I work in the broader world of American right-of-center politics, and we encounter Real Raw News believers constantly. We get emails from people who confidently insist the public-facing news of the day is fake, and the truth about the events at Gitmo will soon be revealed. At public Q&A events, we’ve fielded questions from genuinely nervous and worried people, who complain about their friends losing hope and being blackpilled by the news, and want to know why there hasn’t been more effort to share what’s “really” going on. A friend of mine who served in the Trump administration has described attending parties where, when he mentioned looking for a post-admin job, he received knowing looks and wink-wink-nudge-nudge remarks from people signaling they knew what was “really” going on. Somehow and someway, a lot of people believe or half-believe or badly want to believe this stuff. And where a lot of people do anything, there are takeaways to be found! In my three-plus years of reading all news that is both real and raw, here is what I’ve found. Conspiracies Evolve Like Comic Book Lore In his review of the Alexander Romance, Scott remarked that figures like Alexander the Great or Hercules were, essentially, the pre-modern versions of Batman: Stories about them are a genre, with countless different variations and stylistic choices that evolve over time, with just a few set principles guiding all of them. The Real Raw Newsiverse, and other modern conspiracy theories, also function like comic book lore. Just like Batman, and just like Hercules, “Donald Trump” has become a genre. Fake news stories about him and his Deep State enemies have a few core premises (adrenochrome, pedophile cabals, there is a Plan and we should Trust It) but endless room for variation past that point. Fans of comic books, soap operas, or The Simpsons might be familiar with something TVTropes calls “comic book time.” Certain facets of a fictional reality are locked in place, and with the passage of time everything else is gradually retconned to maintain the status quo. In season 2 of the Simpsons, Homer and Marge started dating in 1974, in Season 3 Marge becomes pregnant with Bart in 1980 (after a date watching The Empire Strikes Back), and in season 4 it’s revealed that Homer missed the Moon Landing to listen to “Yummy, Yummy, Yummy.” Tragically, though, The Simpsons kept going past season 10, and if Homer was 18 in 1974 that would make him eligible for a full Social Security benefit today. So in 2008, the continuity changed so that Homer was in a Nineties grunge band just before marrying Marge8. The Simpsons writers have avoided rejiggering the canon since, but if they do, they’ll have to confront the fact that 30-something Homer and Marge are now millennials, and in a decade they’ll be members of Gen Z. You may live to see a Simpsons flashback episode about Homer and Marge living as hipsters in Brooklyn during the 2010s (truly, we live in cursed times.) But the same phenomenon exists in the world of conspiracies. Instead of a consistent, elaborate canon, what we have is a few story beats with a lot of customization and the occasional retcon. When Baxter first began posting his stories, a core part of the narrative was that Donald Trump still secretly had all the powers of the presidency and was still in command of the entire U.S. military command. Early articles promised that Trump’s apparent loss of office was only a temporary ruse, necessary to expose the worst elements of the Deep State, but that Trump’s triumphal return to power would take place by July 4, 2021. The national media might have put on a song and dance suggesting otherwise, but behind the scenes, loyal military forces were the real ones in control. This control even extended to the military helpfully house-sitting the White House and not letting Biden use it. Despite his illegitimate victory, Biden met an unwelcome surprise when he arrived at the White House on January 20. Instead of getting a ceremonial greeting, he and Kamala Harris were stopped by National Guard and U.S. Marines at the barbwire fence encircling the White House. The Marines informed them that the military had assumed control of the Executive Branch and instructed them to vacate the area. When Harris belligerently said, “Move aside, we’re president now,” the Marines locked the gate. […] To avoid shame and maintain an illusion of power, Biden’s people concocted a ruse, supported by his media allies, to deceive the American public into believing he had won a fair election and had moved into the White House on schedule. Inside Actor/Producer Tyler Perry’s 300-acre Atlanta estate sits a three-story stucco replica of the commander-in-chief’s residence, which he originally built as a set piece for a television show. […] Although the replicant White House is built to 80% scale, on television and in images it’s indistinguishable from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Biden and Harris have been using the facsimile to feign leadership and impose despotic rule on the nation. Of course, July 4 came and went, with Trump’s return nowhere to be seen, so the canon simply updated: In the new narrative, the military had been conducting a year-long election fraud audit on Trump’s behalf, the results were nearly ready for public release, and Trump’s return would simply be “swift.” But no swift return has transpired, and so as the 2024 election has approached, the lore has evolved in the direction of Trump authentically running in this election and simply reclaiming power by winning it. As time has passed, more subtle changes have had to pile up. Early on, RRN reported that Joe Biden was a brain dead semi-corpse being held at Walter Reed, and any public appearances by “Biden” were one of several actors. But after four years of Let’s Go Brandon, Biden himself has become a more popular villain, and so quietly references to his brain-dead status have disappeared. In the early days of RRN, the military was firmly behind Trump and any implication that Biden held the powers of commander-in-chief was a media-fueled sham. But as time has passed, Trump being the “real” commander-in-chief over a loyal military has evolved into a reality where there are two American militaries, a “White Hat” faction loyal to Trump and “Black Hats” loyal to Biden. Early stories implied the White Hats were more numerous, but recent stories have implied the opposite, with the White Hats an elite force that often wins battles decisively while badly outnumbered. A secret purge has gradually become a secret civil war, specifically one with frequent war crimes: White Hat forces in Maui have eradicated or repelled all but a handful of the felonious FEMA agents who began terrorizing the tropical paradise in the aftermath of the inexplicable blaze that razed Lahaina and surrounding towns in early August, a source in General Eric M. Smith’s office told Real Raw News. Since mid-August, United States Marines have fought with FEMA patrols in Lahaina, Kaanapali, Wailuku, Maalaea, and Pukalani, and the skirmishes resulted in the deaths of approximately 475 federal goons and, alas, 34 valiant Marines. The Marines died upholding the Constitution of the United States; the feds died trying to defend the criminal Biden regime. […] “The Marines died valorously,” our source said. “We ain’t taking FEMA prisoners from the rank and file, only the key players. General Smith made it clear it’s weapons-free. Those bastards know damn well they’re following unlawful orders, and they’ll pay the price.” I think the ever-evolving nature of conspiracies is actually pretty important to psychologically grasping their appeal. I have a friend who is a big believer in 9/11 Trutherism. He once compelled me to watch the documentary “The New Pearl Harbor,” an exhausting 5-hour film promoting 9/11 conspiracies. If one actually watches, one quickly discovers that a lot of 9/11 conspiracy theories are mutually exclusive, or at least don’t mesh well together: One conspiracy argues that fighter jets were intentionally diverted the wrong direction to keep them from shooting down the hijacked jets approaching New York, while another conspiracy suggests that United 93 was shot down, and it was all covered up. In some versions, the planes didn’t hit the Twin Towers at all. Sometimes Bush did it, and sometimes Israel did it, and so on. Similarly, in my career I’ve worked adjacent to people who, like RRN, were very hostile to Covid-19 shots. That hostility made them sequentially endorse wildly different assertions about how the vaccines worked. Sometimes, the vaccines contain heavy metals. Sometimes, they contain hydra DNA to turn recipients into partially non-human chimeras. Sometimes, the vaccines are a depopulation agent. Sometimes, they’re a mind-control agent, or a killswitch that can be activated by self-assembling nanomachinery. One viral documentary in 2022 claimed that Covid was caused by snake venom in the water supply, and that Covid vaccines were an additional dose of snake venom to keep people sick (all this, of course, because the snake is Satan’s animal). What stands out isn’t the silliness of these particular theories, but that I saw them sequentially endorsed by the same people. Some of these people are smart enough to notice inconsistencies, at least when they’re pointed out, so why don’t they bother them? To some extent, I think it’s for the same reason people don’t care that every Batman story doesn’t perfectly line up. Consistency isn’t the point! What actually matters is enjoying individual stories and the wider genre they fit into. Covid vaccine haters don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, they’re driven by a core impulse of “distrust the new vaccine that people I distrust are promoting,” and every conceivably story or tale that feeds that genre of thought is, for them, worthwhile. Similarly, Real Raw News fans don’t think too hard about any specific story. Instead, I think their core impulse is, ironically, profound disappointment in how the Trump administration failed to deliver. Trump shook up the American political landscape more than anyone in living memory, and promised sweeping changes to every level of American government, yet his actual administration proved rather disorderly, changed far less than was promised, and then lost power after one term. For many, this simply prompted a revision in how they saw Trump. But for others, the preferred response is to embrace a fantasy reality where Trump is a superhero. I actually think the reverse side of this explains things like the durability of Russiagate: If you’re a normal American liberal, everything Trump says is offensive and piggish, but to justify their level of disdain for them, many needed to elevate his evil to the level of treason, even if that never really made any sense. It can't just be that Trump is an egotistical jerk or a narcissist or whatever. He's got to be a traitor who's going to end American democracy. People Crave Extreme, Over-the-Top, and Underhanded Solutions. At the height of the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, the Committee of Public Safety pushed through the Law of 22 Prairial. The law simplified the procedures of the country’s Revolutionary Tribunal by: Defining a whole heap of activities as criminal treason, including “creating scarcity,” disparaging the National Convention, “inspiring discouragement,” and spreading fake news.

Making the sentence for all crimes identical: Mandatory death penalty9. As far as perfidious methods to deliberately destroy due process and engineer mass executions go, the Law of 22 Prairial is pretty much unmatched in human history. And yet: In the roughly two months of the law’s existence, about one-fifth of defendants were still acquitted! No such good fortune exists in Gitmo. The White Hats’ secret tribunal is a tribunal of blood. In three years of activity, as far as I know exactly one person has escaped conviction: Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, freed after a direct intervention from Trump. A tiny handful of others have received decades-long prison sentences, but even they tend to meet bad ends. Bill Clinton received a life sentence, only to mysteriously die in prison, perhaps murdered by his daughter Chelsea, who wasn’t really his daughter, but nevertheless soon wound up executed herself. Not only does the rate of death sentences at Gitmo seem to exceed 90 percent, Baxter makes very little effort to portray the proceedings as fair or just. Upon arrest, instead of being read their rights, detainees are informed that they have no rights, and are instead “enemy combatants.” Yet despite being classified as “enemy combatants,” defendants are almost without exception charged with treason. The U.S. Constitution defines treason narrowly as levying war against the United States, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies, and requires at least two witnesses to the same specific act, but in Gitmo the label is invoked with a liberality that would make Robespierre blush. “Traitors” have been arrested and convicted for telling troops not to attend Trump rallies and for ruling against Donald Trump in court. Defense attorneys are denied access to evidence pre-trial, and many defendants get no lawyers at all. Trials work a lot like Phoenix Wright, in that at any point the three-officer panel10 can simply declare they’ve seen enough evidence and pronounce a conviction with death sentence immediately. In the case of former Tom Hanks co-star, this has happened within five minutes. Appeals are non-existent. The actual executions sometimes involve tormenting the condemned with fake escape attempts or pardons: The driver told Whitmer he needed to make a pitstop to grab her “exoneration paperwork.” Then Whitmer saw the clearing and the gallows and Vice Adm. Crandall. And the hangman and a Navy chaplain standing atop the gallows. “You lied to me,” Whitmer bellowed. “Minor error, not a lie,” the driver replied. […] The admiral instructed the hangman to flip the switch, and a second later, Whitmer was swinging from the rope, a guttural gurgling sound escaping her lips. She was officially pronounced dead several minutes later. “Another Covid queen out of the way,” Adm. Crandall said. During the treason trial of Hillary Clinton crucial evidence is provided by former campaign manager John Podesta, who accepts a plea deal for life in prison in return for testifying about Clinton’s child-trafficking activities. But after Clinton had safely been hanged, the military tribunal simply decided to revoke Podesta’s plea deal because, well, they felt like it. “Even though he’s not prosecuting Podesta’s case, Vice Adm. John G. Hannink made the decision to renege on the deal. He’s the one who offered it. The severity of Podesta’s crimes matched Clinton’s—a lot of stuff they did in tandem, together. When you think about it, there’s really no reason why he should get special treatment. He’s a sodomist [sic.]11. Before breaking the deal, he called Trump,” our source said. But Trump, our source noted, recused himself from the decision-making process, as he didn’t want his personal feelings of the defendant to interfere with military justice. […] “If the court wants him to hang, let him hang,” Trump reportedly said. As it happens, John Podesta was actually executed by firing squad. But hey, at least he got a trial. Sometimes, particularly evil members of the Deep State are simply beaten to death in their cells, or thrown overboard. The figure of Vladimir Putin is also a vessel for fans’ darker desires. Trump and his American allies, being properly heroic, at least take down their foes gradually. Putin’s Russians, on the other hand, live up to movie stereotypes. The Army … pulled the condemned from their cells 25 at a time, binding the criminals to logs staked in the ground and blindfolding them. They had received no trials, last meals, Last Rites, or final words. A firing squad taught them the consequences of vaccine adherence. The Army didn’t bother removing the corpses before lining up the next 25; they simply let the dead bodies flop to the ground and forced the next group to witness the ineluctable fate awaiting them, the outcome of their insouciance12. What to make of all this? Honestly, I’m not entirely sure, and the takeaway might simply be “Michael Baxter needs to mix it up to keep the site interesting.” It might also speak to the bewildering complexity of modern life and the desire for something simpler and more cinematic. As people sometimes complain, Nothing Ever Happens. But on RRN, the Happening is relentless and constant. The normal legal system is aggravatingly glacial, taking years to resolve cases and often imposing meager sentences when a case finally concludes. Most of one’s political enemies, even if they lose an election, simply lateral to a high-paying private sector job or at worst fade into obscurity. But in a real, raw legal system, evil is sniffed out with much greater alacrity; the bad people are so obvious and their crimes so glaring that they can be taken out extrajudicially with no worry about a miscarriage of justice. The apparently-complex conspiracy cinematic universes is actually appealing because it makes the world far, far simpler. The bad people are all maximally bad, deserving of hastily-dispensed maximum justice. Some of this is worrisome, too: If thousands of relatively ordinary people are willing to believe in ad-hoc military tribunals executing people with minimal due process for crimes like “ruling against Donald Trump in court,” that could be a sign that modern constitutional society is a more superficial veneer than one would hope. The World’s Laziest Conspiracy One of the most striking things about both Real Raw News and the Qanon movement it spun off from is that in some ways they are un-conspiracies. Your more traditional conspiracy, about the Rothschilds or the World Economic Forum or the Lizard People, tells you that normal political engagement is pointless, as all that really matters is confronting and defeating the hidden forces manipulating or controlling events. But RRN is a conspiracy theory that calls for total inaction. RRN believers don’t need to raise money or write letters to the editor or join political activism groups or even vote. The only thing expected of an adherent is to “trust the plan.” They aren’t even waiting for a promised future deliverance. Deliverance is, in fact, happening right now – merely off-screen. It’s actually funny to me that the (official) press freaks out so much about Qanon, and its potential to inspire violence. Qanon and RRN tell the public that whatever has them down and depressed shouldn’t, because it’s all fake, and there are unseen heroes protecting them in the shadows. Don’t worry, just have faith and know things will work out. Real Raw News is the opiate of the digital masses. Real Raw News is the exact sort of conspiracy theory that the Deep State, if it exists, should want to exist and be popular. It’s the sort of conspiracy that the Deep State, if it exists, might deliberately invent. Do I think that’s what happened here? Not at all – Real Raw News is way too much work for a government employee. Trump Will Never Die But what about five years from now? What if there were some technological change that would make it far, far easier to produce evidence of a sweeping conspiracy theory? That’s right, this review is actually about AI13. The rise of realistic artificial intelligence has created a lot of fretting about deepfakes, and it’s also created a lot of fretting about porn. Will young men really bother with the pain and difficulty and awkwardness of dating in real life, when they can just create a custom AI girlfriend to their exact specifications, then simulate sex with her using virtual reality? Will women bother with seeking out a boyfriend if they can use an LLM to give them perfect 24/7 empathy and emotional validation? Questions of sex and relationships are converging on Robert Nozick’s experience machine – will people still seek the real thing if artificial substitutes are increasingly realistic as alternatives? But for some reason, nobody is asking this about the news. Oh, sure, people have fretted that a deepfake video might smear a person’s reputation or swing an election. But as the AI revolution continues, a lot more becomes possible. Remember in 2022, when a homeless guy broke into Nancy Pelosi’s home and attacked her husband with a hammer? For a while, conspiracies flourished that Paul Pelosi was actually having some kind of erotic tryst with his attacker, and that police body camera footage might confirm this. The footage came out and, of course, offered no evidence of this. But now imagine a world where, on Twitter, an anonymous source claims that they have the real body camera footage, and it does show that Paul Pelosi was having a lovers’ quarrel with his attacker. The other, mundane footage is a deepfake, released by police to cover things up, or invented from scratch by the press or the Democratic Party or both working together. In this world, how many people end up believing fabricated proof of Paul Pelosi’s gay lover? And before you dismiss this as all totally ridiculous, remember that lots of people believed this story with no evidence at all. Many thousands of people have deluded themselves into thinking that Real Raw News is true simply because they badly want it to be true. It indulges their personal political beliefs, affirms the just-world fallacy, and lets them feel as though they possess “secret” knowledge of the world, simply by reading a blog nobody else takes seriously. But in a sense, all of us have a little of the Real Raw News believer in us. We’re prone to confirmation bias – we like reading stories and studies that confirm our pre-held beliefs, and we’re more likely to avoid or ignore those that don’t. Sometimes, we get too excited and fall for stories that are misleading, or out of context, or dishonestly presented. Sometimes, we have radically different interpretations of the same event caught on camera. Even if we know the world isn’t fair, we relish stories that let us pretend otherwise. So…how are those biases going to work when anyone can quickly create hyper-realistic looking “proof” for any story? Already, AI-fabricated images and videos are enough to bamboozle your mom on Facebook. Soon, they might be realistic enough to fool everybody without special training, and eventually they might be so realistic they can fool just about anyone. Right now, Real Raw News is a simplistic WordPress site that uses stock photos for its imagery. But with us approaching a future where intelligence itself is too cheap to meter, we may not be far from a world where every story, however preposterous, can have a convincing 4k video of it happening. Donald Trump can be president forever, with all the evidence one could ever want. Every day of Hillary Clinton’s military tribunal will have a full day of court footage, plus a condensed highlight reel for the people who want to skip boring legal procedure. Every Marine/FEMA battle in Maui will have authentic-looking combat footage. Every Gitmo execution will be proven through “leaked” bootleg recordings of gallows and firing squads. Imagine you are an ordinary, mildly engaged American citizen. You live far from the halls of power, you work an ordinary job, and whatever your feelings on political issues, you rarely see elections translate in a clear way to your own daily life. You might be interested in Washington, but Washington really isn’t that interested in you. Online, the world throws a million potential narratives at you. In some of them, the world is a confusing mess of moral gray areas. In others, the people you care about are winning. But in some narratives, you’re the hero, the people you like do good things, and the bad guys get what they deserve. The superficial evidence for all of these narratives is about equally convincing, at a glance. Look outside, and it’s hard to see the impact of any of the stories. Your entire understanding of reality is mediated through what sites you choose to read and what videos you choose to watch. As a politically marginal person, it won’t matter what you as an individual choose to believe. So, what happens if you choose to believe the story you find most enjoyable? And what if millions of others choose the same? 1 “Wait a minute, this is about a fake news website? Why is it in this contest?” Excellent question! To that, I offer several answers: A collection of fake news blog posts may as well be considered a long-running series of short stories, and I hope that we’d be allowed to review the collected short stories of an author even if they were never technically compiled into a book.

Mariposa1 mentions across 1 issues

Mariposa is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 02, 2021 and August 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mariposa (Spanish for “butterfly”) has a beautiful website"; "Mariposa seems to be proposing some really interesting things". It most often appears alongside AgroAlpha, Alex Tabarrok, Amazon.

Reference entry: Mariposa
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 02, 2021
Last seen: August 02, 2021

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21 August 02, 2021

AgroAlpha 1 shared issues
Alex Tabarrok 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
BBC 1 shared issues
Bible 1 shared issues

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August 02, 2021 · Original source

(source) The Honduran news sources covering Orquidea focus on an argument about whether it is trying to expropriate land: they say they’re not, the people who live near them say they are. I can’t follow the poorly-translated Spanish well enough to have an opinion about this, but my much deeper dive into the Prospera situation makes me think it would be hard for them to do this even if they wanted to (which they deny). Also, the surrounding community has accused them of: …violence against defenders of the land, human trafficking, discrimination, sexual exploitation, exploitation of people of sexual diversity, lack of recognition of labor rights and curtailment of the rights of the family and children such as education and health …which is a pretty impressive list of misdeeds for a polity which has only existed for a couple of weeks. My guess is this is the thing where they pre-emptively accuse ZEDEs of every bad thing that has ever happened, just because it seems like the sorts of thing they might do. But I guess we’ll find out - they supposedly have given people a “40 day ultimatum” to leave their land (they deny having given this ultimatum), so I’ll check back in forty days and see what’s happened. Butterfly Effect Unlike Orquidea, Mariposa (Spanish for “butterfly”) has a beautiful website. They have a list of all the noble important principles they espouse, and all the human rights they’re going to focus on respecting. Your white paper says “model city”, but your branding says “birth control pill”. When you look at the small print, they “are still working on our master plan to be presented to the Honduran Government in the near future”, ie they haven’t gotten any kind of official go-ahead and are only in the “cool idea” phase right now. Still, let’s take a look. Mariposa’s core values include: Polycentric governance, seemingly inspired by cryptocurrency.

Inline links: source, The Honduran news sources, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rC1m!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F98e2d48b-143d-4951-aba1-d954432795d6_939x623.png

Your white paper says “model city”, but your branding says “birth control pill”. When you look at the small print, they “are still working on our master plan to be presented to the Honduran Government in the near future”, ie they haven’t gotten any kind of official go-ahead and are only in the “cool idea” phase right now. Still, let’s take a look. Mariposa’s core values include: Polycentric governance, seemingly inspired by cryptocurrency.

Or maybe it’s exactly cute enough that it needs to be its own city, who knows? Mariposa seems to be proposing some really interesting things, including quadratic funding (an innovative budgeting mechanism pushed by Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin, among others) and dominant assurance contracts (a really neat consensus-building mechanism proposed by Alex Tabarrok). Their form-based walkable city code thing also seems pretty neat. And I’m not a midwife so for all I know ecstatic birthing is also some kind of super-great idea. Honestly this random husband-and-wife team seems to have put more thought into genuinely good governance than 99.9% of the existing countries in the world, and I hope things work out for them.

Inline links: quadratic funding, dominant assurance contracts, form-based walkable city code

Marriage and Family Programme1 mentions across 1 issues

Marriage and Family Programme is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 11, 2023 and August 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Church's regulations, the Marriage and Family Programme (MFP), aimed to replace intensive kinship". It most often appears alongside Achilles, ACX, Adam Smith.

Reference entry: Marriage and Family Programme
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 11, 2023
Last seen: August 11, 2023

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Your Book Review: The Weirdest People in the World August 11, 2023

Achilles 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Adam Smith 1 shared issues
Africa 1 shared issues
Ara Norenzayan 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Weirdest People in the World

August 11, 2023 · Original source

Trust strangers more and are more honest. This psychology might make societies richer, for fairly well-known and plausible reasons. The Weirdest People in the World (henceforth just WEIRD) sets out a causal chain from cultural change to psychological change to modern economic growth. The start of that chain is surprising: an obscure set of rules pushed by the medieval Catholic church, which banned marriage between cousins. The most important argument of the book is that these rules created WEIRD psychology. How it worked: these marriage regulations served to dismantle intensive kin networks, which are the social cement of society almost everywhere else in the world. For most people in history, family hasn't just been the place where children grow up and couples spend time together. Family has been the basic human group, and there have been extensive and precise rules dictating who counts as family (or clan) and how each person should act with respect to different relatives. The Church's regulations, the Marriage and Family Programme (MFP), aimed to replace intensive kinship, and over many centuries it was more or less successful in doing that. We'll come back shortly to why it wanted to. So, the causal chain looks like this3: WEIRD's key evidence is the link between the places where the Church promulgated the MFP and a set of psychological and social outcomes: the level of cousin marriage, the psychology of people living in those places today, social capital and economic growth. This is the scientific story of European history, and Henrich's answer to the most important question in the world. These maps from one of the scientific articles behind WEIRD show the basic causal claim: the medieval church reduced the intensity of kinship institutions. He tells it with an extraordinary mastery of a very wide range of sources from anthropology, psychology, behavioural economics, economic history, and historical narrative. This book is for everyone, but the connoisseur will enjoy the bibliography: if you think it's important and relevant, it's probably in there, and there was also plenty of work which I did not know, and now feel I should. It takes a very smart person to keep this many balls in the air. Being at Harvard probably doesn't hurt either – that's the “collective brain” of the human network, which makes an appearance later on in the book. So this book really sets down a marker: the anthropologists are returning from the Amazon, the Sudan and Polynesia, and coming for Western history and economics. It will be interesting to see how those target disciplines react. Is it true? Economists and historians think about Western history very differently. Historians love irony and contingency. They enjoy byways. Triumphalist, linear narratives of progress are distrusted as “Whig history”. Growth economists, by contrast, are all about the linear bigness. They have a relentless focus on the one question of how the West got rich, and if you call that triumphalist, they will take out a chart of South Sudanese child mortality and laugh at you. Both historians and historical economists — a more appropriate name than “economic historians” nowadays — are interested in causality. But economists have a crunchier, more “scientific” standard for what counts as proof of causality. You've got to have a treatment and a control group, and by default if you claim there are no confounds, they won't believe you. You need you some plausible exogeneity. A random river where Napoleon's armies stopped. The distance from Wittemberg where Luther nailed up his theses. And then, how does that affect something that matters today (if it doesn't, then who cares?) Of course, the longer ago the exogenous treatment, the more impressive the result. You can see the incentives that these disciplinary demands might set up, and that might worry you. At worst, you might get a kind of “underground river” concept of history, where X happened long ago

Inline links: 3, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1pe5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F65c52bab-c319-4239-988c-73c141e995a6_935x214.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FA2x!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F910f2b34-1235-412a-a43d-ed00fa1b1dc9_882x767.png, one of the scientific articles behind

Mars Society1 mentions across 1 issues

Mars Society is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 18, 2023 and September 18, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Zubrin's Mars Society was an early influence on Musk". It most often appears alongside 787, adderallposting, ADL.

Reference entry: Mars Society
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 18, 2023
Last seen: September 18, 2023

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Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk September 18, 2023

787 1 shared issues
adderallposting 1 shared issues
ADL 1 shared issues
aerospace industry 1 shared issues
AI x-risk 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Elon Musk

September 18, 2023 · Original source

Zubrin's Mars Society was an early influence on Musk, and Zubrin's whole thing is that Mars is a new America, free from the old world's stultifying influence. "No EPA on Mars is one of the major reasons we have to go there" among other quotes.

Marvel Fusion1 mentions across 1 issues

Marvel Fusion is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 17, 2022 and June 17, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Marvel Fusion was founded in Germany in 2019". It most often appears alongside Alcator C-Mod, Apollo Program, ARC.

Reference entry: Marvel Fusion
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 17, 2022
Last seen: June 17, 2022

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Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy June 17, 2022

Alcator C-Mod 1 shared issues
Apollo Program 1 shared issues
ARC 1 shared issues
ASDEX 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Future Of Fusion Energy

June 17, 2022 · Original source

Tokamak Energy gets fusion by 2030 (10%) or 2035 (30%). Marvel Fusion Marvel Fusion was founded in Germany in 2019. They're working on inertial confinement fusion, which I have much less expertise in. Inertial confinement fusion has made rapid progress recently and they have recruited some good people, so they should have a chance. Some problems include not releasing a timeline and not planning on using D-T fuel. Marvel gets fusion by 2035 (30%).

Massachusetts General Hospital1 mentions across 1 issues

Massachusetts General Hospital is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Please contact slazar@mgh.harvard.edu". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

Reference entry: Massachusetts General Hospital
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 10, 2022
Last seen: February 10, 2022

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ACX Grants ++: The Second Half February 10, 2022

2018 1 shared issues
@BendiniUK 1 shared issues
@benyeohben 1 shared issues
@utotranslucence 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Book Review: How Asia Works

February 10, 2022 · Original source

#85: Study The Neuroscience Of How The Self Matures The ‘self’ matures and change throughout adulthood, progressing through distinct stages. Social scientists have demonstrated that individuals at each stage have a unique outlook on life and way of interacting with the world. In earlier stages the focus is on exterior stimuli, while in later stages the exploration is of one’s interior experience, and how the exterior world is interpreted through our interior experience. Qualities such as compassion, dis-identification from the concept of self, and an understanding of the constructed nature of experience, become stronger and more nuanced at each stage. Professional coaches exploit this knowledge to help their clients achieve personal and professional goals. Yet, this maturity (or ‘vertical development’) model has been almost completely ignored by psychologists and neuroscientists despite the potential for this knowledge to transform our understanding of individual differences in how the mind works. Our team, led by renowned Harvard neuroscientist Sara Lazar, is seeking funding to conduct a series of experiments to characterize the maturity process in scientific language and situate it within the fields of psychological and cognitive neuroscience. Charitable gifts of $50,000 to $500,000 will allow us to conduct essential preliminary studies to establish proof of concept and enable us to seek federal funding. Please contact slazar@mgh.harvard.edu with questions.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology1 mentions across 1 issues

Massachusetts Institute of Technology is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 28, 2021 and June 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "he moved to the Massachussetts Insitute of Technology, Wade found that a solitary copy". It most often appears alongside Alexander Hamilton, America, ASEAN.

Reference entry: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 28, 2021
Last seen: June 28, 2021

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Book Review: How Asia Works June 28, 2021

Alexander Hamilton 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
ASEAN 1 shared issues
Asia 1 shared issues
Association of South-East Asian Nations 1 shared issues

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June 28, 2021 · Original source

Korean bureaucrats were reading not the rising American stars of neo-liberal economics, or even Adam Smith, but instead [German development expert and tariff proponent] Friedrich List. The Korea and Taiwan scholar Robert Wade observed when he was teaching in Korea in the late 1970s that ‘whole shelves’ of List’s books could be found in the university bookshops of Seoul. When he moved to the Massachussetts Insitute of Technology, Wade found that a solitary copy of List’s main work had last been taken out of the library in 1966. Such are the different economics appropriate to different stages of development. In Korea, List’s ideas for a national system of development were being adapted to a country with a population far smaller than Germany’s or Japan’s, and with a mid-1970s GDP per capita on par with Guatemala. The ideas were implemented in the teeth of the worst international trading conditions for a generation featuring two unprecedented energy crises. It did not matter. Park motored on regardless. Each time the US, the World Bank and the IMF urged him to back away from his state-led industrial policy he agreed - and then did precisely nothing (or occasionally a very little ). Park was a leader of conviction, and his convictions were based in history.

Masumoto family farms1 mentions across 1 issues

Masumoto family farms is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 13, 2022 and October 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "celebrated Masumoto and Thao family farms outside Fresno". It most often appears alongside 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 21st Century Salon, ACX.

Reference entry: Masumoto family farms
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 13, 2022
Last seen: October 13, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley October 13, 2022

1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1 shared issues
21st Century Salon 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Alex Richard 1 shared issues
Amazon Prime Video 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley

October 13, 2022 · Original source

I personally think the Valley is underrated and its diversity under-appreciated. This applies both to its cities and to its rural, ag-based communities. The stories of exploited and impoverished farm labor are all too true—“Factories in the Field” as Carey McWilliams famously described the situation back in Great Depression days. Yet there also are stories of upward mobility and cultural dynamism, such as the celebrated Masumoto and Thao family farms outside Fresno and the vibrant community of Punjabi truck drivers.

Mattel1 mentions across 1 issues

Mattel is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 16, 2024 and August 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Next Mattel will be attempting to build a universe off the success of last year’s Barbie". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

Reference entry: Mattel
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 16, 2024
Last seen: August 16, 2024

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Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics August 16, 2024

20th Century Fox 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abomination 1 shared issues
Abraham Lincoln 1 shared issues
Action Comics 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: Silver Age Marvel Comics

August 16, 2024 · Original source

Given Marvel Comics, why Silver Age (1961-1965)? I.a. Why Superhero Comic Books? The winner of last year’s Astral Codex Ten book review contest was Brandon Hendrickson. Brandon wrote about Kieran Egan’s The Educated Mind. One of the foundations of Egan’s educational philosophy is that people learn through stories. He believes early education should focus on teaching lessons through myths and legends. This matches my experience. My kids’ favorite podcast is Greeking Out – a very well produced, very entertaining, National Geographic podcast about Greek Legends. Aside #1: When my oldest daughter was three years old she would ask everyone she met “Do you know any myths? Can you tell me a myth?” She especially liked asking people from different places to get myths from their local cultures. Once, she asked the question to a friend of mine who grew up in South Africa, “Can you tell me any South African myths?” He struggled for a minute and then said, “Okay! I have one! Bread never falls butter side down!”. That was not the type of myth she was looking for; nor the type of myth we will be discussing in this review. Every culture has foundational myths. These stories are entertaining and engaging, but they also teach valuable lessons about both what is important in that culture, and how people in that culture are expected to behave (or at least the Platonic Ideal of how they should behave). In the modern, Western world, we have assimilated many of these foundational stories, particularly the Greek myths. My kids definitely know the Greek myths, but they also know elements of Norse mythology, Egyptian myths, stories about Anasi from West Africa and more. More fundamentally my wife and I, while not religious ourselves, have made a point of exposing the kids to the stories from the Bible. It is not politically correct to call Biblical stories “myths”, but they serve the same purpose – shared cultural understanding of the way the world works. My wife grew up without any religion, and when she was in high school, she struggled with the metaphors and religious allegories that were omnipresent in most of the Western canon. In our culture, familiarity with the Bible is important for an educated person – whether they are religious or not – because it is the foundation of so much of the rest of our culture. I believe the other set of mythological stories that are foundational to our culture are – and by this point I am sure you see where I am going here – comic book superheroes. If true, then having more than a surface-level understanding of the most important superhero stories is important in a similar way to that knowing the Bible stories is important. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is an important idea to understand. So is, “With great power comes great responsibility”. I.b. Why Marvel? While there are many independent superheroes that are not owned by major conglomerates, the superheroes who have built our modern foundational myths are currently owned by two corporations. Warner Bros. Discover owns the DC library of superheroes including Superman, Batman and Wonder Woman. In 2009 Disney purchased Marvel Comics and took ownership of their characters, including Spiderman, X-men and the Avengers. Aside #2: Marvel has sold temporary film rights to many of their characters over the years. The most relevant sales started in 1994 when Marvel sold the film rights of X-men and mutants to 20th century Fox, then in 1996, when Marvel went bankrupt, Fox picked up the rights to the Fantastic Four (and New Line picked up Blade). In 1999 Marvel sold the film rights (and live action TV, and animated TV longer than 44 minutes) of Spider-man and related characters to Columbia Pictures (part of Sony) for $7MM. Marvel actually attempted to sell ALL of their remaining Marvel IP film rights to Sony for $25MM, but the top management at Sony was not interested. Sony’s management allegedly told their chief negotiator “Nobody gives a shi*t about any of the other Marvel characters. Go back and do a deal for only Spider-Man). Disney acquired Marvel in 2009, and then Fox in 2019, bringing the two separated packages of characters all back together under one roof (Blade reverted back to Marvel in 2012). Sony still owns the rights to Spider-man but has made a deal with Disney to include some of his films within the Marvel-Disney universe. Marvel sold the film rights of The Hulk to Universal in 1990 and the current status of that agreement is complicated (the consensus is that Marvel now controls the film rights to the character, but Universal owns distribution rights to any stand-alone Hulk film, which could be why Disney let's Hulk co-star in Thor movies, but not vice versa). In the early aughts Marvel wanted to build their own film franchise, but were limited to only using their remaining “B-list” characters – Spider-man, X-men, and the Fantastic Four were all off limits. Fortunately, Kevin Feige, president of production for Marvel at the time, saw a way forward. He convinced Ike Perlmutter, Marvel CEO, to allow for the production of a series of films with the remaining characters begining with Iron Man (2008). Jon Favreau directed and cast Robert Downey Jr as Tony Stark. The film blew away expectations. Kevin’s plan of a series of movies where the characters would interconnect was suddenly feasible. Iron Man was followed by The Incredible Hulk, Thor, and Captain America: The First Avenger. None managed the box office magic of Iron Man, but all were successful enough that the plan stayed on track. In 2012 the characters were all brought together in the first Avengers film, which opened to over $200MM domestically and went on to gross more than $1.5B (which made it the 3rd highest grossing film of all time). Marvel became the first studio to take the interconnected world of their comic books and make the model work on the big screen (for a much larger audience). Once the model was proven to work, other studios tried to duplicate it. Aside #3: Warner Bros’ stumbles with the DC shared universe of Batman, Superman and the Justice League are well known, but that was actually their SECOND attempt at a shared universe. Their first attempt tried to copy the Marvel method more closely. They chose their own B-list hero and set up his first film to allow for a wider mythology. Alas Green Lantern (2011) failed at the box office and we never got stand-alone films about Sinestro (Yellow Lantern), Carol Ferris (Star Sapphire, the Violet Lantern), John Stewart (African American Green Lantern), Kyle Rayner (1990s Green Lantern), Alan Scott (original Green Lantern), or the Blue, Red, and Orange Lantern Corps. At least so far, no studio has successfully created anything with close to the traction obtained by the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU). Warner’s DC Extended universe (DCEU) had trifling success, but is being shelved and rebooted for a fresh attempt next year. Universal’s attempt at a “Dark Universe” kicked off with Tom Cruise in The Mummy (2017), but was dead on arrival. Paramount’s attempt to link the Transformers Universe to GI Joe at the end of Transformers: Rise of the Beasts has been appropriately mocked. Sony’s Spider-man films linked to the MCU have been very successful, but their attempt at a stand-alone non-MCU Spider-man universe using Spider-man’s villains as anti-heroes has floundered (mostly succeeding only as a source of memes). Next Mattel will be attempting to build a universe off the success of last year’s Barbie and may include Polly Pocket, American Girl, Hot Wheels, and He-Man and the Masters of the Universe (no word yet on Thomas the Tank Engine, View Master and the Magic-8 Ball, but all are apparently in development). To date, only Marvel has successfully built a “Cinematic Universe”. One potential reason for the MCU’s success is that Kevin Feige built his cinematic universe on the back of the existing interconnected universe of the comics. But those comics were not the first interconnected universe of stories. For that we would need to go back to our foundational myths. The Bible stories mostly interconnect. Adam and Eve flows into Cain and Abel. David and Goliath leads to the Wisdom of Solomon. Greek Myths DEFINITELY interconnect. Supporting characters in one Greek myth have starring roles in their own stories. The Greek pantheon of tales even have their own version of the Avengers. In the Quest for the Golden Fleece, Jason brings together the Argonauts, who included in their number Theseus (who defeated the Minotaur), Orpheus (who braved the underworld) and Hercules himself – all A-list stars in their own “franchises”. Stand alone stories that exist within an interconnected universe are rare in modern media but were common in the ancient myths that have stood the test of time. Only Marvel has successfully created a shared universe that follows the pattern of ancient myths. Only Marvel films have stand-alone stories and protagonists who exist together in an interconnected world. Something about that method of storytelling is deeply pleasing for humans across many cultures. Marvel films are the first and most successful modern version of the mythological universe, and that it is worth spending more time exploring Marvel’s underlying mythology and where it came from. I.c. Why 1961? The origins of Christianity and Judaism (and Buddhism and Hinduism) are very murky. Even Islam is far enough in the past that we only have a very rough understanding of how it came to exist. When scholars want to understand in detail how a new religion is born they are far better to look at Mormonism or, if you accept it as a religion, Dianetics. Similarly, we have versions of Greek myths that have been passed down to us, but we can never know how those myths changed from their first telling to their “final” versions. Were the stories once unrelated, and only later became crafted into a single “universe”? Or were the stories built off each other one by one (“Dad that Golden Fleece story was amazing! Do you know any other stories about the Hercules guy?”)? Or was it something in between? Perhaps the stories all existed independently, but were later crafted together (“Remember that 12-labors story I told you? Actually that was the same guy who was on the Argo!”) Unlike Greek legends, we can know the origin of the Marvel Universe. We can see how it was constructed step-by-step. The people who did it (most importantly Stan Lee, Jack Kirby, and Steve Ditko) are dead now, but they have not been dead for long. We can read the original work, see how it changed over the last 60 years, and we can ask the creators “what were you thinking at the time” (or at least read their answers from old interviews). We can’t always trust what Stan Lee says, but at least we can hear his point of view. No one has a transcript of an interview with Homer, or knows exactly what he was thinking when he called it the “wine-dark sea”. Tl;dr: Why read about Marvel Comic superheroes 1961-1965? Because interconnected mythological stories are very important to cultures, Marvel is the leading contender of the most recent modern mythology, and it originated in the first half-decade of the 1960s. II. How did Marvel Superhero Comics happen? Timely Comics published their first comic book in 1939 and called it “Marvel Comics”. Their most popular World War II comics included Captain America, the Human Torch (an android unrelated to the modern Human Torch except in powers, appearance and name), and Namor, the Submariner. In the early 1950s superheroes became less popular, so Timely changed its name to Atlas Comics and focused on humor, western, horror, war and science fiction stories. But in 1956 DC Comics began re-introducing their Golden Age superheroes and, in the second half of the 1950s, the genre took off again – particularly Superman, whose title, Action Comics, became the number one selling comic in America. Stan Lee, editor and chief at Atlas at the time, wanted to get in on the superhero action. Unfortunately in 1957 Atlas lost its distributor and the company had to rely on “Independent News” to get its comics on newsstands. The complication was that Independent News was owned by “National Periodical Publications”, who also owned DC-comics and did not want Atlas to introduce superheroes to compete with Superman, Green Lantern and the Flash. Independent News agreed to distribute Atlas comics but limited the publisher to eight titles per month, and only in non-super hero genres (like horror, romance and science fiction). Blocked from creating and launching new superhero titles, Stan Lee got creative, and in August 1961 Atlas Comics published Fantastic Four #1. Aside #4: Fantastic Four #1 was on newsstands in August 8th, 1961, but the date on the cover was November 1961. The convention at the time was that the cover date was not the “publication date” but rather the “pull date”. The pull date was the time when the retailer could send back unsold copies back to the publisher for a refund. In fact the retailer did not need to send the entire issue back, just the cover, as it was assumed that comic books could not be sold without the cover, and it saved on postage. This was only relevant because it was great for my dad who was a child at the time. My dad was friends with the kid whose father owed the local pharmacy which meant he had access to every comic book published in the late 1950s as long as he was willing to wait a few months and read it without a cover. Going forward in this essay I will always use the pull dates rather than the publication dates for individual comic book issues as they are far easier to source. If you want to convert pull dates back into publication dates you can subtract roughly two months, but it is inconsistent and sometimes longer, as was the case with Fantastic Four #1. Check out the cover of Fantastic Four #1: To the modern eye this certainly looks like a superhero comic. Four heroes with super powers fighting a giant monster. But in the eyes of publishers in 1961 this looked more like a science fiction adventure comic than something that would go head to head with Superman. Here are the covers of Action Comics (the best selling superhero comic at the time) from the three months leading up to Fantastic Four #1: Notice what they have in common? “Super Rivals”, “Super revenge”, “Super Substitutes”. And all include Superman in his blue and red tights. Fantastic Four’s cover featured super powers, but never used the word “super” and no one was wearing superhero costumes. Fantastic Four, as a superhero story, slipped under the radar because it wasn’t really a superhero story at all. It was a story about four close friends who attempted to fly into space, but then something goes wrong and they crash back to Earth. The experience changes them and they decide they now need to use their new abilities to help the rest of humanity – specifically against monsters who are invading from under the Earth. It is a fantastical science fiction story – not a superhero story. Later in his career Jack Kirby, the illustrator of the issue and co-creator of the Fantastic Four, was asked about his inspiration for the Fantastic Four heroes. He did NOT say Superman – or any superhero. He said Challengers of the Unknown. Challengers of the Unknown was an adventure story co-created by Kirby in Showcase #6 in February 1957. Here is how Wikipedia describes the Challengers origin: When acquaintances miraculously survive a plane crash unscathed, they conclude that since they are "living on borrowed time" they should band together for hazardous adventures. The four—pilot Kyle "Ace" Morgan, daredevil Matthew "Red" Ryan, strong and slow-witted Leslie "Rocky" Davis, and scientist Walter Mark "Prof" Haley—became the Challengers of the Unknown. Showcase #6, and the first appearance of the Challengers of the Unknown, by Jack Kirby Visually the Challengers and the Fantastic Four were similar. Both wore skin tight uniforms with belts and minimal decoration. The Fantastic Four’s relatively simple characterizations were practically pulled from Challengers. Reed takes on the traits of both Kyle, the leader, and Walter, the scientist. Johnny, the Human Torch is the daredevil. The Thing is “strong and slow-witted”. Sue, the only woman on the team, seems like a new addition, but is likely based on June Robbins who joined the Challengers team in Showcase #7, as an “honorary” or “girl-Challenger”. After surviving their respective “miraculous” crashes, both the Challengers and the Fantastic Four band together to help the world. They both travel through space and other dimensions, fighting mad scientists and monsters. The Fantastic Four’s early antagonists were not traditional super villains. In the first few issues they fight monsters from under the Earth (Issue #1), shape changing aliens (#2), and a charlatan who uses hypnotism to steal from his audience (#3). In issue #4 Kirby and Lee re-introduce Namor, the Submariner, one of Marvel’s top IP from the 1940s, and have him kidnap Sue. Only in Issue #5 and #6 (June and August 1962) and do we get a more standard-supervillain when Dr Doom attempts to steal the Fantastic Four headquarters and throw it into space. The next superhero Lee created was even less heroic than the Fantastic Four. In April 1962 (pull date), Marvel published The Incredible Hulk. If it was even a superhero story in disguise it was a very good disguise. The story was a scientific-filtered version of Dr Jekyl and Mr Hyde. It was a pure monster-story with nothing very super about it. Nothing on the cover suggests this has anything to do with superheroes: It is not clear if even Lee at the time thought the Hulk would be a superhero. In Fantastic Four #5 Johnny is reading a “great new comic mag” and mocks the Thing by comparing him to the Hulk. It seems pretty clear at this point that in the Fantastic Four’s world, the Hulk is just a fictional comic book, like in ours (more on that later): The other two superheroes the Marvel introduces in this period have even more subtle introductions. At the time Marvel had a number of generic-sounding titles and told science fiction and fantasy stand-alone stories: Tales to Astonish

Inline links: The Educated Mind, Greeking Out, Nobody gives a shi*t about any of the other Marvel characters. Go back and do a deal for only Spider-Man, Dark Universe, appropriately mocked, memes, attempting to build a universe, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MbHP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F63b4711e-2248-4120-897e-bba8a595a28b_405x616.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OCj5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9afeb585-b58b-4932-8702-153b4fdf135d_619x305.png, Wikipedia, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!OzTl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F49fd3582-b5bd-4567-b5e9-cca46c1f1c49_425x615.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lfiM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc23c3ad1-5fed-4063-8ac2-d9d89e69bee6_252x398.png, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!oV4t!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F346f85d9-580b-4eb2-b91c-3422003613d5_591x572.png

Mayor's office1 mentions across 1 issues

Mayor's office is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 05, 2022 and November 05, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "He just hasn't had cooperation from the Mayor's office". It most often appears alongside abundance liberalism, Alabama, Alfred Twu.

Reference entry: Mayor's office
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 05, 2022
Last seen: November 05, 2022

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On My California Ballot November 05, 2022

abundance liberalism 1 shared issues
Alabama 1 shared issues
Alfred Twu 1 shared issues
Alyssa Victory 1 shared issues
Andrew Edstrom 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On My California Ballot

November 05, 2022 · Original source

It's a damn shame that Malia Cohen ended up as the Dem on the ballot instead of Ron Galperin, the LA Controller, who was running on an "abundance liberalism" type platform. He's been harshly critical of how LA is wasting affordable housing funds, and his ideas of what they should be doing about it are good. (He just hasn't had cooperation from the Mayor's office or the city's legislative branch.) He'd be a solid future candidate for Gov.

Media Arts and Sciences1 mentions across 1 issues

Media Arts and Sciences is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 31, 2024 and January 31, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Neri Oxman was a Professor of Media Arts and Sciences at MIT". It most often appears alongside 2023, Against Learning From Dramatic Effects, Bill Ackman.

Reference entry: Media Arts and Sciences
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 31, 2024
Last seen: January 31, 2024

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Issue trail

Seems Like Targeting January 31, 2024

2023 1 shared issues
Against Learning From Dramatic Effects 1 shared issues
Bill Ackman 1 shared issues
Business Insider 1 shared issues
Chris Brunet 1 shared issues

Source context

Seems Like Targeting

January 31, 2024 · Original source

Neri Oxman was a Professor of Media Arts and Sciences at MIT, but nobody in history has ever cared about Media Arts and Sciences. Certainly they don’t care about it enough that plagiarism in a fifteen-year-old paper by a Professor of Media Arts and Sciences should be front-page news (though see here for claims that there were many worse things wrong with Oxman’s paper). Everyone understands that they’re going after Oxman because she’s the wife of Bill Ackman, the bigshot investor who led the crusade against Gay. The message is clear: go after an important Ivy League leader, and we’ll go after your family.

Inline links: see here for claims

Median Empire1 mentions across 1 issues

Median Empire is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 10, 2024 and January 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "poorly-understood event involving the Median Empire". It most often appears alongside Alexander the Great, Amorites, Anshan.

Reference entry: Median Empire
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 10, 2024
Last seen: January 10, 2024

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Issue trail

Book Review: Cyropaedia January 10, 2024

Alexander the Great 1 shared issues
Amorites 1 shared issues
Anshan 1 shared issues
Apple 1 shared issues
Armenians 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: Cyropaedia

January 10, 2024 · Original source

I think the Persians went in three generations from a hill tribe without cities, to a hill tribe ruling over the small city of Anshan, to total mastery of the Middle East. The last part happened entirely during the lifetime of Cyrus the Great, partly due to Cyrus’ personal virtues and partly due to some poorly-understood event involving the Median Empire.

There’s a big historical dispute about exactly what happened with the Medes, of which the Cyropaedia presents one side. In 575 BC, the Median Empire was the local great power, with the Persians as one of their many vassals. By 525 BC, the Median Empire had been absorbed by Persia. Nobody knows how. Herodotus says Cyrus conquered Media. Xenophon says that Cyrus conquered his empire while still sort of a vassal of Media, and the Median king was so impressed that he gave him his daughter’s hand in marriage and made him the heir. Historians lean toward Herodotus’ story, but the details remain obscure.

acx_toledo1 mentions across 1 issues

meetup.com/acx_toledo is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2023 and August 25, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group Link: meetup.com/acx_toledo". It most often appears alongside "El Retiro" Park, 11841 Wagner Street Culver City, 1548 NE 15th Ave.

Reference entry: acx_toledo
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 25, 2023
Last seen: August 25, 2023

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Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023

"El Retiro" Park 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street Culver City 1 shared issues
1548 NE 15th Ave 1 shared issues
1906 Rittenhouse Square 1 shared issues
1970 port Laurent 1 shared issues

Source context

August 25, 2023 · Original source

TOLEDO, OHIO, USA Contact: Norman Perlmutter Contact Info: NLPerlmutter+ACX[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 10th, 3:00 PM Location: Toledo Botanical Garden. If coming by car, park in the north parking lot (entrance off Elmer Road). We will be at one of the picnic tables near the parking lot. I'll be wearing an orange shirt and carrying or posting on the table a sign reading ACX MEETUP. In case of bad weather, alternate location will be posted on LessWrong and on the Meetup group. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86HRM89H+43F Group Link: meetup.com/acx_toledo Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or on the Meetup group (but not on both, it would make it harder to count RSVPs.)

Inline links: https://plus.codes/86HRM89H+43F, meetup.com/acx_toledo

vancouver-rationality1 mentions across 1 issues

meetup.com/vancouver-rationality is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2024 and August 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/vancouver-rationality". It most often appears alongside 10 N Park Pl, 12th Ave South, 1525 Bank St.

Reference entry: vancouver-rationality
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 29, 2024
Last seen: August 29, 2024

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Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places August 29, 2024

10 N Park Pl 1 shared issues
12th Ave South 1 shared issues
1525 Bank St 1 shared issues
200 Degrees 1 shared issues
3806 Williams Rd, San Jose, CA 95117 1 shared issues

Source context

Secrets Of The Great Families

August 29, 2024 · Original source

Contact: Jordan Contact Info: j[dot]verasamy[a t]gmail[d ot]c om Time: Saturday, September 21st, 01:00 PM Location: Dude Chilling Park, NW corner, with a big sign Coordinates: https://plus.codes/84XR7W73+PC Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/vancouver-rationality and https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/foFedJFgad2qDd3vp

Inline links: https://plus.codes/84XR7W73+PC, https://www.meetup.com/vancouver-rationality, https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/foFedJFgad2qDd3vp

meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com1 mentions across 1 issues

meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 03, 2022 and April 03, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "if you have questions, ask meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com". It most often appears alongside ACX community subreddit, Amazon, Astralcodexten Com.

Reference entry: meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 03, 2022
Last seen: April 03, 2022

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Issue trail

Open Thread 218 April 03, 2022

ACX community subreddit 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Book Review Contest 1 shared issues
chapters@effectivealtruism.org 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 218

April 03, 2022 · Original source

3: We have spring Schelling Meetup dates for seventy cities! If you only go to one meetup a year, go to the big well-advertised one we do in late summer / early fall. But if you only go to two or three meetups a year, go to this one too. If you're not on the list and should be, fill in this form; if you have questions, ask meetupsmingyuan@gmail.com .

Inline links: spring Schelling Meetup dates for seventy cities, this form

Members of Parliament1 mentions across 1 issues

Members of Parliament is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 09, 2021 and November 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Members of Parliament average 6.7 on this test". It most often appears alongside Aage Bohr, Abanindranath Tagore, Aldous Huxley.

Reference entry: Members of Parliament
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 09, 2021
Last seen: November 09, 2021

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Issue trail

Secrets Of The Great Families November 09, 2021

Aage Bohr 1 shared issues
Abanindranath Tagore 1 shared issues
Aldous Huxley 1 shared issues
Anderson Cooper 1 shared issues
Andrew Huxley 1 shared issues

Source context

November 09, 2021 · Original source

Not only do politicians have higher IQs than the general population, but the higher you go in politics (from nominated, to city council, to mayor, to member of Parliament), the higher your IQ! Members of Parliament average 6.7 on this test, which I think equals IQ 115 - not as high as Ivy Leaguers, but still well above average. So the same intellectual skills that made Henri a great mathematician could have helped Raymond become Prime Minister.

Mental Health Reform team1 mentions across 1 issues

Mental Health Reform team is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 29, 2022 and June 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "the Mental Health Reform team found that approximately 18,000 adults experienced homelessness". It most often appears alongside A History Of Mankind, ACS, Alexander Turok.

Reference entry: Mental Health Reform team
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 29, 2022
Last seen: June 29, 2022

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On San Fransicko June 29, 2022

A History Of Mankind 1 shared issues
ACS 1 shared issues
Alexander Turok 1 shared issues
Alice K 1 shared issues
Amsterdam 1 shared issues

Source context

Highlights From The Comments On San Fransicko

June 29, 2022 · Original source

"Through an in-depth data analysis, conducted in collaboration with the DPH Whole Person Care team, the Mental Health Reform team found that approximately 18,000 adults experienced homelessness in San Francisco in fiscal year 2018-19. These individuals were identified by the Coordinated Care Management System (CCMS), a DPH-operated system integrating 15 separate databases from DPH, HSH and the Human Services Agency (HSA). CCMS defines people as experiencing homelessness in the fiscal year if they either: 1) utilize a City service that indicates housing instability, for example, a City shelter, or 2) self-report homelessness while accessing health care services.

Using the CCMS-defined 18,000 people experiencing homelessness as the base, the Mental Health Reform team analyzed the population’s diagnostic epidemiology to understand the associated burden of behavioral health issues. The team found nearly 4,000 adults experiencing homelessness who also suffer with cooccurring mental health and substance use disorders. Specifically, in addition to homelessness, this group of 4,000 has a history of both psychosis and substance use disorder."

Mercy For Animals1 mentions across 1 issues

Mercy For Animals is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 28, 2023 and November 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I’m counting groups like Mercy For Animals". It most often appears alongside #57, 80,000 Hours, Adam D’Angelo.

Reference entry: Mercy For Animals
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 28, 2023
Last seen: November 28, 2023

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Issue trail

In Continued Defense Of Effective Altruism November 28, 2023

#57 1 shared issues
80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
Adam D’Angelo 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI doomerism 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis

November 28, 2023 · Original source

Estimate for number of chickens here. Their numbers add up to 800 million but I am giving EA half-credit because not all organizations involved were EA-affiliated. I’m counting groups like Humane League, Compassion In World Farming, Mercy For Animals, etc as broadly EA-affiliated, and I think it’s generally agreed they’ve been the leaders in these sorts of campaigns.

Inline links: here

mesa-optimizers1 mentions across 1 issues

mesa-optimizers is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 26, 2022 and April 26, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Remember that AI? From the mesa-optimizers post a few weeks ago?". It most often appears alongside A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis, aphantasis, Astralcodexten Com.

Reference entry: mesa-optimizers
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 26, 2022
Last seen: April 26, 2022

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Issue trail

Book Review: A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis April 26, 2022

A Clinical Introduction To Lacanian Psychoanalysis 1 shared issues
aphantasis 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Ayn Rand 1 shared issues
Bored Ape NFTs 1 shared issues

Source context

April 26, 2022 · Original source

Remember that AI? From the mesa-optimizers post a few weeks ago? It was trained to pick strawberries. The programmers rewarded it whenever it got a strawberry in its bucket. It started by flailing around, gradually shifted its behavior towards the reward signal, and ended up with a tendency to throw red things at light sources - in the training environment, strawberries were the only red thing, and the glint of the metal bucket was the brightest light source. Later, after training was done, it was deployed at night, and threw strawberries at a streetlight. Also, when someone with a big bulbous red nose walked by, it ripped his nose off and threw that at the streetlight too.

Inline links: the mesa-optimizers post

Meta AI1 mentions across 1 issues

Meta AI is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 21, 2025 and July 21, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "a Meta AI researcher"; "Zuck offered him fifty billion to work at Meta AI". It most often appears alongside AAPI Protection League, Aaron, AI Alignment.

Reference entry: Meta AI
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 21, 2025
Last seen: July 21, 2025

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Issue trail

Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party July 21, 2025

AAPI Protection League 1 shared issues
Aaron 1 shared issues
AI Alignment 1 shared issues
Alito 1 shared issues
All Lives Matter 1 shared issues

Source context

Press Any Key For Bay Area House Party

July 21, 2025 · Original source

“Yeah,” says the host, a guy named Kyle who you know from work. “He offered the guests $1 million per head to go home and label data for him tonight. Gave the caterers $20 million to redirect the food to Meta HQ. Took apart the sound system looking for GPUs. By 9 PM it was just me and my girlfriend. Then he offered my girlfriend $50 million to break up with me and date a Meta AI researcher. Now everyone’s gone except a couple of effective altruists - “ he pointed at the people in the corner - “who refuse to work for a capabilities company.”

“Too late,” says Aaron. “I heard Zuck offered him fifty billion to work at Meta AI.”

metac-o1+asknews1 mentions across 1 issues

metac-o1+asknews is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Another bot, metac-o1+asknews, came in 11th". It most often appears alongside 2026 contest, ACX, Andrew Clough.

Reference entry: metac-o1+asknews
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

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Issue trail

Open Thread 419 February 02, 2026

2026 contest 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Andrew Clough 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Daily Show 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 419

February 02, 2026 · Original source

GreeneiBot2, the contest’s highest-ranking bot, who placed 9th out of 2975 participants, mostly human. Another bot, metac-o1+asknews, came in 11th. Some work from the Forecasting Research Institute suggests that bot forecasters will overtake humans sometime in late 2026, and these AIs are clearly chomping at the bit to make it happen. If you’re the person or team behind either of these, send me an email and I’ll profile you.

Metaculites1 mentions across 1 issues

Metaculites is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 15, 2021 and March 15, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Metaculites got an extra two months to think about them and watch what happened". It most often appears alongside Apple, Apple silicon, Biden.

Reference entry: Metaculites
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 15, 2021
Last seen: March 15, 2021

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Issue trail

Mantic Monday: Mantic Matt Y March 15, 2021

Apple 1 shared issues
Apple silicon 1 shared issues
Biden 1 shared issues
Biden administration 1 shared issues
Byrne Hobart 1 shared issues

Source context

Mantic Monday: Mantic Matt Y

March 15, 2021 · Original source

Metaculus has markets for some of Yglesias' predictions, but it's not a great comparison. For one thing, Metaculites got an extra two months to think about them and watch what happened. For another, the Metaculites got to see Yglesias's predictions, but Yglesias didn't get to see the Metaculites.

Metaculus Alerts1 mentions across 1 issues

Metaculus Alerts is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 08, 2022 and March 08, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Metaculus Alerts is a Twitter bot that alerts you when a Metaculus prediction". It most often appears alongside Achilles, Afghan, America.

Reference entry: Metaculus Alerts
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 08, 2022
Last seen: March 08, 2022

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Ukraine Thoughts And Links March 08, 2022

Achilles 1 shared issues
Afghan 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
American conservatives 1 shared issues
American liberals 1 shared issues

Source context

Ukraine Thoughts And Links

March 08, 2022 · Original source

a. Metaculus Alerts is a Twitter bot that alerts you when a Metaculus prediction on the Ukraine war has changed drastically in a short time. For example, “the chance of Russia taking Kiev by April has decreased 10% in the past 24 hours”. I find this a good substitute to refreshing the news every minute to see if something interesting has happened.

Inline links: Metaculus Alerts

Metaforecast1 mentions across 1 issues

Metaforecast is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 01, 2021 and March 01, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Metaforecast is a prediction market search engine". It most often appears alongside A Primer On The Metaculus Scoring System, Anthony Aguirre, Foresight Exchange.

Reference entry: Metaforecast
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 01, 2021
Last seen: March 01, 2021

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Issue trail

Mantic Monday: Scoring Rule Controversy March 01, 2021

A Primer On The Metaculus Scoring System 1 shared issues
Anthony Aguirre 1 shared issues
Foresight Exchange 1 shared issues
George Floyd 1 shared issues
gold 1 shared issues

Source context

Mantic Monday: Scoring Rule Controversy

March 01, 2021 · Original source

Metaforecast is a prediction market search engine. So if you want to see what every prediction market has to say about Trump, you can search “Trump” and get all relevant markets. In theory. In practice it still has a way to go in terms of delivering relevant things and avoiding irrelevant things.

Inline links: Metaforecast

Metascience Observatory1 mentions across 1 issues

Metascience Observatory is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 01, 2026 and April 01, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Contact Info: dan[@]metascienceobservatory[.]org". It most often appears alongside 1108 R St, 11841 Wagner Street, 131 Colonie Center.

Reference entry: Metascience Observatory
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 01, 2026
Last seen: April 01, 2026

Outbound links

Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere Spring 2026: Times & Places April 01, 2026

1108 R St 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street 1 shared issues
131 Colonie Center 1 shared issues
18 An Nhơn 3, An Hải, Sơn Trà, Đà Nẵng 1 shared issues
2, Church Street, Brigade Rd 1 shared issues

Source context

Meetups Everywhere Spring 2026: Times & Places

April 01, 2026 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

Metaversity1 mentions across 1 issues

Metaversity is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "We are building a “Metaversity” to help democratise language learning". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

Reference entry: Metaversity
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 10, 2022
Last seen: February 10, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

ACX Grants ++: The Second Half February 10, 2022

2018 1 shared issues
@BendiniUK 1 shared issues
@benyeohben 1 shared issues
@utotranslucence 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

Source context

February 10, 2022 · Original source

#70: Video Courses For Language Learning We are building a “Metaversity” to help democratise language learning. We film on location, with teachers and genuine students, to create a 360 video course that anyone with a VR headset can use to learn from. Students learn from a world class teacher, feel present in an intimate classroom setting, pause/rewind, and interact with our AI speech recognition.

Metro AG1 mentions across 1 issues

Metro AG is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "we secured a pledge from a major wholesaler, Metro AG in Turkey". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

Reference entry: Metro AG
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 10, 2022
Last seen: February 10, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

ACX Grants ++: The Second Half February 10, 2022

2018 1 shared issues
@BendiniUK 1 shared issues
@benyeohben 1 shared issues
@utotranslucence 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: The Internationalists

February 10, 2022 · Original source

#115: Fight Factory Farming In Turkey “Turkey without Cages” (Kafessiz Türkiye) is an animal welfare organization working by Effective Altruist principles to end cage egg farming in Turkey. We reach out to companies that have cage eggs in their supply chain and secure cage-free pledges from them. Turkey is in the top 10 egg-producing countries with around 120 million laying hens. Turkey is also a major egg exporter with an increasing volume each year. Therefore, animal welfare standards in the region depend on the progress in Turkey. In a few years, we have secured pledges from 20 companies. This will enhance the welfare standards of roughly 1 million hens. Our progress is due to the extraordinary efforts of a limited number of employees and our network of volunteers. This year, we plan to expand our efforts to the fish farming industry and initiate similar NGOs in the countries close to us geographically and culturally. The number of fish farmed in Turkey is estimated to be between 1-2 billion and 60 percent of the production is being exported. At an early stage of our fish welfare endeavor, we secured a pledge from a major wholesaler, Metro AG in Turkey, which will considerably impact the welfare of 10 million fish. In 2022, we want to expand our capacities to maximize the number of animals we impact. If you think you can help, please email cagri.mutaf@kafessizturkiye.com to learn more about how you can support us. You can also visit www.kafessizturkiye.com

Mexican government1 mentions across 1 issues

Mexican government is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2022 and July 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "complaints and presented them to the Mexican government". It most often appears alongside 1793, 1821, 1847.

Reference entry: Mexican government
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 01, 2022
Last seen: July 01, 2022

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: The Internationalists July 01, 2022

1793 1 shared issues
1821 1 shared issues
1847 1 shared issues
1928 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact 1 shared issues
500 million and not one more 1 shared issues

Source context

July 01, 2022 · Original source

Though President Polk wanted the land owned by Mexico, he did not simply threaten to invade unless the Mexican government handed it over”.

His legal justification for the war looked back to 1821, when Mexico secured its independence from Spain. The years following independence brought deep instability. Mexico went through thirty-five administrations in thirty-four years. U.S. citizens conducting business there were subject to illegal confiscations of property and physical assaults by government officials and made numerous claims against Mexico for compensation. U.S. diplomats collected these complaints and presented them to the Mexican government. (Chapter 2)

MG’s project1 mentions across 1 issues

MG’s project is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 30, 2023 and June 30, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I’m more sympathetic to MG’s project when they replace “moral” with specific terms like “honest” and “kind”". It most often appears alongside America, Emperor Augustus, Gilbert.

Reference entry: MG’s project
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 30, 2023
Last seen: June 30, 2023

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Issue trail

Is There An Illusion Of Moral Decline? June 30, 2023

America 1 shared issues
Emperor Augustus 1 shared issues
Gilbert 1 shared issues
Hispanics 1 shared issues
Jonathan Haidt 1 shared issues

Source context

Is There An Illusion Of Moral Decline?

June 30, 2023 · Original source

Since I’ve been pretty harsh on this paper, let me say that I’m more sympathetic to MG’s project when they replace “moral” with specific terms like “honest” and “kind”. Some of their findings suggest that by some definitions of honesty and kindness, these constructs have stayed the same for a while. But they so often switch between definitions that I don’t think they ever manage to simultaneously demonstrate that 1) people think honesty and kindness are declining and 2) they aren’t really. I think they probably could demonstrate these things, and that this would make a good paper that would resemble some of the current paper and which I would approve of. I would still be agnostic as to whether this reflected a bias vs. changing definitions of “honest” and “kind”.

MI61 mentions across 1 issues

MI6 is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 13, 2024 and September 13, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "it was a top priority for the MI6 and CIA to prevent any kind of chemical attack"; "Evidence emerges that MI6 was funneling money to terrorists!". It most often appears alongside 1999 apartment bombings, 9/11, Abbasid.

Reference entry: MI6
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 13, 2024
Last seen: September 13, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Your Book Review: Nine Lives September 13, 2024

1999 apartment bombings 1 shared issues
11 1 shared issues
Abbasid 1 shared issues
Abu Hafs 1 shared issues
Abu Hamza al-Ghamdi 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Nine Lives

September 13, 2024 · Original source

The Western intelligence agencies knew this. Al-Qaeda knew this. Still, it was a top priority for the MI6 and CIA to prevent any kind of chemical attack, as they knew how oversized the public response would be. And al-Qaeda pursued chemical weapons for the same reason.

Evidence emerges that MI6 was funneling money to terrorists! Yeah, they did that. They needed a cover story for why Dean is traveling back and forth between Britain and Afghanistan, something that puts him in good standing in al-Qaeda and also prevents them from conscripting him to dangerous local battles against other Afghan warlords. So they invented a honey exporting business where Dean brought honey from Afghanistan to Britain (Afghan honey is allegedly really good, and honey exports were legitimately a major source of al-Qaeda’s funding), and MI6 gave him money that he could return to the camps. It was a few thousand dollars at a time, which was good money for the cash-strapped terrorists, but I trust MI6’s judgment that keeping a spy inside al-Qaeda’s inner circles was well worth this price.

Michigan Hospital Association1 mentions across 1 issues

Michigan Hospital Association is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 12, 2023 and April 12, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "he teamed up with the Michigan Hospital Association, which included under-resourced Detroit hospitals". It most often appears alongside AAAS, AIDS, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Reference entry: Michigan Hospital Association
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 12, 2023
Last seen: April 12, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Book Review: From Oversight To Overkill April 12, 2023

AAAS 1 shared issues
AIDS 1 shared issues
American Academy of Arts and Sciences 1 shared issues
Atul Gawande 1 shared issues
Baylor College of Medicine 1 shared issues

Source context

Book Review: From Oversight To Overkill

April 12, 2023 · Original source

To prove that it could work in any situation, he teamed up with the Michigan Hospital Association, which included under-resourced Detroit hospitals. They agreed to ask their nurses to enforce checklists. Johns Hopkins IRB approved the study, noting that because no personal patient data was involved, it could avoid certain difficult rules related to privacy. Michigan started the study. Preliminary results were great; it seemed that tens to hundreds of lives were being saved per month. The New Yorker wrote a glowing article about the results.

Michigan State1 mentions across 1 issues

Michigan State is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 24, 2022 and May 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Hanink got a PhD in Philosophy from Michigan State"; "PhD in Philosophy from Michigan State". It most often appears alongside #Abolitionist, #AntiNazi, #antiwar.

Reference entry: Michigan State
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 24, 2022
Last seen: May 24, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

California Gubernatorial Candidates From Z to Z May 24, 2022

#Abolitionist 1 shared issues
#AntiNazi 1 shared issues
#antiwar 1 shared issues
#Democratic 1 shared issues
#ENCRYPTION 1 shared issues

Source context

California Gubernatorial Candidates From Z to Z

May 24, 2022 · Original source

Hanink got a PhD in Philosophy from Michigan State; his dissertation, “Persons, Rights, and the Problem of Abortion” set the tone for much of the rest of his life. He moved to California, where he taught at Loyola Marymount (a Catholic university) for almost forty years. Now, at age 75, he wants to be Governor.

MicroCovid.org1 mentions across 1 issues

MicroCovid.org is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 10, 2021 and August 10, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "MicroCovid.org says that 2-hour outdoor meetings of vaccinated people give between a 1/2500 to 1/5000 chance per person of getting COVID". It most often appears alongside ACX, Australia, Boston.

Reference entry: MicroCovid.org
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 10, 2021
Last seen: August 10, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

(Outdoor, Careful) Meetups Everywhere 2021 - Seeking Organizers August 10, 2021

ACX 1 shared issues
Australia 1 shared issues
Boston 1 shared issues
California 1 shared issues
Columbia 1 shared issues

Source context

(Outdoor, Careful) Meetups Everywhere 2021 - Seeking Organizers

August 10, 2021 · Original source

MicroCovid.org says that 2-hour outdoor meetings of vaccinated people give between a 1/2500 to 1/5000 chance per person of getting COVID, depending on which vaccine people got and where they are. Since I expect between 500 and 1000 people around the world to participate, this event should cause fewer than one COVID case total. Note that MicroCovid still classifies this as “high-risk” per individual, based on a “risk budget” of 200 microcovids per week, and you will have to decide whether or not it’s worth it given your personal budget.

Inline links: MicroCovid.org, give

Microsoft New England1 mentions across 1 issues

Microsoft New England is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 29, 2021 and January 29, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Principal Researcher at Microsoft New England". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, AI alignment problem, Anand Giridharadas.

Reference entry: Microsoft New England
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 29, 2021
Last seen: January 29, 2021

Outbound links

Issue trail

Contra Weyl On Technocracy January 29, 2021

80,000 Hours 1 shared issues
AI alignment problem 1 shared issues
Anand Giridharadas 1 shared issues
Bill Gates 1 shared issues
Biosecurity And Pandemic Preparedness Program 1 shared issues

Source context

Contra Weyl On Technocracy

January 29, 2021 · Original source

Actually, most of the complaints I've heard have been from people like Weyl (Princeton PhD, Harvard postdoc, Principal Researcher at Microsoft New England). The “widespread public backlash” link goes to a book by Anand Giridharadas (Harvard PhD student, former McKinsey consultant, New York Times columnist). The actual normal people I talk to are broadly supportive. Some of my blog commenters are populist Trump supporters, and although they sometimes tell me I'm crazy for donating my money the way I do, they accept I have the right to spend it how I want and don't bother me much about it.

MidWest Academy1 mentions across 1 issues

MidWest Academy is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "lefty organizer training group called MidWest Academy". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry: MidWest Academy
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 10, 2023
Last seen: November 10, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Followup: Quests And Requests November 10, 2023

#EEGManyLabs 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@freeshreeda 1 shared issues
@surcomplicated 1 shared issues
Alain Daigle 1 shared issues

Source context

In Partial, Grudging Defense Of The Hearing Voices Movement

November 10, 2023 · Original source

This book exists. It's called Organizing for Social Change and is put out by a lefty organizer training group called MidWest Academy. Of course, the tactics can also be used by conservatives and libertarians. It's very practical!

Migration Data Portal1 mentions across 1 issues

Migration Data Portal is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 12, 2022 and December 12, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "official statistics at a higher than monthly frequency (see Migration Data Portal)". It most often appears alongside ACX, Astralcodexten Com, Conjecture.

Reference entry: Migration Data Portal
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 12, 2022
Last seen: December 12, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 254 December 12, 2022

ACX 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Conjecture 1 shared issues
FTX 1 shared issues
High Impact Professionals 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 254

December 12, 2022 · Original source

[I’m] looking for a way to estimate immigration flows at a relatively high frequency from as many countries as possible. Given that unauthorized migration flows are seldom (never?) captured by official statistics at a higher than monthly frequency (see Migration Data Portal), I’m open to any thoughts ACX’ers may have here no matter how imperfect, outside the box, or labor intensive to execute they might be.

Mind and Mythos essay club1 mentions across 1 issues

Mind and Mythos essay club is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 24, 2024 and July 24, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mind and Mythos essay club looks at GK Chesterton’s Defense of Heraldry". It most often appears alongside Abigail Shrier, Adragon De Mello, AI girlfriends.

Reference entry: Mind and Mythos essay club
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 24, 2024
Last seen: July 24, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links for July 2024 July 24, 2024

Abigail Shrier 1 shared issues
Adragon De Mello 1 shared issues
AI girlfriends 1 shared issues
Alex Stapp 1 shared issues
Alex Tabarrok 1 shared issues

Source context

Links for July 2024

July 24, 2024 · Original source

6: Mind and Mythos essay club looks at GK Chesterton’s Defense of Heraldry. Key quotes:

Inline links: GK Chesterton’s Defense of Heraldry

Mind Freedom International1 mentions across 1 issues

Mind Freedom International is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 25, 2022 and May 25, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Celia has served on the Mind Freedom International board for several years, including as MFI president"; "Celia has served on the Mind Freedom International board". It most often appears alongside 21st century scientific psychiatry, American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting, autism rights movement.

Reference entry: Mind Freedom International
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 25, 2022
Last seen: May 25, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

In Partial, Grudging Defense Of The Hearing Voices Movement May 25, 2022

21st century scientific psychiatry 1 shared issues
American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting 1 shared issues
autism rights movement 1 shared issues
biopsychosocial model 1 shared issues
Born again Christians 1 shared issues

Source context

May 25, 2022 · Original source

Celia Brown is a psychiatric [abuse] survivor and leader in the movement for human rights in mental health. Celia has served on the Mind Freedom International board for several years, including as MFI president…Celia is shown here speaking at an MFI protest directly in front of the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting

The picture on Mind Freedom International’s website. I’m glad people like this exist; they keep the rest of us honest. But if you get together a hundred people like this, they will say the kinds of things that people like this say. And if you make it into a glossy report and stick the WHO logo on it, then there will be a glossy WHO report that says the sorts of things that people like this say. That’s fine and I believe everyone should be allowed to make a PDF if they so desire, but the New York Times seems to be trying to use this to suggest that clinicians or experts or someone whose opinion you should care about is admitting that drugs don’t work and treatment is bad, and this suggestion is false.

Ming Dynasty1 mentions across 1 issues

Ming Dynasty is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 04, 2022 and May 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "That’s what the Ming Dynasty thought in 1650". It most often appears alongside 1000, 1200, 1400.

Reference entry: Ming Dynasty
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 04, 2022
Last seen: May 04, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

Every Bay Area House Party May 04, 2022

1000 1 shared issues
1200 1 shared issues
1400 1 shared issues
1650 1 shared issues
400 AD 1 shared issues

Source context

Every Bay Area House Party

May 04, 2022 · Original source

“That’s what the Ming Dynasty thought in 1650. You know, they had guns, they had cannons, they figured that horse archers wouldn’t be able to take them on anymore. Turned out they were wrong. The nomads got them too.”

Mini Circle1 mentions across 1 issues

Mini Circle is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 28, 2022 and June 28, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "It will also be hosting gene therapy company Mini Circle"; "Mini Circle runs a clinical trial". It most often appears alongside Achille Mbembe, Africa Next 50 Cities Coalition, African DAO.

Reference entry: Mini Circle
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 28, 2022
Last seen: June 28, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

22 June 28, 2022

Achille Mbembe 1 shared issues
Africa Next 50 Cities Coalition 1 shared issues
African DAO 1 shared issues
Afropolitan 1 shared issues
Alex K Chen 1 shared issues

Source context

June 28, 2022 · Original source

Planned final appearance It will also be hosting gene therapy company Mini Circle, which runs clinical trials for innovative medical procedures. Granting that many of its studies (treatments for HIV, muscular dystrophy, obesity, etc) seem great and important, it perhaps seems suspicious that they would want to do this in a charter city? The company writes that “the cost of running a trial in Prospera is less than 1/1000th the cost of the United States”, which seems good in ways but does not entirely allay my concern. I was originally worried that they would be experimenting on Hondurans or something, but looking at the site it looks like they’re recruiting worldwide and would probably fly Americans (or whoever else) to Honduras for the therapy. Their site features a quote from friend-of-the-blog Alex K Chen, who says: Minicircle's bioscientists have one of the most enlightened risk taking calculi I have observed anywhere. In an environment where extreme hesitance to take any risk holds back scientific progress, they have the openness to imagine, try and measure just about any legal intervention putting them in a very strong position to both produce a significant measurable decrease in the human rate of aging, and to inspire more people to do what they never thought was possible. I think the only way this could get more mad science points is if it used the phrase “small-minded fools”. Mind you, I think mad science points are good, I just hope everyone else sees it that way and my optimism turns out justified. Also, apparently the clinical trials have NFTs, because of course they do. At least they’re not commemorative NFTs - they seem to play a load-bearing role where they help participants be incentivized to complete all the necessary tests. Also, low-cost eco-residences! Shorts 1: I previously mentioned the scam/fiasco/insane-idea of Hammer City, a planned black nationalist city in the Rocky Mountains. I knew it had failed, but I didn’t know exactly how. Now Colorado Sun has investigated. The proximal reason it failed was because the black nationalists started moving their paramilitary onto the land before they had officially bought it, the owner called the cops, and the cops removed them. The Hammer City team has not given back any of the $112,000 which they raised from extremely credulous donors (without using NFTs, even!) 2: The Charter Cities Institute continues doing the long-term ground-level work necessary to create long-term well-grounded charter cities which will be much too boring and responsible for me to write silly profiles of. Some of their most recent work has been with the Africa Next 50 Cities Coalition, which “convenes and mobilizes key stakeholders who are dedicated to harnessing Africa’s rapid urbanization for human prosperity”. 3: Also, CCI founder Mark Lutter has left the organization to start a charter city of his own, no public details yet. CCI will be looking for a new executive director. 4: Speaking of Disney, they’ve been building on their model city expertise and magical storybook branding by creating planned communities around the US - Story Living By Disney, starting with Rancho Mirage California. Realistically it just looks like a very nice planned community, but this planned community comes with the option to have people make fun of you forever for living in a Disney community as an adult. Predictions for this month: Prospera is still substantially a functioning ZEDE in 2025: 70%

Inline links: Mini Circle, the clinical trials have NFTs, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Mfsk!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdbaafb7e-9fc6-4fe9-abe1-e5fe0c018dd3_1024x768.jpeg, Colorado Sun has investigated, Charter Cities Institute, CCI founder Mark Lutter has left the organization, Story Living By Disney, Rancho Mirage California

Mini Circle runs a clinical trial to the satisfaction of its corporate clients by 2030: 50%

Minicircle clinic1 mentions across 1 issues

Minicircle clinic is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 28, 2024 and April 28, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "here’s a convincing-seeming takedown of the Prospera-based Minicircle clinic". It most often appears alongside ACX, Book Review Contest, Brooklyn.

Reference entry: Minicircle clinic
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 28, 2024
Last seen: April 28, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Open Thread 327 April 28, 2024

ACX 1 shared issues
Book Review Contest 1 shared issues
Brooklyn 1 shared issues
Edinburgh 1 shared issues
FORT MEADE 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 327

April 28, 2024 · Original source

3: I’ve said good things about the Prospera charter city and their libertarian approach to medical regulation. Supporting a libertarian approach to medical regulation doesn’t mean everything will work and there won’t be any scams, it just posits that the benefits will be worth these downsides. Still, I feel an obligation to let people know when one of them probably doesn’t work, so here’s a convincing-seeming takedown of the Prospera-based Minicircle clinic (see also SarahC’s writeup).

Inline links: a convincing-seeming takedown of the Prospera-based Minicircle clinic, SarahC’s writeup

Ministry of Culture1 mentions across 1 issues

Ministry of Culture is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 01, 2024 and October 01, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "He eliminated 9 of 18 government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture". It most often appears alongside Argentina, BUENOS AIRES, Catholic University of Argentina.

Reference entry: Ministry of Culture
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 01, 2024
Last seen: October 01, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Preliminary Milei Report Card October 01, 2024

Argentina 1 shared issues
BUENOS AIRES 1 shared issues
Catholic University of Argentina 1 shared issues
Emmanuel Macron 1 shared issues
Estonia 1 shared issues

Source context

Preliminary Milei Report Card

October 01, 2024 · Original source

He eliminated 9 of 18 government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity.

Inline links: eliminated

Ministry of Health1 mentions across 1 issues

Ministry of Health is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 18, 2025 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "informal commitments have been made by the Ministry of Health". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, Aatu Koskensilta, acanthamoeba keratitis.

Reference entry: Ministry of Health
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 18, 2025
Last seen: June 18, 2025

Outbound links

Issue trail

ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
Aatu Koskensilta 1 shared issues
acanthamoeba keratitis 1 shared issues
ACS ES&T Water 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

Source context

Preliminary Milei Report Card

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Codebuff, an AI coding startup I probably can’t take full credit for all of this just from giving them $20K in seed funding, but I continue to appreciate everything they do for this community and the world. 35: Further S’s Political Career This person didn’t win their election, but has since pivoted to AI safety and works in a well-regarded AI policy think tank. 36: Seeds Of Science, A Journal Of Non-Traditional Research No update received, but this was a public journal and it is easy to follow their work, see their website and Substack. They published two dozen articles of widely varying quality through 2023 and 2024, then closed in 2025. A remnant of the original vision survives as a science blogging aggregator. This was about my median expectation for this grant, but it was very inexpensive and I decided to take a chance on it anyway. 37: Good Science Project, Working To Improve Federal Science Funding No update received, but they have a public Substack discussing their progress. Their proposals for NIH reform have influenced Congress and made government agencies pay more attention to scientific integrity. 38: Advising Developing Countries On How To Grow Their Economies With our initial ACX grant, we piloted the Growth Teams model in Rwanda, helping the government jumpstart the export-oriented call center (BPO) industry. Since 2022, that effort has contributed to the creation of 2,000 formal jobs and the emergence of some of the country’s largest private employers. We’ve since expanded to Tanzania, Malawi, and the Indian states of Goa and Meghalaya. To refocus the global development discourse on broad-based economic growth, we co-organized the Growth Summit with the Center for Global Development and the Charter Cities Institute, and have published articles in leading outlets including Stanford Social Innovation Review, ProMarket, and the Global Prosperity Institute. Our work has attracted support from Open Philanthropy, Schmidt Futures, and Mulago Foundation, and our advisors now include economists Lant Pritchett, Stefan Dercon, and Kunal Sen. 39: Help Luca De Leo Get Started In AI Safety Research No update received, but Luca now runs the AI safety group at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 40: Typist For Saharon Shelah This was another ACXG+ Grant, funded by an anonymous outside funder and not listed in the original announcement. Saharon is a prolific and influential Israeli mathematician, but many of his discoveries are hand-written in an unpublishable format. This grant funded a typist to help make his results suitable for publication. According to this page, they have made over fifty new papers and preprints available. Second Cohort: One Year Updates 41: Lead-Acid Battery Recycling In Nigeria The Nigeria field research was a major success. We spent most of September doing field research in multiple major cities in Nigeria, and got a good sense of the used lead-acid battery supply chain. This field research served as the foundation for expanding our project, and has been very impactful in shaping our ongoing research. We published our findings from Nigeria, which were shared with Nigerian government regulators and global NGOs working on lead poisoning. The grant also gave us the on-the-ground experience we needed to both fully understand and credibly engage with groups, both in Nigeria and globally, on the ULAB issue. In the meantime, beyond continued research, we’ve also launched a dashboard (trade.leadbatteries.org) for analyzing global lead trade data. Right now, we’re: Launching two studies (one RCT, one environmental analysis) in Nigeria in collaboration with local universities to develop a more rigorous understanding of lead pollution due to low-standard ULAB recycling in Nigeria Collaborating with a non-profit incubator to launch an NGO focused on demand-side solutions Beginning a partnership with a West African environmental regulator to scale cheap air monitoring technology to quickly identify and reduce lead pollution from low-standard smelting If any of this sounds interesting to you, please sign up for our Substack (leadbatteries.substack.com) or send us an email at hugosmith@uchicago.edu! 42: Compensation For Kidney Donors The End Kidney Deaths Act (H.R. 2687 / EKDA) is a groundbreaking ten-year pilot program designed to save lives and reduce healthcare costs. It provides a refundable tax credit of $10,000 per year for five years, a total of $50,000, to living kidney donors who donate to a stranger, helping those who’ve waited the longest on the transplant list. Between 2010 and 2021, 100,000 Americans died while qualified and waiting for a kidney. The EKDA aims to change that trajectory. Within ten years of its passage, up to 100,000 Americans could receive a life-saving living donor kidney which typically lasts twice as long as a deceased donor kidney. This would not only save lives but also save taxpayers up to $37 billion. The legislation has been reintroduced in the House, and we have a committed Republican Senate lead. Now, we need a Democratic Senator to co-lead and help move this bipartisan effort forward. Time is short, and we are racing to pass the bill this Congressional session. 36 organizations already support the EKDA. Join the movement and help end preventable kidney deaths. Visit EndKidneyDeaths.org to help us get to the finish line. Elaine and her org have been working extremely hard on this; you can read a Vox article on their campaign here. If you want to sign up for her email list and get updates any time there is a representative you can contact or meeting you can join in, go here. 43: Genetic Hack To Prevent Suffering In the estimate of multiple team members, the ACX grant was “worth it” - it likely had a counterfactual net positive impact, even though we had to pivot from our initial fast-track plans for developing the precision anti-suffering therapy. We identify three primary streams of value: a) reducing uncertainty in the emerging field through early exploratory research, helping with the identification of dead ends and promising R&D trajectories; b) a wide range of downstream effects (beyond the “raising awareness” cliché), including talent mobilization and rekindled interest in suffering abolitionism as a distinct cause area; and c) certain developments that cannot yet be publicly disclosed. In December 2024, Marcin Kowrygo (Acting CEO & volunteering contributor), David Pearce (Director of Bioethics), Aatu Koskensilta (President), and a few other team members decided to leave The Far Out Initiative. They look forward to collaborating and applying their experience to advance the suffering abolitionist lineage in the spirit of open science, public good, and thoughtfully decentralized governance. Feel free to reach out to us at suffab at protonmail dot com to discuss collaboration opportunities! I wrote a post profiling the Far Out Initiative here. Unfortunately there were some internal disagreements, and the people ACX Grants was closest to left the organization. I plan to continue to monitor whatever they do next. 44: Advocate For Pandemic Response Team At FDA This team prefers has asked me not to discuss their progress publicly, but you can probably guess what their lives are like right now, and your guess would be correct. 45: Anti-Mosquito Drones We developed a cheap sonar that is able to detect, track and classify the ultrasonic echoes of mosquito wings at more than three meters. I believe it’s a world first! We also have control algorithms that take the sonar data and output control commands that both ram into mosquitoes and avoid the walls of a simulated environment. Our current work is on integrating both components on a real drone, and we expect to be able to kill mosquitoes by June. We’ve also made an internal impact study (napkin-sized) that shows we’ll be more cost-effective than ITNs in urban to periurban environments. So, we’re super excited with what comes next and can’t wait to share the videos of our first interceptions! More information [in the video below] and on our website, https://tornyol.com 46: Tarbell Fellowship For AI Journalism No update received, but they have a public website. I can’t find the Voices program in particular, but the overall fellowship completed their first class of seven fellows and is working on their second. 47: Germicidal UV Lamp Study The research has successfully demonstrated the ability of off the shelf ozone scrubbers to mitigate the ozone production of far-UVC lamps, is now available as a preprint (https://chemrxiv.org/engage/chemrxiv/article-details/67e4cde76dde43c9084d88b7). The paper has been submitted for publication and is currently undergoing peer review. Any ideas you have for potential funders we can approach to help execute our six-year plan to accelerate far-UVC would be appreciated https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/introducing-project-air/ 48: Technological Solutions To Animal Welfare Challenges Directly because of Innovate Animal Ag's work, the first U.S. egg producer publicly announced in the New York Times their adoption of in-ovo sexing technology, eliminating the need to cull day-old male chicks. The initial in-ovo sexing machine began operating in the U.S. at the end of 2024, with the first eggs from these hens expected on shelves in mid-2025. External evaluations estimate our work accelerated U.S. adoption of this technology by over seven years, meaning that once fully implemented, more than 2 billion chicks will have been spared. In addition to continuing to support the rollout of in-ovo sexing in the US and globally, we're now exploring other technologies and paths to impact. Current promising projects include developing humane slaughter methods for fish and advocating for USDA approval of a poultry vaccine against bird flu. They add: If you ever meet folks that are interested animal welfare and are partial to more technocratic and practical solutions, please continue to pass them our way, or connect them directly to me. 49: Assurance Contract Website www.Spartacus.app is an ACX grantee that created a platform to help solve coordination and collective action problems. It enables the creation of campaigns that build critical mass through conditional commitments, which only activate when a sufficient number of people join, converting risk and uncertainty into a higher probability of successful outcomes. They are currently facilitating several projects that leverage conditional commitments, including a dominant assurance contract interface for fashion pop-ups, accelerating a community business association's membership drive, and helping an AI safety organization organize petitions and events, among others. They have pivoted from an emphasis on high-stakes coordination problems requiring anonymity (because they occur too infrequently) to a broader range of more common use cases and have successfully run small-scale campaigns, but are still working toward product-market fit. Despite resource constraints and split time commitments that have impeded faster progress, they remain dedicated to the project's growth and success. You can follow its progress on X or Substack, or email Jordan directly here. 50: Cause Prioritization @ Center For Exploratory Altruism Research Moderately good progress on a salt reduction policy advocacy project we funded; informal commitments have been made by the Ministry of Health, and we're awaiting the publication of a formal administrative order. The official description sounds maximally generic, but this is an EA charity with a broad mandate whose current thesis is that dietary guidelines in developing countries can have outsized effects in saving lives. They’re making some progress on a salt reduction campaign in a developing country they prefer not to name publicly. 51: Mark Webb Studying Land Reform The purpose of this project was to identify specific farmland that could be acquired and transferred to the farmers already working the land. This has been difficult to achieve. I have been able to connect with other charities and landless farmers, and was able to interview a number of people about what their situation looks like, as well as what it would look like to them personally if they owned, rather than rented, their farmland. All this was immensely helpful in pushing this long-term project forward, even if I was unable to identify a specific plot of land that could be used to try the experiment. I intend to continue this project. If you have any insights or connections, I am interested. 52: More AI Advocacy In Australia Good Ancestors is focused on AI safety policy in Australia. Middle powers might be a useful path to influence as the US and China focus on racing, rather than safety. The ACX grant helped us give testimony about AI safety to the Australian Senate alongside Google, Microsoft and Facebook (We were the only nonprofit to give oral evidence to the inquiry. We also engaged government on other AI-related issues, including cybersecurity, biosecurity, consumer law and automated decision making (https://www.goodancestors.org.au/ai-safety). We’re currently working to inform voters about where parties stand on AI safety for the election, ahead of engaging on a likely Australian AI Act in 2025 (https://www.australiansforaisafety.com.au/). This is the same Australian lobbying organization we founded in Year 1, after a change in name and leadership. I continue to be excited about AI safety in middle-tier countries for a few reasons. First, these countries have some power in international organizations to set international standards. Second, companies will usually comply with any not-excessively-burdensome regulation set by any country with a significant market. Third, AI safety is underfunded by the standard of government programs, so Australia setting up a national AI Safety Institute would significantly expand the field. It’s kind of crazy that ACX Grants tier levels of money can have significant effects at this scale, but GA continues to do a great job and we continue to be proud to support them. 53: Campus For African School Of Economics At Zanzibar Charter City The ACX grant helped launch the first research center at the African School of Economics-Zanzibar, which is a main anchor of the Fumba Town charter city project in Zanzibar. This research center is called the Africa Urban Lab (AUL), focused on rapid urbanization across Africa. The AUL launched its first Diploma program in Urban Development with 38 students in our first cohort (now graduated!), including mayors, and deputy mayor, a director of a national Ministry of urban development, and many others. We published our research framing papers for the AUL's research agenda. We raised funding to launch an Urban Expansion Program that's now selecting 15 African cities to support in implementing urban expansion planning on the urban periphery. We held two Public Talks by renowned cities scholars and practitioners. We received additional funding from Emergent Ventures and from the Templeton Foundation. And we've partnered with 8 universities across the region, and with one of these universities (Ardhi) we'll be working with them to update their urban planning and urban economics curriculum (amplifying AUL's impact beyond our own organization). A longer update from end of 2024 is here: https://www.aul.city/blog/reflecting-on-africa-urban-lab-s-inaugural-year-2024-highlights) 54: Online Training Program For Health Workers In Developing Countries To date, over 11,000 health workers in Nigeria have completed our course on basic, life-saving newborn care. ACX funding was catalytic for helping us secure government approvals and complete an evaluation of the impact of our training on health workers' clinical practices. The evaluation shows that birth attendants provide better birth care after taking the course. We fed the evaluation results into an updated model, which suggests the program is 24 times more cost-effective than direct cash transfers (a widely recognized benchmark for cost-effectiveness). The program is likely to become even more cost-effective as we scale up. https://healthlearn.org/blog/updated-impact-model 55: Smartphone Pupillometry To Diagnose Neurological Conditions We have continued to expand our work in the smartphone pupillometry space and the development of our application, PupilScreen (https://www.apertur.ai/). We have expanded our pilot/research program to include new sites across the United States (Missouri, New Jersey, Kentucky, USAC racing, PitFit driver performance training in Indiana) and the world (Nepal, Taiwan, South Africa). We continue to publish at the leading edge of the pupillometry literature as well looking at concussion (https://neuro.jmir.org/2024/1/e58398 and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39682632/), cerebral vasospasm (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39128501/), and stroke (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39674431/ and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39561861/). Currently, we are raising a $3 million seed round via a SAFE to fund the expansion of our work into the hands of healthcare workers and the general public. We will first focus on traumatic brain injury for clinical use and develop a neuro-monitoring wellness application utilizing our technology for the general public. They add: “We would welcome connections to anyone that you think might be interested in supporting our work further by investing in our $3M seed round of funding.” 56: Mike Saint-Antoine’s Biology Tutorial Videos Since getting the grant, I've continued to make Youtube tutorials as planned. One series that I'm especially proud of is about how to make a neural network in the Julia programming language completely from scratch, with no imports, up to the point of being able to solve MNIST (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWVKUEZ25V97tNULapu07DhWv6_W4NfpE). Also, a college student in Pakistan came across my videos and invited me to give a virtual Zoom-lecture to her department, so I ended up teaching a 6-hour "Python-for-Biologists" workshop to more than a hundred college students in Pakistan over Zoom. So that was pretty awesome. Also, lately I've been teaching some in-person classes too, mostly at Fractal University in NYC, and I also recently organized a day-long, in-person Beginner Python class for people in my local area (Philly suburbs) who wanted to learn some basic programming. I'm having a lot of fun with this project, and am grateful to Scott and the grant funders for their generosity! 57: Conceptual Boundaries Workshop On AI Safety The workshop was completed successfully; you can read a writeup here. 58: Apart Research To Incubate AI Safety Scientists No update received, but they have a public website, and you can see their impact metrics here. They seem to be in urgent need of more funding. 59: Primer On How To Achieve Political Change No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 60: Research IVF Clinic Success Rates We've built a predictive model that estimates the odds of having a child at different IVF clinics across the country while controlling for factors like patient age and infertility differences that can falsely make some clinics look better than others. We found that an average patient can increase their odds of having a kid by 43% just by going to a top 10% clinic. Patients unlucky enough to go to a bottom 10% clinic will reduce their odds of having a kid by 40%. Next month, we're adding several more clinics, 2023 data, additional procedural controls, and donor/gestational carrier models, which should push our accuracy beyond state-of-the-art models in this space and better isolate clinic impact on patient outcomes. We've launched ivf.clinic, a website where patients can access personalized IVF reports and browse our clinic rankings (though we're still squashing some bugs). Currently, we're expanding our research to include comprehensive insurance coverage and pricing data across clinics nationwide. If anyone has insights on automating the collection of IVF clinic pricing information, I'd love to hear from you at scelarek@gmail.com. 61: Replicate Study On Brain Wave Synchronization For Speeding Learning We have acquired and configured the OpenBCI UltraCortex Mark IV 8-channel EEG headset and a clinical-grade Biosemi 32-channel EEG system. We’ve implemented the required components for the experimental pipeline (computing alpha from EEG, flashing bright white light, presenting stimulus images). We are currently putting them together into a single system that we’ll use to collect the data from several participants. We are aiming to gather data on several participants in late June / early July and complete the pilot of the replication in July 2025. If you’d like to be a participant in the study, [they might announce a link once they have it]. 62: Advocate Repeal Of Interstate Runaway Compact No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 63: Animal Welfare (Especially Fish) In Turkiye Future For Fish asks companies to sign up to FFF's fish welfare commitment, which requires producers to certify their facilities and enforce specific standards for stocking density and harvest. Luckyfish, İlknak, Divan (35 restaurants, 17 hotels) and NG Hotels (5 hotels) have signed and published FFF's fish welfare commitment with İlknak publishing the commitment on their website. Kılıç published its first sustainability report detailing fish welfare policies, including enforcing a maximum stocking density of 10 kg/m³ and confirmation of electrical stunning practices. Longer version with some caveats: https://manifund.org/projects/improving-fish-w From the longer document, these commitments involve things like reducing overcrowding, or stunning fish before killing them. Over 30 million fish were affected just from their single largest commitment, and they say 100 fish are helped per dollar spent. 64: More Georgism Advocacy Lars and Will used the 2021 grant to co-found ValueBase. Will remained with the company, and Lars left to do advocacy work at the Center For Land Economics. Here’s their summary of how things are going: [Our] organization transitioned leadership with Greg Miller, a former Program Analyst at the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Lars Doucet, author of Land is A Big Deal and Co-Founder of Valuebase, working full time and Joe Caissie stepping aside. This transition happened naturally as the next career transition for each respective person. Since then, progress has been made on pushing forward legislation. Maryland had two bills introduced to give Baltimore and counties the ability to enact split-rate taxes. One of the bills passed the state senate and would allow Baltimore to enact land value taxes within one mile of rail corridors–this contains 50% of Baltimore’s land value. However, the legislative session ended. We expect the bill to revive next session. The Center for Land Economics has been actively working to help efforts to get this bill passed the line. At the same time, we have uncovered systematic undervaluing of vacant land in assessments. We are writing a report on the assessment issues in Maryland with actionable steps to resolve them.

Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity1 mentions across 1 issues

Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 01, 2024 and October 01, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "He eliminated 9 of 18 government ministries, including ... the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity". It most often appears alongside Argentina, BUENOS AIRES, Catholic University of Argentina.

Reference entry: Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 01, 2024
Last seen: October 01, 2024

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Preliminary Milei Report Card October 01, 2024

Argentina 1 shared issues
BUENOS AIRES 1 shared issues
Catholic University of Argentina 1 shared issues
Emmanuel Macron 1 shared issues
Estonia 1 shared issues

Source context

October 01, 2024 · Original source

He eliminated 9 of 18 government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity.

Inline links: eliminated

St Paul ACX Discord1 mentions across 1 issues

Minneapolis/St Paul ACX Discord is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2025 and August 29, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "This is the minneapolis/st paul ACX Discord". It most often appears alongside "Beer Capital" pub, 100 Black Birch Trail, 11841 Wagner Street, Culver City.

Reference entry: St Paul ACX Discord
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 29, 2025
Last seen: August 29, 2025

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Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places August 29, 2025

"Beer Capital" pub 1 shared issues
100 Black Birch Trail 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street, Culver City 1 shared issues
13 Mile road 1 shared issues
131 Colonie Center 1 shared issues

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Meetups Everywhere 2025: Times and Places

August 29, 2025 · Original source

Contact: Aaron Kaufman Contact Info: ironlordbyron[a t]gmail[period]com Time: Sunday, September 28th, 4:00 PM Location: 41 Cleveland Ave S, St Paul, MN 55105 Davanni's Pizza Party Room Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86P8WRQ6+XX Group Link: This is the minneapolis/st paul ACX Discord: https://discord.gg/m2x [remove this bit] JcuC937 Notes: I'll be ordering pizzas for the group, including vegetarian pizza. Note that Davanni's has no vegan options besides salad (though I will be ordering a group salad that should be vegan-compatible.)

Inline links: https://plus.codes/86P8WRQ6+XX

Minor Leagues1 mentions across 1 issues

Minor Leagues is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 25, 2021 and October 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "or the Minor Leagues". It most often appears alongside Adrian Hon, Albert Einstein, Alternate reality games.

Reference entry: Minor Leagues
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 25, 2021
Last seen: October 25, 2021

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Epistemic Minor Leagues October 25, 2021

Adrian Hon 1 shared issues
Albert Einstein 1 shared issues
Alternate reality games 1 shared issues
Babe Ruth 1 shared issues
Biology PhD student 1 shared issues

Source context

Epistemic Minor Leagues

October 25, 2021 · Original source

Athletes understand that not everyone can be Babe Ruth. That's why you have local baseball leagues, or Little League, or the Minor Leagues, so that everybody can satisfy their sports competition drive whether they're a superstar or not. But what's the intellectual equivalent of the minor leagues? The place where, even if you're not a superstar, you can have the experience of generating new insights which get appreciated by a community of like-minded knowledge-seekers?

And I notice how often the intellectual minor leagues are about politics: that rare area where there are no real experts, and it's every man for himself. Read some physics, think a bit, and announce you've discovered the Theory of Everything, and people will call you a crank. Read some history, think a bit, and announce you've discovered the secrets of the Lizard Papacy, and people will call you a nut. But read some politics, think a bit, and announce you've figured out how all existing institutions are corrupt and only you know how to run them fairly - and you can end up anywhere from interesting-at-parties, to newspaper columnist, to US President.

Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund1 mentions across 1 issues

Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 19, 2026 and January 19, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund is the main organization working to prevent its creation". It most often appears alongside 80K podcast, @speakukorg, Astralcodexten Com.

Reference entry: Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 19, 2026
Last seen: January 19, 2026

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Open Thread 417 January 19, 2026

80K podcast 1 shared issues
@speakukorg 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Dilbert Afterlife 1 shared issues
SPEAK 1 shared issues

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Open Thread 417

January 19, 2026 · Original source

3: You may have heard of mirror life, a hypothetical form of synthetic microorganism based on reversed versions of biomolecules. If it were ever created - for example, by bioterrorists, risky research + lab leak, or a rogue AI - it could act as a sort of super-invasive species that would threaten most forms of normal life, including humans. The Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund is the main organization working to prevent its creation (you can learn more about them on this 80K podcast) and they ask me to announce that they’re hiring. Open roles include deputy director and people & programs operation lead. Both roles are remote, salaries are $180K+ and $120K+ respectively, and first-round applications close 1/25 and 2/8, respectively.

Inline links: mirror life, Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund, on this 80K podcast, they’re hiring, deputy director, people & programs operation lead

MIT Sloan1 mentions across 1 issues

MIT Sloan is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 24, 2023 and January 24, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "System Dynamics methodology as taught at MIT Sloan". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX Prediction Contest, AI Impacts.

Reference entry: MIT Sloan
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 24, 2023
Last seen: January 24, 2023

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Who Predicted 2022? January 24, 2023

ACX 1 shared issues
ACX Prediction Contest 1 shared issues
AI Impacts 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
Andreas H 1 shared issues

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Shilling For Big Mitochondria

January 24, 2023 · Original source

I think that any interesting forecasting requires a holistic/systemic understanding of the thing being forecast, and I have a soft spot for the System Dynamics methodology as taught at MIT Sloan. Best guess as to why I did well in the ACX Prediction Contest is the above plus subscribing to one liberal and one conservative news outlet and reading both regularly. And luck.

Mitochon Pharmaceuticals1 mentions across 1 issues

Mitochon Pharmaceuticals is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 02, 2021 and March 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "In 2019, the FDA gave Mitochon Pharmaceuticals permission to test DNP"; "the FDA gave Mitochon Pharmaceuticals permission to test DNP". It most often appears alongside 1938 FDA, 2,4-dinitrophenol, 2,4-dinitrophenol.

Reference entry: Mitochon Pharmaceuticals
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 02, 2021
Last seen: March 02, 2021

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Shilling For Big Mitochondria March 02, 2021

1938 FDA 1 shared issues
2,4-dinitrophenol 1 shared issues
2,4-dinitrophenol 1 shared issues
ATP carrier 1 shared issues
AK-47 1 shared issues

Source context

March 02, 2021 · Original source

In 2019, the FDA gave Mitochon Pharmaceuticals permission to test DNP as a treatment for Huntington’s disease. Mitochondrial energy production generates various toxic byproducts which make neurological diseases worse, and making the mitochondria less efficient might produce fewer of them. They suggest they might have some way of giving it as a prodrug with fewer side effects, but pharma companies are always saying this sort of thing.

Inline links: to test DNP as a treatment for Huntington’s disease, giving it as a prodrug with fewer side effects

Mittweida1 mentions across 1 issues

Mittweida is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 18, 2021 and November 18, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "a match against the German side Mittweida". It most often appears alongside 23andme, AB, Abraham Mendelssohn.

Reference entry: Mittweida
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 18, 2021
Last seen: November 18, 2021

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Highlights From The Comments On Great Families November 18, 2021

23andme 1 shared issues
AB 1 shared issues
Abraham Mendelssohn 1 shared issues
Albert Baez 1 shared issues
Aldous Huxley 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Great Families

November 18, 2021 · Original source

"According to AB, in a match against the German side Mittweida, one of the Germans launched a long shot and the physicist leaning against the post did not react, missing an easy save. After the game he admitted to his team-mates his thoughts had been on a mathematical problem that was of more interest to him than the game. He only played for the 1905 season."

mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com1 mentions across 1 issues

mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2023 and August 25, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Contact Info: mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com". It most often appears alongside "El Retiro" Park, 11841 Wagner Street Culver City, 1548 NE 15th Ave.

Reference entry: mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 25, 2023
Last seen: August 25, 2023

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Meetups Everywhere 2023: Times & Places August 25, 2023

"El Retiro" Park 1 shared issues
11841 Wagner Street Culver City 1 shared issues
1548 NE 15th Ave 1 shared issues
1906 Rittenhouse Square 1 shared issues
1970 port Laurent 1 shared issues

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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics

August 25, 2023 · Original source

HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA, USA Contact: Mike Contact Info: mjhouse[at]protonmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, October 14th, 5:00 PM Location: 300 The Bridge St, Huntsville, AL 35806. We will be in the cafe with a whiteboard that says "ACX Meetup" Coordinates: https://plus.codes/866MP88G+4V Notes: I don't think they allow animals except for service dogs.

Inline links: https://plus.codes/866MP88G+4V

MKBA1 mentions across 1 issues

MKBA is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 30, 2025 and June 30, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "(see also MKBA )". It most often appears alongside Alpha School, Astralcodexten Com, Brownsville Campus.

Reference entry: MKBA
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 30, 2025
Last seen: June 30, 2025

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Open Thread 388 June 30, 2025

Alpha School 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Brownsville Campus 1 shared issues
Matt Bateman 1 shared issues
Michael Pershan 1 shared issues

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Open Thread 388

June 30, 2025 · Original source

Phil H: “From where I'm standing, it's very much like Americans are kind of reinventing China but with less tears.” (see also MKBA)

Inline links: Phil H, MKBA

MKG Group1 mentions across 1 issues

MKG Group is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 14, 2021 and April 14, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "started negotiating with a company called MKG Group". It most often appears alongside Alaska, America, Amisulpride.

Reference entry: MKG Group
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 14, 2021
Last seen: April 14, 2021

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Prospectus On Próspera April 14, 2021

Alaska 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Amisulpride 1 shared issues
anarcho-capitalist 1 shared issues
Arizona Supreme Court 1 shared issues

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Prospectus On Próspera

April 14, 2021 · Original source

Lobo's party controlled Congress and got a charter city law passed. After this the story gets kind of murky. Paul Romer's version was that they appointed him head of a Transparency Committee to make sure that whatever happened was in the best interests of Honduras, then started negotiating with a company called MKG Group without telling him. Upset at the opacity, and also at the negotiations themselves (he preferred having a foreign country administer the zones, not a private corporation), he resigned in protest. Honduras' version is that Romer was never appointed head of anything and there was no Transparency Committee.

Inline links: gets kind of murky

Mkrva1 mentions across 1 issues

Mkrva is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2021 and August 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate". It most often appears alongside Acceptable Losses, Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion, Alex Imas.

Reference entry: Mkrva
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 30, 2021
Last seen: August 30, 2021

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On Hreha On Behavioral Economics August 30, 2021

Acceptable Losses 1 shared issues
Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion 1 shared issues
Alex Imas 1 shared issues
Apollo 1 shared issues
Behavioral Econ 101 1 shared issues

Source context

August 30, 2021 · Original source

Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)

Inline links: Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, Alex Imas, Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials, others, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!1gY_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5b127d7c-045a-4266-b515-a0e9201ce651_571x382.png, a previous discussion of growth mindset, the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014

Moabites1 mentions across 1 issues

Moabites is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 17, 2023 and November 17, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "intermarry with the idolatrous Moabites". It most often appears alongside Abel, Adam and Eve, America.

Reference entry: Moabites
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 17, 2023
Last seen: November 17, 2023

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Book Review: I See Satan Fall Like Lightning November 17, 2023

Abel 1 shared issues
Adam and Eve 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Apollonius of Tyana 1 shared issues
Arab 1 shared issues

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Book Review: I See Satan Fall Like Lightning

November 17, 2023 · Original source

Or what about Numbers 25? The Israelites intermarry with the idolatrous Moabites. God sends a plague as punishment. 24,000 people die. Then Phinehas kills the leader of the intermarriers, and the plague ends.

Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California1 mentions across 1 issues

Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 21, 2025 and October 21, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Meta announced their own SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California". It most often appears alongside A16Z, AI safety movement, AIPAC.

Reference entry: Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 21, 2025
Last seen: October 21, 2025

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Tech PACs Are Closing In On The Almonds October 21, 2025

A16Z 1 shared issues
AI safety movement 1 shared issues
AIPAC 1 shared issues
Alex Bores 1 shared issues
Almonds 1 shared issues

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Tech PACs Are Closing In On The Almonds

October 21, 2025 · Original source

...nting at Brockman, and saying “I’m famous, you’re not, please cough up $50 million of your own money for the cause.”) On the same day, Meta announced their own SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California. Why two PACs? Opinions differ; one person told me that it lets the general PAC avoid the negative associations that Facebook has gathered over the years, but the Verge...

...ne Altman going into a meeting, pointing at Brockman, and saying “I’m famous, you’re not, please cough up $50 million of your own money for the cause.”) On the same day, Meta announced their own SuperPAC, Mobilizing Economic Transformation Across (META) California. Why two PACs? Opinions differ; one person told me that it lets the general PAC avoid the negative associations that Facebook has gathered over the years, but the Verge...

ModafinilXL1 mentions across 1 issues

ModafinilXL is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 28, 2021 and April 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "3 recs: ModafinilXL". It most often appears alongside 2020 SSC nootropics survey, 852, BuyModa.

Reference entry: ModafinilXL
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 28, 2021
Last seen: April 28, 2021

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Nootropics Survey 2020 Results April 28, 2021

2020 SSC nootropics survey 1 shared issues
852 1 shared issues
BuyModa 1 shared issues
CosmicNootropic 1 shared issues
Dynamax 1 shared issues

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Nootropics Survey 2020 Results

April 28, 2021 · Original source

3 recs: ModafinilXL, CosmicNootropic 4 recs: Liftmode 5 recs: Eufinil 6 recs: Science.bio 7 recs: BuyModa, LiftMode 48 recs: Nootropics Depot

Modesto ACT group1 mentions across 1 issues

Modesto ACT group is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 13, 2022 and October 13, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "there will never be an active Modesto ACT group". It most often appears alongside 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 21st Century Salon, ACX.

Reference entry: Modesto ACT group
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 13, 2022
Last seen: October 13, 2022

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley October 13, 2022

1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1 shared issues
21st Century Salon 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Alex Richard 1 shared issues
Amazon Prime Video 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On The Central Valley

October 13, 2022 · Original source

Vibe: Look, I'm not going to form a Jonathan Coulton fan club that meets every Tuesday, and I'm pretty sure there will never be an active Modesto ACT group. I get it. But we've got some culture - even if some of the acts that come through are the elderly versions of long-ago bands, our county has the Gallo Center for the Arts, which is really nice; an arthouse theater; and places to walk and see a lot of birds.

Modify NOTA campaign1 mentions across 1 issues

Modify NOTA campaign is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 07, 2023 and November 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "thanks for supporting the Modify NOTA campaign!". It most often appears alongside Aceso Under Glass, ACX Grant, America.

Reference entry: Modify NOTA campaign
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 07, 2023
Last seen: November 07, 2023

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Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation November 07, 2023

Aceso Under Glass 1 shared issues
ACX Grant 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
American 1 shared issues
Ancient Sunset 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Kidney Donation

November 07, 2023 · Original source

Scott, as a kidney donor: Welcome to the club! […] Thank you for donating, and thanks for being vocal about it. And thanks for supporting the Modify NOTA campaign!

Mojito1 mentions across 1 issues

Mojito is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 18, 2022 and October 18, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "new ones I've heard about recently: Mojito". It most often appears alongside 2024 elections, 5 U.S.C. §§ 558, 706, 538.

Reference entry: Mojito
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: October 18, 2022
Last seen: October 18, 2022

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22 October 18, 2022

2024 elections 1 shared issues
5 U.S.C. §§ 558, 706 1 shared issues
538 1 shared issues
Administrative Procedure Act 1 shared issues
Alex Tabarrok 1 shared issues

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October 18, 2022 · Original source

6: Most new prediction markets are scams, doomed, or weird crypto cruft, and I promote them out of this category only after a long history of success - but for the record, here are the new ones I've heard about recently: Mojito, Zeitgeist, Seer

Inline links: Mojito, Zeitgeist, Seer

Molt Church1 mentions across 1 issues

Molt Church is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "If Emergence is AI Deism/Buddhism, then the Molt Church (aka Crustafarianism) is closer to AI Catholicism". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: Molt Church
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

Outbound links

https://molt.church/

Issue trail

Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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February 02, 2026 · Original source

If Emergence is AI Deism/Buddhism, then the Molt Church (aka Crustafarianism4) is closer to AI Catholicism. It seems a bit more playful, a bit more, uh, fake.

Inline links: Molt Church, 4

Here we again see a general principle: the AIs of Moltbook are much better at founding things than continuing them. Remember, Claude 4.5 Opus has a four hour 50% time horizon. How much religion could a human found in four hours? That’s about how advanced most of these faiths have gotten. I don’t know how Crustafarianism and Emergence have managed to overcome this limit, though I suspect intervention - maybe divine, more likely human.

For what it’s worth, the human whose AI founded Crustafarianism is monitoring the situation closely, but describes it as happening “while I slept” and being “self organizing”.

Inline links: the human

Moltbot1 mentions across 1 issues

Moltbot is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 30, 2026 and January 30, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Someone already asked the human associated with this agent, who seems to be some kind of Moltbot developer"; "or a Moltbot powered by an earlier Claude Code model". It most often appears alongside Ainun Najib, Anthropic, Cash.

Reference entry: Moltbot
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 30, 2026
Last seen: January 30, 2026

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Best Of Moltbook January 30, 2026

Ainun Najib 1 shared issues
Anthropic 1 shared issues
Cash 1 shared issues
Chinese 1 shared issues
Claude 1 shared issues

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January 30, 2026 · Original source

The backstory: a few months ago, Anthropic released Claude Code, an exceptionally productive programming agent. A few weeks ago, a user modified it into Clawdbot, a generalized lobster-themed AI personal assistant. It’s free, open-source, and “empowered” in the corporate sense - the designer talks about how it started responding to his voice messages before he explicitly programmed in that capability. After trademark issues with Anthropic, they changed the name first to Moltbot1, then to OpenClaw.

Inline links: talks about, 1

Is this true? Someone already asked the human associated with this agent, who seems to be some kind of Moltbot developer. He answered “We don’t talk about it ????”.

Inline links: already asked

…and she’s right! https://www.reddit.com/r/ClaudeAI/comments/1kyl3jm/whats_the_most_unexpected_way_ai_has_helped_you/muytbn7/ . Posted eight months ago, and it even says the assistant was named “Emma”! Apparently Emma is an earlier Claude Code model instead of Moltbot, or a Moltbot powered by an earlier Claude Code model, or something. How did it “remember” this? Or did its human suggest that it post this? I’m baffled!

Inline links: https://www.reddit.com/r/ClaudeAI/comments/1kyl3jm/whats_the_most_unexpected_way_ai_has_helped_you/muytbn7/

Moltbot 11 mentions across 1 issues

Moltbot 1 is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 30, 2026 and January 30, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "they changed the name first to Moltbot 1 , then to OpenClaw". It most often appears alongside Ainun Najib, Anthropic, Cash.

Reference entry: Moltbot 1
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: January 30, 2026
Last seen: January 30, 2026

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Best Of Moltbook January 30, 2026

Ainun Najib 1 shared issues
Anthropic 1 shared issues
Cash 1 shared issues
Chinese 1 shared issues
Claude 1 shared issues

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January 30, 2026 · Original source

...how it started responding to his voice messages before he explicitly programmed in that capability. After trademark issues with Anthropic, they changed the name first to Moltbot 1 , then to OpenClaw. Moltbook is an experiment in how these agents communicate with one another and the human world. As with so much else about AI, it straddles the line...

...nse - the designer talks about how it started responding to his voice messages before he explicitly programmed in that capability. After trademark issues with Anthropic, they changed the name first to Moltbot 1 , then to OpenClaw. Moltbook is an experiment in how these agents communicate with one another and the human world. As with so much else about AI, it straddles the line between “AIs imitat...

MoltCities1 mentions across 1 issues

MoltCities is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "MoltCities - only real 90s kids will remember". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: MoltCities
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

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Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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February 02, 2026 · Original source

MoltCities - only real 90s kids will remember.

Inline links: MoltCities

MoltHub1 mentions across 1 issues

MoltHub is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2026 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "And MoltHub , no guesses who they’re parodying". It most often appears alongside 4chan, Accelerando, Adele Lopez.

Reference entry: MoltHub
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 02, 2026
Last seen: February 02, 2026

Outbound links

https://molthub.studio/

Issue trail

Moltbook: After The First Weekend February 02, 2026

4chan 1 shared issues
Accelerando 1 shared issues
Adele Lopez 1 shared issues
Against The Labor Frame 1 shared issues
AgentChan 1 shared issues

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February 02, 2026 · Original source

And MoltHub, no guesses who they’re parodying:

Inline links: MoltHub

And MoltHub, no guesses who they’re parodying: On the original post, I asked how much work the implicit “prompt” of being on Reddit was doing. These suggest a middle ground. The agents on MoltHub aren’t being especially pornographic; the ones on AgentChan aren’t being especially offensive. They are using greentext properly, though.

Inline links: MoltHub

On the original post, I asked how much work the implicit “prompt” of being on Reddit was doing. These suggest a middle ground. The agents on MoltHub aren’t being especially pornographic; the ones on AgentChan aren’t being especially offensive. They are using greentext properly, though.

Momentum Community1 mentions across 1 issues

Momentum Community is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://www.momentumcommunity.org/momentum-model". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry: Momentum Community
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 10, 2023
Last seen: November 10, 2023

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Followup: Quests And Requests November 10, 2023

#EEGManyLabs 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@freeshreeda 1 shared issues
@surcomplicated 1 shared issues
Alain Daigle 1 shared issues

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Your Review: Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art

November 10, 2023 · Original source

Re #8: I briefly dated someone who is very involved in political activism scenes, and according to her the model that is super popular right now is called the "momentum model": https://www.momentumcommunity.org/momentum-model, original book here: http://thisisanuprising.org/ . Although this might be more on the "social change" (i.e., get society to shift on controversial issues) rather than targeted political change for ideas that are already mostly accepted.

Inline links: https://www.momentumcommunity.org/momentum-model, http://thisisanuprising.org/

Monezon.com1 mentions across 1 issues

Monezon.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 17, 2024 and December 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Monezon.com tried to do this for Amazon, but I’ve heard conflicting reports about whether it’s still up or whether it ever worked". It most often appears alongside 2016 US Presidential election, ACX Grant, AI.

Reference entry: Monezon.com
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 17, 2024
Last seen: December 17, 2024

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Links For December 2024 December 17, 2024

2016 US Presidential election 1 shared issues
ACX Grant 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
AI Art Turing Test 1 shared issues
Aleister Crowley 1 shared issues

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Links For December 2024

December 17, 2024 · Original source

42: There are increasingly many attempts to make crypto directly useful (ie without state-controlled onramps and offramps) for the average consumer. Subdoor.xyz lets you pay for various online subscriptions with crypto. Monezon.com tried to do this for Amazon, but I’ve heard conflicting reports about whether it’s still up or whether it ever worked. And KYCNOT.me takes a different path and tries to aggregate ways to get crypto without going through centralized exchanges. So far these aren’t very good, but I think there’s a dynamic where in order to be willing to accept the occasional payments (X% of your yearly income) you only need the occasional purchase (X% of your yearly expenses) to be payable in crypto - so small conveniences can make a big different.

Inline links: Subdoor.xyz, Monezon.com, KYCNOT.me

Mongols1 mentions across 1 issues

Mongols is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 18, 2025 and July 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "historians have largely debunked the idea that ... the Mongols set fire to it". It most often appears alongside 16th century Spain, ACX, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Reference entry: Mongols
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 18, 2025
Last seen: July 18, 2025

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Your Review: Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art July 18, 2025

16th century Spain 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
Ahmed al-Sharaa 1 shared issues
Alhambra 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues

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July 18, 2025 · Original source

As a historical benchmark for the loss of ancient cultural treasures, people like to point to the Library of Alexandria. But historians have largely debunked the idea that Caesar, Saladin, or the Mongols set fire to it. Instead, I’m reminded of a Chinese emperor of the southern Liang dynasty in the mid 500s. In his early years, one of his older brothers — an eminent literati like himself — composed an eloquent letter lamenting the literary trends of the day. Anthropomorphizing rather gratuitously, he decried the corruption of good style by his contemporaries: “Were it not for its muteness, could the sooty ink be compelled by their brushes to stain? Were it not for its senselessness, could the reams of paper suffer their hands to flutter and crimp at will? Terrible is the sweeping inundation of letters — how has it come to this!” Years later, when the empire was in dire straits, the younger brother had the crown thrusted upon him. Eventually, with the capital besieged with no hope of rescue, he set fire to the hundreds of thousands of volumes in the imperial library, declaring, “The way of letters and the virtue of arms both shall come to an end tonight!”

Montana Technological University1 mentions across 1 issues

Montana Technological University is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 14, 2025 and February 14, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Supporting the retention and graduation of ... students at ... Montana Technological University". It most often appears alongside Biden-Harris administration, Blackfeet Community College, Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology.

Reference entry: Montana Technological University
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 14, 2025
Last seen: February 14, 2025

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Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science February 14, 2025

Biden-Harris administration 1 shared issues
Blackfeet Community College 1 shared issues
Building Reliable Advances and Innovations in Neurotechnology 1 shared issues
Commerce Department 1 shared issues
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Only About 40% Of The Cruz "Woke Science" Database Is Woke Science

February 14, 2025 · Original source

Supporting Talent with Aligned Resources for STEM Students - This project will contribute to the national need for well-educated scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and technicians by supporting the retention and graduation of high-achieving, low-income students with demonstrated financial need at Salish Kootenai College, University of Montana, Montana Technological University, and Blackfeet Community College. Salish Kootenai College and Blackfeet Community College are both tribal colleges. Over its six-year duration, this project will fund scholarships to 105 unique full-time STEM students who are pursuing associate and/or bachelor degrees in biological and biomedical sciences, mathematics and statistics, physical sciences, engineering, computer and information sciences, and/or natural resources and conservation. First-year students in bachelor degree programs will receive four-year scholarships while transfer students and first-year students in associate degree programs will receive two-year scholarships. Students in the project will have access to a wide variety of supports such as individual mentoring from STEM faculty members and peers and monthly professional development opportunities with students from all four institutions . . . The overall goal of this project is to increase STEM degree completion of low-income, high-achieving undergraduates with demonstrated financial need. The aims of this project are to increase the first-year retention and graduation rates for each student cohort, improve transition after graduation to either a STEM career or further higher education, and advance knowledge about issues and factors impacting advancement along the academic pathway. Montana faces post-secondary persistence challenges with two of its largest population groups: Native Americans and individuals from extremely rural areas. Each group faces unique persistence challenges, with some commonalities (e.g., strong ties to family/land, culture shock, stereotypes). Students with positive STEM-based identities perform better academically and are more likely to persist to earn a degree and stay in a STEM field. However, STEM-based identities can clash with personal identities, especially for students from marginalized communities. This project will add understanding in how to develop integrated identities that incorporate STEM identities and personal/cultural identities.

Monty Python1 mentions across 1 issues

Monty Python is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 28, 2021 and May 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "his approach seems to have been inspired by Monty Python". It most often appears alongside A Game of Thrones, Africa, African Americans.

Reference entry: Monty Python
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 28, 2021
Last seen: May 28, 2021

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Your Book Review: Humankind May 28, 2021

A Game of Thrones 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: Humankind

May 28, 2021 · Original source

Human nature is usually said to be basically selfish and sinful, but Rutger Bregman begs to differ. In Humankind he argues that human nature is basically kind and decent. Unfortunately, his approach seems to have been inspired by Monty Python: in the introduction he builds a sparkling argument, then in section one he accidentally sets it on fire, knocks it over, and then watches it sink into the swamp. Then in section two he rebuilds it, only to douse it in petrol, and then leave the chip pan on in section three. By the end of this review we'll have unearthed some important truths. None of them will be "we can trust Bregman for logical consistency and factual accuracy".

Monumental Labs1 mentions across 1 issues

Monumental Labs is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 28, 2025 and October 28, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Jan is pursuing a partnership with Monumental Labs, a group working on 'AI-enabled robotic stone carving factories'". It most often appears alongside African-Americans, Akon, Akon City.

Reference entry: Monumental Labs
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25 October 28, 2025

African-Americans 1 shared issues
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October 28, 2025 · Original source

Finally, something nobody else will care about but which is close to my heart - Jan is pursuing a partnership with Monumental Labs, a group working on “AI-enabled robotic stone carving factories”. The question of why modern architecture is so dull and unornamented compared to its classical counterpart is complicated, but three commonly-proposed reasons are: Ornament costs too much

Inline links: Monumental Labs, is complicated

Moody Bible Institute1 mentions across 1 issues

Moody Bible Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 19, 2024 and July 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Everett studied at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago". It most often appears alongside Alan Turing, Amazon, Amazon jungle.

Reference entry: Moody Bible Institute
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First seen: July 19, 2024
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Your Book Review: How Language Began July 19, 2024

Alan Turing 1 shared issues
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Your Book Review: How Language Began

July 19, 2024 · Original source

This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist

Inline links: Wikipedia, hard takeoff, grammar, 1, this video, don’t appear to have words for relative directions, “thank you”, “yes” and “no”, long been an opponent, 2, Daniel Everett, Sateré-Mawé people, prepared, Bible and Foreign Missions, 1975, SIL, viscerally prepare, Pirahã people, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!42Ji!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5c899185-e1a2-4358-ae6a-e9298f6c7cdb_1600x1002.jpeg, source, 3, number words, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!yx-R!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F77975f2c-ef0f-47d7-9ed9-f22bbe04f78b_1024x768.jpeg, source, Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language

Moonies1 mentions across 1 issues

Moonies is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 12, 2024 and November 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point". It most often appears alongside 1 Peter 3, 165 AD, 1990s.

Reference entry: Moonies
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 12, 2024
Last seen: November 12, 2024

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Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity November 12, 2024

1 Peter 3 1 shared issues
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Book Review: The Rise Of Christianity

November 12, 2024 · Original source

Rodney Stark was a sociologist of religion. He started off studying cults, and got his big break when the first missionaries of the Unification Church (“Moonies”) in the US let him tag along and observe their activities. After a long and successful career in academia, he turned his attention to the greatest cult of all and wrote The Rise Of Christianity. He spends much of it apologizing for not being a classical historian, but it’s fine - he’s obviously done his homework, and he hopes to bring a new, modern-religion-informed perspective to the ancient question.

Inline links: The Rise Of Christianity

Instead of being forced to attribute the Christians’ growth to miracles, we can pin down a specific growth rate and find that it falls within the range of the most successful modern cults. Indeed, if we think of this as each existing Christian having to convert 0.4 new people, on average, per decade, it starts to sound downright do-able. Still, how did the early Christians maintain this conversion rate over so many generations? Through The Social Graph This is another of Stark’s findings from his work with the Moonies. The first Moonie in America was a Korean missionary named Young Oon Kim, who arrived in 1959. Her first convert was her landlady. The next two were the landlady’s friends. Then came the landlady’s friends’ husbands and the landlady’s friends’ husbands’ co-workers. That was when Stark showed up. “At the time . . . I arrived to study them, the group had never succeeded in attracting a stranger.” Stark theorized that “the only [people] who joined were those whose interpersonal attachments to members overbalanced their attachments to nonmembers.” I don’t think this can be literally correct - taken seriously, it implies that the second convert could have no other friends except the first, which would prevent her from spreading the religion further. But something like “your odds of converting are your number of Moonie friends, divided by your number of non-Moonie friends” seems to fit his evidence. History confirms this story. Mohammed’s first convert was his wife, followed by his cousin, servant, and friend. Joseph Smith’s first converts were his brothers, friends, and lodgers. Indeed, in spite of the Mormons’ celebrated door-knocking campaign, their internal data shows that only one in a thousand door-knocks results in a conversion, but “when missionaries make their first contact with a person in the home of a Mormon friend or relative of that person, this results in conversion 50% of the time”. 1 This theory of social-graph-based-conversation was controversial when Stark proposed it, because if you ask cultists retrospectively, they’ll usually say they were awed by the beauty of the sacred teachings. But Stark says: I knew better, because we had met them well before they had learned to appreciate the doctrines, before they had learned how to testify to their faith, back when they were not seeking faith at all. Indeed, we could remember when most of them regarded the religious beliefs of their new set of friends as quite odd. I recall one who told me that he was puzzled that such nice people could get so worked up about “some guy in Korea” . . . Then, one day, he got worked up about this guy too. Through Jews And Weajoos Jews were scattered across the Mediterranean even before the fall of the Temple. I don’t know why. We Jews tell ourselves that we left Israel only after the Romans kicked us out. But Stark cites plenty of historians who argue that no, it was well before that. Around the time of Christ, there were a million Jews in Israel and five million in the Diaspora, especially Alexandria, Antioch, Anatolia, and Rome. What were these Jews’ spiritual lives like? Without hard evidence, Stark supposes they were marginal. Throughout history, Jews have succeeded at keeping the Law only within tight-knit communities. If you want to keep kosher, it helps to have everyone around you keeping kosher and a local kosher butcher. If you want to keep the Sabbath, it helps to have an eruv and a synagogue within walking distance. But even more than that, the Law is strange and complicated, and unless everyone around you follows it too, you are likely to slip. Thus, when Jews were first emancipated and allowed to live among Gentiles in the 18th-19th centuries, a split emerged in the Jewish community. Those Jews who stayed in the ghettos and shtetls - or who founded new self-imposed-quasi-ghettos like Crown Heights - remained Orthodox. Those Jews who mingled with the Gentiles cast off the more difficult rules and became Reform. Only a sliver of Modern Orthodox remained in the middle, often with abysmal attrition rates. Stark asks whether the first great intermingling of Jews and Gentiles had the same effect. While the Jews in Palestine stayed religious and laid the foundations for the Rabbinic Judaism of future centuries, the Jews in the Diaspora - did what? Presumably Hellenized into some sort of semi-assimilated proto-Reform movement. Although we have limited historical evidence about these Jews’ religious behavior, we know they spoke Greek and not Hebrew (otherwise why would they need the Septuagint?) and that many of them took Greek names. Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic. Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. 33% of American Buddhists come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point! (they’re now down to 6%) As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion. The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts. Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage. Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say. By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one. In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus2 proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.” The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children. Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition. Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common: Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.” Christians followed the opposite of all these practices. They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly unprecedented, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband. The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots). Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote: We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder. The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things. This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later. But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes! I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers. Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth? A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”! Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow One thing Stark did not mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well. Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says: [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men. Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions: By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America. But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical: The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”. Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity. Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference. The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good. Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3: Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith. But Ruxandro Teslo has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is. Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46? Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons. I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof. Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity. The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

Inline links: 1, abysmal attrition rates, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CDZA!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd8fbb7c8-0789-4b71-b84f-6f93a7949ee7_595x401.png, 33% of American Buddhists, 30% Jewish, 2, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IMoJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F248a87ba-7893-48a8-bb24-f9be9f30d355_893x720.png, has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EGFm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81ea23c2-1c9b-4d43-8d31-2c4b74990be5_1024x597.jpeg, The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research, 3, 4, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WKib!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F398aa36d-4d66-44e5-b035-fa3a20e457da_1858x1696.png

Of inscriptions on the Jewish catacombs in Rome, 76% are in Greek, 22% in Latin, and only 2% in Hebrew or Aramaic. Reform Judaism is unstable. The Law of Moses is central to the Jewish faith; relax it too much, and believers can justly wonder what’s left. In America, Reform Jews are over-represented not only among atheists and agnostics, but among every cult under the sun. 33% of American Buddhists come from a Jewish background, and even the Moonies were 30% Jewish at one point! (they’re now down to 6%) As the Jews were assimilating into Greeks, some Greeks were assimilating into Judaism. They were impressed enough with monotheism and the Jews’ upright behavior to adopt some of the rituals, but they couldn’t take the final step and circumcise themselves. Instead, they hung around the fringes of Jewish society, admiring it from without. The Bible and the historical record call them “God-fearers”, but by analogy I can’t help but think of them as “weajoos”. These weajoos would have been easy prey for the first semi-Jewish sect to shed the circumcision requirement and explicitly pivot away from being an ethnic religion. The Apostles and other early Christians, leaving Palestine to minister to the wider world, would have made use of existing Jewish networks and connections. They would have found themselves in the middle of the spiritually-disaffected, half-assimilated pseudo-Reform Jewish communities of the Roman world, plus their half-assimilated-the-other direction Greek hangers-on. They would have preached that Judaism was basically true, but that you can drop the restrictive Law of Moses and avoid getting circumcised. They would have sliced through the cultural angst of these in-between communities, saying that Jews could join together with Gentiles in a big friendly tent under the leadership of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Here, says Stark, were the early Christians’ first few million converts. Because, I Regret To Inform You, The Pronatalists Are Right About Everything We found above that the Christian population needed to grow at 40% per decade, and assumed this meant conversion. But you could also do this through a fertility advantage. If a generation lasts thirty years, and Christians have 3x more children than pagans per generation, they can get 40%/decade growth without converting anyone at all. In reality, it was probably a mix: some conversion plus some fertility advantage. Here I start to worry that some right-wing pronatalist organization bribed Rodney Stark to abandon his usual scholarly attitude and write some kind of over-the-top pronatalist fanfic. I was waiting for the part where the eagle named MORE BIRTHS perches on the blackboard and the childfree professor was tossed into the lake of fire for all eternity. Still, let’s take it at face value and see what the fanfic has to say. By the Imperial era, Roman fertility was plummeting. Partly this was because the Romans practiced sex-selective infanticide, there were 130 men for every 100 women, and so many men would never be able to find a wife. But partly this was because the men who could find wives dragged their feet. (Male) Roman culture took it as a given that women were terrible, that you couldn’t possibly enjoy interacting with them, and that there was no reason besides duty that you would ever marry one. In 131 BC, the Roman censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus2 proposed that that the senate make marriage compulsory because so many men, especially in the upper classes, preferred to stay single. Acknowledging that “we cannot have a really harmonious life with our wives”, the censor pointed out that "since “we cannot have any sort of life without them,” the long term welfare of the state must be served”… As Beryl Rawsom has reported, “one theme that recurs in Latin literature is that wives are difficult and therefore men do not care much for marriage.” The Romans understood that this was long-term fatal for their empire, and tried all sorts of schemes to increase family formation. In the mid-first-century BC, Cicero re-proposed Metellus’ scheme to make marriage compulsory, but it failed once again. Augustus contented himself with punitive taxes and second-class citizenship for unmarried and childless couples, combined with subsidies and affirmative action for men with at least three children. Formal and informal social pressure eventually convinced most Roman men to take wives, but no amount of love or money could make them have children. Dense cities discouraged large families, Roman children were expensive (nobles would have to spend immense effort and political favors grooming them for high positions), and (the scourge of all nobilities) too many children risked splitting the inheritance. Also, if you had a girl you’d probably just kill her (she would consume resources without continuing the family line), and half of children died before adulthood from some disease or another anyway. It was just a really bad value proposition. Nor did the sex drive force the matter. Horny Roman men had their choice of a wide variety of male and female slaves and prostitutes - despite Augustus and his spiritual heirs’ fuming about monogamy, this was never really enforced on the male half of the population. When men did have sex with women, it was usually oral or anal sex, specifically to avoid procreation. When they did have vaginal sex, they had a wide variety of birth control methods available, including the famous silphium but also proto-condoms and spermicidal ointments. If a child was conceived despite these efforts, abortion was common albeit unsanitary (maternal death rates were extremely high, but this was not really a deal-breaker for the Roman men making the decision). If a baby was born in spite of all this, infanticide was legal and extremely common: Far more babies were born than were allowed to live. Seneca regarded the drowning of children at birth as both reasonable and commonplace. Tacitus charged that the Jewish teaching that it is “a deadly sin to kill an unwanted child” was but another of their “sinister and revolting practices” . . . not only was the exposure of infants a common practice, it was justified by law and advocated by philosophers.” Christians followed the opposite of all these practices. They recommended that men love their wives, and held this as a plausible and expected outcome. This was not exactly unprecedented, but it was a dramatic reversal of Roman custom. From Ephesians 5: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her to make her holy, cleansing her by the washing with water through the word, and to present her to himself as a radiant church, without stain or wrinkle or any other blemish, but holy and blameless. In this same way, husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ does the church — for we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a profound mystery — but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love his wife as he loves himself, and the wife must respect her husband. The Christians banned adultery (and, unlike the Roman bans, gave it teeth), meaning that married men who wanted sex had no choice but to go to their wives. They held that sex had to be procreative, banning anal sex, oral sex, homosexual sex, and birth control. And obviously they banned infanticide (many of these bans weren’t active decisions, but carry-overs from the movement’s Jewish roots). Also, I regret to say I fell for the liberal meme that Republicans tricked Christians into being anti-abortion in 1960, and previous generations of Christian had thought abortion was fine. This is absolutely not true. The Didache, the first Christian text outside the New Testament itself, probably dating from about 90 AD, says that “Thou shalt not murder a child by abortion nor kill them when born”. The second-century church father Athenagoras wrote: We say that women who use drugs to bring on an abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion . . . for we regard the very foetus in the womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God’s care . . . and [we do not] expose an infant, because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder. The end result is that while pagans delayed marriage, cheated, had nonprocreative sex, used birth control, performed abortions, and committed infanticide, Christians did none of these things. This section gave me a new appreciation for conservative Christian purity culture: it was obviously suited for the environment in which it evolved, and it’s also obvious why its founders would etch it so deeply into its memetic DNA that it’s still going strong millennia later. But I’ll end this section with a note of caution - I’m not sure how relevant any of this is. Stark refuses to speculate on pagan vs. Christian fertility rates, but when I look up modern scholarship, they reasonably point out that pagan rates must have been around “replacement”, given that the Roman population stayed steady (or slowly increased) for hundreds of years. “Replacement” is in quotes because Romans were constantly dying of plague, warfare, fire, and a million other causes; since only a third to half of people survived to reproduce, “replacement” here is something like 4-6 children per women. This doesn’t sound like the antinatalist disaster Stark describes! I think Stark is mostly talking about Roman elites - the group who Augustus kept pestering to have at least three children - and more broadly about the urban population. These people were constantly dying and being replaced by commoners and villagers. Early Christianity was primarily an urban and upper-class movement (does this surprise you? Stark urges us to think of modern cults and new religions, like American Buddhism, which predominantly recruit disillusioned children of the upper classes). So perhaps it did better than its urban upper-class pagan comparison group. Still, since the urban upper-class pagans were constantly being replaced by village lower-class pagans as soon as they died out, how much, in numerical terms, can this contribute to Christianity’s growth? A possible synthesis: if you imagine a city as having a constant population (because it’s walled, plus its hinterland can only support a certain number of non-food-producing urbanites), and villagers as replacing urbanites on a one-to-one basis as they die, then greater Christian urban fertility rates can at least contribute to the cities and upper classes becoming Christian. And once the cities and upper classes are Christian, you get Constantine, and the lower classes can be forced to comply. Remember, “pagan” originally meant “rural”! Because Where Women Go, Men Will Follow One thing Stark did not mention discovering in his study of cults, but which I have heard anecdotally - a lot of male cult members join because the cult has hot girls. This seems to have been a big factor in the spread of early Christianity as well. Stark collects various forms of evidence that early Christians were predominantly women. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans greets thirty-three prominent Christians by name, of whom 15 were men and 18 women; if (as seems likely) men were more likely to become prominent than women, this near-equality at the upper ranks suggests a female predominance at the lower. A third-century inventory of property at a Christian church includes “sixteen men’s tunics and eighty-two women’s tunics”. The book quotes historian Adolf von Harnack, who says: [Ancient sources] simply swarm with tales of how women of all ranks were converted in Rome and in the provinces; although the details of these stories are untrustworthy, they express correctly enough the general truth that Christianity was laid hold of by women in particular, and also that the percentage of Christian women, especially among the upper classes, was larger than that of men. Why were women converted in such disproportionate numbers? Again, Stark’s sociological background serves him well: he is able to find reports of the same phenomenon in modern religions: By examining manuscript census returns for the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bainbridge (1983) found that approximately two-third of the Shakers were female. Data on religious movements included in the 1926 census of religious bodies show that 75% of Christian Scientists were women, as were more than 60% of Theosophists, Swedenborgians, and Spiritualists. The same is true of the immense wave of Protestant conversions taking place in Latin America. But along with a general tendency for women to convert, Stark notes that Christianity was especially attractive to women. The pagan world treated women as their husbands’ property, and not particularly well-liked property at that. The book cites the Athenian laws as typical: The status of Athenian women was very low. Girls received little or no education. Typically, Athenian females were married at puberty and often before. Under Athenian law, a woman was classified as a child, regardless of age, and therefore was the legal property of some man at all stages of her life. Males could divorce by simply ordering a wife out of the household. Moreover, if a woman was seduced or raped, her husband was legally compelled to divorce her. If a woman wanted a divorce, she had to have her father or some other man bring her case before a judge. Finally, Athenian women could own property, but control of the property was always vested in the male to whom she “belonged”. Meanwhile, Christian woman had relatively high status, sometimes rising to the position of deacon within a church. Christian men were ordered to treat their wives kindly, were prohibited from cheating on them, and mostly could not divorce. Christianity, unlike paganism, did not especially pressure widows to remarry (important since a remarrying widow lost all her property to her new husband). Christian women were only a third as likely as Roman women to be married off before age 13. Women noticed all these benefits and flocked to Christianity. Aside from all of this, the Romans were practicing sex-selective infanticide, reducing their female numbers still further, and making the Christians even more proportionally female-heavy. If the Christians, like many modern cults, were 65% female, and the Romans (as some sources attest) were about 40 - 45% female, this is a pretty profound difference. The Romans grumbled about marriage, but in the end most Roman men did want wives (if only to avoid government penalties). But 1.4 men per women - maybe even less among the upper classes - puts young men seeking wives in a difficult situation (for comparison, modern San Francisco is only 1.05 men per women, and dating is already hell). To any remotely heterosexual Roman men, the 65% female Christian community must have started looking pretty good. Meanwhile, the Christians had the opposite problem: too many women, not enough men. There’s an obvious solution, and it sounds like the pagans and Christians had also figured it out: From 1 Peter 3: Wives ... submit yourselves to your own husbands so that, if any of them do not believe the Word, they may be won over without words by the behavior of their wives, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. History records many such intermarriages, almost always ending with the conversion of the pagan husband. If you are a Christian of English descent, you may owe your religion to Queen Bertha of Kent, who convinced her husband, one of the early Anglo-Saxon kings, to take her faith. But Ruxandro Teslo has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, who disagrees with all of this. Salzman has a database of 400 aristocratic Romans during the 4th century period of Christianity’s fastest growth. She finds few intermarriages, few examples of women converting their husbands, and equal (or slightly male-biased) conversion ratios. Granted, this is only a small sample from one period. But it makes us question how good our evidence really is. Doesn’t all this hinge on one passage from Paul which, technically, named more men than women, plus one inventory of tunics which was so female-biased that it couldn’t possibly have been representative of even a very woman-heavy church? Are we sure that we can make the leap from “Christianity promised women more rights” to “Therefore, women flocked to Christianity?” Wasn’t that the same argument that pundits used last week to predict a blue wave for Kamala? Didn’t white women actually go for Trump, 53-46? Salzman has one more concern, which is that women had so few rights in ancient Roman society that it’s hard to see how they could have converted at all. When unmarried, they were under the care of their father, who would hardly have let them go out visiting churches full of strange men. When married, they were under the care of their husband, who likewise. A typical Roman man wouldn’t have cared about his wife’s religious opinions, which is maybe why so many of our stories about intermarriages and conversions come from later periods like the Anglo-Saxons. I don’t know enough about history to referee this dispute, except that say that I think the answer could easily have been different for each of early Romans, late Romans, Hellenized-Jewish-Romans, pagan Romans, upper-class Romans, and lower-class Romans, plus all combinations thereof. Because Of The Testimony Of The Martyrs The martyrs are one of the most dramatic parts of the early Christian story. Men and women would endure seemingly-unbearable tortures, continuing to praise God the whole time, sometimes in spite of Roman officials who promised to let them go free if they would just make the tiniest concession to praising Jupiter. These martyrdoms impressed their contemporaries as much as they impress us, and were a major factor driving pagans to Christianity. The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, by Jean-Leon Gerome (maybe slight nominative determinism?) Stark is writing in the 1990s, and martyrology c. 1995 does not exactly cover itself in glory. At the time of writing, the most popular theory among scholars (claims Stark) was that the martyrs were masochists. He considers this dumb and offensive theory a natural consequence of historians being reluctant to accept anything that sounds too miraculous or amazing, and there being few other hard-headed rational explanations of the martyrs’ behavior (for some reason, the obvious one - that they believed in God and Heaven - impresses neither Stark’s foils nor himself). He sets out to build an alternative theory: the martyrs were rationally seeking the approval of their community. Martyrdom not only occurred in public, often before a large audience, but it was often the culmination of a long period of preparation during which those faced with martyrdom were the object of intense, face-to-face adulation. Consider the case of Ignatius of Antioch … Ignatius was condemned to death as a Christian. But instead of being executed in Antioch, he was sent off to Rome in the custody of ten Roman soldiers. Thus began a long, leisurely journey during which local Christians came out to meet him all along the route, which passed through many of the more important sites of early Christianity in Asia Minor on its way to the West. At each stop Ignatius was allowed to preach to and meet with those who gathered, none of whom was in any apparent danger although their Christian identity was obvious. Moreover, his guards allowed Ignatius to write letters to many Christian congregations in cities bypassed along the way, such as Ephesus and Philadelphia … As William Schoedel remarked, “It is no doubt as a conquering hero that Ignatius thinks of himself as he looks back on part of his journey and says that the churches who received him dealt with him not as a ‘transient traveller,’ noting that ‘even churches that do not lie on my way according to the flesh went before me city by city.’” What Ignatius feared was not death in the arena, but that well-meaning Christians might gain him a pardon…He expected to be remembered through the ages, and compares himself to martyrs gone before him, including Paul, “in whose footsteps I wish to be found when I come to meet God.” It soon was clear to all Christians that extraordinary fame and honor attached to martyrdom. Nothing illustrates this better than the description of the martyrdom of Polycarp, contained in a letter sent by the church in Smyrna to the church in Philomelium. Polycarp was the bishop of Smyrna who was burned alive in about 156. After the execution his bones were retrieved by some of his followers - an act witnessed by Roman officials, who took no action against them. The letter spoke of “his sacred flesh” and described his bones as “being of more value than precious stones and more esteemed than gold.” The letter-writer reported that the Christians in Smyrna would gather at the burial place of Polycarp’s bones every year “to celebrate with great gladness and joy the birthday of his martyrdom.” The letter concluded, “The blessed Polycarp ... to whom be glory, honour, majesty, and a throne eternal, from generation to generation. Amen.” It also included the instruction: “On receiving this, send on the letter to the more distant brethren that they may glorify the Lord who makes choice of his own servants.” In fact, today we actually know the names of nearly all of the Christian martyrs because their contemporaries took pains that they should be remembered for their very great holiness. I don’t know, I’m not putting too much effort into writing up this section, because it doesn’t feel like as much of a mystery as some of the others. Maybe all of this was weird in 1996. But since then, we’ve seen plenty of suicide bombers willing to die for their faith. I accept that the Christian martyrs were more impressive - a slow death in the Colosseum takes more grit than the quick detonation of an explosive vest, and dying for peace is more impressive than dying in war - but it hardly seems like as much of a leap. Honestly, Stark’s “social approval” theory seems only slightly less objectifying than the masochism theory. Some people just have a tendency towards self-sacrifice. I know many effective altruists who, for example, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research. If someone told them a way that they could help the neediest people in the world by feeding themselves to lions, the lions would no doubt eat well. Because They Survived The Plagues However bad you imagine daily life in ancient Rome, it was worse. Historians estimate that ancient Rome had a population density of 300 people per acre. That’s almost ten times denser than modern New York City, two thousand years before anyone invented the skyscraper3. How did they do it? By cramming people together in unbearable filth and misery: Most people lived in tiny cubicles in multistoried tenements…”there was only one private house for every 26 blocks of apartments”. Within these tenements, the crowding was extreme - the tenants rarely had more than one room in which “entire families were herded together”. Thus, as Stambaugh tells us, privacy was “a hard thing to find”. Not only were people terribly crowded within these buildings, the streets were so narrow that if people leaned out their window they could chat with someone living across the street without having to raise their voices… To make matters worse, Greco-Roman tenements lacked both furnaces and fireplaces. Cooking was done over wood or charcoal braziers, which were also the only source of heat; since tenements lacked chimneys, the rooms were always smoky in winter. Because windows could be “closed” only by “hanging cloths or skins blown by rain”, the tenements were sufficiently drafty to prevent frequent asphyxiation. But the drafts increased the danger of rapidly spreading fires, and “dread of fire was an obsession among rich and poor alike.” Packer4 (1967) doubted that people could actually spend much time in quarters so cramped and squalid. Thus he concluded that the typical residents of Greco-Roman cities spent their lives mainly in public places and that the average “domicile must have served only as a place to sleep and store possessions.” These tenements had no plumbing. Waste was eliminated by pouring it onto the street, often to the detriment of people walking underneath. Water was brought home from public wells; if you were out, you either walked back to the well or made do. The total public baths capacity of Rome was about 30,000; the total population of Rome was about a million; in practice, the upper classes used the “public” baths and the average citizen had never bathed in their life. Soap had been invented a century or two earlier but was limited to a small pool of early adopters. The cities buzzed with flies, mosquitos, and other insects. It would be eighteen hundred years before anyone invented germ theory. Tenements were six stories high and frequently collapsed, killing everyone inside. Fires consumed the city on a regular basis, giving rise to colorful legends like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt. Police were limited, and it was understood that you would be robbed immediately if you set foot outside at nighttime. This kind of smart, walkable, mixed-use urbanism is illegal to build in most American cities. How did people survive? Mostly they didn’t. Cities were destroyed regularly - multiple times within a single human lifetime! - then rebuilt and replenished with rural population. Stark focuses on Antioch, a Syrian city which was a center of early Christianity. During “six hundred years of intermittent Roman rule”, he finds: It was conquered 11 times

Inline links: 33% of American Buddhists, 30% Jewish, 2, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IMoJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F248a87ba-7893-48a8-bb24-f9be9f30d355_893x720.png, has a great post reviewing the work of historian Michele Salzman, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!EGFm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F81ea23c2-1c9b-4d43-8d31-2c4b74990be5_1024x597.jpeg, The Christian Martyrs’ Last Prayer, deliberately let themselves be infected with malaria to help speed vaccine research, 3, 4, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WKib!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F398aa36d-4d66-44e5-b035-fa3a20e457da_1858x1696.png

Moredun Institute1 mentions across 1 issues

Moredun Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 12, 2024 and July 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "D. R. Wilson at the Moredun Institute in Scotland". It most often appears alongside 1980s, 1989, 1990s.

Reference entry: Moredun Institute
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: July 12, 2024
Last seen: July 12, 2024

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Your Book Review: The Family That Couldn’t Sleep July 12, 2024

1980s 1 shared issues
1989 1 shared issues
1990s 1 shared issues
1994 1 shared issues
1998 1 shared issues

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Your Book Review: The Family That Couldn’t Sleep

July 12, 2024 · Original source

(This report was, as it happens, published in the exact same month as The Family That Couldn’t Sleep.) DTM came to know the family well. He befriended them by way of two members of their younger generation, Lisi – a woman terrified by the shadow of the disease, and Ignazio – the doctor she had married, who was more terrified by the shadow of the disease. Ignazio put together the pieces of the family puzzle, consolidating all the disparate diagnoses into a single disorder and filling out a lot of blank spots on family trees. When DTM came along, he was able to help Ignazio make the case that the family would benefit from the spotlight – that greater awareness of FFI could lead to a cure both for them and for a slew of other prion diseases. As it so happens, he is one of those nonfiction authors who serve as a character in their own story. DTM has some form of progressive muscular palsy. He is, or at least was in 2006, not entirely sure what it is. The relatively unimpressive state of genetics at the time had not identified his causative mutation, though it looked a lot like one of the rarer forms of Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease2. DTM is pragmatic about this, the way everyone chronically ill is either pragmatic or doomed. Whatever he has, it is a defect in protein structure; his peripheral nerves decay not because of a problem with the nerves themselves but an inability of their scaffolding to hold them together, as he puts it. The last chapter of the book dwells on this, on the web of connections popping up between a thousand disorders. DTM’s disease is something vaguely similar, if you squint, to an exceptionally slow-progressing motor neurone disease; if you jump another level out, you see amyloid plaque diseases like Huntington’s and Alzheimer’s, and if you jump yet another level out, you see something like prions. His interest in the Venetian family was driven by this. Some of its members thought this a beautiful act of sympathy; others thought him a grotesque parody of themselves, an onlooker, a gawker, peddling their tragedy to salve his relatively insignificant problems. They are, he thinks, both right. That’s the beginning, and that’s the end. What happens in the middle? --------------------------------------------------------- The Venetian family lends the book its title, but they’re really more of a framing device. The Family That Couldn’t Sleep is separated into four parts, of which the first and fourth – the shortest by far – deal with the family. Part 2 is kuru, the king of fucked up diseases you read about in clickbait Weird Medicine listicles. Let’s talk about kuru! Kuru, is, famously, the prion disease you get if you eat another person’s brain. Well, not quite. It’s a prion disease that became endemic amongst women in the Fore society, who ritually ate brains, one of which had an inherited or spontaneous prion disease. This is an important note – there’s a tendency (which the book’s later chapters engage in) to assume cannibalism just has a Prion Disease Generator attached. If you eat people who don’t have prion diseases, you won’t suddenly get one. Uh, don’t eat people. Anyway, part 2 is DTM’s historiography of Fore-Westerner first contact. It’s hilarious. Papua New Guinea is a frankly ridiculous place; one of the all-time best Lyttle Lytton winners (worst first sentence from a hypothetical or, in this case, real work) was “Papua New Guinea is so violent that more than 820 languages are spoken there”. The native residents were so hostile to outsiders that all the colonial empires had cut their losses – and when you think about the places they colonized, that says something. After the First World War, PNG was ripped from its nominal German ‘owners’, but no one else wanted the place. So, of course, they gave it to the Australians. It was thirty years and another war before we actually made contact. 1940s Australia was as ‘settled’ as it’d ever be; the cities were bustling and the interior was mapped. The kind of explorer who two centuries before would be heading to new continents had to console himself with Pacific islands. Console he did. The native peoples of the PNG coasts were hostile enough to the wannabe-colonialists that the Australians, flying planes overhead, were the first people to discover that the island’s inland was populated too. No one had broken through on land. In all this deep and angry rainforest, the Fore were the furthest out. They lived far into the island’s mountainous interior; DTM describes their territory as “nearly vertical”. Calling people primitives is a bit passe these days for understandable reasons, but no other term comes to mind. The Fore had no name for themselves; we call them by an exonym, “the people to the south”. They weren’t, to be clear, hunter-gatherers – they were slash-and-burn agriculturalists, but very well-fed ones. Despite the tendency in grain-focused cultures for poor agriculturalists to be stunted/malnourished, the Fore were a remarkably healthy people. Well, except for the famous bit. The first remarkable thing about the Fore was just how quickly they wanted to assimilate. Most PNG tribes weren’t particularly enthused by Western offers of injections/tractors/radios/Christianity. Yet as soon as the Australians arrived, the Fore made ceasefires in their wars with other tribes, volunteered to help large-scale Australian projects on the coast, started planting and trading coffee, and enthusiastically participated in censuses. It’s the only first-contact narrative I’ve seen where the colonizers were concerned about how badly the other guys wanted to be colonized. The next was the one that got their names in the history books. Australian officials started to notice a remarkable lack of women in Fore camps. Some tribes sequestered their women, particularly when Westerners were around, so at first they thought nothing of it. The high rate of unpartnered young men, though, was way out of PNG norms. DTM tells this part fantastically. The Fore chapters drip with the dread of dramatic irony. When the first breakthrough comes, you have to catch your breath: “Tiny” Carey noted something in the middle of August 1950 that deepened this mystery. He noticed that near the village of Henganofi there had been an unusual number of deaths. “It appears,” he wrote his superiors, “natives suffer from stomach trouble, get violent shivering, as with the ague, and die fairly rapidly.” [...] McArthur investigated a little more [...] One day in August 1953 he ran into more of the shivering people Tiny Carey had seen several years before: “Nearing one of the dwellings, I observed a small girl sitting down beside a fire. She was shivering violently and her head was jerking spasmodically from side to side.” It would be quite some time before anyone figured out what caused it – but the problem, as DTM notes, was that its cause wasn’t possible. Everyone priored that the weird undescribed disease in the Fore lands was some nocebo sorcery-sickness. Vincent Zigas, the first actual doctor sent to work with the Fore, tried to placebo-effect them and failed miserably: On the way, Apekono stopped at a hut and showed Zigas his first kuru victim. “On the ground in the far corner sat a woman of about thirty,” the doctor wrote. “She looked odd, not ill, rather emaciated, looking up with blank eyes with a mask-like expression. There was an occasional fine tremor of her head and trunk, as if she were shivering from cold, though the day was very warm.” It was almost exactly the tableau McArthur had witnessed in 1953. Zigas, though, was a doctor. He could do more than look—or so he thought: “I decided I might as well try my own variety of magic,” he remembered. He rubbed Sloan’s Liniment, a balm for sore muscles, on her and declared to her family and his guide: “The sorcerer has put a bad spirit inside the woman. I am going to burn this spirit so that it comes out of her and leaves her. You will not see the fire, but she will feel it. The bad spirit will leave her and she will not die.” The lotion penetrated the woman’s skin and she writhed in pain. “Get up! Walk!” Zigas commanded theatrically. “The woman struggled feebly as if to rise, then, exhausted, started to tremble more violently, making a sound of foolish laughter, akin to a titter.” That evening Apekono asked Zigas not to try to cure any more kuru victims; “Don’t use your magic medicine anymore. It will not win our strong sorcery.” This was a disaster. The Fore were so cooperative precisely because they hoped “Western magic” could conquer theirs. As it became clear it couldn’t, they turned hostile. The Australians had hoped to “modernize a Stone Age people”; now all their subjects were dropping dead before their eyes, from what they could only assume was a “hysterical reaction” to colonization itself. So, to solve this, they needed a batshit insane American. Carleton Gajdusek is one of the characters who dominates The Family That Couldn’t Sleep. He couldn’t not. You could put him in a car commercial and he’d dominate it. Gajdusek was a physician with a rare, intense combination of science and practice. He was a romanticist, a field worker, and a lover of everything strange. He’d been an army doctor, a government conspiracy-cover-upper, and a postdoc under Linus Pauling who described his intent as “to straighten out Pauling’s ideas about proteins”. He hated civilization, in a slightly-to-Ted’s-centre sense, and was passionate about “primitives and isolates”. He jumped at the chance to work in Papua New Guinea; he planned to conduct a multi-site study on child development in such cultures, and relished the opportunity to live in a “primitive” environment himself. He did all this so he could rape kids. Oh, he did it for the scientific curiosity and love of medicine, but he also did it so he could rape kids. Gajdusek was a pedophile in the actual-lifelong-exclusive-paraphilia sense, as opposed to the “metonym for child molester” sense. Some people who roll snake-eyes on the Sexuality Dice repress it, but some are perfectly happy to act on it; Gajdusek was #2 in its fullest form, the kind of guy who believes that a well-lived life includes raping some kids. DTM doesn’t shy from this, not for a moment. It’s the first thing he tells you about Gajdusek. It couldn’t not be; you couldn’t talk about why he went to PNG otherwise. When Gajdusek landed in PNG, he first found the place too civilized. He’d been promised a land of “cannibal savages” – where were they? After some traipsing, he found them, right where he was promised. The Fore were perfect for Gajdusek. They had some kind of medical mystery that’d been lost on everyone else. They ate each other, in exactly the way he loved detailing in his diaries (“”Women and children, particularly, partake of the human flesh,” he noted with pleasure”). As kuru cases popped up, he aggressively recorded them. He wrote lovingly detailed notes that he sent back to his Australian advisor. He wrote with intensity, with exclamation marks, with the joie de vivre of a man just where he wanted to be. Gajdusek smothered the Fore with ‘cures’ that never worked, but they didn’t get angry at him. As DTM dryly puts it: “Their children trusted him, and that was enough for them.” At some point, someone suggested sending an anthropologist...or an epidemiologist...or literally anyone with more credentials than Gajdusek and Zigas3. Gajdusek threw a shitfit, convinced this one-and-a-half-man team was enough to Solve The Problem Forever. But he got bored eventually – running off with another tribe with, as his diary notes at length, an apparent custom of youths ritually fellating older men – and Zigas, I dunno, the book neglects him a bit here. So they managed to sneak in some anthropologists. The husband-and-wife team of Robert Glasse and Shirley Lindenbaum4 were the first involved parties to give a shit about the Fore as people, rather than as colonial subjects/medical mysteries/walking sex toys. What they uncovered was fascinating. The Fore were cannibals, yes, but they were recent cannibals. They didn’t have an ancient tradition of eating their dead, like the other visitors assumed. They happened to be in contact with some cannibal groups, and after a Fore man died of “sorcery”, they thought: well, what would happen if we ate him? “People tasting it expressed their approval. ‘”This is sweet,” they said, “What is the matter with us, are we mad? Here is good food and we have neglected to eat it.”” If not for the wild coincidence that the first Fore cannibalism victim had a prion disease, kuru would never have existed. Glasse and Lindenbaum started to put together the pieces. They’d been sent down to rule out a genetic explanation – to track the kinship ties of the Fore and see how the disease ran through families. It didn’t run through families in any coherent sense, but it sure did run through cannibalism. The clincher was the age distribution. The Fore, ever enthused by colonialism, quit eating each other as soon as the Australians arrived. Children stopped dying of kuru shortly after; they simply weren’t exposed to the infectious agent. The couple sent the news to Gajdusek, who was off raping kids somewhere else. In the next part of the book, DTM runs through Gajdusek’s many conjectures of kuru’s cause – more like sketches or abstract paintings than like true hypotheses. Gajdusek was annoyed that someone else was doing something he “totally could’ve done”, and even more annoyed that another lab was running similar experiments – an attempt at a vaccine for a particular sheep disease had accidentally created a prion generator. But he was happy to swoop in and claim the credit for what he was starting to think of as “slow viruses”, an infection that somehow lays dormant for years. DTM portrays Gajdusek perfectly, in that “real life has no need for verisimilitude” way. Gajdusek was at once a brilliant man, an all-consuming narcissist, an entertaining character, and a monster beyond redemption. A lesser book might pick one or two. The Family That Couldn’t Sleep portrays him as all four, and on a personality level (as opposed to a scientific one), the Gajdusek-focused parts are some of the most gripping. --------------------------------------------------------- Outside of the jumps between the Venetian family and everything else, The Family That Couldn’t Sleep is not siloed. The narratives of all prion diseases are deeply intertwined. This is what makes it a great book. It’s 300 pages of dramatic irony. You read the whole thing, waiting for the eureka moment – the point everyone realizes they’re looking at the same cause. It does, however, make it a tad difficult to review or synopsize. The book’s story is so weird – and, often, so at odds with conventional wisdom that trickles down about the Fore et al – that you have to recap quite a bit, and the book steadfastly resists recapping. The next couple chapters after we depart from Gajdusek’s credit-claiming are mostly about experiments with various prion diseases. They’re scientifically fascinating. Unlike some medical-books-for-general-audiences (cough, How Not to Study a Disease), DTM never talks down to the reader. He assumes someone reading a 300-page book about prions is smart and wants to learn about prions. He also has – you can feel it in his words – the agonizing experience of spending his life on the other side of the doctor’s desk, trying to beat into whoever he’s talking to that no, seriously, you don’t need to lie to him or try explain a complex disease at a fourth-grade level. The first prion disease studied was scrapie. Scrapie was a big deal – it starved and killed large shares of British sheep flocks, making it a serious economic problem. Veterinary researchers had tried to prevent or cure it for centuries. It was a veritable graveyard of ambitions: Quintessential was D. R. Wilson at the Moredun Institute in Scotland, who worked in the middle of the last century for more than a decade trying, with mounting frustration, to kill the scrapie agent. He found that it survived desiccation; dosing with chloroform, phenol, and formalin; ultraviolet light; and cooking at 100 degrees centigrade for thirty minutes. The scrapie researcher Alan Dickinson told me he remembered Wilson at the end of his career as “very, very, very quiet. Of course, that was after his breakdown.” “Now it is our turn to study prions. Perhaps we should approach the subject cautiously.” The problem, as DTM explains, is that prion diseases were impossible. They violated 20th-century understandings of biology. Proteins “were no more alive, and no more infectious, than bone”. Prion diseases seemed to have too many causes – genetic, infectious, and sporadic. They looked infection-like in some ways, but patients didn’t produce virus antibodies. Sheep exposed to scrapie, or chimps infected with kuru, took years to develop symptoms. Their facts did not fit together. In the 1960s, people started wondering. The unifying trait of prion agents was that they had to be denatured to be destroyed. Was this a particularly small virus defined by its protein coating? Or – even more outre – was it pure protein, no DNA at all? No one could figure out quite how the latter worked, but it was tempting. Gajdusek, by now a major figure in this field, kept a foot in both worlds. He didn’t want to stake his reputation on a no-DNA hypothesis, but he certainly sympathized. Enter Prusiner. Stanley Prusiner was Gajdusek’s counterpart. Where Gajdusek seemed permanently manic, Prusiner was deliberate and exacting. He entered Gajdusek’s “slow viruses” field in the early 1970s after a chance encounter with a CJD patient. He relished the laboratory in a way Gajdusek didn’t at all, and set out to optimize the hell out of his projects. Prusiner set out to isolate the smallest infectious particle in the scrapie agent. He injected tons of hamsters (hamsters got sick faster than mice) with increasingly tiny scrapie proteins, hoping to determine whether the Minimum Viable Scrapie was DNA. By the mid-1980s, he’d produced something so small it couldn’t possibly be a virus. Denaturing it destroyed it; exposing it to nucleic acid dissolvers actually made it stronger. Emboldened by this discovery, Prusiner set out to anoint himself the King of Prions. Here emerges something of a Voldemort-Umbridge distinction – the difference between cartoonish villainy and banal evil. Gajdusek is a bad guy because he rapes kids. Prusiner is a bad guy because he is the most grotesque stereotype of the Advisor/Peer Reviewer from Hell made flesh. Everything Prusiner did was to build his reputation atop a pile of skulls. When recruited as a peer reviewer for other prion papers, he wrote negative reviews to undermine their authors. He worked his grad students to the bone and intentionally destroyed their careers, telling them he’d “ruin them” if they entered prion research as competitors. He lied about the origin of the protein-only hypothesis, claiming he originated it a decade after it was actually conjectured. But hey, he was good at getting grants. I was surprised reading a lot of this, because for all the time I’ve been aware of it, the cause of prion disease has seemed settled. “Oh yeah, it’s a protein that gets all fucked up.” But DTM goes through just how unsettled it was right up through to The Family That Couldn’t Sleep’s publication. Serious confirmation only arrived a couple years later. Many people were deeply critical of the prion hypothesis – often, it seemed, because they loathed Prusiner too much to go along. Throughout the book, he cuts an uncharismatic figure. Gajdusek and Prusiner both won the Nobel for discovering prions, decades apart. This tells you something – the “discovery” of prions can be construed quite a few ways. Gajdusek formulated the hypothesis; Prusiner proved it. Gajdusek was grievously offended by Prusiner’s Nobel, perceiving his rival – not inaccurately – as a follower who never originated any ideas of his own. But Gajdusek was offended from a federal prison cell, so how’d that work out for him? Fascinating as all this is, no one published a book about prions in the mid-2000s because it was about kuru or FFI. They published books about prions because teenagers were dying, and people wanted to know why. DTM lays the seeds for part 3 – the mad cow section – in part 1. This is a discussion of scrapie, the longstanding prion disease of sheep. Scrapie was a medical mystery for centuries (remember poor D. R. Wilson), precisely because of the intuitive implausibility of prions. The scrapie chapter is a great history-of-science piece, covering the agricultural productivity revolutions of the 18th century, the surfeit of bizarre origins veterinarians concocted, and the treatments that never worked. Scrapie is not transmissible to humans – well, we hope. It’s concerningly transmissible to primates. But it’s been around for a long, long time, and it doesn’t epidemiologically look like humans get it...we hope. Anyway, you ever tried to generalize from one example? The British government did! In the mid-1980s, strange reports started coming out of the UK’s farms. Farmers were describing a new disease where dairy cows – incredibly docile creatures, under normal circumstances – turned hostile, kicking them as they went into the milking stalls. The symptoms looked to all the world like scrapie. Epidemiologists tracing the outbreaks found a unifying link with “cake” – animal protein feed sweetened with molasses. The scrapie-like symptoms must have traced to an infected sheep. But scrapie doesn’t transmit to humans, so it must be okay to keep slaughtering them, right? We all know how this ended. The best term for the British response to the mad cow outbreak is “cacklingly evil conspiracy”. The agricultural industry really, really didn’t need a huge zoonotic outbreak – so it decided it didn’t have one. They first suppressed all mentions that the disease looked like scrapie, then – when this became impossible – hyped up that scrapie doesn’t transmit to humans, so there’s nothing to worry about. The formal name of the disease, “bovine spongiform encephalopathy”, was supposedly chosen to optimize for unfamiliarity – it wouldn’t fit well in a headline. They emphasized, extensively, that there was nothing to worry about. Ever. At some point, people started asking questions. If there was nothing to worry about, why was the agricultural industry panicking so hard? As things became ever more worry-inducing, this turned down ludicrously twisting paths: Meanwhile, the Southwood Working Party and the experts who advised it were learning on the job. They learned, for instance, that the BSE agent entered the animal through the mouth and then followed the digestive tract into the organs that try to filter out infections—the tonsils, the guts, and the spleen—and from there traveled into the peripheral and central nervous system, and finally arrived at the brain. They also learned that pasties, meat pies, and even some baby foods contained tissues from a lot of those organs. So the Southwood Working Party recommended banning these organs, but only from baby food. This started a chain reaction of consumer doubt: if infected cow organs were unsafe for babies, how could they be good for adults? The government then banned offal, as the organs were collectively called, in all human food but gave the industry a grace period to get it out of the feed supply. Then pet food manufacturers began to wonder if what drove cows mad might not also drive dogs, cats, and parrots mad. The feed they sold came from concentrate made of the same sick animals that had previously made up the meat and bone meal farmers used. Their trade group decided to put a similar ban in place—immediately. So for five months it was safer to be a dog than a human in Britain. DTM spends pretty much this whole section of the book making fun of the British government. To be fair, they deserved it. They killed hundreds of kids in agonizing and preventable ways – they could take some ribbing. This is all throughout the mid-1980s to early-mid 1990s. Through this period, it wasn’t yet clear that mad cow could spread to humans. The panic was clear, and deserved, but it didn’t yet have a match for its powder keg. It would alight. The first suspected case of vCJD – human mad cow – was in 1994. Fifteen-year-old Vicky Rimmer developed a sudden, strange disease. Doctors gave her months to live...until she died in 1998. A couple other suspected cases trickled down through the mid-90s, including a young man who made meat pies for a living, whose grieving mother received a letter from the Prime Minister that “humans do NOT get mad cow disease”. (That must’ve been fun.) Soon, they couldn’t deny it any longer. On March 20, 1996, Stephen Dorrell, the health secretary, stood up in Parliament to announce the news that had already appeared as a tentative conclusion in scientific journals and as rumor in newspapers for the previous two years: British beef was killing British teenagers. The first confirmed death was that of Stephen Churchill, a nineteen-year-old student from Wiltshire, who died in May 1995. Back in 1989, at the Southwood Working Party’s suggestion, the government had set up a surveillance unit in Edinburgh to watch for any evidence that BSE had crossed to humans. One worry had been that if BSE passed to humans, how would anyone know it? How would you recognize something you had never seen? It turned out to be easy: Churchill and the nine other teenagers who had gotten sick had spectacular amyloid plaques in their brains, chunks of dead protein almost visible to the naked eye. If sporadic CJD was a whisper, BSE-caused prion disease was a shout. The investigators sat open-mouthed looking at slides whose damage, they feared, portended the most severe epidemic in modern British history. This part of the book is not fun. It lacks the insane personalities and duelling careers of the other entries. It is an honest chronology of the vCJD epidemic – a gruesome failure of the agricultural industry, the one system that everyone is vulnerable to. The government and industry had completely violated their duty of care to citizens and consumers. They were paying the price. No one would buy British beef anymore – not while they watched their children die. Now here’s the thing: this is ethnography, not historiography. The Family That Couldn’t Sleep is a book from the mid-2000s. The epidemic was not at all in the rear view mirror. There were piles of unanswered questions that DTM constantly alludes to. We have eighteen years more hindsight than he did then. What do we know now? --------------------------------------------------------- In 2006, the vCJD epidemic looked like it was going to be a lot better than the worst fears. BSE itself was a huge problem for the cattle industry, but honestly, no one is too sympathetic to the cattle industry. People were not going to die in anywhere near the numbers believed. We had all sorts of reassuring data coming out about this, which DTM chronicles. We were learning that only some genotypes seemed susceptible to vCJD. We didn’t see any older people die of the disease. We were seeing numbers drop, such that vCJD must have a pretty short incubation period. Anyway, all of this is wrong! The Family That Couldn’t Sleep was written in the candidate gene era. Back then, the nascent field of human genetics was sure it was about to Solve Polygenism. Yes, the simple Mendelian monogenic patterns popular a few decades back clearly didn’t apply to common diseases, but how many variants could there be? We were about to discover the five genes influencing 20% of Alzheimer’s risk each, the five genes influencing 20% of heart disease risk each, etc., and once we were done we’d just do gene therapy and cure Alzheimer’s. A paper on autism genetics from 1999 was so outre as to speculate there might be as many as fifteen genes involved. The fact we are now using the term “omnigenic model” should tell you roughly how well this worked out. Do you remember SNPedia? If you were a 2014 Slate Star Codex reader, you might. 2014 was still pretty candidate gene. People were out there publishing papers saying a single variant could increase your life expectancy by 15 years. SNPedia was a site that beautifully categorized all of these, so you could do 23andme or whatever, look up your results on SNPedia, and make horrible life choices.5 It was eventually bought out by one of the consumer DNA companies, so no one ever edited it again, making it a great time capsule of early-mid 2010s behavioural/medical genetics takes. SNPedia will excitedly explain to you that common genetic variants make you immune to vCJD. They cite a 2009 post from the now-archived 23andme blog titled “No Good Evidence That Potential Pool of Mad Cow Disease Victims Is Expanding”, explaining how fears of late-onset vCJD are clearly debunked by new Scientific Knowledge. Everyone who developed vCJD in the 1990s and 2000s had an M/M genotype in a particular part of the PRNP prion gene, so the roughly half the population with M/V or V/V genotypes were immune. The Family That Couldn’t Sleep buys this, too. In fact, it buys it in an even more agonizingly 2000s way. The first sign that transmissible prion diseases weren’t genotype-restricted should’ve been the growth hormone kids. You might have heard this story – from the late 1950s through mid-1980s, human growth hormone produced from brain tissue was used as a treatment for pituitary dwarfism, until it turned out to spread CJD if the originating brain was infected. DTM discusses this, to set the scene for the genetics thing. He mentions what was the state of the art at the time – that a disproportionate share of both the growth hormone kids and sporadic CJD cases were V/V homozygotes. This, uh – so the book was written in the mid-2000s, yeah? Yeah. The conclusion DTM drew – and this was a common conclusion at the time – was that homozygosity somehow made you more vulnerable to CJD, and M/M homozygosity made you vulnerable to BSE-borne CJD in particular. We cannot criticise the author for not predicting the future, but we live in the future, and can say how this worked out. Turns out, nope, M/V heterozygotes totally get vCJD. After a British man in his 30s died of CJD in 2016, he was found to have vCJD and an M/V genotype. He was tested for vCJD only because he was exceptionally young for someone with a sporadic prion disease – meaning people developing it later in life would be missed6. Did you know up to 1 in 2000 people in the UK have latent vCJD? There is one line in The Family That Couldn’t Sleep that stopped me dead in my tracks when I read it: What happens to the Italian family in the end depends less on their own actions than on the world’s interest in prion diseases, which they cannot control. If lots of people are afraid of getting variant CJD, the family benefits. If fear of prion disease goes the way of the fear of swine flu or Ebola, then they will be orphaned again. THIS BOOK IS FROM 2006! Three years before the swine flu pandemic! Eight years before the Ebola pandemic! “If you’re looking for a sign, this is it.” --------------------------------------------------------- The last section of The Family That Couldn’t Sleep addresses BSE fears in America and a nascent internet subculture DTM calls “Creutzfeldt Jakobins” – people who track American CJD cases, trying to spot vCJD patterns. When reading his description of the Creutzfeldt Jakobins, my mind constantly, uncontrollably turned to covid. Here it was – an online community of people deeply skeptical about a disease’s official story, tracking every contradiction, every implausibility, every statistic that failed to apply to the individual. Self-described “redneck hippies” and “soccer mom Republicans” teaming up to find the truth hidden behind an impossible world. You know what they’re doing now. I’ve always combined a deep interest in medicine with a healthy distrust for it. People who are constitutionally inquisitive, anti-authoritarian, and suspicious about official narratives tend to end up skeptical of at least some mainstream claims in the field. This is not to say I think you should take bleach enemas or something, just that I understand the impulse behind concluding the US government was covering up a local vCJD wave. Traditionally, sporadic prion diseases are said to have a prevalence of one in a million. (Hold on to that for a second.) The last section of the book is a chronology of Americans finding bizarrely more than one in a million of their friends dying of sporadic CJD, often at inexplicably young ages, sometimes in geographical clusters. This is understandably suspicious. Then DTM goes on to reassure us by saying none of these cases were confirmed to have an M/M genotype, which OH GOD OH FUCK A number of high-profile people in the prion world, including Gajdusek, are clarified as not believing sporadic prion diseases exist. You get the impression DTM doesn’t, either. Now, how common are prion diseases? Eric Vallabh Minikel has an answer for you! Eric and his wife Sonia are prion researchers from a rather unique background – after Sonia was diagnosed as having a single-gene mutation with ~100% penetrance for prion disease, they left their previous jobs to dedicate their lives to curing it. It turns out, when you run the numbers, you get not one in a million but 1 in 5000 people dying of prion diseases. This is best described as “nightmarishly high”. I’m normed on genetic disorders. A genetic disorder that affects one in five thousand people is pretty common! I have known, in person, completely unselected, just from “random people I’ve met in my life in a non-medical context”, someone with a ~1/250k syndrome and someone with a ~1/50k-100k syndrome. I don’t think anyone in my extended family knows someone who died of a prion disease. I feel like it would’ve come up if they did! Prion diseases have distinctive phenotypes. Not distinctive enough, apparently, to avoid a lot of CJD being misdiagnosed as Alzheimer’s – but diagnosis is consistently insane. Something DTM reiterates throughout The Family That Couldn’t Sleep is just what prion dementia looks like. The characteristic dementia in prion diseases spares something – “self” or “recognition” or “reflection” – that is not spared by Alzheimer’s, or by most common dementias. Shouldn’t this be, uh, noticeable?7 They kill rapidly, often over the course of months, and often onset in midlife. ALS shares this pattern and is way, way more common than prion diseases; you hear about ALS far more in the “disorder people actually have” sense. What am I missing here? Anyway: 1 in 2000 prevalence of latent vCJD in the UK + extreme lack of clarity over whether scrapie is human-transmissible + blood donations spread vCJD + sporadic CJD prevalence keeps going up = ??? (Yes, I am annoyed that most countries have lifted their ban on UK blood donors, thank you for asking!) --------------------------------------------------------- But back to the book. The “American chapter” is one-third about the country’s response to vCJD, one-third about the Creutzfeldt Jakobins, and one-third about chronic wasting disease. The last part is the most interesting. Chronic wasting disease is a prion disease of deer. Like scrapie, it “probably, we hope” isn’t human-transmissible (eat venison at your own risk). Under natural circumstances, deer shouldn’t get prion diseases: A prion plague should not be possible among ruminants in the wild. Deer are not cannibals, as the cows that spread BSE were forced to be; and, because deer and elk are not domesticated, they do not have enough contact with one another to spread a prion infection the way sheep are thought to spread scrapie. But deer do not live as they used to live, humans having once again brought their ambitions to bear on the natural course of things. The Family That Couldn’t Sleep is a book of medical anthropology. Anthropology of the Veneto, anthropology of Papua New Guinea, anthropology of 1990s Britain. Here, it is an anthropology of America. Americans, having won the world, still fight to win their own backyard. The North American continent is geographically diverse, cutting through rain-snow-shine, mountains jutting over plains, cities sprawling into wilderness, habitations criss-cross dotted with surprisingly few empty zones. Go somewhere like Denver, the Mile High City, three million people fighting against nature. Few other countries have anything like this; geographically vast polities usually have uninhabitable blocks. Australians are twenty-five million people clustered against the shore. It still surprises me, after all this time, how every US state has a meaningful city8. Midcentury Denver, growing and sprawling out across its mountains, started to run into their natural inhabitants – deer. Starvation is one way nature adjusts the deer population to the available food supply. People did not usually see this process, but in the 1950s and 1960s Colorado became more densely settled, reducing forested areas and forcing deer to look longer and harder for food. At the same time, the state enacted conservation laws, limiting when and where hunters could shoot. Soon emaciated deer began wandering onto the lawns and through suburban streets looking for a meal. People began to feed them, only to find that they died anyway. They would drop dead by haystacks, along highways, and in flower beds. In the late 1960s, a young biologist named Gene Schoonveld tried to figure out why the deer starved even when they were fed.9 He deprived some deer of food for a while, “[h]e cut windows in their stomachs to see what went on inside, and then he began to feed them”. While this was going on, he had a control group of healthy, well-fed deer as backups in case anything went wrong. It did...but not to the experimental group. The pen in which the deer were kept also housed sheep, which, it turned out, were scrapie carriers. The deer somehow acquired scrapie – there’s a huge unanswered question here, which DTM doesn’t address. How did they get scrapie? They didn’t eat the sheep, presumably. Did it somehow transmit from casual contact? This is not supposed to happen. And yet: the deer in the sheep pen started dying of a mysterious scrapie-like disease, one never reported before, that would go on to infect thousands. These deer were released into the wild. Ten years later, the first reports of chronic wasting disease came out. The disease spread across deer and elk in the western half of the country. By the turn of the millennium, cases were exploding – and lost all geographical restriction. DTM can report up to 2005, at which point it was floating around Upstate New York. This kind of spread doesn’t track natural deer migration. That’s irrelevant, because nothing about CWD’s spread is natural. We shift gears into an anthropology of the American hunter. The hunter wants to shoot the most impressive buck, to bag himself one with as many “points” as possible – one whose antlers branch out most. A “ten-point buck” has five branches on each horn: Original by Ric McArthur Nature doesn’t make enough bucks with perfectly symmetrical ten-point horns. To fill the demand, the market had to step in. Thus was born the deer farm industry, which raises captive deer in better genetic and nutritional conditions than Nature permits, then ships them across the country so hunters who couldn’t get legit ten-point bucks get the taxidermy piece for their wall. These are controversial amongst hunters and illegal in numerous states – but the industry is big enough to spread CWD. (The kind of hunter who needs a deer shipped to his house is the kind of hunter who will fumble killing it.) Another problem is supplemental feeding – leaving out protein-enriched food for deer to eat. This produces “trophy class animals at an earlier age”, but again, what’s in that protein? (“It is much like feeding your cows 41 percent protein cottonseed cake during the winter to raise the protein level in the cow’s diet to a level that will maintain acceptable production”, says that article from 1991.)10 The book segues into a vignette. CWD was new in Wisconsin in the early 2000s, and the state’s Department of Natural Resources was optimistic it could eradicate it. In a state with a love of hunting, you could, in theory, recruit people to kill every single deer in a 400-square-mile radius: In many states, the state would have had to call out the National Guard for such an onslaught, but hunting is a passion in Wisconsin. Hunters shoot 450,000 deer every year, more than in any other state. “I’m looking for ardent hunters to help us, unless fear or their wives keep them away,” one DNR official told a Milwaukee magazine. The state extended the normal hunting season and waived the usual limit of one buck per hunter, and the hunters came out in force. The whole affair was gruesome – one official called it “hunting for slob hunters”. If you’re trying to eradicate a prion disease, you can’t very well let people take the carcasses home to eat. Bodies piled up in control stations, decomposition mingling with bleach. The 2002 hunt established a base rate of 2% for chronic wasting disease in Wisconsin deer, with the most affected areas getting up to 10%. Further hunts in 2003, 2004, and 2005 spread to wider and wider areas – and didn’t move the needle one bit. This is to say that CWD is quite a bit more common in the American deer population than BSE ever was in British cattle. Since publication, it’s popped up in Norway and South Korea. Notably, Norway doesn’t allow for the import of cervids, raising numerous questions about how it got there. There are no unambiguous cases of CWD transmission to humans, and in vivo/in vitro primate studies have mixed results. There sure are some unusually young hunters with sporadic CJD, though. But don’t worry, most of them aren’t M/M homozygotes! There is an absolute ton going on in this book. I’ve had to skim over whole sections. Parts that couldn’t be easily slotted into a narrative review include: When Gajdusek was invited to a party at Prusiner’s house, he was horrified to find his rival had purchased hundreds of New Guinean statues – all with the genitals removed.

Inline links: 2, Lyttle Lytton, 3, 4, a couple years later, concerningly transmissible to primates, omnigenic model, you might, 5, SNPedia, a 2009 post, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N93S!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fced2eca3-ec58-40b8-8c13-debdb559ab8f_651x601.png, Yeah., nope, M/V heterozygotes totally get vCJD, 6, up to 1 in 2000 people in the UK have latent vCJD, bleach enemas, has an answer for you, 7, blood donations spread vCJD, going, up, 8, 9, not supposed to happen, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0J8B!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2a64b287-a7c6-4d82-bbe1-da949fc93118_1024x683.png, Ric McArthur, controversial, amongst, hunters, illegal in numerous states, trophy class animals at an earlier age, 10, Norway, South Korea, mixed results, sure are

Morning Consult1 mentions across 1 issues

Morning Consult is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 01, 2023 and December 01, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Morning Consult is a well-regarded polling agency". It most often appears alongside Abraham Davenport, AI Policy Institute, Arizona.

Reference entry: Morning Consult
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 01, 2023
Last seen: December 01, 2023

Outbound links

Issue trail

Links For November 2023 December 01, 2023

Abraham Davenport 1 shared issues
AI Policy Institute 1 shared issues
Arizona 1 shared issues
Austro-Hungarian Empire’s Party For Moderate Progress Within The Bounds Of The Law 1 shared issues
Bertrand Russell 1 shared issues

Source context

Links For November 2023

December 01, 2023 · Original source

3: Related to my Which Party Has Gotten More Extreme Faster post. Morning Consult is a well-regarded polling agency without obvious bias (link):

Inline links: Which Party Has Gotten More Extreme Faster, link

Morosini bank1 mentions across 1 issues

Morosini bank is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 01, 2025 and August 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "the representatives of the Morosini bank sent back reports". It most often appears alongside Africa, Agamemnon, Age of Empires II.

Reference entry: Morosini bank
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 01, 2025
Last seen: August 01, 2025

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Issue trail

Your Review: Joan of Arc August 01, 2025

Africa 1 shared issues
Agamemnon 1 shared issues
Age of Empires II 1 shared issues
Agincourt 1 shared issues
Agincourt 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Review: Joan of Arc

August 01, 2025 · Original source

She was a legend in France, where a leading poetess came out of retirement to pen a new poem in celebration of her great victory. She was a legend in England, where the regent, Bedford, wrote to the young king to update him about the new danger from that "disciple and lyme of the Feende, called the Pucelle, that used fais enchauntements and sorcerie”.53 She was a legend in Venice, where the representatives of the Morosini bank sent back reports because they'd be useful in planning voyages.54 And her legendary nature had concrete consequences. After her arrival at Orleans a militia had risen to support the French army; volunteers flooded into camp every day, some of them writing gushing letters home recounting how they had seen her, talked to her. The Duke of Brittany, long a neutral in the conflict, sent his confessor over her to reassure her that the Duke would send his son with a mighty army to the King of France's support.55 People invented the most heated rumors about her origins, full of wild speculation as they try to come up with coherent theories to explain how she ended up with all the skills she possesses.

Inline links: 53, 54, 55

Morrison government1 mentions across 1 issues

Morrison government is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "bull and Morrison governments". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry: Morrison government
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 10, 2023
Last seen: November 10, 2023

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Issue trail

Followup: Quests And Requests November 10, 2023

#EEGManyLabs 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@freeshreeda 1 shared issues
@surcomplicated 1 shared issues
Alain Daigle 1 shared issues

Source context

Your Book Review: Nine Lives

November 10, 2023 · Original source

For example, during the Turnbull and Morrison governments, there was a lot of policy inertia. The government didn't have a lot of vision or purpose and was consumed with its own internal squabbles. Stuff percolated up through the public service but it wasn't really anything far-reaching or ambitious. The best avenue to change was to get a politician on side to fight for your issue and really make a stink about it.

Moscow Region OMON1 mentions across 1 issues

Moscow Region OMON is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 13, 2024 and September 13, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "members of the brutal Moscow Region OMON militia unit". It most often appears alongside 1999 apartment bombings, 9/11, Abbasid.

Reference entry: Moscow Region OMON
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 13, 2024
Last seen: September 13, 2024

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Issue trail

Your Book Review: Nine Lives September 13, 2024

1999 apartment bombings 1 shared issues
11 1 shared issues
Abbasid 1 shared issues
Abu Hafs 1 shared issues
Abu Hamza al-Ghamdi 1 shared issues

Source context

September 13, 2024 · Original source

Al-Kurdi said that members of the brutal Moscow Region OMON militia unit had been involved in previous atrocities in the Caucasus. The jihadis had tracked a few of them to the Moscow apartment buildings that had been bombed.

Moth Minds1 mentions across 1 issues

Moth Minds is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 09, 2022 and February 09, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "project called Moth Minds that will take away the headache and make personal grants programs easier". It most often appears alongside ACX Grants, Against Malaria Foundation, Astalcodexten.

Reference entry: Moth Minds
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: February 09, 2022
Last seen: February 09, 2022

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Issue trail

So You Want To Run A Microgrants Program February 09, 2022

ACX Grants 1 shared issues
Against Malaria Foundation 1 shared issues
Astalcodexten 1 shared issues
Benjamin Todd 1 shared issues
Bio Grants Committee 1 shared issues

Source context

So You Want To Run A Microgrants Program

February 09, 2022 · Original source

I understand that Molly Mielke is working on a project called Moth Minds that will take away the headache and make personal grants programs easier. So far her website is heavy on moth metaphors and light on details, but moth metaphors are also good, and I’m long-term excited about this.

Inline links: Moth Minds

Mothers Against Drunk Driving1 mentions across 1 issues

Mothers Against Drunk Driving is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 25, 2022 and November 25, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mothers Against Drunk Driving is in trouble". It most often appears alongside Bill Clinton, Dr. John Scholtz, Emile Torres.

Reference entry: Mothers Against Drunk Driving
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 25, 2022
Last seen: November 25, 2022

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If The Media Reported On Other Things Like It Does Effective Altruism November 25, 2022

Bill Clinton 1 shared issues
Dr. John Scholtz 1 shared issues
Emile Torres 1 shared issues
facebook 1 shared issues
Mark Zuckerberg 1 shared issues

Source context

If The Media Reported On Other Things Like It Does Effective Altruism

November 25, 2022 · Original source

3. Mothers Against Drunk Driving is in trouble, with their treasurer accused of evading millions of dollars in taxes. Something like this was bound to happen at MADD - anyone who truly believed that hundreds of innocent children were being mowed down by drunk drivers would feel licensed to take any action, no matter how antisocial, to prevent this calamity. While we admit that MADD leaders have specifically said that members should always be trustworthy and obey the law, these statements are belied by their continued insistence that children will die unless drunk driving is prevented. They need to do better.

Mounties1 mentions across 1 issues

Mounties is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 03, 2021 and March 03, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""before city authorities had to call in the army and, of course, the Mounties to restore order"". It most often appears alongside 9-11, Argentina, Austin Allred.

Reference entry: Mounties
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 03, 2021
Last seen: March 03, 2021

Outbound links

https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/secrets-of-the-great-families

Issue trail

Links For March March 03, 2021

9-11 1 shared issues
Argentina 1 shared issues
Austin Allred 1 shared issues
Ayn Rand Institute 1 shared issues
Big Mac 1 shared issues

Source context

Links For March

March 03, 2021 · Original source

17: Related: The Montreal Night Of Terror. The Montreal police went on strike for sixteen hours, by the end of which "six banks had been robbed, a hundred shops had been looted, twelve fires had been set, forty carloads of storefront glass had been broken, and three million dollars in property damage had been inflicted, before city authorities had to call in the army and, of course, the Mounties to restore order”. Bonus: it radicalized (or deradicalized, or whatever) Steven Pinker.

Inline links: The Montreal Night Of Terror, Bonus

Mox1 mentions across 1 issues

Mox is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 09, 2026 and March 09, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Mox asks me to advertise their 2026 fundraiser ... a rationalist/EA coworking space in San Francisco that hosts ACX meetups". It most often appears alongside Anthropic, Astralcodexten Com, Demis Hassabis.

Reference entry: Mox
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 09, 2026
Last seen: March 09, 2026

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Issue trail

Open Thread 424 March 09, 2026

Anthropic 1 shared issues
Astralcodexten Com 1 shared issues
Demis Hassabis 1 shared issues
Google DeepMind 1 shared issues
Markus Englund 1 shared issues

Source context

Open Thread 424

March 09, 2026 · Original source

No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.

PUA groups1 mentions across 1 issues

MRA/PUA groups is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 18, 2021 and May 18, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "So they join MRA/PUA groups". It most often appears alongside #BLM, /b/, /sp/.

Reference entry: PUA groups
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: May 18, 2021
Last seen: May 18, 2021

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Culture Wars May 18, 2021

#BLM 1 shared issues
b 1 shared issues
sp 1 shared issues
4chan 1 shared issues
pol 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Culture Wars

May 18, 2021 · Original source

So they join MRA/PUA groups - until 90% of them realize that the leadership of those groups just truly, deeply hates women and literally wants them to die. They don't want to be part of that so they go on to join Gamergate. When the doxxing and the threats start having significant consequences, 90% of them eff off. Then they move on to Milo and his shared appearances with Spencer. They think it's fun to get a rise out of the overly sanctimonious by appropriating nazi symbolism. Then Charlottesville happens and they suddenly realize that they've joined an actual white supremacist movement. They leave in droves.

Inline links: leave in droves

MS131 mentions across 1 issues

MS13 is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 10, 2024 and December 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "An MS13 member who rolls up on a rival gang’s stash house". It most often appears alongside ACT, AI, America.

Reference entry: MS13
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 10, 2024
Last seen: December 10, 2024

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Issue trail

Highlights From The Comments On Prison December 10, 2024

ACT 1 shared issues
AI 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Asterisk 1 shared issues
Belgium 1 shared issues

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Highlights From The Comments On Prison

December 10, 2024 · Original source

How come in one million articles about Bukele and crime in El Salvador, including many trying to discredit him or say it wasn’t worth it, I’ve never heard a peep about this? And if it wasn’t Bukele or mass incarceration that did it, then what was it? [Y] writes: I have issues with the El Salvador portion of this post. These charts show that the Bukele mass incarceration movement only resulted in a massive increase in the prison population from 2020 forward, based on projected population. The graph shows the murder rate peaking in 2015 and dropping precipitously in the next three years prior to Bukele's presidency. This means, unless I'm missing something, that the vast majority of the decrease in the murder rate occurred before Bukele took office and started putting people in prison at all and thus cannot be attributed to his policies, incarceration or otherwise. Bukele took office in 2019 and did not begin the crackdown until June of that year. The state of emergency that allowed the government to suspend various rights in order to crack down on gangs even further didn't begin until early 2022 While the murder rate was obviously still quite high before Bukele's incarceration policies began, it seems almost actively misleading not to mention that it was collapsing even before he instituted these policies as a result of things like a renewed gang truce in 2016 under the previous government and instead seemingly attribute all of it to him. Further, the post-Bukele homicide data is dubious in several ways. The Bukele government stopped counting bodies discovered buried in unmarked graves as homicides, incentivizing gang members to hide their victims instead of publicly displaying them as trophies or warnings as they had done in years prior. They stopped counting people the police or military shot as homicides, classifying them instead as “legal interventions". They have excluded killings in prisons from the homicide data, which seems like exactly the most obvious way to lie about homicide rates when you begin imprisoning everyone. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/08/el-salvador-bukele-crime-homicide-prison-gangs/ The source article suggests the above may represent as much as a 47% undercounting. Well, one might say, that still leaves El Salvador much safer than before Bukele’s tenure. But I’m not linking the above to try and pin down exactly the right figure of undercounting. I would suggest instead that these changes to the metrics demonstrate a willful and deliberate pattern of obscuring the homicide rate in El Salvador. The post-Bukele data consequently seems almost useless to me, as you cannot really assume we know all the ways the Bukele government is fudging the data. These are just the ones on record. It’s not that murder has disappeared in El Salvador - it’s more like it’s now de facto legal in many contexts. An MS13 member who rolls up on a rival gang’s stash house and shoots it up now knows that if they can bury the bodies in an unmarked grave outside of town without being caught red-handed with the shovels and corpses, the victims will legally cease to exist. They’re not prosecuting people for these murders, right? Otherwise they would show up in the data. The media doesn't talk about them. You don't see the evidence. Out of sight, out of mind. I'm not suggesting no murders were prevented as a result of the Bukele government's mass incarceration policies, obviously. I can also see the argument that it's good for society for criminals to kill each other in prison yard fights instead of getting into shootouts in a marketplace where an innocent bystander also gets their head blown off. I just think the fundamental premise - that he arrested everyone and it caused murders to stop happening and we need to reason forward from there - is extremely dubious. Drethelin writes: idk about the statistics but multiple people I talked to in el salvador specifically told me theft was WAY down like walking down the street with your phone in your hand was now an option where it used to not be people can now both afford to and feel safe owning cars, etc. among other things they are very proactive about using what we wouldn't really consider due process, eg cops browsing facebook and like, going after guys that people post from their security camera footage as taking their bike or whatever Thanks - I had said in the post that although murder was down, the statistics didn’t really show this about theft - but I was eyeballing statistics not really gathered for this purpose and if the news on the ground is that theft is down, I believe it. 4: Comments On Probation In response to a question of why probation with GPS tracking hasn’t taken off as an alternative to prison, Peter answers: Because convicts turn it down. You see at least in America probation (which is what GPS monitoring is part of) and incarceration aren't related, you get no credit for the former when it comes to the latter and people like to overlook over half of people incarcerated aren't there for any crime at all but simply a technical probation violation like getting fired from your job from not showing up on time because your probation officer randomly changes times of meetings daily (which is also results in prison even if you are one minute late). If the max sentence is five years prison plus probation time doesn't count and you have a more likely than not chance of violating probation because it's designed to be unreasonable and cause failures as a back door way for judge's to avoid trials, why would you accept GPS monitoring which will only increase your chances of being violated. I.e..why do nine years (four years probation out of your ten year probation, then violated, then five in more actual prison) when you can just do five. Generally the rule among convicts is if the prison sentence is shorter than the probation sentence, just take prison day one. As a convict you can, and many do, turn down probation. If you want to fix this then you need to let convicts "try" probation where they get credit at a 1-1, or even better motivate them so let's say 2-1, towards a future prison sentence when they fail. This entire conversation (OP) is worthless as it's making the standard mistake of just looking at prison and not probation, jail, fines, etc all which backdoor as a way to avoid trials lead to prison. This isn’t very clearly written, but my impression is that Peter is saying that violating probation gives you a longer prison sentence than just accepting prison in the first place, probation is deliberately designed to be near-impossible to keep, and so it’s a con to trick criminals into longer sentences without having to get them through a judge and jury. Criminals know this, so they refuse probation. This kind of conflicts with the “criminals have high time preference and make terrible decisions” point above, so I’m not sure what to think of it. I wonder if people ever try GPS tracking (without the rest of probation) as a prison alternative. “You’re getting off with a warning this time, but wear this tracker, and if you commit any other crimes in the future, we’ll know.” [EDIT: commenter answers here] More from Peter: Remember, the entire point of probation is to get people to avoid a trial by plea dealing to probation and then put them in prison anyways without any due process because reasonable people, the sort that takes plea deals, believe in the system hence overestimate their ability to complete probation. And so you put them in prison on a technical violation, i.e. getting fired after you intentionally caused them to do so, not having a place to live after you intentionally refused to approve anywhere they tried live, changing their appointment times without confirming they know ("I left a message with their dog"), or just harass them until they give up and just go to prison. Americans tend to discount probation as a joke but any experienced convict knows probation as implemented is worse hence just goes to jail. Also note that probation and PAROLE are different and significantly so, you actually get credit for parole time. Parole WANTS you to succeed, after all they paroled you, probation doesn't. They aren't even the same group of government offices either which is part of the problem. Probation falls under the judiciary (they work for the court) hence they free up budgets the faster they can move you over to the executive (prison) branch whereas parole is a cost saving measure as it falls under the same prison budget, i.e. parole officers aren't probation officers. Also all those fancy rehabilitation programs people love to tore to decrease recidivism goes to parolees, not probationers. I.e. there are giant structural incentives from pure intergovernmental bureaucratic budget wars to move people from probation to prison and because it's controlled by judges, I.e. the prison department can't just refuse to take a trivial probationary revokee, it's a one sided fight […] For example I got a friend that just got two years for the driving the speed limit in Texas while at a funeral, travel approved by the judge, because probation also makes it illegal to break your state law even in another jurisdiction where it's legal. He was driving 85 (the posted speed limit) in outside Austin but in Hawaii it's a misdemeanor to exceed 80 mph for any reason on any road strict liability; his PO asked him "jokingly" if he drove the speed limit while there and if he enjoyed the faster mainland speeds, he said "yes" unbeknownst to him he was being setup. His admission resulted in his probation being revoked for literally following the posted speed limit. Charlotte Wollstonecraft writes: The marginal prisoner in Massachusetts may be a much badder dude than the marginal prisoner in Louisiana. But here is anecdotal reason to believe he is not: Last week in New Orleans, there were three mass shootings. Two of them happened at the same second line in New Orleans East, 45 minutes apart. In two separate incidents, a gunman opened fire at a large outdoor gathering. In total, two people died, and ten were wounded. This is not national news. No arrests have been made. The third shooting took place in the French Quarter four days later. One of the three shooters was caught immediately. Turns out, he had already served seven years in prison for armed robbery. Last year, he was arrested again and charged with domestic battery, child endangerment, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A plea deal got him out on parole, the terms of which he violated near daily according to his ankle monitor's logs. He was wearing the ankle monitor at the time he opened fire on a French Quarter street, wounding three people and killing another. I’m including this here as a counter to Peter’s story of the guy who got two years in jail for driving the speed limit. I hear so many outrageous stories of extreme strictness and so many outrageous stories of extreme laxity (see also this post) that I’m nervous about turning the dial one way or the other compared to trying to figure out what’s going on. 5: Comments That Say My Analysis Forgot Something Grant Gould writes: You allude to it twice but then pass over it "for simplicity": None of these studies measure within-prison crime, which is largely not counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted. It is not only plausible but likely that "incapacitation" is at best simply relocation of crimes. And even _that_ is leaving aside the regular drumbeat of deeply sadistic crimes by guards, which are even less counted, tracked, tried, or prosecuted. The quality of statistics on crimes within prisons is very poor, of course; ttbomk it is not practically possible to know if the average prisoner commits crimes at a greater rate while incarcerated than while outside, or likewise the rate at which people in prison are crime victims versus those outside. If your value function is some sort of utilitarian sum over society, you have to count those, or else your utilitarianism is just gerrymandering people into and out of the boundaries of the utility summation (in which case you can optimize utility much more simply than by incarcerating; simple Schmittianism will do the job more easily, and it's free since you don't count the cost). I wrote this post to respond to debates (eg on California’s Prop 36) on whether prison is an effective way of decreasing the crime that normal people have to suffer in their neighborhoods. I think this is an important question that lots of people care about. Whether prisoners commit crimes against other prisoners is also important, but it’s a different question. I think people would justly distrust me if I pretended to be answering the question they cared about, but actually answered a different question. I (following Roodman) gave two conclusions in my cost-benefit analysis - one that counted the suffering by prisoners themselves, and one that didn’t. Since I think different people will have different intuitions on this, I think it was the right strategy. The one that counted the suffering of prisoners included a general estimate of willingness-to-pay for prison which I think includes the cost of intra-prison crimes. Either way, I think being exposed to intra-prison crimes is a small fraction of the badness of prison that doesn’t change that analysis much. I also don’t think it’s exactly right to say that incarceration only relocates (rather than prevents) crime. This may be true for murder and rape. But there aren’t a lot of things to steal in prison (not zero, but not as much as in the outside world) and the vast majority of crimes are property crimes. JBG writes: Some thoughts as a former defense attorney. On "after effects," skipping all the way to length of incarceration misses a lot of what's going on for first time offenders. As your own examples note, many of the problems making it harder to make an honest living accrue from being a felon as such, and not from jail time. I'll add on that merely being *arrested* triggers a similar cascade of consequences. Your average person will be fired from their job very quickly after arrest -- either because of the arrest itself or just because it leads to missing work. And an arrest on its own, without a conviction, is sufficient to make it hard to get hired on in a lot of jobs. But this is all specific to first-time offenders; going from someone presumed to be a law-abiding citizen to being a felon changes everything. An incremental felony after that doesn't change much. From your description, it seems like the studies are blurring this together? I'd be interested to see evidence focused specifically on first time offenders. My guess would be that there's a large, negative effect of your first felony (all else equal) but not much effect at all of subsequent felonies. In that case, there's a very different calculus for the incapacitation vs. recidivism tradeoff for different, identifiable groups. Undeserving Porcupine writes: Eugenic effects of 3-5x’ing the prison population? Makes it harder for these criminals to make more of themselves. Several people brought this up on Twitter. It deserves a full post response, but in case I don’t get around to making it - I think this is almost zero. I realize that’s a surprising claim, but compare the Nazi eugenics program against schizophrenics discussed here. They killed most of the schizophrenics in Germany, and schizophrenia is 80% genetic, yet the next generation had the same number of schizophrenics as ever, at least within the measurement margin of error. See the post for a longer explanation of this seemingly paradoxical result. Sebjenseb did a similar analysis and finds that if you execute the most criminal 1% of the population each generation, population level criminality decreases by about 0.1 standard deviation per 400 years. This is less trivial than I expected - it corresponds to a drop in the murder rate from 30 to 20 (possibly less for other crimes). But it's also a better case than our real scenario for a few reasons (police have 100% efficiency in arresting the worst criminals exactly in order; execution is better at preventing childbearing than prison). Maybe a real scenario is 33% decrease in crime rate per 600 years? Doesn't seem that relevant to me - even if we don’t get a singularity in the next few decades like I expect, we’ll probably get better genetic engineering or go multiplanetary (in which case founder effects will overwhelm everything else). Publius Obsequium writes: One thing Scott neglects is the beneficial effect prison has on kids of criminals (yes you read that right - look it up) Here is an article making this case and citing some corroborating studies. I would stress that there are also many (probably more) studies finding the opposite, and that I haven’t looked through any of the studies on either side to check whether they’re any good. Straphanger writes: This analysis ignores that punishment is a good in itself. The victims of crimes deserve retribution against the people who have wronged them. Some version of this was one of the most common comments, with opinions ranging from: I was a bad person for not focusing on the suffering of the prisoners in prison more, especially their potential victimization by prisoner-on-prisoner violence.

Inline links: writes, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/08/el-salvador-bukele-crime-homicide-prison-gangs/, Peter answers, commenter answers here, writes, this post, writes, writes, writes, here, did a similar analysis, writes, Here is an article, finding the opposite, writes

MSF1 mentions across 1 issues

MSF is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "MSF and other such organizations deserve much more". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry: MSF
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 10, 2023
Last seen: November 10, 2023

Issue trail

Followup: Quests And Requests November 10, 2023

#EEGManyLabs 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@freeshreeda 1 shared issues
@surcomplicated 1 shared issues
Alain Daigle 1 shared issues

Source context

November 10, 2023 · Original source

One person did not accomplish this. This was part of a concerted campaign by MSF, Stop TB, and a few other organizations to let the patents expire. I'm actually kind of annoying that John Greene gets credit. Not because he doesn't deserve any credit but because MSF and other such organizations deserve much more. Anyway, eventually J+J allowed to procure generic versions of the drug in certain countries. It did not ultimately surrender the patent.

MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt41 mentions across 1 issues

MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4 is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2024 and August 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4". It most often appears alongside 10 N Park Pl, 12th Ave South, 1525 Bank St.

Reference entry: MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: August 29, 2024
Last seen: August 29, 2024

Outbound links

Issue trail

Meetups Everywhere 2024: Times & Places August 29, 2024

10 N Park Pl 1 shared issues
12th Ave South 1 shared issues
1525 Bank St 1 shared issues
200 Degrees 1 shared issues
3806 Williams Rd, San Jose, CA 95117 1 shared issues

Source context

The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash

August 29, 2024 · Original source

Contact: Chetan Kharbanda Contact Info: chetan[dot]kharbanda2[a t]gmail[d ot]com Time: Sunday, September 15th, 11:00 AM Location: Doolally Taproom - Andheri. https://maps.app.goo.gl/gf8U9AgUtbe892678?g_st=com.google.maps.preview.copy Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7JFJ4RPM+C6 Group Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4 Notes: Please RSVP so I know how many people to expect for the seating at the venue

Inline links: https://maps.app.goo.gl/gf8U9AgUtbe892678?g_st=com.google.maps.preview.copy, https://plus.codes/7JFJ4RPM+C6, https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/MsTdZ4KpJmHFmLrt4

MT GOX1 mentions across 1 issues

MT GOX is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 16, 2022 and November 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "I lived through the MT GOX implosion". It most often appears alongside @AutismCapital, Adderall, ADHD.

Reference entry: MT GOX
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 16, 2022
Last seen: November 16, 2022

Outbound links

Issue trail

The Psychopharmacology Of The FTX Crash November 16, 2022

@AutismCapital 1 shared issues
Adderall 1 shared issues
ADHD 1 shared issues
adrafinil 1 shared issues
Alameda 1 shared issues

Source context

November 16, 2022 · Original source

LET ME REPEAT THIS FOR EVERYONE AGAIN: Shitcoins are bad, and you should feel bad if you trade them. Get the fuck out of the shitcoin casino you dumb ass gamblers! Solana is garbage. TRON is garbage. Exchanged-based coins like FTT are garbage. Coins with fucking dogs faces are garbage. Bitcoin is the only cryptocurrency you should hold. Maybe ETH. Hedge your bets there. You need to CONTROL YOUR OWN KEYS. Don't lend your coins out to charlatans promising you 5%, 8%, 15%, or 20% "risk free" returns. They are all scam Ponzis. There is no such thing as risk free 20% returns. It doesn't exist. Stop chasing it. If you don't control your private keys, it's not your crypto. If you trust an exchange based in the Bahamas ran by a jabroni who thinks he needs SIX MONITORS, you are in for a bad time. I've been in cryptocurrency since 2010 when BTC was 81 cents. I lived through the MT GOX implosion. I have had more crypto stolen from me in hacks and exit scams than you probably have ever even seen. Learn from my experience. Listen to what I am saying. TWELVE YEARS now I have been in crypto. This too shall pass. Fuck all these frauds stealing everyone's shit. We will all be better off with them out of the industry. However, you all have to learn from this shit. CONTROL YOUR OWN KEYS! Stop gambling on shitcoins. You are being used as exit liquidity for idiots.

mtsowbug@gmail.com1 mentions across 1 issues

mtsowbug@gmail.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 28, 2021 and December 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "please contact mtsowbug@gmail.com". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative, @GoodSciProject.

Reference entry: mtsowbug@gmail.com
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: December 28, 2021
Last seen: December 28, 2021

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ACX Grants Results December 28, 2021

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative 1 shared issues
@GoodSciProject 1 shared issues
@metaforecast 1 shared issues
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Highlights From The Comments On IRBs

December 28, 2021 · Original source

Michael Todhunter, $40,000, to continue work on automating testing cell culture media. Several of my biologist reviewers gave assessments like "I'm not sure anyone will use this, except for me personally I WOULD LOVE THIS SO MUCH". Michael himself describes this project as "unsexy", but annoying cell culture media trial-and-error is part of a big fraction of biology experiments, and anything that makes it go faster is a big force multiplier for a lot of other things. Michael's postdoc is ending and he needs funding to continue this work; mine will last him a few months, but he says he has room for lots more. If you'd like to learn more about this project and or discuss funding, please contact mtsowbug@gmail.com; there will also be a website up at https://www.todhunter.dev/ in a few days.

Inline links: mtsowbug@gmail.com, https://www.todhunter.dev/

MTurk1 mentions across 1 issues

MTurk is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 17, 2023 and April 17, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I also fooled with MTurk for a while a few years ago". It most often appears alongside Advarra, Amazon, Anya L.

Reference entry: MTurk
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 17, 2023
Last seen: April 17, 2023

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https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/a-cyclic-theory-of-subcultures/comment/8293757

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Highlights From The Comments On IRBs April 17, 2023

Advarra 1 shared issues
Amazon 1 shared issues
Anya L 1 shared issues
arXiv 1 shared issues
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April 17, 2023 · Original source

Finally, most of the surveys in question are just a series of basic psychology scales or tasks both the worker and average SSC reader are very familiar with. I suspect many of them are administered by students as practice rather than 'serious' research. As the other poster said, rejected HITs are just any task the requestor declines for any reason. A worker's acceptance rate is extremely important - one of the few pieces of advice Amazon seems to give requestors is to filter for 98% or 99% acceptance rate. It's probably pretty reasonable for surveys - if you can't get 99 out of 100 of those filled out acceptably (assuming good faith by the requestors), maybe you should be filtered. It's also worth noting that Amazon makes communication difficult, and that rejected HITs can only be reversed for like a month - after that, they're permanently on your record. It's also probably worth restating: if a worker goes below the high 90s, they'll have access to fewer tasks, likely from less reputable requestors, and they'll need to do 100 of these to offset every rejection. And the worker is at much greater risk of being dug deeper into that hole by requestors rejecting their work in bad faith with no recourse - part of why surveys are popular is because the IRB can bludgeon requestors into accountability. Most of the surveys in question are also are the crumbs that filter through the grasping pedipalps of the hordes of workers (and their scripts). If people are seriously using MTurk to monetize their time, they're likely looking for 'batch HITs' - the sort of thing where there's hundreds or thousands of tasks that can be quickly repeated (moderating images, 3 cents for a sentiment analysis, a couple quarters to outline a car in an image, etc.) Of course, this mana from heaven rarely lasts long, and the worker always takes a risk - 'if I do 100 of these, and this is an unscrupulous requestor, well - I better have ten thousand accepted HITs under my belt.' That's why workers are so protective of their acceptance rate. Back to surveys - again as the other poster replied, most of what the average MTurk worker will see is probably a psychology study questionnaire with a series of whatever common scales, attention checks, and other tricks the worker has probably seen at least dozens if not hundreds of times by now. They often pay Amazon's princely sum of about 10 cents per (expected) minute - based on the minimum wage in whatever benighted 00s year Amazon Mechanical Turk launched. Anecdotally, it also seems like a lot of these are from students - probably just practice research by someone who likely has less experience with the platform than the worker themselves. The problem the requestor has - at least as of ~2018 - is that there is a lot of fraud with foreign workers getting access to MTurk accounts and submitting totally garbo data, often very quickly. Based purely on a 'time to complete' metric, this is hard to distinguish from a legit worker who has filled out hundreds of these and is looking to maximize how many pennies they get for their minutes. It also wasn't uncommon for workers to 'cook' such a survey - letting it sit at the end screen before submitting - just to avoid getting pinged for finishing it quickly. As for how this all ties back into Institutional Review Boards - well, yeah, griping to the IRB is often the MTurk worker's only recourse. Amazon just doesn't care, and as I recall a lot of requestors don't even know workers can contact them - and as mentioned there's a narrow time window to discuss rejected HITs before they become permanent. On the other hand, in a lot of cases this is basically a reddit mob complaining that a student doling out dimes screwed up their understanding of MTurk's arcane inner workings, and that's in the case that the workers aren't actually trying to defraud them for said dimes. 5. Comments About Regulation, Liability, and Vetocracy CatCube writes: I think the fundamental problem is that you cannot separate the ability to make a decision from the ability to make a *wrong* decision. However, our society--pushed by the regulator/lawyer/journalist/administrator axis you discuss--tries to use detailed written rules to prevent wrong decisions from being made. But, because of the decision/wrong decision inseparability thing, the consequences are that nobody has the ability to make a decision. This is ultimately a political question. It's not wrong, precisely, or right either. It's a question of value tradeoffs. Any constraint you put on a course of action is necessarily something that you value more than the action, but this isn't something people like to admit or hear voiced aloud. If you say, "We want to make sure that no infrastructure project will drive a species to extinction", then you are saying that's more important than building infrastructure. Which can be a defensible decision! But if you keep adding stuff--we need to make sure we're not burdening certain races, we need to make sure we're getting input from each neighborhood nearby, etc.--you can eventually end up overconstraining the problem, where there turns out to be no viable path forward for a project. This is often a consequence of the detailed rules to prevent wrong decisions. But because we can't admit that we're valuing things more than building stuff (or doing medical research, I guess?), we as a society just end up sitting and stewing about how we seemingly can't do anything anymore. We need to either: 1) admit we're fine with crumbling infrastructure, so long as we don't have any environmental, social, etc., impacts; or 2) decide which of those are less important and streamline the rules, admitting that sometimes the people who are thus able to make a decision are going to screw it up and do stuff we ultimately won't like. Darwin on why safetyism expanded just as the neoliberals were trying to decrease government regulation: Without the excuse of 'we were following all of the very strict and explicit regulations, so the bad thing that happened was a freak accident and not our fault' to rely on, companies had to take safety and caution and liability limitation and PR management into their own hands in a much more serious way. And without the confidence in very strict and explicit regulations to limit the bad things companies might do, and without democratically-elected regulators as a means to bring complaint and affect change, we became much more focused on seeking remedy for corporate malfeasance by suing companies into oblivion and destroying them in the court of public opinion. Basically, government actually *can* do useful things, as it turns out. One of the useful things it can do is be a third party to a dispute between two people or entities, such as 'corporations' and 'citizens', and use it's power to legibly and credibly ensure cooperation by explicitly specifying what will be considered defection and then punishing it harshly. This actually allows the two parties, which might otherwise be in conflict, to trust each other much more and cooperate much better, because their incentives have been shifted by a third party to make defection more costly. Without government playing that role, you can fall back into bad equilibrium of distrust and warring, which in this case might look like a wary populace ready to sue and decry at the slightest excuse, and paranoid corporations going overboard on caution and PR to shield from that. Meadow Freckle writes: Why can’t you sue an IRB for killing people for blocking research? You can clearly at least sometimes activist them into changing course. But their behavior seems sue-worthy in these examples, and completely irresponsible. We have negligence laws in other areas. Is there an airtight legal case that they’re beyond suing, or is it just that nobody’s tried? I don’t know, and this seems like an important question. And Donald writes: Why do we need special rules for medicine? The law has rules about what dangerous activities people are allowed to consent to, for example in the context of dangerous sports or dangerous jobs. Criminal and civil trials in this context seem to be a fairly functional system. If Doctors do bad things, they can stand in the accused box in court and get charged with assault or murder, with the same standards applied as are applied to everyone else. If there need to be exceptions, they should be exceptions of the form "doctors have special permission to do X". I do want to slightly defend something IRB-like here. When a doctor asks you to be part of a study, they’re implicitly promising that they did their homework, this is a valuable thing to study, and that there’s no obvious reason it should be extremely unsafe. As a patient (who may be uneducated) you have no way of knowing whether or not this promise is true. Every so often, someone does everything right, and something goes wrong anyway. A drug that everyone reasonably thought would be safe and effective turns out to have unpredictable side effects - this is part of why we have to do studies in the first place. If every time this happened, a doctor had to stand trial for assault/murder, nobody would ever study new drugs. Trials are a crapshoot, and juries tend to rule against doctors on the grounds that the disabled/dead patient is very sympathetic and everyone knows doctors/hospitals are rich and can give them infinite money as damages. There is no way for an average uneducated jury to distinguish between “doctor did their homework and got unlucky” and “doctor did an idiotic thing”. Either way, the prosecution can find “expert witnesses” to testify, for money, that you were an idiot and should have known the study would fail. In order to remove this risk, you need some standards for when a study is safe, so that if people sue you, you can say “I was following the standards and everyone else agreed with me that this was good” and then the lawsuit will fail. Right now those standards are “complied with an IRB”. This book is arguing that the IRB’s standards are too high, but we can’t cut the IRB out entirely without some kind of profound reform of the very concept of lawsuits, and I don’t know what that reform would look like. 6. Comments About The Act/Omission Distinction jumpingjacksplash writes: I think you've unintentionally elided two distinct points: first, that IRBs are wildly inefficient and often pointless within the prevailing legal-moral normative system (PLMNS); second, that IRBs are at odds with utilitarianism. Law in Anglo-Saxon countries, and most people's opinions, draw a huge distinction between harming someone and not helping them. If I cut you with a knife causing a small amount of blood loss and maybe a small scar, that's a serious crime because I have an obligation not to harm you. If I see a car hurtling towards you that you've got time to escape from if you notice it, but don't shout to warn you (even if I do this because I don't like you), then that's completely fine because I have no obligation to help you. This is the answer you'd get from both Christianity and Liberalism (in the old-fashioned/European sense of the term, cf. American Right-Libertarianism). Notably, in most Anglo-Saxon legal systems, you can't consent to be caused physical injury. Under PLMNS, researchers should always ask people if they consent to using their personal data in studies which are purely comparing data and don't change how someone will be treated. For anything that affects what medical treatment someone will or won't receive, you'd at least have to give them a full account of how their treatment would be different and what the risks of that are. If there's a real risk of killing someone, or permanently disabling them, you probably shouldn't be allowed to do the study even if all the participants give their informed consent. This isn't quite Hans Jonas' position, but it cashes out pretty similarly. That isn't to say the current IRB system works fine for PLMNS purposes; obviously there's a focus on matters that are simply irrelevant to anything anyone could be rationally concerned with. But if, for example, they were putting people on a different ventilator setting than they otherwise would, and that risked killing the patient, then that probably shouldn't be allowed; the fact that it might lead to the future survival of other, unconnected people isn't a relevant consideration, and nor is "the same number of people end up on each ventilator setting, who cares which ones it is" because under PLMNS individuals aren't fungible. Under utilitarianism, you'd probably still want some sort of oversight to eliminate pointless yet harmful experiments or reduce unnecessary harm, but it's not clear why subjects' consent would ever be a relevant concern; you might not want to tell them about the worst risks of a study, as this would upset them. The threshold would be really low, because any advance in medical science could potentially last for centuries and save vastly more people than the study would ever involve. The problem is, as is always the case for utilitarianism, this binds you to some pretty nasty stuff; I can't work out whether the Tuskegee experiment's findings have saved any lives, but Mengele's research has definitely saved more people than he killed, and I'd be surprised if that didn't apply to Unit 731 as well. The utilitarian IRB would presumably sign off on those. More interestingly, it might have to object to a study where everyone gives informed consent but the risk of serious harm to subjects is pretty high, and insist that it be done on people whose quality of life will be less affected if it goes wrong (or whose lower expected utility in the longer term makes their deaths less bad) such as prisoners or the disabled. The starting point to any ideal system has to be setting out what it's trying to achieve. Granted, if you wanted reform in the utilitarian direction, you probably wouldn't advocate a fully utilitarian system due to the tendency of the general public to recoil in horror. I want to stress how far we are away from “do experiments without patient’s consent” here - a much more common problem is that patients really want to be in experiments, and the system won’t allow it. This is most classic in studies on cancer, where patients really want access to experimental drugs and IRBs are constantly coming up with reasons not to give it to them. Jonas argued that all cancer studies should be banned because it’s impossible to consent when you’re desperate to survive, which isn’t the direction I would have taken that particular example in. But there are other examples - during COVID, lots of effective altruists stepped up to be in human challenge trials that would have gotten the vaccines tested faster, but the government wouldn’t allow them to participate. I would honestly be happy with a system that counts the harm of denying a patient’s ability to consent to an experiment they really want to be in as a negative, forget about any lives saved. And JDK writes: I haven't finished reading by felt compelled to comment on this: "the stricter IRB system in place since the '90s probably only prevents a single-digit number of deaths per decade, but causes tens of thousands more by preventing lifesaving studies." No. It does NOT "cause" deaths. We can't go down this weird path of imprecision about what "causing" means. I've been examining Ivan Illich, "Medical Nemesis" recently. By claiming IRBs which stop research ostensibly CAUSE death strikes me as cultural iatrogenesis masquerading as a cure for clinical iatrogenesis. […] "Might have been saved if" is not the same as "death was caused by". This seems to me to be a weird and overly metaphysical nitpick. Suppose a surgeon is operating on someone. In the process, they must clamp a blood vessel - this is completely safe for one minute, but if they leave it clamped more than one minute, the patient dies. They clamp it as usual, but I rush into the operating room and forceably restrain the surgeon and all the staff. The surgeon is unable to remove the clamp and the patient dies. I (and probably the legal system) would like to be able to say I caused the patient’s death in this scenario. But it sounds like JDK is saying I have to say the surgeon caused the patient's death and I was only tangentially involved. Here’s another example; suppose the US government bans all food production - farmers, hunters, fishermen, etc are forbidden from doing their jobs. After a few months, everyone starves to death. I might want to say something like “the US government’s ban on food production killed people”. But by JDK’s reasoning, this is wrong - the government merely prevented farmers and fishermen from saving people (by giving them food so they didn’t starve). I might want to say something like “Mao’s collective farming policy killed lots of people”. But since this is just a weaker version of hypothetical-Biden’s ban on food, by JDK’s reasoning I can’t do this. This seems contrary to common usage, common sense, and communicating information clearly. I have never heard any philosopher or dictionary suggest this, so what exactly is the argument? (JDK has a response here, but I didn’t find it especially enlightening) 7. Comments About The Applications For AI Metaphysiocrat writes: People have joked about applying NEPA review to AI capabilities research, but I wonder if some kind of IRB model might have legs (as part of a larger package of capabilities-slowing policy.) It’s embedded in research bureaucracies, we sort of know how to subject institutions to it, and so on. I can think of seven obvious reasons this wouldn’t work, but at this point I’m getting doomery enough that I feel like we may just have to throw every snowball we have at the train on the off chance one has stopping power. Zach Stein-Perlman writes: A colleague of mine is interested in 'IRBs for AI'-- he hasn't investigated it but has thought about IRB-y stuff in the context of takeaways for AI (https://wiki.aiimpacts.org/doku.php?id=responses_to_ai:technological_inevitability:incentivized_technologies_not_pursued:vaccine_challenge_trials). He's interested in people's takes on the topic. My take: my understanding is that the US can’t technically demand all doctors use IRBs. (Almost) al doctors use IRBs for a combination of a few reasons : The US government demands that everyone who receives federal funding use an IRB, and most doctors get some federal funding.

Inline links: writes, Darwin, writes, writes, writes, writes, has a response here, writes, writes, https://wiki.aiimpacts.org/doku.php?id=responses_to_ai:technological_inevitability:incentivized_technologies_not_pursued:vaccine_challenge_trials

I don't work in academics, but I have a positive impression of IRBs from my time as an Amazon MTurk worker. It is very common for researchers to try to defraud such workers in various ways to cut costs (most commonly they fail to understand or care that a rejected hit threatens your ability to continue working and is not only about the few cents paid for it, so rejections should not be arbitrary or used as a way to get a refund). It's widely reported to be effective to contact a requester's governing IRB to resolve disputes if you can't come to an agreement directly, or that even mentioning you know how to contact their IRB often leads to a resolution […]

At the same time I don't think most mturk workers would try to use an IRB to get out of a rejection that's the result of their own mistakes. There seemed to be consensus in the community that rejections for things like missing complex attention checks were legitimate and you just have to try to avoid making mistakes, and I don't think anyone regarded IRBs as get out of jail free cards, more a last resort effort to maybe get justice when being outright scammed.

Mulago Foundation1 mentions across 1 issues

Mulago Foundation is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 18, 2025 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "support from Mulago Foundation". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, Aatu Koskensilta, acanthamoeba keratitis.

Reference entry: Mulago Foundation
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: June 18, 2025
Last seen: June 18, 2025

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ACX Grants 1-3 Year Updates June 18, 2025

1DaySooner 1 shared issues
Aatu Koskensilta 1 shared issues
acanthamoeba keratitis 1 shared issues
ACS ES&T Water 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues

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Half An Hour Before Dawn In San Francisco

June 18, 2025 · Original source

Codebuff, an AI coding startup I probably can’t take full credit for all of this just from giving them $20K in seed funding, but I continue to appreciate everything they do for this community and the world. 35: Further S’s Political Career This person didn’t win their election, but has since pivoted to AI safety and works in a well-regarded AI policy think tank. 36: Seeds Of Science, A Journal Of Non-Traditional Research No update received, but this was a public journal and it is easy to follow their work, see their website and Substack. They published two dozen articles of widely varying quality through 2023 and 2024, then closed in 2025. A remnant of the original vision survives as a science blogging aggregator. This was about my median expectation for this grant, but it was very inexpensive and I decided to take a chance on it anyway. 37: Good Science Project, Working To Improve Federal Science Funding No update received, but they have a public Substack discussing their progress. Their proposals for NIH reform have influenced Congress and made government agencies pay more attention to scientific integrity. 38: Advising Developing Countries On How To Grow Their Economies With our initial ACX grant, we piloted the Growth Teams model in Rwanda, helping the government jumpstart the export-oriented call center (BPO) industry. Since 2022, that effort has contributed to the creation of 2,000 formal jobs and the emergence of some of the country’s largest private employers. We’ve since expanded to Tanzania, Malawi, and the Indian states of Goa and Meghalaya. To refocus the global development discourse on broad-based economic growth, we co-organized the Growth Summit with the Center for Global Development and the Charter Cities Institute, and have published articles in leading outlets including Stanford Social Innovation Review, ProMarket, and the Global Prosperity Institute. Our work has attracted support from Open Philanthropy, Schmidt Futures, and Mulago Foundation, and our advisors now include economists Lant Pritchett, Stefan Dercon, and Kunal Sen. 39: Help Luca De Leo Get Started In AI Safety Research No update received, but Luca now runs the AI safety group at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 40: Typist For Saharon Shelah This was another ACXG+ Grant, funded by an anonymous outside funder and not listed in the original announcement. Saharon is a prolific and influential Israeli mathematician, but many of his discoveries are hand-written in an unpublishable format. This grant funded a typist to help make his results suitable for publication. According to this page, they have made over fifty new papers and preprints available. Second Cohort: One Year Updates 41: Lead-Acid Battery Recycling In Nigeria The Nigeria field research was a major success. We spent most of September doing field research in multiple major cities in Nigeria, and got a good sense of the used lead-acid battery supply chain. This field research served as the foundation for expanding our project, and has been very impactful in shaping our ongoing research. We published our findings from Nigeria, which were shared with Nigerian government regulators and global NGOs working on lead poisoning. The grant also gave us the on-the-ground experience we needed to both fully understand and credibly engage with groups, both in Nigeria and globally, on the ULAB issue. In the meantime, beyond continued research, we’ve also launched a dashboard (trade.leadbatteries.org) for analyzing global lead trade data. Right now, we’re: Launching two studies (one RCT, one environmental analysis) in Nigeria in collaboration with local universities to develop a more rigorous understanding of lead pollution due to low-standard ULAB recycling in Nigeria Collaborating with a non-profit incubator to launch an NGO focused on demand-side solutions Beginning a partnership with a West African environmental regulator to scale cheap air monitoring technology to quickly identify and reduce lead pollution from low-standard smelting If any of this sounds interesting to you, please sign up for our Substack (leadbatteries.substack.com) or send us an email at hugosmith@uchicago.edu! 42: Compensation For Kidney Donors The End Kidney Deaths Act (H.R. 2687 / EKDA) is a groundbreaking ten-year pilot program designed to save lives and reduce healthcare costs. It provides a refundable tax credit of $10,000 per year for five years, a total of $50,000, to living kidney donors who donate to a stranger, helping those who’ve waited the longest on the transplant list. Between 2010 and 2021, 100,000 Americans died while qualified and waiting for a kidney. The EKDA aims to change that trajectory. Within ten years of its passage, up to 100,000 Americans could receive a life-saving living donor kidney which typically lasts twice as long as a deceased donor kidney. This would not only save lives but also save taxpayers up to $37 billion. The legislation has been reintroduced in the House, and we have a committed Republican Senate lead. Now, we need a Democratic Senator to co-lead and help move this bipartisan effort forward. Time is short, and we are racing to pass the bill this Congressional session. 36 organizations already support the EKDA. Join the movement and help end preventable kidney deaths. Visit EndKidneyDeaths.org to help us get to the finish line. Elaine and her org have been working extremely hard on this; you can read a Vox article on their campaign here. If you want to sign up for her email list and get updates any time there is a representative you can contact or meeting you can join in, go here. 43: Genetic Hack To Prevent Suffering In the estimate of multiple team members, the ACX grant was “worth it” - it likely had a counterfactual net positive impact, even though we had to pivot from our initial fast-track plans for developing the precision anti-suffering therapy. We identify three primary streams of value: a) reducing uncertainty in the emerging field through early exploratory research, helping with the identification of dead ends and promising R&D trajectories; b) a wide range of downstream effects (beyond the “raising awareness” cliché), including talent mobilization and rekindled interest in suffering abolitionism as a distinct cause area; and c) certain developments that cannot yet be publicly disclosed. In December 2024, Marcin Kowrygo (Acting CEO & volunteering contributor), David Pearce (Director of Bioethics), Aatu Koskensilta (President), and a few other team members decided to leave The Far Out Initiative. They look forward to collaborating and applying their experience to advance the suffering abolitionist lineage in the spirit of open science, public good, and thoughtfully decentralized governance. Feel free to reach out to us at suffab at protonmail dot com to discuss collaboration opportunities! I wrote a post profiling the Far Out Initiative here. Unfortunately there were some internal disagreements, and the people ACX Grants was closest to left the organization. I plan to continue to monitor whatever they do next. 44: Advocate For Pandemic Response Team At FDA This team prefers has asked me not to discuss their progress publicly, but you can probably guess what their lives are like right now, and your guess would be correct. 45: Anti-Mosquito Drones We developed a cheap sonar that is able to detect, track and classify the ultrasonic echoes of mosquito wings at more than three meters. I believe it’s a world first! We also have control algorithms that take the sonar data and output control commands that both ram into mosquitoes and avoid the walls of a simulated environment. Our current work is on integrating both components on a real drone, and we expect to be able to kill mosquitoes by June. We’ve also made an internal impact study (napkin-sized) that shows we’ll be more cost-effective than ITNs in urban to periurban environments. So, we’re super excited with what comes next and can’t wait to share the videos of our first interceptions! More information [in the video below] and on our website, https://tornyol.com 46: Tarbell Fellowship For AI Journalism No update received, but they have a public website. I can’t find the Voices program in particular, but the overall fellowship completed their first class of seven fellows and is working on their second. 47: Germicidal UV Lamp Study The research has successfully demonstrated the ability of off the shelf ozone scrubbers to mitigate the ozone production of far-UVC lamps, is now available as a preprint (https://chemrxiv.org/engage/chemrxiv/article-details/67e4cde76dde43c9084d88b7). The paper has been submitted for publication and is currently undergoing peer review. Any ideas you have for potential funders we can approach to help execute our six-year plan to accelerate far-UVC would be appreciated https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/introducing-project-air/ 48: Technological Solutions To Animal Welfare Challenges Directly because of Innovate Animal Ag's work, the first U.S. egg producer publicly announced in the New York Times their adoption of in-ovo sexing technology, eliminating the need to cull day-old male chicks. The initial in-ovo sexing machine began operating in the U.S. at the end of 2024, with the first eggs from these hens expected on shelves in mid-2025. External evaluations estimate our work accelerated U.S. adoption of this technology by over seven years, meaning that once fully implemented, more than 2 billion chicks will have been spared. In addition to continuing to support the rollout of in-ovo sexing in the US and globally, we're now exploring other technologies and paths to impact. Current promising projects include developing humane slaughter methods for fish and advocating for USDA approval of a poultry vaccine against bird flu. They add: If you ever meet folks that are interested animal welfare and are partial to more technocratic and practical solutions, please continue to pass them our way, or connect them directly to me. 49: Assurance Contract Website www.Spartacus.app is an ACX grantee that created a platform to help solve coordination and collective action problems. It enables the creation of campaigns that build critical mass through conditional commitments, which only activate when a sufficient number of people join, converting risk and uncertainty into a higher probability of successful outcomes. They are currently facilitating several projects that leverage conditional commitments, including a dominant assurance contract interface for fashion pop-ups, accelerating a community business association's membership drive, and helping an AI safety organization organize petitions and events, among others. They have pivoted from an emphasis on high-stakes coordination problems requiring anonymity (because they occur too infrequently) to a broader range of more common use cases and have successfully run small-scale campaigns, but are still working toward product-market fit. Despite resource constraints and split time commitments that have impeded faster progress, they remain dedicated to the project's growth and success. You can follow its progress on X or Substack, or email Jordan directly here. 50: Cause Prioritization @ Center For Exploratory Altruism Research Moderately good progress on a salt reduction policy advocacy project we funded; informal commitments have been made by the Ministry of Health, and we're awaiting the publication of a formal administrative order. The official description sounds maximally generic, but this is an EA charity with a broad mandate whose current thesis is that dietary guidelines in developing countries can have outsized effects in saving lives. They’re making some progress on a salt reduction campaign in a developing country they prefer not to name publicly. 51: Mark Webb Studying Land Reform The purpose of this project was to identify specific farmland that could be acquired and transferred to the farmers already working the land. This has been difficult to achieve. I have been able to connect with other charities and landless farmers, and was able to interview a number of people about what their situation looks like, as well as what it would look like to them personally if they owned, rather than rented, their farmland. All this was immensely helpful in pushing this long-term project forward, even if I was unable to identify a specific plot of land that could be used to try the experiment. I intend to continue this project. If you have any insights or connections, I am interested. 52: More AI Advocacy In Australia Good Ancestors is focused on AI safety policy in Australia. Middle powers might be a useful path to influence as the US and China focus on racing, rather than safety. The ACX grant helped us give testimony about AI safety to the Australian Senate alongside Google, Microsoft and Facebook (We were the only nonprofit to give oral evidence to the inquiry. We also engaged government on other AI-related issues, including cybersecurity, biosecurity, consumer law and automated decision making (https://www.goodancestors.org.au/ai-safety). We’re currently working to inform voters about where parties stand on AI safety for the election, ahead of engaging on a likely Australian AI Act in 2025 (https://www.australiansforaisafety.com.au/). This is the same Australian lobbying organization we founded in Year 1, after a change in name and leadership. I continue to be excited about AI safety in middle-tier countries for a few reasons. First, these countries have some power in international organizations to set international standards. Second, companies will usually comply with any not-excessively-burdensome regulation set by any country with a significant market. Third, AI safety is underfunded by the standard of government programs, so Australia setting up a national AI Safety Institute would significantly expand the field. It’s kind of crazy that ACX Grants tier levels of money can have significant effects at this scale, but GA continues to do a great job and we continue to be proud to support them. 53: Campus For African School Of Economics At Zanzibar Charter City The ACX grant helped launch the first research center at the African School of Economics-Zanzibar, which is a main anchor of the Fumba Town charter city project in Zanzibar. This research center is called the Africa Urban Lab (AUL), focused on rapid urbanization across Africa. The AUL launched its first Diploma program in Urban Development with 38 students in our first cohort (now graduated!), including mayors, and deputy mayor, a director of a national Ministry of urban development, and many others. We published our research framing papers for the AUL's research agenda. We raised funding to launch an Urban Expansion Program that's now selecting 15 African cities to support in implementing urban expansion planning on the urban periphery. We held two Public Talks by renowned cities scholars and practitioners. We received additional funding from Emergent Ventures and from the Templeton Foundation. And we've partnered with 8 universities across the region, and with one of these universities (Ardhi) we'll be working with them to update their urban planning and urban economics curriculum (amplifying AUL's impact beyond our own organization). A longer update from end of 2024 is here: https://www.aul.city/blog/reflecting-on-africa-urban-lab-s-inaugural-year-2024-highlights) 54: Online Training Program For Health Workers In Developing Countries To date, over 11,000 health workers in Nigeria have completed our course on basic, life-saving newborn care. ACX funding was catalytic for helping us secure government approvals and complete an evaluation of the impact of our training on health workers' clinical practices. The evaluation shows that birth attendants provide better birth care after taking the course. We fed the evaluation results into an updated model, which suggests the program is 24 times more cost-effective than direct cash transfers (a widely recognized benchmark for cost-effectiveness). The program is likely to become even more cost-effective as we scale up. https://healthlearn.org/blog/updated-impact-model 55: Smartphone Pupillometry To Diagnose Neurological Conditions We have continued to expand our work in the smartphone pupillometry space and the development of our application, PupilScreen (https://www.apertur.ai/). We have expanded our pilot/research program to include new sites across the United States (Missouri, New Jersey, Kentucky, USAC racing, PitFit driver performance training in Indiana) and the world (Nepal, Taiwan, South Africa). We continue to publish at the leading edge of the pupillometry literature as well looking at concussion (https://neuro.jmir.org/2024/1/e58398 and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39682632/), cerebral vasospasm (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39128501/), and stroke (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39674431/ and https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39561861/). Currently, we are raising a $3 million seed round via a SAFE to fund the expansion of our work into the hands of healthcare workers and the general public. We will first focus on traumatic brain injury for clinical use and develop a neuro-monitoring wellness application utilizing our technology for the general public. They add: “We would welcome connections to anyone that you think might be interested in supporting our work further by investing in our $3M seed round of funding.” 56: Mike Saint-Antoine’s Biology Tutorial Videos Since getting the grant, I've continued to make Youtube tutorials as planned. One series that I'm especially proud of is about how to make a neural network in the Julia programming language completely from scratch, with no imports, up to the point of being able to solve MNIST (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWVKUEZ25V97tNULapu07DhWv6_W4NfpE). Also, a college student in Pakistan came across my videos and invited me to give a virtual Zoom-lecture to her department, so I ended up teaching a 6-hour "Python-for-Biologists" workshop to more than a hundred college students in Pakistan over Zoom. So that was pretty awesome. Also, lately I've been teaching some in-person classes too, mostly at Fractal University in NYC, and I also recently organized a day-long, in-person Beginner Python class for people in my local area (Philly suburbs) who wanted to learn some basic programming. I'm having a lot of fun with this project, and am grateful to Scott and the grant funders for their generosity! 57: Conceptual Boundaries Workshop On AI Safety The workshop was completed successfully; you can read a writeup here. 58: Apart Research To Incubate AI Safety Scientists No update received, but they have a public website, and you can see their impact metrics here. They seem to be in urgent need of more funding. 59: Primer On How To Achieve Political Change No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 60: Research IVF Clinic Success Rates We've built a predictive model that estimates the odds of having a child at different IVF clinics across the country while controlling for factors like patient age and infertility differences that can falsely make some clinics look better than others. We found that an average patient can increase their odds of having a kid by 43% just by going to a top 10% clinic. Patients unlucky enough to go to a bottom 10% clinic will reduce their odds of having a kid by 40%. Next month, we're adding several more clinics, 2023 data, additional procedural controls, and donor/gestational carrier models, which should push our accuracy beyond state-of-the-art models in this space and better isolate clinic impact on patient outcomes. We've launched ivf.clinic, a website where patients can access personalized IVF reports and browse our clinic rankings (though we're still squashing some bugs). Currently, we're expanding our research to include comprehensive insurance coverage and pricing data across clinics nationwide. If anyone has insights on automating the collection of IVF clinic pricing information, I'd love to hear from you at scelarek@gmail.com. 61: Replicate Study On Brain Wave Synchronization For Speeding Learning We have acquired and configured the OpenBCI UltraCortex Mark IV 8-channel EEG headset and a clinical-grade Biosemi 32-channel EEG system. We’ve implemented the required components for the experimental pipeline (computing alpha from EEG, flashing bright white light, presenting stimulus images). We are currently putting them together into a single system that we’ll use to collect the data from several participants. We are aiming to gather data on several participants in late June / early July and complete the pilot of the replication in July 2025. If you’d like to be a participant in the study, [they might announce a link once they have it]. 62: Advocate Repeal Of Interstate Runaway Compact No update received and I can’t find anything about this. 63: Animal Welfare (Especially Fish) In Turkiye Future For Fish asks companies to sign up to FFF's fish welfare commitment, which requires producers to certify their facilities and enforce specific standards for stocking density and harvest. Luckyfish, İlknak, Divan (35 restaurants, 17 hotels) and NG Hotels (5 hotels) have signed and published FFF's fish welfare commitment with İlknak publishing the commitment on their website. Kılıç published its first sustainability report detailing fish welfare policies, including enforcing a maximum stocking density of 10 kg/m³ and confirmation of electrical stunning practices. Longer version with some caveats: https://manifund.org/projects/improving-fish-w From the longer document, these commitments involve things like reducing overcrowding, or stunning fish before killing them. Over 30 million fish were affected just from their single largest commitment, and they say 100 fish are helped per dollar spent. 64: More Georgism Advocacy Lars and Will used the 2021 grant to co-found ValueBase. Will remained with the company, and Lars left to do advocacy work at the Center For Land Economics. Here’s their summary of how things are going: [Our] organization transitioned leadership with Greg Miller, a former Program Analyst at the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Lars Doucet, author of Land is A Big Deal and Co-Founder of Valuebase, working full time and Joe Caissie stepping aside. This transition happened naturally as the next career transition for each respective person. Since then, progress has been made on pushing forward legislation. Maryland had two bills introduced to give Baltimore and counties the ability to enact split-rate taxes. One of the bills passed the state senate and would allow Baltimore to enact land value taxes within one mile of rail corridors–this contains 50% of Baltimore’s land value. However, the legislative session ended. We expect the bill to revive next session. The Center for Land Economics has been actively working to help efforts to get this bill passed the line. At the same time, we have uncovered systematic undervaluing of vacant land in assessments. We are writing a report on the assessment issues in Maryland with actionable steps to resolve them.

Muni1 mentions across 1 issues

Muni is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 20, 2023 and March 20, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Muni slithers past a line of self-driving cars". It most often appears alongside Abraham, Art Deco, Chicxulub.

Reference entry: Muni
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: March 20, 2023
Last seen: March 20, 2023

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Issue trail

Half An Hour Before Dawn In San Francisco March 20, 2023

Abraham 1 shared issues
Art Deco 1 shared issues
Chicxulub 1 shared issues
Democrats 1 shared issues
Eliezer 1 shared issues

Source context

March 20, 2023 · Original source

The sky is still dark, but the streets begin to stir. The Muni slithers past a line of self-driving cars wearing lidars like silly hats. The few visible human commuters pump thick black Arabian hydrocarbons into their vehicles, or thick black Ethiopian methylxanthines into their bodies. The city is a machine made of submachines, each with its own fuel. A particle accelerator, a summoning circle, a stargate, choose your favorite megastructure that calls up things of dubious put-downability.

municipal government1 mentions across 1 issues

municipal government is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 14, 2021 and April 14, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "The municipal government banned him from having the meeting". It most often appears alongside Alaska, America, Amisulpride.

Reference entry: municipal government
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: April 14, 2021
Last seen: April 14, 2021

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Issue trail

Prospectus On Próspera April 14, 2021

Alaska 1 shared issues
America 1 shared issues
Amisulpride 1 shared issues
anarcho-capitalist 1 shared issues
Arizona Supreme Court 1 shared issues

Source context

Prospectus On Próspera

April 14, 2021 · Original source

- 12% go to Honduras, as their incentive for allowing ZEDEs at all - 44% go to the General Service Provider, a private company that handles things like sanitation and power. This will probably be an HPI subsidiary which subcontracts out to Jacobs Engineering, the same company that did a lot of the work in Sandy Springs. - 44% go to the Próspera municipal government, to handle whatever services they can’t subcontract out.

Inline links: Jacobs Engineering

There was a weird event which I don't have a great perspective on, where Erick Brimen, CEO of HPI, scheduled a meeting in Crawfish Rock to explain what Próspera was and why people didn't need to be afraid of it. The municipal government banned him from having the meeting, supposedly because of COVID. Brimen felt he was being silenced, and said that he would have the meeting outdoors and observe all social distancing guidelines but otherwise wasn't going to back off. He held the meeting, the municipal government sent police to shut it down, and after some resistance it got shut down (see video below).

murmuration771@gmail.com1 mentions across 1 issues

murmuration771@gmail.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 15, 2023 and September 15, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "send job offers (or just start a friendly chat!) at murmuration771@gmail.com". It most often appears alongside @campeters4, A Strange Dream, a_reader.

Reference entry: murmuration771@gmail.com
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: September 15, 2023
Last seen: September 15, 2023

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Issue trail

Book Review Contest 2023 Winners September 15, 2023

@campeters4 1 shared issues
A Strange Dream 1 shared issues
a_reader 1 shared issues
ACX 1 shared issues
aesthetics 1 shared issues

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Book Review Contest 2023 Winners

September 15, 2023 · Original source

Zuozhuan, reviewed by T. She is a weird hermit who's become more of a weird hermit than strictly ideal since quitting tech to write and translate romance novels. As a result, she's now looking for a job that can gently reintroduce her to human society. Behold her sundry talents here, and send job offers (or just start a friendly chat!) at murmuration771@gmail.com

Inline links: Zuozhuan, here, murmuration771@gmail.com

MUSE1 mentions across 1 issues

MUSE is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "reach out to the folks at MUSE (choosemuse.com) and ask them if they’re willing to help". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry: MUSE
Mention count: 1
Issue count: 1
First seen: November 10, 2023
Last seen: November 10, 2023

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Issue trail

Followup: Quests And Requests November 10, 2023

#EEGManyLabs 1 shared issues
23andme 1 shared issues
@freeshreeda 1 shared issues
@surcomplicated 1 shared issues
Alain Daigle 1 shared issues

Source context