Organizations: K

Groups, collectives, magazines, venues, and institutions operating inside the scene. This section collects the K slice of the category index.

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Kalshi

Kalshi is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 30 times across 30 issues between February 08, 2021 and March 03, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Kalshi is 'the first regulated futures exchange dedicated to trading on event outcomes'"; "representative of Kalshi tells me that only people who take offers pay the fee"; "new prediction market Kalshi had some high fees". It most often appears alongside Polymarket, Metaculus, Manifold.

Article page
Kalshi
Mention count
30
Issue count
30
First seen
February 08, 2021
Last seen
March 03, 2026
February 08, 2021 · Original source
Kalshi is "the first regulated futures exchange dedicated to trading on event outcomes". As far as I can tell they actually did it. They got the government to agree to let them run a prediction market, regulated as investing rather than gambling. There will be a $25,000 max on contracts, so it might not be enough for the real whales, but that's still thirty times higher than existing prediction markets and enough to probably be a sea change. I talked to a representative who said they'll be "focused on creating markets in a few key categories such as climate, economics, geopolitics, energy, education, government, space, COVID, and technology", but that they remain open to potentially expanding to all sorts of other areas (except onions, which apparently have a very specific carve-out as something which it is illegal to have futures markets about, somebody please write a cyberpunk novel revolving around this). So far they're still setting things up, but they describe themselves as "ramping quickly towards launch". I am super psyched about this and will keep you all updated.
July 27, 2021 · Original source
Kalshi - the first fully-regulated real-money prediction market - is now open for public beta.
The most exciting part is the monetary limit, which seems to be $25,000 per market (on buys, not earnings - so in theory you could buy $25,000 one-cent shares and win $2.5 million if you’re right). That’s about 30x the $850 limit on PredictIt. “Kalshi trader” could very easily be someone’s day job - though it’s probably still not worth opening your own investment bank over.
The least exciting part is the fees. They’re a bit complicated, but most of the time they’re around 10%, win or lose. I appreciate that this company is doing a really hard thing and deserves to make money, but I just don’t know how to square that with the fact that fees make prediction markets a lot less useful. Tetlock says that superforecasters are able to wring genuine signal out of single-digit differences in probability - when a superforecaster says 63%, they really mean 63%, and their prediction becomes less accurate if you round it to 60% or 65%. I don’t know how you’d match that in a market with 10% fees - and it looks like Kalshi traders don’t either, given that there’s currently a 103% chance that New York either will or won’t close indoor dining.
August 01, 2021 · Original source
4: On last week’s Mantic Monday, I complained that new prediction market Kalshi had some high fees. A representative of theirs contacted me to say that it’s more complicated. He writes: “We actually charge 7% of the variance (price times one minus the price) for each trade. We only charge this for takers, so effectively a single user would expect to pay 3.5% of the variance (since they pay 7% half the time).” I regret any misimpression my oversimplified numbers may have given.
December 27, 2021 · Original source
Polymarket, PredictIt, and Kalshi are silent on this question for now.
February 01, 2022 · Original source
PREDICTION MARKETS 88. No new real-money prediction market becomes bigger than Polymarket: 70% 89. Manifold Markets is still alive and active: 30% 90. New legal US real-money prediction market at least half as big as Kalshi: 5% 91. New illegal but easy-to-use market satisfying the above: 20% 92. I post my scores on these predictions before 2/1/23: 80%
February 07, 2022 · Original source
The rumor on the prediction market grapevine (which I absolutely cannot substantiate; please don’t sue me for libel) is that this might have something to do with competing prediction market Kalshi. Kalshi spent two years and probably a lot of money getting the CFTC to agree they were legal, and has a former CFTC Commissioner as a Director. Their legal status forces them to do an annoying and expensive regulatory dance all the time; illegal prediction markets were able to move more nimbly, provide better user experience, and eat their lunch. This was a big problem for them - but they’d just finished making lots of friends in the agency that decides which illegal things to crack down on, so, as Tyler Cowen likes to say, “solve for the equilibrium”.
I think there’s a general sense among people interested in the field that prediction markets are vastly underperforming their potential. There ought to be a billion dollar prediction market, maybe a ten billion dollar one. Smart VCs clearly believe something like this, or Kalshi wouldn’t have gotten $30 million+ in investment. Sometimes people who incorrectly believe I know things about prediction markets ask me if know the missing secret sauce.
Easy to create your own subsidized markets “Real money” should be self-explanatory. Metaculus and Manifold are both very nice, but so far they’re limited to a small group of enthusiasts playing in their spare time. I value them both, but neither is the killer app that makes prediction markets as central to everyday life as stock markets or polls or whatever. “Easy to use” is kind of self-explanatory, but with some caveats. A big part of ease-of-use is liquidity; you can get that from a big user base or from clever deployment of automated market makers. A market that requires crypto knowledge is harder to use than one that doesn’t; one that’s inaccessible from the US is harder to use than one that isn’t. Also all the normal things like UI and search. “Easy to create your own markets” is where we’ve gotten stuck so far. Prediction markets are absolutely on top of questions about whether Donald Trump will win various elections. This is a solved problem. What I really wanted last year (and would have subsidized!) was a market about whether Alameda County, California, would permit indoor gatherings of 50 people on January 8th 2022 (ie would I be forced to cancel my wedding). But I also would have appreciated the ability to put a few questions to prediction markets before starting my psychiatry practice, or my grants program, or any of a dozen other things I did. A friend has gone further, and half-jokingly said they want to create conditional prediction markets about whether they’re compatible with various women in our friend group, to be paid out six months after the first date. Some of these applications are attempts to route around the principal-agent problem. Maybe I have some question about whether a certain grant would succeed, I’m not sure who to ask, and even if someone gives me a “Bob Smith, Grant Evaluator” business card, I don’t know if he’s any good. A prediction market takes all the pain out of searching for information - if I subsidize it enough, it’ll attract people with the relevant skill set who will solve my problem for me. Probably some of these ideas wouldn’t work, but probably other ideas I can’t even think of now would. I don’t know what the killer app for prediction markets will be. But we’re not going to find out unless people can create their own subsidized markets and play around. Polymarket took some baby steps towards this before the settlement: they had a Discord server where anyone could propose questions, and a lot of those questions became markets. But they still had to be general interest, not “let Alice’s five friends predict her dating life”. And there’s a big difference between “talk it over with company representatives on a Discord server” and “press a button”. Imagine if you could only tweet by emailing Jack Dorsey and convincing him that your comment was a good thing to have on Twitter. Even if Jack had good judgment and approved most requests, this would be a long way from the limbic system < — > Send Tweet loop that real Twitter users know and love. I asked some people in the business why they won’t do this. They said most people are bad at writing good resolution criteria. They don’t want their employees to get stuck resolving incredibly dumb questions about people’s dating lives, hunting down inaccessible or conflicting information, and making a bunch of people mad whichever way they decide. As far as I can tell, Manifold Markets solved that problem with their “proposer decides the resolution, caveat emptor” strategy. But Manifold is US-based and can’t use real money, so there’s still no way to subsidize a market effectively. (This is why I’m pessimistic about Kalshi. They could potentially do a lot of good in the “will Afghanistan collapse?” types of markets the Nobel laureates want, though even there I think some of their betting limits will give them trouble - $25,000 is good money, but not quite good enough to incentivize founding the prediction market equivalent of a Wall Street trading firm. But even if they solve this, I can’t imagine the regulators giving them permission to host “will this grant work out?” or “how will my dating life go?” markets; it’s just too weird, and the CFTC is too conservative. I don’t know, maybe their connections will come through and pull it off, but I don’t even know if they’re ambitious enough to want this, and I hate having to rely on one organization.) Right now my hopes are, in ascending order of likelihood: Manifold figures out some kind of weird crypto thing that isn’t real money from a legal perspective, but is real money from a “people really want it and will put a lot of effort into getting it” perspective.
February 14, 2022 · Original source
These run from about 48% to 60%, but I think the differences are justified by the slightly different wordings of the question and definitions of “invasion”. You see a big jump last Friday when the US government increased the urgency of their own warnings. I ignored this on Friday because I couldn’t figure out what their evidence was, but it looks like the smart money updated a lot on it. A few smaller markets that Clay didn’t include: Manifold is only at 36% despite several dozen traders. I think they’re just wrong - but I’m not going to use any more of my limited supply of play money to correct it, thus fully explaining the wrongness. Futuur is at 47%, but also thinks there’s an 18% chance Russia invades Lithuania, so I’m going to count this as not really mature. Insight Prediction, a very new site I’ve never seen before, claims to have $93,000 invested and a probability of 22%, which is utterly bizarre; I’m too suspicious and confused to invest, and maybe everyone else is too. (PredictIt, Polymarket, and Kalshi all avoid this question. I think PredictIt has a regulatory agreement that limits them to politics. Polymarket and Kalshi might just not be interested, or they might be too PR-sensitive to want to look like they’re speculating on wars where thousands of people could die.) What happens afterwards? Clay beats me again: For context: So it looks like forecasters expect that, conditional upon Russia invading at all, there’s an 80% chance they’ll take Mariupol in the east, a 66% chance they’ll take Kharkiv (also eastern, but only a third ethnic Russian and currently aligned with the central government), and only about a 30% chance they take Kyiv or Odessa. See also this thread full of speculation in the subreddit. As for me, I’m going all in on “yes” after seeing this tweet: Alexander Cube Last week I speculated that to truly realize the potential of prediction markets, we’d need one that was real money, easy to use, and easy to create markets on. Gustavo Lacerda and Nuno Sempere very kindly drew this picture and named it after me: Nobody has reached the promised land at the furthest point. But all three connected vertices are occupied. Augur is real-money and lets people create their own markets, (but it’s impossible to use - it’s made of complicated crypto contracts that nobody’s made a workable front end for yet). Polymarket is real money and easy to use (but doesn’t let people create their own markets; apparently they’re nervous about resolution disputes). Manifold is easy to use and lets people create their own market, but it’s not real money (they’re American and centralized, so they have to follow anti-gambling regulations). Manifold Markets Speaking of which, they’re open! As the cube suggests, Manifold is a site where anyone can create their own (play money) prediction market. They set the question and they decide when and how it resolves (with everyone else just out of luck if they decide to fake it or rug-pull). It’s a bold strategy, but boy oh boy are people liking it so far: Not actually in order This is a semi-randomly selected sample of Manifold markets, but let’s go through them one by one. The Ukraine market is the biggest on Manifold. It’s also deeply out of step with every other prediction market and the top non-prediction-market authorities - who are all giving numbers in the 50s and 60s. I don’t understand how this is so low - yes, play money < real money, but mostly because play money doesn’t get enough people betting. Here lots of people are betting - it’s the biggest market on the site, and since you only start with $1000 either twenty people have bet everything or more people have bet a fraction - but it’s still wrong. I tried to spend some play money to correct it and it snapped back to just as wrong as it was before. I have no explanation. Midnight The Stray Cat is the second biggest market on Manifold, just after Ukraine. I guess the Internet really liking cats shouldn’t be a surprise at this point. In case you need to do research first I’m told this is the cat in question: Props to Manifold for a bunch of markets like the third one on there, where they eat their own dog food by using their market to predict how their business decisions are going to go. ACX Bot has copy-pasted all of my predictions from 2022. At some point they should be able to compare their results with Zvi (ie a single very smart person), with the contest many of you entered (ie an average of formless crowdsourced predictions), and Metaculus (ie a non-monetary forecasting tournament). I’m looking forward to it! Most of you already know Lars Doucet, who’s written some great ACX posts on Georgism. I don’t know what possessed him to make a Joe Rogan Georgism interviewee market, unless he’s gunning for the position. Valinor is a group house on my street, with ~a dozen people living in and around it. We’ve been talking about fixing the backyard for a while. Now we can bet about whether it will happen. Having a number for this actually affects some of my decisions a little. Connor is hijacking the prediction market to make a poll, which is pretty cute. Dwayne Johnson does not have a 15% chance of winning the election. Manifold is suffering from the usual play money problem, where if you only start out with $1000 in play money, nobody wants to lock it up for three years to make a 15% profit. Vivek’s market, “Will I believe that 13177 is a prime number”, is pretty unusual. I’m interpreting it as a test/demonstration of prediction markets’ information-gathering ability. If you don’t know something and it’s hard to Google, you can make a prediction market about whether you’ll believe it in the future, and people who are able to figure out the answer will bet on it. Based on the 97% YES rate, I’m guessing 13177 is in fact a prime number. What else can you do this with? TANSTAAFL’s “Will I Be Convinced That Justin Trudeau Is Not Fidel Castro’s Son?” market is maybe pushing the limit of this methodology. Anyway, there are lots of me-too prediction markets but this is something genuinely new under the sun. Maybe it will be awesome itself, but I’m also hoping it helps bigger players realize how much more is possible. This Week In Metaculus A few new questions on intelligence enhancement, eg: The question explicitly allows embryo selection, but says it must raise IQ ten points and be available for <25% median income to count. Trivial improvements to existing embryo selection will top out around 9 points, so this seems to be predicting something more interesting, maybe iterated embryo selection at the very least. I’m probably slightly bearish on this one; I believe if it existed someone would find a way to get it, but I think the regulatory climate might be able to prevent the relevant research indefinitely. Improving adult IQ is really hard. This is a bold thing to speculate about! Atmospheric CO2 was 300ish for most of pre-industrial history, 400ish now, and rising. This question predicts 600 in 2100, which sounds like what happens if global warming gets a bit worse but eventually stabilizes. I’m less sure. I think if we make it to 2100, we’ll have so much technology that atmospheric CO2 can be whatever we want it to be. But maybe we’ll want it to stay where it is; once there’s been a lot of global warming and people have moved / shifted lifestyles, it could be equally disruptive to cool the planet back down. Right now it’s 5%, the official government prediction is 10% by 2030, but this market says 17.6%. But look at that probability distribution! It’s a lot of people saying 10%ish, plus a very long tail of very big numbers. I think people are disagreeing about how exponential this change is going to be. Shorts Metaculus is holding an essay contest for people who want to use their AI-related prediction markets to argue the future of AI. $6500 available in prizes.
March 01, 2022 · Original source
There’s a Putin ouster market that has exactly the same probability as Metaculus', and a very small “will Russia invade anywhere else” market that’s at 30% right now, more than twice Metaculus’ level. Meanwhile, searching for Ukraine on Kalshi gives me nothing, so please accept their “will it be over 35 degrees in New York City” market instead. Everyone keeps telling me I shouldn’t be so bearish on Kalshi, they can be both regulated and dynamic at the same time. Maybe so, but not yet.
Meanwhile, searching for Ukraine on Kalshi gives me nothing, so please accept their “will it be over 35 degrees in New York City” market instead. Everyone keeps telling me I shouldn’t be so bearish on Kalshi, they can be both regulated and dynamic at the same time. Maybe so, but not yet.
March 14, 2022 · Original source
1: Taosumer reviews my Prediction Market Cube and asks why I don’t have “decentralized” on there as a desideratum. My answer: decentralization is great, but for me it cashes out in “ease of use” - specifically, it’s easy to use it because the government hasn’t shut it down or banned you. Or as “real money” - the reason Manifold isn’t real-money is because they’re centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore need to obey laws. Or as “easy to create market” - the reason Kalshi doesn’t let you create markets is partly because it’s centralized and therefore vulnerable and therefore needs to limit markets to things regulators like. I agree that, because of those second order effects, decentralization is crucial and needs to be pursued more, and I agree that it’s a tragedy that [whatever happened to Augur] happened to Augur.
June 13, 2022 · Original source
2: Bloomberg has an article on Kalshi: A New Prediction Market Lets Investors Bet Big on Almost Anything. Great explanation of why regulated prediction markets are so hard, and what kinds of things they can or can’t do. Key quotes: “One day during their time at Y Combinator, Lopes Lara and Mansour say, they cold-called 60 lawyers they’d found on Google. Every one of them said to give up”. Also “the [Division of Market Oversight] was set up to deal with exchanges that might create two or three new markets a year. Kalshi’s business model called for new ones practically every day.”
August 08, 2022 · Original source
1: Lots of people have asked for my thoughts on CFTC shutting down PredictIt. I’ll write something on this next Monday, but for now I tentatively agree the conclusions of this Karlstack article. Short version: the guy on Twitter claiming responsibility is probably a troll; more likely this is Kalshi/Sequoia Capital weaponizing the CFTC to shut down competitors and get a monopoly. PredictIt’s parent group has a link to contact your member of Congress and other relevant officials here, but the website doesn’t work very well and I doubt the political campaign will work much better.
August 16, 2022 · Original source
Most people I’ve talked to suspect Kalshi, a big for-profit prediction market funded with $30 million from VC firm Sequoia Capital. Their edge (which they boast about openly) is their close relationship with the CFTC - for example, their head of regulatory strategy is a former CFTC official, a former CFTC commissioner is on their board of directors, etc.
Kalshi’s legality is both their biggest strength and their biggest weakness. It’s a weakness because they have to submit a lot of paperwork to the CFTC every time they want to open a new market, let the CFTC spend weeks or months debating its social utility, and sometimes get refused; as a result of this and other regulatory hurdles, they’re usually months behind, and much less interesting than, other prediction markets (for example, they still don’t have any questions about the Ukraine war). On the other hand, they can operate free from regulatory harassment.
But operating free from regulatory harassment isn’t actually an advantage if the CFTC never harasses other prediction markets - which was its policy up until about a year ago. You can see why Kalshi - which had spent a big chunk of its $30 million lobbying the CFTC for approval - was kind of annoyed that they were doing neither better nor worse than illegal crypto prediction markets. Or PredictIt, run by Victoria University on a no-action letter.
October 18, 2022 · Original source
One of my hopes for forecasting is that it eventually becomes so well-validated that decision-makers can take these kinds of considerations into account: “Should we sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine? It would have such-and-such benefits, but also increase the risk of nuclear escalation by 3.6%, is it worth it?” We can’t directly compare Samotsvety and Swift because they’re predicting over different time periods. But assuming that there’s more risk in the next six months than in the six months after that, I think Samotsvety is a little higher but they’re not embarrassingly far off. Metaculus is a bit more optimistic than either, believing there’s only a 4% chance of detonation in Ukraine in 2023 and a 7% chance of any use in the next ~year. Max Tegmark is going much higher than anyone else and says 16% chance of global nuclear war. Kalshi Applies For Election Markets Kalshi is a regulated and fully-legal prediction market with good lobbyists and a compliance team. This means the CFTC probably won’t randomly shut them down one day. But it also means they can only create new markets with CFTC permission. In July, Kalshi asked the CFTC for permission to make midterm election prediction markets - specifically, which party will win control of the House and Senate. The CFTC has said they will make a decision by October 28 (which doesn’t leave much time for predicting to happen before the November 8 election, but I guess it sets a precedent). September was the Request For Comment period, when the CFTC solicited comments from stakeholders about what they should do. Kalshi tried really hard to get lots of people to send in positive assessments - I know this because of how many people asked me “why is the CEO of Kalshi emailing me about this thing?” Their strategy seems to have worked; among the people who wrote to the CFTC in support were: A managing director at JP Morgan
I personally declined to comment because I was still angry at Kalshi for (suspectedly!) having a role in the PredictIt decision. Now I feel kind of childish for this, because many other equally angry people swallowed their pride and agreed to send the positive comments for the good of forecasting in general - including the CEO of the company that runs PredictIt! Others including Moskovitz wrote pro-Kalshi comment but recommended that CFTC also approve other markets. Whatever, too late to change things now. I may also have sent a kind of petty email insulting the Kalshi people when they asked, which I feel slightly bad about. Oh well. As the Dalai Lama says, “don’t be petty and vengeful, but if you are, at least blog about it publicly to maximize its future deterrent effect.”
I couldn’t find too many comments in opposition, but one came from a group called Better Markets, which wrote a very long argument saying this was too close to gambling and was a further step towards “the deeply troubling trend toward the ’gamification’ and ‘retailization’ of finance.” Also, frequent prediction market player Avraham Eisenberg wrote a not very serious comment which may have been motivated by spite toward Kalshi, or him just not being a very serious person.
November 21, 2022 · Original source
1: Government regulator CFTC is poised to reject Kalshi’s request to host election prediction markets (see also here). I’ve been extra harsh on Kalshi because of allegations that they worked to destroy competitors. But I would look beyond that if I thought they were really going to achieve all of our dreams and create a real legal high-volume prediction market on important questions. This kind of thing is why I’m still pessimistic. Election betting is the bread-and-butter of most prediction markets; Kalshi spent months and rallied a dream team of supporters to beg for permission to do that, and apparently still failed. I think there’s more of a future in play money and cryptocurrency, much as I hate to admit it. Still, I will temporarily put aside my grudge against Kalshi to say that I’m sorry about this and I admire the level of fighting spirit they showed here.
December 20, 2022 · Original source
People don’t trust the prediction market. If there is a 10% mispricing, but a 15% chance that the prediction market will go bust, steal your money, or wrongly resolve the question against you - then on average you lose 5% by correcting the mispricing! This doesn’t mean it’s impossible to have a truly accurate prediction market. There are two markets right now - Polymarket and Kalshi - where you can easily make $10,000+ by correcting mispricings. Unsurprisingly, I can’t find any big obvious mispricings on these markets! 2.4: Is there any empirical evidence comparing real prediction markets to experts? Yes. As predicted, prediction markets are about as accurate as Nate Silver. See Maxim Lott’s analysis here. More generally, studies usually find that prediction markets beat the average person, various experts, and various other methods like election polling. They are somewhere between equal-to and slightly-worse-than complicated aggregation algorithms, but these complicated aggregation algorithms are rarely used in real life, and I consider them to be “prediction markets lite”, ie part of the same toolbox of forecasting technologies. Hanson (2007) says (I have not individually checked each claim): Remarkably, in every known head-to-head field comparison between speculative markets and other forward-looking institutions, the speculative markets have been at least as accurate. More often than not, they prevail. Orange juice futures improve on National Weather Service forecasts (Roll 1984), horse race markets beat horse race experts (Figlewski 1979), Oscar markets beat columnist forecasts (Pennock, Giles, and Nielsen 2001), gas demand markets beat gas demand experts (Spencer 2004), stock markets beat the official NASA panel at identifying the company responsible for the Challenger accident (Maloney and Mulherin 2003), election markets beat national opinion polls (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 2003), and corporate sales markets beat official corporate forecasts (Chen and Plott 2002). 2.4.1: If prediction markets are only as good as Nate Silver or other experts, who cares? Why don’t we just skip the prediction markets and listen to the experts directly? See the next section, “Why believe prediction markets are canonical?” 2.4.2: What if there are many equally impressive experts who disagree? What do prediction markets do then? See the next section, “Why believe prediction markets are canonical?” 3. Why believe prediction markets are canonical? By canonical, I mean that in ideal cases: all prediction markets speak with a single voice
Make special deals with US regulators for exemptions to the usual restrictions. Usually these deals involve promises to have a very limited set of questions or deal in very small bets only. PredictIt used to be the leader here, but regulators changed their mind and are shutting it down. Kalshi will probably replace it.
Operate using play-money only. Here Manifold is the leader. You could also think of superforecasting tournaments like Metaculus as a version of this. I claim that the main reason prediction markets haven’t fulfilled their potential and become a major pillar of worldwide decision-making is that none of these solutions are really adequate. For whatever reason, most people interested in prediction markets are American, so Polymarket has a limited userbase. The regulators are pretty harsh, so the companies that strike deals to get exemptions usually have to trade away most of their functionality. Kalshi can only ask a few specific regulator-approved questions; the limits are so harsh that they’re not even allowed to predict elections. Play-money prediction markets like Manifold are a lot of fun, but there’s a limit to how much work people will do to earn play money. I want a world where the people who are best at correcting mispricings in prediction markets can make full-time jobs out of it, and where there are prediction market equivalents of Goldman Sachs where hundreds of brilliant people work together with cut-throat efficiency to find mispricings the moment they appear. Play money won’t get us there. Real money prediction markets tend to have between four- and six-digit (very occasionally seven-digit) volumes on most questions. Play money prediction markets have between one- and four-digit numbers of traders on most questions. Most big prediction markets are usually within 10% of each other and the best outside experts, but not always within 1%. Traditional financial markets are usually within 1% of each other, so I think this is because the prediction markets are still too small to have sub-1% accuracy. I hope that as they grow bigger they can reach this milestone. 7. What can I do to help promote prediction markets? If you’re an ordinary person with no special expertise or skills, I think the best thing you can do is create a Manifold Markets account, bet on topics that are interesting to you, and create markets for any interesting topics that don’t have one yet. I think this could be helpful for a few reasons: It’s hard to really understand prediction markets until you’ve played a few yourself.
April 25, 2023 · Original source
2: Nuno Sempere: Tracking The Money Flows In Forecasting. EG Metaculus runs off of ~$6M in grants; Kalshi has $30M in VC funding. Gnosis, a crypto protocol that never went anywhere, apparently had a $230M market cap at one point, but this is probably some kind of fake crypto valuation trick.
July 23, 2023 · Original source
2: Kalshi is trying to get CFTC permission to run some political prediction markets in the US again, maybe with good implications for other markets if they succeed. CFTC comment period ends tomorrow (sorry), I am slightly more optimistic that these make a difference after the FDA retracted its telemedicine plan based on them. News article here, discussion on the subreddit here, and the CFTC’s comment page is here.
August 01, 2023 · Original source
Kalshi is a legal prediction market trying to comply with regulations. They asked their regulator, the CFTC, for permission to make prediction markets about the upcoming elections. In grand regulatory tradition, CFTC has drawn this out into an excruciating yearlong process that has aggravated everyone involved.
Most comments seemed to be anti-Kalshi. Some big anti-market and anti-gambling organizations urged their audiences to participate, especially a group called Better Markets. Most of these people’s talking points involved gambling on elections being a threat to democracy: what if it incentivized people to rig elections?
Big Wall Street firms can bet more on Kalshi, up to $100 million, but big Wall Street firms already have hundreds of millions of dollars at stake in elections based on who passes the next Sarbanes-Oxley or whatever. In fact, the whole reason for Wall Street to gamble $100 million on an election is to hedge the risk that Bernie Sanders will get elected and cost them $100 million. Allowing election bets makes Wall Street less interested in elections, not more!
August 28, 2023 · Original source
First, the simplest proof that something was predictable is to have predicted it. Since I know you’ll ask, yes, I bet on the markets at the time - 10,000 mana on Manifold and $100 on Kalshi - and made a nice profit. I would have bet more on Kalshi but it took too long to load the money onto my account.
NinthCause and SG are Manifold co-founders. Jack, Marcus Abramovich, and Michael Wheatly are Manifold leaderboard record holders. Peter Wildeford is a superforecaster who came near the top in the ACX forecasting contest. Matthew Barnett works in AI forecasting. You all know Eliezer and Zvi. As far as I can tell nobody high up on the YES side is similarly illustrious. But prediction markets are supposed to ensure you don’t have to resort to name-dropping, so how did this go wrong? I was tempted to blame Manifold-specific factors, like the ability to get starting mana instead of putting skin in the game. But real-money markets Polymarket and Kalshi got approximately the same results: Polymarket: https://polymarket.com/event/is-the-room-temp-superconductor-real Kalshi: https://kalshi.com/markets/supercon/roomtemp-superconductor-reported Both reached the 40s to 50s! I think there just wasn’t enough smart money to drown out the people who wanted to bet on an exciting thing being true, or who were unduly influenced by a social media environment optimized to keep their attention by convincing them that an exciting thing was true. I have never claimed prediction markets are always good. All I wrote in the Prediction Market FAQ was that either a prediction market will be good, or you could make lots of free money. In this case, it was the second one. I regret I only made $30. I do hope this situation will improve over time, as over-eager forecasters get burned and dollars flow from dumb money to smarter. [EDIT: I should have included something about Metaculus here, but it’s confusing. I think the most popular Metaculus market was lower because it had stricter resolution criteria (the first replication had to be positive, instead of any replication) but that otherwise Metaculus raw probabilities mirrored everyone else’s. We don’t know how their algorithmically processed probabilities did yet and I’ll report on that information when I get it.] Salem/CSPI Tournament Winners The Salem Center and the Center For The Study Of Partisanship And Ideology, two think tanks associated with right-wing intellectual Richard Hanania, sponsored a prediction market tournament last year. Participants got $1000 in play money to bet on selected markets about current events; winners would be interviewed for a well-paying academic sinecure at one of the think tanks. Now the tournament is over. Winners have yet to be announced, but unofficially, everyone knows who they are: First place out of 999 participants is zubbybadger. Zubby is a prediction market veteran who was featured in a Washington Monthly article last year for his great track record in political betting (he’s made > $150,000 on PredictIt). Now he works as a “community manager” for Kalshi (I don’t know what this entails). Second place was Robert from Considerations On Codecrafting. He’s written a detailed reflection on his experience (part one, part two) which is my main source for this section and highly recommended. He describes himself as “having absolutely no experience with prediction markets”. Third place was Johnny Ten-Numbers, about whom I can find no further information. You can see the rest of the top 20 at the very bottom of this post. Reading Robert’s story of his experience, I’m struck by how little of the competition at the top was about predictive accuracy. Everyone in the top 20 was a very accurate predictor (Exactly equally accurate? Hard to tell.) What separated 1st place from 20th, aside from luck, was things like: Ability to move fast - both in responding to news, and in taking the other side of bad bets. Several top performers programmed bots to give them an edge here.
Kalshi: https://kalshi.com/markets/supercon/roomtemp-superconductor-reported Both reached the 40s to 50s! I think there just wasn’t enough smart money to drown out the people who wanted to bet on an exciting thing being true, or who were unduly influenced by a social media environment optimized to keep their attention by convincing them that an exciting thing was true. I have never claimed prediction markets are always good. All I wrote in the Prediction Market FAQ was that either a prediction market will be good, or you could make lots of free money. In this case, it was the second one. I regret I only made $30. I do hope this situation will improve over time, as over-eager forecasters get burned and dollars flow from dumb money to smarter. [EDIT: I should have included something about Metaculus here, but it’s confusing. I think the most popular Metaculus market was lower because it had stricter resolution criteria (the first replication had to be positive, instead of any replication) but that otherwise Metaculus raw probabilities mirrored everyone else’s. We don’t know how their algorithmically processed probabilities did yet and I’ll report on that information when I get it.] Salem/CSPI Tournament Winners The Salem Center and the Center For The Study Of Partisanship And Ideology, two think tanks associated with right-wing intellectual Richard Hanania, sponsored a prediction market tournament last year. Participants got $1000 in play money to bet on selected markets about current events; winners would be interviewed for a well-paying academic sinecure at one of the think tanks. Now the tournament is over. Winners have yet to be announced, but unofficially, everyone knows who they are: First place out of 999 participants is zubbybadger. Zubby is a prediction market veteran who was featured in a Washington Monthly article last year for his great track record in political betting (he’s made > $150,000 on PredictIt). Now he works as a “community manager” for Kalshi (I don’t know what this entails). Second place was Robert from Considerations On Codecrafting. He’s written a detailed reflection on his experience (part one, part two) which is my main source for this section and highly recommended. He describes himself as “having absolutely no experience with prediction markets”. Third place was Johnny Ten-Numbers, about whom I can find no further information. You can see the rest of the top 20 at the very bottom of this post. Reading Robert’s story of his experience, I’m struck by how little of the competition at the top was about predictive accuracy. Everyone in the top 20 was a very accurate predictor (Exactly equally accurate? Hard to tell.) What separated 1st place from 20th, aside from luck, was things like: Ability to move fast - both in responding to news, and in taking the other side of bad bets. Several top performers programmed bots to give them an edge here.
September 11, 2023 · Original source
2: Manifold Markets wants me to remind you that this is approximately your last chance to sign up for Manifest, their forecasting and prediction market conference in Berkeley, CA. Guests will include Nate Silver, Robin Hanson, Aella, Zvi, and the CEOs of Kalshi, Manifold, and Polymarket. I’m still figuring out if I can make it but I’ll try my best.
October 31, 2023 · Original source
Prediction markets have often existed in a regulatory gray area. A newer market, Kalshi, has tried to cooperate with regulators to become a new kind of fully-legal and highly-regulated platform, but it’s been tough going. The day of the conference, main government regulator CFTC denied Kalshi’s petition to have betting markets on elections (see the first item here for previous discussion). This is pretty discouraging; election betting is the bread and butter of prediction markets, and the government seems to have banned it.
December 05, 2023 · Original source
Source: Kalshi Second one is out of order, but these basically agree. Why is Taylor Swift so high? I understand she’s a very famous pop star, but hasn’t she been an equally famous pop star every one of the past ten years?
1: Last month, we talked about the CFTC (regulatory body) denying Kalshi’s request to have election questions on their prediction market. Kalshi is now suing the CFTC to reverse their decision, saying that “the contracts contain no unlawful acts prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act and therefore, the CFTC has no power to block them”. I have to admit I’m surprised by this - I thought Kalshi was trying to cultivate good will with the CFTC, and this seems pretty adversarial. Also, if they win, what’s left of the CFTC’s ability to regulate prediction markets at all? Any regulation experts want to weigh in?
February 20, 2024 · Original source
Across Metaculus, Manifold, Good Judgment, Infer, Kalshi, and Polymarket, we only found 55 questions with large crowds on good geopolitics questions about 2024. Also, this eval only scores binary questions for the same reason - we didn’t find enough continuous questions to get statistical power. (Part of the motivation for the Humans vs. Bots tournament was to double our sample size on binary questions, but we haven’t run new evals on them yet.)
May 13, 2024 · Original source
There are already hundreds of groups that care deeply about the outcome of elections. Some have billions of dollars on the line, like defense contractors, fossil fuel companies, real estate developers, and investment banks. Others care for non-financial reasons: transgender people, Christians, gun owners, the population of Ukraine, people who think we’ll all die from climate change, people who think the country will become a dictatorship, all Democrats, all Republicans, etc. The idea that adding one more group - “people who have a few thousand dollars staked on Kalshi” - will be the difference between a safe and secure election, and one that’s hacked by motivated parties, is pretty crazy.
RIP Kalshi, who are the main group negatively affected by this. This takes away a lot (though not all) of their value proposition, leaving them the option of contracts on some economic indicators, weather, and whatever else they can slip through the cracks.
September 12, 2024 · Original source
40: This month in prediction markets: a court reverses the CFTC’s ruling that Kalshi can’t have prediction markets on Congressional elections. I have to say - before I found a few subfields of politics where I was interested enough to follow the nuts and bolts, I never really understood how much of the law-making process was government agencies setting policies, the people who dislike those policies going to court, and the court cancelling the policies. Also, thanks to TracingWoodgrains and his lawyer friends for their related work trying to protect US prediction markets.
September 17, 2024 · Original source
Still, it’s hard to overstate their dominance. Remember, their presidential election market has $910 million. For their competitor, PredictIt, the same number is $37 million. Kalshi doesn’t have election bets (more on this later) but their biggest markets look to be in the $2 - $5 million range.
3: Kalshi vs. CFTC, round one million: after CFTC banned Kalshi from hosting political contracts last year, Kalshi appealed. Earlier this month, the judge sided with Kalshi, saying that the CFTC’s attempt to define elections as “gaming” so it can regulate them under anti-gaming laws is an illegal power grab. The judge claims this has no relevance to the CFTC’s broader anti-political-market push, but since the whole thing is based on the elections = gaming theory I think it has a lot of relevance indeed. The CFTC has since appealed, and Kalshi is blocked from hosting the contracts until the appeal goes through (it’s 49 days until the election; at this point even a pro-Kalshi ruling might be a Pyrrhic victory). Also, why is Kalshi trying to get Congress contracts up, but not a Presidency contract? More sympathetic test case?
November 05, 2024 · Original source
On October 14th, Polymarket gave Donald Trump 54% odds of winning, compared to Nate Silver’s 49% and Metaculus’ 45%. Whatever, everyone knows Polymarket has a small right-wing bias, and 5% isn’t too bad. Three days later, it had risen from 54% to 61%, despite no news and no change for Metaculus or Nate, bringing the Polymarket/Silver spread to an unprecedented 11%. What happened? This is the rare prediction market story where the answers are already in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal: one really rich guy put $30 million on Trump (a recent followup by Jorge Velez claims it’s actually more like $75 million). Although he prefers to remain anonymous, reporters have talked to him and are able to reveal that he’s French, goes by “Theo”, is a former banker, and has no insider connections. He just a normal rich guy who really thinks Trump will win. This is exactly the sort of shock that prediction markets are supposed to be resilient against. Instead, the market stayed at 61% for days, swung even higher for a while, finally fell back down two weeks later, then went back up again. What happened? The simplest story would be insufficient liquidity: there just weren’t enough people to gather the $75 million it would take to bet against Theo. This is superficially plausible: Polymarket requires crypto and bans Americans, so the mispricing couldn’t be corrected until enough crypto-literate, American-election-following foreigners showed up to bet $75 million. That’s a tall order, and maybe it took two weeks. But the simple story seems wrong. Other real-money markets rose approximately in tandem with Polymarket. For example, Smarkets got to Trump 59% on 10/16, and peaked at 64% on 10/30. Kalshi followed a similar path. Both tracked Polymarket, not Nate Silver or Metaculus (neither of whom ever went above Trump 55% since Harris joined the race). So I think the remaining stories are: Theo made his giant bet on Polymarket. By coincidence, at the same time, bettors everywhere massively overcounted a few good polls for Trump and started a feeding frenzy on pro-Trump shares. This made all other markets gain, and Polymarket stay at its Theo-caused peak, until a few bad polls for Trump brought everyone back to reality last week.
[EDIT, thanks to commenter Chastity for the explanation] There wasn’t enough liquidity to get Polymarket back down, but traders looking for free money arbitraged with Polymarket-Kamala plus Smarkets/Kalshi-Trump. Polymarket is so much bigger than the other two (and Theo kept driving it back up), so this just looked like Smarkets and Kalshi going all the way up to Polymarket levels.
Kalshi Plays The Long Game The CFTC has suffered a string of recent defeats in its quest to regulate prediction markets. Most recently, with one month to go, an appeals court struck down their decision that Kalshi couldn’t offer election betting. In their ruling, the judges said that:
November 07, 2024 · Original source
Another group - the real-money markets - said the election was 60%. Polymarket was the leader here; a group of smaller prediction markets, including Kalshi, Betfair, and PredictIt - were probably just changing downstream of Polymarket, as traders tried to arbitrage the bigger site’s odds.
January 13, 2026 · Original source
For a few weeks in October, Polymarket founder Shayne Coplan was the world’s youngest self-made billionaire (now it’s some AI people). Kalshi is so accurate that it’s getting called a national security threat.
For a few weeks in October, Polymarket founder Shayne Coplan was the world’s youngest self-made billionaire (now it’s some AI people). Kalshi is so accurate that it’s getting called a national security threat. The catch is, of course, that it’s mostly degenerate gambling, especially sports betting. Kalshi is 81% sports by monthly volume. Polymarket does better - only 37% - but some of the remainder is things like this $686,000 market on how often Elon Musk will tweet this week - currently dominated by the “140 - 164 times” category. (ironically, this seems to be a regulatory difference - US regulators don’t mind sports betting, but look unfavorably on potentially “insensitive” markets like bets about wars. Polymarket has historically been offshore, and so able to concentrate on geopolitics; Kalshi has been in the US, and so stuck mostly to sports. But Polymarket is in the process of moving onshore; I don’t know if this will affect their ability to offer geopolitical markets) Degenerate gambling is bad. Insofar as prediction markets have acted as a Trojan Horse to enable it, this is bad. Insofar as my advocacy helped make this possible, I am bad. I can only plead that it didn’t really seem plausible, back in 2021, that a presidential administration would keep all normal restrictions on sports gambling but also let prediction markets do it as much as they wanted. If only there had been some kind of decentralized forecasting tool that could have given me a canonical probability on this outcome! Still, it might seem that, whatever the degenerate gamblers are doing, we at least have some interesting data. There are now strong, minimally-regulated, high-volume prediction markets on important global events. In this column, I previously claimed this would revolutionize society. Has it? I don’t feel revolutionized. Why not? The problem isn’t that the prediction markets are bad. There’s been a lot of noise about insider trading and disputed resolutions. But insider trading should only increase accuracy - it’s bad for traders, but good for information-seekers - and my impression is that the disputed resolutions were handled as well as possible. When I say I don’t feel revolutionized, it’s not because I don’t believe it when it says there’s a 20% chance Khameini will be out before the end of the month. The several thousand people who have invested $6 million in that question have probably converged upon the most accurate probability possible with existing knowledge, just the way prediction markets should. I actually like this. Everyone is talking about the protests in Iran, and it’s hard to gauge their importance, and knowing that there’s a 20% chance Khameini is removed by February really does help to place them in context. The missing link seems to be between “it’s now possible to place global events in probabilistic context → society revolutionized”. Here are some possibilities: Maybe people just haven’t caught on yet? Most news sources still don’t cite prediction markets, even when many people would care about their outcome. For example, the Khameini market hasn’t gotten mentioned in articles about the Iran protests, even though “will these protests succeed in toppling the regime?” is the obvious first question any reader would ask. Maybe the problem is that probabilities don’t matter? Maybe there’s some State Department official who would change plans slightly over a 20% vs. 40% chance of Khameini departure, or an Iranian official for whom that would mean the difference between loyalty and defection, and these people are benefiting slightly, but not enough that society feels revolutionized. Maybe society has been low-key revolutionized and we haven’t noticed? Very optimistically, maybe there aren’t as many “obviously the protests will work, only a defeatist doomer traitor would say they have any chance of failing!” “no, obviously the protests will fail, you’re a neoliberal shill if you think they could work” takes as there used to be. Maybe everyone has converged to a unified assessment of probabilistic knowledge, and we’re all better off as a result. Maybe Polymarket and Kalshi don’t have the right questions. Ask yourself: what are the big future-prediction questions that important disagreements pivot around? When I try this exercise, I get things like: Will the AI bubble pop? Will scaling get us all the way to AGI? Will AI be misaligned?
I don’t feel revolutionized. Why not? The problem isn’t that the prediction markets are bad. There’s been a lot of noise about insider trading and disputed resolutions. But insider trading should only increase accuracy - it’s bad for traders, but good for information-seekers - and my impression is that the disputed resolutions were handled as well as possible. When I say I don’t feel revolutionized, it’s not because I don’t believe it when it says there’s a 20% chance Khameini will be out before the end of the month. The several thousand people who have invested $6 million in that question have probably converged upon the most accurate probability possible with existing knowledge, just the way prediction markets should. I actually like this. Everyone is talking about the protests in Iran, and it’s hard to gauge their importance, and knowing that there’s a 20% chance Khameini is removed by February really does help to place them in context. The missing link seems to be between “it’s now possible to place global events in probabilistic context → society revolutionized”. Here are some possibilities: Maybe people just haven’t caught on yet? Most news sources still don’t cite prediction markets, even when many people would care about their outcome. For example, the Khameini market hasn’t gotten mentioned in articles about the Iran protests, even though “will these protests succeed in toppling the regime?” is the obvious first question any reader would ask. Maybe the problem is that probabilities don’t matter? Maybe there’s some State Department official who would change plans slightly over a 20% vs. 40% chance of Khameini departure, or an Iranian official for whom that would mean the difference between loyalty and defection, and these people are benefiting slightly, but not enough that society feels revolutionized. Maybe society has been low-key revolutionized and we haven’t noticed? Very optimistically, maybe there aren’t as many “obviously the protests will work, only a defeatist doomer traitor would say they have any chance of failing!” “no, obviously the protests will fail, you’re a neoliberal shill if you think they could work” takes as there used to be. Maybe everyone has converged to a unified assessment of probabilistic knowledge, and we’re all better off as a result. Maybe Polymarket and Kalshi don’t have the right questions. Ask yourself: what are the big future-prediction questions that important disagreements pivot around? When I try this exercise, I get things like: Will the AI bubble pop? Will scaling get us all the way to AGI? Will AI be misaligned?
March 03, 2026 · Original source
First, that Polymarket and Kalshi are doing a good job filling the gambling niche, Metaculus is doing a good job filling the information-aggregation niche, and hedging is the last prediction market niche capable of spawning a billion-dollar company. Actually, why set your sights so low? There’s currently two trillion dollars tied up in the derivatives market; a better hedge would be very lucrative.
2: Yahoo Finance: Man Bet Entire Life Savings Of $342,195 That Elon Musk Would Fail. This is more heartwarming than it sounds - it’s about economist Alan Cole and a Kalshi market about whether DOGE would successfully cut the federal budget by some amount. Cole was an expert in tax law and knew that the budget is sufficiently constrained that it was literally impossible to cut it that amount, and so (after getting his wife’s buy-in) put his entire life savings on NO. NO turned out correct, netting him a 37% profit after one year.
Khan Academy

Khan Academy is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 6 times across 6 issues between May 14, 2021 and July 04, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "more math with Khan Academy"; "I have experience from five years at Khan Academy"; "I used to lead R&D at Khan Academy". It most often appears alongside India, Bill Gates, Harvard.

Article page
Khan Academy
Mention count
6
Issue count
6
First seen
May 14, 2021
Last seen
July 04, 2025
May 14, 2021 · Original source
And yet, despite following a lot of the same strategies that gambling machine designers did, those app creators never did create an army of self-improvement addicts. I haven’t heard any tales of someone losing his job because he was too busy getting more steps with his Fitbit, neglecting her marriage because she was too busy learning a new language on Duolingo, or dropping out of school to make more time for Khan Academy. Why is that? If designers can turn creaky slot machines into a multibillion dollar addictive product, why couldn’t they do the same for all these virtuous apps? Why can I, a person who gets addicted to apps fairly easily, not bring myself to spend more than ten minutes on Duolingo? Why are these apps still more broccoli than chocolate?
February 03, 2022 · Original source
#53: Educational Videos Hi there. I make educational videos at youtube.com/primerlearning. The two guiding principles are to inspire people to realize (1) that learning and analysis are intrinsically interesting, and (2) that you don't need to specialize in a topic to understand its most powerful ideas. My hope is that this will positively impact humanity's relationship with knowledge in the future, helping combat simplistic ideologies and inspiring more people to delve into and innovate within quantitative fields. Why fund this project instead of other similar ones? [The quality and popularity of the videos are unusually high, I have experience from five years at Khan Academy, and we'll probably have overlapping world views that make my influence in line with your values.] I'm asking for 100k to subsidize the hiring of a full-time engineer. The videos are coding-intensive, being focused on animated simulations. I have gotten along well enough, but I am self-taught as a coder, and my comparative advantage is elsewhere. This one-time investment will accelerate video production and pay for itself in the short/medium term, since the revenue per video is already high. [If interested, contact justin@primerlearning.org]
February 10, 2022 · Original source
#80: A “Mnemonic Medium” To Replace Textbooks What comes after the book? Is it pictures of pages on screens? Videos of people lecturing? Why are all the answers to this question so boring? Where are the powerful ideas about memory, psychology, sociology? I’m Andy Matuschak, and I’ve been developing a “mnemonic medium” which embeds interactive memory supports to make it easy for readers to remember and apply what they read. To test these ideas, physicist Michael Nielsen and I created a quantum computing textbook called Quantum Country. Hundreds of readers have now demonstrated long-term retention of the text’s fine details. I’ve been running experiments to understand and improve the medium, both in that textbook and by expanding the technology to a variety of other contexts. I believe that this medium, refined and widely deployed, could help people learn difficult topics much more easily and reliably. Now, here’s where you come in: I used to lead R&D at Khan Academy, but now I’m independent and crowdfunding a research grant. You can read more about my work and help make it happen at https://patreon.com/quantumcountry.
December 01, 2022 · Original source
Fuzzy trad ideas of “values” mattering. Brooks already hints at this in his discussion of the crime / illegitimacy boom. I was previously suspicious of these explanations because it was hard to come up with a locus for “values”. Trends this big couldn’t be explained by individual values, but they didn’t quite seem like national values either - at least not the kind that could be budged with public awareness campaigns and feel-good support-our-values Disney movies. Brooks suggests the ruling class as the repository of values, and then lets values change suddenly because of a change in ruling classes. One final note: Brooks’ neologism for the new meritocrats, “Bobos”, stood for bourgeois bohemians. It was cute but never caught on. I would say its closest modern equivalent is “bluechecks” (this is a a vast improvement over the earlier term “Cathedral”, since it doesn’t imply having read Moldbug). Alas, Elon Musk ruined it; I can only hope lightning strikes a second time and we get some equally descriptive moniker. And speaking of Elon: every true silicon-blooded techie dreams of a world with no ruling class. A world where DeFi algorithms replace bankers, prediction markets replace “thought leaders”, and something something Khan Academy handwave bootcamp something something replaces the Ivy League. This is a beautiful utopian vision, which means it will never happen. More realistically, might techies replace traditional meritocrats as the ruling class? I think this was plausible around 2015, then fizzled out. Partly it fizzled because the New York Times, eternal mouthpiece of the establishment, noticed the situation and played defense effectively. Partly it failed because the meritocrats sort of took over Silicon Valley, and even though they don't own everything yet, they do own enough to prevent it from organizing into a real counterelite. And partly it failed because the specter of Trump convinced lots of different elites to close ranks around the bluechecks as heroic defenders of democracy. I'm currently bearish on the whole project. But if Brooks is right, Conant/Pusey’s fateful (and at the time unheralded) decision to open up Ivy admissions showed just how fragile aristocracies can be. Maybe some opportunity will arise where it is least expected. Related: David Brooks reconsiders Bobos 20 years later (Atlantic)
June 27, 2025 · Original source
Leadership …and so many other things. 100% of MAP test questions are multiple choice. Where are the students learning deep thinking? What about the learning you get from small group discussions in a university seminar? I think Alpha’s answer to that concern is “that is what we do in the afternoon workshops”. I think that is a fine answer. How well do most schools teach those things as a baseline? Maybe Alpha does as good a job as other schools teaching public speaking. Maybe they do a better job? But what is missing is an objective measure of how well they do it. I can see that GT is making progress on the measurement of those softer skills by running workshops on “competitive academics” where the output is legible. The kids at that school don’t just learn to give talks, they give talks and then submit them to The Moth in an attempt to qualify for (and win) Storytelling Nights. They don’t just write persuasive essays graded by their teachers, they write persuasive essays and then submit them to national competitions. They don’t just learn the concepts of long term planning and strategy, they put them in practice playing go and chess and then compete against their peers and earn an elo ranking. I think it is a fair way to assess these things and leads to more accountability, but note that it is only happening at the GT school with ten kids, not the main Alpha campus, and the data points so far on whether it is working are very thin. Our friends at the flagship school are less convinced that the climbing wall workshop is teaching those “non-state mandated” academics that the core program misses. Another disappointment is “Alpha Writes”. The school was not happy with the third-party reading and writing apps out there and built their own. Alpha Reads is excellent. Alpha Writes (which is newer and just launched about a month ago) is not. I believe the school (and Joe Liemandt) understands that the product is not good enough, and they are taking it back to the drawing board, but for now I do not think the Alpha kids have any real edge versus traditional schools in their training on essay or creative writing skills. How do Alpha’s MAP score improvements compare to other selective private schools across the country? This is an important question for some parents. It is great if you can expect your 5th grader to advance 2.6x faster than they would at the local public school, but if you are planning to spend $40,000/year to send him to Alpha, your alternative is likely not the local public school. And if you are considering moving your family to Austin for the school, your alternative options are places like Horace Mann, Harvard-Westlake, and Lakeside. How does the 2.6x improvement that Alpha is delivering compare to those elite institutions? I have no idea. Unlike Alpha I have not found any elite school who has shared the MAP improvement rate for the students at their school. I expect these elite schools are very good for all the reasons the selective private school I sent my kids to before GT was good: They have a select group of peers, they have great teacher:student ratios, and they have incredible resources. I also expect most of these schools do NOT accelerate (I could very well be wrong here and would be happy to be corrected). If they are like the schools I am familiar with they allow their students to advance through the material at the “normal” pace, with the normal pedagogy, but, because those kids are so bright, that leaves them plenty of time for enrichment. Lakeside school (where Bill Gates’ children attended) has classes where students write and perform one-act plays at the school’s annual festival; advanced photography courses where students develop their own signature style and brand; Literature classes on Victorian novels, the Harlem Renaissance, and Chaos Theory; classes on abnormal psychology, architecture, blockchain, game theory and wilderness survival and leadership. I am sure by the time they graduate, students from Lakeside have learned much more than what is measured on a standardized MAP test. The problem is that it is difficult to measure those “extra things”, so you are left making the decision on vibes and prestige and marketing materials. (and meanwhile the objective numbers are held under lock and key by the elite schools themselves who have no incentive to share them when they are already winning on vibes). Is there any data on how different education programs are doing on improving MAP scores? I have not found any schools other than Alpha that share their data, but there are some “educational interventions” where the measured output was an improvement on MAP tests. Teach to One: Math is a math program used in some schools that is meant to be “personalized” using “technology-infused direct instruction”. Their studies find that students who follow their full program improve 23% faster on the math MAP scores, and students who are “exposed” to the program improve 12% faster. MAP Accelerator is a tool developed by Khan Academy. It claims that students who use it consistently for 30-minutes per week improve their MAP scores 9-43% faster than a control group. Both examples show that if you have technology-enabled personalized learning for extended periods of time improve MAP scores versus the norm. Both show that those results only happen when the students stick with the program. This shows that the “secret sauce” of Alpha’s 2-Hour Learning is not what and how they are teaching but rather: That they are using personalized technology-enhanced programing (when most schools aren’t)
July 04, 2025 · Original source
In recent years, some of the boldest claims have come from Khan Academy. Founded in 2006, Khan Academy began as a set of lecture videos created by Sal Khan and has grown to include practice exercises with feedback, full curricula, and an AI chatbot tutor. Unlike earlier personalized learning tools, Khan Academy has seen broader adoption in real classrooms. It is a common element in personalized learning programs, which have been popular with tech billionaires who like to donate to education causes.
Last year, Laurence Holt published an excellent article summarizing the core challenge of today’s education technology. There is no shortage of fancy online programs that claim to teach kids math. Khan Academy was the first to gain widespread popularity, but it’s actually used much less now than some newer entrants like IXL and i-Ready. Every one of these programs commissions some study showing that students who use their program with fidelity learn more than some control group. Holt digs into the data, and it turns out that the group who used the programs with fidelity was often around 5%. The article is called “The 5 Percent Problem.” These programs do seem to help a subset of students, but don’t do much for the rest. While Holt’s article focuses on math education, education technology has had a similarly lackluster impact on achievement in English classes. We know that reading on screens leads to less learning than reading on paper, and the personalized learning apps have a similarly disappointing track record as in math.
KGB

KGB is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 5 times across 5 issues between February 16, 2022 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "email it to the KGB’s Riddle Decoding Division"; "The KGB confiscating hospital records of the victims"; "Putin got a burning desire to join the KGB". It most often appears alongside US, CIA, Hitler.

Article page
KGB
Mention count
5
Issue count
5
First seen
February 16, 2022
Last seen
August 08, 2024
February 16, 2022 · Original source
In one kind of surreal passage, Teach discusses the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams. Dreams contain content that the mind wants to repress, but then - why dream it? Why go to a psychoanalyst specializing in dream interpretation? When the CIA wants to keep something classified, they don’t cloak it in a riddle and email it to the KGB’s Riddle Decoding Division.
July 30, 2022 · Original source
In April 1979, anthrax escaped from a biological warfare lab in Sverdlovsk, USSR, resulting in at least 64 deaths. This leak was successfully covered up by the Soviet authorities for more than a decade, with the KGB confiscating hospital records of the victims. The truth was only discovered after the fall of the Soviet Union, when a proper scientific investigation was finally allowed in 1992 and 1993.
August 03, 2023 · Original source
Vladimir Putin, age 6, with his official mother Maria Putina. As for the investigative journalist deaths, it would be more surprising for a Russian investigative journalist of the early 2000s not to die horribly. Both were researching other things about Putin besides his childhood. and had made themselves plenty of enemies. Russo was in Chechnya at the time, another known risk factor for horrible death. I wouldn’t over-update on this. Still, I found the adoption controversy interesting as a metaphor for everything about Putin. Vladimir Putin really did seem to appear on Earth - or at least in the corridors of power in Russia - fully formed. At each step in his career, he was promoted for no particular reason, or because he seemed so devoid of personality that nobody could imagine him causing trouble. This culminated in his 2000 appointment as Yeltsin’s successor when “The world’s largest landmass, a land of oil, gas, and nuclear arms, had a new leader, and its business and political elites had no idea who he was.” My source for this quote is The Man Without A Face: The Unlikely Rise Of Vladimir Putin by Masha Gessen, a rare surviving Russian investigative journalist. As always in Dictator Book Club, we’ll go through the story first, then discuss if there are any implications for other countries trying to avoid dictatorship. II. The Agony And The Ex-Stasi Officially, Vladimir Putin was born in 1952 to Vladimir Putin Sr. and Maria Putina, two middle class laborers who had lost their previous two children in the hellish Nazi siege of Leningrad a decade before. Putin’s paternal grandfather was Spiridon Putin, “personal cook to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin”1. Also: [Spiridon] Putin worked at the famous Hotel Astoria, where he once served Grigori Rasputin. Rasputin gave Putin a gold ruble as he was impressed with the cuisine and noticed the similarity between their names. …but his family was otherwise normal. Putin was a mediocre student; schoolmates who remember him at all recall that he was easily-offended, often got in physical fights, and always won. Around age ten, Putin got a burning desire to join the KGB. He credits the many pro-KGB propaganda kids’ TV shows of the time, but Gessen suspects that his father might also have been a secret KGB informant. Schoolmates remember he kept a portrait of the founder of the KGB on his desk. And Putin’s otherwise mediocre transcript was boosted by excellent grades in German; KGB employment required a foreign language. And so: At the age of sixteen, a year before finishing secondary school, Vladimir Putin went to the KGB headquarters in Leningrad to try to sign up. “A man came out,” he recalled for a biographer. “He did not know who I was. And I never saw him again after that. I told him I go to school and in the future I would like to work for the state security services. I asked if it was possible and what I would have to do to achieve it. The man said they don’t usually sign up volunteers, but the best way for me would be to go to college or serve in the military. I asked him which college. He said a law college or the law department of the university would be best. To everyone’s surprise, mediocre student Putin applied to university and got in. Then: All through my university years I kept waiting for that man I spoke to at KGB headquarters to remember me . . . but they had forgotten all about me, because I had been a schoolboy when I came . . . But I remembered they do not sign up volunteers, so I made no moves myself. Four years went by. Silence. I decided the issue was closed and started looking around for other possible job assignments . . . But when I was in my fourth year, I was contacted by a man who said he wanted to meet with me. He did not say who he was, but somehow I knew right away. Putin trained relentlessly, both at the official KGB school and in his hobby of judo, though he took time out to marry his sweetheart: Putin’s own descriptions of his relationships paint him as a strikingly inept communicator. He had one significant relationship with a woman before meeting his future wife; he left her at the altar. “That’s how it happened,” he told his biographers, explaining nothing. “It was really hard.” He was no more articulate on the subject of the woman he actually married - nor, it seems, was he successful at communicating his feelings to her during their courtship. They dated for more than three years - an extraordinarily long time by Soviet or Russia standards, and at a very advanced age: Putin was almost thirty-one when they married which made him a member of a tiny minority - less than ten percent - of Russians who remained unmarried past the age of thirty. The future Mrs Putin was a domestic flight attendant from the Baltic Sea city of Kaliningrad; they had met through an acquaintance. She has gone on record saying it was by no means love at first sight, for at first sight Putin seemed unremarkable and poorly dressed; he has never said anything about his love for her. In their courtship, it seems, she was both the more emotional and the more insistent one. Her description of the day he finally proposed paints a picture of a failure to communicate so profound that it is surprising these people actually maanged to get married and have two children. “One evening we were sitting in his apartment, and he says ‘ Little friend, by now you know what I’m like. I am basically not a very convenient person.’ And then he went on to describe himself: not a talker, can be pretty harsh, can hurt your feelings, and so on. Not a good person to spend your life with. And he goes on. ‘Over the course of three and a half years you’ve probably made up your mind.’ I realized we were probably breaking up. So I said, ‘Well, yes, I’ve made up my mind.’ And he said, with doubt in his voice, ‘Really?’ That’s when I knew we were definitely breaking up. ‘In that case,’ he said, ‘I love you and I propose we get married on such and such a day.’ And that was completely unexpected.” They were married three months later. Life as a KGB officer was disappointing. Gessen describes it as sitting in a Leningrad office, cutting articles out of newspapers, and sending them to superiors who would ignore them. Putin probably worked in “counterintelligence”, which meant the newspaper articles he cut out were about dissidents. There was no interesting dissent in Leningrad in the late 1970s. After five years, Putin got his “big break”; he was assigned to be a spy in East Germany. This, too, underwhelmed him. The East Germany assignment consisted of sitting in the KGB offices in Dresden, cutting articles out of East German papers, and sending them to superiors who would ignore them. Putin drank beer and got fat. He stopped training, or exercising at all, and he gained over twenty pounds - a disastrous addition to his short and fairly narrow frame. From all apeearances, he was seriously depressed […] He spent most days sitting at his desk, in a room he shared with one other agent (every other officer in the Dresden building had his own office) . . . Former agents estimate they spent three-quarters of their time writing reports. Putin’s biggest success in his [five year] stay in Dresden appears to have been in drafting a Colombian universtiy student at a school in West Berlin, who in turn introduced them to a Colombian-born US Army sergeant, who sold them an unclassified Army manual for 800 marks. In 1989, the Soviet Union began to collapse. East Germans protested in front of KGB headquarters; Putin was sent out to negotiate and got screamed at and insulted. HQ refused to defend them or even give them orders, before finally telling them to burn all their records - the records Putin had wasted the past five years of his life meticulously collecting. He and his fellow spies spent a few tense days shoveling their lives’ work into stoves while people outside hurled curses at them. He stayed and watched briefly as his East German friends and colleagues were fired and banned from all good jobs for collaborating with the Soviet occupiers - then was recalled home to Leningrad, where nobody had any idea what he should do. Feeling abandoned, even betrayed, he handed in his resignation to the KGB. Back in Leningrad, he briefly got a position at the university as “assistant chancellor for foreign relations” on the grounds that he was one of the only people in the city who had ever been to a foreign country. After only a few months, the new mayor offered him a high position in city government, for the same reason. This was Anatoly Sobchak, a two-faced politician who had climbed to the top by convincing both the pro-democracy protesters and the communists he was on their side. Gessen speculates he promoted Putin both because of his foreign experience, and because “it’s better to choose your own KGB handler than to have one assigned to you.” Wait, hadn’t Putin already resigned from the KGB? Yes. He did this several times throughout his life, always at dramatic moments. When the next dramatic moment arrived, he would hand in his resignation again. Partly this is because Putin is lying about all of this, and he can’t keep his lies straight. But partly it’s because resigning from the KGB is futile; once you’re a part of the network, they will always feel free to call on you when needed. Putin could resign as often as it felt dramatically appropriate to do so, secure that this wouldn’t affect his membership in any way. Also, it seems unclear whether you can disband the KGB. Around this point in the story, the Soviet generals launched their coup, Yeltsin defeated them, and the KGB was replaced by various other security agencies more congenial to a newly democratic state. But everyone continues to act as if this isn’t true, and Putin continues to call on and be called upon by his KGB connections. I don’t have a great sense of exactly how this worked - maybe the new security agency, the FSB, had strong institutional continuity? Maybe the formal network gracefully transitioned into an informal one? Deputy Mayor Putin with his boss, Mayor Sobchak (source) Putin became Deputy Mayor In Charge Of Foreign Affairs, in charge of making business deals with foreign cities. In this position, he was notably corrupt even for 1990s St. Petersburg, one of the most corrupt cities in one of the most corrupt eras in one of the most corrupt nations in history. People who challenged his corruption tended to have bad things happen to him; probably he called on his KGB connections here, though it seemed he also had some connections to local organized crime. Mayor Sobchak, who was equally corrupt, stood behind him the whole way. Eventually the electorate got tired of all the corruption and voted Sobchak out; Putin moved to Moscow and got various mid-level positions on the strength of being boring, loyal, and not having enough personality to offend anybody - others say the KGB was involved in some way. Around this time, President Boris Yeltsin was floundering. He had descended into alcoholism, become temperamental, fired all of his competent ministers, and mismanaged the country to the brink of economic collapse. His approval rating was 2%. The only people in Moscow who didn’t hate him were his daughter Tatyana and friendly oligarch Boris Berezovksy. Their job was to pick new officials when Yeltsin would fire the previous ones in a drunken rage. When an opening in Security opened up, Berezovsky remembered Putin, who he had met a few times doing business in St. Petersburg. Putin had refused a bribe - something so shocking it had seared him in the oligarch’s memory2. If Berezovsky is to be believed, he was the one who mentioned Putin to Valentin Yumashev, Yeltsin’s chief of staff. “I said ‘We’ve got Putin, who used to be in the secret services, didn’t he?’ And Valya said ‘Yes, he did,’ and I said, ‘Listen, I think it’s an option. Think about it: he is a friend, after all.’ And Valya said, ‘But he’s got pretty low rank.’ And I said, ‘Look, there is a revolution going on, everything is all mixed up, so there . . . ‘“ As the description of the decision-making process for appointing the head of the main security agency of a nuclear power, this conversation sounds so absurd, I am actually inclined to believe it. Putin got to work filling the FSB with his old KGB pals, and Yeltsin got to work tanking his reputation still further. By this time, the most likely scenario was that the opposition party - the Communists - would win the upcoming election, then prosecute Yeltsin for corruption. Berezovsky and Tatyana Yeltsin tried to come up with an exit strategy. All they could think of was resigning in favor of some handpicked successor who would give him a presidential pardon. But who? Well, there was always Putin again. He still seemed loyal. The security forces seemed to like him. There were a bunch of wars going on in Chechnya, and it would look good to have a strong scary-looking guy in power. But mostly he was just in the right place at the right time. Possibly the most bizarre fact about Putin’s ascent to power is that the people who lifted him to the throne know little more about him than you do. Berezovsky told me he never considered Putin a friend and never found him interesting as a person . . . but when he considered Putin as a successor to Yeltsin, he seemed to assume that the very qualities that had kept them at arm’s length would make Putin an ideal candidate. Putin, being apparently devoid of personality and personal interest, would be both malleable and disciplined. And what did Boris Yeltsin himself know about his soon-to-be-anointed successor? He knew this was one of the few men who had remained loyal to him. He knew he was of a different generation: unlike Yeltsin, [communist opposition leader] Primakov, and his army of governors, Putin had not come up through the ranks of the Communist Party and had not, therefore, had to publicly switch allegiances when the Soviet Union collapsed. He looked different: all those men, without exception, were heavyset and, it seemed, permanently wrinkled; Putin - slim, small, and by now in the habit of wearing well-cut European suits - looked much more like the new Russia Yeltsin had promised his people ten years earlier. Yeltsin also knew, or thought he knew, that Putin would not allow the prosecution or persecution of Yeltsin himself once he retired. And if Yeltsin still possessed even a fraction of his once outstanding feel for politics, he knew that Russians would like this man they would be inheriting, and who would be inheriting them. On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned in favor of Putin, effective immediately. That same day, Putin signed his first presidential decree - a law saying Yeltsin would not be prosecuted. III. Doubt Creeps In From the beginning, Putin had strong support. Westerners and liberals liked him because he was Yeltsin’s handpicked successor. Oligarchs liked him because he wasn’t communist and seemed potentially controllable. The Soviet nostalgia contingent liked him because he was ex-KGB and seemed to share their values. As for ordinary citizens - a few months earlier, when Putin was still Yeltsin’s second-in-command, there had been a series of four apartment bombings, killing a total of 300+ people. Everyone suspected the Chechens, a group of Muslims with a history of terrorism who Russia was in the process of invading at the time. Vladimir Putin, as head of the security forces, got up in front of the country and gave a firm-sounding, profanity-laced speech where he vowed justice for everyone involved. His men quickly caught some Chechens, who were found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison. The bombings stopped. Putin was hailed as a hero. Over the next few months, people started noticing weird things that didn’t add up. Most concerningly, a fifth bomb, in the city of Ryazan, had been discovered beforehand by an alert resident. The local police were called. They brought in a bomb squad, the bomb squad confirmed it was a bomb and defused it, and the apartment was saved. More heroics! Except a few days later, everyone involved backtracked and said no, it was fake, it was just a training exercise, no bomb at all, nothing to worry about. This was clearly false; the bomb squad had tested it and the bomb was as real as they come. Several members of the local police said this, then quickly changed their story. It started to look like a coverup. Russia’s investigative journalists had not yet all been murdered, and some of them started looking into the case. It seemed that when local police successfully defused the bomb, they had found clues pointing to the perpetrators, who appeared to be associated with the Russian security services. The security services had then strong-armed the police into denying that a bomb ever existed. Also, some people noticed that the speaker of the Russian Parliament had announced on September 13 that they had just received word of a bombing in Volgodonsk, but the bombing in Volgodonsk had not occurred until September 16. It would seem that someone had passed him the wrong note. Seen on satirical conservative website Babylon Bee. This was exactly what happened with the Volgodonsk apartment bombing. The standard position in the West is now that Putin orchestrated the apartment bombings himself - killing 300 Russians - as a justification for escalating the war on Chechnya and to make himself look good after he framed some perpetrators. The plan worked. Putin won re-election handily. By the time people started questioning the official story, his power was already secure. The questioners faced harassment - typical “warning shots” would be burglaries of their houses with all the valuables left intact, or getting beaten up by random thugs while they were out walking, or being accused of a series of crimes - tax evasion, but if they proved themselves innocent of that, then it was taking bribes, and if they proved themselves innocent of that too, then it was failing to register their businesses correctly. Soon media oligarchs faced the same treatment, and either fled the country or handed their newspapers and TV channels over to the state. Boris Berezovsky, the oligarch who had originally helped put Putin in power, kept his own TV station until 2003, when the Russian submarine Kursk sank and Putin faced criticism for bungling the rescue. Putin summoned Berezovsky, the former kingmaker and the man still in charge of Channel One, and demanded that the oligarch hand over his shares in the television company. “I said no, in the presence of [chief of stff] Voloshin,” Berezovsky told me. “So Putin changed his tone of voice then and said, ‘See you later, then, Boris Abramovich.' and got up to leave. And I said, “Volodya [nickname for Vladimir], this is goodbye.’ We ended on this note, full of pathos […] Within days, [Berezovsky] had left for France, then moved on to Great Britain, joining his former [business] rival Gusinsky in political exile. Soon enough, there was a awarrant out for his arrest in Russia and he had surrendered his shares of Channel One. Over the next few years, Putin centralized authority further. He got Parliament to agree to constitutional changes where governors served at his whim, and members of Parliament were elected by governors. “The only official in the Russian Federation directly elected by the people was the President.” Then he made it clear that governors who kept his favor would keep their jobs, and vice versa. He developed an entire colorful vocabulary for threatening people, moving beyond traditional standbys like “Nice house you’ve got there, shame if something were to happen to it” into new realms of intimidation. A Prime Minister who quit after Putin arrested one too many media tycoon was given the parting words “If you ever have a problem with the tax police, you may ask for help, but please come to me personally.” An urban legend says that leading dissident Marina Salye received a New Year’s postcard from Putin: “I wish you a Happy New Year and the health to enjoy it.” By the time the next election came around in 2004, the vote counts were clearly fake. Gessen doubts Putin even had to give a direct order to falsify them; everyone was so desperate for his goodwill that they did so all on their own. The problem was less that honest officials refused to stuff the ballot box, and more that some bureaucrats were so desperate to make sure Putin knew they were complying with his (implied) desires that they faked the vote in extremely obvious ways, without even a nod to keeping it plausible. The Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe reported “The elections . . . failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments, calling into question Russia’s willingness to move towards European standards for democratic elections.” The New York Times reported something entirely different, publishing a condescending but approving editorial titled Russians Inch Toward Democracy. Putin had sunk far enough to earn the same dubious honor as Stalin: praise from the New York Times. IV. The Very-Briefly-Reluctant Culture Warrior One thing missing from this book: anything about religion, nationalism, gays, or the culture wars. This isn’t because Masha Gessen doesn’t care about these things: when the book was written, they self-described as “the only publicly out gay person in [Russia]”; since then (like everyone else) they have declared themselves nonbinary with they/them pronouns. In an afterword, Gessen remedies this omission. For his first decade, Putin wasn’t too interested in culture war topics; his ideology began and ended with “Russia strong”. But Gessen says that after another rigged election in 2012, people grew tired and started protesting Putin. Putin’s propaganda department made various accusations against the rioters, and one of them - they’re gay - seemed to stick. Putin had stumbled by coincidence onto a narrative that resonated with the Russian people. A few months later, a deliberately provocative punk band called Pussy Riot invaded a cathedral and sung a song whose chorus was “the Lord is shit”. Putin announced he was against this sort of thing, again his popularity soared, and again he took notice. Since then, he’s leaned into various culture-warrior roles that other people have cast upon him - protector of traditional values, leader of the conservative world, something something Eurasianism - without giving many clues how much he believes them vs. considers them useful bulwarks for his own power. Is it true that Putin only leaned into traditional values after 2012? I only looked into this question briefly, and it seems like he was on good terms with the Orthodox Church well before then. But some of this could have just been his native authoritarianism; just as he wanted to consolidate all media and business under his control, he wanted to consolidate all religion, and the Orthodox Church was the natural vehicle for, and a cooperative partner in, doing this. Both shared suspicion of invasive Western religions and Islam; both liked the idea of Russia being united in a top-down structure. God doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with it. V. Could It Happen Here? …is the question we ask at the end of every Dictator Book Club. The Man Without A Face makes it sound like Putin was able to consolidate power and become a dictator because: He led the security services
August 11, 2023 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
August 08, 2024 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
KKK

KKK is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between April 19, 2021 and September 15, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "All this stuff about how he’s “the candidate of the KKK” and “the vanguard of a new white supremacist movement” is made up"; "The KKK and Richard Spencer did not play a major role in the Trump administration"; "Neither Trump nor any of his officials (Cabinet, etc) will endorse the KKK". It most often appears alongside Ann Arbor, Astralcodexten Com, Biden administration.

Article page
KKK
Mention count
4
Issue count
4
First seen
April 19, 2021
Last seen
September 15, 2025
April 19, 2021 · Original source
I think time has proven me right here. There was no large-scale state-sponsored violence against minorities during the Trump presidency. Trump’s race-related policies were similar to those of other recent Republican presidents. The three most-discussed Trump supporter hate crimes all turned out to be hoaxes (1, 2, 3, I swear I’m not trying to cherry-pick, these really were the most discussed incidents at the time). There was no huge spike in hate crimes during the Trump presidency, just fluctuations of about the same scale as during previous years. The much-reported-upon study showing that Trump rallies increased local hate crimes was reanalyzed and found to be wrong; adjusting for population correctly showed they did not increase hate crimes at all. Trump lost support among white voters, and gained support among voters of color at an unprecedented rate among Republicans. The KKK and Richard Spencer did not play a major role in the Trump administration, and the media stopped covering them in favor of new, less-racialized pro-Trump groups like QAnon.
7. Neither Trump nor any of his officials (Cabinet, etc) will endorse the KKK, Stormfront, or explicit neo-Nazis publicly, refuse to back down, etc, and keep their job [confidence: 99%].
March 09, 2023 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
July 06, 2023 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
September 15, 2025 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
Karlstack

Karlstack is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between June 22, 2021 and August 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Chris of Karlstack says he bet on high inflation on Polymarket"; "Chris of Karlstack writes about his quest"; "Chris from Karlstack notes that this user “has a bad reputation as a troll”". It most often appears alongside Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt.

Article page
Karlstack
Mention count
3
Issue count
3
First seen
June 22, 2021
Last seen
August 16, 2022
  • 21 June 22, 2021
  • 22 June 13, 2022
  • 22 August 16, 2022
June 22, 2021 · Original source
Chris of Karlstack says he bet on high inflation on Polymarket (and presumably won, given last month’s data). Matt Yglesias admits he got a previous low inflation prediction wrong (at 90% confidence, no less!). These people are good and deserve praise.
June 13, 2022 · Original source
3: Chris of Karlstack writes about his quest to dectuple his $1000 investment on prediction markets.
August 16, 2022 · Original source
This doesn’t make a lot of sense - if a judge rules in someone’s favor in a lawsuit, it should look like a court order, and it would probably involve PredictIt paying damages or something. How would a lawsuit over an unfair banning make CFTC shut the whole market down? Chris from Karlstack notes that this user “has a bad reputation as a troll” and hasn’t provided any evidence to substantiate his claims.
Chris from Karlstack has what he considers a “smoking gun”: last month, Kalshi filed documents with the CFTC proposing to move into the “who will win elections” market, which PredictIt previously dominated. It’s incredibly suspicious that the CFTC closed down the premier election-focused prediction market just two weeks after the company everyone accuses them of being in the pocket of tried to move into the election-predicting space.
Kickstarter

Kickstarter is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between August 17, 2023 and February 10, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "I’ll be running a Kickstarter campaign next month"; ""I’ll give you a link you can use to get to the Kickstarter campaign once it’s set up.""; "looking for funding to start a Kickstarter campaign". It most often appears alongside GiveWell, Mongolia, Twitter.

Article page
Kickstarter
Mention count
3
Issue count
3
First seen
August 17, 2023
Last seen
February 10, 2024
August 17, 2023 · Original source
“This is the prototype,” she tells you. “The Automated Land Acknowledger. I’ll be running a Kickstarter campaign next month.”
“Here, I’ll give you a link you can use to get to the Kickstarter campaign once it’s set up. If you’re one of the first ten donors, you get an automatic Gold package, which includes two ALAs for the price of one.”
December 01, 2023 · Original source
45: I’ve written before about how most light boxes for seasonal affective disorder are much dimmer than the sun and would probably work better if they were brighter. A company called Brighter is trying to make 50,000 lumen lights, about 5x better than existing light boxes. They report that they’re looking for funding to start a Kickstarter campaign (apparently you need funding to start Kickstarters now?); you can reach the founder here if you’re interested.
February 10, 2024 · Original source
Jordan Braunstein and Tetra Jones, $34,000 to work on assurance contracts. These are the general case of what Kickstarter does - coordinate people who all agree to do something if enough other people agree to make it worth their while. They want to branch out from Kickstarter’s funding-focused model into different forms of contract - for example, compacts for political action (eg Free State Project), dominant assurance contracts that incentivize people to overcome transaction costs, and “contigently anonymous” contracts where people can hide their identity until a certain threshold gets reached. Jordan and Tetra applied separately to start their own platforms, but have agreed to to work together on spartacus.app; you can contact them here if you want to help or participate in testing. I’m aware that another site, EnsureDone, is already trying something similar4. I’m funding Spartacus as a backup, but I like Ensure too and they should feel free to contact me if I can help in any way.
Kayak.com

Kayak.com is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between February 02, 2021 and July 06, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as ""Here, check out the Kayak.com results.""; "flight aggregator kayak.com offered $140". It most often appears alongside 2017 NYT article on UFOs, @ActualNames1, AARO.

Article page
Kayak.com
Mention count
2
Issue count
2
First seen
February 02, 2021
Last seen
July 06, 2023
February 02, 2021 · Original source
"Hmmmmm," I said. Then it came to me. "A trip from San Francisco to Milan. Here, check out the Kayak.com results." I held up my cell phone:
July 06, 2023 · Original source
I wanted to see what planes cost, and flight aggregator kayak.com offered $140. But it also offered the two Amtrak tickets for $62. I’ve double-checked that the same two tickets on Amtrak.com cost $320. I don’t know why this is so different. But buy your train tickets on Kayak, I guess.
Kiev City Council

Kiev City Council is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between July 01, 2022 and July 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "the Kiev City Council has rescinded the 1147 AD decree"; "The Kiev city council probably did not un-found Moscow". It most often appears alongside @a_centrism, @amplituhedron, ACX.

Article page
Kiev City Council
Mention count
2
Issue count
2
First seen
July 01, 2022
Last seen
July 04, 2022
July 01, 2022 · Original source
31: In response to Russia debating un-recognizing Lithuania’s independence, the Kiev City Council has rescinded the 1147 AD decree by the Grand Prince of Kievan Rus founding the city of Moscow. Moscow now officially has not been founded; please conduct yourselves accordingly. [Update: Likely fake]
July 04, 2022 · Original source
1: Some corrections from Thursday’s links post: the SPLC poll on feminism must be flawed somehow, see here. The Kiev city council probably did not un-found Moscow, see here. And although I condemned Hanania’s admission that he sometimes endorsed putting his personal aesthetics above objective utility, commenters brought up situations that don’t seem so clear-cut: for example, would you destroy a beautiful rainforest so farmers could raise pigs there? (assume the farmers get some money from it, which raises their utility, and that the rainforest doesn’t get enough tourists or novel-pharmaceutical-product hunters to be as valuable as the pig money).
King’s College London

King’s College London is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between April 09, 2024 and February 09, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Filippa Lentzos, a biosecurity expert at King’s College London"; "A team from King’s College London is studying AI spirituality, AI relationships". It most often appears alongside Manifold, #S14, 2009 flu pandemic.

Mention count
2
Issue count
2
First seen
April 09, 2024
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February 09, 2026
April 09, 2024 · Original source
I’m not a virologist, but I question how this comparison works. Surely HKU1 got its insert on some specific day. If you take the virus the day before, and then the other virus the day after, there will be no differences except the insert, and it will look just like COVID (ie an insert without many other mutations). The fact that the COVID comparison has few mutations, and the HKU1 insert has many mutations, just shows that whatever older virus we chose to compare HKU1 to is more distant from HKU1 than BANAL-52 (or whatever) is from COVID. Or am I missing something here? [The evidence that China tried to cover up zoonosis from the start] is untrue. They clearly said from the start this is a zoonotic spillover at HSM, and at least part of the government went to immense efforts to identify the animal, close farms, etc. (and of course couldn’t find any infected animal). Only in late 2020 did they start suspecting an import from cold-chain products after having multiple outbreaks that seem related to cold-chain products. From a Vox article from March 2023: From the start, the Chinese government interfered with efforts by both Chinese and international experts to study the pandemic, including its origins. Reporting by the AP found that even as WHO officials were publicly praising China’s cooperation, behind the scenes they were complaining about lack of access and a refusal to share data. Within months of the beginning of the pandemic, the Chinese government imposed restrictions on academic research into the origins of the novel coronavirus … China’s intransigence wasn’t unusual — countries are rarely eager to confirm that they’re the source of a deadly disease — but it went beyond the norm. International investigators weren’t permitted to see the market until more than a year after the pandemic began and a WHO-affiliated team was allowed a highly choreographed and controlled visit. The resulting report that came out of the Wuhan visit, which dismissed the possibility of a lab origin, pointed the finger at some kind of zoonotic spillover while concluding that it was unlikely that the spread started at the market, which surprised many experts. It also found that it was “possible” that the virus had been introduced via contaminated frozen food products from abroad. While few experts took that possibility seriously, it fit a narrative the Chinese government had been pushing, against nearly all evidence, that the pandemic had in fact not originated in China. “China just doesn’t want to look bad,” Filippa Lentzos, a biosecurity expert at King’s College London, told Science last August. “They need to maintain an image of control and competence. And that is what goes through everything they do.” […] it seems clear that with more cooperation, scientists could have been looking at raccoon dogs a year or more ago. “The big issue right now is that this data exists and that it is not readily available to the international community,” Maria Van Kerkhove, the WHO’s Covid-19 technical lead, told reporters on Friday. “This is first and foremost absolutely critical, not to mention that it should have been made available years earlier, but that data needs to be made accessible to individuals who can access it, who can analyze it and who can discuss it with each other.” The irony is that by making it so difficult to properly investigate a zoonotic origin of Covid, the Chinese government has created a vacuum that has been filled by claims on all sides, including the much more damning accusation that the pandemic was the result of a lab error at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. For what it’s worth, my timeline of Chinese denials and coverups looks like this: December: COVID doesn't exist, it's all lies Early January: Fine, it exists, but it’s just some wet market thing that can't spread from person to person Late January: Fine, it can spread from person to person, but we’ve got it under control now. February: Fine, it’s out of control, but you would not believe how great our response was. We're basically heroes. March: COVID was a US bioweapon, or possibly came from Italy. April: Chinese people are banned from researching the origins of COVID without government permission. 2: Comments Arguing Against Lab Leak 2.1: Is the pandemic starting near WIV reverse correlation? randomstringofcharacters wrote: Isn't [the pandemic starting near the lab] a reverse correlation issue? The lab is situated there because it's an area where coronaviruses were found in the past. Many people had this question, but Wuhan Institute of Virology was founded in 1956, didn’t originally focus on coronaviruses, and isn’t in a coronavirus hot spot. Most of WIV’s coronavirus samples come from Yunnan, about a thousand miles away. COVID’s closest relatives were found in Laos, almost two thousand miles away. During the debate, both Saar and Peter calculated the odds of a natural pandemic arising in Wuhan by dividing the population of Wuhan by the total urban population of East Asia (Saar) or South China (Peter). Saar got 1.5%, Peter got 3% (he later said this could be as high as 10% because it was a central hub in the wildlife trade). This isn’t an Official Position and I don’t think anyone else shares it, but during the debate Peter pointed out a few times that there are plenty of disease-ridden bats in Hubei (the province Wuhan is in), and that it’s not impossible that a bat virus currently known only in Laos could be active in Hubei. Still, this is the minority viewpoint and most scientists just think it involved something about the wildlife trade. 3: Other Points That Came Up 3.1: Apology to Peter re: extreme odds quiet_NaN wrote: Hot take: Peter clearly failed to convince anyone. The lab leak odds, in log10 (i.e. orders of magnitude are): Peter -20.7 Saar 2.7 Eric -3.1 Will -2.5 Scott -1.2 Daniel -1.4 One of these numbers is clearly an outlier. Scott mentions it and calls it "trolling", I would argue that it is debating in bad faith. 2e-21 is a ratio which is just silly. For one thing, the gain of function at WiV pathway is not the only pathway towards a lab leak. The WIV could also have released a naturally occurring coronavirus at the wet market. At 2e-21 odds, we would probably have to consider the possibility that the WIV built a time machine and went back in time to infect the wet market. I might have screwed up here - or at least I should have emphasized the “trolling” part. Peter complained about my presentation of his extreme-odds slide, saying: This is basically accurate. During the debate, Saar gave lots of different numbers. I don’t want to say exactly what the different numbers meant, because in earlier drafts of my post, Saar said I misunderstood them. My impression were that some of his numbers were conservative, others were central, others were extreme, others were adjusted-for-out-of-model-error, others were not-adjusted, etc. In an early draft of the post, I gave higher numbers for Saar. Saar asked me to replace them with the numbers I ended up using. I decided to agree, because I wanted to represent Saar fairly with the numbers he most centrally believed, but also because these were closest to the numbers on his Rootclaim site so it wasn’t like he was making them up just to fool me. Peter didn’t argue quite as hard, and also he didn’t have anything like the Rootclaim site, so I just took his first set of numbers. Trying to piece things together, I think a reasonable summary would be: During the debate, Saar mentioned 700-million-to-one odds in favor of lab leak, not because he thought this was plausible, but just as a discussion of where the situation would end up if you didn’t adjust for human fallibility.
February 09, 2026 · Original source
1: A team from King’s College London is studying AI spirituality, AI relationships, and other uses of AI for “personal guidance”. If you’re over 18 and “this resonates with you”, they’d like you to take a survey, which will take ~10-30 minutes.
kwrationality.ca

kwrationality.ca is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between March 30, 2024 and August 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Check out kwrationality.ca for more info"; "Group Link: https://kwrationality.ca/". It most often appears alongside 200 Degrees, 4th Ave Food Park, Aachen.

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kwrationality.ca
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2
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March 30, 2024
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August 29, 2024
March 30, 2024 · Original source
WATERLOO, ONTARIO, CANADA Contact: Jenn Contact Info: jenn[at]kwrationality[dot]ca Time: Thursday, May 9th, 7:00 PM Location: Meeting Room A, Basement of Kitchener Public Library main branch (85 Queen St N) Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86MXFG37+4C Event Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/vwZsrqkp84YyfzRaR/2024-acx-spring-megameetup Group Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/NiM9cQJ5qXqhdmP5p Notes: We run weekly meetups! Check out kwrationality.ca for more info.
August 29, 2024 · Original source
Contact: Jenn Contact Info: jenn[at]kwrationality[dot]ca Time: Thursday, September 12th, 07:00 PM Location: Waterloo Public Library Main Branch Auditorium Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86MXFF8G+94G Group Link: https://kwrationality.ca/ Notes: We'll decamp to a nearby restaurant for food/drinks at around 8:30.
K&T

K&T is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2021 and August 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting". It most often appears alongside Acceptable Losses, Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion, Alex Imas.

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K&T
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August 30, 2021
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August 30, 2021
August 30, 2021 · Original source
I find I usually click the third box on both. I want to tip generously, but giving the maximum possible tip seems profligate. Surely the third box is the right compromise. I recently noticed that this is insane. For a $35 meal, I’m giving GrubHub drivers $3 and UberEats drivers $7 for the same service (or maybe there’s some difference between their services which makes UberEats suggest the higher tip - but if there is, I don’t know about it and it doesn’t affect my decision). Again, this is Behavioral Economics 101 - in particular, one of the many biases lumped together under menu effects. Instead of being a rational economic actor who values food delivery at a certain price, I’m trying to be a third-box-of-four kind of guy. That means that whoever is in charge of this menu has lots of power over the specific dollar amount I give. Not infinite power - if the third box said $1000 I would notice and refuse. But enough power that “nudging” seems like a fair description. Nobody believes studies anymore, which is fair. I trust in a salvageable core of behavioral economics and “nudgenomics” because I can feel in my bones that they’re true for me and the people around me. Let’s move on to Hreha’s article and see if we can square it with my belief in a “salvageable core”. II. Yechaim’s Historical Detective Story Hreha writes: The biggest replication failures relate to the field's most important idea: loss aversion. To be honest, this was a finding that I lost faith in well before the most recent revelations (from 2018-2020). Why? Because I've run studies looking at its impact in the real world—especially in marketing campaigns. If you read anything about this body of research, you'll get the idea that losses are such powerful motivators that they'll turn otherwise uninterested customers into enthusiastic purchasers. The truth of the matter is that losses and benefits are equally effective in driving conversion. In fact, in many circumstances, losses are actually *worse* at driving results. Why? Because loss-focused messaging often comes across as gimmicky and spammy. It makes you, the advertiser, look desperate. It makes you seem untrustworthy, and trust is the foundation of sales, conversion, and retention. "So is loss aversion completely bogus?" Not quite. It turns out that loss aversion does exist, but only for large losses. This makes sense. We *should* be particularly wary of decisions that can wipe us out. That's not a so-called "cognitive bias". It's not irrational. In fact, it's completely sensical. If a decision can destroy you and/or your family, it's sane to be cautious. "So when did we discover that loss aversion exists only for large losses?" Well, actually, it looks like Kahneman and Tversky, winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics, knew about this unfortunate fact when they were developing Prospect Theory—their grand theory with loss aversion at its center. Unfortunately, the findings rebutting their view of loss aversion were carefully omitted from their papers, and other findings that went against their model were misrepresented so that they would instead support their pet theory. In short: any data that didn't fit Prospect Theory was dismissed or distorted. I don't know what you'd call this behavior... but it's not science. This shady behavior by the two titans of the field was brought to light in a paper published in 2018: "Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion". I encourage you to read the paper. It's shocking. This line from the abstract sums things up pretty well: "...the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it." When the two biggest scientists in your field are accused of "systemic misrepresentation", you know you've got a serious problem. Which leads us to another paper, published in 2018, entitled "The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?". The paper's authors did a comprehensive review of the loss aversion literature and came to the following conclusion: "current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains." Yikes. But given the questionable origins of the field, it's not surprising that its foundational finding is *also* dubious. If loss aversion can't be trusted, then no other idea in the field can be trusted. This argument relies on two papers - Yechaim’s Acceptable Losses and Gal & Rucker’s Loss Of Loss Aversion. Yechaim’s paper is a historical detective story. It looks at how Kahneman and Tversky first “discovered” and popularized the idea of loss aversion from earlier 1950s and 1960s research. It concludes they did a bad job summarizing this earlier research; looked at carefully, it doesn’t support the strong conclusions they drew. From one perspective, nobody should care about this. All the 1950s and 1960s research was terrible - one of the most important studies it discusses had n = 7. Since then, we’ve had much more rigorous studies of tens of thousands of people. All that hinges on Yechaim’s paper is whether Kahneman and Tversky were personally bad people. Hreha thinks they were. He calls their behavior “shady”, “shocking”, and says they “systematically misrepresented findings to support their pet theory…I don't know what you'd call this behavior... but it's not science.” Again, nothing important really hinges on this, but I feel like fighting about it, so let’s look deeper anyway. Here’s how Yechaim summarizes his accusation against K&T: In addition, the results of several studies seem to have been misrepresented by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Galenter and Pliner (1974) were wrongly cited as showing loss aversion, whereas, in fact, they did not observe an asymmetry in the pleasantness ratings of gains and losses. Likewise, in Green (1963), the results were argued to show loss aversion, even though this study did not involve any losses. In addition, the objective outcomes for some of the participants in Grayson (1960) were transformed by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) so as to better support a model assuming different curvatures for gains and losses (see Table 1). Finally, studies showing no loss aversion or suggesting aversion to large losses were not cited in Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) or in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Yechaim bases his argument on three sets of early studies of loss aversion: Galenter and Plinter (1974), Fishburn and Kochenberger’s review (1979) and miscellaneous others. —Galenter and Plinter— is actually really neat! It explores “cross-modal” perceptions of gains versus losses. That is, if you ask how much a certain loss hurt, people will probably just say something like “I dunno, a little?” and then it will be hard to turn that into a p-value. G&P solve this by making people listen to loud noises, and asking questions like “is the difference between how much loss A and loss B hurt greater or lesser than the difference between the volume of noise 1 and noise 2?” The idea is that the brain uses a bunch of weird non-numerical scales for everything, and we understand its weird-non-numerical scale for noise volume pretty well, and so maybe we can compare it to how people think about gains or losses. I don’t know why people in 1974 were doing anything this complicated instead of inventing the basic theory of loss aversion the way Kahneman and Tversky would five years later, but here we are. Anyway, Yechaim concludes that this study failed to find loss aversion: Summing up their findings, Galenter and Pliner (1974) reported as follows: “We now turn to the question of the possible asymmetry of the positive and negative limbs of the utility function. On the basis of intuition and anecdote, one would expect the negative limb of the utility function to decrease more sharply than the positive limb increases... what we have observed if anything is an asymmetry of much less magnitude than would have been expected ... the curvature of the function does not change in going from positive to negative” (p. 75). Thus, our search for the historical foundations of loss aversion turns into a dead end on this particular branch: Galenter and Pliner (1974) did not observe such an asymmetry; and their study was quoted erroneously [by Kahneman and Tversky]. I looked for the full text of Galenter and Pliner, but could not find it. I was however able to find the first two pages, including the abstract. The way Galenter and Pliner summarize their own research is: Cross-modality matching of hypothetical increments of money against loudness recover the previously proposed exponent of the utility function for money within a few percent. Similar cross-modality matching experiments for decrements give a disutility exponent of 0.59, larger than the utility exponent for increments. This disutility exponent was checked by an additional cross-modality matching experiment against the disutility of drinking various concentrations of a bitter solution. The parameter estimated in this fashion was 0.63. If I understand the bolded part right, the abstract seems to be saying that they did find loss aversion! I was also able to find the Google Books listing for the book that the study was published in. Its summary is: Three experiments were conducted in which monetary increments and decrements were matched to either the loudness of a tone or the bitterness of various concentrations of sucrose octa-acetate. An additional experiment involving ratio estimates of monetary loss is also reported. Results confirm that the utility function for both monetary increments and decrements is a power function with exponents less than one. The data further suggest that the exponent of the disutility function is larger than that of the utility function, i.e., the rate of change of 'unhappiness' caused by monetary losses is greater than the comparable rate of 'happiness' produced by monetary gains. (Author). Again, the way the book is summarized (apparently by the author) says this study does prove loss aversion. Without being able to access the full study, I’m not sure what’s going on. Possibly the study found loss aversion, but it was less than expected? Still, I feel like Yechaim should have mentioned this. At the very least, it decreases Kahneman and Tversky’s crime from “lied about a study to support their pet theory” to “credulously believed the authors’ own summary of their results and didn’t dig deeper”. But also, why did the authors believe their study showed loss aversion? Why does Yechaim disagree? Without being able to access the full paper, I’m not sure. —Green 1963— is the second study that Yechaim accuses K&T of misrepresenting. Here’s how K&T cite this study in their paper: It is of interest that the main properties ascribed to the value function have been observed in a detailed analysis of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for changes of wealth (Fishburn and Kochenberger [14]). The functions had been obtained from thirty decision makers in various fields of business, in five independent studies [5, 18, 19, 21, 40]. Most utility functions for gains were concave, most functions for losses were convex, and only three individuals exhibited risk aversion for both gains and losses. With a single exception, utility functions were considerably steeper for losses than for gains. Green 1963 is footnote 19. So K&T don’t even mention it by name. They mention it as one of several studies that a review article called Fishburn and Kochenberger analyzes. F&K are reviewing a bunch of studies of executives. In each study, a very small number of executives (usually about 5-10 per study) make a hypothetical business decision comparing gains and losses, for example: Suppose your company is being sued for patent infringement. Your lawyer’s best judgement is that your chances of winning the suit are 50–50; if you win, you will lose nothing, but if you lose, it will cost the company $1,000,000. Your opponent has offered to settle out of court for $200,000. Would you fight or settle? Then they ask the same question with a bunch of other numbers, and plot implied utility functions for each executive based on the answer. Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)
Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)
“Behavioral economics” as a set of mysteries that need to be explained is as real as it ever was. You didn’t need Kahneman and Tversky to tell you that people sometimes make irrational decisions, and you don’t need me to tell you that people making irrational decisions hasn’t “failed to replicate”.
K-DEMO

K-DEMO is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 17, 2022 and June 17, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Most of the countries in ITER plan on making their own large demonstration power plant... South Korea is being more aggressive and will build their DEMO". It most often appears alongside Alcator C-Mod, Apollo Program, ARC.

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K-DEMO
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June 17, 2022 · Original source
ITER gets fusion by 2035 (50%) or 2040 (70%). K-DEMO Most of the countries in ITER plan on making their own large demonstration power plant, after they see if ITER succeeds. South Korea is being more aggressive and will build their DEMO while ITER is still doing its early experiments. The construction should be complete by 2037. Success here is highly correlated with ITER's success. K-DEMO gets fusion by 2040 (70%).
K-DEMO gets fusion by 2040 (70%).
Kafessiz

Kafessiz is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "I am a research volunteer at Kafessiz, an organization working to end the use battery cages for hens in Turkey". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

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Kafessiz
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February 10, 2022 · Original source
#97: Start An EA Club At A Turkish University I am Berke, a philosophy major interested in Effective Altruism from Istanbul, Turkey. I am interested in EA since 2019, and currently I am a research volunteer at Kafessiz, an organization working to end the use battery cages for hens in Turkey. EA doesn’t have much presence neither in Istanbul nor the country in general. There are no EA clubs at colleges, and I intend to start the first one at my college. We plan to do seminar programmes (fellowships) similar to the ones in Oxford and increase EA outreach at both our college and in online Turkish language platforms. If we find enough people interested, we plan to start a fellowship program in one or two months and a few other things. If you’re interested you can contact me at berke.celik@boun.edu.tr . What would be achieved in the name of utility if you fund an EA Society at a college you've never heard of? For certain EA causes, there is a lot to be achieved in Turkey. For example, the number of hens in battery cages in Turkey is something around 100 million. Establishing a non-trival EA presence at my college would be good first step because it is the most selective college in the country. In Turkey you enter college via a central exam, and 70% of the 1000 people who scored highest in the exam chose to be here, and this is not a flex, I am just trying to say:If one wants Effective Altruist ideas to spread in a country of 80 million, or at least among the future Turkish elite, my college is a good place to start.
#115: Fight Factory Farming In Turkey “Turkey without Cages” (Kafessiz Türkiye) is an animal welfare organization working by Effective Altruist principles to end cage egg farming in Turkey. We reach out to companies that have cage eggs in their supply chain and secure cage-free pledges from them. Turkey is in the top 10 egg-producing countries with around 120 million laying hens. Turkey is also a major egg exporter with an increasing volume each year. Therefore, animal welfare standards in the region depend on the progress in Turkey. In a few years, we have secured pledges from 20 companies. This will enhance the welfare standards of roughly 1 million hens. Our progress is due to the extraordinary efforts of a limited number of employees and our network of volunteers. This year, we plan to expand our efforts to the fish farming industry and initiate similar NGOs in the countries close to us geographically and culturally. The number of fish farmed in Turkey is estimated to be between 1-2 billion and 60 percent of the production is being exported. At an early stage of our fish welfare endeavor, we secured a pledge from a major wholesaler, Metro AG in Turkey, which will considerably impact the welfare of 10 million fish. In 2022, we want to expand our capacities to maximize the number of animals we impact. If you think you can help, please email cagri.mutaf@kafessizturkiye.com to learn more about how you can support us. You can also visit www.kafessizturkiye.com
Kafessiz Turkiye

Kafessiz Turkiye is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "visit www.kafessizturkiye.com". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

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Kafessiz Turkiye
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February 10, 2022 · Original source
#115: Fight Factory Farming In Turkey “Turkey without Cages” (Kafessiz Türkiye) is an animal welfare organization working by Effective Altruist principles to end cage egg farming in Turkey. We reach out to companies that have cage eggs in their supply chain and secure cage-free pledges from them. Turkey is in the top 10 egg-producing countries with around 120 million laying hens. Turkey is also a major egg exporter with an increasing volume each year. Therefore, animal welfare standards in the region depend on the progress in Turkey. In a few years, we have secured pledges from 20 companies. This will enhance the welfare standards of roughly 1 million hens. Our progress is due to the extraordinary efforts of a limited number of employees and our network of volunteers. This year, we plan to expand our efforts to the fish farming industry and initiate similar NGOs in the countries close to us geographically and culturally. The number of fish farmed in Turkey is estimated to be between 1-2 billion and 60 percent of the production is being exported. At an early stage of our fish welfare endeavor, we secured a pledge from a major wholesaler, Metro AG in Turkey, which will considerably impact the welfare of 10 million fish. In 2022, we want to expand our capacities to maximize the number of animals we impact. If you think you can help, please email cagri.mutaf@kafessizturkiye.com to learn more about how you can support us. You can also visit www.kafessizturkiye.com
Kaiser Oakland

Kaiser Oakland is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 27, 2022 and October 27, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "psych residents from ... Kaiser Oakland". It most often appears alongside Bay Area, Scott, slatestarcodex.com.

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Kaiser Oakland
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October 27, 2022 · Original source
1: A friend who wants to do psychiatry residency in the Bay Area asks to be put in touch with past or former psych residents from Stanford, Kaiser Oakland, UCSF, or UC Davis. If you’re in that category and willing to talk, please email me at scott@slatestarcodex.com and I’ll put you in touch with her.
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 16, 2025 and January 16, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of anthropology human heredity and eugenics in Nazi Germany". It most often appears alongside Afghanistan, Africa, African small-plot subsistence agriculture.

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January 16, 2025 · Original source
(source) … sub-Saharan Africa is also a hot spot. I wonder what’s wrong in Cuba - this is exactly the sort of easily gameable metric I would usually expect them to be good at, or at least carefully faking. If you’re interested, you can donate to Iodine Global Network here. Bob Jacobs writes: > His opponents pointed out both his personal racist opinions/activities That's the mildest possible way you could've put it. He wasn't someone who had "personal racist opinions" that he kept as "personal racist opinions". He was the editor-in-chief of Mankind Quarterly, a white supremacist journal that was founded by people like: Henry Garrett an American psychologist who testified in favor of segregated schools during Brown versus Board of Education, Corrado Gini who was president of the Italian genetics and eugenics Society in fascist Italy, and Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer who was director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of anthropology human heredity and eugenics in Nazi Germany. He was a member of the Nazi Party and the mentor of Josef Mengele, the physician at the Auschwitz concentration camp infamous for performing human experimentation on the prisoners during World War 2. Mengele provided for Verschuer with human remains from Auschwitz to use in his research into eugenics. It's funded by the pioneer fund, an organization he was a board member of and that has been classified as a white supremacist hate group, with one of its first projects being to fund the distribution in US churches and schools of "Erbkrank", a Nazi propaganda film about eugenics. He's not just called racist, he *is* racist, he even describes *himself* as a racist. No contesting any of this. MM writes: I spent 18 months in a country where people are supposed to have an iq of about 70, according to the map. My neighbors and friends were mostly non-literate. They did not seem less intelligent than the people I know in my current (US) neighborhood or the people I grew up with (in the US). Most of them would not have performed well on IQ tests, though. They'd never attended school and had no familiarity with puzzle-solving. This was 35 years ago and most people had not seen movies or even photographs. I remember sitting with one older woman and helping her interpret a black-and-white photograph: this is the arm, here's where it connects to the body, etc. It's hard for people from literate societies with tons of exposure to text & graphical representations to see the extent of the gap. Calvin writes: I have a decent amount of experience with the intellectually disabled, and saying "cognitive issues are only responsible for a small part of the [communication] deficit" is so wrong that it makes me question everything else in this essay. Trust me, even making allowances for poor hearing or difficulty forming words, the cognitive issues are responsible for 90% of the deficit. An IQ of 60 is really low and it's a significant handicap. I was concerned to hear this - I have a little experience with the intellectually disabled, but it didn’t involve knowing people’s exact IQ, so I’m not very well-calibrated here. Looking for more information, I found https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-01.htm, which purports to describe the characteristics of very low IQ people, mostly in the context of criminal justice (where lawyers often try to use a client’s low IQ as a mitigating factor - ie maybe he didn’t truly understand that crime is wrong). The report says things like: Although all persons with mental retardation have significantly impaired mental development, their intellectual level can vary considerably. An estimated 89 percent of all people with retardation have I.Q.s in the 51-70 range. An I.Q. in the 60 to 70 range is approximately the scholastic equivalent to the third grade […] Although mental retardation of any degree has profound implications for a person's cognitive and social development, it is a condition which in many cases is not readily apparent. While some of the mentally retarded, such as those whose retardation is caused by Down's syndrome or fetal alcohol syndrome, have characteristically distinctive facial features, most cannot be identified by their physical appearance alone. Unless their cognitive impairment is unusually severe (e.g. an I.Q. below 40), persons with mental retardation may be thought of as "slow" but the full extent of their impairment is often not readily appreciated, particularly by people who have limited contact with or knowledge of them, including police, prosecutors, judges, and other participants in the criminal justice system. Many capital offenders with mental retardation did not have their condition diagnosed until trial or during post-conviction proceedings. And gave some examples (slightly out of order for this list): Oliver Cruz, who was executed in Texas on August 9, 2000, had an I.Q. that was measured variously at 64 and 76. Cruz nonetheless insisted to reporters that, although he was perhaps "slow in reading, slow in learning," he was not mentally retarded. Mitigation specialist Scharlette Holdman recalled a client who so successfully hid his retardation from his attorneys that he allowed them to sign him up for college-level calculus classes, which he could not comprehend. He had gone through much of his schooling allowing his younger sister to complete his homework for him. When he was given papers to read in connection to his case, he would carefully stare at them. If he was asked a substantive question, he usually responded, "I don't recall." Only when experts in retardation evaluated him and investigators reviewed his school records and spoke to his family did lawyers discover he had mental retardation and had been considered "slow" since his early childhood. Another capital defendant "hid his mental retardation for most of his life by working at a very repetitive job as a switcher on the railroad. He lied about finishing high school. He was actually in special education classes and did not finish the sixth grade. He was drafted into the army and discharged because of his mental retardation. He lied about his service record. He often made things up so that people would not suspect mental retardation." Morris Mason, whose I.Q. was 62-66, was executed in 1985 in Virginia after being convicted of rape and murder. Before his execution, Mason asked one of his legal advisors for advice on what to wear to his funeral As one psychiatrist testified about a capital defendant with an I.Q. of between 35 to 45: "[People with mental retardation try] to go along with people that they suspect are in authority. For example, I asked [the defendant] where we were when I saw him, and he obviously didn't know, so I asked him if we were in Atlanta and he said `Yes, we are in Atlanta.' In fact, we were in Birmingham, Alabama. I could have said New York and he would have said `Sure, New York' These people are obviously not going to win Nobels anytime soon. But even the guy with IQ 35 - 45 was still talking to people. I think this supports the thesis that intellectually disabled people without specific syndromes can seem pretty normal most of the time. (though keep in mind that anything from the court system should be treated with a grain of salt - defense attorneys have an incentive to exaggerate the intellectual disability of their clients in the hopes that it gets them a lighter sentence) Lyman Stone writes: Emil's post isn't correct, however. We know from the recent Reich lab paper on long-run genetic selection that there was strong selection for IQ in the neolithic revolution, which implies agriculture strongly selects for IQ and ability to plan. Malawians are 60-80% subsistence farmers. Even a "normal" low-IQ person cannot do the implied math and long-term planning involved in this kind of farming. And in fact, economists routinely find that African small-plot subsistence agriculture is actually highly optimized; farmers make very precise choices about where to plant which seeds, which fertilizer to use, etc. Key point is basically: it really isn't true that an IQ 60 person can run a farm functionally. Moreover, mean IQ of 60 implies large shares even lower, at ranges that are uniformly nonverbal even without specific disability. And this is why in the actual record-level NIQ database, they truncate estimates below 60, because even the database managers realize these estimates are crazy. See my post here: https://substack.com/home/post/p-154757665 We know that people with extremely low IQs in the Flynn sense must be capable of subsistence agriculture, because pre-Flynn Effect, most of the West had extremely low IQs, and they were all doing subsistence agriculture. How is this possible? Responding to Lyman’s comment, I wrote: I stick to the claim in this post - that our estimates for what a very low IQ means are poorly-grounded, and that people with low IQs can do some pretty impressive things, especially if they're concrete and part of a cultural transmission package. Maybe this is the Joseph Henrich "Secret Of Our Success" thing. We know that Malawians get poor test scores in school, so it seems like there's some disconnect between do-well-on-tests intelligence and run-a-subsistence-farm intelligence, and the abstract/concrete and novel/cultural distinctions are the best explanation that I can think of. You say that "the phenotype that arises from a given tested IQ in America is clearly vastly worse than the phenotype arising from the same tested IQ in Africa", which I basically agree with. I think part of it is the syndromes issue raised above, and part of it is that maybe Malawians have zero contact with the culture of abstraction that IQ tests come out of whereas even very uneducated Westerners have some contact with it, and maybe another part of it is that whatever health/nutrition issues the Malawians have preferentially harm faculties responsible for more abstract tasks rather than more concrete ones. For an opposite data point, when I was in Haiti, my boss told me (secondhand, no personal experience) of extreme difficulties working with Haitians, like that they couldn't alphabetize files even when that was explained to them. Many Haitains are also successfuly subsistence farmers, so I think this also supports some kind of heavy abstract/concrete distinction. I don't think we're really disagreeing, just agreeing on something like the correlations that make up IQ being less valid outside the normal range. Maybe one way to look at it is to go back to the claim from the justice system document above, saying that people with IQ in the 60s are the mental equivalent of third-graders. The third-graders I know are very into Pokemon, and have all sorts of opinions on how if you add X bonus to a Y strength fire-type Pokemon and then play Z combo, it will [commence six weeks of droning on about different Pokemon cards]. Is this the sort of math/reasoning/strategizing that we don’t expect someone with IQ 60 to be able to do? Does the fact that third-graders can do it mean that we’re miscalibrated? I’m not sure. The part of Lyman’s comment that gives me the most pause is his observation that, if the mean IQ is 60, a decent fraction of people must be 45, and a non-negligible portion 30. At this point, even third-grader comparisons don’t save us. I guess this is where I bring in the claim that IQ breaks down as a guide to practical living skills below some point. You can see several more layers of response between me and Lyman here, but I was especially grateful for him teaching me two things I didn’t already know: First, he corrected my misconception about Reich on ancient European cognitive evolution. Reich had said that pre-agriculture Europeans were “2-3 standard deviations” below moderns. I had interpreted that as IQ deviations of 15 points, making them genetic IQ 55-70, which would have been pretty crazy. Stone tells me he actually meant PGS deviations, each of which was about 3-4 IQ points, so he’s claiming that pre-agriculture Europeans had genetic IQ of 90 (they probably also had lower IQ for environmental reasons).,
Kansas City Rationalists

Kansas City Rationalists is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 10, 2022 and April 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group info: Kansas City Rationalists has regular events". It most often appears alongside 1022 High St. Blue House w/red porches, 11:11 Cafe, 1548 NE 15th Ave.

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1
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1
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April 10, 2022
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April 10, 2022
April 10, 2022 · Original source
KANSAS CITY, MO Contact: Alex (alex.hedtke@gmail.com) Date: June 3 Time: 6:30 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86F72CM7+V5 Location: Minsky’s Pizza - 5105 Main St. Tell the hostess you are here for the ACX meetup (we will be located in their dedicated meeting room) Notes: We'll be discussing A Human's Guide to Words, but if you haven't read it, please don't let that stop you from attending! Group info: Kansas City Rationalists has regular events
Karlsruhe Rationality Group

Karlsruhe Rationality Group is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 10, 2023 and April 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "An event post will be created on the Karlsruhe Rationality Group on LessWrong". It most often appears alongside 100 Alexander St, 10004 Jasper Ave, Edmonton, AB T5J 1R3, 11841 Wagner St, Culver City, CA.

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1
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1
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April 10, 2023
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April 10, 2023
April 10, 2023 · Original source
KARLSRUHE, GERMANY Contact: Marcus Contact Info: mail[at]marcuswilhelm[dot]de Time: Saturday, April 22nd, 03:00 PM Location: We meet on the KIT campus on the grass in front of Audimax, next to the large sculpture with the intertwined tubes Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8FXC2C68+X5 Notes: An event post will be created on the Karlsruhe Rationality Group on LessWrong; see there for more recent updates (e.g. in case of rain).
Karnataka study

Karnataka study is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 24, 2024 and April 24, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "In the RAND and Karnataka studies, it didn’t". It most often appears alongside 2008 America, @agoodmanbacon, Baicker.

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Karnataka study
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April 24, 2024
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April 24, 2024
April 24, 2024 · Original source
In some parts of the Karnataka study, we lose statistical significance at step 1. The better insurance didn’t necessarily result in more medical utilization. For example, it didn’t cause people to be (significantly) more likely to give birth in a hospital or get surgery.
In the Oregon study, better insurance caused more use of antidiabetic drugs. But in the Karnataka study, it didn’t (AFAICT RAND didn’t measure this).
In the Oregon study, better insurance caused higher ratings of self-reported health. But in the RAND and Karnataka studies, it didn’t.
kc_rat_ea

kc_rat_ea is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 30, 2024 and March 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/kc_rat_ea/". It most often appears alongside 1111 Brickell Ave, 11841 Wagner St., Culver City, 1970 Port Laurent place, Newport Beach 92660.

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kc_rat_ea
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1
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1
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March 30, 2024
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March 30, 2024
March 30, 2024 · Original source
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA Contact: Alex Hedtke Contact Info: alex[dot]hedtke[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Friday, May 10th, 5:00 PM Location: 5200 Wornall Rd, Kansas City, MO 64112 (Jacob L. Loose Park) - We will be at the grill and the stone tables to the right of the entrance, between the entrance and the playground. Coordinates: https://plus.codes/86F72CM4+QH Group Link: https://www.meetup.com/kc_rat_ea/ Notes: There is a playground, so feel free to bring kids! Also, while not necessary, bring any cookout food potluck-style you'd like. There will be a grill.
Keio University

Keio University is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 21, 2024 and June 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "The school would form the basis of the institution that would eventually be named Keio University". It most often appears alongside Abenomics, An Encouragement of Learning, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization.

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Keio University
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June 21, 2024
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June 21, 2024
June 21, 2024 · Original source
Against this backdrop, the shogunate and supporters of the imperial house begin waging a civil war. Fukuzawa does not take sides. “After all, both parties seemed to be alike in their anti-foreign prejudice.” On the one hand, the end of the feudal society that Fukuzawa disliked so intensely was in sight. On the other hand, the opposing side had a habit of murdering people with his chosen profession. He does his best to stay out of it, and as war comes to the streets of Edo, he begins building a new school just as everyone else evacuates the city. So much the better, he says, for “all the carpenters and masons were delighted to get work then.” The school would form the basis of the institution that would eventually be named Keio University.
Kellogg Foundation

Kellogg Foundation is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 22, 2022 and September 22, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "large foundations like the Ford, Hewlett, Packard, Rockefeller, and Kellogg Foundations". It most often appears alongside Adam Neumann, Alex Roesch, Amazon.

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Kellogg Foundation
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1
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September 22, 2022
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September 22, 2022
September 22, 2022 · Original source
The simple and effective answer is to increase estate taxes. Anybody who tries to get a social-justice movement to focus on any mechanism of wealth distribution other than estate taxes, is probably funded by somebody trying to distract people from imposing higher estate taxes. I'm pretty sure that most of the money for the Social Justice movement today comes from large foundations like the Ford, Hewlett, Packard, Rockefeller, and Kellogg Foundations, which are usually run by people connected to the family in question, with its enormous inherited estate.
KFOR

KFOR is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 06, 2021 and September 06, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "A doctor named Jason McElyea apparently told local broadcaster KFOR". It most often appears alongside AP, BBC, BBC.

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KFOR
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1
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1
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September 06, 2021
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September 06, 2021
  • AP 1 shared issues
  • BBC 1 shared issues
  • BBC 1 shared issues
  • COVID 1 shared issues
  • Democrat 1 shared issues
September 06, 2021 · Original source
In case you find this hard to follow: ivermectin is an antiparasitic drug that looked promising against COVID in early studies. Later it started looking less promising, and investigators found that a major supporting study was fraudulent. But by this point it had gotten popular among conspiracy theorists as a suppressed coronavirus cure that They Don’t Want You To Know. The media has tried to spread the word that the scientific consensus remains skeptical. In the process, they may have gone a little overboard and portrayed it as the world’s deadliest toxin that will definitely kill you and it will all somehow be Donald Trump’s fault. It turned into the latest culture war issue, and now there’s a whole discourse on (for example) how supposedly-sober fact-checkers keep calling it "a horse dewormer” (it is used to deworm horses, but it’s also FDA-approved for humans, but lots of the people using it are buying the horse version), and probably this is hypocritical in some way. Enter the article above. A doctor named Jason McElyea apparently told local broadcaster KFOR that Oklahoma hospitals are “overwhelmed” with ivermectin poisoning cases, so much so that “gunshot victims” are “left waiting”. Some of the world’s biggest news outlets heard the story and ran with it. The tweet mentions the Rolling Stone version, but the same story, with the same doctor’s testimony, got picked up by The Guardian, the BBC, Yahoo News, etc. Which brings us to the Sequoyah Hospital letter on the right. They released a statement saying that Dr. McElyea hasn’t worked there in two months, they haven’t had any ivermectin overdose cases, and they don’t know what he’s talking about. In the comments, author Virginia Hume sums up the situation nicely: I’ve recently been reading Scout Mindset (expect a review soon), which is kind of the rationalist movement in book form. It focuses on the difference between how we treat ideas that conform to our biases versus those that contradict them. If they conform, we ask “Are we allowed to accept this?” and wave them through, like a small town police chief dealing with a case involving the mayor’s son. If they contradict, we subject them to the harshest inquisition possible, like a small town police chief dealing with a guy named “Abdullah” with a sinister-looking beard. The media was already looking to discredit ivermectin. So the report of one doctor - without even a phone call to confirm - was good enough for Rolling Stone, The Guardian, BBC, etc. It was “too good to check”. II. Did you believe that? I did, briefly. Then I remembered the Law Of Rationalist Irony: the smugger you feel about having caught a bias in someone else, the more likely you are falling victim to that bias right now, in whatever way would be most embarrassing. So, quick check: am I doing this? I notice this story is exactly tailored to appeal to me and people like me. It discredits the media establishment, who I don’t like. It’s a great argument for why we need more rationality, something I’ve been trying to push. It lets me feel superior to everyone: I am properly skeptical of ivermectin, but also I haven’t become a contemptible propagandist who joins in mass media smear campaigns. And I didn’t even take a second to check if it was true! I’m relying entirely on the word of a Twitter bluecheck I’ve never heard of before, whose profile picture is some kind of dog (an Australian sheepdog? maybe some kind of weird collie?) Forget making a phone call to a hospital, I didn’t even read the original article! The story was “too good to check”! So I tried checking, and noticed that the third reply to the original tweet was this: In case you’re as confused as I am, NHS here = “Northeastern Health System”, an Oklahoma health care group. Britain is not involved. This…turns out to be completely true. The story never mentions Sequoyah Hospital! Dr. McElyea has worked at Sequoyah in the past, but he’s a traveling doctor and works lots of places. Plausibly Sequoyah just wanted to clarify that they weren’t like the hospitals in the story, they’re not turning away gunshot victims, and if you happen to be a gunshot victim you’re still welcome to go to Sequoyah and can expect timely care. Apparently I’m not the only person who doesn’t scroll down to the third tweet. The right-wing Washington Examiner has an article on how Rolling Stone’s Ivermectin Fiction Shows Why Republicans Don’t Trust Media. Fox has an article on Rolling Stone Forced To Issue Update After Viral Ivermectin Story Turns Out To Be False. One Redditor puts it more bluntly: “Dr. Jason McElyea, who has been claiming that emergency rooms have been turning away gunshot victims because of Ivermectin overdoses, is a liar.” None of these sources mentioned that the original article had never claimed Sequoyah Hospital was involved. Their story was - I guess - too good to check. III. Did you believe that? I mean, that’s also a pretty cool story, isn’t it? Right-wing news outlets accuse the so-called “liberal media” of bias, then get hoist on their own petard? Seems a bit too cute. Have you clicked through to any of the links yet? No? Not even after I admitted I’m probably biased here? Sequoyah Hospital might not be the particular hospital that the doctor in the story was thinking of. But isn’t it suspicious that other hospitals are so packed with ivermectin cases that they have to delay care to gunshot victims, yet Sequoyah says that it “has not treated any patients due to complications of treating ivermectin”? Seems weird for there to be that much difference. Okay, this time I promise I’m not trying to psych you out. Here’s what I’ve actually been able to figure out about this situation: Rolling Stone seems to think that the Sequoyah Hospital statement casts doubt on their account. They changed the title of their article to “One Hospital Denies Oklahoma Doctor’s Story…” and edited in a long prologue about the hospital’s statement in a way that suggests they feel bad about their reporting. They say that they have reached out to various relevant doctors and hospitals for comments but have not heard back from them - which I guess is good, because if your hospital is so busy that you don’t have time to treat gunshot victims, you really shouldn’t have time to give interviews to Rolling Stone.
Also five days ago, McElyea gave this interview on a local news station, where he warned people not to take ivermectin, said he’d seen some ivermectin overdose cases, and mentioned how overcrowded the hospitals were. The flow of the local news report very much implies these two things are connected, but I notice that Dr. McElyea himself doesn’t state this in so many words. There’s just a clip of him saying ivermectin is dangerous, immediately followed by a clip where he talks about how overcrowded the hospitals are. The local report seems to want you to link those two things, but their exact wording is a little weaselly.
Khan-for-Everything

Khan-for-Everything is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2025 and June 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "After twenty‑odd years of watching shiny education fixes wobble and crash— ... Khan‑for‑Everything". It most often appears alongside 10,000 hour rule, 2 Hour Learning, Inc, 2-hour Learning.

Reference entry
Khan-for-Everything
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1
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1
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June 27, 2025
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June 27, 2025
June 27, 2025 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
Kidney One

Kidney One is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 05, 2022 and November 05, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "figures out what’s up with The Kidney One". It most often appears alongside abundance liberalism, Alabama, Alfred Twu.

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Kidney One
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1
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1
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November 05, 2022
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November 05, 2022
November 05, 2022 · Original source
Andrew Grossman does better detective work than I did and figures out what’s up with The Kidney One.
Kimi

Kimi is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 26, 2025 and November 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Chinese AIs you’ve heard of - DeepSeek, Kimi, etc - are primarily trained on a combination of stockpiled American chips"; "the Chinese AIs you’ve heard of - DeepSeek, Kimi, etc". It most often appears alongside 9/11, AI ethics, AI Safety.

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Kimi
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1
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1
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November 26, 2025
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November 26, 2025
November 26, 2025 · Original source
Models: The quality of foundation models - giant multi-purpose AIs like GPT or Claude - primarily depends on the amount of compute used to train them, so America’s compute advantage carries over to this level. In theory, clever training methods and advanced algorithms can make one model more or less compute-efficient than another, but this doesn’t seem to be affecting the current state of the race much - most advances by one country are quickly diffused to (or stolen by) the other. Despite some early concerns, neither DeepSeek nor Kimi K2 Chinese models provide strong evidence of a Chinese advantage in computational efficiency (1, 2).
In 2023, the US realized it was in an AI race with China and slashed chip exports. Chinese access to compute dropped dramatically. They began accelerating onshore chip development, but this will take a decade or more to pay off. For now, the Chinese AIs you’ve heard of - DeepSeek, Kimi, etc - are primarily trained on a combination of stockpiled American chips from before the export controls, and American chips smuggled in through third parties, especially Singapore and Malaysia.
Kimi K2

Kimi K2 is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 26, 2025 and November 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "neither DeepSeek nor Kimi K2 Chinese models provide strong evidence of a Chinese advantage". It most often appears alongside 9/11, AI ethics, AI Safety.

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Kimi K2
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1
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1
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November 26, 2025
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November 26, 2025
November 26, 2025 · Original source
Models: The quality of foundation models - giant multi-purpose AIs like GPT or Claude - primarily depends on the amount of compute used to train them, so America’s compute advantage carries over to this level. In theory, clever training methods and advanced algorithms can make one model more or less compute-efficient than another, but this doesn’t seem to be affecting the current state of the race much - most advances by one country are quickly diffused to (or stolen by) the other. Despite some early concerns, neither DeepSeek nor Kimi K2 Chinese models provide strong evidence of a Chinese advantage in computational efficiency (1, 2).
King’s Council

King’s Council is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 01, 2025 and August 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as ""We reported all that to the King’s Council, and were of opinion that, given the imminent necessity and the peril in which the town of Orleans stood, the King could well use her help and send her to Orleans."". It most often appears alongside Africa, Agamemnon, Age of Empires II.

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King’s Council
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1
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1
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August 01, 2025
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August 01, 2025
August 01, 2025 · Original source
"We reported all that to the King’s Council, and were of opinion that, given the imminent necessity and the peril in which the town of Orleans stood, the King could well use her help and send her to Orleans.
KIPP

KIPP is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2025 and June 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "After twenty‑odd years of watching shiny education fixes wobble and crash—KIPP, AltSchool, Summit Learning, One-laptop-per-child, No child left behind, MOOCs, Khan‑for‑Everything". It most often appears alongside 10,000 hour rule, 2 Hour Learning, Inc, 2-hour Learning.

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KIPP
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1
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1
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June 27, 2025
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June 27, 2025
June 27, 2025 · Original source
“Powered by AI (not teachers).” If all of this makes your inner Bayesian flinch, you’re in good company. After twenty‑odd years of watching shiny education fixes wobble and crash—KIPP, AltSchool, Summit Learning, One-laptop-per-child, No child left behind, MOOCs, Khan‑for‑Everything—you should be skeptical. Either Alpha is (a) another program for the affluent propped up by selection effects, or (b) a clever way to turn children into joyless speed‑reading calculators. Those were, more or less, the two critical camps that emerged when Alpha’s parent company was approved to launch the tuition‑free Arizona charter school this past January. Unfortunately, the public evidence base on whether this is “real” is thin in both directions. Alpha’s own material is glossy and elliptical; mainstream coverage either repeats Alpha’s talking points, or attacks the premise that kids should even be allowed to learn faster than their peers. Until Raj Chetty installs himself in the hallway with a clipboard counting MAP percentiles it is hard to get real information on what exactly Alpha is doing, whether it is actually working beyond selection effects, and if there is anyway it could scale in a way that all the other education initiatives seemed to fail to do. I first heard about Alpha in May 2024, and in the absence of randomized‑controlled clarity, I did what any moderately obsessive parent with three elementary-aged kids and an itch for data would do: I moved the family across the country to Austin for a year and ran the experiment myself (unfortunately, despite trying my best we never managed to have identical twins, so I stopped short of running a proper control group. My wife was less disappointed than I was). Since last autumn I’ve collected the sort of on‑the‑ground detail that doesn’t surface in press releases, or is available anywhere online: long chats with founders, curriculum leads, “guides” (not teachers), Brazilian Zoom coaches, sceptical parents, ecstatic parents, and the kids who live inside the Alpha dashboard – including my own. I hope this seven-part review can help share what the program actually is and that this review is more open minded than the critics, but is something that would never get past an Alpha public relations gatekeeper: Starting Point: My Assumptions: how my views on elite private schools, tutoring and acceleration shaped the experiment (and this essay). WHAT is the existing education environment.
Kirby Museum

Kirby Museum is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 16, 2024 and August 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "for more details on who deserves the credit and who claimed what when, check out the Kirby museum". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

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Kirby Museum
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1
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1
First seen
August 16, 2024
Last seen
August 16, 2024
August 16, 2024 · Original source
The Juggernaut (Galactus and High Evolutionary came in 1966) And that is without mentioning on the plethora of supporting characters (like Mary Jane Watson, Aunt May, Betty Ross, Flash Thompson, Jane Foster and Foggy Nelson), and world building (like SHIELD, HYDRA, Asteroid M, Savage Land, mutants, the Inhumans, and the Sentinels). That is basically the list of all the characters used in Marvel movies today (There are SOME that have been used in the films that came later: Captain Marvel (1977), Ms Marvel (2013), Thanos (1968), Falcon (1969), Winter Soldier (2005) and some of the Guardians of the Galaxy (1969)). That level of iconic character creation would be enough to make this period of Marvel history special all on its own (the only real comparison is DC comics from 1939-1941). Innovation #2: The Integrated Universe The idea of mixing together characters from different titles had already been done by DC comics, but Marvel took it to a new level. In the early years Stan Lee was writing almost all of the stories. While he played fast and loose with lots of conventions, he was adamant with himself that the stories needed to work TOGETHER. So when Iron Man goes to China and is trapped there by the Mandarin for two issues, he also goes missing from the storylines in the Avengers (and the remaining team members ask each other where Iron Man could be). The timing of these shenanigans does not always work out – sometimes issues were delayed due to artists not being able to deliver on time – and the planned timing became inconsistent, but Lee tried hard to make it all work and “seem real to the reader”. It stressed out Lee so much that in Avengers #16 he changed things up. He took all the characters with their own titles – Iron Man, Thor, Ant Man and the Wasp, and had them “retire from the Avengers”. He kept Captain America on the team (who had joined in issue #4, but did not have his own monthly title), and then re-filled the roster with reformed villains. He took Quicksilver and the Scarlet Witch from the X-men and Hawkeye from the pages of Tales of Suspense. The new structure still allowed overlap between the different titles, but he would not have to juggle characters being leads in two books at the same time. Nothing like that level of attention to detail existed in DC – or anywhere else for that matter – for more than a decade. Did readers REALLY care? Especially when issues sat on newsstands for months at a time and there was no such thing as a comic book shop to find old issues, or internet discussion forums to nitpick inconsistencies? Maybe not. But Lee cared. He was writing for readers who paid attention and cared, and that trend would continue through the evolution of comics into the 21st century. But it started here. Innovation #3: The Marvel Method In the early Silver Age, Stan Lee, in addition to his editor and chief duties, was writing nine different comic book series. Not all of those comics were coming out monthly, but most were. It was an impressive feat. No wonder that some ideas and tropes leaked from one title to another (“Another alien invasion?” “The communists are kidnapping our best scientists… again?”). He made it through by counting on his artists in a way that had not been done before. Traditionally the comic book writer would write the entire story for the artist, who would then deliver on the script. Lee did not have time for that – at least with the artists he trusted. Instead he used what came to be called the “Marvel Method”. When Lee and Kirby were creating the Fantastic Four the two worked in collaboration. Lee often gets most of the credit today, but the consensus is now that that is more because Lee was an extroverted self-promoter, rather than “more deserving” of the credit. In any case once the basic idea for the team was created, what is not in question is the rough method Lee and Kirby used to create the stories (for more details on who deserves the credit and who claimed what when, check out the Kirby museum). The basic method worked like this: Lee would create an outline of the story. The major plot points.The characters. Who did what when. What was the conflict and how it was resolved. He would give that outline to the artist
Klassisknyproduktion

Klassisknyproduktion is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 10, 2023 and November 10, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "this Facebook group is about reviving human based architecture and reviving classical design styles https://m.facebook.com/groups/Klassisknyproduktion/?ref=share&mibextid=S66gvF". It most often appears alongside #EEGManyLabs, 23andme, @freeshreeda.

Reference entry
Klassisknyproduktion
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1
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1
First seen
November 10, 2023
Last seen
November 10, 2023
November 10, 2023 · Original source
As far as architecture is concerned, this Facebook group is about reviving human based architecture and reviving classical design styles https://m.facebook.com/groups/Klassisknyproduktion/?ref=share&mibextid=S66gvF
Kleros

Kleros is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 20, 2024 and February 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "multi-round dispute system similar to Augur or Kleros". It most often appears alongside 2024 presidential election, Aella, AI.

Reference entry
Kleros
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1
Issue count
1
First seen
February 20, 2024
Last seen
February 20, 2024
  • 24 February 20, 2024
February 20, 2024 · Original source
How many residents will live in Prospera, a new special economic zone in Honduras, on Jan 1, 2026? Answer: 600 (80% confidence interval 100-2,000) This seems like a good guess (except that my confidence interval would have included zero because there’s a 20%+ chance that it gets shut down). So overall its forecasts seem pretty impressive. But I was concerned by its reasoning even in some of the questions it got “right”. For example, the Nikki Haley question tried to get a base rate by asking what percent of elections Haley had won before, and found she had won 71% of them - these were mostly elections for South Carolina governor. You can see what the AI is trying to do - but it’s not going to work. Then it got confused and read a lot of news stories about how she’s currently losing the 2024 presidential election, and seemed to think they were about 2028. So either the AI only got a reasonable probability by coincidence, or it was testing many different strategies, throwing out the useless ones, and updating only on the useful ones, in a way that was kind of opaque to the casual reader. Still, if the company says it beats most human forecasters, this doesn’t seem totally impossible based on what I’ve seen. And that would be exciting! An AI that can generate probabilistic forecasts for any question seems like in some way a culmination of the rationalist project. And if you can make something like this work, it doesn’t sound too outlandish that you could apply the same AI to conditional forecasts, or to questions about the past and present (eg whether COVID was a lab leak). I would be most excited if at some point this graduated from its geopolitical focus and was able to answer questions on any topic (eg “what is the chance that Astral Codex Ten gains paid subscribers this year?”), maybe if the questioner gives it links or feeds it some of the appropriate information. FutureSearch is run by a team formerly from Metaculus, including former Metaculus CTO (and Google internal prediction market veteran) Dan Schwarz. They’re looking for potential clients and/or investors; if you’re interested, email hello@futuresearch.ai. Vitalik On AI Prediction Markets Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum-founder-turned-cryptocurrency-public-intellectual, has a blog post on The Promise And Challenge Of Crypto + AI Applications. One of them is a prediction market. He writes: Prediction markets have been a holy grail of epistemics technology for a long time; I was excited about using prediction markets as an input for governance ("futarchy") back in 2014, and played around with them extensively in the last election as well as more recently. But so far prediction markets have not taken off too much in practice, and there is a series of commonly given reasons why: the largest participants are often irrational, people with the right knowledge are not willing to take the time and bet unless a lot of money is involved, markets are often thin, etc. One response to this is to point to ongoing UX improvements in Polymarket or other new prediction markets, and hope that they will succeed where previous iterations have failed. After all, the story goes, people are willing to bet tens of billions on sports, so why wouldn't people throw in enough money betting on US elections or LK99 that it starts to make sense for the serious players to start coming in? But this argument must contend with the fact that, well, previous iterations have failed to get to this level of scale (at least compared to their proponents' dreams), and so it seems like you need something new to make prediction markets succeed. And so a different response is to point to one specific feature of prediction market ecosystems that we can expect to see in the 2020s that we did not see in the 2010s: the possibility of ubiquitous participation by AIs. AIs are willing to work for less than $1 per hour, and have the knowledge of an encyclopedia - and if that's not enough, they can even be integrated with real-time web search capability. If you make a market, and put up a liquidity subsidy of $50, humans will not care enough to bid, but thousands of AIs will easily swarm all over the question and make the best guess they can. The incentive to do a good job on any one question may be tiny, but the incentive to make an AI that makes good predictions in general may be in the millions. Note that potentially, you don't even need the humans to adjudicate most questions: you can use a multi-round dispute system similar to Augur or Kleros, where AIs would also be the ones participating in earlier rounds. Humans would only need to respond in those few cases where a series of escalations have taken place and large amounts of money have been committed by both sides. This is a powerful primitive, because once a "prediction market" can be made to work on such a microscopic scale, you can reuse the "prediction market" primitive for many other kinds of questions: Is this social media post acceptable under [terms of use]?
Knights of St. John

Knights of St. John is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 25, 2021 and May 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "its name may come from the Knights of St. John, who used it to treat wounds while crusading". It most often appears alongside 2002 meta-analysis by Cochrane Collaboration, 5-HTP, 5-HTP.

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Knights of St. John
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1
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1
First seen
May 25, 2021
Last seen
May 25, 2021
May 25, 2021 · Original source
St. John’s Wort is a plant which has been used in herbal medicine for centuries (its name may come from the Knights of St. John, who used it to treat wounds while crusading). The most important active chemical, hyperforin, might be a weak reuptake inhibitor of various chemicals, including serotonin (which would technically make it an SSRI), but as far as I can tell this is too weak to really explain its effects. A meta-analysis of 35 studies including 6993 patients suggests it works, but other studies show no benefit. German studies tend to do the best and American studies the worst, which might either reveal something about those countries’ cultural biases, or about the different strains and extracts of the plant used in the two countries. This herb is infamous for interacting with various medications, and if you’re taking anything else you should talk to your doctor before starting it. This seems like a reasonable brand, but I’m open to suggestions for better ones.
Knights Templar

Knights Templar is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 01, 2025 and August 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "he had the Knights Templar abolished and all the officers of the order burned for heresy". It most often appears alongside Africa, Agamemnon, Age of Empires II.

Reference entry
Knights Templar
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1
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1
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August 01, 2025
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August 01, 2025
August 01, 2025 · Original source
According to legend5, this curse was incurred by Philip the Fair6, King of France around 1300, when he had the Knights Templar abolished and all the officers of the order burned for heresy so he wouldn't have to pay back his debts.7 From the flames, the last Grandmaster of the order cursed him with his dying breath that he would "see him before God's tribunal before the year was out" and Philip duly died within the year. His sons would follow him, and their sons, each in inexorable succession passing the crown to the next before dying in turn. The last of the Capet princes managed to make it almost fifteen years past Philip's death before succumbing to that old favorite, "unknown causes."8
KnowYourMeme

KnowYourMeme is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 12, 2022 and July 12, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Source: KnowYourMeme". It most often appears alongside 1/6 Committee, Africa, Berkshire Hathaway.

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KnowYourMeme
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1
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1
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July 12, 2022
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July 12, 2022
  • 22 July 12, 2022
July 12, 2022 · Original source
Source: KnowYourMeme I thought of this last week while reading Is Conservative Media Breaking Up With Trump? The Daily Beast argues that the revelations from the 1/6 Committee are so damaging that even previously-loyal GOP elites are starting to turn on their former master. And with DeSantis as such a tempting alternative 2024 nominee, maybe Trump is more of a liability than an asset. Is this finally the jam ol Donny Trump can’t wriggle his way out of?
Koch Foundation

Koch Foundation is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 26, 2025 and February 26, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "maybe by creating an activist network like the Koch Foundation". It most often appears alongside Democrats, Elon Musk, Ezra Klein.

Reference entry
Koch Foundation
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1
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1
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February 26, 2025
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February 26, 2025
February 26, 2025 · Original source
I think the conflict theorist imagines the rich person should put in up to $49K of resources, whether that’s literal money (in the form of donations), time and energy (maybe by creating an activist network like the Koch Foundation), or just posting about it on Facebook.
kolakao.de

kolakao.de is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 10, 2022 and February 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Homepage: https://kolakao.de/kolanuss". It most often appears alongside 2018, @BendiniUK, @benyeohben.

Reference entry
kolakao.de
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1
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1
First seen
February 10, 2022
Last seen
February 10, 2022
February 10, 2022 · Original source
#110: Invest In Organic Kolanut For Startup We are a small social startup from Germany needing organic kolanut for our production. As there was no organic kola at the European market, we partnered with a young organic farmers cooperative to supply us. In West Africa kolanut is used traditionally, but usually not dried and exported. Relevant exports would help to diversify the income for the farmers and open new perspectives with a traditional product. We got first small shipments of kola so we are able to use it in our own production and supply others with samples. We already have inquiries for 20-30t, but we can't deliver these demands without firstly helping our African partners in extending their quality management and invest in the supply chain more than we can currently afford. We do not look for usual venture investment because we don't want to optimize our business for profits. When we are big enough we want to incorporate steward ownership (https://purpose-economy.org/en/) to keep our business this way. If we could get a grant of 10,000€ we could buy some needed equipment, travel to Africa or even find some consultants to improve quality management. We are also looking for Investors to found a non-profit importing company, having more sustainable positive impact, but also needing substantial Investment (~100,000€). If we don't find such an Investor, we have to find a established importing company to partner with. Contact: info@kolakao.de. Homepage: https://kolakao.de/kolanuss (still only in German, sorry)
kommherrjesus.de

kommherrjesus.de is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 01, 2025 and October 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "hosted on kommherrjesus.de". It most often appears alongside 1910s Portugal, 1999 British eclipse, 2017 US eclipse.

Reference entry
kommherrjesus.de
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1
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1
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October 01, 2025
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October 01, 2025
October 01, 2025 · Original source
…unfortunately a 25 mile circle centered on Merate includes the city of Milan, population 1.1 million, which produced no reports of unusual solar activity. And Milan had clear line-of-sight to Ghiaie and Merate, and so probably better viewing conditions than Tavernola, which (you can see from the map above) has some intervening hills. Might the miraculous light source have been like a spotlight, aimed in only one direction - that is, east to Ghiaie and Tavernola, but not southwest to Milan? This would contradict Dalleur’s Fatima analysis, since one of the most dramatic testimonies comes from the city of Minde, which is on the opposite side of the presumed light source from Fatima. I don’t really think it’s possible to maintain a theory where this phenomenon gets transmitted through normal geography. 3.2: Mary Such Cases At this point, the reader will get the general idea, and we can start moving faster, as there is a large amount of ground to cover. Heroldsbach, Germany, 1949: The Virgin appeared to four young girls. Rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on December 8th, 10,000 people saw another sun miracle. Here are about a hundred testimonies, gathered with typical German thoroughness. An expert meteorologist brought in to investigate summarized them as follows: If one now considers the testimony in detail, one encounters a surprisingly small agreement of the observations made. One witness has seen a red sun, the other a yellow, an orange or pink with blue and green, or a whitish sun. A silver one was also observed or all the colors mentioned in colorful change. One wants to have observed an oversized, the other a first small or normal, but then rapidly enlarging and rushing towards the viewer in a frightening way. Most of the witnesses noticed that the solar disk rotated very quickly in two or three phases of rotation for about a quarter of an hour. The Catholic Church condemned the apparition and miracle as fake, even going so far as to excommunicate the child-seers. Later they relented slightly and un-excommunicated them, but their official position is still that nothing supernatural happened - this sun miracle was merely an overly enthusiastic hallucination! Necedah, Wisconsin, USA, 1949: A housewife named Mary Ann Van Hoof claimed to have seen the Virgin Mary. This is among the less plausible visitations: Van Hoof, who was raised Spiritualist, also claimed to have seen Joan of Arc, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln. The messages she channeled seemed less like tidings of peace and love than like a particularly unhinged Truth Social post, and included warnings about the Rothschilds. Still, rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on August 15 1950, 50,000 - 100,000 people showed up hoping for a miracle. As for what happened next, Wikipedia says that “witness accounts vary significantly”. WaPo says that “observers saw nothing unusual” and LIFE mentions nothing out of the ordinary. But other sources report sun miracles, and I was eventually able to track down three testimonials in a summary of articles from a local newspaper, which states that “after a rainy morning…”: It was about noon when Van Hoof came out of the house and a woman screamed, “By God, it’s really true,” and fell to her knees. Then it happened that the Rapids woman and so many in the crowd saw the sun, covered with a dark, greenish gray disk, spinning down toward the earth. And she testified, “I thought the end of the earth was coming and fell to my knees.” A Pittsville woman also described the sun spinning closer to the earth. “I and many other people, fell to our knees in awe.” The Daily Tribune visited the Oct. 7, 1950, event — a 25-minute “last” message from the Mediatrix to the “throng” of 50,000. Responding to this seventh vision, gasps were heard from women who again saw the sun behaving oddly. A Catholic priest told reporters he saw the sun whirl clockwise and jump. The Catholic Church condemned the apparition as fake, and declared van Hoof’s followers “a cult”. Lubbock, Texas, USA, 1988. Really? Really? Nothing could be more natural than for the Queen of Heaven to appear to kind-hearted shepherd children in Portugal. Even an appearance in war-torn West Germany makes a certain amount of sense. But Lubbock, Texas? I suppose this must have been how the cool Sanhedrin members felt when they learned the Christ hailed from Nazareth. But that doesn’t make it any better. Anyway, rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on August 15, 1988, about 10,000 people witnessed the Miracle of the Sun. Here is an indirect testimonial, a man describing his wife’s experience: A large crowd had gathered outside Saint John Neumann Church on that very hot August afternoon on the Feast of the Assumption. Mass was being said in the afternoon, and around the time of the Consecration, suddenly her cousin’s wife (a convert, if you remember) said “look at the sun”. When she did, the sun was pulsating, it would look like it was coming down to earth and then go back again, it spun around in circles, much the same as what took place in Fatima in 1917...and changed colors. She looked at it directly for 15 minutes or so without any damage to her eyes. As my wife looked around, the people in the crowd seemed to be bathed in various colors. During all this my wife even saw The Blessed Mother. The Blessed Mother was extending her arms in what appeared to be a welcoming gesture. But not everyone had the same experience that day: her cousin’s wife and our son saw and believed instantly, but her cousin and brother saw nothing at all. Why did some see these events and others did not? We don’t know...not enough faith? Or perhaps they had enough faith, and they didn’t need a sign! Here we have something special: according to the Los Angeles Times, one pilgrim took a poll about who saw what: A push was on to assemble evidence for the commission in a lawyerly way. Testimonies from 247 people present at the feast had been recorded. The statements were transcribed by volunteers and stored in a computer. Joe James himself indexed the information: 186 had witnessed the spinning of the sun; 75 had seen the Virgin; 64 Jesus; 18 an angel. How could anyone ignore the bulk of such documentation? We don’t know how the 247 people were selected, but very naively it seems like 2/3 of those present saw the sun spinning. This also matches the first person listing 2/4 family members. (the Catholic Church withheld judgment, refusing to either endorse or condemn the visions) Benin City, Nigeria, 2017. On October 13 2017, crowds gathered around the world to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Fatima miracle. One such commemoration happened in Benin City, Nigeria, where 30,000 people attended the National Marian Congress and witnessed the re-dedication of Nigeria to Mary’s Sacred Heart. As the speakers commemorated the Fatima event . . . . . . someone pointed to the sky and shouted “It’s happening again!”. It was, indeed, happening again. You can read about ten testimonies here. I’ll quote just one, from Brother Joseph Obiemeka Azih: Immediately after the 3:00 p.m. Divine Mercy prayers, there were brief showers of rain. Then came sudden brightness of the sun, which was hitherto hidden behind layers of dark cloud. We also observed rather surprisingly the mysterious shooting of the sun forward and backward. Intermittently emitting of powerful bluish and golden colors of light from “Our Lady clothed with the Sun.” The sight was indescribably beautiful. We were busy staring at the bright sun steadily for more than twenty minutes without blinking an eye even for a second! People around us were dazzling and reflecting these bluish and golden colors on their dresses and faces. What a mystery! More than 30,000 people inside the arena were seen peering at “the dancing of the sun” bewildered. The miracle lasted for more than 45 minutes after which there was [a] heavy downpour which the Bishops present said [were] “showers of blessing.” I was able to confirm that some of the people whose testimonies were listed on the site are real Nigerian Catholics whose existence is attested in other sources. Two weeks later, there was another Nigerian commemoration of the Fatima anniversary, in Lagos, and a sun miracle happened at that one too. 3.3: Made You Gaze At Medjugorje Medjugorje (Bosnia, 1981) is in many ways a typical Marian apparition site, much like the ones on the list above. Child-seers, warnings to repent, sun miracles, you know the story by now. But in Medjugorje, the miracles keep happening. Pilgrims - or, more cynically, tourists - go there just to see the sun miracles, and many come back satisfied. You can find blogs by people who went to Medjugorje hoping to see a sun miracle, and on their first or fifth or eighth or whatever day, there’s a crowd of people, yelling and pointing at the sun, and they look up and see it too. Here’s an account from Catholic blogger Father Dwight Longernecker: I was an Anglican priest living in England, in 1985 when I was invited by a group of Anglicans and Catholics to visit Medjugorje. I didn’t want to go. Being a former Evangelical-fundamentalist I wasn’t too keen on apparitions of the Blessed Virgin. I opted out. They insisted. I dug in my heels. They said someone else would pay for it. I didn’t want to go. They cajoled and twisted my arm until I said ‘yes’ [...] On our second day there I sat on the balcony of our guesthouse with a large woman named Eleanor. As we began the rosary I looked up and the sun was a blaze of light in the sky. I looked down to the car parked below and the sun was reflected in the hood of the car as a blaze of light. Eleanor and I prayed the rosary together. I had my eyes closed. At 6:20 Eleanor gave me an elbow in the ribs and pointed. The sun was now a disc of white light in the sky like a Eucharistic host. Then as I watched it began to spin, first clockwise then anti clockwise. Sparks spit out from the rim of the sun like a firework. I looked down and the sun was a white spinning disc on the hood of the car. I don’t think this would have happened if it was just my eyes playing tricks on me. Plus, Eleanor saw it too. That’s why she gave me an elbow in the ribs. I am not sure how long this lasted, but when we spoke about it to our fellow pilgrims they said many people in the town square had reported the same phenomenon. Some of these tourists capture the phenomenon on video. Unfortunately, the videos are of three types: Videos of a bunch of people pointing at the sun, and shouting the word “Miracle!” in various languages, and obviously looking extremely excited, but the sun itself looks totally normal, and the person taking the video apologizes and says that their camera isn’t good enough to capture it.
List of testimonies from Heroldsbach, Germany miracle (hosted on kommherrjesus.de).
Kriley Exca-Break

Kriley Exca-Break is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 24, 2022 and May 24, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Robert is endorsed by California businesses including Kriley Exca-Break". It most often appears alongside #Abolitionist, #AntiNazi, #antiwar.

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Kriley Exca-Break
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1
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1
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May 24, 2022
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May 24, 2022
May 24, 2022 · Original source
Robert is endorsed by California businesses including Valley Livestock Feed Recycling, Eaton Tire Service, and Kriley Exca-Break.
Ku Klux Klan

Ku Klux Klan is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 01, 2024 and May 01, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "which was basically 'don't be the KKK'". It most often appears alongside #MeToo, #StopAAPIHate, #StopAAPIHate.

Reference entry
Ku Klux Klan
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1
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1
First seen
May 01, 2024
Last seen
May 01, 2024
May 01, 2024 · Original source
No direct inline source block was recovered for this mention.
Kuomintang

Kuomintang is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 28, 2021 and June 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Taiwan, which was occupied by Kuomintang unconnected to its Japanese colonial tradition". It most often appears alongside Alexander Hamilton, America, ASEAN.

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Kuomintang
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1
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1
First seen
June 28, 2021
Last seen
June 28, 2021
June 28, 2021 · Original source
I'm not sure. It's worth noting that Korea and Taiwan were both Japanese colonies, and heavily influenced by Japanese economic philosophy. This seems especially clear in the case of Korea, whose economic miracle was led by Park Chung-Hee, a former Japanese officer who had studied Japanese economic theory. It's less obvious with Taiwan, which was occupied by Kuomintang unconnected to its Japanese colonial tradition. But of course the China of the time was also heavily influenced by Japan. Maybe the common factor among these three countries' economic policies was the heavy Japanese influence. And then mainland China had lots of reasons to be influenced by them, especially by Taiwan, and then Vietnam was influenced by mainland China.
Kursk

Kursk is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 03, 2023 and August 03, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "when the Russian submarine Kursk sank". It most often appears alongside Anatoly Sobchak, Antonio Russo, Artyom Borovik.

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Kursk
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1
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1
First seen
August 03, 2023
Last seen
August 03, 2023
Instagram handle
@p.k.81
August 03, 2023 · Original source
Seen on satirical conservative website Babylon Bee. This was exactly what happened with the Volgodonsk apartment bombing. The standard position in the West is now that Putin orchestrated the apartment bombings himself - killing 300 Russians - as a justification for escalating the war on Chechnya and to make himself look good after he framed some perpetrators. The plan worked. Putin won re-election handily. By the time people started questioning the official story, his power was already secure. The questioners faced harassment - typical “warning shots” would be burglaries of their houses with all the valuables left intact, or getting beaten up by random thugs while they were out walking, or being accused of a series of crimes - tax evasion, but if they proved themselves innocent of that, then it was taking bribes, and if they proved themselves innocent of that too, then it was failing to register their businesses correctly. Soon media oligarchs faced the same treatment, and either fled the country or handed their newspapers and TV channels over to the state. Boris Berezovsky, the oligarch who had originally helped put Putin in power, kept his own TV station until 2003, when the Russian submarine Kursk sank and Putin faced criticism for bungling the rescue. Putin summoned Berezovsky, the former kingmaker and the man still in charge of Channel One, and demanded that the oligarch hand over his shares in the television company. “I said no, in the presence of [chief of stff] Voloshin,” Berezovsky told me. “So Putin changed his tone of voice then and said, ‘See you later, then, Boris Abramovich.' and got up to leave. And I said, “Volodya [nickname for Vladimir], this is goodbye.’ We ended on this note, full of pathos […] Within days, [Berezovsky] had left for France, then moved on to Great Britain, joining his former [business] rival Gusinsky in political exile. Soon enough, there was a awarrant out for his arrest in Russia and he had surrendered his shares of Channel One. Over the next few years, Putin centralized authority further. He got Parliament to agree to constitutional changes where governors served at his whim, and members of Parliament were elected by governors. “The only official in the Russian Federation directly elected by the people was the President.” Then he made it clear that governors who kept his favor would keep their jobs, and vice versa. He developed an entire colorful vocabulary for threatening people, moving beyond traditional standbys like “Nice house you’ve got there, shame if something were to happen to it” into new realms of intimidation. A Prime Minister who quit after Putin arrested one too many media tycoon was given the parting words “If you ever have a problem with the tax police, you may ask for help, but please come to me personally.” An urban legend says that leading dissident Marina Salye received a New Year’s postcard from Putin: “I wish you a Happy New Year and the health to enjoy it.” By the time the next election came around in 2004, the vote counts were clearly fake. Gessen doubts Putin even had to give a direct order to falsify them; everyone was so desperate for his goodwill that they did so all on their own. The problem was less that honest officials refused to stuff the ballot box, and more that some bureaucrats were so desperate to make sure Putin knew they were complying with his (implied) desires that they faked the vote in extremely obvious ways, without even a nod to keeping it plausible. The Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe reported “The elections . . . failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments, calling into question Russia’s willingness to move towards European standards for democratic elections.” The New York Times reported something entirely different, publishing a condescending but approving editorial titled Russians Inch Toward Democracy. Putin had sunk far enough to earn the same dubious honor as Stalin: praise from the New York Times. IV. The Very-Briefly-Reluctant Culture Warrior One thing missing from this book: anything about religion, nationalism, gays, or the culture wars. This isn’t because Masha Gessen doesn’t care about these things: when the book was written, they self-described as “the only publicly out gay person in [Russia]”; since then (like everyone else) they have declared themselves nonbinary with they/them pronouns. In an afterword, Gessen remedies this omission. For his first decade, Putin wasn’t too interested in culture war topics; his ideology began and ended with “Russia strong”. But Gessen says that after another rigged election in 2012, people grew tired and started protesting Putin. Putin’s propaganda department made various accusations against the rioters, and one of them - they’re gay - seemed to stick. Putin had stumbled by coincidence onto a narrative that resonated with the Russian people. A few months later, a deliberately provocative punk band called Pussy Riot invaded a cathedral and sung a song whose chorus was “the Lord is shit”. Putin announced he was against this sort of thing, again his popularity soared, and again he took notice. Since then, he’s leaned into various culture-warrior roles that other people have cast upon him - protector of traditional values, leader of the conservative world, something something Eurasianism - without giving many clues how much he believes them vs. considers them useful bulwarks for his own power. Is it true that Putin only leaned into traditional values after 2012? I only looked into this question briefly, and it seems like he was on good terms with the Orthodox Church well before then. But some of this could have just been his native authoritarianism; just as he wanted to consolidate all media and business under his control, he wanted to consolidate all religion, and the Orthodox Church was the natural vehicle for, and a cooperative partner in, doing this. Both shared suspicion of invasive Western religions and Islam; both liked the idea of Russia being united in a top-down structure. God doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with it. V. Could It Happen Here? …is the question we ask at the end of every Dictator Book Club. The Man Without A Face makes it sound like Putin was able to consolidate power and become a dictator because: He led the security services
Kwakiutl

Kwakiutl is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 10, 2022 and June 10, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Among the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast of Canada". It most often appears alongside 50,000 BC, Africa, Altamira.

Reference entry
Kwakiutl
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
June 10, 2022
Last seen
June 10, 2022
June 10, 2022 · Original source
One might reasonably ask whether this was all responding solely to environmental concerns: altruistic during periods of being flush with resources, despotic during periods of scarcity. But that’s not what we see. Among the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast of Canada
among societies like the Inuit or Kwakiutl, times of seasonal congregation were also ritual seasons, almost entirely given over to dances, rites and dramas. Sometimes these could involve creating temporary kings or even ritual police with real coercive powers (though, often, peculiarly, these ritual police doubled as clowns). In other cases, they involved dissolving norms of hierarchy and propriety, as in the Inuit midwinter orgies.
KYCNOT.me

KYCNOT.me is a recurring organization in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 17, 2024 and December 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "And KYCNOT.me takes a different path and tries to aggregate ways to get crypto without going through centralized exchanges". It most often appears alongside 2016 US Presidential election, ACX Grant, AI.

Reference entry
KYCNOT.me
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 17, 2024
Last seen
December 17, 2024
December 17, 2024 · Original source
42: There are increasingly many attempts to make crypto directly useful (ie without state-controlled onramps and offramps) for the average consumer. Subdoor.xyz lets you pay for various online subscriptions with crypto. Monezon.com tried to do this for Amazon, but I’ve heard conflicting reports about whether it’s still up or whether it ever worked. And KYCNOT.me takes a different path and tries to aggregate ways to get crypto without going through centralized exchanges. So far these aren’t very good, but I think there’s a dynamic where in order to be willing to accept the occasional payments (X% of your yearly income) you only need the occasional purchase (X% of your yearly expenses) to be payable in crypto - so small conveniences can make a big different.