Publications: I

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InfoWars

InfoWars is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 5 times across 5 issues between July 22, 2022 and January 11, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "a couple random blogs and an InfoWars video"; "a guy in a tinfoil hat on Infowars"; "Looking on Infowars, one of their top stories as I write this". It most often appears alongside Trump, United States, COVID.

Article page
InfoWars
Mention count
5
Issue count
5
First seen
July 22, 2022
Last seen
January 11, 2023
July 22, 2022 · Original source
I accidentally proved my point in the process of writing this. I planned to reference a story where a Chinese weatherman was replaced by an AI replica for months without anyone noticing. I saw it on social media a while back - it never crossed my mind to fact check it, because nothing about the reporting seemed suspect. Here I am months later, about to use it in a piece, so I did some due diligence. Turns out that The Epoch Times is not a reliable publication. Cool, glad I checked, let me find a mainstream link… four search engines later and all I found was a couple random blogs and an InfoWars video, all pointing back to this one unassuming article.
December 20, 2022 · Original source
when you’re not sure which of many competing experts to trust, you should trust a prediction market instead of any of them Going through these claims one by one: 3.1: Why expect all prediction markets to agree with each other? Either all prediction markets agree with each other, or you can get rich quick: Suppose prediction markets disagreed. For example, suppose the RNC ran an Official Republican Prediction Market that said there was only a 10% chance Democrats would win the next election, and a 90% chance Republicans would. And suppose the DNC ran an Official Democrat Prediction Market that made the opposite prediction: 90% chance Democrats, 10% chance Republicans. Then you could buy a share of “Democrats will win” from the Republican market for 10 cents, plus a share of “Republicans will win” from the Democrat market for 10 cents, and be guaranteed to make $1 when one party or the other wins. You have turned 20 cents into a guaranteed $1. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This is just what financial experts call “arbitrage”. You may notice that in finance, people always give specific prices for things like shares of stock, barrels of oil, or Bitcoins. People say things like “Google stock is up to $300”, but never “Google stock is up to $300 on the NYSE, but down to $200 on NASDAQ”. If that was true, people would buy it on NASDAQ, sell it on NYSE, make $100 in free money, and get rich quick. In ideal situations, arbitrage forces everybody everywhere to agree on the same price for a financial instrument. Prediction markets turn claims about truth into financial instruments in a way which forces everybody everywhere to agree on how likely the claim is to be true. 3.2: Why expect prediction markets to be hard for special interests to manipulate? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt, or you can get rich quick. Argument: Suppose a prediction market was currently mispriced because of a manipulation attempt. For example, suppose there is a prediction market for whether the sun will rise tomorrow. The true probability is obviously 100%, corresponding to a cost of $1.00. But suppose some special interest who wanted to trick people into believing the sun would not rise successfully spent money to bid the market down to only 10%. This means that you can buy, for $0.10, a share which pays $1 if the sun rises tomorrow. In other words, you can dectuple your money for free. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. This may sound complicated in theory, but it plays out straightforwardly in real life. As a test, I tried to manipulate the market on whether Austin Chen, founder of Manifold Markets, would be charged with a felony. There’s no reason to think he should be, so the price started at 5%. I spent $200 in Manifold’s play money bidding it up to 95%. Within an hour, other investors noticed the mispricing and corrected it back down to 5% again. 3.3: Why expect prediction markets to be free from bias? Either a prediction market is not currently mispriced because of bias, or you can get rich quick. The argument: Suppose all smart people, including you, know that there is an 80% chance that the Democrats’ economic plan will create new jobs. But suppose that Republicans, because of their partisan biases, refuse to believe it, and say there is only a 40% chance. And suppose the Republicans set up their own prediction market where they bid the price of a share down to $0.40. You can, of course, go on this prediction market, buy shares for $0.40, and double your money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I already described how something like this happens on PredictIt (a non-ideal prediction market that you can only make a few hundred dollars in expectation by correcting), and that I do in fact make a few hundred dollars every election season. 3.4: Why should I believe a prediction market’s consensus over my own opinion? This is the same argument as “the prediction market will always be at least as accurate as the top expert” only with you in the place of the top expert. Either prediction markets are at least as smart as you are, or you can get rich quick. The argument here is the same as “at least as smart as the smartest expert” argument in 2, except replacing “the smartest expert” with “you”. But just to lay it out explicitly: Suppose you were smarter than some prediction market. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. I like this because it’s a good empirical test, and one that many people have tried. If you think you’re smarter than the prediction markets, bet on them and see what happens! I think most people will find that (over the long run) they lose money, and eventually this will cure them of their delusion that they can beat the markets. A few people might find that (over the long run) they do win money, just as a few people (eg Warren Buffett) can consistently win money on the stock market. Hopefully those people will quit their day jobs and become full-time prediction market traders. They’ll become multimillionaires, and their hard work will ensure that prediction markets stay more accurate than the rest of us. 3.5: Why should I believe that a prediction market makes good decisions about which of many competing experts to trust? Suppose you accept that a prediction market will always be at least as accurate as some well-known expert (eg Nate Silver). But what if you’re not sure who the real experts are? Or what if there are many experts, all saying different things, and nobody knows who to trust? In this case, a prediction market will always be at least as good as any other source (including you) at telling good experts from bad, or at figuring out which of many good experts is the best. By this point you should be able to predict the argument, but for completeness’ sake: Suppose you were better than the prediction market at determining which of many competing experts to trust, or how to aggregate the pronouncements of many experts into a single authoritative opinion. Then if you disagreed with the market, usually you would be right and it would be wrong. So look for cases where you disagree with the market, buy those shares, and you will make money in expectation. Repeat until you are rich or the mispricing has been corrected. To ground this in a real example, suppose there is some new virus which might or might not spread to the United States. A Harvard professor of epidemiology says there’s a 70% chance it will spread, a Yale professor of epidemiology says there’s an 90% chance it will spread, and a guy in a tinfoil hat on Infowars says there’s a 0% chance it will spread because it’s all a fake government plot. If I knew nothing else about this situation, I would probably think there’s about an 80% chance the virus will spread. I trust the Harvard and Yale professors equally much, and the tinfoil hat guy not at all. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 10%, because most people trusted the tinfoil hat guy. I would want to buy YES shares until the price got up to 80%, because in expectation I would octuple my money. Suppose I saw a prediction market that was only at 70%. Now I wouldn’t be sure whether the prediction market was dumber than me (believed tinfoil hat guy) or smarter than me (they know a lot about epidemiology - or about the credibility of specific experts - and have decided to trust the Harvard professor over the Yale professor). Maybe I could improve on this. If I knew things about epidemiology, I could read over both professors’ arguments and try to figure out if one was better than the other. If I knew things about academia, I could pick over both professors’ resumes and see whether the Harvard professor seemed more distinguished or had more respect in her own field than the Yale professor. In the end, I might decide the prediction market was right to price it at 70% (in which case I wouldn’t do anything), or that actually both experts seemed equally expert (in which case I might bid it up to 80%), or that actually the Yale epidemiologist was better (in which case I might bid it up to 90%). 3.5.1: Isn’t it weird to give non-experts (like prediction market investors) the final judgment in which of two experts is right? Yes, but I don’t think this is avoidable. If there were no such thing as prediction markets, and the Harvard epidemiologist said 70%, and the Yale epidemiologist said 90%, and the tinfoil hat guy said 0%, and for some reason it mattered a lot to you which of these was true - then you would still have to make that decision. If there’s some extremely authoritative source who can make the decision for you - let’s say the World Health Organization says “after reviewing all experts’ arguments, we believe that the final probability is 75%” - then great! Either: The WHO is clearly the most trustworthy source - in which case we go back to the Nate Silver situation where the prediction market should be just as accurate as it is.
December 22, 2022 · Original source
Looking on Infowars, one of their top stories as I write this is New Vaccine Data Shows Alarming Number Of Stillbirths And Miscarriages Caused By Covid Shot. It’s based on the VAERS system of vaccine adverse events, which looks like this:
Or how about this article: Kari Lake Trial Bombshell: Audit Reveals 42.5% of Ballots Randomly Sampled Were ILLEGAL Ballots. This describes the results of a real audit. It looks like 42.5% of ballots audited were printed the wrong size (19 inch ballots on 20 inch paper); if there’s some regulation saying the ballots have to be the right size, I guess this might be “ILLEGAL”. The Lake campaign says this proves some kind of foul play. The government argues that maybe they messed up printing the ballots, but it was an honest mistake, and if it rendered the ballots machine-unreadable they would have counted them by hand later, so the results are still fine. Infowars does a terrible job providing balance; they mostly just quote the Lake campaign’s accusations that it was sinister, while ignoring or downplaying the more plausible government statements. Still, on the most nitpicky level, as far as I can tell the article doesn’t say a lot which is literally false. Perhaps great journalism would investigate how the printing process worked and where it went wrong, but as far as I know neither side does that - they just report the relevant officials’ claims in more vs. less accusatory tones and expect you to make a judgment call based on your priors (mine are on “honest mistake”).
Looking through Infowars, it looks like many of their articles are around this quality of these two. Others are even less misinformative; there are lots of articles about members of some group Infowars doesn’t like committing a crime or doing an offensive thing; usually other sources confirm that these crimes or offenses are real. Or articles about “EXPERT SAYS X!”, where someone who could be charitably described as an expert (an MD or PhD) really did say X, even though X is insane and all other experts disagree. If Infowars is lying here, it’s by choosing to report on these stories instead of others, in a way that suggests they’re important - not by making up completely imaginary things on the spot.
December 29, 2022 · Original source
Last week I wrote The Media Very Rarely Lies. I argued that, although the media is often deceptive and misleading, it very rarely makes up facts. Instead, it focuses on the (true) facts it wants you to think about, and ignores other true facts that contradict them or add context. This is true of establishment media like the New York Times, but also of fringe media like Infowars. All of the “misinformation” out there about COVID, voter fraud, conspiracies, whatever - is mostly people saying true facts in out-of-context misleading ways.
Your analysis of InfoWars is itself lacking a key piece of context: you are reading its web site after it has declared bankruptcy following a $965 million verdict for defamation for claiming that the Sandy Hook shooting was a hoax and the bereaved parents were all professional actors. (Alex Jones, who runs InfoWars, also recently declared bankruptcy after a separate $473M verdict against himself personally.)
It's entirely reasonable that InfoWars completely revamped its approach to lying after those chickens came home to roost. I suspect that repeating the experiment with archived versions of the InfoWars front page on randomly selected dates in 2016-2021 would yield more examples of outright lies (not just about Sandy Hook), from before the site was deterred by defamation law.
January 11, 2023 · Original source
Comments About Whether Infowars Believes Their Own Claims
So 72% of people agreed that technically true but deliberately misleading things were lies. Could I have saved myself some trouble if I had titled the post “The Media Very Rarely Says False Things”? Or “The Media Very Rarely Makes Up Facts”? I think people would have been equally annoyed that I was using “false things” or “make up facts” in a way that excludes technically-true-but-misleading statements. Someone’s going to argue I should have gone all the way and titled it “The Media Very Rarely Lies, But This Is True Only In The Most Nitpicky Technical Sense Of The World Lie, And In The Normal Sense Of The Word They Definitely Do” - at which point I will remind you that I absolutely did that, I just put the second part in the subtitle instead of the title. If you can’t bring yourself to read the non-bolded gray text, there’s no helping you. 2: Comments Equating Lying With Egregiously Sloppy Reasoning Other people placed a lot of importance on the specific phrasing in the Infowars birth certificate article where it concluded “therefore, the birth certificate is false”. For example, Bakkot: I'm with you on the general point but I think you're being too charitable to InfoWars (and maybe others) in at least some examples. Take the InfoWars birth certificate one: in addition to all the claims about layers and so on, it says "the document is a shoddily contrived hoax". That is a factual claim which is false. They offer support for that claim which isn't actually convincing, and the support they offer happens to be true but out of context, and I'm with you on calling the supporting evidence "not lies". But "the document is a shoddily contrived hoax" is in fact flatly false, and is asserted by the article itself, not just "someone said". This seems wrongheaded to me. Reposting from my own comment there: when I say "Obama's birth certificate is real and not a forgery", I'm not tapping into the Platonic realm and reading the truth directly. I'm saying that I have seen a lot of evidence that makes me think Obama's birth certificate is real and not a forgery, and have inferred the conclusion "it's real and not a forgery" from that. If later it turned out it was a forgery - say there was some amazingly vast conspiracy theory that I completely missed - I wouldn't have been lying when I said the words "Obama's birth certificate is real and not a forgery". I would have been stating the conclusion I had inferred from my facts (which, in this hypothetical, would have been wrong, because I'm bad at reasoning). Jones states his own facts and the conclusion he infers from them. If his conclusion is wrong, the correct term for this wrongness is "failed inference", not "lying". Bakkot is still not happy with this: I don't think you've made a claim with reckless disregard for the truth, whereas I think InfoWars did. I am not at all convinced that InfoWars had a sincere belief that the birth certificate in question was a forgery. I think it is much more likely that they simply didn't care to know the truth of the matter. And I think it's reasonable to say that when someone makes it a false claim without caring whether or not it's true, that's a lie. This is the standard used for defamation in the US ("reckless disregard for the truth" is stock legal phrase), and defamation is usually understood to mean "lying about someone in a harmful way", so I think this is a pretty normal standard. At this point I acknowledge we’re disputing definitions, but I want to stand by mine. I’ve seen, again and again, that people are incapable of understanding that honest disagreement is possible. For example, I wrote about this here in the context of the millions of liberals who insist that conservatives can’t possibly care about fetuses’ lives and anyone who says they does must just be lying about it in order to justify their real program of oppressing women. When someone says “Joe is a liar”, I don’t want to have to ask every time “Do you mean you have some actual evidence for this, or that they said something you disagree with and you instantly leapt to ‘this is reckless disregard for the truth because nobody could ever be so dumb as to honestly disagree with me’?” I think if we let people use the word “lie” this way, then the overwhelming majority of accusations of lying would be false. Why would we want to define a word in a way that dooms it to constantly be used incorrectly to mislead people? I’m kind of sensitive to this because for almost every article I write, people in the comments accuse me of lying, or “pretending” I don’t know why the statements I made are wrong, or some other offense which I plead innocent to. My prior on “a randomly selected egregiously wrong person is lying” is much lower than the sort of people who make these accusations. I think people are just really paranoid about this, and we should use our terms carefully in a way that mitigates this paranoid rather than inflames it. Some of this might be more convincing after you read Part 6 of this post, where I list commenters’ proposed examples of media lies. Eric Newcomer writes: I hope we can all agree that the NYT wouldn't draw such big conclusions from such thin findings. The InfoWars birth certificate article doesn't even really seem internally certain about how PDF layers work. The critique I'm making now falls into the broader "InfoWars is much more egregious in its infractions than the NYT category." But I do think it reveals the slippery line between knowing lies and what one might call "lies of egregious sloppiness." If some serious part of a person knows that they haven't proved what they're claiming but they (or their bosses) insist on claiming that you have proved it, isn't that a form of lying? I’m sorry, but “lies of egregious sloppiness” sounds to me like “physical violence of egregious emotional violence”. Emotional violence and physical violence are both bad. Physical violence probably sounds worse to most people, and so it’s really tempting to, if emotional violence is really bad, say that that makes it a kind of physical violence. But I think that, although this is tempting, it’s false and you shouldn’t do it. I don’t want to say you’re allowed to sound more confident than you are. If you’re 71% confident, and you falsely say you’re 72% confident, then you are lying. But if you are very dumb, and seeing a random piece of toast makes you 100% confident that Obama’s birth certificate is false, and you vomit some random words to that effect onto a page, then you’re an idiot but not a liar. 3: Comments About Whether Infowars Believes Their Own Claims But I guess if you do want to be careful with the definition of the word “lie”, then it becomes important to know whether people at Infowars honestly believe their conspiracy theories or not. I don’t want to defend super-hard the thesis that they do. I’m not sure. If you forced me to guess, I’d say something like for a randomly given Infowars reporter and a randomly selected conspiracy theory they’re reporting on, 40% of the time they think it’s at least plausible enough that they’re doing good work by reporting on it, 20% of the time they know on some level that it’s false and they’re doing something wrong, and 40% of the time they’re in some kind of weird superposition where it seems emotionally true to them and they feel this hard enough that they never get around to asking whether it’s literally true. I’m really not attached to these numbers, but man are a lot of you attached to the claim that they definitely know their theories are false and are consciously lying. My main argument against this is that millions of people believe conspiracy theories - if they didn’t, we wouldn’t care so much about them! - and why shouldn’t some of those people work at Infowars? It would be quite a weird system for the conspiracy ecosystem to be run by an elite who secretly know they’re false, serving up fables to a base who believe them completely. How would you prevent some of the believers from rising into the elite? It would almost take a conspiracy of its own! Eric Newcomer has a more convincing counterargument than I expected: As an aside, I have personally worked at the NYT newsroom (reporting fellow) and at conservative outlet Washington Examiner. And I found the latter to be much sloppier and less worried about thinking through the impression it gave from facts. The Examiner would headline any big budget deficit number etc on my beat whereas the NYT had very detailed copy editors who would spot factual assertions in my copy that I didn't even consider I was making and push back on them. On InfoWars, it seems naive to presume that the outlet pushing the most misleading stories (InfoWars) is acting in good faith rather than just supplying readers with what they want. I get the point (one that Noam Chomsky has made) that outlets can just hire the bias that they want. But I actually think it's fairly hard to staff up true believers who can write and report credibly for conspiracy and super rightwing type stuff -- hence why a bunch of liberals like myself found themselves out of college writing for the local section of the Washington Examiner before it was killed. I find that on an intuitive level, I’m not too surprised to learn this - most journalists seem liberal, it would make sense that conservative papers couldn’t entirely escape this effect. On a more napkin-math level, I’m boggled - isn’t this embarrassing for the Examiner (and the journalists involved?) Wouldn’t they spend a lot of effort avoiding it? In a country with 100 million conservatives, is it really that hard to find a handful of them capable of writing news articles? There are many people writing okay-quality right-wing Substacks that get like five views per article. Are they doing this for the (nonexistent) money, without believing in the cause? If not, why couldn’t these people have been Washington Examiner reporters? Or InfoWarriors? I think Richard Hanania has a theory that a lot of liberals’ political advantage comes from a culture where they are happy to work themselves ragged for minimal compensation as long as it seems like like an impressive job they won’t be embarrassed to tell their friends and family about - ie intellectual college-degree-requiring labor. Maybe this is what the Examiner is taking advantage of? I don’t know. I don’t know what kind of ethical principles Eric considered when he decided to work for the Examiner, but I bet he wouldn’t have agreed to work for Infowars even if they paid him much more money. This should also factor into our calculations about whether Infowars is being staffed by Eric-equivalents. Human writes: There is at least one former infowars employee who alleges that their stories are (at least often) known to be false. The most clear-cut example I can quickly find is here: "Shortly after Jones began selling the supplements, someone posted a video on YouTube holding a Geiger counter displaying high radiation readings on a beach in Half Moon Bay, Calif. The video went viral, stoking fears that radiation from Fukushima was drifting across the Pacific Ocean. Jones saw an opportunity and sent me, along with a reporter, a writer and another cameraman, to California. We had multiple Geiger counters shipped overnight, unaware of how to read or work them, and drove up the West Coast, frequently stopping to check radiation levels. Other than a small spike in Half Moon Bay — which the California Department of Public Health said was from naturally occurring radioactive materials, not Fukushima — we found nothing. "Jones was furious. We started getting calls from the radio-show producers in the office, warning us to stop posting videos to YouTube stating we weren’t finding elevated levels of radiation. We couldn’t just stop, though; Jones demanded constant real-time content. On some of these calls, I could hear Jones screaming in the background." See also here for a discussion of Jones admitting he was lying about Sandy Hook during the lawsuit. 4: Comments On Why 8% Of Americans Said They Had Relatives Who Died From The COVID Vaccine Many people, including me, were confused by a poll in which 8% of Americans said they had a relative who died from the COVID vaccine. I speculated that maybe they were reading too quickly and misinterpreted it as “a relative who got the COVID vaccine”. But Tytonidaen wrote: I think a more likely explanation is that many people are choosing to attribute deaths to the vaccine that are not actually from the vaccine. For example, let's say Person A gets vaccinated and dies shortly after of some completely unrelated cause. And let's say Person B, the loved one being polled, has priors about vaccines or the medical establishment or whatever that cause them to be convinced it was actually the vaccine that killed Person A. In hypothetical reality, Person A lived a rather unhealthy lifestyle, had lots of risk factors for a heart attack, and would have died from a heart attack, regardless of whether they'd gotten the vaccine. Then, when Person A does, indeed, die of a heart attack, and by sheer coincidence had recently gotten vaccinated, Person B blames the COVID vaccine when polled, but it wasn't really the vaccine that killed their loved one. It might be easier to believe that outside forces (like a vaccine) harmed the person than to believe that the loved one's own actions did (like a poor lifestyle, not taking their meds, etc.). That's only one example, but I think the underlying dynamic could easily explain the poll results. None Of The Above wrote: In general, it seems like when you ask a factual question with partisan/CW valence on a poll, and the respondents don't know much about the factual question, they answer the "whose side are you on" question instead. That is, if you ask Republican-voting biologists, they'll nearly all tell you the Theory of Evolution is basically how living stuff came to be, but if you ask Republican-voting normies whose vaguely-remembered high school biology class may have mentioned Darwin a few times, they'll answer that evolution is a lie--they don't really know one way or another, they're just answering the "whose side are you on" question. Democratic normies will far more often tell you evolution is true, but probably could do little better in explaining why than the Republican normies could in explaining why evolution is really an atheist lie of some kind. Zack wrote: I took a time-boxed peek at the Pollfish data. The 1500 results were splint into 3 batches of 500. I arbitrarily selected the Jul 4 file to look at. In that file, there were 36 respondents who reported a household member had died from he vaccine. Focusing on those responses, I noticed a few interesting patterns. Of those 36 respondents, 10 responded "Yes" to both the question about death of a household member from COVID and death of a household member from the vaccine. I'm skeptical that 10 out of 500 people were unfortunate enough to have 2 household members die: one from COVID and one from the vaccine. (Especially because these are not large households; 4 of these 10 report that they have 1 other household member, and 5 of these 10 report having 2-4 other household members.) Of these 36 respondents, 20 responded "Yes" to both the question about death of a household member from the vaccine and "Are you planning on getting future COVID vaccines?" I'm skeptical that 55% of people who had a household member die of a vaccine would plan to get the vaccine themselves. Of these 36 respondents, there are even 4 who experienced a surprising number of adverse affects from the vaccine (Myocarditis, Pericarditis, AND Bell's Palsy ) requiring hospitalization in addition to having a household member die from the vaccine. Of these 4, 2 selected all of the following: "It will likely shorten my lifespan", "I am now unable to hold a job", "I am now unable to work a full day", "It impacts my personal life", "It is a minor annoyance". Those two are planning to get the vaccine again. There's some overlap between these respondents. Ignoring all of them drops from 36 who had a household member die of the vaccine to 12. I don't see obvious inconsistencies in these responses. However, there seems to be a broader issue with the survey design. They look at average time to complete each question, but average doesn't seem like the right measure here (3 people took 10+ minutes to answer; summed, the fastest 250 responses took about as long as those slowest 3). Of the 500 responses, most people seem to answer 7-10 questions. I timed myself just reading those questions silently in my head (not thinking about the answers). Of three attempts, my fastest was a bit over 17 seconds. 40 people completed the survey in 17 seconds or less. I'm skeptical it's possible for someone to provide a quality response to the survey that quickly. 225 people (nearly half) completed the survey in less than 31 seconds. I think that's the fastest I could answer if I were seeing the questions for the first time. It seems like Pollfish's model may encourage hasty, poor quality responses; "Pollfish uses non-monetary incentives like an extra life in a game or access to premium content." (https://resources.pollfish.com/pollfish-school/how-the-pollfish-methodology-works/) It seems like that creates a misalignment of incentives; the respondent is in a hurry to get back to whatever they were doing. They provide survey fraud protection, and claim it filters suspiciously quick or suspiciously consistent answers (e.g., the same answer for all questions), but it seems to be overlooking obviously problematic responses in this case. (https://resources.pollfish.com/pollfish-school/how-pollfish-prevents-fraudulent-responses/) This bothered me enough that I emergency-edited the ACX Survey partway through to include (slightly differently phrased variants of) the two questions on the poll: Did anyone in your family (as per your best guess) die of COVID?
Did anyone in your family (as per your best guess) die of COVID vaccine side effects? I got 917 responses so far. On Kirsch’s original poll, the answers were 3.5% and 7.9%; on my survey, they were 6.8% and 0.9%. I think my higher rate of COVID deaths was because I carelessly changed “household” to “family”, which includes eg extended family. But why did I get so many fewer vaccine deaths? Looking at these people's other responses, they did not show a consistent tendencies to make things up or say outrageous things (except for one who listed their religion as “Satanist”). That having been said, they did have an atypical response pattern; most ACX readers are white male Westerners, but these people were 38% female, 38% nonwhite, and 88% non-American. Highest degree was 12% high school, 25% college grad, and 63% postgrad; IQs were listed as extremely high, just like everyone else who gives their IQs on my survey. Politics were significant for 25% Marxist (otherwise a rarity in my survey), but otherwise typical, and did not lean right-wing. They were slightly, but not overwhelmingly, more likely to distrust the media and dislike strong COVID responses than other survey respondents. Overall I don't feel like I learned too much from examining them. The survey is still open (take it now if you haven’t already!) and I'm hoping to get more data on this later. 5: Comments Pointing Out Very Clear Examples Of Media Lies Several people agreed with the wider point, but tried to find a counterexample - a media lie so explicit that nobody could ever deny it. Some people noted that the term “fake news”, when invented in 2016, was originally applied to a very specific kind of fake article, often from weird Macedonian article mills, that were saying utterly fake stuff in a way that even Infowars didn’t. Robert Stadler: This was what was interesting about the phenomenon of "fake news" during the 2016 election, before that term was successfully hijacked by Donald Trump to mean "news stories I don't like." There was a wave of what looked like news articles, spread largely via Facebook, that were entirely fictitious. The people writing those "articles" were not journalists and were not trying to be journalists. They made up the stories out of a mix of rumor and complete fabrications, either for political purposes or just as click-bait (this has never been entirely clear to me). It's unfortunate that the term "fake news" has been so thoroughly tainted, because the existence of those articles was genuinely noteworthy, and it's now harder to talk about them . . . I don't remember any myself (since it's been 6 years), but here's a study which has some specifics - http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf After some searching, Benjamin Jest (writes As Fair A Name) was finally able to produce a specific example - Nancy Pelosi Hanged At Gitmo - which does, indeed, claim that leading US Democrat Nancy Pelosi was hanged at Guantanamo Bay for “treason and conspiracy” on December 27, 2022. It seems to suggest that the order was given by Donald Trump, who is still President, and that Hillary Clinton had already been executed in the same manner in April 2021. I will admit this is definitely an example of a “news source” making things up rather than just stretching the truth. The source, RealRawNews, claims on its About Page to be a “parody site”, but this outside article about them says they go back and forth between claiming to be a parody and claiming to be real. Some of their claims are more plausible than the Gitmo one - for example, that many Air Force pilots were resigning because of the COVID vaccine mandate - but equally false. They seem to go back and forth between “things that some conservatives might believe to be true” and “things that are obviously false but maybe gratify conservatives’ id”, adding or subtracting the “parody” label based on which one they’re doing at the time. It’s a fascinating business model, and I guess the term “fake news” fairly applies to it. Yug Gnirob writes: I don't know how to find them, but I definitely remember several completely fake articles about Trump during and immediately after the election. One of them was him citing "an ancient law" that prevented President Obama from doing... some liberal thing, I don't remember what. The most memorable one was immediately after the "Muslim Ban", where they claimed it had resulted in the arrest of a high-priority terrorist on day 1. I feel like that one showed up on one of the fact check sites, but I'm not seeing it on Snopes. I remember Stephen Colbert reporting the articles had been tracked down to a couple of Macedonian teens, who had discovered that writing fabricated pro-Trump articles was an easy way to make money. 6: Comments Making Other Claims Of Media Lies And Misdeeds — Beowulf888 on the LA Times and COVID: Well, there are media outlets that propagandize—but I think it boils down to if it bleeds it leads. Most corporate media outlets have the economic incentive to increase the readership by grabbing one's attention with scary headlines and articles. The perfect example of this phenomenon was in April 2020 when the LA Times interviewed an atmospheric chemist at Scripps. She made the claim that SARS2 virus particles in sewage were being carried back to land by sea spray. The reporters and editors uncritically relayed her comments as if she were an expert with the same credentialled expertise as a virologist or epidemiologist. There are numerous reasons why this would be very very low on the threat level even with what little we knew about the SARS2 virus at that time. This story was picked up by the media everywhere, and county health officials (either because there was public pressure to do so, or because they really believed her) shut down beaches up and down the coast of California. Did the LA Times and the news media really have any motivation to promote the closure of public beaches? I can't imagine they did. But they did have a scary headline that would promote readership and spread LA Times as a news source. Some weeks later the LA Times did a retraction, but by that time it had entered the popular imagination that beaches were a potential vector for COVID infection. I’m developing an allergy to the word “uncritically”. Being able to fact-check scientists is a rare skill - I’m not surprised nobody at the LA Times had it ready to deploy for this exact article. — Mike Mulligan writes: The pushback is largely because you are doing a false equivocation between the New York Times (who you hate and have a vendetta against) and Infowars (who you are pretending does basically the same thing as other outlets). And you know this, but on your own metric it won't count as a lie, because you just selectively misrepresented things. On the two articles in this series, I’ve included phrases like “This doesn’t mean these establishment papers are exactly as bad as Infowars; just that when they do err, it’s by committing a more venial version of the same sin Infowars commits” and “Again, my goal here isn’t to . . . say NYT is exactly as bad as Infowars” and tried to explain the exact way that two things can both commit a similar error without one being exactly as the other (Hitler and someone who shot a robber in self-defense both committed a similar action called “killing people”, but this doesn’t mean they both killed exactly the same people with exactly the same level of justification). Still, I got numerous comments getting angry at me for saying that I was calling NYT exactly as bad as Infowars, and saying I was being deceptive / lying because of this. This is why I’m so convinced people are erring on the side of too mistrustful - you can fill your articles with sentences about how you’re not claiming X, and people will still find ways to accuse you of lying because you said X. — Garrett writes: [The way Infowars covered Obama’s birth certificate] isn't any different from eg. mainstream media coverage of anything which involves firearms. They make (or promulgate) so many stupid technical errors I've stopped paying attention to them at all. They could have 1 person on staff who's responsibility is to understand firearms and run everything past them. But they don't. To what should I attribute this continual stream of errors? Is mainstream media coverage of firearms honestly flawed? Is it “reckless disregard for truth?” Is it a “lie of egregious sloppiness?” I think your answer to this question will depend more on how bad you want to accuse the mainstream media of being, relative to other forms of media, than on how you define these inherently slippery terms. — Jeremy Goldberg writes: There's an outright lie right now on the Washington Post homepage. A caption above a graph showing the inflation rate over time states, "Elevated prices coming down, annualized rate shows." The chart shows the current inflation rate is 7.1 percent, down from a high of around 9 percent. Elevated prices are not coming down at all. They just aren't elevating as fast anymore. I asked Jeremy to guess the probability that this was an honest mistake vs. malice. He said (thanks for giving a clear answer!) 60-40 in favor of malice. I think this is pretty high, given that I had to read Jeremy’s comment several times before I realized what the error was supposed to be, but I’ve already said I lean towards the “all the rest of you are extremely paranoid” side of things. — Jiro writes: I opened a thread on dsl: https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php/topic,8430.0.html People brought up several examples there. You can read the thread. One of the more famous examples was saying that Kyle Rittenhouse crossed state lines with a weapon. There are also a bunch of cases where the media says there's "no evidence" for something that has evidence. Someone also brought up your own example of people "tested for drugs" when they were actually just asked if they used drugs. I would count that as an outright lie, even though you don't. I disagree that being asked if someone used drugs is a "test". Oh god, if saying there’s “no evidence” for something counts as a lie, then every media source in the country stands hopelessly condemned. I did write an article (here) on what the people who use that phrase might be thinking (if you can call it that). I agree the Rittenhouse situation was pretty egregious, though commenters bring up that since he went across state lines and had a weapon, it wasn’t unreasonable for people to assume he brought the weapon across state lines. Still, you wonder whether news sources would have repeated reasonable-sounding-but-didn’t-actually-check slanders about someone they liked. I do think this is a good antidote to some of the “mainstream media is actually very careful and fact-checks everything in their original reporting” takes in the comments section. — David Riceman says: How about Richard Landes's new book "Can the whole world be wrong?" about the many lies in the cognitive war against Israel (e.g. Muhammad Al Dura) See his discussion here for why he thinks this is a good example. — FractalCycle writes: I'm collecting examples from other people, will post ones that seem like real counterexamples as I get them. Here's one from recently: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/jsByfxvNA4x23stLY/a-letter-to-the-bulletin-of-atomic-scientists Yes, I included this issue with the Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists in my last links post, and they really do come out looking very bad here. See here for more discussion. — Hank Wilbon (writes Partial Magic) writes: I think the false Rolling Stone story a decade ago about the frat gang rape counts as the media explicitly lying, particularly as Rolling Stone is historically known for good fact checking (It is a plot point in the movie Almost Famous), however I think that counts as a "very rare" case and that Scott's claim is correct. I asked “Why? A woman said she had been raped, and Rolling Stone believed her. The woman was making it up, but Rolling Stone wasn't” and Deepa commented “Isn't it the job of a reporter to investigate? And be good at it?” I don’t want to pick on Deepa, but this is what happens when you have an overly expansive definition of “lie”! — TorontoLLB writes: The most straightforward counterexample I can think of is the NBC manipulation of the George Zimmerman 911 call. For example this: "The 9-1-1 operator then asked: "OK, and this guy, is he black, white or Hispanic?", and Zimmerman answered, "He looks black." was changed to: ""This guy looks like he's up to no good. He looks black." In another segment they combined completely separate parts of the call to create an audio clip that presents him as saying ""This guy looks like he's up to no good or he's on drugs or something. He's got his hand in his waistband, and he's a black male." There was other bits of reporting from the major networks that appear to be closer to fraud than selective amplification or choosing what not to report. Enough so that in Twitter threads asking people how they got "red-pilled" person after person refers to the media response to the incident. I haven’t looked into this and I can’t confirm or deny that this is true. I hope everyone finds at least one of these comments obviously fair, and at least another obviously unfair, in a way that encourages you to think more about these issues. 7: Other Comments — Paul writes: What's funny is the Weekly World News - the supermarket tabloid with headlines declaring Bigfoot had been found, and married to a local man's sister!; JFK was still alive, etc. - would pass muster under this analysis. They always had sources report stories to them. Those sources were just batshit crazy. Their strategy was simply not to question them skeptically to poke holes in their story as an ordinary reporter/person would, but to encourage them - "Wow, really, a wedding; what was Bigfoot wearing?" I don't mean to entirely dismiss the distinction you make. But in insisting that not a single story - not even one of the most egregious stories by the most irresponsible, disreputable, of barely-extant publications - is a lie, I think you try to prove too much. In doing so, you retreat so far that you defend only a weak and emasculated position, not any of the broader or more meaningful points implicated by your piece. Thanks for this - I always wondered what those tabloids thought they were doing, and for some reason this matches my model of human psychology better than my previous theories about “maybe they just made it up” - though I bet they do some of that too. — John Buridan writes: I used to have very low priors against conspiracy theories and so was willing to hear out the arguments at length and go back and forth for many weeks and months on a single theory. I would say my conspiracy theory expertise is in creationism and government conspiracies, especially ones involving either Catholicism or Judaism. And I'm okay on one's involving fluoridation, chemtrails, and GMOs etc. One of my housemates was a senior when I was a freshman in college gave me the Adobe illustrator birth certificate shtick, and we went through it together. We downloaded the birth certificate, uploaded it to Adobe illustrator, and saw the weird things. Then I went back to my day job where I was learning Adobe Illustrator. This is maybe 2 weeks later. And what do I find but that when I do this with any PDF, Illustrator renders it in the same janky way? Conspiracy dissolved. I grew up surrounded by people who believed conspiracy theories, although none of those people were my parents. And I have to say that the fact that so few people know other people who believe conspiracy theories kind of bothers me. It's like their epistemic immune system has never really been at risk of infection. If your mind hasn't been very sick at least sometimes, how can you be sure you've developed decent priors this time? Of course, this just all goes back to the dark matter beliefs of people in our outgroup. And the eternal question of where do good priors come from? How do some people's beliefs get so messed up? Thanks for this. I agree that a little bit of experience personally believing conspiracy theories, or knowing people who do, goes a long way. When I was a teenager, I flirted with a lot of pseudoarchaeology theories - think Graham Hancock, underwater pyramids, that kind of thing. I got better, but it left me with a visceral understanding of how people can genuinely believe weird things - not be lying about it, not be secretly making some kind of emotional point about how they hate the system, not be deliberately trying to be as sloppy as possible because you’re a bad person - just genuinely believe it because you tried to reason about it and failed. I think if you haven’t had that experience, then it’s really hard to understand people who have. 8: My Actual Thoughts I should probably try to say, as clearly as possible, what I think. It seems like all of these are different things: Reasoning well, and getting things right
If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It

If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between January 21, 2026 and February 24, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "I have a post called If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It"; "People in his replies tried to enforce a norm (cf. If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It)"; "pathetic defense I called out in If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It". It most often appears alongside A16Z, Trump, Twitter.

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January 21, 2026 · Original source
I have seen people try to walk this back by saying Adams only meant they would be persecuted in some way that was metaphorically equivalent to hunting, but I feel like “good chance you will be dead within the year” is saying he means the kind of hunting which literally kills you, and “police will stand down” means that it will be the sort of extremely illegal thing that police would normally react to. I have seen other people try to link this to examples of Republicans actually getting killed, such as Charlie Kirk. But Adams was telling his readers there was “a good chance” that “they” would be dead within a year, which I think implies this fate happening to a significant proportion of ordinary Republicans, not just one prominent person. Also, Kirk was five years after the comment was posted. Can we dismiss this as a joke? I think Adams has used the manipulation technique of saying things that might or might not be jokes and then strategically sticking to them or saying “What? Me? I was only joking! Haha! You can’t take a joke!” depending on which was more convenient to him at that exact second, enough times that I’m not comfortable letting him have that escape. Also, when I was replying to Joel Pollak about this, I happened to glance at his Twitter account, and one of the top tweets was a repost of someone saying that “The Democrat playbook is to arrest every single person who disagrees with them”. I think if I forced Pollak into some kind of extremely literal frame of mind - maybe asked him to bet money on whether I could tweet the words “the Democrats are wrong about immigration” in my Democrat-controlled state without getting arrested - he would admit that, okay, they don’t want to arrest literally every single person who disagrees with them. He was exaggerating for effect, probably in much the way he’s going to say that Scott Adams was exaggerating for effect. You say stuff like “The Democrats are going to HUNT YOU DOWN and LITERALLY MURDER YOU. They will TORTURE YOUR FAMILY and RAPE YOUR DAUGHTER and EAT YOUR PETS and TURN YOUR HOUSE INTO A CHURCH OF SATAN”, and what you mean is “I disagree with the Democrats and sometimes they go overboard cancelling people”. I have a post called If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It. My thesis is that tolerating claims of “directional correctness” - the thing where someone asks to get a pass because even if they said wasn’t literally true, it “points to” an “emotionally correct” thing - is eventually totally corrosive. It means everyone ratchets up their claims to the highest level they think they can get away with (ie walk back later if challenged, as a motte and bailey). And then you end up with this miasma where maybe 5% of people totally believe you, and 50% of people sort of absorb the connotation and think something like that is true, and then people get terrified of the Democrats and think of them as monsters and treat politics as an existential struggle where they will genuinely get arrested or murdered unless they do it to the Democrats first, and then you get a civil war or something. I think Adams and Pollak’s milieu has in fact reached this point, and their love for these kinds of exaggerations is a big part of the cause. Adams was one of the funniest people in the world. If he was actually telling a joke, you could tell by the fact that you were laughing hysterically. “Democrats will hunt and kill you” isn’t funny. I’ll refrain from judgment about whether it was Adams’ sincerely held belief, some kind of annoying manipulation attempt, or whether Adams even recognized a difference between the two. But I think judging him on the fact that it didn’t happen is completely within bounds. … 3: Comments On The Substance Of The Piece … Zanzibar BuckBuck McFate writes: This business where boomers are tolerant of contradictions and find them amusing whereas millennials are horrified is a dynamic I've noticed as well, it seems to be true in politics also, I myself feel this hunger to be authentic all the time. I think it has something to do with the difficulty children have in putting negativity in context. They can't distinguish between a parent having a bad day and venting, or having an existential crisis. So the 50s guy was half right - you don't have to love your boss in your heart of hearts but careful what you say to your kids. Feral Finster writes: » “This is the basic engine of Dilbert: everyone is rewarded in exact inverse proportion to their virtue. Dilbert and Alice are brilliant and hard-working, so they get crumbs. Wally is brilliant but lazy, so he at least enjoys a fool’s paradise of endless coffee and donuts while his co-workers clean up his messes. The P.H.B. is neither smart nor industrious, so he is forever on top, reaping the rewards of everyone else’s toil. Dogbert, an inveterate scammer with a passing resemblance to various trickster deities, makes out best of all.” Compare with the famous observation that executives are sociopaths, management are clueless, and the workers losers. Yeah, it’s interesting to compare Rao and Adams. Rao formulated his Gervais Principle as a specific response to Adams’ Dilbert Principle, which I guess means Rao thought Adams got it wrong. Did he? The Pointy Haired Boss seems to go back and forth between Clueless and Sociopath, which is probably why Rao thought Adams’ work fell short. Dogbert is clearly Sociopath, but has no permanent role in the corporation, and doesn’t really represent a real thing you can be - his character was a ridiculous scammer who succeeded at near-impossible endeavours (like convincing people he was a Nostradamus-style mystical prophet) because the logic of the strip demanded it. Later, Adams foregrounded the CEO character more, maybe to create a purer Sociopath, letting the Boss go closer to Clueless. This is making me somewhat regret accusing Adams of wanting to be the Pointy-Haired Boss. It would have been fairer (and less of an accusation/surprise) to accuse him of wanting to be Dogbert. But again, Dogbert doesn’t represent a real thing you could be, which might have been why the PHB made a better metaphor. (contra my claim, the cover of Win Bigly shows a mashup of Dogbert and Trump. Fine, Dogbert is a thing one person can be.) You can read my full review of The Gervais Principle here. cincilator writes: Scott Alexander, former tribune of nerds now says that the sneerclub was right about everything all along? I didn’t expect that, let me tell you. Several people interpreted me as attacking nerds. I disagree - I think I was attacking self-hating nerds, because nerdiness is fine and you shouldn’t have to hate yourself for it. To spell it out more explicitly: All nerds must eventually realize they’re not going to immediately dominate everything by intellect alone. This isn’t because intellect isn’t great, it’s because 1) it’s only one of many skills, and 2) you probably aren’t even the person with the most intellect. Again, every mildly-talented person has to face this realization, whether it’s a nerd realizing he won’t be the next Einstein or a jock realizing he won’t be the next LeBron. If someone deals with this using denial (one of Freud’s maladaptive defenses), you get the nerd who says no, I really am the next Einstein, ie a crackpot, aka the sort of person who gets featured on Sneerclub. If they deal with it using reaction formation (another of Freud’s maladaptive defenses), you get the self-hating nerd, aka the sort of person who joins Sneerclub4. If they just deal with it maturely instead of spinning up maladaptive defenses against it, they’re a nerd who is hopefully good-natured and accepting of their nerdiness, and hopefully does some good work in some specific small area, and changes the world in some specific small way (or some very large way, if they can work together with other people and get lucky). Bugmaster writes: I think Adams is basically correct. Yes, facts and evidence do exist and are real; but they have virtually no impact on anything socially important -- i.e., on anything important whatsoever. Memes and charisma and persuasion are what matters if you want to achieve life goals that extend beyound yourself and your immediate family. I worry that Adams (and you) are doing something where unless the average person can solve every problem by facts and intelligence alone, then facts+intelligence lose and memes and persuasion win. But the average person also can’t solve every problem by memes+persuasion alone! If Dilbert is an 80th percentile nerd, the 80th percentile persuader is - I don’t know, a used-car salesman? Dilbert’s probably earning more money, especially nowadays when he could make L5 at Google. And if Donald Trump is a 99.9999th percentile persuader, the 99.9999th percentile nerd is Ilya Sutskever. Probably most people would slightly prefer being Trump to Sutskever, but Sutksever does have a couple billion dollars, plus the more ethereal rewards of genius; it still seems like a pretty good deal. I also think you’re doing a sort of black-and-white thinking here. Every day, great persuaders like Sam Bankman-Fried and Elizabeth Holmes end up in jail, because in fact the things that they said were true were not true. Every day, smooth-talking charismatic manipulators successfully seduce the girl into bed with them, then totally fail to turn it into a happy stable marriage, because after a few years even the dumbest woman catches on and figures out whether her mate provides real value or not. Even Donald Trump has only a 37% approval rating, because he can’t make “we should alienate our allies over Greenland” sound plausible to most of the American people. When someone’s very good at it, persuasion sometimes helps them blur facts around the edges. But that’s it. Nobody except Scott Adams and a few psychotherapists ever go to hypnotist school. Most don’t even go to any formal persuasion classes. That’s because hypnotism/persuasion isn’t really a lifehack that helps you win all the time at everything. If the world’s best hypnotist asked a room of VCs for money with a stupid business plan, he would probably fail. This isn’t to say persuasion is useless, and in certain fields it can be very powerful indeed. But let’s not go crazy and start worshipping it. The grass is always greener on the other side. The nerd sits in his cubicle and thinks “If only I were more charismatic.” But the salesman with the bright teeth and the firm handshake thinks “Man, I bet I could get out of this dead-end job if only I were smarter.”5 … 4: The Part On Race And Cancellation (INCLUDED UNDER PROTEST) … Ilya Lozovsky writes: Ninety percent of this essay is brilliant — smarter and realer than anything anyone else has written about Adams — but the end lost me. It's too generous, to the point of being a whitewash. Adams was vicious and hateful and played a material role in convincing Americans to vote for actual fascism. I don't think it's right to "hand it to him." JJ McCullough (JJM’s Shortstack) writes: Good essay, but I think you kinda yadda-yadda'd away his racist rant, which was extremely explicit and extended. I think it was the opposite of a "bog-standard cancellation," which we think of as being a slightly unfair, overzealous policing of an at least slightly subjectively offensive comment, often from years ago. But Scott went on quite a long diatribe about why black people, as a group, are dangerous and undesirable to be around, and why he, personally, goes out of his way to avoid them. Some conservatives have tried to use "bog-standard" anti-woke logic in defending him, but no, his comments really are quite explicitly and undeniably racist, if that term has any useful definition at all. Alex Wotbot writes: Now, you quoted Adams saying: “the best advice I would give to white people is to get the hell away from black people; just get the fuck away” If this was the intended point, does it really make sense that only the far-left freaked out? It’s kind of important to mention this was within a hypothetical. Suppose a survey reported that 26% of a population believes “The phrase ‘It’s OK to be blonde’ is hate speech” and another 21% weren’t sure if they agree with the statement or not. Now suppose you were blonde, would you hang around that population? Now go read the February 2022 Rasmussen Reports survey. Please do better than this, I don’t want to have to Gell-Mann memoryhole this. Many people had strong opinions on this, so I have to respond to it. But first, I want to make it extra clear in capital letters: I AM DOING THIS IN THE COMMENTS POST, TO RESPOND TO YOUR COMMENTS, AND NOT BECAUSE I THINK IT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING. Certain people screenshotted the one paragraph of my ten thousand word essay that discussed this and posted it on Twitter, in order to make it look like I was joining in some kind of chorus of liberals reducing Adams to his worst moment. I posted what I thought was a no-nonsense, factual description of what happened, in order not to be accused of hiding it or covering it up. It was the least important part of my essay, I’m aware that writing about it at all opens me to attack from both sides, and I discuss it here only to respond to all of you who wanted to know my opinion on it. Just don’t screenshot it on Twitter and say “LOOK SCOTT IS STILL HARPING ON THE RACE THING”, that’s all I’m asking. That having been said… To make sure we’re all on the same page - Adams’ comments were prompted by this poll, conducted February 2023. The question was: “Do you agree or disagree with this statement: ‘It’s OK to be white’” Among blacks, 53% agreed, 26% disagreed, and 21% were “not sure”. Among whites, the numbers were 81/7/13. Here’s the video of Adams’ comments: Transcript: If nearly half of all blacks are not okay with white people - according to this poll, not according to me - that’s a hate group. And I don’t want to have anything to do with them. And I would say, based on the current way things are going, the best advice I would give to white people is to get the hell away from black people. Just get the f**k away. Wherever you have to go. Just get away. Cause there’s no fixing this. This can’t be fixed. You just have to escape. That’s what I did. I went to a neighborhood with a very low black population. Because unfortunately, there’s a high correlation between the density - this is according to Don Lemon, here I’m just quoting Don Lemon, who said when he lived in a mostly black neighborhood, there were a bunch of problems he didn’t see in white neighborhoods. So even Don Lemon sees a big difference, for your quality of living, based on where you live and who’s there. So I think it makes no sense whatsoever as a white citizen of America to try to help black citizens anymore. It doesn’t make sense. Because there’s no longer a rational impulse. And so I’m… I’m gonna, uh, I’m gonna back off from being helpful to black America, because it doesn’t seem like it pays off. Like I’ve been doing it all my life, and I’ve been… the only outcome is I get called a racist. That’s the only outcome. [cackles] It makes no sense to help black Americans if you’re white… it’s over. Don’t even think it’s worth trying. Totally not trying. Is this racist? I have a piece called Against Murderism, where I talk about why it’s so hard for people to agree on questions about “racism”. The summary: although it would be possible to have someone be purely, axiomatically racist - having it be a premise of their reasoning that they hate black people - in practice few people are like this. More typically, people have some argument more like: I don’t like [specific bad thing]
February 05, 2026 · Original source
There seems to be a general mood that OpenAI is vulnerable these days, culminating in Anthropic Superbowl commercials making fun of it for introducing ads. I thought the commercials were in bad taste, misrepresenting what OpenAI’s ads would be like and turning the completely normal decision for a tech company to have an ad-supported free version of their product into some kind of horrible betrayal. I thought Sam Altman’s response was fair (although his countercriticism of Anthropic also missed the mark). People in his replies tried to enforce a norm of “if you write a long explanation defending yourself against someone else’s funny lies, that means you care and you lose”, but that’s a stupid norm and people should stop shoring it up (cf. If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It).
February 24, 2026 · Original source
But the inverse evil trick is saying something “directionally correct”, ie slightly stronger than the truth can support. If your enemy committed assault, say he committed murder. If he committed sexual harassment, say he committed rape. If your drug increases cancer survival by 5% in rats, say that it “cures cancer”. Then, if someone calls you on it, accuse them of “literally well ackshually-ing” you, because you were “directionally correct” and it’s offensive to the victims to try to defend assault-committed sexual harassers. This is the sort of pathetic defense I called out in If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct It.
Insight

Insight is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between August 16, 2022 and October 18, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Insight has almost made it"; "Source: Insight". It most often appears alongside 538, Aristotle, Aristotle Inc.

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Insight
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2
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August 16, 2022
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October 18, 2022
  • 22 August 16, 2022
  • 22 October 18, 2022
August 16, 2022 · Original source
The community consensus so far seems to be to try to avoid Kalshi as long as it can. There are some good real-money prediction markets open to non-Americans: Polymarket, Futuur, Hedgehog, and Insight Prediction, although Americans will find visits prohibited nationally, and I would never recommend violating precepts negligently. You could also try play-money markets like Manifold, or market-adjacent forecasting sites like Metaculus.
Source: Insight Prediction …members of the community it created, betting on its chances, using one of the many descendant sites it inspired. You can’t kill an idea.
From Insight:
October 18, 2022 · Original source
Sources: Manifold, CSPI, Metaculus, Polymarket, PredictIt, Insight, GJOpen The lowest forecaster is higher than the highest pollster! Taking 538 as an example, forecasters range from 5 pp higher (Manifold) to 17 pp higher (PredictIt). Tournaments and real-money markets tend to give higher numbers than play-money sites. I would go with 47% on this one, based on the convergence between GJO, CSPI, and Polymarket. CFTC vs. PredictIt (and everyone else), Part II The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the US agency regulating prediction markets. In August, they told PredictIt (the biggest political prediction market) to shut down, effective in February. Now a motley group of stakeholders are suing the CFTC for a stay of execution. Plaintiffs include: 2 professors using the site as “a source of data for research”
Several additional plaintiffs I can’t find good information about You can find the complaint here. The plaintiffs write: The [CFTC’s action], without explanation or other indication of reasoned decisionmaking, without “written notice of the facts or conduct which may warrant” the Revocation, and without providing anyone “an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance” with the terms of No-Action Relief or other requirements, violates the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 558, 706. Among other things, the Revocation is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, [and/or] otherwise not in accordance with law” and occurred “without observance of procedure required by law.” The Court should “hold unlawful and set aside” the Revocation, including its command that contracts that would otherwise turn on events occurring after February 2023 be prematurely liquidated. 5 U.S.C. § 706. The Court also should enter a preliminary and then permanent injunction against the prescriptions in the Revocation requiring the liquidation of contracts by February 2023, including contracts that concern the 2024 elections, well before they would ordinarily mature. I am not a lawyer, but it sounds kind of like they’re saying “the decision was bad, and the Administrative Procedure Act says regulators shouldn’t do bad things”. I am split between the part of me which hates government regulators doing bad things, and the part of me which feels like this is how you get a cover-your-ass-ocracy that never does anything at all without fifteen layers of paperwork and ten trillion dollars per action. Whatever. At least this time it’s in my favor. Of course there are prediction markets about it: Source: Insight Prediction Nuclear Warcasting, Part 2 Samotsvety Forecasting is a team made of top prediction market players and tournament winners, vaguely affiliated with effective altruism, who make predictions in the public interest. Earlier this year, they got attention for forecasting the risk of nuclear war - in particular, they said there was an a 0.01% per month chance of London getting nuked this spring. Since then, most of the fear has crystallized into a specific scenario. Suppose Russia is losing very badly in Ukraine. Putin, fearing a coup or revolution at home if he gives up, decides to use a tactical nuclear weapon, ie a “small” nuke more suited to winning battles than destroying cities. He nukes a Ukrainian battlefield position. The West is enraged at this violation of the nuclear taboo and feels like it needs to respond decisively - maybe by nuking something on Russia’s side, or through some other act of extreme escalation. Then Russia feels like they need to respond, and eventually it escalates to strikes on major cities and global nuclear war. There are reasons for doubt. Tactical nukes wouldn’t really be useful in Ukraine; the battle lines are too spread out and there’s no single place where a nuclear explosion could take out a substantial portion of Ukraine’s forces. In the past, nuclear powers have accepted lost wars gracefully rather than turning to nukes. And the Russians deny it, and saying this is all just Western propaganda intended to scare people. Amid this uncertainty, Samotsvety has published an update: now they are at 16% chance that “Russia uses any type of nuclear weapon in Ukraine in the next year”, and 0.02% per month of a strike on London. Although they didn’t mention it this time, they previously said the risk of a strike on San Francisco was a little over half that of London; I don’t know if that’s changed. See also Dan Keys’ comment here for some skepticism of Samotsvety’s process. Swift Centre is a lot like Samotsvety; they’re a collection of top forecasters brought together by EA to make important predictions. They also took a swing at the nuclear question, and said 9.1% chance of a hostile nuclear detonation in Europe in the next six months. They didn’t calculate the risk that this would spread to global war, but they did discuss how different scenarios would bring the risk up or down: One of my hopes for forecasting is that it eventually becomes so well-validated that decision-makers can take these kinds of considerations into account: “Should we sent ATACMS missiles to Ukraine? It would have such-and-such benefits, but also increase the risk of nuclear escalation by 3.6%, is it worth it?” We can’t directly compare Samotsvety and Swift because they’re predicting over different time periods. But assuming that there’s more risk in the next six months than in the six months after that, I think Samotsvety is a little higher but they’re not embarrassingly far off. Metaculus is a bit more optimistic than either, believing there’s only a 4% chance of detonation in Ukraine in 2023 and a 7% chance of any use in the next ~year. Max Tegmark is going much higher than anyone else and says 16% chance of global nuclear war. Kalshi Applies For Election Markets Kalshi is a regulated and fully-legal prediction market with good lobbyists and a compliance team. This means the CFTC probably won’t randomly shut them down one day. But it also means they can only create new markets with CFTC permission. In July, Kalshi asked the CFTC for permission to make midterm election prediction markets - specifically, which party will win control of the House and Senate. The CFTC has said they will make a decision by October 28 (which doesn’t leave much time for predicting to happen before the November 8 election, but I guess it sets a precedent). September was the Request For Comment period, when the CFTC solicited comments from stakeholders about what they should do. Kalshi tried really hard to get lots of people to send in positive assessments - I know this because of how many people asked me “why is the CEO of Kalshi emailing me about this thing?” Their strategy seems to have worked; among the people who wrote to the CFTC in support were: A managing director at JP Morgan
Source: Insight, but note low volume
Interest.co.nz

Interest.co.nz is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between December 09, 2021 and December 10, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Source: Interest.co.nz". It most often appears alongside Australia, Fortress Of Doors, Georgism.

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December 09, 2021 · Original source
Source: Interest.co.nz I could dig further, but I think I've seen enough to convince me of this general point. The majority of bank loans in a lot of major developed countries (including the US, UK, and New Zealand) are for real estate, and, as we've already shown, the majority of real estate's value is concentrated in land. Whether or not land represents a clear majority of bank loans, it's undeniably a big chunk.
December 10, 2021 · Original source
Source: Interest.co.nz In his case study of Australia for the same article, Hagman points to too low a rate of land tax as making it hard to see the full predicted effects borne out. Maybe a similar thing was going on in New Zealand?
I Hate Pronouns More Than Genocide

I Hate Pronouns More Than Genocide is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2023 and August 30, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Richard Hanania, whose many flaws have never included a lack of self-awareness, freely admits that I Hate Pronouns More Than Genocide". It most often appears alongside 2020 election, ACX, Aella.

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August 30, 2023 · Original source
But as soon as anyone brings up gender, the awareness raises itself. Millions of people who have never thought about IRBs spend a substantial portion of their lives having strong opinions on gender. At least one presidential candidate is centering his entire campaign around gender. Richard Hanania, whose many flaws have never included a lack of self-awareness, freely admits that I Hate Pronouns More Than Genocide. The rest of the world may hold that philosophy only implicitly, but they hold it nevertheless.
I Went Viral. I Was Wrong

I Went Viral. I Was Wrong is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 29, 2021 and September 29, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "So she wrote another post saying I Went Viral. I Was Wrong". It most often appears alongside Amazon, Andrew Jackson, Barack Obama.

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September 29, 2021 · Original source
And about scientist Bethany Brookshire, who complained online that men always wrote to her as “Ms. Brookshire” vs. women’s “Dr. Brookshire”, proving something about how men were too sexist to treat a female scientist with the respect she deserved. The post went viral, but as it became a bigger deal, she wanted to make sure she was right. So she went over hundreds of past emails and found that actually, men were more likely to call her Dr. than women; the alternate pattern had been entirely in her imagination. So she wrote another post saying I Went Viral. I Was Wrong, which was generally well-received and prompted good discussion.
ICD

ICD is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 27, 2023 and February 27, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "acute and transient psychotic disorder (ICD)". It most often appears alongside 12th-century England, 21st-century America, acute and transient psychotic disorder.

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February 27, 2023 · Original source
I don’t think Bouffée délirante is a culture bound syndrome - it’s just the French equivalent of brief psychotic disorder (DSM), acute and transient psychotic disorder (ICD), or Brief Limited Intermittent Psychotic symptoms (CAARMS). [See] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8581951/
ICD-10

ICD-10 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 25, 2024 and January 25, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "accepted by other classification systems, including the ICD-10". It most often appears alongside 1979 study on capital punishment by psychologists, 2016 election, Bayesian updating.

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January 25, 2024 · Original source
Politics can become something between an addiction and an obsession. People can spend hours every day watching cable TV or scrolling through their Twitter feeds, trying to stay abreast of the latest outrage the other side is perpetrating. To be clear, they hate this. Each time they hear another outrage they’re somewhere between dejected and enraged. But they keep doing it. For hours a day. They will justify this with claims like “I need to stay informed so I can make a difference”. Then they will forget to vote because they were tired on Election Day. In any other situation, a condition with impaired cognition, psychotic symptoms, emotional instability that impaired normal functioning, and associated addictions/obsessions would qualify as a mental disorder. So again, which mental disorder is it? This post is about the possibility that it might be trauma. II. When Donald Trump was elected, some people described themselves as “traumatized”. Someone asked me for comment on the record, hoping I would say something like “as a real psychiatrist, trauma is a real disorder with strict criteria, and all you people are dumb”. I did not, in fact, make this comment. “Trauma” isn’t technically a mental disorder. The DSM contains seven “trauma and stressor related disorders”, of which the best-known is PTSD. An eighth disorder, “complex PTSD”, didn’t quite make it into the DSM but has been accepted by other classification systems, including the ICD-10 and WHO; other proposed trauma disorders are even less well-established. “Trauma” itself is a vague word encompassing all of these plus many less-well-defined situations. Although the vague concept “trauma” goes well beyond the DSM’s formal definition of PTSD, I think the latter makes a good reference point. Let’s look at the diagnostic criteria: [A trauma victim is someone who has] exposure to “actual or threatened death, injury, or sexual violence in one or more of the following ways: Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s).
Identifying Interpretable Visual Features in Artificial and Biological Neural Systems

Identifying Interpretable Visual Features in Artificial and Biological Neural Systems is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 27, 2023 and November 27, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I was able to find one paper, Identifying Interpretable Visual Features in Artificial and Biological Neural Systems". It most often appears alongside An Introduction To Circuits, Anthropic, Anthropic interpretability team.

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November 27, 2023 · Original source
Is the AI plotting to kill all humans? There will be some combination of millions of features and connections that answers these questions. In some case we can even imagine how we would begin to do it - check how active the features representing race are when we ask it to judge people, maybe. But realistically, when we’re working with very complex interactions between millions of neurons we’ll have to automate the process, some larger scale version of “ask GPT-4 to tell us what GPT-2 is doing”. This probably works for racial stereotypes. It’s more complicated once you start asking about killing all humans (what if the GPT-4 equivalent is the one plotting to kill all humans, and feeds us false answers?) But maybe there’s some way to make an interpreter AI which itself is too dumb to plot, but which can interpret a more general, more intelligent, more dangerous AI. You can see more about how this could tie into more general alignment plans in the post on the ELK problem. I also just found this paper, which I haven’t fully read yet but which seems like a start on engineering safety into interpretable AIs. Finally, what does all of this tell us about humans? Humans also use neural nets to reason about concepts. We have a lot of neurons, but so does GPT-4. Our data is very sparse - there are lots of concepts (eg octopi) that come up pretty rarely in everyday life. Are our brains full of strange abstract polyhedra? Are we simulating much bigger brains? This field is very new, but I was able to find one paper, Identifying Interpretable Visual Features in Artificial and Biological Neural Systems. The authors say: Through a suite of experiments and analyses, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that neurons in both deep image model [AIs] and the visual cortex [of the brain] encode features in superposition. That is, we find non-axis aligned directions in the neural state space that are more interpretable than individual neurons. In addition, across both biological and artificial systems, we uncover the intriguing phenomenon of what we call feature synergy - sparse combinations in activation space that yield more interpretable features than the constituent parts. Our work pushes in the direction of automated interpretability research for CNNs, in line with recent efforts for language models. Simultaneously, it provides a new framework for analyzing neural coding properties in biological systems. This is a single non-peer-reviewed paper announcing a surprising claim in a hype-filled field. That means it has to be true - otherwise it would be unfair! If this topic interests you, you might want to read the full papers, which are much more comprehensive and interesting than this post was able to capture. My favorites are: An Introduction To Circuits
Idkeys2023

Idkeys2023 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 05, 2024 and March 05, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "If you included an ID key in your entry, you can find your score here: Idkeys2023". It most often appears alongside @wc1766, Adam, Adam Unikowsky.

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March 05, 2024 · Original source
If you included an ID key in your entry, you can find your score here: Idkeys2023 15.5KB ∙ XLSX file Download Download
IEEE 3173

IEEE 3173 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 18, 2025 and June 18, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "publication of IEEE standard IEEE 3173". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, Aatu Koskensilta, acanthamoeba keratitis.

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IEEE 3173
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June 18, 2025 · Original source
The project is going reasonably well, if slowly. We are in the balloting process (peer review) for publication of IEEE standard IEEE 3173, and hope to publish later in 2025. This has taken a few years, but that's not an unusually lengthy period, given the time it takes to prepare standards.
If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Diets

If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Diets is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 13, 2026 and January 13, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as ""I’m actually working on a guide to all the GLP-1s. I’m calling it If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Diets."". It most often appears alongside Adeline, Aella Simposium, Altman.

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January 13, 2026 · Original source
“Cremieux’s post is okay, but there’s a lot of tacit knowledge that didn’t make it in there. I’m actually working on a guide to all the GLP-1s. I’m calling it If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Diets.”
If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct You

If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct You is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 12, 2025 and June 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "This is another heuristic from the same place as If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct You". It most often appears alongside January 6th, Richard Nixon, technological singularity.

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June 12, 2025 · Original source
This is another heuristic from the same place as If It’s Worth Your Time To Lie, It’s Worth My Time To Correct You.
If Only Turing Was Alive To See This

If Only Turing Was Alive To See This is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 22, 2021 and January 22, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "SSC posts like If Only Turing Was Alive To See This". It most often appears alongside Applied Divinity Studies, Bulls**t Jobs (Part 1 of ∞), Catherine Olsson.

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January 22, 2021 · Original source
All "important" content will be freely available regardless of subscription status, but subscribers will get a little extra. In particular, there will be one subscribers-only Open Thread a week (on Wednesdays), along with the normal free Open Thread on Sundays, and occasional subscriber-only AMA (ask me anything) threads. I also plan to occasionally post shorter or lighter content for subscribers only, maybe once or twice a month. This would be along the lines of SSC posts like If Only Turing Was Alive To See This or Bulls**t Jobs (Part 1 of ∞). I might also paywall a few very impulsive Culture War posts, just to prevent them from going viral. I predict this will be less than 10% of content, and less than 1% of content weighted by some measure of importance.
If Trump Wins, Say Goodbye To Your Black Friends

If Trump Wins, Say Goodbye To Your Black Friends is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 19, 2021 and April 19, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Salon literally wrote an article called If Trump Wins, Say Goodbye To Your Black Friends". It most often appears alongside #Resistance, 1/2019 government shut down, 538.

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April 19, 2021 · Original source
I wrote this during a time when people were making extreme claims about Trump’s purported racial policies. Matt Yglesias (then at Vox) wrote that “My guess is in a Trump administration angry mobs will beat and murder Jews and people of color with impunity”. Jamelle Bouie (of Slate) agreed and said we were on the edge of “state-sanctioned racial violence”. Salon literally wrote an article called If Trump Wins, Say Goodbye To Your Black Friends (it was subtitled “A Modest Proposal”, but my impression is the joking part was the suggestion to build a black separatist nation in Atlanta). Vox wrote about how minority kids believed they would be forced to leave the country; therapists were called in to help Muslim kids who believed Trump was going to kill them.
IGS Energy Resource Center

IGS Energy Resource Center is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2021 and August 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://www.igs.com/energy-resource-center/energy-101/how-much-electricity-do-my-home-appliances-use". It most often appears alongside AP News, Associated Press, Bitcoin.

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August 25, 2021 · Original source
2. https://www.igs.com/energy-resource-center/energy-101/how-much-electricity-do-my-home-appliances-use
il[dot]com

il[dot]com is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 30, 2024 and March 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "il[dot]com". It most often appears alongside 1111 Brickell Ave, 11841 Wagner St., Culver City, 1970 Port Laurent place, Newport Beach 92660.

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il[dot]com
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March 30, 2024 · Original source
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL Contact: Gruns Contact Info: aviram[dot]ben[dot]eliav[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Wednesday, April 17th, 5:00 PM Location: Gan Sacher near the gan sipur cafe Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8G3QQ6J5+V4 Notes: please email me so we can know how many people to expect
TEL AVIV, ISRAEL Contact: Inbar Contact Info: inbar192[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Thursday, April 25th, 5:00 PM Location: Sarona Park, grass area close to the Benedict restaurant, will have ACX sign and red balloons Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8G4P3QCP+MJ9 Group Link: https://www.facebook.com/groups/5389163051129361 Notes: Everyone is welcome! Feel free to bring snacks.
ABUJA, NIGERIA Contact: Olaoluwa Contact Info: akinloluwa[dot]olaoluwa[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, April 20th, 11:00 AM Location: The 'High Table' at Habil Cafe, No 3 Atapkme Street, Wuse II, Abuja. There will be a small sign saying 'Abuja ACX Meetup' Coordinates: https://plus.codes/6FX93F9H+J9 Notes: RSVP on LessWrong will be nice. Ended up eating all the food last time ):
Immunity

Immunity is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 17, 2025 and October 17, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "who has published in Immunity". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, ACX, ACX.

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Immunity
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October 17, 2025 · Original source
Mice, Mechanisms, And Dementia, by Myka Estes. Myka is a neuroscientist and immunologist who has published in Science, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, and Immunity. She currently manages a research lab focused on children with profound neurodevelopmental disorders and publishes the Journal Club with Myka Substack. She’s also in the process of launching an independent bookstore, and in her spare time - she has no spare time.
Impact Of A Poverty Reduction Intervention On Infant Brain Activity

Impact Of A Poverty Reduction Intervention On Infant Brain Activity is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 26, 2022 and January 26, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "A recent paper claims to have found an Impact Of A Poverty Reduction Intervention On Infant Brain Activity". It most often appears alongside alpha waves, Andrew Gelman, Baby’s First Years.

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January 26, 2022 · Original source
A recent paper claims to have found an Impact Of A Poverty Reduction Intervention On Infant Brain Activity. It’s doing the rounds of the usual media sites, like Vox and the New York Times:
Getting to the paper itself: it’s called The Impact Of A Poverty Reduction Intervention On Infant Brain Activity. It’s part of a much larger study called Baby’s First Years which randomizes some low-income mothers to receive $300/month in extra support. Most of these families were making about $20,000, so this was an increase of about 10-20%.
Imperfect Information

Imperfect Information is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 05, 2024 and November 05, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Rajiv Sethi’s Imperfect Information is another good predic"; "Rajiv Sethi’s Imperfect Information is another good prediction market Substack". It most often appears alongside Aaron Peskin, Berkeley, Betfair.

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November 05, 2024 · Original source
2: And Rajiv Sethi’s Imperfect Information is another good prediction market Substack that’s appeared recently. I relied on their excellent analysis for some of my discussion of the big Polymarket bet.
Impossibly Hungry Judges

Impossibly Hungry Judges is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 23, 2021 and November 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "See this article on Impossibly Hungry Judges for where I’m getting my intuitions on this". It most often appears alongside 1/6 insurrectionists, Ahmed, Alabama.

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November 23, 2021 · Original source
Fourth, the comment on my biases. I am happy to own up to most of these. For example, yes, I am (slightly) biased against high effect size studies. See this article on Impossibly Hungry Judges for where I’m getting my intuitions on this. If you claim a very large effect size, it should be really obvious. If some studies show medium-low effect sizes and others medium-high, that’s within the range of normal variability and methodological disagreement and so on. If some studies show it cures literally everyone, and others show it does nothing whatsoever, then something has gone terribly wrong: maybe one group is making up data. If it’s a random sketchy guy who has a history of having made up data before (eg Carvallo) vs. huge trials run by legions of prestigious scientists, I’m going to assume it’s the first guy. This is especially true in the context of a few good ivermectin studies (eg Mahmud), which show that it has decent effect size like every other drug, but doesn’t cure literally everyone. Mahmud disagrees with the ones that find no effect, but it equally disagrees with the ones that find it’s a 100% perfect cure.
In Continued Defense of Effective Altruism

In Continued Defense of Effective Altruism is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 30, 2024 and May 30, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "I’ve also addressed similar questions at In Continued Defense of Effective Altruism". It most often appears alongside AI risk, Alcoholics Anonymous, Bay.

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May 30, 2024 · Original source
You can find the rest of the post here. I’ve also addressed similar questions at In Continued Defense of Effective Altruism and Effective Altruism As A Tower Of Assumptions.
In Praise Of Pretending To Really Try

In Praise Of Pretending To Really Try is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 06, 2024 and August 06, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Katja Grace has a great article called In Praise Of Pretending To Really Try". It most often appears alongside AI, altruism, America.

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August 06, 2024 · Original source
Katja Grace has a great article called In Praise Of Pretending To Really Try. Maybe at some level all of our values are pretense - you’re just trying to convince other people (or yourself!) that you’re a good person. Maybe this is true of the selfish values (responsibility, diligence, etc) as much as the altruistic ones (at least this is how it works for me - I don’t feel deep internal motivation to do my taxes, I do them some reasonable amount and then think “Okay, I’ve done enough taxes for today that I don’t feel like a loser, I’ll finish them up tomorrow.”) Pretense is bad insofar as it replaces work optimized for effectiveness (really finishing your taxes, really helping others) with work optimized for signaling (staring at your taxes for an hour then crediting yourself for an hour of work, slacktivism). The solution isn’t to stop pretending and “do it for real”, because that’s not an action available to humans. The solution is to up your pretending game. Don’t feel good about how responsible you are for staring at your taxes without doing them - only feel good if you’ve done good work. Don’t feel good about having made vague gestures in favor of altruism - only feel good in proportion to the people you’ve actually helped. You can do this partly through your own conscience, and partly through joining a community that accords status on this basis.
In Search of the Big Bang

In Search of the Big Bang is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 30, 2022 and September 30, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "cf. In Search of the Big Bang". It most often appears alongside 5HT2A serotonin, acetylcholine, Alice.

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September 30, 2022 · Original source
Essentially, subjective reward warps the motor-planning space around the thing you believed to have caused the reward. And in general, craving is implemented with tense and warped patterns that restrict movement in directions that don't bring you reward. Extreme addiction might be like being bound in all directions except the one taking you to your addiction. In the mind of an addict, a meth pipe could essentially play the role of a Singularity: under its grip, it becomes the geometric culmination of history as it captures all of your future trajectories.That's one good reason to wait until you're close to death before trying out serious doses of dopaminergics (cf. In Search of the Big Bang).
In the Jewish tradition, humility is among the greatest of the virtues, as its opposite, pride, is among the worst of the vices.

In the Jewish tradition, humility is among the greatest of the virtues, as its opposite, pride, is among the worst of the vices. is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2024 and August 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "See also this essay , “In the Jewish tradition, humility is among the greatest of the virtues, as its opposite, pride, is among the worst of the vices.”". It most often appears alongside 10240, 4chan, @slatestarcodex.

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August 08, 2024
Last seen
August 08, 2024
August 08, 2024 · Original source
I’m skeptical of this. My favorite counterexample is the Torah, which says that Moses was the most humble man in the world (Numbers 12:3), plus the ensuing scholarly debate on how Moses himself could write this in the Torah with a straight face. My favorite answer claim that God forced Moses to write that he was the most humble man in the world, but Moses fought back by making some of the alephs in the Torah really small as a sort of steganographic claim that he was embarrassed by having to praise himself. See also this essay, “In the Jewish tradition, humility is among the greatest of the virtues, as its opposite, pride, is among the worst of the vices.”
In the Pipeline

In the Pipeline is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 20, 2021 and August 20, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Writing at In the Pipeline, Derek Lowe called this a tragedy". It most often appears alongside ACT/SSC, aducanumab, aducanumab.

Reference entry
In the Pipeline
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1
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1
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August 20, 2021
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August 20, 2021
August 20, 2021 · Original source
Writing at In the Pipeline, Derek Lowe called this a tragedy.3 I want to go further. This is not just a tragedy, but a travesty. The FDA has become a sadistically distorted mockery of what medical regulation should look like. There can be no excuses for the level of statistical incompetence required to approve aducanumab based on the flimsy efficacy data from the trials.
Incredible Hulk #6

Incredible Hulk #6 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 16, 2024 and August 16, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "canceled a few months later in March 1963 ( Incredible Hulk #6 )". It most often appears alongside 20th Century Fox, Abomination, Abomination.

Reference entry
Incredible Hulk #6
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1
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1
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August 16, 2024
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August 16, 2024
August 16, 2024 · Original source
The issue sold well, but it was not enough to save the Hulk, whose title was canceled a few months later in March 1963 (Incredible Hulk #6). But the idea of cross promotion stayed with Lee. When Spider-man launched his own title in March 1963, Lee pulled no punches. Amazing Spider-man #1 included two stories, but the cover story had Spider-man applying for membership with the Fantastic Four. The two most popular heroes were together and interacting. It was a huge debut and broke more records (allegedly. Actual records from this era are very spotty. Most sales numbers and “records” are based on memories and anecdotes told by those involved years later. But it was clear the issue sold a lot of copies). By early 1963 it was established that the Fantastic Four, the Hulk and Spider-man all existed together within the same shared universe. But what about Ant Man,Thor and Iron Man? Aside #5: The Hulk comic in Fantastic Four #5 pretty clearly establishes that the Hulk was a fictional character in the Fantastic Four world, but there are other clues that Lee was not thinking about his characters as existing and crossing over in the early days. Both Bruce Banner (the Hulk) and Mr Fantastic fight off global alien invasions in their early issues. In both cases the stories make clear that only Bruce/Reed is smart enough to save the world. No mention is made of the OTHER scientist who saved the world from the alien invasion a few months earlier. Bringing different superheroes from their own titles together was not an idea created by Atlas/Marvel and Lee. That was likely All Star Comics #3 (December 1940) when writer Gardner Fox brought together all the major DC heroes who were not staring in their own independent titles, including Green Lantern, the Flash and Doctor Fate, to create the Justice Society of America (JSA). Batman and Superman cameoed in All Star Comics #7, but generally they were considered too popular to dilute their appearances in ensemble titles. That changed in March 1960 when DC re-launched the idea of a superteam with the Justice League of America and included all of their most popular heroes as the leads – Superman, Batman and Wonder Woman. It was immediately a top seller. The launch of JLA is likely what caused the owner of Atlas to ask Lee to create a ”superhero team comic”. Lee did not have a stable of heroes to bring together, so he had to create something entirely new – The Fantastic Four. But now that Lee DID have a collection of his own heroes AND he had the greenlight to create straightforward superhero comics, he decided to build himself his own JLA. In September 1963 Atlas published two new titles: The Avengers and the X-men. The X-men were a brand new team of all new heroes, but the Avengers were a close parallel to the Justice League. Lee took his existing collection of heroes (except the Fantastic Four and Spider-man) and created an excuse for a team-up. In the issue they individually battle Thor’s brother Loki before coming together to defeat him as a team. They decide that given they all have different powers, they should work together to be unstoppable. The entire formation of the team takes only four panels and is a little corny, but it does its job: While the Avengers were a clear copy of the Justice League, Stan Lee put his own spin on it. While the JLA superheroes all had roughly the same personality and no real inter-team conflict, Lee made his heroes very distinct – almost caricatures – and there was PLENTY of inter-team conflict. The Hulk in particular abandoned the team in the second issue and was the primary antagonist by Avengers #3. Avengers #3 (January 1964) is itself the final step in connecting all of the Marvel heroes together. The Hulk has gone missing and the rest of the team wants to find him. Iron Man uses an “Image Projector” to ask other superheroes around the world if they had seen the Hulk. He visits the Fantastic Four, Spider-man and the X-men. In that same month in Tales of Suspense, Iron Man meets Angel (one of the X-men). The cat was out of the bag. Lee had a new trick to boost sales of all of his titles and he put it to work throughout the year. The first full crossover of the Fantastic Four and the Avengers happens in May (Fantastic Four #26). Daredevil premiered in March 1964 (with Spider-man on the cover, but not in the pages), and crosses over in Amazing Spider-man #16 (September 1964). Dr Strange first appears on the cover of another title in Fantastic Four #27 (June 1964). The Avengers battle the X-men (before teaming up) in X-men #9 (Dec 1964) Atlas was no longer just a collection of comic books about various topics, or even a collection of different flavors of superhero. It was a single shared universe: The Marvel Universe. It wasn’t planned out in advance, instead it happened in stages due more to commercial rather than artistic needs. Basically Stan Lee created the most successful modern mythology because he needed the money. III. Are Silver Age Marvel Comics any good? Well, apart from Amazing Spider-man, which holds up surprisingly well, I would not recommend reading any of them. Even Spider-Man is much weaker than the Ultimate Spider-Man reboot version of the story published 2000-2011. If you wanted to read Spider-Man from the beginning you would likely enjoy that later series a lot more than the original. The other titles vary in quality from “okay” (the Fantastic Four) to “absolute garbage” (Ant Man stories in Tales to Astonish). Which begs the questions, if these comics were so bad, how did they succeed as well as they did? Clearly the comics were “good for their time”. Millions of people bought and read them, and they clearly passed the “test of time”. So does that mean that we are better today at making art than we were back then? Or is art neither better or worse, just “of its time” and people back then would think the Ultimate Spider-man stories from 2000 were unreadable? I will argue the following: The stories were “good for their time”. VERY good for their time. They were much much better than the comic book stories that preceded them, and much better than other contemporary comic book adventures (like those being published by DC)
Industrial Regulation Statute

Industrial Regulation Statute is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 14, 2021 and April 14, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "You can read the details in the Industrial Regulation Statute starting on page 317 of their law code". It most often appears alongside Alaska, America, Amisulpride.

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April 14, 2021
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April 14, 2021
April 14, 2021 · Original source
You can read the details in the Industrial Regulation Statute starting on page 317 of their law code , but I think the basics of “pick a country” are - you can choose what country’s regulations you want to operate under, with your options being Honduras or a list of Best Practice Peer Countries including:
Infectious Diseases Emerging From Chinese Wet Markets

Infectious Diseases Emerging From Chinese Wet Markets is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 09, 2024 and April 09, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "See for example Infectious Diseases Emerging From Chinese Wet Markets, published in 2006". It most often appears alongside #S14, 2009 flu pandemic, 2013-16 West African Ebola outbreak.

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April 09, 2024
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April 09, 2024
April 09, 2024 · Original source
This collapses the ‘extreme coincidence’ claim, which as explained above, turns lab-leak into the leading hypothesis. My strongest disagreement is with his Point 3 - the inference from other seafood-market-based COVID spread events. Saar writes: A common objection to this method is that these outbreaks are caused by cold-chain products brought into these markets. However, this still fails to explain why markets form these early clusters and not the many other places where cold chain products are delivered to. Additionally, this only demonstrates the importance of cold wet surfaces in preserving SARS2 infectivity, further strengthening the hypothesis in method 1 that a crowded location with many wet surfaces like HSM is highly conducive for rapid SARS2 spread. Last, it also opens the possibility that the HSM outbreak was also caused by cold-chain products. This would reduce the significance of Wuhan being the outbreak location (as the product could have come from anywhere), but since the other evidence for lab-leak is so strong, Wuhan can be given no weight and still lab-leak would be highly likely – Rootclaim’s conclusion will only drop from 94% to 92%. Most of these outbreaks have been traced back to either a migrant worker (eg a fisherman from a country with COVID sells fish at the market of a country with Zero COVID) or a cold chain product. For example, here’s Dai et al on the Xinfadi outbreak, the most important event of this type: According to a joint publication by the Beijing CDC and 13 research institutions, the outbreak at Xinfadi Market was likely to be initiated by fomite transmission from contaminated foods imported via cold-chain logistics (Pang et al., 2020; Beijing Daily, 2020b). Based on the epidemiological investigations at the Xinfadi Market, the researchers preliminarily concluded that booth #S14 in the aquaculture product selling area on the basement floor of the primary trading hall was the source of the initial transmission. Specifically, five customers were tested positive for IgG/IgM antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 in serological screenings, all of whom visited booth #S14 on May 30 and 31, 2020. On May 30, 2020, the owner of booth #S14 procured imported and fully packaged salmon from a company's cold storage warehouse, then cut and processed the salmon for sale at the Xinfadi Market. Laboratory tests showed that sample swabs from five salmon fish from this supplier were tested positive by examining all salmon in the original sealed packages (n = 3582) in the cold storage facility. Viral genome sequencing showed that the viral strain isolated from one of the positive salmon swabs was homologous to that isolated from the infected persons and environmental samples at the Xinfadi Market (Beijing Daily, 2020b). The joint study reported that an ancestral strain isolated from the Xinfadi Market in Beijing was markedly different from the strains identified in two preceding outbreaks in China and the sequences obtained in March 2020 in Beijing. Phylogenetic analysis assigned the ancestral Xinfadi strain to clade B.1.1. Given the fact that the ancestral sequences were mainly identified in Europe, the strain was more likely to be imported to Beijing rather than derived from strains previously circulating in China (Pang et al., 2020). I know China has a bias towards believing frozen food COVID explanations, but this all sounds pretty convincing to me. Why is it more often markets than other places with cold chain products? Partly it’s the migrant workers - a lot of seafood markets are right next to seaports, and the contact tracing eventually traces back to a fisherman who came in through the seaport - I don’t think this is any more mysterious than epidemics often starting via airport or any other transportation hub. But even just keeping the focus on cold chain products, - there have also been outbreaks in seafood distribution warehouses, on docks, and in a seafood processing work area. Markets have many more people than any of those locations, and maybe (total speculation) cutting on cutting boards could aerosolize bits of fish. The strongest evidence that the Wuhan / Huanan Seafood Market epidemic wasn’t caused by migrant workers or imported seafood products is that there was no previous COVID-infected source of workers or seafood. If there had been, we would have noticed when the outbreak there spread (see Section 1.4 on Brazil). Responses to a few of Saar’s other points below: How many locations other than markets provide an interface with wildlife? Were markets actually identified in advance to be high-risk spillover locations or only in retrospect? I think scientists had called wet markets as an especially dangerous potential transmission location in advance. See for example Infectious Diseases Emerging From Chinese Wet Markets, published in 2006, which says: » “In Chinese wet-markets, unique epicenters for transmission of potential viral pathogens, new genes may be acquired or existing genes modified through various mechanisms such as genetic reassortment, recombination and mutation. The wet-markets, at closer proximity to humans, with high viral burden or strains of higher transmission efficiency, facilitate transmission of the viruses to humans.” In 2004, a paper on an emerging bird flu expressed hope that it would not spread too widely, but concluded that: » “Even in the event of yet another lucky escape, more measures must be taken to limit the amplification of viruses with pandemic potential in the wet markets around the world.” In 2007, Reuters published an investigation: Chinese Markets May Be Breeding Ground For Deadly Viruses, which said things like: » “We face similar threats from other viruses and such epidemics can happen because we continue to have very crowded markets in China," said Lo Wing-lok, an infectious disease expert in Hong Kong. "Even though official measures are in place, they are not faithfully followed. We are not talking about just civet cats, but all animals," he added.” Wet Markets, A Continuing Source Of SARS And Influenza, published 2004, is admittedly focusing on the next SARS1 outbreak instead of on SARS2, but gets bonus points for mentioning both wet markets and labs as likely causes of the next pandemic: » “Will SARS reappear? This question confronts public-health officials worldwide, particularly infectious disease personnel in those regions of the world most affected by the disease and the economic burden of SARS, including China, Taiwan, and Canada. Will the virus re-emerge from wet markets or from laboratories working with SARS CoV, or are asymptomatic infections ongoing in human beings? Similar questions can be asked about a pandemic of influenza that is probably imminent. Knowledge of the ecology of influenza in wet markets can be used as an early-warning system to detect the reappearance of SARS or pandemic influenza.” Saar mentions that there are several other possible sources like restaurants or farms. I think Peter demonstrated during the debate that pandemics are unlikely to start in rural areas, so farms aren’t that important. Restaurants mostly source their products from wet markets. During SARS1, some pandemics started in restaurants because they kept the civets in cages next to the diners (like how some Western restaurants keep lobsters). After SARS1, restaurants stopped doing that and became a less likely spillover location. Saar again: Scott quotes Peter, who implies that under the lab-leak hypothesis, we would expect the confirmed early cases to be centered around the WIV. However, cases are not expected to center on the lab. The lab is not spraying viruses into the air or hosting thousands of locals daily. If a worker gets infected, they spread the virus to their friends and family at completely different locations. In most places with an outbreak of known origin, epidemics show some geographic clustering. This has been true ever since the very beginning of epidemiology, when John Snow successfully traced a cholera outbreak back to its origin at a contaminated water pump by taking the center of the map of cholera cases. This isn’t a 100% law of nature; an infected lab worker might get lucky and not pass it to any of his lab co-workers. Still, we might expect him to infect his family, the stores he went to, or the restaurants he went to. If he lived near his workplace, these might also be near the lab. If he didn’t - let’s say he lived on the other side of town and had a long commute - he would start a cluster near his house, or his favorite store, or his favorite restaurant. Then the people there would infect their families/co-workers/stores/restaurants. The cluster would start somewhere! Sure, some people would infect nobody close to their work or home, and instead just infect one person a hundred miles away who they breathed on during a trip - but this is the exception, not the rule. So you wouldn’t expect a totally random distribution of cases all around Wuhan. There would be one center, or maybe several centers. But none of the claims that COVID was quietly spreading for months before the wet market have pointed to some alternate center of cases. If COVID was spreading for months before the lab, it somehow spread in a completely diffuse geographical pattern, with people exactly as likely to infect people far away from them as close to them - until it reached the wet market in December, and then spread in the normal center-radiating-outward way that every other infection spreads. All the evidence trying to support a spillover at the market is based on complex models with many single points of failure, built from unreliable and biased data. Therefore, it is difficult to give this evidence significant weight as there is always a possibility of errors in the data or its interpretation. More on this in the UFO comment below. Disagree. “First known case was at a wet market” is as simple as it comes. Certainly it’s less complex than “the virus has a 12 nucleotide insertion at the furin cleavage site, and even though those sometimes happen by natural recombination probably this one didn’t, and even though it looks out of frame maybe there was some weird thing going on with serine that made it in frame this one time only”, which is Saar’s star piece of evidence. I understand Saar thinks he can come up with lots of objections to “seen near wet market is suspicious for wet market origin”, then claim that getting over those objections requires “complexity”. But if Peter had no dignity, he could also come up with lots of objections to “seen in same city as Wuhan Institute of Virology is suspicious". He could say that maybe the civet farms of Hubei province were uniquely blah blah blah, and then Saar would have to prove that the civet farms weren’t uniquely blah blah blah, and then he could say “Oh, sure seems like you have a complex model with lots of unique points of failure, it all depends on fifty facts about the regulation of civet farms.” To illustrate what a market looks like in a real zoonotic pandemic, consider this study from SARS1. The researchers went to a random market and sampled the wildlife sold there. 4 of 6 civets sampled were positive, and 3 of them were phylogenetically distinct (i.e. infected in completely different places). A scientist I talked to says the 3 phylogenetically distinct lineages were most likely sampling errors. Still, this seems irrelevant to me since, again, no raccoon-dogs were tested. Scott explains that Covid’s closest known relative, BANAL-52, is rare and so it’s highly unlikely the WIV would’ve had it available as the starting point to engineer Covid . . . This is a basic mistake. SARS2 is not based on BANAL-52 but a relative of it. There is nothing unlikely here. No BANAL-52 relative close enough to create COVID from has ever been discovered. By mentioning BANAL-52, I was trying to be maximally charitable to the lab leak side. In order to create COVID, they would need a virus very close to COVID. But in years and years of searching, nobody has ever discovered a virus like this. Therefore it must be rare. As a way of bounding how rare, let’s see how rare the closest virus ever discovered is. That’s BANAL-52. It is very rare. Therefore, the COVID ancestor must be rarer than that. I don’t know how strong this argument is, because maybe there are millions of rare viruses capable of becoming pandemics, such that getting any one of them is very easy, even though each one individually is rare. The version of this I find convincing is that it should be a probabilistic cost to say that WIV did gain-of-function on a seemingly undiscovered and so-far-very-hard-to-discover rare virus instead of on any of the usual SARS-like viruses that people do their gain-of-function research on. Overall, all attempts to portray [Connor Reed] as an unstable, delusional person were unsuccessful. He is an ordinary person who very accurately described Covid-19 symptoms in real-time and claims to have received a positive test result. The timing and location matches the lab leak hypothesis and is impossible for the HSM claim. Therefore, they must discredit him. It is worth noting here the biased evidentiary standards used by zoonotic proponents. Reed’s testimony about his sickness, given on camera to multiple outlets, is deceitful and should be ignored. Yet, an anonymous voice testimony in one Chinese publication is definitely identified as Mr. Chen (another possible pre-HSM case) and should be considered reliable. See above for why I don’t trust Connor Reed. I’m not sure why Saar attributes Mr. Chen to “an anonymous voice testimony in one Chinese publication”. When I looked for Chen information, I got this thread, where it’s attributed to two Chinese hospital doctors, cross-checked with the Chinese COVID data repository, and double-cross-checked with the supplementary table in a peer-reviewed paper published by a team of Wuhan doctors. To understand how ridiculous the claim is that the HKU1 insertion looks just as engineered as SARS2’s, here are their alignments. Hopefully that should be enough. COVID: HKU1: I’m not a virologist, but I question how this comparison works. Surely HKU1 got its insert on some specific day. If you take the virus the day before, and then the other virus the day after, there will be no differences except the insert, and it will look just like COVID (ie an insert without many other mutations). The fact that the COVID comparison has few mutations, and the HKU1 insert has many mutations, just shows that whatever older virus we chose to compare HKU1 to is more distant from HKU1 than BANAL-52 (or whatever) is from COVID. Or am I missing something here? [The evidence that China tried to cover up zoonosis from the start] is untrue. They clearly said from the start this is a zoonotic spillover at HSM, and at least part of the government went to immense efforts to identify the animal, close farms, etc. (and of course couldn’t find any infected animal). Only in late 2020 did they start suspecting an import from cold-chain products after having multiple outbreaks that seem related to cold-chain products. From a Vox article from March 2023: From the start, the Chinese government interfered with efforts by both Chinese and international experts to study the pandemic, including its origins. Reporting by the AP found that even as WHO officials were publicly praising China’s cooperation, behind the scenes they were complaining about lack of access and a refusal to share data. Within months of the beginning of the pandemic, the Chinese government imposed restrictions on academic research into the origins of the novel coronavirus … China’s intransigence wasn’t unusual — countries are rarely eager to confirm that they’re the source of a deadly disease — but it went beyond the norm. International investigators weren’t permitted to see the market until more than a year after the pandemic began and a WHO-affiliated team was allowed a highly choreographed and controlled visit. The resulting report that came out of the Wuhan visit, which dismissed the possibility of a lab origin, pointed the finger at some kind of zoonotic spillover while concluding that it was unlikely that the spread started at the market, which surprised many experts. It also found that it was “possible” that the virus had been introduced via contaminated frozen food products from abroad. While few experts took that possibility seriously, it fit a narrative the Chinese government had been pushing, against nearly all evidence, that the pandemic had in fact not originated in China. “China just doesn’t want to look bad,” Filippa Lentzos, a biosecurity expert at King’s College London, told Science last August. “They need to maintain an image of control and competence. And that is what goes through everything they do.” […] it seems clear that with more cooperation, scientists could have been looking at raccoon dogs a year or more ago. “The big issue right now is that this data exists and that it is not readily available to the international community,” Maria Van Kerkhove, the WHO’s Covid-19 technical lead, told reporters on Friday. “This is first and foremost absolutely critical, not to mention that it should have been made available years earlier, but that data needs to be made accessible to individuals who can access it, who can analyze it and who can discuss it with each other.” The irony is that by making it so difficult to properly investigate a zoonotic origin of Covid, the Chinese government has created a vacuum that has been filled by claims on all sides, including the much more damning accusation that the pandemic was the result of a lab error at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. For what it’s worth, my timeline of Chinese denials and coverups looks like this: December: COVID doesn't exist, it's all lies Early January: Fine, it exists, but it’s just some wet market thing that can't spread from person to person Late January: Fine, it can spread from person to person, but we’ve got it under control now. February: Fine, it’s out of control, but you would not believe how great our response was. We're basically heroes. March: COVID was a US bioweapon, or possibly came from Italy. April: Chinese people are banned from researching the origins of COVID without government permission. 2: Comments Arguing Against Lab Leak 2.1: Is the pandemic starting near WIV reverse correlation? randomstringofcharacters wrote: Isn't [the pandemic starting near the lab] a reverse correlation issue? The lab is situated there because it's an area where coronaviruses were found in the past. Many people had this question, but Wuhan Institute of Virology was founded in 1956, didn’t originally focus on coronaviruses, and isn’t in a coronavirus hot spot. Most of WIV’s coronavirus samples come from Yunnan, about a thousand miles away. COVID’s closest relatives were found in Laos, almost two thousand miles away. During the debate, both Saar and Peter calculated the odds of a natural pandemic arising in Wuhan by dividing the population of Wuhan by the total urban population of East Asia (Saar) or South China (Peter). Saar got 1.5%, Peter got 3% (he later said this could be as high as 10% because it was a central hub in the wildlife trade). This isn’t an Official Position and I don’t think anyone else shares it, but during the debate Peter pointed out a few times that there are plenty of disease-ridden bats in Hubei (the province Wuhan is in), and that it’s not impossible that a bat virus currently known only in Laos could be active in Hubei. Still, this is the minority viewpoint and most scientists just think it involved something about the wildlife trade. 3: Other Points That Came Up 3.1: Apology to Peter re: extreme odds quiet_NaN wrote: Hot take: Peter clearly failed to convince anyone. The lab leak odds, in log10 (i.e. orders of magnitude are): Peter -20.7 Saar 2.7 Eric -3.1 Will -2.5 Scott -1.2 Daniel -1.4 One of these numbers is clearly an outlier. Scott mentions it and calls it "trolling", I would argue that it is debating in bad faith. 2e-21 is a ratio which is just silly. For one thing, the gain of function at WiV pathway is not the only pathway towards a lab leak. The WIV could also have released a naturally occurring coronavirus at the wet market. At 2e-21 odds, we would probably have to consider the possibility that the WIV built a time machine and went back in time to infect the wet market. I might have screwed up here - or at least I should have emphasized the “trolling” part. Peter complained about my presentation of his extreme-odds slide, saying: This is basically accurate. During the debate, Saar gave lots of different numbers. I don’t want to say exactly what the different numbers meant, because in earlier drafts of my post, Saar said I misunderstood them. My impression were that some of his numbers were conservative, others were central, others were extreme, others were adjusted-for-out-of-model-error, others were not-adjusted, etc. In an early draft of the post, I gave higher numbers for Saar. Saar asked me to replace them with the numbers I ended up using. I decided to agree, because I wanted to represent Saar fairly with the numbers he most centrally believed, but also because these were closest to the numbers on his Rootclaim site so it wasn’t like he was making them up just to fool me. Peter didn’t argue quite as hard, and also he didn’t have anything like the Rootclaim site, so I just took his first set of numbers. Trying to piece things together, I think a reasonable summary would be: During the debate, Saar mentioned 700-million-to-one odds in favor of lab leak, not because he thought this was plausible, but just as a discussion of where the situation would end up if you didn’t adjust for human fallibility.
Infinite Scroll

Infinite Scroll is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 07, 2023 and November 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "If anyone is interested, I wrote about my decision to donate here: Infinite Scroll". It most often appears alongside Aceso Under Glass, ACX Grant, America.

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Infinite Scroll
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November 07, 2023
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November 07, 2023
November 07, 2023 · Original source
If anyone is interested, I wrote about my decision to donate here: Infinite Scroll Infinite Scroll Special Edition: Kidney Donation On June 25th, 2019, I donated a kidney. I had two kidneys going into that day; I have one kidney now. Yesterday marked my fourth anniversary of giving up that kidney. I didn’t donate to a person I know, but to a stranger on the kidney waiting list—a queue that, despite our ever-increasing medical mastery, remains depressingly long… Read more 3 years ago · 8 likes · Jeremiah Johnson
Infinite Scroll Special Edition: Kidney Donation

Infinite Scroll Special Edition: Kidney Donation is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 07, 2023 and November 07, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Infinite Scroll Special Edition: Kidney Donation". It most often appears alongside Aceso Under Glass, ACX Grant, America.

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November 07, 2023
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November 07, 2023
November 07, 2023 · Original source
If anyone is interested, I wrote about my decision to donate here: Infinite Scroll Infinite Scroll Special Edition: Kidney Donation On June 25th, 2019, I donated a kidney. I had two kidneys going into that day; I have one kidney now. Yesterday marked my fourth anniversary of giving up that kidney. I didn’t donate to a person I know, but to a stranger on the kidney waiting list—a queue that, despite our ever-increasing medical mastery, remains depressingly long… Read more 3 years ago · 8 likes · Jeremiah Johnson
Inflation Reduction Act

Inflation Reduction Act is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 28, 2023 and September 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "martyrs will go willingly to their deaths over how many pages are in the Inflation Reduction Act". It most often appears alongside 2020 election, @eigenrobot, @jeremychrysler.

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September 28, 2023
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September 28, 2023
September 28, 2023 · Original source
45: Romana Didulo mixes sovereign citizenship, QAnon, and messianism in her claim to be Queen of Canada, by the grace of the US military and extraterrestrials; her followers (30 who literally follow her around, 30,000 on social media)considered dangerous. I think this is an especially interesting case for theorists of religion - the James Strang to the original Q’s Joseph Smith. The cult deficit must have something to do with the channeling of religious feeling into politics, and the difficulty of having political “unobservables” in the sense that God and angels are unobservable. But with sufficient paranoia, everything becomes unobservable. We will have schisms over the true nature of the Senate; crusades will be fought over which amendments are in the Constitution; martyrs will go willingly to their deaths over how many pages are in the Inflation Reduction Act. This will be bad, of course - but sociologically fascinating.
Inner Alignment: Explain Like I’m 12 Edition

Inner Alignment: Explain Like I’m 12 Edition is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 11, 2022 and April 11, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Rafael Harth’s Inner Alignment: Explain Like I’m 12 Edition". It most often appears alongside AI safety curriculum, Alignment Forum, AlphaGo.

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April 11, 2022
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April 11, 2022 · Original source
Rafael Harth’s Inner Alignment: Explain Like I’m 12 Edition,
Innovation Agenda For Addiction

Innovation Agenda For Addiction is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 17, 2024 and December 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Nicholas Reville ... has published his Innovation Agenda For Addiction". It most often appears alongside 2016 US Presidential election, ACX Grant, AI.

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December 17, 2024
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December 17, 2024
December 17, 2024 · Original source
52: Nicholas Reville of Recursive Adaptation has published his Innovation Agenda For Addiction, sort of the Progress Studies-ish take on the opioid crisis and how to solve it. The main points are deploying GLP-1RAs for their anti-addictive effects, giving addiction medicines a special fast-track through the FDA, and various government incentives / advance purchase commitments / partnerships. Even aside from the plan, this is interesting to read for its examination of perverse incentives in medicine - for example, pharma companies are reluctant to develop anti-addiction medications because they don't want to be seen as "profiting off a crisis", and they don't want to study their existing medications for addiction because the studies might reveal new side effects that would harm their existing business. Everything here seems reasonable, but my main worry is that a lot of it is zero-sum - the FDA only has so much review capacity, spending it on addiction meds would decrease it for other meds, and I worry that every disease is so bad that "redirect the FDA to focus on this in particular!" sounds pretty good when you think about it on its own. I am more excited about finding ways to streamline it in general - but don't begrudge advocates for particular conditions for wishing they had an easier time.
Inquisitive

Inquisitive is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 17, 2024 and December 17, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Heterodox Academy has a new magazine, Inquisitive". It most often appears alongside 2016 US Presidential election, ACX Grant, AI.

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December 17, 2024 · Original source
25: Heterodox Academy has a new magazine, Inquisitive. It focuses on chronicling the fight for academic freedom, rather than publishing controversial things you would need academic freedom to say, which I think is a good choice (other outlets already cover the latter). Happy to see them speaking up against Big IRB.
Inside Philanthropy

Inside Philanthropy is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 28, 2023 and November 28, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Inside Philanthropy website says that Open Philanthropy is one of the few major grantmakers offering YIMBY support". It most often appears alongside #57, 80,000 Hours, Adam D’Angelo.

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Inside Philanthropy
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November 28, 2023 · Original source
Open Philanthropy’s Wikipedia page says it was “the first institutional funder for the YIMBY movement”. The Inside Philanthropy website says that “on the national level, Open Philanthropy is one of the few major grantmakers that has offered the YIMBY movement full-throated support.” Open Phil started giving money to YIMBY causes in 2015, and has donated about $5 million, a significant fraction of its total funding.
Inside View podcast

Inside View podcast is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 24, 2023 and January 24, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "You can hear him discuss his forecasting strategies on the Inside View podcast". It most often appears alongside ACX, ACX Prediction Contest, AI Impacts.

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January 24, 2023 · Original source
20th: Peter Wildeford. Peter is the co-CEO of effective altruist organization Rethink Priorities. He’s also one of the top forecasters on Metaculus. You can hear him discuss his forecasting strategies on the Inside View podcast.
Instapundit

Instapundit is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 06, 2023 and July 06, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Instapundit examines the ruling through the legal concept of “deference”". It most often appears alongside 2017 NYT article on UFOs, @ActualNames1, AARO.

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July 06, 2023 · Original source
Instapundit examines the ruling through the legal concept of “deference”
Institutional Change by Imitation: Introducing Western Governance Practice in Congolese Villages

Institutional Change by Imitation: Introducing Western Governance Practice in Congolese Villages is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 27, 2022 and May 27, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "See, e.g. Institutional Change by Imitation: Introducing Western Governance Practice in Congolese Villages for details". It most often appears alongside An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins, anti-politics machine, Basotho Congress Party.

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May 27, 2022 · Original source
As measured by randomized experiments. See, e.g. Institutional Change by Imitation: Introducing Western Governance Practice in Congolese Villages for details.
Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics

Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 04, 2022 and April 04, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "points to his previous “Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics” essay"; "Eliezer already listed most of these in his Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics paper in 2013". It most often appears alongside 2013, Agricultural Revolution, AI.

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April 04, 2022 · Original source
Chess AI performance over time. Why does this matter? If there’s a slow takeoff (ie gradual exponential curve), it will become obvious that some kind of terrifying transformative AI revolution is happening, before the situation gets apocalyptic. There will be time to prepare, to test slightly-below-human AIs and see how they respond, to get governments and other stakeholders on board. We don’t have to get every single thing right ahead of time. On the other hand, because this is proceeding along the usual channels, it will be the usual variety of muddled and hard-to-control. With the exception of a few big actors like the US and Chinese government, and maybe the biggest corporations like Google, the outcome will be determined less by any one agent, and more by the usual multi-agent dynamics of political and economic competition. There will be lots of opportunities to affect things, but no real locus of control to do the affecting. If there’s a fast takeoff (ie sudden FOOM), there won’t be much warning. Conventional wisdom will still say that transformative AI is thirty years away. All the necessary pieces (ie AI alignment theory) will have to be ready ahead of time, prepared blindly without any experimental trial-and-error, to load into the AI as soon as it exists. On the plus side, a single actor (whoever has this first AI) will have complete control over the process. If this actor is smart (and presumably they’re a little smart, or they wouldn’t be the first team to invent transformative AI), they can do everything right without going through the usual government-lobbying channels. So the slower a takeoff you expect, the less you should be focusing on getting every technical detail right ahead of time, and the more you should be working on building the capacity to steer government and corporate policy to direct an incoming slew of new technologies. Yudkowsky Contra Christiano Eliezer counters that although progress may retroactively look gradual and continuous when you know what metric to graph it on, it doesn’t necessarily look that way in real life by the measures that real people care about. (one way to think of this: imagine that an AI’s effective IQ starts at 0.1 points, and triples every year, but that we can only measure this vaguely and indirectly. The year it goes from 5 to 15, you get a paper in a third-tier journal reporting that it seems to be improving on some benchmark. The year it goes from 66 to 200, you get a total transformation of everything in society. But later, once we identify the right metric, it was just the same rate of gradual progress the whole time. ) So Eliezer is much less impressed by the history of previous technologies than Paul is. He’s also skeptical of the “GDP will double in 4 years before it doubles in 1” claim, because of two contingent disagreements and two fundamental disagreements. The first contingent disagreement: government regulations make it hard to deploy imperfect things, and non-trivial to deploy things even after they’re perfect. Eliezer has non-jokingly said he thinks AI might destroy the world before the average person can buy a self-driving car. Why? Because the government has to approve self-driving cars (and can drag its feet on that), but the apocalypse can happen even without government approval. In Paul’s model, sometime long before superintelligence we should have AIs that can drive cars, and that increases GDP and contributes to a general sense that exciting things are going on. Eliezer says: fine, what if that’s true? Who cares if self-driving cars will be practical a few years before the world is destroyed? It’ll take longer than that to lobby the government to allow them on the road. The second contingent disagreement: superintelligent AIs can lie to us. Suppose you have an AI which wants to destroy humanity, whose IQ is doubling every six months. Right now it’s at IQ 200, and it suspects that it would take IQ 800 to build a human-destroying superweapon. Its best strategy is to lie low for a year. If it expects humans would turn it off if they knew how close it was to superweapons, it can pretend to be less intelligent than it really is. The period when AIs are holding back so we don’t discover their true power level looks like a period of lower-than-expected GDP growth - followed by a sudden FOOM once the AI gets its superweapon and doesn’t need to hold back. So even if Paul is conceptually right and fundamental progress proceeds along a nice smooth curve, it might not look to us like a nice smooth curve, because regulations and deceptive AIs could prevent mildly-transformative AI progress from showing up on graphs, but wouldn’t prevent the extreme kind of AI progress that leads to apocalypse. To an outside observer, it would just look like nothing much changed, nothing much changed, nothing much changed, and then suddenly, FOOM. But even aside from this, Eliezer doesn’t think Paul is conceptually right! He thinks that even on the fundamental level, AI progress is going to be discontinuous. It’s like a nuclear bomb. Either you don’t have a nuclear bomb yet, or you do have one and the world is forever transformed. There is a specific moment at which you go from “no nuke” to “nuke” without any kind of “slightly worse nuke” acting as a harbinger. He uses the example of chimps → humans. Evolution has spent hundreds of millions of years evolving brainier and brainier animals (not teleologically, of course, but in practice). For most of those hundreds of millions of years, that meant the animal could have slightly more instincts, or a better memory, or some other change that still stayed within the basic animal paradigm. At the chimp → human transition, we suddenly got tool use, language use, abstract thought, mathematics, swords, guns, nuclear bombs, spaceships, and a bunch of other stuff. The rhesus monkey → chimp transition and the chimp → human transition both involved the same ~quadrupling of neuron number, but the former was pretty boring and the latter unlocked enough new capabilities to easily conquer the world. The GPT-2 → GPT-3 transition involved centupling parameter count. Maybe we will keep centupling parameter count every few years, and most times it will be incremental improvement, and one time it will conquer the world. But even talking about centupling parameter points is giving Paul too much credit. Lots of past inventions didn’t come by quadrupling or centupling something, they came by discovering “the secret sauce”. The Wright brothers (he argues) didn’t make a plane with 4x the wingspan of the last plane that didn’t work, they invented the first plane that could fly at all. The Hiroshima bomb wasn’t some previous bomb but bigger, it was what happened after a lot of scientists spent a long time thinking about a fundamentally different paradigm of bomb-making and brought it to a point where it could work at all. The first transformative AI isn’t going to be GPT-3 with more parameters, it will be what happens after someone discovers how to make machines truly intelligent. (this is the same debate Eliezer had with Ajeya over the Biological Anchors post; have I mentioned that Ajeya and Paul are married?) Fine, Let’s Nitpick The Hell Out Of The Chimps Vs. Humans Example This is where the two of them end up, so let’s follow. Between chimps and humans, there were about seven million years of intermediate steps. These had some human capabilities, but not others. IE homo erectus probably had language, but not mathematics, and in terms of taking over the world it did make it to most of the Old World but was less dominant than moderns. But if we say evolutionary history started 500 million years ago (the Cambrian), and AI history started with the Dartmouth Conference in 1955, then the equivalent of 7 million years of evolutionary history is 1 year of AI history. In the very very unlikely and forced comparison where evolutionary history and AI history go at the same speed, there will be only about a year between chimp-level and human-level AIs. A chimp-level AI probably can’t double GDP, so this would count as a fast takeoff by Paul’s criterion. But even more than that, chimp → human feels like a discontinuity. It’s not just “animals kept getting smarter for hundreds of millions of years, and then ended up very smart indeed”. That happened for a while, and then all of sudden there was a near-instant phase transition into a totally different way of using intelligence with completely new abilities. If AI worked like this, we would have useful toys and interesting specialists for a few decades, until suddenly someone “got it right”, completed the package that was necessary for “true intelligence”, and then we would have a completely new category of thing. Paul admits this analogy is awkward for his position. He answers: Chimp evolution is not primarily selecting for making and using technology, for doing science, or for facilitating cultural accumulation. The task faced by a chimp is largely independent of the abilities that give humans such a huge fitness advantage. It’s not completely independent—the overlap is the only reason that evolution eventually produces humans—but it’s different enough that we should not be surprised if there are simple changes to chimps that would make them much better at designing technology or doing science or accumulating culture […] So I don’t think the example of evolution tells us much about whether the continuous change story applies to intelligence. This case is potentially missing the key element that drives the continuous change story—optimization for performance. Evolution changes continuously on the narrow metric it is optimizing, but can change extremely rapidly on other metrics. For human technology, features of the technology that aren’t being optimized change rapidly all the time. When humans build AI, they will be optimizing for usefulness, and so progress in usefulness is much more likely to be linear. That is, evolution wasn’t optimizing for tool use/language/intelligence, so we got an “overhang” where chimps could potentially have been very good at these, but evolution never bothered “closing the circuit” and turning those capabilities “on”. After a long time, evolution finally blundered into an area where marginal improvements in these capacities improved fitness, so evolution started improving them and it was easy. Imagine a company which, through some oversight, didn’t have a Sales department. They just sat around designing and manufacturing increasingly brilliant products, but not putting any effort into selling them. Then the CEO remembers they need a Sales department, starts one up, and the company goes from moving near zero units to moving millions of units overnight. It would look like the company had “suddenly” developed a “vast increase in capabilities”. But this is only possible when a CEO who is weirdly unconcerned about profit forgets to do obvious profit-increasing things for many years. This is Paul’s counterargument to the chimp analogy. Evolution isn’t directly concerned about various intellectual skills; it only wants them in the unusual cases where they’ll contribute to fitness on the margin. AI companies will be very concerned about various intellectual skills. If there’s a trivial change that can make their product 10x better, they’ll make it. So AI capabilities will grow in a “well-rounded” way, there won’t be any “overhangs”, and there won’t be any opportunities for a sudden overhang-solving phase transition with associated new-capability development like with chimps → humans. Eliezer answers: Chimps are nearly useless because they're not general, and doing anything on the scale of building a nuclear plant requires mastering so many different nonancestral domains that it's no wonder natural selection didn't happen to separately train any single creature across enough different domains that it had evolved to solve every kind of domain-specific problem involved in solving nuclear physics and chemistry and metallurgy and thermics in order to build the first nuclear plant in advance of any old nuclear plants existing. Humans are general enough that the same braintech selected just for chipping flint handaxes and making water-pouches and outwitting other humans, happened to be general enough that it could scale up to solving all the problems of building a nuclear plant - albeit with some added cognitive tech that didn't require new brainware, and so could happen incredibly fast relative to the generation times for evolutionarily optimized brainware. Now, since neither humans nor chimps were optimized to be "useful" (general), and humans just wandered into a sufficiently general part of the space that it cascaded up to wider generality, we should legit expect the curve of generality to look at least somewhat different if we're optimizing for that. Eg, right now people are trying to optimize for generality with AIs like Mu Zero and GPT-3. In both cases we have a weirdly shallow kind of generality. Neither is as smart or as deeply general as a chimp, but they are respectively better than chimps at a wide variety of Atari games, or a wide variety of problems that can be superposed onto generating typical human text. They are, in a sense, more general than a biological organism at a similar stage of cognitive evolution, with much less complex and architected brains, in virtue of having been trained, not just on wider datasets, but on bigger datasets using gradient-descent memorization of shallower patterns, so they can cover those wide domains while being stupider and lacking some deep aspects of architecture. It is not clear to me that we can go from observations like this, to conclude that there is a dominant mainline probability for how the future clearly ought to go and that this dominant mainline is, "Well, before you get human-level depth and generalization of general intelligence, you get something with 95% depth that covers 80% of the domains for 10% of the pragmatic impact". ...or whatever the concept is here, because this whole conversation is, on my own worldview, being conducted in a shallow way relative to the kind of analysis I did in Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, where I was like, "here is the historical observation, here is what I think it tells us that puts a lower bound on this input-output curve". Here Eliezer sort of kind of grants Paul’s point that AIs will be optimized for generality in a way chimps aren’t, but points to his previous “Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics” essay to argue that we should expect a fast takeoff anyway. IEM has a lot of stuff in it, but one key point is that instead of using analogies to predict the course of future AI, we should open that black box and try to actually reason about how it will work, in which case we realize that recursive self-improvement common-sensically has to cause an intelligence explosion. I am sort of okay with this, but I feel like a commitment to avoiding analogies should involve not bringing up the chimp-human analogy further, which Eliezer continues to do, quite a lot. I do feel like Paul succeeded in convincing me that we shouldn’t place too much evidential weight on it. The Wimbledon Of Reference Class Tennis “Reference class tennis” is an old rationalist idiom for people throwing analogies back and forth. “AI will be slow, because it’s an economic transition like the Agricultural or Industrial Revolution, and those were slow!” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s an evolutionary step like chimps → humans, and that was fast!” “No, AI will be slow, because it’s an invention, like the computer, and computers were invented piecemeal and required decades of innovation to be useful.” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s an invention, like the nuclear bomb, and nuclear bombs went from impossible to city-killing in a single day.” “No, AI will be slow, because it will be surrounded by a shell-like metallic computer case, which makes it like a turtle, and turtles are slow.” “No, AI will be fast, because it’s dangerous and powerful, like a tiger, and tigers are fast!” And so on. Comparing things to other things is a time-tested way of speculating about them. But there are so many other things to compare to that you can get whatever result you want. This is the failure mode that the term “reference class tennis” was supposed to point to. Both participants in this debate are very smart and trying their hardest to avoid reference-class tennis, but neither entirely succeeds. Eliezer’s preferred classes are Bitcoin (“there wasn't a cryptocurrency developed a year before Bitcoin using 95% of the ideas which did 10% of the transaction volume”), nukes, humans/chimps, the Wright Brothers, AlphaGo (which really was a discontinuous improvement on previous Go engines), and AlphaFold (ditto for proteins). Paul’s preferred classes are the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, chess engines (which have gotten better along a gradual, well-behaved curve), all sorts of inventions like computers and ships (likewise), and world GDP. Eliezer already listed most of these in his Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics paper in 2013, and concluded that the space of possible analogies was contradictory enough that we needed to operate at a higher level. Maybe so, but when someone lobs a reference class tennis ball at you, it’s hard to resist the urge to hit it back. Recursive Self-Improvement This is where I think Eliezer most wants to take the discussion. The idea is: once AI is smarter than humans, it can do a superhuman job of developing new AI. In his Microeconomics paper, he writes about an argument he (semi-hypothetically) had with Ray Kurzweil about Moore’s Law. Kurzweil expected Moore’s Law to continue forever, even after the development of superintelligence. Eliezer objects: Suppose we were dealing with minds running a million times as fast as a human, at which rate they could do a year of internal thinking in thirty-one seconds, such that the total subjective time from the birth of Socrates to the death of Turing would pass in 20.9 hours. Do you still think the best estimate for how long it would take them to produce their next generation of computing hardware would be 1.5 orbits of the Earth around the Sun? That is: the fact that it took 1.5 years for transistor density to double isn’t a natural law. It’s pointing to a law that the amount of resources (most notably intelligence) that civilization focused on the transistor-densifying problem equalled the amount it takes to double it every 1.5 years. If some shock drastically changed available resources (by eg speeding up human minds a million times), this would change the resources involved, and the same laws would predict transistor speed doubling in some shorter amount of time (naively 0.000015 years, although realistically at that scale other inputs would dominate). So when Paul derives clean laws of economics showing that things move along slow growth curves, Eliezer asks: why do you think they would keep doing this when one of the discoveries they make along that curve might be “speeding up intelligence a million times”? (Eliezer actually thinks improvements in the quality of intelligence will dominate improvements in speed - AIs will mostly be smarter, not just faster - but speed is a useful example here and we’ll stick with it) Paul answers: Summary of my response: Before there is AI that is great at self-improvement there will be AI that is mediocre at self-improvement. Powerful AI can be used to develop better AI (amongst other things). This will lead to runaway growth. This on its own is not an argument for discontinuity: before we have AI that radically accelerates AI development, the slow takeoff argument suggests we will have AI that significantly accelerates AI development (and before that, slightly accelerates development). That is, an AI is just another, faster step in the hyperbolic growth we are currently experiencing, which corresponds to a further increase in rate but not a discontinuity (or even a discontinuity in rate). The most common argument for recursive self-improvement introducing a new discontinuity seems be: some systems “fizzle out” when they try to design a better AI, generating a few improvements before running out of steam, while others are able to autonomously generate more and more improvements. This is basically the same as the universality argument in a previous section. Eliezer: Oh, come on. That is straight-up not how simple continuous toy models of RSI work. Between a neutron multiplication factor of 0.999 and 1.001 there is a very huge gap in output behavior. Outside of toy models: Over the last 10,000 years we had humans going from mediocre at improving their mental systems to being (barely) able to throw together AI systems, but 10,000 years is the equivalent of an eyeblink in evolutionary time - outside the metaphor, this says, "A month before there is AI that is great at self-improvement, there will be AI that is mediocre at self-improvement." (Or possibly an hour before, if reality is again more extreme along the Eliezer-Hanson axis than Eliezer. But it makes little difference whether it's an hour or a month, given anything like current setups.) This is just pumping hard again on the intuition that says incremental design changes yield smooth output changes, which (the meta-level of the essay informs us wordlessly) is such a strong default that we are entitled to believe it if we can do a good job of weakening the evidence and arguments against it. And the argument is: Before there are systems great at self-improvement, there will be systems mediocre at self-improvement; implicitly: "before" implies "5 years before" not "5 days before"; implicitly: this will correspond to smooth changes in output between the two regimes even though that is not how continuous feedback loops work. I got a bit confused trying to understand the criticality metaphor here. There’s no equivalent of neutron decay, so any AI that can consistently improve its intelligence is “critical” in some sense. Imagine Elon Musk replaces his brain with a Neuralink computer which - aside from having read-write access - exactly matches his current brain in capabilities. Also he becomes immortal. He secludes himself from the world, studying AI and tinkering with his brain’s algorithms. Does he become a superintelligence? I think under the assumptions Paul and Eliezer are using, eventually maybe. After some amount of time he’ll come across a breakthrough he can use to increase his intelligence. Then, armed with that extra intelligence, he’ll be able to pursue more such breakthroughs. However intelligent the AI you’re scared of is, Musk will get there eventually. How long will it take? A good guess might be “years” - Musk starts out as an ordinary human, and ordinary humans are known to take years to make breakthroughs. Suppose it takes Musk one year to come up with a first breakthrough that raises his IQ 1 point. How long will his second breakthrough take? It might take longer, because he has picked the lowest-hanging fruit, and all the other possible breakthroughs are much harder. Or it might take shorter, because he’s slightly smarter than he was before, and maybe some extra intelligence goes a really long way in AI research. The concept of an intelligence explosion seems to assume the second effect dominates the first. This would match the observation that human researchers, who aren’t getting any smarter over time, continue making new discoveries. That suggests the range of possible discoveries at a given intelligence level is pretty vast. Some research finds that the usual pattern in science is constant rate of discovery from exponentially increasing number of researchers, suggesting strong low-hanging fruit effects, but these seem to be overwhelmed by other considerations in AI right now. I think Eliezer’s position on this subject is shaped by assumptions like: If you have an AI as intelligent as Elon Musk today, then tomorrow you can run it on more hardware with a bit of normal human algorithmic progress, and get one twice as intelligent. So even if it would take Elon years to make a breakthrough, long before those years are up you’ll have an AI that can make breakthroughs much faster.
Intentions

Intentions is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 20, 2022 and April 20, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "readprimarysources (author of the blog Intentions ) writes:". It most often appears alongside A.E. Waite, Adlerian psychology, AL.

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Intentions
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April 20, 2022 · Original source
readprimarysources (author of the blog Intentions) writes:
Intercept

Intercept is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 29, 2022 and June 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "This is the conclusion of most sources I can find. The only dissenter is this Intercept article"; "Another surprise on the Intercept’s graph". It most often appears alongside Baltimore, Black Lives Matter, BLM.

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Intercept
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June 29, 2022 · Original source
Here it looks like there’s a big change in murders through April, with basically no extra increase through July. This definitely contradicts the graph above. What’s going on here? I don’t know the Intercept’s criteria for including cities on their chart, but more than half of the cities in the US with the most murders aren’t even on there, whereas they did choose to include such colossi of crime as Omaha, Nebraska. Either they’re cherry-picking on purpose, or using some kind of inscrutable methodology that coincidentally is giving the wrong result. Of the actually relevant cities on there - New York, Chicago, etc - most of them show the May spike we discussed earlier. From the Financial Times. Notice no difference from the usual trend in March, April, or early May, then a very obvious spike around the time the BLM protests start on May 25. This is shootings rather than murders, for the same reason discussed below, but murders show a similar though noisier pattern. Another surprise on the Intercept’s graph: Minneapolis, the epicenter of BLM protests, saw more of a change in January-April than from May-August. Is this true? Cassell (2020) shows us the data: It looks like maybe this is random variation; there’s so few murders in Minneapolis in the winter that even one or two looks like a very large percent increase. But the raw data show that the summer was a much bigger deal. Since murder is very rare, maybe we can get a better view using assault, a crime similar to murder but much more common: Now the pattern is really obvious, except that it looks like it began about a week before the protests. I’m not sure, but I think this is because the site the paper took this from uses a 7-day rolling average, which smooths the data at the cost of having it be about a week off. A few of the other graphs have this problem as well, but I wouldn’t read too much into it. Nationwide, the spike in murders clearly happened in May, not March. On a city by city level, it’s hard to tell because murders are so rare. But when we look at other crimes that probably correlate with the murder rate, they clearly go up in May, not March. Police Pullback My specific claim is that the protests caused police to do less policing in predominantly black areas. This could be because of any of: Police interpreted the protests as a demand for less policing, and complied.
From the Financial Times. Notice no difference from the usual trend in March, April, or early May, then a very obvious spike around the time the BLM protests start on May 25. This is shootings rather than murders, for the same reason discussed below, but murders show a similar though noisier pattern. Another surprise on the Intercept’s graph: Minneapolis, the epicenter of BLM protests, saw more of a change in January-April than from May-August. Is this true? Cassell (2020) shows us the data: It looks like maybe this is random variation; there’s so few murders in Minneapolis in the winter that even one or two looks like a very large percent increase. But the raw data show that the summer was a much bigger deal. Since murder is very rare, maybe we can get a better view using assault, a crime similar to murder but much more common: Now the pattern is really obvious, except that it looks like it began about a week before the protests. I’m not sure, but I think this is because the site the paper took this from uses a 7-day rolling average, which smooths the data at the cost of having it be about a week off. A few of the other graphs have this problem as well, but I wouldn’t read too much into it. Nationwide, the spike in murders clearly happened in May, not March. On a city by city level, it’s hard to tell because murders are so rare. But when we look at other crimes that probably correlate with the murder rate, they clearly go up in May, not March. Police Pullback My specific claim is that the protests caused police to do less policing in predominantly black areas. This could be because of any of: Police interpreted the protests as a demand for less policing, and complied.
I mentioned the Intercept piece above, which through selective presentation of data managed to make it look like the protests and homicide spike didn’t coincide. It presents several unconvincing lines of evidence against the protests alone being a main driver (though eventually allows them a supporting role), and in the end focuses on rising gun sales (but guns are mostly bought by white people, and so can’t explain why the homicide spike was so overwhelmingly black). Finally, it concludes that it was “a complex stew of forces”.
Internal Family Systems manuals

Internal Family Systems manuals is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 21, 2024 and May 21, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "After reading the IFS manuals, I tried most of their tricks". It most often appears alongside Bay Area, Bessel van der Kolk, Bob.

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May 21, 2024
May 21, 2024 · Original source
(After reading the IFS manuals, I tried most of their tricks for initiating this sort of trance and meeting Sabby or whoever. I got nothing. I notice most of the patients with great results are severely traumatized borderlines, ie the same people who often get multiple personality disorder after the slightest hint from a therapist that this might happen. We’ll get back to this analogy later.)
International

International is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 29, 2022 and September 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "That’s kind of the opposite of “International” but wh"; "They’re still the most-subscribed-to blog in the International section!!". It most often appears alongside 1 Kings 10-11, 2008 Democratic National Convention, Adam Scheffer.

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International
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September 29, 2022 · Original source
I am looking forward to reading the rest of this book when it comes out, if only to resolve my curiosity on which direction Gioia decides to take it. Good blog, 5/5, would read again. International: THUNDERDOME!! The ALL CAPS and MULTIPLE EXCLAMATION POINTS in the title are not a mistake!! All of their articles are like this!!
It looks like they are a right-wing pro-Trump blog!! That’s kind of the opposite of “International” but whatever!! They’re still the most-subscribed-to blog in the International section!!
International Journal Of Nanomedicine

International Journal Of Nanomedicine is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 17, 2021 and November 17, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "This one is published in the International Journal Of Nanomedicine". It most often appears alongside ACE-2 receptor, ACSH, Ahmed et al.

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November 17, 2021 · Original source
…looks very impressive, in terms of the experimental group doing better than the control, except that they don’t specify whether it was before the trial or after it, and at least one online commentator thinks it might have been before, in which case it’s only impressive how thoroughly they failed to randomize their groups. Overall I don’t feel bad throwing this study out. I hope it one day succeeds in returning to its home planet. Lopez-Medina et al: Colombian RCT. 200 patients took ivermectin, another 200 took placebo. They originally worried the placebo might taste different than real ivermectin, then solved this by replacing it with a different placebo, which is a pretty high level of conscientiousness. Primary outcome was originally percent of patients whose symptoms worsened by two points, as rated on a complicated symptom scale when a researcher asked them over the phone. Halfway through the study, they realized nobody was worsening that much, so they changed the primary outcome to time until symptoms got better, as measured by the scale. In the ivermectin group, symptoms improved that much after 10 days; in the placebo group, after 12, p = 0.53. By the end of the study, symptoms had improved in 82% of ivermectin users and 79% of controls, also insignificant. 4 patients in the ivermectin group needed to be hospitalized compared to 6 in the placebo group, again insignificant. This study is bigger than most of the other RCTs, and more polished in terms of how many spelling errors, photographs of computer screens, etc, it contains. It was published in JAMA, one of the most prestigious US medical journals, as opposed to the crappy nth-tier journals most of the others have been in. When people say things like “sure, a lot of small studies show good results for ivermectin, but the bigger and more professional trials don’t”, this is one of the two big professional trials they’re talking about. Ivermectin proponents make some good arguments against it. In order to get as big as it did, Lopez-Medina had to compromise on rigor. Its outcome is how people self-score their symptoms on a hokey scale in a phone interview, instead of viral load or PCR results or anything like that. Still, this is basically what we want, right? In the end, we want people to feel better and less sick, not to get good scores on PCR tests. Also, it changed its primary outcome halfway through; isn’t that bad? I think maybe not; the reason we want a preregistered primary outcome is so that you don’t change halfway through to whatever outcome shows the results you want. The researchers in this study did a good job explaining why they changed their outcome, the change makes sense, and their original outcome would also have shown ivermectin not working (albeit less accurately and effectively). I don’t know of any evidence that they knew (or suspected) final results when switching to this new outcome, and it seems like the most reasonable new outcome to switch to. Finally, their original placebo tasted different from ivermectin (though they switched halfway through). This is one of the few studies where I actually care about placebo, because people are self-rating their symptoms. But realistically most of these people don’t know what ivermectin is supposed to taste like. Also, they did a re-analysis and found there was no difference between the people who got the old placebo and the new one. I’m making a big deal of this because ivmmeta.com - the really impressive meta-analysis site I’ve been going off of - puts a special warning letter underneath their discussion of this study, urging us not to trust it. They don’t do this for any of the other ones we’ve addressed so far - not the one by the guy whose other studies were all frauds, not the one where 50% of 21 people had headaches, not the unrandomized one where the groups were completely different before the experiment started, not even the one by the guy accused of crimes against humanity. Only this one. This makes me a lot less charitable to ivmmeta than I would otherwise be; I think it’s hard to choose this particular warning letter strategy out of well-intentioned commitment to truth. They just really don’t like this big study that shows ivermectin doesn’t work. Also, the warning itself irritates me, and includes paragraphs like: RCTs have a fundamental bias against finding an effect for interventions that are widely available — patients that believe they need treatment are more likely to decline participation and take the intervention [Yeh], i.e., RCTs are more likely to enroll low-risk participants that do not need treatment to recover (this does not apply to the typical pharmaceutical trial of a new drug that is otherwise unavailable). This trial was run in a community where ivermectin was available OTC and very widely known and used. Nobody else worries about this, and there are a million biases that non-randomized studies have that would be super-relevant when discussing those, but somehow when they’re pro-ivermectin the site forgets to be this thorough. I think a better pro-ivermectin response to this study is to point out that all the trends support ivermectin. Symptoms took 10 days to resolve in the ivermectin group vs. 12 in placebo; 4 ivermectin patients were hospitalized vs. 6 placebo patients, etc. Just say that this was an unusually noisy trial because of the self-report methodology, and you’re confident that these small differences will add up to significance when you put them into a meta-analysis. Roy et al: We’re back in East India, and back to non-randomized trials. 56 patients were retrospectively examined; some had been given ivermectin + doxycycline, others hydroxychloroquine, other azithromycin, and others symptomatic treatment only. We don’t get any meaningful information about how this worked, but we are told that they did not differ in “clinical well-being reporting onset timing”. Whatever. Chahla et al: The first of many Argentine trials. 110 patients received medium-dose ivermectin; 144 were kept as a control (no placebo). This was “cluster randomized”, which means they randomize different health centers to either give the experimental drug or not. This is worse than regular randomization, because there could be differences between these health centers (eg one might have better doctors who otherwise give better treatment, one might be in the poor part of town and have sicker patients, etc). They checked to see if there were any differences between the groups, and it sure looks like there were (the experimental group had twice as many obese people as the controls), but as per them, these differences were not statistically significant. Note that if this did make a difference, it would presumably make ivermectin look worse, not better. The primary outcome was given as “increase discharge from outpatient care with COVID-19 mild disease”. This favored the treatment; only 2/110 patients in the ivermectin group failed to be discharged, compared to 20 patients in the control group. But, uh, these were at different medical centers. Can’t different medical centers just have different discharge policies? One discharges you as soon as you seem to be getting better, the other waits to really make sure? This is an utterly crap endpoint to do a cluster randomized controlled trial on. If you’re going to do cRCT, which is never a great idea, you should be using some extremely objective endpoint that doctors and clinic administrators can’t possibly affect, like viral load according to some third-party laboratory, using the same third-party laboratory for both clinics. This is such a bad idea that I can’t help worrying I’m missing or misunderstanding something. If not, this is dumb and bad and should be ignored. Mourya et al: We’re back in India. This is a nonrandomized study comparing 50 patients given ivermectin to 50 patients given hydroxychloroquine. No primary outcome was named, but they focus on PCR negativity. Only 6% of patients in the hydroxychloroquine group were negative, compared to 90% of patients in the ivermectin group! On what day did they do the test? Uh, kind of random, and they admit that “in [the hydroxychloroquine group], mean time difference from the date of initiation of treatment and second test was significantly longer (7.24±2.75 days) as compared to 5.22±1.21 days in [the ivermectin group] (p=0.021).” Since they assessed these groups at different times, we shouldn’t draw any conclusions from them getting different results. Except that as far as I can tell this should handicap ivermectin, making it especially impressive that it did better. But also, the ivermectin group was made mostly of people who had been asymptomatic at the beginning (70%), and the hydroxychloroquine group had almost no asymptomatic cases (8%) . They were giving the ivermectin to healthy people and the hydroxychloroquine to sick people! They admit deep in the discussion that this “may be a confounding factor”. So basically they got totally different groups of people, tested them at totally different times, and the two sets of test results differed. So what? So this is why normal people do RCTs instead of whatever the heck this is, that’s what. Loue et al: …this one isn’t going to be an RCT either. Loue tells a story about a cluster of COVID cases at the French nursing home where he works. He asked people if they wanted to try ivermectin; 10 did and 15 didn’t. 1 ivermectin patient died, compared to 5 non-ivermectin patients. The non-ivermectin group looked a bit sicker than the ivermectin group in the inevitable Table 1, though it’s hard to tell. One interesting possible confounder (not mentioned, but I’m imagining it) is that demented patients probably couldn’t consent to ivermectin and ended up in the control group. This is another case of “I’m not going to trust anything that isn’t an RCT”. Merino et al: Another (sigh) non-RCT. Mexico City tried a public health program where if you called a hotline and said you had COVID, they sent you an emergency kit with various useful supplies. One of those supplies was ivermectin tablets. 18,074 people got the kit (and presumably some appreciable fraction took the ivermectin, though there’s no way to prove that). Their control group is people from before they started giving out the kits, people from after they stopped giving out the kits, and people who didn’t want the kits. There are differences in who got COVID early in the epidemic vs. later, and in people who did opt for medical kits vs. didn’t. To correct these, the researchers tried to adjust for confounders, something which - as I keep trying to hammer home again and again - never works. They found that using the kit led to a 75% or so reduction in hospitalization, though they were unable to separate out the ivermectin from the other things in the kit (paracetamol and aspirin), or from the placebo effect of having a kit and feeling like you had already gotten some treatment (if I understand right, the decision to go to the hospital was left entirely to the patient). I think this study is a moderate point in favor of giving people kits in order to prevent hospital overcrowding, but I’m not willing to accept that it tells us much about ivermectin in particular. Faisal et al: This one was published in The Professional Medical Journal (mispelled as “Profesional Medical Journal” in its URL), so you know it’s going to be good! It describes itself as “a cross-sectional study”, but later says it “randomized patients into two groups”, which would make it an RCT - I think they might just be using the term “cross-sectional” different from the standard American usage. A hospital in Pakistan got 50 patients on ivermectin + azithromycin, and another 50 on azithromycin alone. Primary outcome was not mentioned, and the data were presented confusingly, but a typical result is that only 4% of the ivermectin group had symptoms lasting more than 10 days, whereas 16% of the control group did, p < 0.01. They do a really weird thing where they compare how long it took symptoms to resolve between IVM and control groups within each bin. That is, if I’m understanding correctly, they ask “of the people who took between 3-5 days for symptoms to resolve, did they resolve faster for IVM or control?”. This is an utterly bizarre analysis to perform, although it doesn’t affect the fact that their other results still seem to favor ivermectin. Maybe I’m confused about what’s going on here. I’ve mostly been letting people off easy on no placebo, but I as far as I can tell (not very far) this paper seems to be going off whether patients reported continuing to have symptoms to the hospital doing the study, and I think that is potentially susceptible to placebo effects. Additionally, there’s no preregistration, and even though they talk a lot about doing PCR tests they don’t present the results. This is by no means the worst study here but I still think it’s pretty low quality and I don’t trust it. Aref et al: This one is published in the International Journal Of Nanomedicine, even though I’m pretty sure that isn’t a real thing. In this case the “nanomedicine” is a new nasal spray version of ivermectin which is so confusing I cannot for the life of me figure out what dose they are giving these patients. This Egyptian study gives 57 patients intranasal ivermectin plus hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, oseltamavir, and some vitamins; another 57 patients get all that stuff except the ivermectin. Primary outcome is not stated, but they look at various symptoms, all of which look better in the ivermectin group: 95% of ivermectin patients got negative PCRs at some time point, compared to 75% of controls, p = 0.004. I am pretty suspicious of this study, not least because it comes from Egypt which has an awful reputation for fake studies, and it returns extreme results that I wouldn’t expect even if ivermectin was actually a wonder drug. But I cannot find any particular thing wrong with it, nor did anyone else I looked at, so I will grudgingly let it stand. Krolewiecki et al: Another Argentine study. This one is a real RCT. 30 patients received ivermectin, 15 were the control group (no placebo, again). Primary outcome was difference in viral load on day 5. The trend favored ivermectin but it was not statistically significant, although they were able to make it statistically significant if they looked at a subset of higher-IVM-plasma-concentration patients. They did not find any difference in clinical outcomes. A pro-ivermectin person could point out that in the subgroup with the highest ivermectin concentrations, the drug seemed to work. A skeptic could point out that this is exactly the kind of subgroup slicing that you are not supposed to do without pre-registering it, which I don’t think this team did. I agree with the skeptic. Vallejos et al: Another Argentine study. It’s big (250 people in each arm). It’s an RCT. It tries to define a primary outcome (“Primary outcome: the trial ended when the last patient who was included achieved the end of study visit”), but that’s not what “primary outcome” means, and they don’t offer an alternative. Other outcomes: no difference in PCR on days 3 or 12. Hospitalization is nonsignificantly better in the ivermectin group (14 vs. 21, p = 0.2), but death is nonsigificantly better in the placebo group (3 vs. 4, p = 0.7). This isn’t even the kind of nonsignificant that might contribute to an exciting meta-analysis later. This is just a pure null result. I cannot find any problem with this study, and neither can anyone else I checked. This is the biggest RCT we’ve seen so far, so we should take it seriously. TOGETHER Trial: Speaking of big RCTs… This one hasn’t been published yet. There’s a video of a talk about it, but I am not going to watch it, because it is a video, so I am getting information secondhand from eg here. Apparently, it compares 677 people (!) randomized to ivermectin to 678 people randomized to placebo. 86 ivermectin patients ended up in the hospital compared to 95 placebo patients, p-value not significant. This was a really big professional trial done by bigshot researchers from a major Canadian university, and the medical establishment is taking it much more seriously than any of these others. When it comes out, it will probably get published in a top journal. When discussing Lopez-Medina, I wrote: When people say things like “sure, a lot of small studies show good results for ivermectin, but the bigger and more professional trials don’t”, this is one of the two big professional trials they’re talking about. This is the other one. Not coincidentally, it’s also the other trial that ivmmeta.com has a warning letter underneath telling you to disregard. Their main concern is that instead of truly randomizing patients to ivermectin vs. placebo, they did a time-dependent randomization that meant during some weeks more patients were getting one or the other. This is a problem because the trial takes place in Brazil, where different variants were more common at different times. Here’s their image: On the one hand, I have immense contempt for ivmmeta for letting all those other awful studies pass and then pulling out all the stops to try to nitpick this one. I have no idea if their proposed randomization failure really happened. And no doubt the reason they’re even able to investigate this is that this study is really careful and transparent - most of them don’t tell you anything about their randomization method. I would be shocked if other studies don’t have all these problems and worse. On the other hand, the point isn’t to be fair, it’s to be right. And this is a potential confounder. Not a huge one. But a potential one. I guess all we can do is try to bound the damage. Even if the confounding is 100% real and bad, there’s no way to make this study consistent with the crazy super-pro-ivermectin results of studies like Espitia-Hernandez and Aref. And even if we deny any confounding, we see the same slight pro-ivermectin trend - 86 hospitalizations vs. 95 - that we’ve seen in so many other studies. Nothing is going to make me believe that this isn’t in the top 33% of studies we’ve been looking at, so let’s add it as grist for the meta-analysis (though maybe not quite as much grist as its vast size indicates) and move on, angrily. Buonfrate et al: An Italian RCT. Patients were randomized into low-dose ivermectin (32), placebo (29), or high-dose ivermectin (32). Primary outcome was viral load on day 7. There was no significant difference (average of 2 in ivermectin groups, 2.2 in placebo group). They admit that they failed to reach the planned sample size, but did a calculation to show that even if they had, the trial could not have returned a positive result. Clinically, an average of 2 patients were hospitalized in each of the ivermectin arms, compared to 0 in the placebo arm - which bucks our previously-very-constant pro-ivermectin trend. Mayer et al: Not an RCT. Patients in an Argentine province were offered the opportunity to try ivermectin; 3266 said yes and become the experimental group, 17966 said no and became the control group. There were many obvious differences between the groups, but they all seemed to handicap ivermectin. There was a nonsignificant trend toward less hospitalization and significantly less mortality (1.5% vs. 2.1%, p = 0.03). While looking into this study, I learned the term “immortal time bias”. This means a period in between selection for the study and the beginning of study recording where patient outcomes are not counted. I think the problem here is that if you signed up for the system on Day X, and if you got sick before they could give you ivermectin, you were in the control group. See this Twitter thread, I have not confirmed everything he says. This only hardens my resolve to stay away from non-RCTs. Borody et al: Our last paper! …is it a paper? I can’t find it published anywhere. It mostly seems to be on news sites. Doesn’t look peer-reviewed. And it starts with “Note that views expressed in this opinion article are the writer’s personal views”. Whatever. 600 Australians were treated with ivermectin, doxycycline, and zinc. The article compares this to an “equivalent control group” made of “contemporary infected subjects in Australia obtained from published Covid Tracking Data”; this is not how you control group, @#!% you. Then it gets excited about the fact that most patients had better symptoms at the end of the ten-day study period than the beginning (untreated COVID resolves in about ten days). Why are these people wasting my time with this? Let’s move on. The Analysis If we remove all fraudulent and methodologically unsound studies from the table above, we end up with this: Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz, who investigated many of the studies above for fraud, tried a similar exercise. I learned about his halfway through, couldn’t help seeing it briefly, but tried to avoid remembering it or using it when generating mine (also, I did take the result of his fraud investigations into account), so they should be considered not quite independent efforts. His looks like this: He nixed Chowdhury, Babaloba, Ghauri, Faisal, and Aref, but kept Szenta Fonseca, Biber (?), and Mayer. There was correlation of 0.45, which I guess is okay. I asked him about his decision-making, and he listed a combination of serious statistical errors and small red flags adding up. I was pretty uncomfortable with most of these studies myself, so I will err on the side of severity, and remove all studies that either I or Meyerowitz-Katz disliked. We end up with the following short list: We’ve gone from 29 studies to 11, getting rid of 18 along the way. For the record, we eliminated 2/19 for fraud, 1/19 for severe preregistration violations, 10 for methodological problems, and 6 because Meyerowitz-Katz was suspicious of them. …but honestly this table still looks pretty good for ivermectin, doesn’t it? Still lots of big green boxes. Meyerowitz-Katz accuses ivmmeta of cherry-picking what statistic to use for their forest plot. That is, if a study measures ten outcomes, they sometimes take the most pro-ivermectin outcome. Ivmmeta.com counters that they used a consistent and reasonable (if complicated) process for choosing their outcome of focus, that being: If studies report multiple kinds of effects then the most serious outcome is used in calculations for that study. For example, if effects for mortality and cases are both reported, the effect for mortality is used, this may be different to the effect that a study focused on. If symptomatic results are reported at multiple times, we used the latest time, for example if mortality results are provided at 14 days and 28 days, the results at 28 days are used. Mortality alone is preferred over combined outcomes. Outcomes with zero events in both arms were not used (the next most serious outcome is used — no studies were excluded). For example, in low-risk populations with no mortality, a reduction in mortality with treatment is not possible, however a reduction in hospitalization, for example, is still valuable. Clinical outcome is considered more important than PCR testing status. When basically all patients recover in both treatment and control groups, preference for viral clearance and recovery is given to results mid-recovery where available (after most or all patients have recovered there is no room for an effective treatment to do better). If only individual symptom data is available, the most serious symptom has priority, for example difficulty breathing or low SpO2 is more important than cough. I’m having trouble judging this, partly because Meyerowitz-Katz says ivmmeta has corrected some earlier mistakes, and partly because there really is some reasonable debate over how to judge studies with lots of complicated endpoints. By this point I had completely forgotten what ivmmeta did, so I independently coded all 11 remaining studies following something in between my best understanding of their procedure and what I considered common sense. The only exception was that when the most severe outcome was measured in something other than patients (ie average number of virus copies per patient), I defaulted to one that was measured in patients instead, to keep everything with the same denominator. My results mostly matched ivmmeta’s, with one or two exceptions that I think are within the scope of argument or related to my minor deviations from their protocol. Placebo vs. ivermectin groups sometimes differed in size, which I’ve adjusted for and rounded off. Probably I’m forgetting some reason I can’t just do simple summary statistics to this, but whatever. It is p = 0.15, not significant. This is maybe unfair, because there aren’t a lot of deaths in the sample, so by focusing on death rather than more common outcomes we’re pointlessly throwing away sample size. What happens if I unprincipledly pick whatever I think the most reasonable outcome to use from each study is? I’ve chosen “most reasonable” as a balance between “is the most severe” and “has a lot of data points”: Now it’s p = 0.04, seemingly significant, but I had to make some unprincipled decisions to get there. I don’t think I specifically replaced negative findings with positive ones, but I can’t prove that even to myself, let alone to you. [UPDATE 5/31/22: A reader writes in to tell me that the t-test I used above is overly simplistic. A Dersimonian-Laird test is more appropriate for meta-analysis, and would have given 0.03 and 0.005 on the first and second analysis, where I got 0.15 and 0.04. This significantly strengthens the apparent benefit of ivermectin from ‘debatable’ to ‘clear’. I discuss some reasons below why I am not convinced by this apparent benefit.] (how come I’m finding a bunch of things on the edge of significance, but the original ivmmeta site found a lot of extremely significant things? Because they combined ratios, such that “one death in placebo, zero in ivermectin” looked like a nigh-infinite benefit for ivermectin, whereas I’m combining raw numbers. Possibly my way is statistically illegitimate for some reason, but I’m just trying to get a rough estimate of how convinced to be) So we are stuck somewhere between “nonsignificant trend in favor” and “maybe-significant trend in favor, after throwing out some best practices”. This is normally where I would compare my results to those of other meta-analyses made by real professionals. But when I look at them, they all include studies later found to be fake, like Elgazzar, and unsurprisingly come up with wildly positive conclusions. There are about six in this category. One of them later revised their results to exclude Elgazzar and still found strong efficacy for ivermectin, but they still included Niaee and some other dubious studies. The only meta-analysis that doesn’t make these mistakes is Popp (a Cochrane review), which is from before Elgazzar was found to be fraudulent, but coincidentally excludes it for other reasons. It also excludes a lot of good studies like Mahmud and Ravakirti because they give patients other things like HCQ and azithromycin - I chose to include them, because I don’t think they either work or have especially bad side effects, so they’re basically placebo - but Cochrane is always harsh like this. They end up with a point estimate where ivermectin cuts mortality by 40% - but say the confidence intervals are too wide to draw any conclusion. I think this basically agrees with my analyses above - the trends really are in ivermectin’s favor, but once you eliminate all the questionable studies there are too few studies left to have enough statistical power to reach significance. Except that everyone is still focusing on deaths and hospitalizations just because they’re flashy. Mahmud et al, which everyone agrees is a great study, found that ivermectin decreased days until clinical recovery, p = 0.003? So what do you do? This is one of the toughest questions in medicine. It comes up again and again. You have some drug. You read some studies. Again and again, more people are surviving (or avoiding complications) when they get the drug. It’s a pattern strong enough to common-sensically notice. But there isn’t an undeniable, unbreachable fortress of evidence. The drug is really safe and doesn’t have a lot of side effects. So do you give it to your patients? Do you take it yourself? Here this question is especially tough, because, uh, if you say anything in favor of ivermectin you will be cast out of civilization and thrown into the circle of social hell reserved for Klan members and 1/6 insurrectionists. All the health officials in the world will shout “horse dewormer!” at you and compare you to Josef Mengele. But good doctors aren’t supposed to care about such things. Your only goal is to save your patient. Nothing else matters. I am telling you that Mahmud et al is a good study and it got p = 0.003 in favor of ivermectin. You can take the blue pill, and stay a decent respectable member of society. Or you can take the horse dewormer pill, and see where you end up. In a second, I’ll tell you my answer. But you won’t always have me to answer questions like this, and it might be morally edifying to observe your thought process in situations like this. So take a second, and meet me on the other side of the next section heading. … … … … … The Synthesis Hopefully you learned something interesting about yourself there. But my answer is: worms! As several doctors and researchers have pointed out (h/t especially Avi Bitterman and David Boulware), the most impressive studies come from places that are teeming with worms. Mahmud from Bangladesh, Ravakirti from East India, Lopez-Medina from Colombia, etc. Here’s the prevalence of roundworm infections by country (source). But alongside roundworms, there are threadworms, hookworms, blood flukes, liver flukes, nematodes, trematodes, all sorts of worms. Add them all up and somewhere between half and a quarter of people in the developing world have at least one parasitic worm in their body. Being full of worms may impact your ability to fight coronavirus. Gluchowska et al write: Helminth [ie worm] infections are among the most common infectious diseases. Bradbury et al. highlight the possible negative interactions between helminth infection and COVID-19 severity in helminth-endemic regions and note that alterations in the gut microbiome associated with helminth infection appear to have systemic immunomodulatory effects. It has also been proposed that helminth co-infection may increase the morbidity and mortality of COVID-19, because the immune system cannot efficiently respond to the virus; in addition, vaccines will be less effective for these patients, but treatment and prevention of helminth infections might reduce the negative effect of COVID-19. During millennia of parasite-host coevolution helminths evolved mechanisms suppressing the host immune responses, which may mitigate vaccine efficacy and increase severity of other infectious diseases. Treatment of worm infections might reduce the negative effect of COVID-19! And ivermectin is a deworming drug! You can see where this is going… The most relevant species of worm here is the roundworm Strongyloides stercoralis. Among the commonest treatments for COVID-19 is corticosteroids, a type of immunosuppresant drug. The types of immune responses it suppresses do more harm than good in coronavirus, so turning them off limits collateral damage and makes patients better on net. But these are also the types of immune responses that control Strongyloides. If you turn them off even very briefly, the worms multiply out of control, you get what’s called “Strongyloides hyperinfection”, and pretty often you die. According to the WHO: The current COVID-19 pandemic serves to highlight the risk of using systemic corticosteroids and, to a lesser extent, other immunosuppressive therapy, in populations with significant risk of underlying strongyloidiasis. Cases of strongyloidiasis hyperinfection in the setting of corticosteroid use as COVID-19 therapy have been described and draw attention to the necessity of addressing the risk of iatrogenic strongyloidiasis hyperinfection syndrome in infected individuals prior to corticosteroid administration. Although this has gained importance in the midst of a pandemic where corticosteroids are one of few therapies shown to improve mortality, its relevance is much broader given that corticosteroids and other immunosuppressive therapies have become increasingly common in treatment of chronic diseases (e.g. asthma or certain rheumatologic conditions). So you need to “address the risk” of strongyloides infection during COVID treatment in roundworm-endemic areas. And how might you address this, WHO? Treatment of chronic strongyloidiasis with ivermectin 200 µg/kg per day orally x 1-2 days is considered safe with potential contraindications including possible Loa loa infection (endemic in West and Central Africa), pregnancy, and weight <15kg. Given ivermectin’s safety profile, the United States has utilized presumptive treatment with ivermectin for strongyloidiasis in refugees resettling from endemic areas, and both Canada and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control have issued guidance on presumptive treatment to avoid hyperinfection in at risk populations. Screening and treatment, or where not available, addition of ivermectin to mass drug administration programs should be studied and considered. This is serious and common enough that, if you’re not going to screen for it, it might be worth “add[ing] ivermectin to mass drug administration programs” in affected areas! Dr. Avi Bitterman carries the hypothesis to the finish line: First two images are with all relevant studies; second two are a sensitivity analysis that removes some of the most dubious. The good ivermectin trials in areas with low Strongyloides prevalence, like Vallejos in Argentina, are mostly negative. The good ivermectin trials in areas with high Strongyloides prevalence, like Mahmud in Bangladesh, are mostly positive. Worms can’t explain the viral positivity outcomes (ie PCR), but Dr. Bitterman suggests that once you remove low quality trials and worm-related results, the rest looks like simple publication bias: This is still just a possibility. Maybe I’m over-focusing too hard on a couple positive results and this will all turn out to be nothing. Or who knows, maybe ivermectin does work against COVID a little - although it would have to be very little, fading to not at all in temperate worm-free countries. But this theory feels right to me. It feels right to me because it’s the most troll-ish possible solution. Everybody was wrong! The people who called it a miracle drug against COVID were wrong. The people who dismissed all the studies because they F@#king Love Science were wrong. Ivmmeta.com was wrong. Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz was…well, he was right, actually, I got the worm-related meta-analysis graphic above from his Twitter timeline. Still, an excellent troll. Also, the best part is that I ignorantly asked, in my description of Mahmud et al above: And it was! It was a fluke! A literal, physical, fluke! For my whole life, God has been placing terrible puns in my path to irritate me, and this would be the worst one ever! So it has to be true! The Scientific Takeaway About ten years ago, when the replication crisis started, we learned a certain set of tools for examining studies. Check for selection bias. Distrust “adjusting for confounders”. Check for p-hacking and forking paths. Make teams preregister their analyses. Do forest plots to find publication bias. Stop accepting p-values of 0.049. Wait for replications. Trust reviews and meta-analyses, instead of individual small studies. These were good tools. Having them was infinitely better than not having them. But even in 2014, I was writing about how many bad studies seemed to slip through the cracks even when we pushed this toolbox to its limits. We needed new tools. I think the methods that Meyerowitz-Katz, Sheldrake, Heathers, Brown, Lawrence and others brought to the limelight this year are some of the new tools we were waiting for. Part of this new toolset is to check for fraud. About 10 - 15% of the seemingly-good studies on ivermectin ended up extremely suspicious for fraud. Elgazzar, Carvallo, Niaee, Cadegiani, Samaha. There are ways to check for this even when you don’t have the raw data. Like: The Carlisle-Stouffer-Fisher method: Check some large group of comparisons, usually the Table 1 of an RCT where they compare the demographic characteristics of the control and experimental groups, for reasonable p-values. Real data will have p-values all over the map; one in every ten comparisons will have a p-value of 0.1 or less. Fakers seem bad at this and usually give everything a nice safe p-value like 0.8 or 0.9.
international relations journals

international relations journals is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 15, 2025 and April 15, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "reading enough international relations journals to get a sense of what policymakers are thinking about". It most often appears alongside Affordable Housing Bureau, Ajb, Alienation of labor.

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April 15, 2025 · Original source
Biden supports Xi’s campaign to prevent Chinese people from getting addicted to video games, and wants to keep video-game-enabling GPUs out of the country. …and design experiments to distinguish between these, or wait for more chip sanctions to see how they pan out. But in real life, we can be very sure some of these (like 2 and 7) weren’t intended, and others (like 4) were. Why? Some combination of trusting Biden’s stated goals, psychoanalyzing Biden’s plausible goals, checking who lobbied Biden to do this, and reading enough international relations journals to get a sense of what policymakers are thinking about. I think it’s fine to do black box systems analysis, just like it’s fine to do behaviorism. But we should view these as methodological commitments for a specific group, rather than good strategies for normal people. Jared Peterson (blog) writes: This originally struck me as rather silly and as an obvious misinterpretation of an idea that has nothing to do with human intentions...then I read the comments and saw many people claiming exactly that! Donella Meadows is an important figure in the field of Systems Thinking, and says by definition (whether human designed or not), systems have a purpose. "A system’s function or purpose is not necessarily spoken, written, or expressed explicitly, except through the operation of the system. The best way to deduce the system’s purpose is to watch for a while to see how the system behaves. Purposes are deduced from behavior, not from rhetoric or stated goals” One way to think about this is that Meadows would be OK talking about Molochs purpose as something coherent. Is changing the climate the purpose of modern capitalism? In one sense, no. But simultaneously, it is perfectly coherent to talk about the system as having that exact purpose because the system seems to work towards that goal. Even if you push against the system, the system seems to adapt and continue with that goal anyways. There is something almost intelligent about systems where they seem to work towards goals that no one ever intended. But the phrase isn't about human goals at all! Oh! I agree this makes sense if you need to talk about the “purpose” of an un-designed system with no humans in it. Moonshadow writes: This sentiment is grasping towards the same sort of place as your "Meditations on Moloch" essay. No-one involved in the system wants what the system actually ends up doing. But whatever their individual intents, /the system as a whole/, if allowed to grow naturally, inevitably ends up doing what Moloch wants. Of course the purpose we intended for the system isn't really that, any more than Moloch really exists. But you can't begin the meta level fight - of designing the system's high level organisational structures and incentives to try to reduce this effect, instead of letting it emerge organically like it always does - unless you first admit the problem. I agree this is a useful thing to talk about, I just don’t think “purpose” is the right word for it. I’m not even sure “system” is the right word for it. A good example of Moloch would be two countries having a nuclear arms race. But how is this POSIWID? The purpose of the . . . system of two countries . . . is to . . . have a nuclear arms race? This is pretty different from how I usually hear it used. But here is a dissenting voice. Ajb writes: POSIWID was not originally an antagonistic political snark. It's perfectly sensible to notice that a system may be fulfilling other purposes than it does officially, and this is not incompatible with it operating in good faith. You can think of it as a bit like Chesterton's fence: * to reform a system you should understand what purposes it fulfills, not just what it is officially supposed to do * These additonal or alternative purposes may in fact be desirable ones that you should avoid breaking. Cybernetics (where the phrase originated) drew a lot of inspiration from biology, and there obviously nothing has an 'official purpose' at all. But it nevertheless has organisation and is functional. Rob writes: The problem with quoting aphorisms like this is that it misses the context - specifically the context of a management consultant (viz. Stafford Beer) who spends his entire life being told about systems his clients have put in place, with some stated purpose in mind. Those systems do not achieve their stated purposes, but can be continually defended against change by re-stating the purpose - this shouldn't work, but in practice it often does, because most people aren't great at decoupling intent from outcome. "The purpose of a system is what it does" is a good rhetorical counter, because it acknowledges that, in practice, any continuation of a system with known outcomes is a tacit acceptance of those outcomes as the system's real purpose. You don't get to claim some other "real" purpose once you know what the outcomes are. My interpretation has always been in the spirit of this tweet: https://x.com/primawesome/status/1178671690261286918?lang=en > My neighbor told me coyotes keep eating his outdoor cats so I asked how many cats he has and he said he just goes to the shelter and gets a new cat afterwards so I said it sounds like he’s just feeding shelter cats to coyotes and then his daughter started crying. I agree this makes more sense in the context of some supposed person claiming that “the system has good intentions” means they should never have to change the system. I don’t think I really see this failure mode. I bet a lot of you are going to yell at me and say that, I don’t know, homelessness or something is like this. But defenders of the current homelessness system never say you can’t change it because it had good intentions when it started. I predict they would say that their own group is doing good work, and it’s everyone else who needs to change. Or that the current system works a little and just needs to be funded more. Or that the current system is better than nothing, and your proposed attempt to “change” it is secretly a plan to gut it and leave homeless people without help. I definitely don’t think they’d say “Yes, your proposed change would improve the system, but you’re not allowed to make it because the people who designed the current system had good intentions”. Leah Libresco Sargeant writes: I think the Catholic principle of double effect is helpful here. This often comes up in the case of eg delivering a baby pre-viability because the mom has an infection that will progress to sepsis and death if she and the baby aren’t separated. The three criteria are: the nature of the act is itself good, or at least morally neutral;
Intervention Report

Intervention Report is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 11, 2024 and January 11, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "one of the core conclusions of the 'Intervention Report' was 'economic development and reform zones'". It most often appears alongside ACX Grants, Africa, Amalgamated Kenyan Wells.

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Intervention Report
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January 11, 2024 · Original source
I was glad to see the EA Intervention Report on Charter Cities but it was limited by the fact that it was written by non-expert outsiders. Mark Lutter's response is much better informed than was their write up.
Insofar as one of the core conclusions of the "Intervention Report" was "economic development and reform zones," the actual work done by Charter Cities Institute and others in this domain do, in fact, work on a variety of zone-based reforms. The Romer-esque version of a "Charter City" was to some extent a straw man for what should have been a deeper dive into the global movement of zones with distinctive law and governance.
So by all means support CCI. The work it does is much more important than the EA Intervention Report acknowledges.
Intrinsic Perspective

Intrinsic Perspective is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 27, 2025 and February 27, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Intrinsic Perspective wants a law saying AI-generated text must be watermarked". It most often appears alongside /r/NootropicsDepot, @fae_dreams, @ObhishekSaha.

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February 27, 2025 · Original source
11: Intrinsic Perspective wants a law saying AI-generated text must be watermarked. I was most interested the article’s claim that there is now “semantic watermarking” - watermarking which operates on the level of ideas, and can’t be defeated by rephrasing an AI-generated text in your own words. I have skimmed the paper explaining this and think I vaguely understand what’s going on, but it still boggles me that this is possible. 12: Aella: How OnlyFans Took Over The World. There have been camgirl sites since forever. How did OnlyFans leap over all of its predecessors and achieve an unprecedented level of success? Aella discusses many factors, but one stands out: traditional camsites advertised the site as a whole, and then once you got to the site you chose which model you wanted to see. OnlyFans encourages models to advertise themselves - often on their own social media accounts, sometimes via scams - which “unlocks human creativity” on the problem of bringing new eyeballs to a porn site. 13: Nate Silver has 113 predictions for Trump’s second term. I’d be interested to see whether making each of these predictions 10% less confident (to account for possible gameboard-overturning AI) ends up beating Nate. 14: Sarah Constantin: What’s Behind The SynBio Bust? Three of the most promising synthetic biology companies - Gingko, Zymergen, and Amyris - all crashed between 2021 and 2023. Why? Producing chemicals in traditional factories is orders of magnitude more efficient than synthesizing them via microbes (except for the sort of large biomolecules that can’t be produced in factories). These companies had brilliant employees and cool tech, but no clear plan to get around this handicap, and used up their runway before they could figure one out. They also focused too hard on designing the microbes, and were too willing to outsource the actual manufacturing to other people without being sufficiently paranoid that those other people were doing quality control. 15: One of the more exciting psychiatric results (which I blogged about a long time ago) was the apparent finding that omega-3 supplementation could prevent high-risk people from having first break schizophrenia. A new RCT says this doesn’t replicate and cites two other recent trials showing it didn’t replicate. There’s also a new meta-analysis which says actually it does replicate, but usually failing a big RCT is a bad sign and I’m pretty skeptical. Thanks to Isaak F for the links. {ETA: Thomas Reilly says: “Although I don't believe omega-3 supplementation has any benefit in psychosis, I also don't think this new trial should shift your opinion much, given the total sample size was n=135 and the total number of transitions to psychosis was n=8.”] 16: Claim that predictions of global warming magnitude are gradually going down thanks to successful pledges/action: Source is CipherNews (h/t Stefan Schubert) apparently citing Climate Action Tracker, but I get the impression that this is just some people eyeballing the size of pledges and not any more sophisticated forecasting. I don’t know how to square this with the claims that such and such a thing (summer temperature, sea ice, etc) is much worse than anyone expected. 17: I don’t know anything about the Lucy Letby case, but all of my smart friends who have been right about this kind of thing before say she’s innocent. 18: A reader asks House of Strauss (edgy sports Substack) whether the vibe shift away from political correctness threatens the edgy Substack business model - as the power of orthodoxy declines, can you still get rich and famous as a brave anti-orthodoxy critic? His answer: nothing that can happen from here is as bad as the Twitter/X link deboost (which made attracting attention harder for everyone). I mostly agree: I think discoverability has suffered, people who are already famous will be able to stay famous without too much extra effort, and everyone else will have to explore new options. 19: Spectator: Could AI Lead To A Revival Of Decorative Beauty? Profiles Not Quite Past, a startup using AI and fancy printing to make customized Delft tiles. It’s a good idea and the tiles are very pretty, but the tiles are sort of a best possible case (a pretty, traditional object that can have a customized 2D image and be mass-printed). I think most forms of lost decorative beauty aren’t bottlenecked by ability to generate 2D images of the type image models are good at, and so will have to wait. 20: Some friends including Kelsey Piper wrote an emergency PEPFAR Report, collecting evidence for why PEPFAR is good/effective/important and deserves to be kept. Some key points: PEPFAR has saved between 7.5 and 30 million lives, at a cost between $1,500 and $10,000 per life saved. The US government is willing to spend at least a thousand times this much to save an American life.
Investigating the genetic architecture of noncognitive skills using GWAS-by-subtraction

Investigating the genetic architecture of noncognitive skills using GWAS-by-subtraction is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 03, 2021 and November 03, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "That's the thought process behind Investigating the genetic architecture of noncognitive skills using GWAS-by-subtraction , by Demange et al". It most often appears alongside Abdel Abdellaoiu, Abdel Abdellaoui, al-Qaeda.

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November 03, 2021 · Original source
At some point, some geneticists just did the hard thing and found some actual genes for actual intelligence, separate from educational attainment. And if you have both the educational attainment genes and the intelligence genes, you can subtract the one from the other to find the non-intelligence-related genes that affect educational attainment in other ways. That's the thought process behind Investigating the genetic architecture of noncognitive skills using GWAS-by-subtraction, by Demange et al (the "al" includes some researchers whose work has featured here before, like Paige Harden, Elliot Tucker-Drob, and Abdel Abdellaoiu).
Investopedia

Investopedia is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 28, 2021 and December 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Think the Investopedia or Bogleheads of investing in prediction markets". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, 2016 Washington carbon tax ballot initiative, @GoodSciProject.

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Investopedia
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December 28, 2021 · Original source
Nikos Bosse, $5,000, to seed a wiki about forecasting. Articles would include technical topics like scoring rules, interviews with superforecasters, and links to existing prediction markets and forecasting platforms. Think the Investopedia or Bogleheads of investing in prediction markets. This is another leg of my "improve forecasting infrastructure" goal area. Nikos is a PhD student working on infectious disease forecasting. If you think you can help with the wiki, email him at nikosbosse@gmail.com.
iopscience.iop.org

iopscience.iop.org is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2021 and August 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/4/2/024008/pdf". It most often appears alongside AP News, Associated Press, Bitcoin.

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iopscience.iop.org
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August 25, 2021 · Original source
10. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/4/2/024008/pdf . I'm using their on-peak time because I'm assuming the average 20 mile bus trip is a commute. The paper claims that under some reasonable ways of thinking about things, taking the bus off-peak is actually more polluting than taking a car, because we're imagining eg an entire bus with you as the only passenger, which requires more carbon than an entire car with you as the only passenger. This seems a little hokey, because the bus is going to run its route whether you're on it or not, but it's a natural consequence of dividing the carbon cost of the bus by number of passengers and assigning you your "share", which seems like the right way to handle peak times. Since I've used their peak numbers, this methodological dispute doesn't affect my table.
iqcomparisonsite.com

iqcomparisonsite.com is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 20, 2024 and March 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "google results in being presented with the website 'iqcomparisonsite.com'". It most often appears alongside ACT, Clearer Thinking, ClearerThinking.

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iqcomparisonsite.com
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March 20, 2024 · Original source
The average ClearerThinking user reported their IQ as 130. These are implausibly high. Only 1/200 people has an IQ of 138 or higher. 1/50 people have IQ 130, but the ClearerThinking survey used crowdworkers (eg Mechanical Turk) who should be totally average. Okay, fine, so people lie about their IQ (or foolishly trust fake Internet IQ tests). Big deal, right? But these don’t look like lies. Both surveys asked for SAT scores, which are known to correspond to IQ. The LessWrong average was 1446, corresponding to IQ 140. The ClearerThinking average was 1350, corresponding to IQ 134. People seem less likely to lie about their SATs, and least likely of all to optimize their lies for getting IQ/SAT correspondences right. And the Less Wrong survey asked people what test they based their estimates off of. Some people said fake Internet IQ tests. But other people named respected tests like the WAIS, WISC, and Stanford-Binet, or testing sessions by Mensa (yes, I know you all hate Mensa, but their IQ tests are considered pretty accurate). The subset of about 150 people who named unimpeachable tests had slightly higher IQ (average 140) than everyone else. Thanks to Spencer Greenberg of ClearerThinking, I think I’m finally starting to make progress in explaining what’s going on. Problem #1: The Biggest SAT → IQ Conversion Site Is Wrong Thanks to Sebastian Jensen for pointing this out! He writes: A search of ‘SAT to IQ’ on google results in being presented with the website ‘iqcomparisonsite.com’. This man has directly converted the SAT percentiles to IQ scores, which is not what should be done. Tests like the ACT and SAT correlate with IQ at about 0.8-0.85 [rca], [my analysis], [emil article], [scholarly article]. The general factor of academic achievement and IQ correlate at about 0.81-0.88 [psychometric test], [GCSE grades]. This discrepancy occurs because they measure different abilities - an IQ test will test many different abilities, while the SAT/ACT only tests verbal/mathematical ability. In addition, these percentiles are very outdated as the average SAT score has changed over time due to changes in the content of the test. Instead, the ideal way to do this is to take the percentiles from the current versions of the SAT and then convert those into z-scores and then regress those z-scores by the mean by the estimated regression coefficient. Using Sebastian’s updated tables, we find that the average Less Wrong IQ as predicted by SATs goes down from 140 → 132, and the ClearerThinking IQ goes down from 134 → 124. So people probably exaggerated their IQs somewhat, and unrelatedly we were using an SAT → IQ conversion that exaggerated IQs, and so the numbers falsely appeared to match. Okay! It’s a start! Interlude: The ClearerThinking IQ Test The ClearerThinking survey included a battery of cognitive tests of exactly the sort that could usually be used to determine IQ. Unfortunately none of them were normed, so we know how all the 3700 subjects did relative to each other, but not where the 100 point is. Spencer was able to norm them to the general population based on education level. That is, he asked his sample about their educational attainment (college degree, PhD, etc) and found they were a little more educated than the US average. Since the US average IQ is 100, his sample should have an average a little higher than this. He was able to calculate how much higher. Then he mapped a bell curve to everyone in his sample’s performance on his tests. Since he had 3700 people, he was able to do this relatively smoothly. He found an average IQ of 110, which originally surprised me, because I thought his sample was supposed to be random crowdworkers, who should be close to the US average of 100. But in fact, his survey was a combination of 1900 crowdworkers and 1800 people who saw it on social media - eg friends and friends-of-friends of Spencer. Separating this out by group, we find that the crowdworkers have an average normed-IQ of 100, and the social media referrals have an average normed-IQ of 120, making the overall average of 110. This seems pretty trustworthy, since it correctly estimates the crowdworkers (completely average) as 100. Spencer studied math at Columbia, his friends and friends-of-friends are pretty smart, and I think the 120 estimate for them is also okay. But there’s still a problem here. Using an accurate SAT score → IQ calculator, we determined that the ClearerThinking average should be 124. But using real cognitive tests, it looks like it’s 110. What went wrong? Problem #2: Only The Smartest People Report Their SATs Using Spencer’s cognitive test results, we can compare people who did vs. didn’t take the SAT. We find: People who didn’t take the SAT (remember, this includes current high schoolers) have tested-IQ 110.
Is Enlightenment Compatible With Sex Scandals?

Is Enlightenment Compatible With Sex Scandals? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 31, 2022 and October 31, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "my old post Is Enlightenment Compatible With Sex Scandals?". It most often appears alongside A Mind Without Craving, ACX, Andres Emilsson.

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October 31, 2022 · Original source
Several people brought up my old post Is Enlightenment Compatible With Sex Scandals?, where I mentioned that a lot of famous Buddhist meditation teachers had sex scandals. Presumably all of these teachers could reach the first jhana, which is pretty low on the totem pole of Buddhist meditative accomplishments. So what went wrong? Did they just forget that they could get pleasure through jhana instead of scandalous sex?
Is Pharma Research Worse Than Chance

Is Pharma Research Worse Than Chance is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 23, 2021 and March 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "He makes the same point I made in Is Pharma Research Worse Than Chance". It most often appears alongside 2008 crisis, A Failure, But Not Of Prediction, Ancient Phoenicia.

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March 23, 2021 · Original source
But haven't theories given us all sorts of useful things, like science, which leads to technology? Taleb is willing to compromise a tiny bit on this, but he suggests theory is much less important for technology than we give it credit for. He makes the same point I made in Is Pharma Research Worse Than Chance - a whole lot of drug design seems to happen more by accident (or more politely, through tinkering and investigating) than by smart people using theory to discover drugs. Fleming discovered pencillin by wondering why there were blank spots in his petri dishes; meanwhile:
Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage?

Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2025 and September 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "and a related 2019 review article (“ Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage? ”)"; "“ Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage? ” Abraham, Jones, and Glanzman, npj Science of Learning (2019)". It most often appears alongside A Change of Heart, Abraham, Adams.

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September 12, 2025 · Original source
A dramatic followup experiment by Glanzman’s group suggested that the memory was at least partly stored as RNA. Their experiment involved sensitizing one slug to touch, by shocking it, extracting RNA from that slug, and then injecting that RNA into a different slug. They found that the second slug became sensitive to touch, as if it had been shocked. In other words, it seems like the ‘memory’ of the shock got transferred! See their 2018 paper (“RNA from Trained Aplysia Can Induce an Epigenetic Engram for Long-Term Sensitization in Untrained Aplysia”), and a related 2019 review article (“Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage?”) for more discussion.
“Is plasticity of synapses the mechanism of long-term memory storage?”
Is Reinforcement Learning Involved In Sensory Processing?

Is Reinforcement Learning Involved In Sensory Processing? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 12, 2021 and April 12, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Best of recent Less Wrong: Is Reinforcement Learning Involved In Sensory Processing?". It most often appears alongside A Whirlwind Tour Of Ethereum Finance, Agan, Air Force Chapel.

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April 12, 2021 · Original source
17: Best of recent Less Wrong: Is Reinforcement Learning Involved In Sensory Processing?, Politics Is Way Too Meta, A Whirlwind Tour Of Ethereum Finance, and reasons why the GPT-3 paper is disappointing.
Is Science Slowing Down?

Is Science Slowing Down? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 24, 2024 and October 24, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "You can find long versions of this at Is Science Slowing Down?". It most often appears alongside 1960: The Year The Singularity Was Cancelled, 1960s, 1973.

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October 24, 2024 · Original source
You can find long versions of this at Is Science Slowing Down? and 1960: The Year The Singularity Was Cancelled, but here’s the short version.
Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomes

Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomes is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 03, 2025 and July 03, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "This is from Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomes". It most often appears alongside 23andme, @alextisyoung, Aborigines.

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July 03, 2025 · Original source
I don’t want to get into another “did you communicate this poorly?” argument after the recent Tyler Cowen one, so I will just quote the Turkheimer paragraphs I objected to and let readers make their own decisions. This is from Is Tan Et Al The End Of Social Science Genomes:
Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes” ?

Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes” ? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 29, 2024 and February 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "post on Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes” ?". It most often appears alongside @BoyanSlat, @eigenrobot, @JackTindale.

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February 29, 2024 · Original source
...istan - and, after that, professional basketball in Mongolia. 38: Vaticidal Prophet responds to my It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic with a post on Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes” ? You can see my response here , and Vat’s counter-response below. 39: Claim (h/t @NiohBerg, @eigenrobot): “Islam is dying in Iran” Iranians in the comments chiming in to...
...in Uzbekistan - and, after that, professional basketball in Mongolia. 38: Vaticidal Prophet responds to my It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic with a post on Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes” ? You can see my response here , and Vat’s counter-response below. 39: Claim (h/t @NiohBerg, @eigenrobot): “Islam is dying in Iran” Iranians in the comments chiming in to...
Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art

Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 17, 2025 and October 17, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art , by Canarius Agrippa"; "Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art, by Canarius Agrippa". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, ACX, ACX.

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October 17, 2025 · Original source
Islamic Geometric Patterns In The Metropolitan Museum Of Art, by Canarius Agrippa. He is a physicist living in Boston, now on his third attempt at starting a blog, at Canis Agrippae.
Israel 2015

Israel 2015 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 16, 2022 and November 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Also, Israel 2015, Combining Stimulants and Monoamine Oxidase Inhibitors: A Reexamination of the Literature and a Report of a New Treatment Combination". It most often appears alongside @AutismCapital, Adderall, ADHD.

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Israel 2015
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November 16, 2022 · Original source
Also, Israel 2015, Combining Stimulants and Monoamine Oxidase Inhibitors: A Reexamination of the Literature and a Report of a New Treatment Combination follows a patient who took selegiline and lisdexamfetamine at the same time, notes with surprise that they didn’t die, and concludes that:
Israeli news

Israeli news is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 28, 2024 and March 28, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Interview with Saar about Rootclaim in Israeli news". It most often appears alongside ACX comment thread, ACX subreddit, Asia.

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Israeli news
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March 28, 2024 · Original source
Interview with Saar about Rootclaim (not the lab leak debate) in Israeli news
ISSFLL

ISSFLL is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 17, 2023 and November 17, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "I appreciate ISSFLL for reminding me of the connection between Christianity → slave morality → modern harm-focused and victim-focused morality". It most often appears alongside Abel, Adam and Eve, America.

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ISSFLL
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November 17, 2023 · Original source
Which is too bad, because the last two chapters of ISSFLL bring us to:
I appreciate ISSFLL for reminding me of the connection between Christianity → slave morality → modern harm-focused and victim-focused morality, and for painting this as a grand arc of history. But aside from that, I don’t feel like it comes out with a particularly coherent viewpoint, or any extra insight on our current social order.
Italian periodicals

Italian periodicals is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 24, 2021 and February 24, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "They read British, French, and Italian periodicals". It most often appears alongside 1950s, 1980s, 1983.

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Italian periodicals
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February 24, 2021
February 24, 2021 · Original source
Although you wouldn't expect them to have any consistent aesthetic, Fussell gets weirdly specific about them. They buy their clothes from L.L. Bean and Land's End, and tend to dress in down vests, flannel shirts, and hiking boots (which apparently "conveys the message [that] I am freer and less terrified than you are"). They enjoy touch football (because it is actually fun, unlike other sports which are just class signaling), and carry their infants around in slings or papooses (because these are the objectively simplest ways to convey infants). They read British, French, and Italian periodicals (because this is objectively the best way to keep abreast of world affairs), and live in cute old houses in unusual locations. Their front yard may be gravel (because they have transcended the class signaling of lawns), and their furniture includes "parody displays" like "an elephant's foot umbrella stand" and "campy fabric". "Instead of the chart of Nantucket or Catalina Island favored by the upper-middles, a chart of Bikini Atoll or Guadalcanal. On the coffee table, Mother Jones and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists." Their TV preferences are for "classic reruns like The Honeymooners or I Love Lucy" (apparently the objectively best TV shows).
It’s Embarrassing To Be A Stay At Home Mom

It’s Embarrassing To Be A Stay At Home Mom is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2024 and September 12, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "before reading It’s Embarrassing To Be A Stay At Home Mom". It most often appears alongside @halomancer1, ACX, Amazon.

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September 12, 2024 · Original source
6: …and I found the above a good appetizer before reading It’s Embarrassing To Be A Stay At Home Mom, which argues (I think correctly) that the root cause of declining fertility is what society finds honorable vs. low-status. Attempts to shore up fertility through economic means and free childcare have mostly failed. Attempts to shore it up with status (giving mothers of X children some kind of national award presented by a beloved figure) have . . . well, they’re at least correlated with success, although this post doesn’t prove causation as well as I’d like. In this model, Asians (Korea, Japan, etc) are having the most fertility issues because their societies are most collectivist, ie people more closely follow the gradient of what is vs. isn’t considered socially acceptable/high-status. I’m impressed by this post’s thoroughness, but also by arguments from the stay-at-home moms I know: they say people are constantly giving them grief about it, and often look for some part-time make-work job they can take just so people will stop looking down on them for being a stay-at-home mother (a friend suggests this is responsible for most of the popularity of multi-level marketing - and this same friend argues that Korea could solve its fertility crisis by mandating that all K-pop idols have at least two children).
It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic

It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 29, 2024 and February 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Vaticidal Prophet responds to my It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic". It most often appears alongside @BoyanSlat, @eigenrobot, @JackTindale.

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February 29, 2024 · Original source
38: Vaticidal Prophet responds to my It’s Fair To Call Schizophrenia Probably Mostly Genetic with a post on Is Traumatic Brain Injury “Caused By Genes”? You can see my response here, and Vat’s counter-response below.
It’s Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic

It’s Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 08, 2024 and February 08, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "last week we had It’s Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic". It most often appears alongside Dr. Steven Hyman, E. Fuller Torrey, Michael Roe.

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February 08, 2024 · Original source
We’ve been gradually working our way through the conversation around E. Fuller Torrey’s concerns about schizophrenia genetics - last week we had It’s Fair To Describe Schizophrenia As Probably Mostly Genetic, the week before Unintuitive Properties Of Polygenic Disorders. Here are two more arguments Torrey makes that we haven’t gotten to:
It’s Probably Not Lithium

It’s Probably Not Lithium is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 01, 2022 and July 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Her main writeup is here: It’s Probably Not Lithium". It most often appears alongside @a_centrism, @amplituhedron, AISafetySupport.com.

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July 01, 2022 · Original source
47: Natalia Mendonca has been working hard trying to investigate theories of obesity (especially SMTM’s lithium contamination theory). Her main writeup is here: It’s Probably Not Lithium. But I’ve been even more impressed with some of the periperhal things she’s found that apply to almost all “alternative” theories of obesity, like that lab mice don’t actually seem to be getting fatter and the evidence that truly wild animals are inexplicably getting fatter is slim. I hope she puts it in one place someday.
Iveria

Iveria is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 20, 2023 and April 20, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "the poems in Iveria were widely read and much admired". It most often appears alongside 15 minute cities, 200 Concrete Problems In AI Interpretability, 2022 ACX Forecasting contest.

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Iveria
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April 20, 2023 · Original source
Stalin published all of his work anonymously and never publicly acknowledged it . . . in his biography of Stalin, Simon Sebag Montefiore notes that the poems in Iveria "were widely read and much admired. They became minor Georgian classics, to be published in anthologies and memorised by schoolchildren until the 1970s (and not as part of Stalin's cult; they were usually published as 'Anonymous').
ivmmeta.com

ivmmeta.com is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 24, 2021 and November 24, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "just going off the ones on the sidebar of ivmmeta.com". It most often appears alongside Alexandros Marinos, Algernon’s Law, COVID.

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ivmmeta.com
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November 24, 2021 · Original source
We can go further. The same people behind ivmmeta.com have posted this “meta-analysis” of curcumin, a common spice and oft-mooted panacea:
But what’s true of curcumin is equally true of lots of other different compounds: zinc, hydroxychloroquine, quercetin, nigella sativa, melatonin…just going off the ones on the sidebar of ivmmeta.com, there are about thirty different things that have this same level of very early, very dubious super-promising COVID results. Some are expensive and some are dangerous, but I think about twenty of them are cheap and safe.
IWillNeverLogOff.com

IWillNeverLogOff.com is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 01, 2023 and December 01, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "A very old friend of mine now has a Substack: IWillNeverLogOff.com". It most often appears alongside Abraham Davenport, AI Policy Institute, Arizona.

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IWillNeverLogOff.com
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December 01, 2023
December 01, 2023 · Original source
16: A very old friend of mine now has a Substack: IWillNeverLogOff.com, mostly books and movie reviews.