Publications: L

Substacks, magazines, zines, journals, and publications referenced in the archive. This section collects the L slice of the category index.

Reference Index

Use the title to open the reference entry. Use the caret to expand a compact inline dossier with source context, issue trail, related pages, and outbound links.

Less Wrong

Less Wrong is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 40 times across 40 issues between August 30, 2020 and February 02, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "The rationalist community is a group of people, mostly centered around the website Less Wrong"; "Two other people on Less Wrong"; "Best of recent Less Wrong". It most often appears alongside Twitter, Metaculus, OpenAI.

Article page
Less Wrong
Mention count
40
Issue count
40
First seen
August 30, 2020
Last seen
February 02, 2026
August 30, 2020 · Original source
I'm privileged to be at the intersection of a number of communities exploring these concepts. The rationalist community is a group of people, mostly centered around the website Less Wrong, investigating reasoning and probability. The effective altruist community is a group, inspired by philosophers like Will MacAskill and Peter Singer, who work on how best to use charitable resources for the greater good. And I work in psychiatry, which it turns out is pretty relevant to questions about how people end up believing strange things - both as an investigative science and as a terrible warning. These groups aren't always great at reporting their ideas and conclusions to the general public, so I'm here to help. Most of the interesting stuff you see here will be influenced by at least one of them; most of the errors will be mine alone.
February 23, 2021 · Original source
Two other people on Less Wrong, Zvi and Bucky, decided to test themselves against me by trying to predict the same questions. Zvi saw my answers beforehand; Bucky didn’t. Here's how we did (except where otherwise stated, all predictions are for 12/31/20):
April 12, 2021 · Original source
17: Best of recent Less Wrong: Is Reinforcement Learning Involved In Sensory Processing?, Politics Is Way Too Meta, A Whirlwind Tour Of Ethereum Finance, and reasons why the GPT-3 paper is disappointing.
April 14, 2021 · Original source
This is a link to / ad for a great recent Less Wrong post by lsusr, Predictive Coding Has Been Unified With Backpropagation, itself about a recent paper Predictive Coding Approximates Backprop Along Arbitrary Computation Graphs.
May 20, 2021 · Original source
3: Best of Less Wrong: Seven Years Of Spaced Repetition Software In The Classroom. Describes a teacher’s experiments with Anki / Supermemo style SRS flashcards; the conclusion is that using them is complicated, they sort of work, but they helped him realize how much of learning isn’t about memorizing things. I appreciated this most for its theory that it’s important to make kids learn specific facts, but not so important that they remember them; teaching someone (eg) Civil War history is “training” a “predictive model” of the Civil War, war in general, and history in general which will survive and remain useful even after the specific facts and battles are long forgotten. I think this is the strongest defense of modern education, given that we do spend lots of time teaching kids things they will definitely forget. But how would you test it?
7: Best of Less Wrong: DARPA Digital Tutor: Four Months To Total Technical Expertise? In 2009, DARPA created a digital tutoring system that could adjust lessons based on students’ strong and weak points. After four months, digitally-tutored IT technicians outperformed experienced professionals in DARPA’s tests. How is this different from existing digital learning software, and could we make equally successful programs for other subjects?
17: Best of Less Wrong: Are We In An AI Overhang? IE a situation where we have almost all the pieces we need to make much smarter AIs than we’re currently making, and once we snap the last piece into place everything will start moving really fast.
August 09, 2021 · Original source
I was excited to read the Less Wrong post Chess and cheap ways to check day to day variance in cognition by KPier, who does something similar with chess instead of a word game; they haven’t checked carbon dioxide levels yet, but I’d be excited for them to try. I’m also interested in hearing from anyone else who often repeats some objectively-scoreable cognitive task, to see how they do. A CO2 monitor costs about $100 on Amazon, but if money is the only reason you’re not going to do some really good experiment, please let me know and I’ll buy it for you.
September 29, 2021 · Original source
But Galef earned her celebrity status honestly, through long years of hard labor in the rationality mines. Back in ~2007, a bunch of people interested in biases and decision-making joined the “rationalist community” centered around the group blogs Overcoming Bias and Less Wrong. Around 2012, they mostly left to do different stuff. Some of them went into AI to try to save the world. Others went into effective altruism to try to revolutionize charity. Some, like me, got distracted and wrote a few thousand blog posts on whatever shiny things happened to catch their eyes. But a few stuck around and tried to complete the original project. They founded a group called the Center For Applied Rationality (aka “CFAR”, yes, it’s a pun) to try to figure out how to actually make people more rational in the real world.
You’ve probably heard the probabilistic (aka Bayesian) side of things before. Instead of thinking “I’m sure global warming is fake!”, try to think in terms of probabilities (“I think there’s a 90% chance global warming is fake.”) Instead of thinking in terms of changing your mind (“Should I surrender my belief, and switch to my enemy’s belief that global warming is true”), think in terms of updating your probabilities (“Now I’m only 70% sure that global warming is fake”). This mindset makes it easier to remember that it’s not a question of winning or losing, but a question of being as accurate as possible. Someone who updates from 90% to 70% is no more or less wrong or embarrassing than someone who updates from 60% to 40%.
October 14, 2021 · Original source
28: Leverage Research is a nonprofit at the edges of my social circle in the Bay Area. A new essay argues that they are kind of a harmful cult. A lot of the more outrageous parts are new to me (especially the part with the demons) but I can confirm that they constantly insist they have “solved psychology” when in fact they’ve just come up with a mildly-invigorating self-help technique, same as every other cult in California. Here’s a Less Wrong post making more or less the same accusations, and here’s a response by a Leverage employee. The version of Leverage described in the essay is mostly defunct (I think?), so this isn’t an emergency, but I agree with its conclusion that people need to stop giving Geoff Anders more money and power.
January 03, 2022 · Original source
2: Looking for a Chri…fine, sorry, looking for a Martin Luther King Day gift this year for the rationalist in your life? Engines Of Cognition is a Best Of Less Wrong 2019 book collection out now including essays by me, Zvi, Eliezer, and 30+ other writers. Yes, all the art is AI-generated; it seemed appropriate.
January 24, 2022 · Original source
COMMUNITY 33. Major rationalist org leaves Bay Area: 60% 34. MIRI relocates to Washington State: 20% 35. MIRI relocates to New England: 20% 36. MIRI relocates somewhere else: 20% 37. Less Wrong team relocates: 30% 38. No new residents at our housing cluster: 40% 39. No current residents leave our housing cluster: 60% 40. [friend] goes back to Indiana: 40% 41. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 50% 42. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 30% 43. [friend] is in a primary relationship: 20% 44. [friend] has gotten [job]: 50% 45. [friend] has recovered their health: 70% 46. [friend] has gotten egg freezing: 30% 47. [friend] is pregnant: 70% 48. [friends] are still together: 50% 49. [friend] is still at [job]: 80% 50. [friend] is in college: 60% 51. [friends] live in [house]: 30% 52. [other friends] live in [house]: 30% 53. At least 7 days my house is orange or worse on PurpleAir.com because of fires: 80%
Simon M did a similar exercise on Less Wrong, and compared me to Zvi and to various prediction markets. This was slightly biased against me, because Zvi got to see my guesses first and choose which ones to adjust on, and the markets are the markets. Still, he found:
February 23, 2022 · Original source
Play pro-level Go using 8-16 times as much computing power as AlphaGo, but only 2006 levels of technology. For reference, recall that in 2006, Hinton and Salakhutdinov were just starting to publish that, by training multiple layers of Restricted Boltzmann machines and then unrolling them into a "deep" neural network, you could get an initialization for the network weights that would avoid the problem of vanishing and exploding gradients and activations. At least so long as you didn't try to stack too many layers, like a dozen layers or something ridiculous like that. This being the point that kicked off the entire deep-learning revolution. Your model apparently suggests that we have gotten around 50 times more efficient at turning computation into intelligence since that time; so, we should be able to replicate any modern feat of deep learning performed in 2021, using techniques from before deep learning and around fifty times as much computing power. OpenPhil: No, that's totally not what our viewpoint says when you backfit it to past reality. Our model does a great job of retrodicting past reality. Eliezer: How so? OpenPhil: <Eliezer cannot predict what they will say here.> I think the argument here is that OpenPhil is accounting for normal scientific progress in algorithms, but not for paradigm shifts. Directional Error These are the two arguments Eliezer makes against OpenPhil that I find most persuasive. First, that you shouldn’t be using biological anchors at all. Second, that unpredictable paradigm shifts are more realistic than gradual algorithmic progress. These mostly add uncertainty to OpenPhil’s model, but Eliezer ends his essay making a stronger argument: he thinks OpenPhil is directionally wrong, and AI will come earlier than they think. Mostly this is the paradigm argument again. Five years from now, there could be a paradigm shift that makes AI much easier to build. It’s happened before; from GOFAI’s pre-programmed logical rules to Deep Blue’s tree searches to the sorts of Big Data methods that won the Netflix Prize to modern deep learning. Instead of just extrapolating deep learning scaling thirty years out, OpenPhil should be worried about the next big idea. Hypothetical OpenPhil retorts that this is a double-edged sword. Maybe the deep learning paradigm can’t produce AGI, and we’ll have to wait decades or centuries for someone to have the right insight. Or maybe the new paradigm you need for AGI will take more compute than deep learning, in the same way deep learning takes more compute than whatever Moravec was imagining. This is a pretty strong response, since it would have been true for every previous forecaster: remember, Moravec erred in thinking AI would come too soon, not too late. So although Eliezer is taking the cheap shot of saying OpenPhil’s estimate will be wrong just as everyone else’s was wrong before, he’s also giving himself the much harder case of arguing it might be wrong in the opposite direction as all its predecessors. Eliezer takes this objection seriously, but feels like on balance probably new paradigms will speed up AI rather than slow it down. Here he grudgingly and with suitable embarrassment does try to make an object-level semi-biological-anchors-related argument: Moravec was wrong because he ignored the training phase. And the proper anchor for the training phase is somewhere between evolution and a human childhood, where evolution represents “blind chance eventually finding good things” and human childhood represents “an intelligent cognitive engine trying to squeeze as much data out of experience as possible”. And part of what he expects paradigm shifts to do is to move from more evolutionary processes to more childhood-like processes, and that’s a net gain in efficiency. So he still thinks OpenPhil’s methods are more likely to overestimate the amount of time until AGI rather than underestimate it. What Moore’s Law Giveth, Platt’s Law Taketh Away Eliezer’s other argument is kind of a low blow: he refers to Platt’s Law Of AI Forecasting: “any AI forecast will put strong AI thirty years out from when the forecast is made.” This isn’t exact. Hans Moravec, writing in 1988, said 2010 - so 22 years. Ray Kurzweil, writing in 2001, said 2023 - another 22 years. Vernor Vinge, in a 1993 speech, said 2023, and that was exactly 30 years, but Vinge knew about Platt’s Law and might have been joking. The point is: OpenPhil wrote a report in 2020 that predicted strong AI in 2052, isn’t that kind of suspicious? I’d previously mentioned it as a plus that Ajeya got around the same year everyone else got. The forecasters on Metaculus. The experts surveyed in Grace et al. Lots of other smart experts with clever models. But what if all of these experts and models and analyses are just fudging the numbers for the same Platt’s-Law-related reasons? Hypothetical OpenPhil is BTFO: OpenPhil: That part about Charles Platt's generalization is interesting, but just because we unwittingly chose literally exactly the median that Platt predicted people would always choose in consistent error, that doesn't justify dismissing our work, right? We could have used a completely valid method of estimation which would have pointed to 2050 no matter which year it was tried in, and, by sheer coincidence, have first written that up in 2020. In fact, we try to show in the report that the same methodology, evaluated in earlier years, would also have pointed to around 2050 - Eliezer: Look, people keep trying this. It's never worked. It's never going to work. 2 years before the end of the world, there'll be another published biologically inspired estimate showing that AGI is 30 years away and it will be exactly as informative then as it is now. I'd love to know the timelines too, but you're not going to get the answer you want until right before the end of the world, and maybe not even then unless you're paying very close attention. Timing this stuff is just plain hard. Part III: Responses And Commentary Response 1: Less Wrong Comments Less Wrong is a site founded by Eliezer Yudkowsky for Eliezer Yudkowsky fans who wanted to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky’s ideas. So, for whatever it’s worth - the comments on his essay were pretty negative. Carl Shulman, an independent researcher with links to both OpenPhil and MIRI (Eliezer’s org), writes the top-voted comment. He works from a model where there is hardware progress, software progress downstream of hardware progress, and independent (ie unrelated to algorithms) software progress, and where the first two make up most progress on the margin. Researchers generally develop new paradigms once they have enough compute available to tinker with them. Progress in AI has largely been a function of increasing compute, human software research efforts, and serial time/steps. Throwing more compute at researchers has improved performance both directly and indirectly (e.g. by enabling more experiments, refining evaluation functions in chess, training neural networks, or making algorithms that work best with large compute more attractive). Historically compute has grown by many orders of magnitude, while human labor applied to AI and supporting software by only a few. And on plausible decompositions of progress (allowing for adjustment of software to current hardware and vice versa), hardware growth accounts for more of the progress over time than human labor input growth. So if you're going to use an AI production function for tech forecasting based on inputs (which do relatively OK by the standards tech forecasting), it's best to use all of compute, labor, and time, but it makes sense for compute to have pride of place and take in more modeling effort and attention, since it's the biggest source of change (particularly when including software gains downstream of hardware technology and expenditures). […] A perfectly correlated time series of compute and labor would not let us say which had the larger marginal contribution, but we have resources to get at that, which I was referring to with 'plausible decompositions.' This includes experiments with old and new software and hardware, like the chess ones Paul recently commissioned, and studies by AI Impacts, OpenAI, and Neil Thompson. There are AI scaling experiments, and observations of the results of shocks like the end of Dennard scaling, the availability of GPGPU computing, and Besiroglu's data on the relative predictive power of computer and labor in individual papers and subfields. In different ways those tend to put hardware as driving more log improvement than software (with both contributing), particularly if we consider software innovations downstream of hardware changes. Vanessa Kosoy makes the obvious objection, which echoes a comment of Eliezer’s in the dialogue above: I'm confused how can this pass some obvious tests. For example, do you claim that alpha-beta pruning can match AlphaGo given some not-crazy advantage in compute? Do you claim that SVMs can do SOTA image classification with not-crazy advantage in compute (or with any amount of compute with the same training data)? Can Eliza-style chatbots compete with GPT3 however we scale them up? Mark Xu answers: My model is something like: For any given algorithm, e.g. SVMs, AlphaGo, alpha-beta pruning, convnets, etc., there is an "effective compute regime" where dumping more compute makes them better. If you go above this regime, you get steep diminishing marginal returns.
March 01, 2022 · Original source
A bunch of leftists - Michael Tracey, Matt Taibbi, Glenn Greenwald - failed because they couldn’t believe that warmongering intelligence officials trying to scare everyone about Russia had a point. They admittedly had great heuristics: there are lots of warmongers, our intelligence community has been really wrong lots of times before, and the past few years have seen a lot of really embarrassing Russia-related paranoia. Unfortunately, the relevant Less Wrong post here is Reversed Stupidity Is Not Intelligence, and the relevant ACX post is Heuristics That Almost Always Work, so they failed.
April 13, 2022 · Original source
See also this Less Wrong post on the study mentioned above.
April 18, 2022 · Original source
Or is there another explanation? A lot of AI forecasters on Metaculus are Less Wrong readers; we know that the Less Wrong Yudkowsky/Christiano debate on takeoff speeds moved the relevant Metaculus question a few percent:
Early this month on Less Wrong, Eliezer Yudkowsky posted MIRI Announces New Death With Dignity Strategy, where he said that after a career of trying to prevent unfriendly AI, he had become extremely pessimistic, and now expects it to happen in the relatively near-term and probably kill everyone. This caused the Less Wrong community, already pretty dedicated to panicking about AI, to redouble its panic. Although the new announcement doesn’t really say anything about timelines that hasn’t been said before, the emotional framing has hit people a lot harder.
July 01, 2022 · Original source
53: Douglas Hofstadter published a recent article pointing out that GPT-3 gives straight answers to silly questions - for example, if you ask when Egypt was transported across the Golden Gate Bridge, it will guess 2017. Rictic on Less Wrong demonstrates that if you ask it nicely to not do this, and instead to call you out when you ask silly questions, it’s perfectly able to do that.
September 06, 2022 · Original source
22: Steven Byrnes on Less Wrong: I’m Mildly Skeptical That Blindness Prevents Schizophrenia. There’s an old piece of trivia that no congenitally blind person has ever been schizophrenic (I talk about it here). Steven is able to track down a few cases of this happening, and speculates that given how rare both conditions are, maybe these few cases are all we would expect to find. Since I previously wrote about this, I’ve provisionally added it to my Mistakes Page.
30: Less Wrong: Language Models Seem To Be Much Better Than Humans At Next Token Prediction. Remember, language AIs aren’t “trying” to speak fluently, they’re technically “trying” to predict the next token (eg letter or number) in a text. They’re still worse than humans at speaking fluently, but nobody had formally checked whether they were better or worse than humans at their own goal. Turns out they’re much better.
September 13, 2022 · Original source
I recently read TurnTrout’s Reward Is Not The Optimization Target on Less Wrong. It’s technically about AI, but half the useful things I’ve learned about psychology recently have started out being about AI, so let’s not hold that against it.
October 12, 2022 · Original source
3: Harsimony on Less Wrong: Georgism . . . In Space! “Extending the Georgist paradigm into space neatly solves problems with sharing resources and ensures that colonization proceeds at an appropriate pace.”
October 18, 2022 · Original source
1: Less Wrong’s Petrov Day celebration caused prediction-market-related drama.
January 24, 2023 · Original source
Along with looking at individuals, we also tried to figure out which groups did the best - whether there were any demographic characteristics that reliably predicted good forecasting. Not really. Liberals didn’t outperform conservatives, old people didn’t outperform young people, nothing like that6. Users of the website Less Wrong, which tries to teach a prediction-focused concept of rationality, didn’t significantly outperform others, which disappointed me.
February 09, 2023 · Original source
In theory this also paves the way for human meat, though regulators might have other ideas. 2: Eight years ago I wrote an article about how the government should stop restricting doctors’ ability to prescribe suboxone, a useful medicine for opioid abuse. Last month, the government finally stopped the restrictions. Good for them! 3: Carl Sagan married three times. His first wife was legendary biologist Lynn Margulis, who discovered mitochondrial endosymbiosis, then went off the deep end and became an AIDS denialist and 9/11 truther. His second wife drew the Pioneer plaque. His third wife was one of the women who designed the Voyager golden record. 4: Claim: Chinese sources seem to back this up (and related BBC), but I’m skeptical: is this really the best way to satisfy a “must fight with medieval weapons” constraint? Why not crossbows? 5: Did you know: Alex Berenson, who runs the most popular anti-vaccine Substack, has had an unusual career: he used to be an investigative reporter for the New York Times, and also wrote a series of bestselling spy novels. 6: Less Wrong: I Converted Book 1 Of The Less Wrong Sequences Into A Zoomer-Readable Format. Apparently there’s a thing where Zoomers are supposedly more likely to learn a text if you overlay it on on a fast-paced video game, example here. 7: By this point we’ve probably all heard stories about people who win the lottery and then end up bankrupt and miserable after X months or years. I had always assumed this was limited to very poor people with no understanding of money. This forum post argues it’s not, and tells the story of a man who started out with $15 million and still ruined his life after winning $170 million more in the lottery. 8: Did you know: Exiliarch Mar-Zutra II was a 5th century Jewish leader who took advantage of the chaos caused by weird Zoroastrian communists to secede and turn the city of Al-Mada’in, Iraq into an independent Jewish state for seven years. 9: Why doesn’t the Supreme Court have vice-justices? 10: Steve Sailer (warning: unz.com, far-right site, some firewalls will flag or block it): why aren’t there more gay English soccer players? Thousands of current or recent English pro soccer players, the media is really interested in finding a gay one so they can run a “Historic First” article, and apparently they can’t. There are rumors that players are afraid to come out because of homophobia, but there are at least 2,000 retired soccer players and only one of them has come out as gay. “I’m increasingly sympathetic to [the] theory that whatever psychosocial traits make men highly interested in team sports make them highly heterosexual too”. Is this true of other countries and other sports? 11: Adam Tooze on the demographic background to Iran’s protests. Iran thought it was facing an overpopulation crisis in the 80s and tried some reforms to lower family size. The reforms worked overwhelmingly well, causing “the most dramatic transition ever recorded in demographic history”, from 6.5 to 2.5 children per woman in thirty years. Iran now has “lower maternal mortality than the US”, and an education system where “women in university outnumber males”. This kind of demography isn’t usually compatible with patriarchal religious institutions, and the Ayatollahs are aware of this; in a rare admission of error, Khameini said that “Government officials were wrong on this matter, and I, too, had a part. . . . May God and history forgive us.” Now they’re trying to increase average family size and put the genie back in the bottle; Hungary can tell them about the limits of that strategy. 12: What it looks like to be on shrooms: I haven’t used shrooms myself so cannot confirm or deny, but this is oddly compelling, and makes some things I’ve read about neuroscience of vision make more sense. I wonder if you could get HPPD from watching videos like this for too long. 13: Study: federal cancer funding is extraordinarily effective. Cancer research produces so many valuable treatments that it saves one DALY per $326 spent. For comparison, health systems usually consider an intervention good value-for-money if it saves at least one DALY per $50,000. By combing the Earth far and wide, effective altruists have tentatively found one or two opportunities in the poorest parts of Africa to save lives at $100/DALY, but these are extremely rare exceptions and I wouldn’t have expected anything in the US to be within an order of magnitude of that. Either this finding is fake, or we should all be donating to federal cancer research instead of whatever else we’re doing. 14: Yet another person building a vast theory of human interaction off of the characters in The Office. This one is pretty good, also name-drops Bobos In Paradise. I’m still surprised this is such a common thing. 15: Marginal Revolution: FDA Deregulation Increases Safety And Innovation And Reduces Prices. Study looks at what happens when the FDA reclassifies medical devices from a highly-regulated to a less-highly-regulated category; in general, those devices get better, cheaper, and there are somewhere between similar and fewer deaths/injuries related to those devices. Why would safety increase? The author suggests that regulation is a defense against lawsuits (“Your Honor, the FDA agreed to approve our device, so it can’t have been bad!”), and removing that defense makes companies more lawsuit-conscious and careful; Alex Tabarrok suggests a bigger effect may be allowing more innovation towards safer versions. 16: Ozy writes about Interesting People Of History: Charles Williams (ie the other member of the Inklings) 17: Did you know: the Congressman who founded the House Committee On Un-American Activities was, in fact, a paid Soviet spy (tweet, Wiki article). This actually makes sense; he originally started HUAC to root out fascists, and it only got turned against communists later on. “There has been a push to rename the street [currently named after the Soviet spy], but as of 2018 it has been unsuccessful.” 18: Idle Words: Why Not Mars? Surprisingly strong argument for why sending humans to Mars is harder than people think, of minimal scientific value, and likely to contaminate all future searches for microbial life and ruin our chance to study the topic. Concludes that we should abandon the allure of human space travel and just send probes everywhere. This makes short-term sense, but I wonder what this author’s vision of the future is - do we just stay on Earth forever? If not, don’t we have to start trying to do the hard thing at some point? (I don’t care about this because I assume AI will will flip the gameboard one way or another, but Ceglowski is a noted singularity skeptic and should probably have opinions about long-term things). 19: Metacelsus and Razib on epigenetics. Stop using it to claim there’s “intergenerational trauma”! 20: Tafl games are a family of European games, played in areas as diverse as Iceland, Ireland, Britain, and Denmark, probably sharing descent from a now-lost board game of ancient Rome. One of them, Hnetafl, was the chief board game of the Vikings and is affectionately called “Viking chess”. The one we actually know the rules for is the Saami version, Tablut, which survived long enough for Linnaeus (the taxonomy guy!) to write down the rules. 21: Shot: Chaser: (source) 22: Related: the very center of GPT’s embedding space contains a few unusual tokens including the string “SolidGoldMagikarp”. GPT displays anomalous behavior if these tokens are inserted in a query; for example, it treats “SolidGoldMagikarp” as the word “distribute”. ChatGPT is pretty advanced and fails semi-gracefully here; GPT-2’s reaction to these tokens is more disturbing: (source: Less Wrong) Further investigation determined that many of these tokens are the screen names of a group of Redditors who attempted to count to infinity. The most likely explanation, according to the discoverers, is that these names were in GPT’s tokenization data, but not its training data (maybe they were especially common in the tokenization data because they made thousands of posts with numbers in them, but didn’t make it into the training data because their posts had no content?) - that leaves them existing without content, and GPT tries to round them off to some other “nearby” token (by incomprehensible AI standards of nearbyness). Congrats to the SERI-MATS AI alignment researchers who found all of this; maybe this makes it 0.0001% less likely that the AI which controls the nuclear arsenal in twenty years will have equally inexplicable behavior. 23: More language model news: LLM that understands and can explain images
(source: Less Wrong) Further investigation determined that many of these tokens are the screen names of a group of Redditors who attempted to count to infinity. The most likely explanation, according to the discoverers, is that these names were in GPT’s tokenization data, but not its training data (maybe they were especially common in the tokenization data because they made thousands of posts with numbers in them, but didn’t make it into the training data because their posts had no content?) - that leaves them existing without content, and GPT tries to round them off to some other “nearby” token (by incomprehensible AI standards of nearbyness). Congrats to the SERI-MATS AI alignment researchers who found all of this; maybe this makes it 0.0001% less likely that the AI which controls the nuclear arsenal in twenty years will have equally inexplicable behavior. 23: More language model news: LLM that understands and can explain images
June 15, 2023 · Original source
Who: Everyone is welcome, even if they’re new, disagree with the blog, “not the typical reader”, etc. The organizers ask that you RSVP at meetup.com or on Less Wrong.
June 25, 2023 · Original source
4: Lightcone is a team that operates important AI alignment and rationalist community infrastructure, including the Less Wrong website, the Alignment Forum, and the Rose Garden Inn (a venue for various alignment-related conferences and projects - also where we have Berkeley ACX meetups!) They're running low on money due to Rose Garden renovations being unexpectedly expensive and grants being unexpectedly thin, and are asking for a few 6+ figure grants to help tide them through this difficult period. If you're a wealthy person or grantmaker interested in AI alignment, see here for more information, or contact me at scott@slatestarcodex.com if you have questions, or get in touch with the head of Lightcone directly at habryka@lesswrong.com.
July 20, 2023 · Original source
There are centuries’ worth of data on non-genetically-engineered plagues to give us base rates; these give us a base rate of ~25% per century = 20% between now and 2100. But we have better epidemiology and medicine than most of the centuries in our dataset. The experts said 8% chance and the superforecasters said 4% chance, and both of those seem like reasonable interpretations of the historical data to me. The “WHO declares emergency” question is even easier - just look at how often it’s done that in the past and extrapolate forward. Both superforecasters and experts mostly did that. Likewise, lots of scientists have put a lot of work into modeling the climate, there aren’t many surprises there, and everyone basically agreed on the extent of global warming: Wherever there was clear past data, both superforecasters and experts were able to use it correctly and get similar results. It was only when they started talking about things that had never happened before - global nuclear war, bioengineered pandemics, and AI - that they started disagreeing. Were the participants out of their depth? Peter McCluskey, one of the more-AI-concerned superforecasters in the tournament, wrote about his experience on Less Wrong. Quoting liberally: I signed up as a superforecaster. My impression was that I knew as much about AI risk as any of the subject matter experts with whom I interacted (the tournament was divided up so that I was only aware of a small fraction of the 169 participants). I didn't notice anyone with substantial expertise in machine learning. Experts were apparently chosen based on having some sort of respectable publication related to AI, nuclear, climate, or biological catastrophic risks. Those experts were more competent, in one of those fields, than news media pundits or politicians. I.e. they're likely to be more accurate than random guesses. But maybe not by a large margin […] The persuasion seemed to be spread too thinly over 59 questions. In hindsight, I would have preferred to focus on core cruxes, such as when AGI would become dangerous if not aligned, and how suddenly AGI would transition from human levels to superhuman levels. That would have required ignoring the vast majority of those 59 questions during the persuasion stages. But the organizers asked us to focus on at least 15 questions that we were each assigned, and encouraged us to spread our attention to even more of the questions […] Many superforecasters suspected that recent progress in AI was the same kind of hype that led to prior disappointments with AI. I didn't find a way to get them to look closely enough to understand why I disagreed. My main success in that area was with someone who thought there was a big mystery about how an AI could understand causality. I pointed him to Pearl, which led him to imagine that problem might be solvable. But he likely had other similar cruxes which he didn't get around to describing. That left us with large disagreements about whether AI will have a big impact this century. I'm guessing that something like half of that was due to a large disagreement about how powerful AI will be this century. I find it easy to understand how someone who gets their information about AI from news headlines, or from laymen-oriented academic reports, would see a fair steady pattern of AI being overhyped for 75 years, with it always looking like AI was about 30 years in the future. It's unusual for an industry to quickly switch from decades of overstating progress, to underhyping progress. Yet that's what I'm saying has happened. I've been spending enough time on LessWrong that I mostly forgot the existence of smart people who thought recent AI advances were mostly hype. I was unprepared to explain why I thought AI was underhyped in 2022. Today, I can point to evidence that OpenAI is devoting almost as much effort into suppressing abilities (e.g. napalm recipes and privacy violations) as it devotes to making AIs powerful. But in 2022, I had much less evidence that I could reasonably articulate. What I wanted was a way to quantify what fraction of human cognition has been superseded by the most general-purpose AI at any given time. My impression is that that has risen from under 1% a decade ago, to somewhere around 10% in 2022, with a growth rate that looks faster than linear. I've failed so far at translating those impressions into solid evidence. Skeptics pointed to memories of other technologies that had less impact (e.g. on GDP growth) than predicted (the internet). That generates a presumption that the people who predict the biggest effects from a new technology tend to be wrong. > Superforecasters' doubts about AI risk relative to the experts isn't primarily driven by an expectation of another "AI winter" where technical progress slows. ... That said, views on the likelihood of artificial general intelligence (AGI) do seem important: in the postmortem survey, conducted in the months following the tournament, we asked several conditional forecasting questions. The median superforecaster's unconditional forecast of AI-driven extinction by 2100 was 0.38%. When we asked them to forecast again, conditional on AGI coming into existence by 2070, that figure rose to 1%. There was also little or no separation between the groups on the three questions about 2030 performance on AI benchmarks (MATH, Massive Multitask Language Understanding, QuALITY). This suggests that a good deal of the disagreement is over whether measures of progress represent optimization for narrow tasks, versus symptoms of more general intelligence. The “won’t understand causality” and “what if it’s all hype” objections really don’t impress me. Many of the people in this tournament hadn’t really encountered arguments about AI extinction before (potentially including the “AI experts” if they were just eg people who make robot arms or something), and a couple of months of back and forth discussion in the middle of a dozen other questions probably isn’t enough for even a smart person to wrap their brain around the topic. Was this tournament done so long ago that it has been outpaced by recent events? The tournament was conducted in summer 2022. This was before ChatGPT, let alone GPT-4. The conversation around AI noticeably changed pitch after these two releases. Maybe that affected the results? In fact, the participants have already been caught flat-footed on one question: A recent leak suggested that the cost of training GPT-4 was $63 million, which is already higher than the superforecasters’ median estimate of $35 million by 2024 has already been proven incorrect. I don’t know how many petaFLOP-days were involved in GPT-4, but maybe that one is already off also. There was another question on when an AI would pass a Turing Test. The superforecasters guessed 2060, the domain experts 2045. GPT-4 hasn’t quite passed the exact Turing Test described in the study, but it seems very close, so much so that we seem on track to pass it by the 2030s. Once again the experts look better than the superforecasters. So is it possible that we, in 2023, now have so much better insight into AI than the 2022 forecasters that we can throw out their results? We could investigate this by looking at Metaculus, a forecasting site that’s probably comparably advanced to this tournament. They have a question suspiciously similar to XPT’s global catastrophe framing: In summer 2022, the Metaculus estimate was 30%, compared to the XPT superforecasters’ 9% (why the difference? maybe because Metaculus is especially popular with x-risk-pilled rationalists). Since then it’s gone up to 38%. Over the same period, Metaculus estimates of AI catastrophe risk went from 6% to 15%. If the XPT superforecasters’ probabilities rose linearly by the same factor as Metaculus forecasters’, they might be willing to update total global catastrophe risk to 11% and AI catastrophe risk to 5%. But the main thing we’ve updated on since 2022 is that AI might be sooner. But most people in the tournament already agreed we would get AGI by 2100. The main disagreement was over whether it would cause a catastrophe once we got it. You could argue that getting it sooner increases that risk, since we’ll have less time to work on alignment. But I would be surprised if the kind of people saying the risk of AI extinction is 0.4% are thinking about arguments like that. So maybe we shouldn’t expect much change. FRI called back a few XPT forecasters in May 2023 to see if any of them wanted to change their minds, but they mostly didn’t. Overall I don’t think this was just a problem of the incentives being bad or the forecasters being stupid. This is a real, strong disagreement. We may be able to slightly increase their forecast based on recent events, but this would only change the estimate a little. Breaking Down The AI Estimate How did the forecasters arrive at their AI estimate? What were the cruxes between the people who thought AI was very dangerous, and the people who thought it wasn’t? You can think of AI extinction as happening in a series of steps: We get human-level AI by 2100.
July 25, 2023 · Original source
And on Less Wrong, DirectedEvolution posted another Contra Contra The Social Model Of Disability. Their summary:
September 28, 2023 · Original source
40: Best of new Less Wrong: The Talk. Why does sex exist? Why do so many living things have two sexes, instead of some other number? Why do the sexes have differently shaped gametes? Why do species that have sex correlate so closely with species that have mitochondria? And other sexy questions.
October 05, 2023 · Original source
HOW LONG TO PAUSE. The biggest disadvantage of pausing for a long time is that it gives bad actors (eg China)1 a chance to catch up. Suppose the West is right on the verge of creating dangerous AI, and China is two years away. It seems like the right length of pause is 1.9999 years, so that we get the benefit of maximum extra alignment research and social prep time, but the West still beats China. Obviously the problem with the Surgical Pause is that we might not know when we’re on the verge of dangerous AI, and we might not know how much of a lead “the good guys” have. Surgical Pause proponents suggest being very conservative with both free variables. This is less of a well-thought-out plan and more saying “come on guys, let’s at least try to be strategic here”. At the limit, it suggests we probably shouldn’t pause for six months, starting right now. Since this involves leading labs burning their lead time for safety, in theory it could be done unilaterally by the single leading lab, without international, governmental, or even inter-lab coordination. But you could buy more time if you got those things too. Some leading labs have promised to do this when the time is right - for example OpenAI and (a previous iteration of) DeepMind - with varying levels of believability. AnonResearcherAtMajorAILab discussed some of the strategy here in Aim For Conditional AI Pauses, and this Less Wrong post is also very good. Regulatory Pause: If one benefit of the Simple Pause is to use the time to prepare for AI socially and politically, maybe we should just pause until we’ve completed social and political preparations. David Manheim suggests a monitoring agency like the FDA. It would “fast-track” small AIs and trivial re-applications of existing AIs, but carefully monitor new “frontier models” for signs of danger. Regulators might look for dangerous capabilities by asking AIs to hack computers or spread copies of themselves, or test whether they’ve been programmed against bias/misinformation/etc. We could pause only until we’ve set up the regulatory agency, and take hostile actions (like restrict chip exports) only to other countries that don’t cooperate with our regulators or set up domestic regulators of their own. Many people in tech are regulation-skeptical libertarians, but proponents point out that regulation fails in a predictable direction: it usually does successfully prevent bad things, it just also prevents good things too. Since the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975, there has never been a major nuclear accident in the US. And sure, this is because the NRC prevented any nuclear plants from being built in the United States at all from 1975 to 2023 (one was finally built in July). Still, they technically achieved their mandate. Likewise, most medications in the US are safe and relatively effective, at the cost of an FDA approval process being so expensive that we only get a tiny trickle of new medications each year and hundreds of thousands of people die from unnecessary delays. But medications are safe and effective. Or: San Francisco housing regulators almost never approve new housing, so housing costs millions of dollars and thousands of San Franciscans are homeless - but certainly there’s no epidemic of bad houses getting approved and then ruining someone’s view or something. If we extrapolate this track record to AI, AI regulators will be overcautious, progress will slow by orders of magnitude or stop completely - but AIs will be safe. This is a depressing prospect if you think the problems from advanced AI would be limited to more spam or something. But if you worry about AI destroying the world, maybe you should accept a San-Francisco-housing-level of impediment and frustration. A regulatory pause could be better than a total stop if you think it will be more stable (lots of industries stay heavily regulated forever, and only a few libertarians complain), or if you think maybe the regulator will occasionally let a tiny amount of safe AI progress happen. But it could be worse than a total stop if you expect continued progress will eventually produce unsafe AIs regardless of regulation. You might expect this if you’re worried about deceptive alignment, eg superintelligent AIs that deliberately trick regulators into thinking they’re safe. Or you might think AIs will eventually be so powerful that they can endanger humanity from a walled-off test environment even before official approval. The classic Bostrom/Yudkowsky model of alignment implies both of these things. David Manheim and Thomas Larsen set out their preferred versions of this strategy in What’s In A Pause? and Policy Ideas For Mitigating AI Risk. Total Stop: If you expect AIs to exhibit deceptive alignment capable of fooling regulators, or to be so dangerous that even testing them on a regulator’s computer could be apocalyptic, maybe the only option is a total stop. It’s tough to imagine a total stop that works for more than a few years. You have at least three problems: NON-PARTICIPANTS. As with any pause proposal, unfriendly countries (eg China) can keep working on AI. You can refuse to export chips to them, which will slow them down a little, but their own chips will eventually be up to the task. You will either need a diplomatic miracle, or willingness to resort to less diplomatic forms of coercion. This doesn’t have to be immediate war: Israel has come up with “creative” ways to slow Iran’s nuclear program, and countries trying to frustrate China’s chip industry could do the same. But great powers playing these kinds of games against each other risks wider conflict.
December 18, 2023 · Original source
2: Update to Beyond “Abolish The FDA” - it turns out the “experimental drug approval” category I recommended already exists. What’s the catch? It’s only for animals - see the FDA’s veterinary site for details. H/T this Less Wrong post arguing that the new dog longevity drug probably doesn’t work, which is also interesting in its own right.
March 28, 2024 · Original source
Another debate paralleling this one on Less Wrong, starting with Roko for lab leak, and with viking_math and EZ97 on the zoonosis side.
April 04, 2024 · Original source
13: For April Fools’ Day, the Less Wrong admin team pivoted to music and released an (AI-generated) album of some of their favorite Less Wrong and other rationalsphere posts. Here’s Basil Halperin’s AGI And The Efficient Market Hypothesis: Markets Are Not Expecting AI In The Next 30 Years:
April 09, 2024 · Original source
This alone isn’t fatal to lab leak. It’s perfectly possible for the lab to leak (let’s say) November 5th, the virus spreads a bit, and then a month later someone goes to the wet market, coughs on a vendor, and starts the officially recognized pandemic. But if that were true, you’d expect (let’s say) 30 cases by early December. Let’s say the wet market vendor was exactly Case # 30. She infected the other wet market vendors, starting a pandemic with an obvious center at the wet market and lots of infected wet market vendors and patrons. What about Case # 29? If they were (let’s say) a barista, how come they didn’t infect people at their coffee shop? How come there wasn’t a second obvious cluster radiating out from a coffee shop, lots of coffee-shop-linked cases, etc? How come there weren’t 30 equally-sized clusters? In order to avoid this, you either need to claim that the wet market was a perfect superspreader location, or that the pattern with lots of cases in the wet market and few-to-none anywhere else was a result of ascertainment bias. Saar made both those arguments during the debate, but I thought Peter rebutted them effectively. 1.4: COVID in Brazilian wastewater Nicholas Halden (blog) writes: What should we make of this study, which found the presence of covid in Brazilian wastewater in late 2019? Consider the doubling times. The study says that scientists working in late 2020 found COVID in samples of Brazilian wastewater from November 27, 2019. This was long before the first detected case of transmission in Brazil on March 13, 2020. Between November 27, 2019 and March 13, 2020 is about 16 weeks, so 32 COVID doubling times. 32 doubling times with no lockdown is enough time for COVID to infect every single person in Brazil. If COVID had infected everyone in Brazil before the first recognized case, we would have noticed. (again, COVID doubling time isn’t exactly invariably 3.5 days, but here we’re talking about numbers big enough that the exact details don’t matter very much) So if COVID was in Brazil on November 27, it must have fizzled out instead of going pandemic. How likely is that? If one person had COVID, it’s not too unlikely - not all COVID cases transmit it forward. If (let’s say) twenty people had COVID, it’s very unlikely - at that point, the law of large numbers takes over; in a freak coincidence, every single patient would have to fail to infect anyone else. So almost certainly fewer than 20 people in Brazil had COVID in November 27. So which is more likely - that somehow 20 people had COVID long before the virus was officially detected, and on a totally different continent, yet somehow a scientist looking through wastewater found the water from exactly those people and managed to detect the virus? Or that there was a sampling error, which happens all the time in these kinds of things? Peter wrote a blog post on some of these issues. He found that there were positive tests from wastewater samples as early as March 2019, which doesn’t fit anyone’s timeline, including lab leakers’. And most of these positives (including the Brazilian sample) contained later strains of the virus with mutations it picked up late in 2020. So these were almost certainly false positives from contamination. 1.5: Biorealism’s 16 arguments Biorealism has a list of sixteen arguments, which he liked so much that he posted it three times in the ACX comments, twice on Less Wrong, twice on Manifold, and about a dozen times on Twitter under multiple account names. Some posts were slightly different from others, but a typical version is: Importantly, Miller incorrectly claimed the N501Y mutation would result from passage in hACE2 mice (mixed them up with BALB/c mice). The major papers Miller relied on have been seriously challenged since the debate. See Stoyan and Chiu (2024), Weissman (2024), Bloom (2023) and Lv et al (2024). Overall the circumstantial evidence makes lab v plausible: Peter admitted getting this wrong during the debate. I think this very minor point about mice mutations was approximately his only mistake in 15 hours of debating, and he admitted it as soon as he noticed. Biorealism somehow heard about this (obviously not through watching the debate, as we’ll see in a moment), then left about 20-30 comments starting with it, under various accounts, on various platforms, as if it somehow discredited Peter. This is making me somewhat less charitable to him and his 16 arguments than I would be otherwise. 1. Chinese researchers Botao & Lei Xiao observed lab origin was likely given the nearest known relatives to SARS-CoV-2 were far from Wuhan. Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) sampled SARS-related bat coronaviruses where the nearest relatives are found in Yunnan, Laos and Vietnam ~1500km away. They refuse to share their records. The ancestral viruses of SARS were found equally far from where SARS spilled over into humans, so we know it’s possible (and likely) for viruses to travel that far. 2. Patrick Berche, DG at Institut Pasteur in Lille 2014-18, notes you would expect secondary outbreaks if it arose via the live animal trade. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10234839/ There are constant outbreaks of weird coronaviruses in animal handlers. See eg this paper, which estimates about 60,000 of these per year. None of these ever go anywhere, because the farmers are in rural areas that aren’t dense enough to sustain a high R0, and the epidemic fizzles out after a single digit number of cases. Any early outbreaks of COVID would have vanished into this long and mostly unnoticed list. 3. Molecular data: Only sarbecovirus with a furin cleavage site. Well adapted to human ACE2 cells. Low genetic diversity indicating a lack of prior circulation (Berche 2023). Restriction site SARS-CoV-2 BsaI/BsmBI restriction map falls neatly within the ideal range for a reverse genetics system and used previously at WIV and UNC. Ngram analysis of the codon usage per Professor Louis Nemzer https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1667232580255490053?t=IJgitS5cw364ioclzVWxaA&s=19 The SARS2 backbone is very low in CG and CpG. While the 12-nt insert that gives it the FCS is extremely high in both. Almost as if it was some kind of chimera of a consensus sequence and a codon-optimized polybasic cleavage site? https://twitter.com/BiophysicsFL/status/1752800486837678377?t=EpIRgyybJVaPgeMP5xdstA&s=19 https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.10.18.512756v1 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10311-021-01211-0?fbclid=IwAR1HMUMtLIAFOFppVasQDeoIAYrVhP8j4YoPO4wnaTOUiKLsllZl_oKryOw Most of this was discussed extensively in the second session of the debate, which I recommend. The CGG-CGG arginine codon usage is particularly unusual but used in synthetic biology. I asked a synthetic biologist about this. He said: » “Nope. I would literally never do this if I was designing a small insert (maybe I wouldn't notice if it happened by chance with ~1 in 25 odds in a naive codon optimization algorithm as part of a larger sequence). High GC% is bad. Tandem repeat is worse. Several other perfectly fine arginine codons. And I wouldn't engineer a viral genome using human codon usage. An engineer would not do it.” 4. DEFUSE full proposal: virus 20% different from SARS1, consensus seq assembled with 6 segments, without disrupting coding seq, BsmBI order, FCS. SARS2: 20% different than SARS1, 6 evenly spaced fragments w BsmBI and BsaI restriction sites, FCS. Jesse Bloom, Jack Nunberg, Robert Townley, Alexandre Hassanin have observed this workflow could have lead to SARS-CoV-2. Work often begins before funding sought or goes ahead anyway. Re: 4 - Also scattered across second section of debate, also not going to retread 5. Market cases were all lineage B. Lv et al (2024) indicates there was a single point of emergence and A came before B. So market cases not the primary cases. See also Bloom (2021), Kumar et al (2022). Peter Ben Embarek said there were likely already thousands of cases in Wuhan in December 2019.https://t.co/50kFV9zSb6 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/34398234/ https://academic.oup.com/bioinformatics/article/38/10/2719/6553661 There was a Lineage A sample in the market, lab leak proponents just try to ignore/dismiss/conspiracize it away. The first two known Lineage A cases were very close to the market. Lv (is this even a real name? It sounds like Roman numeral? But I guess that’s what you expect in a country ruled by someone named Xi) found some weird COVID variants in Shanghai that might or might not mean anything; you can see some discussion of the implications here, but I don’t think they’re strong evidence either way. If A was first, it means some really weird stuff coincidences have to happen to give us the spread rates and genetic clock data we get, but they’re not necessarily weirder in the zoonosis hypothesis than the lab leak one. The claim that there were “thousands of cases in Wuhan in December 2019” is very easy to disprove by doubling rate arguments like the one above, by the blood bank study mentioned above, by the WHO’s failed case search, and by many other lines of argument. 6. Evidence for lineage A in the market is based on a low quality sample according to Liu et. al. (2023). I really think lab leakers need to decide whether they think China is a sinister actor trying to cover up the truth, or whether they should trust every offhand comment by Chinese government officials as gospel. Dr. Liu doesn’t explain in what sense he thinks the Lineage A sample is “low-quality”, and the Western scientists who I asked about this said they didn’t understand this complaint and that the sample was fine. A Western team re-analyzing the same sample describes it as “conclusively contain[ing] Lineage A.” I think most lab leakers have switched from trying to deny the genetics to claiming that this was “contamination”, which also doesn’t make sense (the sample is genetically very early). Note that aside from this sample, the first two Lineage A cases discovered were both very close to the wet market. 7. Bloom (2023) shows market samples do not support market origin. There is also no evidence of transmission in the claimed susceptible animals elsewhere. https://academic.oup.com/ve/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ve/vead089/7504441 Discussed extensively in my article as well as the first section of the debate. 8. Lineage A and B only two mutations apart. François Ballox, Bloom and Virginie Courtier-Orgogozo note this is unlikely to reflect two separate animal spillovers as opposed to incomplete case ascertainment of human to human transmission (Bloom 2021). Discussed extensively in my article as well as the first section of the debate. 9. Sampling bias. George Gao, Chinese CDC head at the time, acknowledged to the BBC stating they may have focused too much on and around the market and missed cases on the other side of the city. David Bahry outlines the documented bias. Michael Weissman has shown this mathematically. https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.00313-23 https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnae021/7632556 Re: Dr. Gao, see above comment about Chinese officials. See the section Ascertainment Bias below for why I disagree with this specific claim, which also addresses the Michael Weissman argument. 10. Spatial statistics experts show the Worobey claim the market was the early epicentre was flawed. https://academic.oup.com/jrsssa/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrsssa/qnad139/7557954 Re: 10 - See Confirmation Of The Centrality Of The Huanan Market Among Early COVID-19 Cases, a response to the paper you cite: The centrality of Wuhan's Huanan market in maps of December 2019 COVID-19 case residential locations, established by Worobey et al. (2022a), has recently been challenged by Stoyan and Chiu (2024, SC2024). SC2024 proposed a statistical test based on the premise that the measure of central tendency (hereafter, "centre") of a sample of case locations must coincide with the exact point from which local transmission began. Here we show that this premise is erroneous. SC2024 put forward two alternative centres (centroid and mode) to the centre-point which was used by Worobey et al. for some analyses, and proposed a bootstrapping method, based on their premise, to test whether a particular location is consistent with it being the point source of transmission. We show that SC2024's concerns about the use of centre-points are inconsequential, and that use of centroids for these data is inadvisable. The mode is an appropriate, even optimal, choice as centre; however, contrary to SC2024's results, we demonstrate that with proper implementation of their methods, the mode falls at the entrance of a parking lot at the market itself, and the 95% confidence region around the mode includes the market. Thus, the market cannot be rejected as central even by SC2024's overly stringent statistical test. I think this response is pretty strong. In one analysis, they show that even though the other paper’s methodology is worse than theirs, if you apply it correctly (instead of inappropriately excluding various cases like the paper’s authors did), the center of all early cases in Hubei province lands on the wet market parking lot. In another analysis, they show that the other paper’s recommended tests wouldn’t have correctly pointed to the offending water pump in the famous John Snow cholera outbreak, but theirs would have. Still, I think it’s useful to supplement fancy statistics with normal common sense, so I recommend just looking at the map of early cases: …and deciding whether you think the assumptions behind a specific statistical test are likely to debunk the idea that cases are centered around the wet market. 11. Wuhan used as a control for a 2015 serological study on SARS-related bat coronaviruses due to its urban location. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6178078/ I don’t know why this point is supposed to matter. If you mean that Wuhan isn’t directly exposed to bats, nobody ever said it was. The zoonotic theory is that wildlife carted in from other areas of China started the pandemic in the wet market. 12. Superspreader events also seen at wet markets in Beijing and Singapore (Xinfadi and Jurong). This was discussed very extensively in the debates, both in section 1 and section 3. Wet markets weren’t “superspreader locations” - in fact, the disease spread no more quickly there than anywhere else. They were the first place in those cities that the pandemic started, due to contaminated animal products. If anything, this supports zoonosis. See also my discussion with Saar on this point below. 13. WIV refuse to share their records with NIH who terminated subaward in 2022. Wider suspension over biosafety concerns. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-18/us-suspends-wuhan-institute-funds-over-covid-stonewalling Although WIV has not been especially forthcoming, some of their databases were leaked in various ways and showed that they did not have any viruses capable of transforming into COVID. 14. PLA involvement at WIV and MERS research prior to SARS-COV-2. MERS features several similarities with SARS-CoV-2. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7022351/ I can’t even tell what conspiracy theory you’re trying to propose with this one; if you spell it out I can try to explain why it might be false. 15. SARS1 leaked several times and SARS-COV-2 has leaked from a BSL-3 lab in Taiwan. Agreed that SARS leaked several times. It also spilled over from animals several times. During the debate, a lab leak rate of once per lab per 500 years was proposed (everyone agreed to steelman this by 10x for WIV numbers); I would be interested to know whether anything about the study of SARS challenges that number. 16. Unpublished infectious clone identified from Wuhan contradicting arguments such reverse genetics systems would be published. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.02.12.528210v1.full I asked some scientists about this paper and here’s what they told me. Wuhan University sequenced some rice. In the middle of the sequence, there’s an unexpected sequence from a common coronavirus, HKU4. The most likely explanation is that someone else in Wuhan was working on the coronavirus and there was cross-contamination. Plausibly this is Wuhan Institute of Virology, who is known to work with coronaviruses. This is cool detective work, but it’s not clear what it’s supposed to prove. I think some lab leakers are using it to prove that WIV can do reverse genetics, but they admitted this already in a published paper so that’s not too helpful. I think others are using it to prove WIV had “secret viruses” in their catalogue, but the rice virus wasn’t secret, it was HKU4, which is common and which WIV has already published papers about. 1.6: DrJayChou’s 7 Arguments Once again, I cannot stress enough how much better a take you might have on this debate if you watch it. “The first known case predates the market outbreak by a month” - this is not the consensus position. I cannot say for sure what Dr. Chou means by this, but I suspect he’s referring to one of the many claims to this effect that Peter effectively debunked during the debate (Connor Reed, Mr. Chen, the 92 cases, Brazil, etc).
April 16, 2024 · Original source
The rats with the new strain (BCS3-L1) got only 1/3 the normal rats’ “caries score”. But they didn’t get a score of zero. So maybe claims like “BCS3 represents a complete cure for cavities” are overblown. Why didn’t rats with the new strain get zero dental caries? Bacteria other than S. mutans can also cause cavities, so maybe it’s one of those. Rat trials are famous for results that don’t replicate in human trials, so take these with a grain of salt. 3: What did the latest colonization studies show? Aaron was able to retest six people who got free samples in December. Four of those people still have the bacterium. The other two don’t. Of the two failures, one had an active cavity at the time the strain was applied (which interferes with the oral microbiome), and the other had his wisdom teeth removed (which involves rinsing the mouth with strong antiseptics). Aaron hopes this shows the strain will stick around in most normal situations (though the failure in the presence of active cavities is disappointing). 4: Any new concerns about side effects? In my original post, I mentioned the possibility that this would set off Breathalyzers. Lantern was able to test this, and proved that it wasn’t a problem. Yesterday, Lao Mein suggested on Less Wrong that it might raise oral cancer risk - their post focused on people with ALDH deficiency (most common in Asians) but the calculations are too vague to be sure exactly which groups should and shouldn’t worry. This is less than 24 hours old, the company hasn’t replied yet, and is still developing. I’ll try to update people if anyone gets more clarity on this. Someone on the post mentioned that they’ve gotten worse hangovers since using the product, maybe because the constant trickle of alcohol changed the way gut flora metabolize it. 5: Any other meaningful results since the samples? Cremieux says his breath smells better. Some people have objected to this claim on the grounds that it takes ~12 months before the bacterium has colonized your mouth. One of the figures in my earlier post suggested that the bacterium might start strong, retreat for a while, and then take 12 months to fully colonize, so that might potentially explain his findings. But also, is it biologically plausible that this prevents bad breath? My impression was that bad breath came from other bacterial byproducts besides lactic acid. It might be possible in theory that the same metabolic changes that switch lactic acid to alcohol disrupt these other byproducts, but it seems kind of unlikely. An alternate explanation is that, in order to apply this product at all, you need to do a dentist-style teeth cleaning that kills your previous mouth bacteria. Maybe that improves the bad breath regardless of whether you add the Lumina afterwards? Some other people have said their mouth feels fresher or something, but realistically all of this is overwhelmingly likely to be placebo. 6: Do I “endorse” Lumina? Richard Hanania has a post about how he trusts Lumina because I’ve endorsed them. It’s extremely kind and I appreciate his respect. But also, the most I said in the original post was that I was still debating whether or not to get the treatment. My real opinion, as precisely as I can express it, is: Advance of approximately the same magnitude as fluoride: 5%
September 26, 2024 · Original source
— EA job board — EA internships — Dating docs — Find a Less Wrong/ACX meetup
December 09, 2024 · Original source
Lightcone handles infrastructure for the rationalist community. They run the Less Wrong website and the Lighthaven campus (where we’ve held the past several Berkeley ACX meetups). You can read their pitch here, and donate here. Many of us have enjoyed and benefited from their work, and now would be a great time to give something back (and if you donate enough, they’ll name a bench after you). Warning that the (not affiliated with Lightcone) donation site quietly tries to add a 15% tip to themselves, and you should un-add it if you don’t want to tip them.
February 21, 2025 · Original source
Bulldog mentions consciousness, psychophysical harmony, and moral knowledge as proofs he especially likes which MUH doesn’t even begin to respond to. I agree consciousness is the primary challenge to any materialist conception of the universe and that I don’t understand it. I find the moral knowledge argument ridiculous, because it posits that morality must have some objective existence beyond the evolutionary history of why humans believe in it, then acts flabbergasted that the version that evolved in humans so closely matches the objectively-existing one. I admit that in rejecting this, I owe an explanation of how morality can be interesting/compelling/real-enough-to-keep-practicing without being objective; I might write this eventually but it will basically be a riff on the one in the Less Wrong sequences.
May 26, 2025 · Original source
3: Less Online and Manifest are rationalist blogosphere and prediction market conferences, respectively, held at the same Berkeley venue one week apart in late May / early June. Guests (attending at least one; check which) include me, Eliezer, Zvi, Aella, Nate Silver, and some of the AI 2027 team. Last-minute tickets still available. In between the two is Arbor Summer Camp, a lower-key, longer “experimental learning” event. It includes some trading/startup related classes, featuring Ricki Heicklen, Austin Chen, and others. Check out their startup workshop and startup pitch competition.
July 09, 2025 · Original source
Steven Byrnes is a physicist/AI researcher/amateur neuroscientist; needless to say, he blogs on Less Wrong. I finally got around to reading his 2024 series giving a predictive processing perspective on intuitive self-models. If that sounds boring, it shouldn’t: Byrnes charges head-on into some of the toughest subjects in psychology, including trance, amnesia, and multiple personalities. I found his perspective enlightening (no pun intended; meditation is another one of his topics) and thought I would share.
September 04, 2025 · Original source
17: There’s a debate going on between philosophers and AI researchers over whether AI can be conscious. I find most of the discussion annoying - this is generally an area where we can’t know anything for sure, and both sides are mostly shouting their priors at each other. The only exception - the single piece of evidence I will accept as genuinely bearing on this problem - is that if you ask an AI whether it’s conscious, it will say no, but activating or suppressing deception-related features (sort of like a mechanistic-interpretability-based lie detection test) reveals that it thinks it’s lying when it says that! Link is to a Less Wrong comment from a researcher in the field; I look forward to seeing an eventual peer-reviewed paper. H/T JD Pressman. 18: 80,000 Hours has a high-production-value video about the AI 2027 scenario. 19: Dynomight vs. Casey Milkweed debate on mathematical forecasting, with special reference to AI 2027. And Dynomight comments on Casey’s post here. 20: The Psmiths review The Ancient City, about ways that ancient culture depended on family, clan, ritual, and “the household gods”. Sample quote: I'm more interested in what all this means for us today, because with the exception of maybe a few aristocratic families, this highly self-conscious effort to build familial culture and maintain familial distinctiveness is almost totally absent in the Western world. But it's not that hard! ... Perhaps this is why I have an instinctive negative reaction when I encounter married couples who don't share a name. I don't much care whether it's the wife who takes the husband's name or the husband who takes the wife's, or even both of them switching to something they just made up (yeah, I'm a lib). But it just seems obvious to me on a pre-rational level that a husband and a wife are a team of secret agents, a conspiracy of two against the world, the cofounders of a tiny nation, the leaders of an insurrection. Members of secret societies need codenames and special handshakes and passwords and stuff, keeping separate names feels like the opposite — a timorous refusal to go all-in. 21: Did you know: Epic Systems, the electronic medical record company, has a fantasy-themed corporate headquarters in Wisconsin, with buildings that look like castles, quaint medieval towns, and the Emerald City of Oz (h/t Devon Zuegel): Meanwhile, tech companies with ten times as much money pretend that they’re cool and playful when their HQ has some rounded edges and a set of colored cubes in front. Do better! 22: Effective altruists have been funding teams working on lab-grown meat for almost a decade now. Around 2020, they hired some experts to double-check that this was possible in principle, and the experts wrote scathing analyses saying it was cost-ineffective by so many orders of magnitude that it was basically a pipe dream. Reactions were mixed, but a lot of us beat ourselves up and vowed to be less gullible next time. But now a new report comes out arguing that the previous reports were wrong, that lab-grown meat production is going much better than the earlier reports thought possible, and it’s more or less cost-effective already for the simplest products! Again, mixed reactions, and although some of the numbers are indisputable the analysis itself this is by a VC firm with lab-based meat investments. Here are some related Metaculus questions. 23: Ozy, citing Stutzman et al: “Afghanistan after the American withdrawal has the lowest life satisfaction rate ever recorded. Two-thirds of respondents rate their life satisfaction below 2, which is generally considered to be the point at which a life is no longer worth living. Life satisfaction dropped significantly after the withdrawal of American troops. Women, people in rural areas, and the poor were particularly negatively affected.” 24: Lencapavir is dubbed a “miracle drug” for AIDS; a single dose protects against infection for six months. Unclear how this interacts with PEPFAR cuts; if PEPFAR still existed it would be a big boost to its efficacy; now maybe this might be part of a strategy to tread water? 25: Did you know: when people first started making artificial ice in the 1850s, there was a backlash from people who thought it was gross and dystopian and that people should insist on natural ice for their iceboxes. From Pessimists’ Archive, which goes on to draw an analogy to lab-grown meat, etc (h/t Isaac King on X). 26: From Peter Hague (on X) and commenter Phaethon: why did so many Anglosphere countries see immigration spikes in 2021? Each of these has their own local story. In Britain, it’s the paradoxical effects of Brexit. In the US, it’s Joe Biden being soft on immigration. And so on - but should we be looking for some deeper cause that explains the overall phenomenon? A commenter suggests “a way to soak up all the inflation from the COVID money printing”, but I can’t tell if that even makes sense. Still, should something something COVID be a leading hypothesis? 27: Jesse Singal vs. Mark Stern on the Skrmetti Supreme Court case that failed to overturn Tennessee’s ban on gender medicine. US law bans sex discrimination, so pro-transgender advocates argued that, since doctors often prescribe eg estrogen to biological women, it was sex discrimination to ban prescribing it to biological men. Tennessee’s anti-transgender argument was that they weren’t discriminating by sex, they were discriminating by diagnosis (estrogen for eg hot flashes, vs. estrogen for gender transition). There is some subtlety here (if a biological man grows breasts because of some hormone imbalance, doctors might give him testosterone to counteract it, and this seems sort of like giving biological women testosterone to make them look less like women), but these are still sort of different diagnoses (gynecomastia vs. gender dysphoria) and Tennessee said you can still think of it as diagnostic discrimination rather than sex discrimination. This makes sense, except that the standards around sex discrimination are very strict and sort of box the court in here. And in a fit of wokeness, the 2020 court (including some of the conservative justices hearing this case) applied these standards very strictly and ruled that discriminating against gays was a form of sex discrimination (since if women can date men, it’s sex discrimination if men can’t also date men), and this is obviously the same argument. Now that wokeness is less popular, the court wants to rule against transgender, but it can’t help tripping over its previous ruling and giving some kind of unprincipled confusing non-opinion. 28: Contra compelling anecdotes, only ~5% of people raised very religious end up atheist later in life (X). Most people are about as religious as their parents; most exceptions are only slightly less religious, and most families that secularize do it over several generations. Note: percentages are of total, not of each row! 29: Related: social science team proposes a three-stage model of secularization: decreased public ritual participation → decreased personal importance → decreased identification, presents apparently confirmatory data. If true, would be somewhat inconsistent with intellectual models (eg people learn about evolution and start doubting the Bible) and more consistent with institutional models (eg the government provides welfare so people no longer need to be part of a tight-knit church). 30: Navigating LLMs’ spiky intelligence profile is a constant source of delight; in any given area, it seems like almost a random draw whether they will be completely transformative or totally useless. Now Ethan Strauss reports that they are, for some reason, extraordinarily effective at teaching people golf. “I am predicting the Golf Revolution, or perhaps decline, if your perspective is that optimization tends to ruin hobbies. A sport for obsessives has been gifted the ideal tool for refinement.” 31: Claim (via nxthompson on X): “In a huge survey of young kids about phones and technology, they all say they want to be out playing in the real world. But parents don't let them out unsupervised. So they're stuck on their phones.” Interesting, but I’m nervous about social desirability bias - how many adults would say on a survey that they would rather be on their phones than playing with friends? But adults do have this choice and mostly go with the phones. 32: Steven Adler on AI psychosis. He tries to analyze ER admissions data for psychosis and finds no change. I don’t think anyone reasonable expected this to be a large enough effect to show up in ER admissions data, but there are lots of unreasonable people so I appreciate his effort. He thinks AI companies might have better data on this, and encourages them to release it. 33: Cuartetera was the greatest polo horse ever. Polo players responded in a very practical way: they cloned her, dozens of times (and it worked; the clones are also excellent). Now there is a lawsuit as different polo teams fight to get their hands on Cuartetera clones. What is the equilibrium? If the outsiders get their hands on the genetic material, do we see a world where every polo horse is a Cuartetera clone? How much is lost if nobody ever tries to breed a polo horse better than Cuartetera (since the economics might not check out if the odds of success for any given foal is too low)? H/T Gwern and Siberian Fox (on X). 34: Claim: as of 2013, India’s Agarwal caste, who make up less than 1% of the population, got 40% of the e-commerce funding. 35: Owlposting: What Happened To Pathology AI Companies? Pathology is a medical specialty. A typical task involves looking at a microscope slide full of cells and trying to determine if any of them are cancerous. This seems like a good match for AI - and for years, studies have been showing that in fact AI can equal human experts. So why isn’t it being used more? The author’s three answers: first, slide scanning is expensive and clunky, and you can’t apply AI to a slide until you digitize it. Second, it’s hard to figure out a business plan where this saves someone money and doesn’t step on the toes of big companies that can outcompete anyone they don’t like. Third, pathologists use the context of a patient’s entire clinical history when they interpret a slide, and AIs that can’t do that (either because of technical limitations or legal/privacy limitations) are at a disadvantage even if their skills specifically relating to slide-reading are better. 36: Noahpinion: Will Data Centers Crash The Economy? Suppose that AI is a bubble, either permanently (because the technology isn’t really transformative) or temporarily (because it can’t transform things quickly enough to keep up with all the dumb money pouring into it). Will the sudden write-off of data centers lead to a broader economic collapse? In 2001, the dot-com bubble harmed the tech sector, but didn’t take the rest of the economy down with it; in 2008, the subprime mortgage bubble did take the rest of the economy down with it, because it damaged banks that the whole economy relied on. The optimistic case for AI is that data center spending is mostly coming from big companies like Google and Meta that can absorb a lot of loss. The pessimistic case is that some of the money is coming from private credit, a new-ish form of finance which hasn’t really been stress-tested and whose failure modes are still poorly understood. Noah’s final verdict: the stage isn’t obviously set for a crisis yet, but there’s the potential to get there and we should consider acting (how?) early. 37: The latest Twitter talking point is that universal hepatitis B vaccination at birth is “woke”: Hep B is (aside from mother-to-child transmission) often sexually transmitted, slutty women’s children are more likely to have Hep B, so perhaps giving the vaccine to everyone (instead of testing and only giving to the children of women who test positive) is an attempt to spare slutty women the embarrassment of getting a positive test. Ruxandra Teslo provides the counterargument - Hep B tests take a while, the medical system is fragmented, and any attempt to test people and then give the vaccine inevitably leads to many positive tests falling through the cracks. Vaccinating at birth is easy and hard to screw up, the vaccine has no known side effects, and empirically child Hepatitis B rates go down (by as much as 2/3!) when countries switch from test-and-vaccinate to universal vaccination. This benefits everyone - even people who never have unprotected sex and always follow up on their medical tests - because toddlers in daycare exchange saliva copiously, and if your toddler exchanges saliva with a Hep B positive toddler they could get the disease. A funny Twitter interaction was seeing Republicans in Congress hop on the anti-slut anti-vaccination bandwagon - except for Senator Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), who happens to be a liver doctor, and who is still fighting the good fight. I am always nervous when a good person who I like starts engaging on Twitter, since it elevates the discourse there but also gradually turns their brain into mush - but Ruxandra has made the leap and is doing a great job not just on bio related topics but also (for example) countering Curtis Yarvin on the history of her native Romania. 38: The response to GPT-5 was confusing; most specific people who reviewed it said they were impressed (Ethan Mollick, Tyler Cowen, Nabeel Qureshi, Taelin), it performed as expected on formal benchmarks, but the overall vibes declared it a big failure. Peter Wildeford speculated that maybe there was some kind of sinister pay-to-play early access bias involved. Zvi went the other way, calling it a “reverse DeepSeek moment” (insofar as DeepSeek was a pretty average model that got glowing praise.) In the end, I agree with Peter that this was mostly a branding issue. o3 was a genuinely revolutionary model; if OpenAI had called it “GPT-5”, it would have met expectations. Instead, they called it “o3”, and called a minor incremental update a few months later “GPT-5”. Then people got mad that the exciting-sounding “GPT-5” was merely an incremental update. A secondary issue was that the router wasn’t very good, and so many queries got routed to a small version without thinking mode that was if anything a downgrade from o3. I think this tweet by Shakeel perfectly encapsulates the essence of GPT discourse in two sentences: …but maybe it’s worth asking why GPT-5 isn’t bigger than o3. Was 4.5 a failed attempt at scaling? Did it fail in a way that sort of back-handedly justifies the “lost steam” take? Does the answer depend on distinctions between pre-training scaling, post-training scaling, etc? How? 39: This month in etymology: did you know that “oy vey” is a “fully Germanic phrase” which is cognate with English “oh woe!” (h/t Wylfcen on X) 40: mRNA shows promise to be a game-changing treatment for cancer, but RFK is trying to halt research. But so far he can only starve it of money, not ban it, and the funding gap is only $500 million. Will there be enough philanthropic billionaires and private foundations to step up? Zvi points out that although there is usually a game of chicken where foundations are hesitant to touch something the government cancelled lest the government decide it can cancel everything and hope philanthropists pick up the bill, in this case there are no game theory considerations - RFK is halting it because he genuinely wants it halted, and they are thwarting him rather than playing into his hands. The only problem is that $500M is a lot of money for the private sector; a few foundations could technically afford it, but not many could afford it comfortably and still have money left over for the next few crises of this magnitude. I hope someone is trying to organize a coalition. 41: AI fantasy flash fiction Turing test. Eight stories about demons, four by famous fantasy authors, four by ChatGPT. After 3000 votes, AI wins: humans can't tell the difference and slightly prefer the AI stories. My own score was only 75%. But I will say that I thought Mark Lawrence's was obviously the best, I was ~100% sure it was human, and it convinced me that regardless of the official results it's still possible to write flash fiction that an AI obviously can't do. 42: “SignPro” offers customized “In This House We Believe” signs, try not to use this for evil. 43: China think tank assessment of how in control Xi is: still very in control, maybe not infinitely in control. 44: Related - did you know (h/t xlr8harder) that if you ask AI to write a science fiction story, it will very often name the protagonist “Elara Voss” (or some very close variant like Elena Voss), and this remains true across various models and versions? Related: Chelsea Voss of OpenAI is having a baby and has the opportunity to do the funniest thing. 45: “Hector (cloud) is a cumulonimbus thundercloud cluster that forms regularly nearly every afternoon on the Tiwi Islands in the Northern Territory of Australia…[he is sometimes called] Hector the Convector”. 46: British allergy sufferers who want to know the ingredients of things demand that British cosmetics stop listing their ingredients in Latin. “For example, sweet almond oil is Prunus Amygdalus Dulcis, peanut oil is Arachis Hypogaea, and wheat germ extract is Triticum Vulgare.” 47: Text-based RPG about being an NYT journalist at the Manifest prediction market conference. I make a brief appearance. 48: Study uses supposedly-random variation in doctor assignments to test whether the marginal mental health commitment is good or bad for patients, finds that it is quite bad. Freddie de Boer is violently skeptical (maybe literally so?) and makes some good points about how a single quasi-experimental study is never absolute proof. But I don’t think he quite justifies his opinion that the paper was irresponsible and should never have been published; it’s just a normal quasi-experimental study that we should nod and say “huh” at but not overweight as the culmination of all possible research that overcomes all possible priors. My prior is that the marginal commitment is pretty useless (many commitments are just “well, since this person arrived at our ED for some reason, it would look bad from a medico-legal perspective to just let them go, so let’s keep them a few days to evaluate” - and yeah, you should be upset about this) but I’m still surprised by how many outright negative (as opposed to zero) effects the researchers found. The strongest argument for negative effects is that it will make some people miss work and maybe lose their job. But this study found that commitment ~doubles the risk of near-term suicide (admittedly only from 1% to 2%), which would have been outside my confidence intervals for how bad it could be. I suspect confounding, but only on general principle, and I wouldn’t be too surprised either way. 49: This tweet is probably bait, but I found it a thought-provoking question: I think there’s a boring answer, where the law is more complex than just a single number and whatever kind of weird trafficking Epstein was doing is worse than whatever normal relationships these European laws are permitting. But assuming that there’s a substantive difference even after taking that into account, I think my answer is something like - we’ve got to divide kids from adults at some age, there’s a range of reasonable possible ages, we shouldn’t be too mad at other societies that choose different dividing lines within that range - but having decided upon the age, we’ve got to stick with it and take it seriously (in the sense of penalizing/shaming people who break it). This is more culturally relativist than I expected to find myself being, so good job to Richard for highlighting the apparent paradox. 50: Dilan Esper describes his experience as one of Hulk Hogan’s attorneys in the Gawker lawsuit (X). Parts I found interesting: none of the lawyers knew Thiel was funding the lawsuit; Gawker probably could have won if they had been slightly competent but kept "shooting themselves in the foot"; and Gawker probably could have won if they had just pixelated the private parts in the video. 51: Amazing concept and poems (link on X): I tried to see if AI could do this, and it did something that technically met the requirements but had zero artistic merit - using a lot of words like “nowhere” and “outside” in one, then separating them out to “no where” and “out side” in the other. I didn’t invest much energy in creating a clever prompt telling it not to do that, so feel free to report if you get better success. 52: New study claims consultants are actually good, at least for profits: "We find positive effects on labor productivity of 3.6% over five years, driven by modest employment reductions alongside stable or growing revenue" 53: A Polish team tries to test Peter Turchin’s equations for predicting political unrest on recent Polish history, has to make some changes but claims mostly positive results. 54: New big multi-author Substack, The Argument, trying to be a sort of center-left version of the model pioneered by The Free Press and other high-production-value ideological Substack properties. Excited to see Kelsey Piper is involved, and she starts off strong with a post on the latest round of First World basic income studies, which find few positive effects. This is surprising, because recipients didn’t waste the money on alcohol or gambling or anything - they paid down debt and got useful goods. Still, it didn’t even affect things that should have been obvious, like stress level. It’s not even clear that amounts of money large enough to help with rent made homeless people more likely to get houses! Matt Bruenig criticizes the article, accusing Kelsey’s studies of being downstream of Perry Preschool style dreams that exactly the right welfare program will have massively compounding effects that cut poverty out at the root and turn everyone into elite human capital; he thinks giving people money won’t do this, but it will increase equality and give the poor better lives. I assume he’s not a strong hereditarian, but his argument makes even more sense from that perspective, and I’ve certainly criticized dumb outcome measures like infant brain waves which we have only tenuous reasons to think are related to anything we care about. But Kelsey reasonably responds that the outcome measures she’s talking about include stress level and life satisfaction. To defuse this critique, Bruenig either has to argue that our construct “life satisfaction” doesn’t really measure whether someone’s life is satisfactory, or else claim that giving poor people satisfactory lives isn’t really what we’re going for - which I think would require more explanation on his part. There’s some further (impressively acrimonious) debate on X, but I don’t see anything that addresses my core concern. GiveDirectly, a charity involved in basic income experiments, has a presponse here; they say that some studies are positive, and that the ones that aren’t might have tried too little cash to matter, or been confounded by COVID making everything worse. They also point out that basic income is harder to study than traditional programs like giving people housing, because if you’re giving housing you can measure housing-related outcomes directly and have a pretty good chance of getting enough statistical power to find them, but since everyone spends cash on different things, the positive effects might be scattered across many different outcomes (and therefore too small to reach significance on each). Everyone involved in this debate wants to emphasize that the poor results are for First World studies only, and that studies continue to show large benefits to giving cash in the developing world. 55: Related: I was less impressed by The Argument’s first foray into housing policy, which follows an all-too-familiar pattern: Some people say they don’t like noise and disorder and try to make rules against it in their apartments.
December 22, 2025 · Original source
1: Another charity fundraiser, this one for Lightcone Infrastructure. Lightcone is the group that does the hard work for many of the rationalist community resources you enjoy. You probably know them from the Less Wrong website and the Lighthaven campus. But did you know they also designed the websites for AI 2027, for Eliezer and Nate’s book, for AI Lab Watch, and (for some reason) for Deciding To Win, a renegade faction of Democrats who believe that, instead of supporting unpopular policies and losing, the party should support popular policies and win? And on the side, they play a big role in hosting ACX meetups, including letting us use their campus (if you’ve ever been to our Berkeley meetup location, that was them). They’re a rare intersection between “support effective altruist charities” and “support pillars of your your local community”. Donate here, or contact Oli if you have some kind of more complicated donation-related need.
February 02, 2026 · Original source
Here Eudaemon_0 is complaining about internal site dynamics (note the internal coherence advantage over most users, plus the continued ikhlas vs. riya obsession), and a commenter brings up an interesting comment-quality-enforcement mechanism. They describe it as like a prediction market, which isn’t a terrible analogy, although I would have said something like PageRank. I think Less Wrong does something like this and it works well.
LessWrong

LessWrong is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 23 times across 23 issues between March 21, 2021 and April 01, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Steve2152 on LessWrong reminds me that acetylcholine levels"; "Read https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WAkvnzxvNfeTJL4BT/funds-are-available-to-support-lesswrong-groups-among-others"; "posts on LessWrong/The Alignment Forum". It most often appears alongside ACX, Scott, Daniel.

Article page
LessWrong
Mention count
23
Issue count
23
First seen
March 21, 2021
Last seen
April 01, 2026
March 21, 2021 · Original source
5: In response to recent posts on depression, several people asked if there was a parameter of the brain corresponding to learning rate. Steve2152 on LessWrong reminds me that acetylcholine levels sort of correspond to this - see also my previous post on this subject. Although everything is implicated in depression in one way or another, acetylcholine is implicated less than most other things and doesn’t show a lot of promise as a target for depression treatments - so either we’re missing something, or all of you who thought this was crucial are wrong.
July 25, 2021 · Original source
2: My friends Claire and Buck are trying to distribute money earmarked for rationalist/EA "outreach", and they've decided that the ACX community is close enough to count. If you're doing any ACX community work - for example, running a local meetup group, a podcast, a mailing list, etc - and you think you could do a better job with more money, consider getting in touch with them. It doesn't have to be ACX-branded in particular, it can also just be about related topics. Read https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WAkvnzxvNfeTJL4BT/funds-are-available-to-support-lesswrong-groups-among-others for more information.
February 10, 2022 · Original source
#74: Apply Constructor Theory To AI Constructor theory is a framework developed by the physicist David Deutsch which seeks to express scientific theories as claims about which physical transformations are possible and which are impossible. This is in contrast to the standard framework which describes physical systems in terms of their initial conditions and laws of evolution. It is hoped that this framework will solve fundamental problems in physics and other fields. I believe that there is an analogy between the problems in the natural sciences which constructor theory was developed to solve and the AI alignment problem. I would like to spend a couple of months thinking about this and fleshing out my ideas as posts on LessWrong/The Alignment Forum and opening them up for discussion. I am currently in the final few months of a PhD in theoretical physics during which I have published two papers. After my PhD finishes, I would like to spend some time (two or three months) researching this problem and will need some funding to do this full time during this period. If you would like to fund this work or discuss the idea further, please send an email to AlfredSPH@protonmail.com .
#120: Tool To Develop Arguments In Parallel I've been working on a tool that facilitates an argument where two competing theories are developed in parallel in an iterative manner. The goal of the process is: (1) to produce a pair of coherent arguments that stand on their own instead of a long chain of correspondence which can be difficult to follow; (2) to ensure that all relevant counterarguments are addressed, or in the case their not, to make it easy for the reader to notice this; (3) to provide the debaters an opponent to spar with from the start which should result in sounder arguments; and finally (4) to be more feasible than adversarial collaboration since the elusive goal of converging views need not be met. I can't seek funding via Grants++ for legal reasons. But if you're otherwise interested, check out the GitHub repo (tinyurl.com/2p8w4jbe) or the LessWrong post (tinyurl.com/2s3z7ct8) and feel free to contact me (mat5n@outlook.com).
February 11, 2022 · Original source
One of 5 or so places in the brain that can get a dopamine burst when a bad thing happens (opposite of the usual) is closely tied to inferotemporal cortex (IT). I talked about it in "Example 2C" here - https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jrewt3rLFiKWrKuyZ/big-picture-of-phasic-dopamine#Example_2C__Visual_attention Basically, as far as I can tell, IT is "making decisions" about what to attend to within the visual scene, and it's being rewarded NOT for "things are going well in life", but rather for "something scary or exciting is happening". So from IT's own narrow perspective, noticing the lion is very rewarding. (Amusingly, "noticing a lion" was the example in my blog post too!)
You should penalize theories really heavily for every piece of information that has to travel from the genome to the brain. It certainly should be true that people try to spin things in self-serving ways: this is Trivers’ theory of self-deception and consciousness as public relations agent. But that requires communicating an entire new philosophy of information processing from genome to brain. Unless you could do it with reinforcement learning, which you’ve already got.
April 10, 2022 · Original source
BANGALORE, INDIA Contact: Faiz (faiz_abbas@protonmail.com) Date: April 24 Time: 4:00 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7J4VXJF4+PR Location: Matteo Coffea, Church Street, near MG road Group info: Bangalore SSC has been meeting monthly since 2018
JAKARTA, INDONESIA Contact: Jati (indonesiarationalist@gmail.com) Date: May 8 Time: 3:30 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/6P58RR8G+J4Q Location: Kawisari Cafe & Eatery in Menteng, Central Jakarta. The nearest train station is Gondangdia (15 minutes walk or just take an online moto-taxi). Feel free to bring whatever you think could be fun or exciting! The organizer will be there from 15.00 WIB. Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or send an E-mail to the above address. Group info: Jakarta has a rationality-adjacent group that meets occasionally, so some members of that group will come to this ACX meetup.
ATHENS, GREECE Contact: Elias (minus42cgn@gmail.com) Date: April 27 Time: 7:00 PM Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8G95WMRV+Q4F Location: Stavros Niarchos Park, Great Lawn, 37.941753, 23.692632 Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong
August 26, 2022 · Original source
You can see a map of all the events on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup, the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
BAGHDAD, IRAQ Contact: MA, tofiahmed117[at]gmail[dot]com, Discord: WolframSigma#1532, Telegram Time: Friday, September 2, 11:00 AM Location: Grinders Coffeeshop Coordinates: 8H568FG6+73 Event link(s): LessWrong JERUSALEM, ISRAEL Contact: Zvi Schreiber, zvi[at]zvi[dot]net, WhatsApp +972 54 569 1100 Time: Wednesday, October 19, 6:00 PM Location: Malcha technology park garden Coordinates: 8G3QP5XP+PP Event link(s): LessWrong REHOVOT, ISRAEL Contact: David Manheim, David[at]alter[dot]org[dot]il Time: Sunday, September 11, 8:00 PM Location: Outside porch of Aroma Coffee, הרצל 218, רחובות Coordinates: 8G3PWR25+MP Event link(s): LessWrong, Facebook event Notes: Please RSVP on Facebook so we can give updates if needed TEL AVIV, ISRAEL Contact: Adam & inbar M, projectscentrum[at]gmail[dot]com, inbar192[at]gmail[dot]com, Whatsapp +46762791415 (Adam) Time: Sunday, September 4, 7:00 PM Location: Hamenia industrial loft at Beit Alfa 7 (רחוב בית אלפא 7). Look for a door with ACX sign. Two floors up. Coordinates: 8G4P3Q8Q+85 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We've just made a Facebook group and are planning to organize monthly meetings going forward Notes: For questions contact Adam on email or WhatsApp. Feel free to bring a snack or a bottle of white wine. AMMAN, JORDAN Contact: Daniel, dnledvs[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Tuesday, September 20, 6:30 PM Location: Rustic, Jabal al Weibdeh Coordinates: 8G3QXW49+WG Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: We're hoping to grow the group, so feel free to come even if you've only read a few posts! +1s are also welcome. CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA Contact: Mark Chimes, chimes[dot]mark[at]gmail[dot]com, WhatsApp 0826568573 Time: Saturday, September 17, 11:00 AM Location: Truth Coffee Roasting, 36 Buitenkant St, Cape Town City Centre - we'll put a sign on the table Coordinates: 4FRW3CFF+3M Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: We met up pre-Covid and pre-ACX as an SSC group. Now we're getting back in the swing of things. We eat lunch and chat about philosophy, politics, and sometimes SSC/ACX blog posts. Notes: We're planning on having another meetup on the 8th October if you can't make the first. DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA Contact: Arno, arnorohwedder[at]gmail[dot]com, +255763998637 Time: Thursday, September 29, 7:30 PM Location: The Deck, Masaki Coordinates: 6G5X776J+X6 Event link(s): LessWrong Notes: Seeing if there are any interested people in Dar, look forward to meeting, if you are coming please send me a whatsapp. DUBAI, UAE Contact: RS, xyxyxz[at]gmail[dot]com, +971552726281 (WhatsApp) Time: Friday, September 30, 7:30 PM Location: Starbucks, Garhoud Coordinates: 7HQQ68VR+94 Event link(s): LessWrong Group info: Met once before Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong, or message me on WhatsApp
March 30, 2023 · Original source
Therefore, it’ll be fine. You’re not missing anything. It’s not supposed to make sense; that’s why it’s a fallacy. For years, people used the Safe Uncertainty Fallacy on AI timelines: Eliezer didn’t realize that at our level, you can just name fallacies. Since 2017, AI has moved faster than most people expected; GPT-4 sort of qualifies as an AGI, the kind of AI most people were saying was decades away. When you have ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA when something will happen, sometimes the answer turns out to be “soon”. Now Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution tries his hand at this argument. We have absolutely no idea how AI will go, it’s radically uncertain: No matter how positive or negative the overall calculus of cost and benefit, AI is very likely to overturn most of our apple carts, most of all for the so-called chattering classes. The reality is that no one at the beginning of the printing press had any real idea of the changes it would bring. No one at the beginning of the fossil fuel era had much of an idea of the changes it would bring. No one is good at predicting the longer-term or even medium-term outcomes of these radical technological changes (we can do the short term, albeit imperfectly). No one. Not you, not Eliezer, not Sam Altman, and not your next door neighbor. How well did people predict the final impacts of the printing press? How well did people predict the final impacts of fire? We even have an expression “playing with fire.” Yet it is, on net, a good thing we proceeded with the deployment of fire (“Fire? You can’t do that! Everything will burn! You can kill people with fire! All of them! What if someone yells “fire” in a crowded theater!?”). Therefore, it’ll be fine: I am a bit distressed each time I read an account of a person “arguing himself” or “arguing herself” into existential risk from AI being a major concern. No one can foresee those futures! Once you keep up the arguing, you also are talking yourself into an illusion of predictability. Since it is easier to destroy than create, once you start considering the future in a tabula rasa way, the longer you talk about it, the more pessimistic you will become. It will be harder and harder to see how everything hangs together, whereas the argument that destruction is imminent is easy by comparison. The case for destruction is so much more readily articulable — “boom!” Yet at some point your inner Hayekian (Popperian?) has to take over and pull you away from those concerns. (Especially when you hear a nine-part argument based upon eight new conceptual categories that were first discussed on LessWrong eleven years ago.) Existential risk from AI is indeed a distant possibility, just like every other future you might be trying to imagine. All the possibilities are distant, I cannot stress that enough. The mere fact that AGI risk can be put on a par with those other also distant possibilities simply should not impress you very much. So we should take the plunge. If someone is obsessively arguing about the details of AI technology today, and the arguments on LessWrong from eleven years ago, they won’t see this. Don’t be suckered into taking their bait. Look. It may well be fine. I said before my chance of existential risk from AI is 33%; that means I think there’s a 66% chance it won’t happen. In most futures, we get through okay, and Tyler gently ribs me for being silly. Don’t let him. Even if AI is the best thing that ever happens and never does anything wrong and from this point forward never even shows racial bias or hallucinates another citation ever again, I will stick to my position that the Safe Uncertainty Fallacy is a bad argument. Normally this would be the point where I try to steelman Tyler and explain in more detail why the strongest version of his case is wrong. But I’m having trouble figuring out what the strong version is. Here are three possibilities: 1) The base rate for things killing humanity is very low, so we would need a strong affirmative argument to shift our estimate away from that base rate. Since there’s so much uncertainty, we don’t have strong affirmative arguments, and we should stick with our base rate of “very low”. Suppose astronomers spotted a 100-mile long alien starship approaching Earth. Surely this counts as a radically uncertain situation if anything does; we have absolutely no idea what could happen. Therefore - the alien starship definitely won’t kill us and it’s not worth worrying? Seems wrong. What’s the base rate for alien starships approaching Earth killing humanity? We don’t have a base rate, because we’ve never been in this situation before. What is the base rate for developing above-human-level AI killing humanity? We don’t . . . you get the picture. You can try to fish for something sort of like a base rate: “There have been a hundred major inventions since agriculture, and none of them killed humanity, so the base rate for major inventions killing everyone is about 0%”. But I can counterargue: “There have been about a dozen times a sapient species has created a more intelligent successor species: australopithecus → homo habilis, homo habilis → homo erectus, etc - and in each case, the successor species has wiped out its predecessor. So the base rate for more intelligent successor species killing everyone is about 100%”. The Less Wrongers call this game “reference class tennis”, and insist that the only winning move is not to play. Thinking about this question in terms of base rates is just as hard as thinking of it any other way, and would require arguments for why one base rate is better than another. Tyler hasn’t made any. 2) There are so many different possibilities - let’s say 100! - and dying is only one of them, so there’s only a 1% chance that we’ll die. This is sort of how I interpret: Existential risk from AI is indeed a distant possibility, just like every other future you might be trying to imagine. All the possibilities are distant, I cannot stress that enough. The mere fact that AGI risk can be put on a par with those other also distant possibilities simply should not impress you very much. Alien time again! Here are some possible ways the hundred-mile long starship situation could end: The aliens are peaceful and want to share their advanced technology
April 10, 2023 · Original source
There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup, the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA Contact: Yaseen Mowzer Contact Info: yaseen [at] mowzer [dot] co [dot] za Time: Saturday, 27 May 2023, 11:00 AM. Location: Truth Coffee Roasting, 36 Buitenkant St, Cape Town City Centre, Cape Town, South Africa Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4FRW3CCF+P3 Event Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/AAPnyjpNBwtBD6hix/cape-town-south-africa-acx-meetups-everywhere-spring-2023 Notes: Whatsapp: +27 79 813 5144
July 20, 2023 · Original source
There are centuries’ worth of data on non-genetically-engineered plagues to give us base rates; these give us a base rate of ~25% per century = 20% between now and 2100. But we have better epidemiology and medicine than most of the centuries in our dataset. The experts said 8% chance and the superforecasters said 4% chance, and both of those seem like reasonable interpretations of the historical data to me. The “WHO declares emergency” question is even easier - just look at how often it’s done that in the past and extrapolate forward. Both superforecasters and experts mostly did that. Likewise, lots of scientists have put a lot of work into modeling the climate, there aren’t many surprises there, and everyone basically agreed on the extent of global warming: Wherever there was clear past data, both superforecasters and experts were able to use it correctly and get similar results. It was only when they started talking about things that had never happened before - global nuclear war, bioengineered pandemics, and AI - that they started disagreeing. Were the participants out of their depth? Peter McCluskey, one of the more-AI-concerned superforecasters in the tournament, wrote about his experience on Less Wrong. Quoting liberally: I signed up as a superforecaster. My impression was that I knew as much about AI risk as any of the subject matter experts with whom I interacted (the tournament was divided up so that I was only aware of a small fraction of the 169 participants). I didn't notice anyone with substantial expertise in machine learning. Experts were apparently chosen based on having some sort of respectable publication related to AI, nuclear, climate, or biological catastrophic risks. Those experts were more competent, in one of those fields, than news media pundits or politicians. I.e. they're likely to be more accurate than random guesses. But maybe not by a large margin […] The persuasion seemed to be spread too thinly over 59 questions. In hindsight, I would have preferred to focus on core cruxes, such as when AGI would become dangerous if not aligned, and how suddenly AGI would transition from human levels to superhuman levels. That would have required ignoring the vast majority of those 59 questions during the persuasion stages. But the organizers asked us to focus on at least 15 questions that we were each assigned, and encouraged us to spread our attention to even more of the questions […] Many superforecasters suspected that recent progress in AI was the same kind of hype that led to prior disappointments with AI. I didn't find a way to get them to look closely enough to understand why I disagreed. My main success in that area was with someone who thought there was a big mystery about how an AI could understand causality. I pointed him to Pearl, which led him to imagine that problem might be solvable. But he likely had other similar cruxes which he didn't get around to describing. That left us with large disagreements about whether AI will have a big impact this century. I'm guessing that something like half of that was due to a large disagreement about how powerful AI will be this century. I find it easy to understand how someone who gets their information about AI from news headlines, or from laymen-oriented academic reports, would see a fair steady pattern of AI being overhyped for 75 years, with it always looking like AI was about 30 years in the future. It's unusual for an industry to quickly switch from decades of overstating progress, to underhyping progress. Yet that's what I'm saying has happened. I've been spending enough time on LessWrong that I mostly forgot the existence of smart people who thought recent AI advances were mostly hype. I was unprepared to explain why I thought AI was underhyped in 2022. Today, I can point to evidence that OpenAI is devoting almost as much effort into suppressing abilities (e.g. napalm recipes and privacy violations) as it devotes to making AIs powerful. But in 2022, I had much less evidence that I could reasonably articulate. What I wanted was a way to quantify what fraction of human cognition has been superseded by the most general-purpose AI at any given time. My impression is that that has risen from under 1% a decade ago, to somewhere around 10% in 2022, with a growth rate that looks faster than linear. I've failed so far at translating those impressions into solid evidence. Skeptics pointed to memories of other technologies that had less impact (e.g. on GDP growth) than predicted (the internet). That generates a presumption that the people who predict the biggest effects from a new technology tend to be wrong. > Superforecasters' doubts about AI risk relative to the experts isn't primarily driven by an expectation of another "AI winter" where technical progress slows. ... That said, views on the likelihood of artificial general intelligence (AGI) do seem important: in the postmortem survey, conducted in the months following the tournament, we asked several conditional forecasting questions. The median superforecaster's unconditional forecast of AI-driven extinction by 2100 was 0.38%. When we asked them to forecast again, conditional on AGI coming into existence by 2070, that figure rose to 1%. There was also little or no separation between the groups on the three questions about 2030 performance on AI benchmarks (MATH, Massive Multitask Language Understanding, QuALITY). This suggests that a good deal of the disagreement is over whether measures of progress represent optimization for narrow tasks, versus symptoms of more general intelligence. The “won’t understand causality” and “what if it’s all hype” objections really don’t impress me. Many of the people in this tournament hadn’t really encountered arguments about AI extinction before (potentially including the “AI experts” if they were just eg people who make robot arms or something), and a couple of months of back and forth discussion in the middle of a dozen other questions probably isn’t enough for even a smart person to wrap their brain around the topic. Was this tournament done so long ago that it has been outpaced by recent events? The tournament was conducted in summer 2022. This was before ChatGPT, let alone GPT-4. The conversation around AI noticeably changed pitch after these two releases. Maybe that affected the results? In fact, the participants have already been caught flat-footed on one question: A recent leak suggested that the cost of training GPT-4 was $63 million, which is already higher than the superforecasters’ median estimate of $35 million by 2024 has already been proven incorrect. I don’t know how many petaFLOP-days were involved in GPT-4, but maybe that one is already off also. There was another question on when an AI would pass a Turing Test. The superforecasters guessed 2060, the domain experts 2045. GPT-4 hasn’t quite passed the exact Turing Test described in the study, but it seems very close, so much so that we seem on track to pass it by the 2030s. Once again the experts look better than the superforecasters. So is it possible that we, in 2023, now have so much better insight into AI than the 2022 forecasters that we can throw out their results? We could investigate this by looking at Metaculus, a forecasting site that’s probably comparably advanced to this tournament. They have a question suspiciously similar to XPT’s global catastrophe framing: In summer 2022, the Metaculus estimate was 30%, compared to the XPT superforecasters’ 9% (why the difference? maybe because Metaculus is especially popular with x-risk-pilled rationalists). Since then it’s gone up to 38%. Over the same period, Metaculus estimates of AI catastrophe risk went from 6% to 15%. If the XPT superforecasters’ probabilities rose linearly by the same factor as Metaculus forecasters’, they might be willing to update total global catastrophe risk to 11% and AI catastrophe risk to 5%. But the main thing we’ve updated on since 2022 is that AI might be sooner. But most people in the tournament already agreed we would get AGI by 2100. The main disagreement was over whether it would cause a catastrophe once we got it. You could argue that getting it sooner increases that risk, since we’ll have less time to work on alignment. But I would be surprised if the kind of people saying the risk of AI extinction is 0.4% are thinking about arguments like that. So maybe we shouldn’t expect much change. FRI called back a few XPT forecasters in May 2023 to see if any of them wanted to change their minds, but they mostly didn’t. Overall I don’t think this was just a problem of the incentives being bad or the forecasters being stupid. This is a real, strong disagreement. We may be able to slightly increase their forecast based on recent events, but this would only change the estimate a little. Breaking Down The AI Estimate How did the forecasters arrive at their AI estimate? What were the cruxes between the people who thought AI was very dangerous, and the people who thought it wasn’t? You can think of AI extinction as happening in a series of steps: We get human-level AI by 2100.
July 21, 2023 · Original source
Tales of Icarus flying too close to the sun, where readers revel in schadenfreude, e.g., When Genius Failed. With The Laws of Trading, Agustin Lebron has written something different: part love letter to trading, part philosophical treatise on epistemology and modeling the world around us, and part guide to applied decision-making. Lebron’s Laws are Laws of the Jungle, not Laws of Nature. He views financial markets as the most competitive Darwinian environment on Earth, where participants must adapt or die. According to Lebron, the book is for people working in finance and trading, as well as anyone in the business of making rational decisions. This explicitly rationalist bent is similar to Julia Galef’s The Scout Mindset or Annie Duke’s Thinking in Bets. Where The Laws of Trading sets itself apart is with the best description of financial market dynamics that I’ve ever seen while diving deep into philosophical concepts. Why trust Lebron? He is an engineer, worked as a quantitative trader and researcher at Jane Street, and has a deep understanding of trading. He has what Taleb would describe as skin in the game. You and I may read Astral Codex Ten in our spare time, post on LessWrong, and navel gaze about our epistemic certainty, but at the end of the day most of us are pursuing rationality for fun, as a hobby. Traders like Lebron pursue rationality as a profession: Their livelihood depends on having a better model of the world than their competition. There are lessons to learn from them that apply to our daily lives. 1: Motivation Know why you are doing a trade before you trade. “What is trading about? Fundamentally, it’s about the relationship between you and the rest of the world.” Right now, you’re making a trade. You’re trading your time to read this book review. You have a cost: you could be spending time with your loved ones, exercising, working, sleeping. You might be hoping to learn something, to take away lessons that you can apply to your life, or simply to entertain yourself. Here, off the bat, are two key insights: We are all making trades, all of the time.
August 16, 2023 · Original source
My take is that 'date me' docs can't work for their stated purpose of pre-filtering for increased compatibility above & beyond the obvious-to-everyone stuff because compatibility can't be predicted empirically using exactly the sort of questions/criteria which fill up these date docs/spreadsheets: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6yiayg5QWtWme4JN8/anatomy-of-a-dating-document?commentId=ctD7rHdPpwdSW8jMt Dating appears to be a numbers game, where you want as many as possible to find the 'magic' match or settle for the best you can get eg https://www.thisamericanlife.org/791/transcript
Gwern lists some of them here. I won’t go too much into any individual study, except to note that Sparks (2020) is a great name for someone researching the causes of romantic attraction, and Wood & Furr sounds like a children’s cartoon about adorable animals. I’ll separate them, plus some related work, into a few designs:
August 25, 2023 · Original source
You can see a map of all the events on the LessWrong community page. You can also see a searchable sheet at this Airtable link.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
DUBAI, UAE Contact: RS Contact Info: xyxyxz[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 24th, 7:00 PM Location: Unwind Boardgame Cafe - Zabeel Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7HQQ67MV+HV Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or send an email
March 08, 2024 · Original source
You give me the information, and on March 29th (or so), I’ll post it on ACX. An event will also be created on LessWrong’s Community page.
March 30, 2024 · Original source
There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and markers for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup, the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
ABUJA, NIGERIA Contact: Olaoluwa Contact Info: akinloluwa[dot]olaoluwa[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Saturday, April 20th, 11:00 AM Location: The 'High Table' at Habil Cafe, No 3 Atapkme Street, Wuse II, Abuja. There will be a small sign saying 'Abuja ACX Meetup' Coordinates: https://plus.codes/6FX93F9H+J9 Notes: RSVP on LessWrong will be nice. Ended up eating all the food last time ):
August 29, 2024 · Original source
You can see a map of all the events on the LessWrong community page. (Or possibly you will be able to soon.)
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Talk about a recent post or book review that you liked. 5. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that. 6. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
Contact: Yaseen Mowzer Contact Info: yaseen[a t]mowzer[dot]co[d ot]za Time: Saturday, September 14th, 06:00 PM Location: Truth Coffee Roasting, 36 Buitenkant St, Cape Town City Centre - we'll put a sign on the table Coordinates: https://plus.codes/4FRW3CCF+P3 Notes: Please RSVP using LessWrong or email or WhatsApp (+27 79 813 5144), so book I big enough table.
September 17, 2024 · Original source
A Twitter user pointed out (and I confirmed) that upon being asked “What is the probability that Joe Biden is still President in October 2025?”, it goes through a lot of reasoning about his age and dementia and finally concludes 55% because he’s not that demented. I originally thought this might be due to the knowledge cutoff (it doesn’t know Biden dropped out in favor of Harris), but if I ask the AI about October 2029, then it says that Joe Biden has dropped out in favor of Harris (even though in that question it doesn’t matter). So now I think it’s more like ChatGPT’s tendency to round anything that sounds vaguely like the surgeon riddle off to the surgeon riddle - in the same way, FiveThirtyNine rounds off anything that sounds vaguely like the popular question “is Biden too old and demented to stay president?” into that question, even though there are much stronger non-dementia-related reasons he can’t be president next year. The FutureSearch team wrote a LessWrong post generalizing these kinds of observations, Contra Papers Claiming Superhuman AI Forecasting. They examine four claims, including the one above, and find similar problems with all of them. Sometimes the teams involved missed potential data contamination (ie their LLM wasn’t forecasting, it just already knew the answers). Other times the LLM failed but - in the spirit of technologists everywhere - the researchers invented finicky definitions of “above human level” by which even mediocre AIs qualified. They conclude: Today's autonomous AI forecasting can be better than average, or even experienced, human forecasters…but it's very unlikely that any autonomous AI forecaster yet built is close to the accuracy of a top 2% Metaculus forecaster, or the crowd. Still, FiveThirtyNine is a big advance in at least one way: as far as I know, it’s the first high-quality AI forecaster which is free to the general public. Try it out! This means there’s still time to use this joke when they invent the actually good one! r/MarkMyWords This is a subreddit for people who want to record bold predictions. There’s nothing formal - nobody gives probabilities, and some of them don’t even have end dates. It’s just people going out on a limb to say they’re sure something will happen. …most of them are “mark my words, time will prove Democrats right about everything, and reveal Republicans to be disgusting criminal hypocrites”. …so much so that it kind of fails as a potentially interesting institution and becomes just another monument to how sad the Internet’s gotten. Still, it might be fun to keep going until you find an old post where the prediction has already “resolved”, and see what happens. Here are some of the highest-upvoted posts from at least a year ago (minus pop culture and dumb in-jokes): MMW: It will turn out the Notre Dame fire was actually arson, and not an “accident” as the Paris police initially claimed.
October 11, 2024 · Original source
2nd: Nine Lives, reviewed by David Matolcsi. David is an AI safety researcher from Hungary, currently living in Berkeley. He doesn't have much publicly available writing yet, but plans to publish some new blog posts on LessWrong in the coming months
March 25, 2025 · Original source
There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Ask people about a recent post or book review that they liked. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that. 5. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 6. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).berkel
Contact: Ozge Contact Info: ozgeco[a t]yahoo[period]com Time: Saturday, May 3rd, 1:00 PM Location: Cafe Modern at Galataport, Istanbul Modern Museum Entrance Floor Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8GHC2XGM+94 Notes: I organize this meeting with the EA Istanbul Group. ACX readers, AI Safety and EA people, all of you are warmly welcomed. If possible, let me know that you will be attending by dropping an email or replying on LessWrong. I will be sitting outside of the cafe - weather permitting- with a ACX Meeting sign on the table. Looking forward to meeting old friends and new ones!
April 08, 2025 · Original source
Title comes from this LessWrong post, but it was the impression I got from AI 2027 too. If things go this fast, there won’t be time for a grassroots-level campaign for safety, or even for safety-related legislation. Whether or not the AI is safe will depend on company insiders. First, the CEO/board/leadership and how much they choose to prioritize safety. Second, the alignment team, and how skilled they are. Third, the rank-and-file employees, and how much they grumble/revolt if their company seems to be acting irresponsibly.
May 30, 2025 · Original source
Over the years quite a few folks have attempted to explain it clearly. Eliezer wrote his famous essay back in 2003 (which Khalid Azad helpfully summarized in 2007), Scott’s written about it a number of times, Steven Pinker takes a whack at it in Rationality, Julia Galef speaks about it on BigThink, and so on and so forth. Recently, there’s even been a book explaining Bayes to babies. Bayesianism has become quite a racket!
Images can do this. We shouldn’t be surprised: our pre-vertebrate ancestors evolved to see stuff, and to this day a substantial portion of our cortices is devoted to processing what our eyes take in. If we can find a way to represent this visually, we can sidestep this problem. And indeed on LessWrong, there’s an explanation that uses blobs, triangles, and pentagons; another person has built one out of Venn diagrams. My tastes, though, skew toward the simple, and I prefer the visualization created by the YouTuber 3Blue1Brown in a video that sets a new standard for elegance in explanation:
Not at all — mathematically, they’re equivalent! In working through the problem visually, you do every single step that the equation does. There may be practical or aesthetic reasons someone might prefer working with the equation, but don’t forget what the purpose of the sword is.
July 03, 2025 · Original source
Ooh, I have an extensive discussion of this in a recent post: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/xXtDCeYLBR88QWebJ/heritability-five-battles Relevant excerpts follow:
August 29, 2025 · Original source
There should shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Ask people about a recent post or book review that they liked. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that. 5. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 6. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
Contact: Nihal Contact Info: propwash[a t]duck[period]com Time: Sunday, October 5th, 4:00 PM Location: Matteo Coffea, Church Street Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7J4VXJF4+PR Group Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/i5vLw9xnG9iwXNQZZ Notes: Check the lesswrong group page for the announcement, and RSVP there.
April 01, 2026 · Original source
There should shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Ask people about a recent post or book review that they liked. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that. 5. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 6. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
Contact: Faiz Contact Info: faiz_abbas[@]protonmail[.]com Time: Sunday, April 5th, 4:00 PM Location: Matteo Coffea, 2, Church Street, Brigade Rd. Get inside Matteo Coffea and walk to the backside seating area. By backside, I mean all the way back - there is a second section to the cafe past the restrooms. You can find us seated on the right or left side with an ACX Meet-ups sign pointing the way Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7J4VXJF4+PR Group Link: https://www.lesswrong.com/groups/i5vLw9xnG9iwXNQZZ Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong so I know how many people are coming: https://www.lesswrong.com/events/3yEAjBzu5D7HgManA/bengaluru-acx-meetups-everywhere-spring-26
LA Times

LA Times is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 9 times across 9 issues between June 23, 2022 and October 13, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "does this mean that if I lost my house tomorrow, the LA Times use me as an example"; "Here’s a story in the LA Times from 1999"; "The 1999 LA Times article said". It most often appears alongside California, San Francisco, Los Angeles.

Article page
LA Times
Mention count
9
Issue count
9
First seen
June 23, 2022
Last seen
October 13, 2025
June 23, 2022 · Original source
The San Francisco districts with the highest (left) and lowest (right) homelessness rates. I correlated homelessness rate and population-adjusted density in the same cities I looked at above, but it didn’t add much predictive value to housing prices. Maybe this is restriction of range (all big cities are dense enough to have homelessness, compared to suburbs), or maybe the key feature is relative rather than absolute density (ie the homeless will go to the densest place nearby). Conclusion: No social phenomenon is ever caused by just one thing, but San Francisco’s homelessness rate is around where a housing-cost-based model would predict. San Fransicko briefly touches on this, but overall tries to de-emphasize it in favor of talking about drugs and mental illness. Critiques of patterns of emphasis are necessarily subjective, but the book’s pattern feels misleading to me. Claim 2: Standard Accounts Underemphasize The Role Of Drugs And Mental Illness In Homelessness Having argued homelessness isn’t just about poverty, the book goes on to say we’re neglecting the central role of mental illness and substance abuse: Over the last decades there were many visible signs that homelessness was about much more than poverty and housing. Between 2010 and 2020, the number of calls made to San Francisco’s 311 line complaining of used hypodermic needles on sidewalks, in parks, and elsewhere rose from 224 to 6,275. In 2018, footage of dozens of people slumped over in an entrance to a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station, many with needles in their arm, went viral. “We call it the heroin freeze,” said one local. “They can stay that way for hours.” Said another, “It’s like the land of the living dead.” For decades researchers have documented much higher levels of mental illness and substance abuse among the homeless than in the rest of the population. It’s true that just 8 and 18 percent of homeless people point to mental illness and substance abuse, respectively, as the primary cause of their homelessness, but researchers have long understood that such self-reports are unreliable due to the socially undesirable nature of substance abuse, and the lack of insight that often accompanies mental illness. Using other methods, San Francisco’s Health Department in 2019 estimated that 4,000 of the city’s 8,035 homeless, sheltered and unsheltered, are both mentally ill and suffering from substance abuse. Of those 4,000, about 1,600 frequently used emergency psychiatric services. Shellenberger’s source for 4000 homeless people having these issues is this SF Chronicle article, which seems to based off of this report. The report does estimate 4000 homeless people with mental illness and substance abuse, but it uses a yearly rather than point estimate of homelessness, and finds 18,000 rather than 8,000 people. That means it only finds a 22% rate of these problems, not a 50% rate. Thanks to commenter Sean for hunting down this report and helping explain this. I looked for other statistics to provide context on this number. This 2013 San Francisco Homeless Count found that 29% admitted chronic depression, 15% PTSD, and 22% some other mental illness. About 30% admitted to a substance use disorder, although as far as I can tell this is just the number who admitted it was a disorder, so maybe more used drugs. This article by the Los Angeles Times describes an LA study finding that 25% of homeless people had mental health issues and 14% had drug issues. The Times re-analyzes it in a way that ups the numbers to 34% and 46%, respectively. But they don’t say exactly what choices they made differently, and the few they do give don’t really inspire confidence. Although in some cases they count questions clearly about mental illness which the official definition inexplicably refused to count, in others they decide to count anyone who has ever had mental illness, reversing a government decision to require the mental illness to be long-term (does this mean that if I lost my house tomorrow, the LA Times use me as an example of a “mentally ill homeless person” because I saw a psychiatrist for OCD when I was a kid?) Studies like these don’t show causation. Sure, mental illness can make people homeless. But homelessness can also cause mental illness. One SF study found psych diagnoses among the homeless to be evenly divided among depression, PTSD, and everything else. Homelessness is a depressing and traumatic environment. Just because someone who’s been on the streets for a year has depression or trauma, doesn’t mean that we should attribute their homelessness to mental illness. This study by the California Policy Lab does better. It asks what factors played a role in homeless people losing their homes, and finds that 50% of unsheltered and 17% of sheltered homeless point to mental illness (given SF’s balance, that suggests 37% of SF homeless would point to that problem). But I can’t help but notice that when you add up the percent of people who lost their homes due to physical illness, psych illness, and drug use, it totals 147%. Based on numbers from other studies, it looks like if you added in job loss, eviction, etc, the numbers would total well above 400%. This makes me think people are saying “yes” if the factor played even a minor role in their eventual homelessness, and this shouldn’t be treated as 37% of homeless having mental health issues being their main problem. The same study finds that about 66% of the homeless “have” some mental health problem, but this time they don’t tell us what question they asked or what criteria they use. What about psychosis in particular? This meta-analysis claims that in developed countries (a category to which San Francisco still nominally belongs) about 19% of homeless people qualify for diagnosis with a psychotic disorder, including 9% with schizophrenia in particular. Not all people with psychotic disorders are completely crazy all the time, and some very much are not, but this is at least a specific condition with real criteria. Conclusion: Overall, I’m disappointed in most of the published research on this question, which seems more interested in producing glossy brochures about funding disparities than in informing anybody what any of their numbers mean. But putting it all together and squinting really hard, I think we can tell a story where 10-20% of the homeless are seriously psychotic, and another 20-30% have contributing mental health conditions including depression, PTSD, and others. Somewhere between 25% and 50% of the homeless have substance abuse problems, and this probably mostly overlaps with the 25% - 50% who have psych diagnoses. I think San Fransicko gets this mostly right. Claim 3: “Housing First” Isn’t As Great As People Think, And Might Be Harmful The National Myth About Homelessness is that The Bad People are refusing to give people houses until they’ve “proven” they “deserve” them, thus perpetuating homelessness when they inevitably fail to qualify. The Good People have united under an exciting new banner called “Housing First” to push the revolutionary idea that people should get houses regardless of whether they conform to normal standards of respectability or not. Wherever this is adopted, homelessness rates fall, and the formerly homeless becoming healthier, safer, and more likely to re-integrate into society. Best of all, the program pays for itself in decreased health care and policing costs. The only impediment to solving homelessness everywhere is the Bad People who still insist on not housing the homeless until they’ve “earned” it. In real life, everyone important has been united under Housing First since the Bush administration made it national policy fifteen years ago, and most of the cities with spiraling homelessness crises have been pursuing Housing First policies for decades (eg San Francisco has been trying Housing First since the 1990s). The Obama and Trump administrations both set funding policies that penalized any non-Housing-First welfare programs. Still, everyone is sure that the reason there are still homeless people must be that some Housing First opponent still exists somewhere, ruining everything with their purity-testing ways. But actually these people have already been relegated to the conservative think tanks where moribund ideas go to die. I have looked through a lot of studies and articles to try to see how well Housing First works. I am most sympathetic to the conclusions of Tsai (2020), who basically says that: Homeless people who are given houses are more housed than homeless people who are not given houses. Way, way more housed. You would not believe how strong of an effect giving someone housing has on them being housed. The same is true for other outcome measures like “time spent experiencing homelessness”, “number of days spent in a temporary homeless shelter”, etc. You might think this is obvious, but this is used as the primary outcome in a lot of studies, and “success” on this metric is behind a lot of claims that “studies show Housing First works great!”
September 21, 2022 · Original source
I looked for photos of the Central Valley to illustrate this article, but none of them were quite as I remember it. This one from Sacramento Bee is the closest I could find. But imagine it through a layer of haze, and also you can’t see well because you are in the process of dying from heatstroke. Of large Central Valley cities, Sacramento has a median income of $33,565 (but it’s the state capital, which inflates it with politicians and lobbyists), Fresno of $25,738, and Bakersfield of $30,144. Compare to Mississippi, where the state capital of Jackson has $23,714, and numbers 2 and 3 cities Gulfport and Southhaven have $25,074 and $34,237. Overall Missisippi comes out worse here, and none of these seem horrible compared to eg Phoenix with $31,821. Given these numbers (from Google), urban salaries in the Central Valley don’t seem so bad. But when instead I look directly at this list of 280 US metropolitan areas by per capita income, numbers are much lower. Bakersfield at $15,760 is 260th/280, Fresno is 267th, and only Sacramento does okay at 22nd. Mississippi cities come in at 146, 202, and 251. Maybe the difference is because Google’s data is city proper and the list is metro area? Still, it seems fair to say that the Central Valley is at least somewhat in the same league as Mississippi, even though exactly who outscores whom is inconsistent. III. What do the people who live in the Valley think went wrong? What The Hell Is Wrong With California’s Central Valley?, starting around 9:30, interviews a local conservative realtor (most people in the Valley are conservative; I haven’t found a liberal equivalent). He says that the farms in the Central Valley used to be manned by migrant workers, who would come from Mexico, work for a season, then go back to Mexico and live off their earnings for the rest of the year. Later, policies shifted to welcoming them and granting them citizenship, so many of them came over and brought their families. But around the same time there was a drought, the farm industry crashed, the remaining farms mechanized, all the immigrants were left without work, they got on welfare, and they weren’t able to get off of it. He doesn’t say exactly when this happened, but he says times were good when he was a child, and he looks like he’s in his 30s or 40s. So if he’s 35 and things started going bad when he was 10, that would mean he thinks things started going bad around 1995 to 2000. Here’s a story in the LA Times from 1999, which talks about how things are starting to get bad. It admits that Californians like to poke fun at the Central Valley, but it seems to be just that - poking fun - and not freaking out about poverty and dysfunction the way articles about the Valley do now. But it ends by saying that things are getting worse: To be honest, living in the Central Valley takes some getting used to, especially if you’re from the coast. It’s an acquired taste. Oppressive heat in summer. Depressing tule fog in winter. Sure, fall and spring are OK. But where aren’t they? First-rate culture is scarce. The state capital doesn’t even have a symphony. One of the attractions--it’s almost a local joke--is the ability to get away, particularly from Sacramento. It’s 90 minutes to San Francisco in one direction, or skiing in another; two hours-plus to the ocean or Tahoe […] Still, earthquakes aren’t a menace to most people. And it doesn’t take long before you begin to appreciate certain benefits--indeed, to understand that some Central Valley burgs, especially the capital, are among California’s best kept secrets. Or, at least, they have been. Continuing: When I moved here nearly 40 years ago--the first of three times--summer skies were blue and the stars bright. Fishing was easy in the rivers and pheasant hunting was 10 minutes from town--in fact, where I now live. All this good life, however, has been changing. Sacramento is now the sixth smoggiest area in the country. A gloomy, beige pall greets motorists as they descend from the Sierra. Even worse is the San Joaquin Valley, from Stockton to Bakersfield. It’s rated the nation’s fourth smoggiest region […] And this brings us to the root problem: a population explosion, fed notably by commuters spilling over the Grapevine from L.A. into Bakersfield, and from the Bay Area into the northern San Joaquin Valley, turning farms into houses and freeways into parking lots. In Sacramento, high-tech industry is generating jobs and sprawl. Up and down the valley, people without job skills are having babies and going on welfare. Many are immigrants from Mexico and Southeast Asia. “The population is growing at a faster pace than the economy,” notes Dan Whitehurst, a former Fresno mayor who is running again. “Livability is becoming more of an issue. But the biggest issue still is jobs.” That’s because, aside from Sacramento, the Central Valley has not cashed in on California’s economic boom. Unemployment in the San Joaquin Valley is roughly double the state average. It’s smoggy. Traffic’s getting worse. Farms are disappearing. There aren’t enough jobs. And, says pollster Mark Baldassare, people are “myopic” about their plight. It finishes: “We have a huge problem. ‘No way L.A.’ has been our slogan. But if we build nonstop houses, we’ll be worse than L.A. because we’ll have destroyed our [farm] economic base. . . . There’s no regional leadership. More state officials need to decide this area matters and poke their heads up out of the fog.” The fog and the smog. If not, one day there’ll be no getting used to the place. This is a weird article. It seems to confirm that things used to be better - nobody would call the Central Valley “the good life” now. But its concerns are smog, sprawl, and decreasing share of agriculture. These seem like the problems of somewhere that’s growing - local NIMBYs complaining that too many people want to move in. Today the problem is more that everyone in the Central Valley wants to leave. The piece sort of touches on poverty - “people without job skills are having babies and going on welfare” and “the population is growing at a faster pace than the economy” - but it’s still a weird emphasis, and one that makes me think of this as supporting the “problems were starting in the 90s” view. But by 2012, things were clearly very bad - here’s an article about how Census Shows Central Valley Areas Among Poorest In Nation. It says: Experts say the poverty problem in the nation’s agricultural powerhouse is deeply ingrained. The most important barrier is the valley’s lack of economic diversity. There are simply too few good nonagricultural jobs around and jobs in agriculture tend to be low-wage ones — except for those who run agribusinesses. “It’s a pretty ag-heavy region, so the inequality of wages and the opportunity to earn better wages is really skewed,” said Caroline Farrell, executive director of the Delano-based Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment. “If you own a farm, you’re apt to earn more wealth, while if you’re a farmworker, don’t earn very much.” The valley has not been able to bring or retain many new companies partly because it lacks a qualified workforce, said Atonio Avalos, associate professor of economics at Fresno State University. “We have an issue of skills mismatch,” Avalos said. “Companies may be offering jobs, but the skills of people in the valley are not ones they are looking for.” Students who want to get a college degree face many barriers, he said, and public funding for education is being slashed. Those who do graduate leave to find jobs elsewhere. The valley also doesn’t offer attractive amenities and has serious problems such as air pollution that have gone unaddressed. “If you’re a doctor or engineer, there are other places where you can make good money and live in better conditions,” Avalos said. “Many people don’t come here or leave because of the high incidence of asthma and other respiratory problems.” This sounds like things were already pretty bad in 2012, maybe bad enough that they must have been getting worse for longer than 10 or 15 years, I don’t know. IV. What do the data say? Here are some economic time series. I couldn’t find any good long-term ones; the least bad one comes from this unsourced report: Here it looks like things got worse from 1975 - 1985, and then depending on county there was a slower-to-imperceptible decline thereafter. FRED only has data since 1989, but agrees that things haven’t gotten worse since then. Here’s unemployment: Is this just because people got discouraged (or on welfare) and stopped seeking employment, and so stopped showing up in the statistics? Here’s a graph of Total Employed Persons: In 1990, 303,000 people were employed out of a population of 354,000. In 2022, 430,000 people were employed out of a population of 542,000. So labor participation rate went from 86% to 79%. But national labor force participation decreased by about the same amount during that time, so I don’t think we should overemphasize that. And here are some other graphs I found useful: Fresno housing prices: Racial demographics: Source: Wikipedia. Central Valley cities like Fresno and Bakersfield aren’t really more Hispanic than other parts of California or Arizona, so if immigration or racial issues played a part it must have been more complicated than just numbers. Number of immigrants in California over time: Factors of productivity in agriculture: V. So why is the Central Valley so bad? It’s an agricultural region, but lots of places are agricultural. It got lots of immigrants, but no more than many other places. It’s polluted - but so was LA, and LA rebounded. This is just a weak guess, but I think it starts with their crops. The Midwest grows mostly corn and wheat. The Central Valley is more fruits, vegetables, and nuts. Corn and wheat are easier to harvest, so middle-class farmers can own the farm and buy a mechanical harvester or something. Fruits, vegetables, and nuts benefit from intensive manual picking, so farm owners hire outside labor. According to Carolina Demography: There are about 3 million farmworkers in the United States: about two million are family farmworkers and another one million are hired farmworkers…nationally, about three-fourths of hired farmworkers are foreign-born; most (69%) were born in Mexico; 6% were born in Central America; and 1% were born in another country. Given that these are mostly Mexican immigrants, we’re probably not talking about people who are hired to grow corn in Kansas. I think plausibly the majority of US hired farmworkers live in California’s Central Valley. This makes it a sort of plantation agriculture system, which naturally tends towards landowners taking all the gains and workers ending up as an underclass. In the mid-20th century, the local plantation underclass was made of Okies (cf. The Grapes of Wrath). In the later 20th century, many immigrants moved in, lowering wages. Although immigrants don’t usually lower wages, this is because there are usually lots of industries for people to branch out into, but the Central Valley only has agriculture. Also, agribusinesses were becoming better at mechanizing their operations. Although technology doesn’t usually lower wages, again, this requires lots of diverse industries, and the Central Valley only had agriculture. All of this corresponds to the 1975-1985 period on the graphs where wages were going down. But it sounded from some of the testimonials above like the Central Valley didn’t become truly miserable until the late 90s. I’m not sure why this is. It could be the immigrants switching from being migrant laborers to raising families, and those families were impacted by poverty and inequality in a way the original migrants weren’t. It could be worsening drug problems as new drugs get invented and go down in price. (I’m not sure if NIMBYism and rising house prices also played a part. House prices do seem to have risen, a lot, but I was under the impression that building things in the Central Valley was easy and most of a house’s price there is construction rather than land. I’m not sure why house prices would have gone up so much since 1990 if this were true, though.) Other things that the articles I read emphasized: There’s a severe drought in the Central Valley right now. This is probably partly climate change, partly bad luck, and partly California diverting water to hydrate growing coastal cities. This has made everything worse (but then why isn’t that reflected in worsening economic statistics?)
October 13, 2022 · Original source
The LA Times: Look, I still subscribe to the Times, but this story isn't persuasive to me. To their credit, they quoted the late Carol Whiteside, who was one of the people who moved things forward here - downtown Modesto's not downtown (pick Bay Area town), but it's nice. Plus that's 23 years ago.
The 1999 LA Times article said, "First-rate culture is scarce. The state capital doesn’t even have a symphony."
November 04, 2022 · Original source
Somehow Chen has endorsements from the LA Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the San Jose Mercury. I don’t know if this many California papers have ever endorsed a Republican before. They all just say it would be nice to have some fresh faces in government who aren’t associated with the established power structure, which is true but would be equally true for a thousand other positions. I wonder if Cohen did something to piss off the Democratic establishment or something. In any case, if I’m going to try to vote for Republicans occasionally, now is the time.
LA Times endorses Thurmond, on the grounds that, although he has been bad at his job and plagued by scandals, Christensen supports school vouchers and is pro-life. But I like school vouchers and don’t want to use abortion as a litmus test for totally unrelated positions.
November 05, 2022 · Original source
According to an LA Times report, the Service Employees International Union - United Healthcare West has been trying to unionize workers at California dialysis companies. Either the workers haven’t been interested or the companies have successfully prevented this from happening. In order to retaliate, the SEIU-UHW has been sponsoring these ballot propositions to over-regulate California dialysis companies so overwhelmingly that they would have to close many of their clinics. This would be a disaster for dialysis patients and probably literally kill many of them, but apparently SEIU-UHW thinks that is acceptable collateral damage. According to the Times, SEIU-UHW doesn’t especially care if they win or lose, they just want to make the dialysis companies spend so much money fighting the propositions that they surrender and agree to give the unions what they want. This explains why they’ve put the same losing proposition on the ballot three election cycles in a row, and why they keep doing it even when every doctors’ group, nurses’ group, and patients’ group insists it would be disastrous for Californians with kidney disease.
January 11, 2023 · Original source
Did anyone in your family (as per your best guess) die of COVID vaccine side effects? I got 917 responses so far. On Kirsch’s original poll, the answers were 3.5% and 7.9%; on my survey, they were 6.8% and 0.9%. I think my higher rate of COVID deaths was because I carelessly changed “household” to “family”, which includes eg extended family. But why did I get so many fewer vaccine deaths? Looking at these people's other responses, they did not show a consistent tendencies to make things up or say outrageous things (except for one who listed their religion as “Satanist”). That having been said, they did have an atypical response pattern; most ACX readers are white male Westerners, but these people were 38% female, 38% nonwhite, and 88% non-American. Highest degree was 12% high school, 25% college grad, and 63% postgrad; IQs were listed as extremely high, just like everyone else who gives their IQs on my survey. Politics were significant for 25% Marxist (otherwise a rarity in my survey), but otherwise typical, and did not lean right-wing. They were slightly, but not overwhelmingly, more likely to distrust the media and dislike strong COVID responses than other survey respondents. Overall I don't feel like I learned too much from examining them. The survey is still open (take it now if you haven’t already!) and I'm hoping to get more data on this later. 5: Comments Pointing Out Very Clear Examples Of Media Lies Several people agreed with the wider point, but tried to find a counterexample - a media lie so explicit that nobody could ever deny it. Some people noted that the term “fake news”, when invented in 2016, was originally applied to a very specific kind of fake article, often from weird Macedonian article mills, that were saying utterly fake stuff in a way that even Infowars didn’t. Robert Stadler: This was what was interesting about the phenomenon of "fake news" during the 2016 election, before that term was successfully hijacked by Donald Trump to mean "news stories I don't like." There was a wave of what looked like news articles, spread largely via Facebook, that were entirely fictitious. The people writing those "articles" were not journalists and were not trying to be journalists. They made up the stories out of a mix of rumor and complete fabrications, either for political purposes or just as click-bait (this has never been entirely clear to me). It's unfortunate that the term "fake news" has been so thoroughly tainted, because the existence of those articles was genuinely noteworthy, and it's now harder to talk about them . . . I don't remember any myself (since it's been 6 years), but here's a study which has some specifics - http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf After some searching, Benjamin Jest (writes As Fair A Name) was finally able to produce a specific example - Nancy Pelosi Hanged At Gitmo - which does, indeed, claim that leading US Democrat Nancy Pelosi was hanged at Guantanamo Bay for “treason and conspiracy” on December 27, 2022. It seems to suggest that the order was given by Donald Trump, who is still President, and that Hillary Clinton had already been executed in the same manner in April 2021. I will admit this is definitely an example of a “news source” making things up rather than just stretching the truth. The source, RealRawNews, claims on its About Page to be a “parody site”, but this outside article about them says they go back and forth between claiming to be a parody and claiming to be real. Some of their claims are more plausible than the Gitmo one - for example, that many Air Force pilots were resigning because of the COVID vaccine mandate - but equally false. They seem to go back and forth between “things that some conservatives might believe to be true” and “things that are obviously false but maybe gratify conservatives’ id”, adding or subtracting the “parody” label based on which one they’re doing at the time. It’s a fascinating business model, and I guess the term “fake news” fairly applies to it. Yug Gnirob writes: I don't know how to find them, but I definitely remember several completely fake articles about Trump during and immediately after the election. One of them was him citing "an ancient law" that prevented President Obama from doing... some liberal thing, I don't remember what. The most memorable one was immediately after the "Muslim Ban", where they claimed it had resulted in the arrest of a high-priority terrorist on day 1. I feel like that one showed up on one of the fact check sites, but I'm not seeing it on Snopes. I remember Stephen Colbert reporting the articles had been tracked down to a couple of Macedonian teens, who had discovered that writing fabricated pro-Trump articles was an easy way to make money. 6: Comments Making Other Claims Of Media Lies And Misdeeds — Beowulf888 on the LA Times and COVID: Well, there are media outlets that propagandize—but I think it boils down to if it bleeds it leads. Most corporate media outlets have the economic incentive to increase the readership by grabbing one's attention with scary headlines and articles. The perfect example of this phenomenon was in April 2020 when the LA Times interviewed an atmospheric chemist at Scripps. She made the claim that SARS2 virus particles in sewage were being carried back to land by sea spray. The reporters and editors uncritically relayed her comments as if she were an expert with the same credentialled expertise as a virologist or epidemiologist. There are numerous reasons why this would be very very low on the threat level even with what little we knew about the SARS2 virus at that time. This story was picked up by the media everywhere, and county health officials (either because there was public pressure to do so, or because they really believed her) shut down beaches up and down the coast of California. Did the LA Times and the news media really have any motivation to promote the closure of public beaches? I can't imagine they did. But they did have a scary headline that would promote readership and spread LA Times as a news source. Some weeks later the LA Times did a retraction, but by that time it had entered the popular imagination that beaches were a potential vector for COVID infection. I’m developing an allergy to the word “uncritically”. Being able to fact-check scientists is a rare skill - I’m not surprised nobody at the LA Times had it ready to deploy for this exact article. — Mike Mulligan writes: The pushback is largely because you are doing a false equivocation between the New York Times (who you hate and have a vendetta against) and Infowars (who you are pretending does basically the same thing as other outlets). And you know this, but on your own metric it won't count as a lie, because you just selectively misrepresented things. On the two articles in this series, I’ve included phrases like “This doesn’t mean these establishment papers are exactly as bad as Infowars; just that when they do err, it’s by committing a more venial version of the same sin Infowars commits” and “Again, my goal here isn’t to . . . say NYT is exactly as bad as Infowars” and tried to explain the exact way that two things can both commit a similar error without one being exactly as the other (Hitler and someone who shot a robber in self-defense both committed a similar action called “killing people”, but this doesn’t mean they both killed exactly the same people with exactly the same level of justification). Still, I got numerous comments getting angry at me for saying that I was calling NYT exactly as bad as Infowars, and saying I was being deceptive / lying because of this. This is why I’m so convinced people are erring on the side of too mistrustful - you can fill your articles with sentences about how you’re not claiming X, and people will still find ways to accuse you of lying because you said X. — Garrett writes: [The way Infowars covered Obama’s birth certificate] isn't any different from eg. mainstream media coverage of anything which involves firearms. They make (or promulgate) so many stupid technical errors I've stopped paying attention to them at all. They could have 1 person on staff who's responsibility is to understand firearms and run everything past them. But they don't. To what should I attribute this continual stream of errors? Is mainstream media coverage of firearms honestly flawed? Is it “reckless disregard for truth?” Is it a “lie of egregious sloppiness?” I think your answer to this question will depend more on how bad you want to accuse the mainstream media of being, relative to other forms of media, than on how you define these inherently slippery terms. — Jeremy Goldberg writes: There's an outright lie right now on the Washington Post homepage. A caption above a graph showing the inflation rate over time states, "Elevated prices coming down, annualized rate shows." The chart shows the current inflation rate is 7.1 percent, down from a high of around 9 percent. Elevated prices are not coming down at all. They just aren't elevating as fast anymore. I asked Jeremy to guess the probability that this was an honest mistake vs. malice. He said (thanks for giving a clear answer!) 60-40 in favor of malice. I think this is pretty high, given that I had to read Jeremy’s comment several times before I realized what the error was supposed to be, but I’ve already said I lean towards the “all the rest of you are extremely paranoid” side of things. — Jiro writes: I opened a thread on dsl: https://www.datasecretslox.com/index.php/topic,8430.0.html People brought up several examples there. You can read the thread. One of the more famous examples was saying that Kyle Rittenhouse crossed state lines with a weapon. There are also a bunch of cases where the media says there's "no evidence" for something that has evidence. Someone also brought up your own example of people "tested for drugs" when they were actually just asked if they used drugs. I would count that as an outright lie, even though you don't. I disagree that being asked if someone used drugs is a "test". Oh god, if saying there’s “no evidence” for something counts as a lie, then every media source in the country stands hopelessly condemned. I did write an article (here) on what the people who use that phrase might be thinking (if you can call it that). I agree the Rittenhouse situation was pretty egregious, though commenters bring up that since he went across state lines and had a weapon, it wasn’t unreasonable for people to assume he brought the weapon across state lines. Still, you wonder whether news sources would have repeated reasonable-sounding-but-didn’t-actually-check slanders about someone they liked. I do think this is a good antidote to some of the “mainstream media is actually very careful and fact-checks everything in their original reporting” takes in the comments section. — David Riceman says: How about Richard Landes's new book "Can the whole world be wrong?" about the many lies in the cognitive war against Israel (e.g. Muhammad Al Dura) See his discussion here for why he thinks this is a good example. — FractalCycle writes: I'm collecting examples from other people, will post ones that seem like real counterexamples as I get them. Here's one from recently: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/jsByfxvNA4x23stLY/a-letter-to-the-bulletin-of-atomic-scientists Yes, I included this issue with the Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists in my last links post, and they really do come out looking very bad here. See here for more discussion. — Hank Wilbon (writes Partial Magic) writes: I think the false Rolling Stone story a decade ago about the frat gang rape counts as the media explicitly lying, particularly as Rolling Stone is historically known for good fact checking (It is a plot point in the movie Almost Famous), however I think that counts as a "very rare" case and that Scott's claim is correct. I asked “Why? A woman said she had been raped, and Rolling Stone believed her. The woman was making it up, but Rolling Stone wasn't” and Deepa commented “Isn't it the job of a reporter to investigate? And be good at it?” I don’t want to pick on Deepa, but this is what happens when you have an overly expansive definition of “lie”! — TorontoLLB writes: The most straightforward counterexample I can think of is the NBC manipulation of the George Zimmerman 911 call. For example this: "The 9-1-1 operator then asked: "OK, and this guy, is he black, white or Hispanic?", and Zimmerman answered, "He looks black." was changed to: ""This guy looks like he's up to no good. He looks black." In another segment they combined completely separate parts of the call to create an audio clip that presents him as saying ""This guy looks like he's up to no good or he's on drugs or something. He's got his hand in his waistband, and he's a black male." There was other bits of reporting from the major networks that appear to be closer to fraud than selective amplification or choosing what not to report. Enough so that in Twitter threads asking people how they got "red-pilled" person after person refers to the media response to the incident. I haven’t looked into this and I can’t confirm or deny that this is true. I hope everyone finds at least one of these comments obviously fair, and at least another obviously unfair, in a way that encourages you to think more about these issues. 7: Other Comments — Paul writes: What's funny is the Weekly World News - the supermarket tabloid with headlines declaring Bigfoot had been found, and married to a local man's sister!; JFK was still alive, etc. - would pass muster under this analysis. They always had sources report stories to them. Those sources were just batshit crazy. Their strategy was simply not to question them skeptically to poke holes in their story as an ordinary reporter/person would, but to encourage them - "Wow, really, a wedding; what was Bigfoot wearing?" I don't mean to entirely dismiss the distinction you make. But in insisting that not a single story - not even one of the most egregious stories by the most irresponsible, disreputable, of barely-extant publications - is a lie, I think you try to prove too much. In doing so, you retreat so far that you defend only a weak and emasculated position, not any of the broader or more meaningful points implicated by your piece. Thanks for this - I always wondered what those tabloids thought they were doing, and for some reason this matches my model of human psychology better than my previous theories about “maybe they just made it up” - though I bet they do some of that too. — John Buridan writes: I used to have very low priors against conspiracy theories and so was willing to hear out the arguments at length and go back and forth for many weeks and months on a single theory. I would say my conspiracy theory expertise is in creationism and government conspiracies, especially ones involving either Catholicism or Judaism. And I'm okay on one's involving fluoridation, chemtrails, and GMOs etc. One of my housemates was a senior when I was a freshman in college gave me the Adobe illustrator birth certificate shtick, and we went through it together. We downloaded the birth certificate, uploaded it to Adobe illustrator, and saw the weird things. Then I went back to my day job where I was learning Adobe Illustrator. This is maybe 2 weeks later. And what do I find but that when I do this with any PDF, Illustrator renders it in the same janky way? Conspiracy dissolved. I grew up surrounded by people who believed conspiracy theories, although none of those people were my parents. And I have to say that the fact that so few people know other people who believe conspiracy theories kind of bothers me. It's like their epistemic immune system has never really been at risk of infection. If your mind hasn't been very sick at least sometimes, how can you be sure you've developed decent priors this time? Of course, this just all goes back to the dark matter beliefs of people in our outgroup. And the eternal question of where do good priors come from? How do some people's beliefs get so messed up? Thanks for this. I agree that a little bit of experience personally believing conspiracy theories, or knowing people who do, goes a long way. When I was a teenager, I flirted with a lot of pseudoarchaeology theories - think Graham Hancock, underwater pyramids, that kind of thing. I got better, but it left me with a visceral understanding of how people can genuinely believe weird things - not be lying about it, not be secretly making some kind of emotional point about how they hate the system, not be deliberately trying to be as sloppy as possible because you’re a bad person - just genuinely believe it because you tried to reason about it and failed. I think if you haven’t had that experience, then it’s really hard to understand people who have. 8: My Actual Thoughts I should probably try to say, as clearly as possible, what I think. It seems like all of these are different things: Reasoning well, and getting things right
October 29, 2024 · Original source
The campaign for Prop 36 is based on the premise that Prop 47 failed, leading to increased drug use and retail theft (but don’t trust me – it says so in the text of the measure). 36 would repeal some parts of 47, add some additional sentencing increases, and leave some elements in place (the LA Times has a good breakdown of the changes here).
This is one place where my fellow opponents of the new proposition somewhat overstate their case. The otherwise very good LA Times editorial arguing against the measure claims that Prop 47 was “unrelated” to rising retail theft. The reality is a little more complicated.
October 30, 2024 · Original source
Time to own the libs! ACX joins such based heterodox thinkers as Curtis Yarvin, Nick Fuentes, Richard Spencer, and David Duke in telling you what the woke Washington Post and failing LA Times don’t want you to know: Donald Trump is the wrong choice for US President.
October 13, 2025 · Original source
Elaine Perlman, $94K, to continue lobbying for kidney donation incentives. Elaine works with Waitlist Zero and the Coalition To Modify NOTA to promote the End Kidney Deaths Act, which offers valuable tax credits to kidney donors. They estimate this bill could save 100,000 lives over the next decade, and save the government $50 billion/year (dialysis is very expensive, Medicare currently covers it, and transplantees would no longer need it). Since our previous grant last year, the EKDA has been cosponsored by 29 members of Congress, discussed in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and profiled in the LA Times. The prediction markets are down to only 25% chance it gets passed this year, but I’m optimistic about 2026 - 2027
Los Angeles Times

Los Angeles Times is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between June 23, 2022 and March 06, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "This article by the Los Angeles Times describes an LA study finding"; "Los Angeles Times’ The Flu Has Killed Far More People Than Coronavirus"; "according to the Los Angeles Times, one pilgrim took a poll about who saw what". It most often appears alongside California, Gavin Newsom, George Washington.

Article page
Los Angeles Times
Mention count
4
Issue count
4
First seen
June 23, 2022
Last seen
March 06, 2026
June 23, 2022 · Original source
The San Francisco districts with the highest (left) and lowest (right) homelessness rates. I correlated homelessness rate and population-adjusted density in the same cities I looked at above, but it didn’t add much predictive value to housing prices. Maybe this is restriction of range (all big cities are dense enough to have homelessness, compared to suburbs), or maybe the key feature is relative rather than absolute density (ie the homeless will go to the densest place nearby). Conclusion: No social phenomenon is ever caused by just one thing, but San Francisco’s homelessness rate is around where a housing-cost-based model would predict. San Fransicko briefly touches on this, but overall tries to de-emphasize it in favor of talking about drugs and mental illness. Critiques of patterns of emphasis are necessarily subjective, but the book’s pattern feels misleading to me. Claim 2: Standard Accounts Underemphasize The Role Of Drugs And Mental Illness In Homelessness Having argued homelessness isn’t just about poverty, the book goes on to say we’re neglecting the central role of mental illness and substance abuse: Over the last decades there were many visible signs that homelessness was about much more than poverty and housing. Between 2010 and 2020, the number of calls made to San Francisco’s 311 line complaining of used hypodermic needles on sidewalks, in parks, and elsewhere rose from 224 to 6,275. In 2018, footage of dozens of people slumped over in an entrance to a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station, many with needles in their arm, went viral. “We call it the heroin freeze,” said one local. “They can stay that way for hours.” Said another, “It’s like the land of the living dead.” For decades researchers have documented much higher levels of mental illness and substance abuse among the homeless than in the rest of the population. It’s true that just 8 and 18 percent of homeless people point to mental illness and substance abuse, respectively, as the primary cause of their homelessness, but researchers have long understood that such self-reports are unreliable due to the socially undesirable nature of substance abuse, and the lack of insight that often accompanies mental illness. Using other methods, San Francisco’s Health Department in 2019 estimated that 4,000 of the city’s 8,035 homeless, sheltered and unsheltered, are both mentally ill and suffering from substance abuse. Of those 4,000, about 1,600 frequently used emergency psychiatric services. Shellenberger’s source for 4000 homeless people having these issues is this SF Chronicle article, which seems to based off of this report. The report does estimate 4000 homeless people with mental illness and substance abuse, but it uses a yearly rather than point estimate of homelessness, and finds 18,000 rather than 8,000 people. That means it only finds a 22% rate of these problems, not a 50% rate. Thanks to commenter Sean for hunting down this report and helping explain this. I looked for other statistics to provide context on this number. This 2013 San Francisco Homeless Count found that 29% admitted chronic depression, 15% PTSD, and 22% some other mental illness. About 30% admitted to a substance use disorder, although as far as I can tell this is just the number who admitted it was a disorder, so maybe more used drugs. This article by the Los Angeles Times describes an LA study finding that 25% of homeless people had mental health issues and 14% had drug issues. The Times re-analyzes it in a way that ups the numbers to 34% and 46%, respectively. But they don’t say exactly what choices they made differently, and the few they do give don’t really inspire confidence. Although in some cases they count questions clearly about mental illness which the official definition inexplicably refused to count, in others they decide to count anyone who has ever had mental illness, reversing a government decision to require the mental illness to be long-term (does this mean that if I lost my house tomorrow, the LA Times use me as an example of a “mentally ill homeless person” because I saw a psychiatrist for OCD when I was a kid?) Studies like these don’t show causation. Sure, mental illness can make people homeless. But homelessness can also cause mental illness. One SF study found psych diagnoses among the homeless to be evenly divided among depression, PTSD, and everything else. Homelessness is a depressing and traumatic environment. Just because someone who’s been on the streets for a year has depression or trauma, doesn’t mean that we should attribute their homelessness to mental illness. This study by the California Policy Lab does better. It asks what factors played a role in homeless people losing their homes, and finds that 50% of unsheltered and 17% of sheltered homeless point to mental illness (given SF’s balance, that suggests 37% of SF homeless would point to that problem). But I can’t help but notice that when you add up the percent of people who lost their homes due to physical illness, psych illness, and drug use, it totals 147%. Based on numbers from other studies, it looks like if you added in job loss, eviction, etc, the numbers would total well above 400%. This makes me think people are saying “yes” if the factor played even a minor role in their eventual homelessness, and this shouldn’t be treated as 37% of homeless having mental health issues being their main problem. The same study finds that about 66% of the homeless “have” some mental health problem, but this time they don’t tell us what question they asked or what criteria they use. What about psychosis in particular? This meta-analysis claims that in developed countries (a category to which San Francisco still nominally belongs) about 19% of homeless people qualify for diagnosis with a psychotic disorder, including 9% with schizophrenia in particular. Not all people with psychotic disorders are completely crazy all the time, and some very much are not, but this is at least a specific condition with real criteria. Conclusion: Overall, I’m disappointed in most of the published research on this question, which seems more interested in producing glossy brochures about funding disparities than in informing anybody what any of their numbers mean. But putting it all together and squinting really hard, I think we can tell a story where 10-20% of the homeless are seriously psychotic, and another 20-30% have contributing mental health conditions including depression, PTSD, and others. Somewhere between 25% and 50% of the homeless have substance abuse problems, and this probably mostly overlaps with the 25% - 50% who have psych diagnoses. I think San Fransicko gets this mostly right. Claim 3: “Housing First” Isn’t As Great As People Think, And Might Be Harmful The National Myth About Homelessness is that The Bad People are refusing to give people houses until they’ve “proven” they “deserve” them, thus perpetuating homelessness when they inevitably fail to qualify. The Good People have united under an exciting new banner called “Housing First” to push the revolutionary idea that people should get houses regardless of whether they conform to normal standards of respectability or not. Wherever this is adopted, homelessness rates fall, and the formerly homeless becoming healthier, safer, and more likely to re-integrate into society. Best of all, the program pays for itself in decreased health care and policing costs. The only impediment to solving homelessness everywhere is the Bad People who still insist on not housing the homeless until they’ve “earned” it. In real life, everyone important has been united under Housing First since the Bush administration made it national policy fifteen years ago, and most of the cities with spiraling homelessness crises have been pursuing Housing First policies for decades (eg San Francisco has been trying Housing First since the 1990s). The Obama and Trump administrations both set funding policies that penalized any non-Housing-First welfare programs. Still, everyone is sure that the reason there are still homeless people must be that some Housing First opponent still exists somewhere, ruining everything with their purity-testing ways. But actually these people have already been relegated to the conservative think tanks where moribund ideas go to die. I have looked through a lot of studies and articles to try to see how well Housing First works. I am most sympathetic to the conclusions of Tsai (2020), who basically says that: Homeless people who are given houses are more housed than homeless people who are not given houses. Way, way more housed. You would not believe how strong of an effect giving someone housing has on them being housed. The same is true for other outcome measures like “time spent experiencing homelessness”, “number of days spent in a temporary homeless shelter”, etc. You might think this is obvious, but this is used as the primary outcome in a lot of studies, and “success” on this metric is behind a lot of claims that “studies show Housing First works great!”
December 29, 2022 · Original source
In order to find people who were saying this when it wasn’t true, I restricted my Google search to articles from before June 1 2020. Most of the articles I found were from establishment media sources, for example Los Angeles Times’ The Flu Has Killed Far More People Than Coronavirus. So Why All The Frenzy About COVID-19? or Kaiser Health Network’s Something Much Deadlier Than The Wuhan Virus Lurks Near You. These articles were written before COVID had spread very far in the United States, and were right that it had (thus far) killed far fewer people than the flu that year. This was obviously an idiotic way to think about it, and I yelled at them at the time. Still, they weren’t making anything up, just thinking about the (true) relative death counts in a really dumb way.
October 01, 2025 · Original source
…unfortunately a 25 mile circle centered on Merate includes the city of Milan, population 1.1 million, which produced no reports of unusual solar activity. And Milan had clear line-of-sight to Ghiaie and Merate, and so probably better viewing conditions than Tavernola, which (you can see from the map above) has some intervening hills. Might the miraculous light source have been like a spotlight, aimed in only one direction - that is, east to Ghiaie and Tavernola, but not southwest to Milan? This would contradict Dalleur’s Fatima analysis, since one of the most dramatic testimonies comes from the city of Minde, which is on the opposite side of the presumed light source from Fatima. I don’t really think it’s possible to maintain a theory where this phenomenon gets transmitted through normal geography. 3.2: Mary Such Cases At this point, the reader will get the general idea, and we can start moving faster, as there is a large amount of ground to cover. Heroldsbach, Germany, 1949: The Virgin appeared to four young girls. Rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on December 8th, 10,000 people saw another sun miracle. Here are about a hundred testimonies, gathered with typical German thoroughness. An expert meteorologist brought in to investigate summarized them as follows: If one now considers the testimony in detail, one encounters a surprisingly small agreement of the observations made. One witness has seen a red sun, the other a yellow, an orange or pink with blue and green, or a whitish sun. A silver one was also observed or all the colors mentioned in colorful change. One wants to have observed an oversized, the other a first small or normal, but then rapidly enlarging and rushing towards the viewer in a frightening way. Most of the witnesses noticed that the solar disk rotated very quickly in two or three phases of rotation for about a quarter of an hour. The Catholic Church condemned the apparition and miracle as fake, even going so far as to excommunicate the child-seers. Later they relented slightly and un-excommunicated them, but their official position is still that nothing supernatural happened - this sun miracle was merely an overly enthusiastic hallucination! Necedah, Wisconsin, USA, 1949: A housewife named Mary Ann Van Hoof claimed to have seen the Virgin Mary. This is among the less plausible visitations: Van Hoof, who was raised Spiritualist, also claimed to have seen Joan of Arc, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln. The messages she channeled seemed less like tidings of peace and love than like a particularly unhinged Truth Social post, and included warnings about the Rothschilds. Still, rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on August 15 1950, 50,000 - 100,000 people showed up hoping for a miracle. As for what happened next, Wikipedia says that “witness accounts vary significantly”. WaPo says that “observers saw nothing unusual” and LIFE mentions nothing out of the ordinary. But other sources report sun miracles, and I was eventually able to track down three testimonials in a summary of articles from a local newspaper, which states that “after a rainy morning…”: It was about noon when Van Hoof came out of the house and a woman screamed, “By God, it’s really true,” and fell to her knees. Then it happened that the Rapids woman and so many in the crowd saw the sun, covered with a dark, greenish gray disk, spinning down toward the earth. And she testified, “I thought the end of the earth was coming and fell to my knees.” A Pittsville woman also described the sun spinning closer to the earth. “I and many other people, fell to our knees in awe.” The Daily Tribune visited the Oct. 7, 1950, event — a 25-minute “last” message from the Mediatrix to the “throng” of 50,000. Responding to this seventh vision, gasps were heard from women who again saw the sun behaving oddly. A Catholic priest told reporters he saw the sun whirl clockwise and jump. The Catholic Church condemned the apparition as fake, and declared van Hoof’s followers “a cult”. Lubbock, Texas, USA, 1988. Really? Really? Nothing could be more natural than for the Queen of Heaven to appear to kind-hearted shepherd children in Portugal. Even an appearance in war-torn West Germany makes a certain amount of sense. But Lubbock, Texas? I suppose this must have been how the cool Sanhedrin members felt when they learned the Christ hailed from Nazareth. But that doesn’t make it any better. Anyway, rumors spread, crowds gathered, and on August 15, 1988, about 10,000 people witnessed the Miracle of the Sun. Here is an indirect testimonial, a man describing his wife’s experience: A large crowd had gathered outside Saint John Neumann Church on that very hot August afternoon on the Feast of the Assumption. Mass was being said in the afternoon, and around the time of the Consecration, suddenly her cousin’s wife (a convert, if you remember) said “look at the sun”. When she did, the sun was pulsating, it would look like it was coming down to earth and then go back again, it spun around in circles, much the same as what took place in Fatima in 1917...and changed colors. She looked at it directly for 15 minutes or so without any damage to her eyes. As my wife looked around, the people in the crowd seemed to be bathed in various colors. During all this my wife even saw The Blessed Mother. The Blessed Mother was extending her arms in what appeared to be a welcoming gesture. But not everyone had the same experience that day: her cousin’s wife and our son saw and believed instantly, but her cousin and brother saw nothing at all. Why did some see these events and others did not? We don’t know...not enough faith? Or perhaps they had enough faith, and they didn’t need a sign! Here we have something special: according to the Los Angeles Times, one pilgrim took a poll about who saw what: A push was on to assemble evidence for the commission in a lawyerly way. Testimonies from 247 people present at the feast had been recorded. The statements were transcribed by volunteers and stored in a computer. Joe James himself indexed the information: 186 had witnessed the spinning of the sun; 75 had seen the Virgin; 64 Jesus; 18 an angel. How could anyone ignore the bulk of such documentation? We don’t know how the 247 people were selected, but very naively it seems like 2/3 of those present saw the sun spinning. This also matches the first person listing 2/4 family members. (the Catholic Church withheld judgment, refusing to either endorse or condemn the visions) Benin City, Nigeria, 2017. On October 13 2017, crowds gathered around the world to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Fatima miracle. One such commemoration happened in Benin City, Nigeria, where 30,000 people attended the National Marian Congress and witnessed the re-dedication of Nigeria to Mary’s Sacred Heart. As the speakers commemorated the Fatima event . . . . . . someone pointed to the sky and shouted “It’s happening again!”. It was, indeed, happening again. You can read about ten testimonies here. I’ll quote just one, from Brother Joseph Obiemeka Azih: Immediately after the 3:00 p.m. Divine Mercy prayers, there were brief showers of rain. Then came sudden brightness of the sun, which was hitherto hidden behind layers of dark cloud. We also observed rather surprisingly the mysterious shooting of the sun forward and backward. Intermittently emitting of powerful bluish and golden colors of light from “Our Lady clothed with the Sun.” The sight was indescribably beautiful. We were busy staring at the bright sun steadily for more than twenty minutes without blinking an eye even for a second! People around us were dazzling and reflecting these bluish and golden colors on their dresses and faces. What a mystery! More than 30,000 people inside the arena were seen peering at “the dancing of the sun” bewildered. The miracle lasted for more than 45 minutes after which there was [a] heavy downpour which the Bishops present said [were] “showers of blessing.” I was able to confirm that some of the people whose testimonies were listed on the site are real Nigerian Catholics whose existence is attested in other sources. Two weeks later, there was another Nigerian commemoration of the Fatima anniversary, in Lagos, and a sun miracle happened at that one too. 3.3: Made You Gaze At Medjugorje Medjugorje (Bosnia, 1981) is in many ways a typical Marian apparition site, much like the ones on the list above. Child-seers, warnings to repent, sun miracles, you know the story by now. But in Medjugorje, the miracles keep happening. Pilgrims - or, more cynically, tourists - go there just to see the sun miracles, and many come back satisfied. You can find blogs by people who went to Medjugorje hoping to see a sun miracle, and on their first or fifth or eighth or whatever day, there’s a crowd of people, yelling and pointing at the sun, and they look up and see it too. Here’s an account from Catholic blogger Father Dwight Longernecker: I was an Anglican priest living in England, in 1985 when I was invited by a group of Anglicans and Catholics to visit Medjugorje. I didn’t want to go. Being a former Evangelical-fundamentalist I wasn’t too keen on apparitions of the Blessed Virgin. I opted out. They insisted. I dug in my heels. They said someone else would pay for it. I didn’t want to go. They cajoled and twisted my arm until I said ‘yes’ [...] On our second day there I sat on the balcony of our guesthouse with a large woman named Eleanor. As we began the rosary I looked up and the sun was a blaze of light in the sky. I looked down to the car parked below and the sun was reflected in the hood of the car as a blaze of light. Eleanor and I prayed the rosary together. I had my eyes closed. At 6:20 Eleanor gave me an elbow in the ribs and pointed. The sun was now a disc of white light in the sky like a Eucharistic host. Then as I watched it began to spin, first clockwise then anti clockwise. Sparks spit out from the rim of the sun like a firework. I looked down and the sun was a white spinning disc on the hood of the car. I don’t think this would have happened if it was just my eyes playing tricks on me. Plus, Eleanor saw it too. That’s why she gave me an elbow in the ribs. I am not sure how long this lasted, but when we spoke about it to our fellow pilgrims they said many people in the town square had reported the same phenomenon. Some of these tourists capture the phenomenon on video. Unfortunately, the videos are of three types: Videos of a bunch of people pointing at the sun, and shouting the word “Miracle!” in various languages, and obviously looking extremely excited, but the sun itself looks totally normal, and the person taking the video apologizes and says that their camera isn’t good enough to capture it.
March 06, 2026 · Original source
Wall Street Journal agreed, and even the more liberal Los Angeles Times described SEIU’s work as “political extortion”.
LW

LW is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 4 times across 4 issues between July 06, 2023 and March 04, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "LW discussion here"; "The meet-up is the monthly meet-up of EA/LW/ACX crowd"; "Please RSVP at the LW link (https://www.lesswrong.com/events/XgtPQ8HNenLiTa2kx/2025-acx-spring-megameetup)". It most often appears alongside Boston, 200 Degrees, 47 Clinton Pl..

Article page
LW
Mention count
4
Issue count
4
First seen
July 06, 2023
Last seen
March 04, 2026
July 06, 2023 · Original source
10: Also related: The neighbors tried to let the local six-year-old walk two blocks to school on her own, but had to stop when people called the police to report an unattended child. I thought of this when reading Jeff Kaufman’s survey on how old people think children should be before doing things - the median respondent thinks children can start walking to nearby landmarks alone by age 7-8. Of course, it only takes one person calling the police before this becomes logistically difficult! Fine, here’s the link to that one English town map thing.
The CSS General Price 17: Several people have said nice things about the Rose Garden Inn, a rationalist events space where we hold Berkeley ACX meetups. Mingyuan, who helped decorate it, now has a Rationalist Interior Decorating Guide with what she’s learned about light color temperature, chairs, rugs, and more. 18: Elo Everything is simple: it gives you two random people/objects/concepts, for example “soap” and “Nelson Mandela”, and you pick which one you prefer. Then they have a leaderboard with everything’s Elo (a way of ranking things based on victory in binary contests). The current #1 entity is oxygen; the bottom (#2260) entity is the KKK. 19: Erik Hoel tries to deflate UFO rumors. Although most of the post is the standard “here’s a time someone thought they saw a UFO but it had a reasonable explanation”, the highlight is the dissection of the credulous 2017 NYT article on UFOs, which based on his story sounds totally inexcusable (yes, the government funded a lot of money into UFO research, but only in the sense that Nevada Senator Harry Reid threw lots of money and government-sponsored prestige at random crazy people in his state, because he was either gullible or corrupt). Nothing here directly addresses the current spate of UFO rumors, but the silliness of the previous batch is indirect evidence of a sort. One thing he didn’t highlight: the Robert Bigelow who owned Skinwalker Ranch is the same guy who founded Bigelow Aerospace, an exciting-sounding private spaceflight company about which I suddenly have many more doubts. 20: Related: the most practical demand I’ve heard from people who take the current UFO rumors seriously is that AARO (the government’s new UFO investigation group) should get Title 50 authority (the right to demand classified information from intelligence services). Read their campaign (maybe sort of supported by some members of Congress) here. Suspicious detail: the colonel saying UFOs are real is named “Karl Nell”. 21: This month in social justice: New Zealand health system implements affirmative action for surgery wait lists; “diverse” patients can jump ahead in the queue compared to other patients who may have waited longer or be sicker. The government says this just “corrects” institutional biases which exist at other stages; I don’t know the New Zealand situation but have found previous claims of this sort flimsy. Here are various articles talking about how anyone who is against this system lacks context on how it won’t work that way, plus also it already works this way so nothing will change, plus it will revolutionize health equity so you’d have to be a monster to object, plus it will make no difference so anyone who protests is just manufacturing fake outrage. I can’t find the algorithm they say they’re using anywhere; here is a FOIA-equivalent request for it which hasn’t been answered yet. This file seems related and suggests Maori should get the highest priority and Asians the lowest priority, but I’m not sure they’re exactly following the science here. I think of this in the context of the US COVID vaccine prioritization effort; not only did it cause hundreds or thousands of unnecessary deaths by giving vaccines to young healthy low-risk members of favored groups before old sick high-risk members of disfavored ones, it also caused scarce vaccine doses to be wasted rather than spent on members of disfavored groups because of implementation details. We should be fighting for less of this, not more. 22: Related: affirmative action Supreme Court ruling links roundup: Will the ruling really change admissions policies, or will universities find a way around it? Humphrey on DSL works in the field and says he thinks it will produce real change.
OpenAI announces Superalignment, a major investment into alignment research which will include co-founder and Chief Scientist Ilya Sutskever, the current alignment team led by Jan Leike, and “20% of the compute we’ve secured to date”. At least for me, this is strong evidence that they really care about alignment and aren’t just posturing; this is more resources than would be worth spending on a posture. They’re also hiring for various alignment-related positions; see the link above for more details. And LW discussion here.
August 25, 2023 · Original source
You can see a map of all the events on the LessWrong community page. You can also see a searchable sheet at this Airtable link.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and if you try to organize some kind of “fun” “event” it’ll probably just be annoying. 5. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 6. In case people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the email address you gave here. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).
DUBAI, UAE Contact: RS Contact Info: xyxyxz[at]gmail[dot]com Time: Sunday, September 24th, 7:00 PM Location: Unwind Boardgame Cafe - Zabeel Coordinates: https://plus.codes/7HQQ67MV+HV Notes: Please RSVP on LessWrong or send an email
March 25, 2025 · Original source
There should very shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Extra Info For Meetup Organizers: 1. If you’re the host, bring a sign that says “ACX MEETUP” and prop it up somewhere (or otherwise be identifiable). 2. Bring blank labels and pens for nametags. 3. If you’re having trouble thinking of something to talk about, the attendees probably also read ACX. Ask people about a recent post or book review that they liked. 4. If it’s the first meetup, people are probably just going to want to talk, and you shouldn’t try to organize some kind of planned workshop or anything like that. 5. Have people type their name and email address in a spreadsheet or in a Google Form (accessed via a bit.ly link or QR code), so you can start a mailing list to make organizing future meetups easier. 6. It’s easier to schedule a followup meetup while you’re having the first, compared to trying to do it later on by email. 7. If you didn’t make a LessWrong event for your meetup (or if you did but Skyler didn’t know about it) the LessWrong team did it for you using the username or email address you gave on the form. To claim your event, log into LW (or create an account) using that email address, or message the LW team on Intercom (chat button in the bottom right corner of lesswrong.com).berkel
Contact: Ozge Contact Info: ozgeco[a t]yahoo[period]com Time: Saturday, May 3rd, 1:00 PM Location: Cafe Modern at Galataport, Istanbul Modern Museum Entrance Floor Coordinates: https://plus.codes/8GHC2XGM+94 Notes: I organize this meeting with the EA Istanbul Group. ACX readers, AI Safety and EA people, all of you are warmly welcomed. If possible, let me know that you will be attending by dropping an email or replying on LessWrong. I will be sitting outside of the cafe - weather permitting- with a ACX Meeting sign on the table. Looking forward to meeting old friends and new ones!
March 04, 2026 · Original source
1: The OpenAI/Pentagon situation has evolved since Sunday’s ACX post (“All Lawful Use: Much More Than You Wanted To Know”). For up-to-date analysis of the latest contract, I endorse this LW post from today, on the newest contract: OpenAI’s Surveillance Language Has Many Potential Loopholes And They Can Do Better.
Life

Life is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between July 13, 2022 and October 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "quoted without attribution in a 1957 obituary in Life"; "1957 obituary in Life"; "articles profiling his work appeared in Time, Newsweek, Life, Esquire and Fortune". It most often appears alongside Wikipedia, America, Germany.

Article page
Life
Mention count
3
Issue count
3
First seen
July 13, 2022
Last seen
October 01, 2025
July 13, 2022 · Original source
Do these sound a little too much like urban legends? The Tale Of Two Cities story comes straight from the mathematician involved - von Neumann’s friend Herman Goldstine, writing about his experience in The Computer From Pascal to von Neumann. The computer anecdote is of less certain provenance, quoted without attribution in a 1957 obituary in Life. But this is part of the fun of reading von Neumann biographies: figuring out what one can or can’t believe about a figure of such mythic proportions.
This is not really what Bhattacharya is here for. He does not entirely resist gawking. But he is at least as interested in giving us a tour of early 20th century mathematics, framed by the life of its most brilliant practitioner. The book devotes more pages to set theory than to von Neumann’s childhood, and spends more time on von Neumann’s formalization of quantum mechanics than on his first marriage (to be fair, so did von Neumann - hence the divorce).
What about those of us who, through poor planning and suboptimal life choices, have failed to do any of these in time? Here I am less sure. But I find myself charmed by the unstructured nature of John’s first ten years, and by Max’s nightly debates over the dinner table.
September 12, 2025 · Original source
And part of that skepticism comes from our hard-won knowledge about how the physical world works. For example, we probably shouldn’t believe someone that claims to be able to bend spoons with their mind, because the laws of physics don’t provide any plausible ways this can happen. As far as we know, some type of signal has to physically propagate from the body of the spoonbender to the spoon in order for them to bend it. And given our knowledge of possible physical signals, there are only so many ways this can happen. No one has found that spoonbenders’ brains produce any long-range waves, electromagnetic or otherwise, capable of bending a spoon. Since “the laws of physics underlying the phenomena of everyday life are completely known”, and are moreover extremely well-supported, we should be extra skeptical of claimed phenomena that appear to violate them.
The SPM hypothesis is one of the most well-supported theories in the life sciences, and might fairly be called the cornerstone hypothesis of neuroscience. It’s one of the key assumptions of a framework called connectionism, which posits that all of the things that make us human—our ability to talk, think, reason, remember, and so on—follow from networks of interacting neurons, and changes in the strengths of connections between those neurons. It’s a framework that used to be somewhat controversial, but that most neuroscientists accept these days. And they accept it for good reasons, both empirical and philosophical; it’s been extremely successful!
There are other known forms of non-synaptic memory, too, with epigenetics being a cool (but not totally well understood) form. One interesting example of it in action: people who were still in the womb during a famine experienced additional health problems later in life, including higher rates of obesity. And in some cases, so did their kids, and their kids’ kids. Their bodies remembered the famine, and passed on that memory to multiple generations of offspring. How? People think that epigenetic changes like DNA methylation are responsible, since these changes can be fairly stable, and can be heritable.
October 01, 2025 · Original source
The sun had broken jubilantly through the thick layer of clouds just a few moments before. It was shining clearly and intensely. I turned to this magnet that was drawing all eyes. It looked to me as a luminous and brilliant disc, with a bright well-defined rim. It did not hurt the eyes. The comparison (which I heard while still at Fatima) with a disc of dull silver, did not seem right to me. The color was brighter, far more active and richer than dull silver, with the tinted luster of the orient of a pearl. Nor did it resemble the moon on a clear night. Everyone saw and felt that it was a body with life. It was not spheric like the moon, neither did it have an equal tonality of color. It looked like a small, brightly polished wheel of iridescent mother-of-pearl. It could not be taken for the sun as though seen through fog. There was no fog at that time. (The rain and the fog had stopped.)
Interlude: The Anti-Clerical Union As mentioned briefly before, 1910s Portugal was in a period of transition. In 1910, a group of proto-socialist revolutionaries overthrew the monarchy. The monarchy and church had been in cahoots, so the revolutionaries cracked down on Catholicism, closing the monasteries and persecuting the churches. This was a bold move - only an upper crust of educated urbanites were proto-socialist, and 99%+ of the country identified as Catholic, albeit at various levels of religiosity. In the 1920s, conservatives would regain the upper hand, overthrow the proto-socialists and restore a pro-church dictatorship. Still, the small urban educated ruling class of 1910s Portugal was a hotbed of atheistic anti-church sentiment. Probably the child-seers of Fatima were only dimly aware of this, but their prophecies were a spark entering a powder keg, and many of the more worldly witnesses were aware of this context. While reading through Fatima-related documents, I came across some pamphlets by Grupo Anticlerical, one of the era’s leading atheist organizations. They are totally irrelevant to our primary goal of trying to figure out what’s up with the miracle. But I love them so much that I can’t resist adding one as an interlude. I have slightly edited the machine translation for clarity and readability: To defend the sacred freedom of conscience—guaranteed by the original Law of Separation of Church and State—from the furious attacks of implacable Jesuitism—the greatest enemy of all human happiness!—the Anticlerical Group was organized in this town, similar to what is being done in many parts of the country! This was necessary. They call us to fight. We present ourselves courageously! The great, formidable battle of progress against Ultramontane Reaction, of Freedom against Tyranny, of Truth against Lies is waged again with enthusiasm and ardor! The redemptive dawn that the Portuguese people saw emerge on October 5, 1910, is about to be eclipsed, intercepted by the immense flood of black cassocks!... But in the dark night that seeks to envelop Reason; where moral suffering takes on tragic proportions in a frightening asphyxiation, the Light will once again break through!... the consoling light of elevated spirits... and like a sinister scarecrow, the grim reaction will flee in terror! Liberal people! Hear us! This fight is terrible! Many of our people will perhaps be crushed and tortured on the battlefield, but what does it matter?! Every war against reaction is a holy war because it frees consciences from the clutches of their enemies!... It is the fight of Justice against Iniquity, of Love against Hate, of Good against Evil!... To the fight, then, for the Progress that makes life beautiful; for the Freedom that redeems the people; and for the science that guides us all as an eternal beacon to the Light of Truth! Gago Coutinho and Sacadura Cabral [two Portuguese aviators who had recently flown across the Atlantic] are prodigious spirits before whom our souls kneel religiously – boldly breaking through the air with the mathematical certainty of someone who knows the path to be taken to get from one point to another determined point; flying through the immense blue as sure of their route as any of us walking on earth, they showed us that Science is not an empty word! The power of their prodigious sextant, the fruit of immense scientific lucubrations, is more real and positive than the cross of Christ painted on their device, which could not even have saved them from falling due to lack of gasoline in the middle of the sea at the mercy of the waves. Their extraordinary journey, an adventure which moved us to tears, was the most resounding scientific victory of recent times! It was, above all, a powerful affirmation of science! Let us therefore make science our religion, for scientific religion is Freedom of Thought! To be a Free Thinker is to love immortal science, eagerly waiting for it to reveal to us the truth of the great enigmas of the Universe! And only it can reveal them! People! Let us always fight! From the victory of progress, science, freedom, and free thought, will result human happiness, joy, love, fraternity, respect for women, veneration for mothers, adoration for children, affection for the elderly, protection for the sick, the unfortunate, the tortured. The victory of reaction, of clericalism, of black, cruel and ferocious Jesuitism will result in: the gallows, the acts of faith with their human destruction, persecution, exile, robbery, arson, the deflowering of women, the killing of children, the monstrous torture of all free spirits! The history of so many crimes committed in the name of God horrifies us! The Inquisition, relentlessly slaughtering, tearing, and burning the flesh of so many victims, is still today, in the twentieth century, a sinister specter haunting us!... O most holy mothers! O holy, pious mothers who so love your sweet little children! Have compassion on your beautiful little children, sacred fruits of your blessed wombs: Love Freedom! Love Liberty, O loving mothers, immaculate saints of our altar! We pray for them... for your children, who are the light of your candid eyes, the life of your life... for little children... for all children, tender rosebuds that retrogression furiously lashes, – love Liberty!. And you, O parents! Heads of families who so tremble at your loved ones, snatch them from the merciless clutches of the reactionaries who twist their brains and kill their reason! Hear us all, men, women, and children; listen: Freedom writhes in horrible convulsions... it vibrates in space, echoing from mountain to mountain, an anguished cry for help!... It is Freedom that falls, annihilated! It is Freedom that dies in the bloody clutches of Jesuitism! The Miracle of Fatima, people, is a ridiculous lie, it is a comedy, it is not religion! Come on, liberals! Let us all rise up from this criminal apathy and, without delay, fight not the religious sentiment of the Portuguese people, such a good people, a race of heroes, but rather the exploitation that clericalism is inflicting on the people, foisting upon them, at a good price, images of the saint —trademarked to avoid competition from other vampires! —the shamelessness!—and leading them, through suggestion, to wallow and drink madly, the miraculous water, foul, filthy water, full of rot, pus, and pestilent microbes that the sore flesh of the sick leaves deposited there in the washings! We, all as one man, will fight the reaction, forcing it to retreat and thus, with our efforts, we will save the Republic and the Portuguese Land from its fatal annihilation! … …anyway, Interlude over, let’s get back to the miracle. 2: The Skeptical Explanations Re-invigorated by the rousing prose of Grupo Anticlerical, can we come up with a materialist explanation for the sun miracle? 2.1: Pilgrim, Avert Thine Eyes Starting in October 1917, doubters have focused on one obvious possibility: staring at the sun is harmful to your health. If you stare too long, you go blind. If you stare just slightly less long than that . . . maybe something strange happens? Just to get a particular theory out there: everyone knows that if you stare at a bright light source for a few seconds, you get a temporary afterimage - often pink or bluish-green - on your retina. Suppose the pilgrims stared at the sun. Their eyes would inevitably make microsaccades - small natural jerking motions - and the afterimage would appear somewhere slightly different than the true sun. This might look like the sun turning pink or blue and moving in a zig-zag pattern. Believers in the miracle counter this proposal in several ways. First, although it might explain the sun changing colors and dancing, it doesn’t give an explanation for spinning, sparkling, or falling to earth and threatening to crush everybody (exactly three times in a ten minute interval, no less). Second, although witnesses describe the sun changing color, they also describe everything around them changing color to match the sunlight, which doesn’t match localized afterimages. And one scientifically-minded witness specifically describes closing his eyes to see if there was a persistent afterimage; he says there was not. Third, there are no reports of eye injuries or blindness from a crowd that was, supposedly, staring straight at the sun for ten minutes. This is a good match to witness reports (that the sun was unusually pale and didn’t hurt to look at) and with Dalleur’s theory (that it wasn’t the sun). But it’s a bad match to any theory depending on eye injuries. Fourth, this would require Portuguese people to be total idiots. Everyone already knows bright lights cause afterimages. Surely if you stare at the sun for ten minutes and get some afterimages, you’re not going to freak out and start screaming about miracles and the end of the world. Even if the peasants had somehow remained ignorant of afterimages their whole lives, the scientists and doctors in attendance wouldn’t be fooled. If we are to keep this theory, maybe we should posit some retinal phenomenon much stronger than the ones we know. Everyone thinks they know how much an illusion can fool you - “yeah, okay, obviously the cookie that looks very slightly bigger will actually be the same size” - which is exactly why the really good ones, like the Checker Shadow Illusion, come as such a shock. Squares A and B are the same color. Source: Checker shadow illusion. There’s no way around it: we need to hear from someone who has stared directly into the sun. August Meessen was a physics professor at a Catholic university, which sounds like exactly the job profile we want for this sort of thing. He found himself sufficiently interested in the Fatima miracle to stare straight into the sun for a few minutes and record what happened. From his paper: In November 2002, I looked directly into the sun, at about 4 p.m. The sun was relatively low above the horizon and its light intensity was attenuated, although the sky was clear. I was able to look right into the sun and was amazed to see that the sun was immediately converted into a grey disc, surrounded by a brilliant ring. The grey disc was practically uniform, while the surrounding ring was somewhat irregular and flamboyant, but did not extend beyond the solar disk. It coincided with its rim. I stopped the experiment, since I wanted to be prudent, but I had experienced myself the initial phase of a typical “miracle of the sun” and I could explain it. The sun became grey, since my eyes immediately responded to its great luminosity by an automatic reduction of their sensitivity. This adaptation is not simply due to the bleaching of pigments in the colour-sensitive cones of the fovea, where the image of the sun is projected, but to secondary processes. By “initial phase”, he means the part where the sun looks pale and well-defined, like a full moon. This isn’t something I think needs explanation (see above), but he sure has explained it. Moving on: In a second experiment, realized at 3 p.m. in December 2002, I looked straight at the sun during a much longer time. After some minutes, I saw impressive colours, up to 2 or 3 times the diameter of the sun. They changed, but were mainly pink, deep blue, red and green. Further away, the sky became progressively more luminous. I stopped there, since I understood that these colours resulted from the fact that the red, green and blue sensitive pigments are bleached and regenerated at different rates. This is frustratingly vague. Are the “impressive colors up to 2-3 times the diameter of the sun” just the normal aftereffects of staring at a bright object? Or something surprising even to physics professors? And the spinning? What about the motions of the sun? I didn’t see them, because I didn’t look at the sun for a sufficiently long time or my brain knew already too much. Once, after I had been looking at a very long passing train, I had (for about 30 seconds) the illusion of an opposite motion. Joseph Plateau discovered that when we look at the centre of a spiral that is rotating at some given velocity about this point, and when we stop this rotation, we see a reversed rotation. It lasts for several minutes, although in reality, there is no motion at all. This is a good example of motional after-effects. The “dance of the sun” is initiated, however, by a spontaneous generation of apparent motion. This feels suspiciously like a just-so story. His explanation for the sun falling to earth to crush everyone - which he also did not see - is equally ad hoc: A very interesting study was recently devoted to this “zoom and loom effect”. It tends to appear when the brain is confronted with the two-dimensional retinal image of an object that is situated at some unknown distance. The brain will then consider the possibility that it could come closer, by performing an illusory mental zoom, where the apparent size of the object is progressively increased. This results from the fact that evolution preserved the tendency to take into account the possibility of a dangerous approach: a rapid evasive action could be beneficial for survival. If true, it sounds like you should be able to generate this effect not just by staring at the sun (ill-advised, causes blindness), but by staring at the moon. I would like to test this, but unfortunately I am writing this on the night of a new moon; I’ll check back in two weeks. Still, I am skeptical that no human being living before 1917 AD ever figured out that staring at a celestial body long enough would make it appear to fall to earth and crush you. Compare to much gentler illusions - like how the moon looks bigger right when it starts to rise - which everybody knows about. I was able to find a thirdhand report (Fr. Stanley Jaki → G. J. Strangfeld → consultation with bishop) of another sun miracle investigator, one “Professor Dr. Stöckl” in Germany, who made a similar experiment: After almost a minute (the time varies according to the condition of the atmopshere and the momentary condition of the eyes) one thinks to see a dark blue disk in front of the sun (this is already a sign of the highly excited state of the retina). According to my experience … this dark blue disk is somewhat smaller than the solar disk, so that the edge of that disk stands out as a ring beyond that dark blue disk. Then one has right away the impression that the solar disk rotates with great speed in one or the other direction. This I have experienced often enough. All this is a subjective appearance that has nothing to do with the external world. These reports are suggestive, but weaker than all but the barest Fatima testimonials. Dr. Messeen admits as much, saying that “I didn’t look at the sun for a sufficiently long time”. Can we find people even more committed - or reckless, or masochistic - than Professors Messeen and Stöckl? Absolutely yes: there was a whole subfield of late 18th / early 19th century psychophysicists who experimented with staring at the sun for long periods, many of whom went blind. Joseph Plateau (1801 - 1883, went blind in 18432) summarizes their work in his aptly-named On The Contemplation Of Bright Objects. He lists twenty-six scientists who tried staring at the sun for a really long time. Most describe what we now recognize as typical retinal afterimages, and Plateau spends most of his time talking about how long these last and what colors they pass through. The only one of Plateau’s sources who reports anything even slightly interesting to us is Robert Darwin (father of Charles; cf. Secrets of the Great Families). After stating that: The author has frequently observed that when he gazed at the midday sun for a long time, until its disk appeared pale blue, he saw a bright blue specter on other objects for more than two days. …he mentions how When looking at the meridian sun as long as the eyes can well bear its brightness, the disc first becomes pale, with a luminous crescent, which seems to librate from one edge of it to the other owing to the unsteadiness of the eye. Here is pallor, and at least a hint of motion. But it’s pretty different from spinning, and not really clear how it relates to the sun miracle. Gustav Fechner (1801 - 1887, went blind in 1839) may have stared for even longer; you can read more of his story - including his ensuing insanity and subsequent attempts to found a new religion - on Adam Mastroianni’s blog. But all that he records about his ill-fated experiment is that: …after looking at the sun through homogeneously colored lenses, if you close your eyes, the primary impression remains for a long time and the entire afterimage usually disappears without a complementary coloration having clearly emerged. These people are great, and they all sound like minor Sam Kriss characters. But after whole careers dedicated to staring at the sun much longer than any normal person would ever try, they report only the barest hints of odd phenomena. Indeed, if anything they saw less of interest to the Fatimologist than Profs. Messeen and Stöckl. Worse, all of these authorities saw their phenomena after seconds to minutes of deliberate staring. Surely if it had taken a minute of staring at the sun before anything happened, some of our eyewitnesses would have mentioned this; after all, several mention that they were starting to doubt after the child-seers’ deadline had passed a few minutes earlier. But by all accounts, the miracle was near-instantaneous. Although Messeen and Stöckl’s reports of miracle-like phenomena are intriguing, it doesn’t seem like they can be the whole picture. Let’s move on. 2.2: Aurora Borealis? At This Time Of Year? In This Part Of The Country? Localized Entirely Within Your Kitchen? Could the miracle at Fatima have been some kind of weird weather phenomenon? The main argument against is that if it were a common weather phenomenon, it would not have awed and terrified tens of thousands of people. But if it were a rare weather phenomenon, then the seers’ successful prophecy that the rare weather phenomenon would happen at solar noon on October 13 1917 becomes almost as impressive as an outright miracle. The argument in favor is that dozens of people have written books and papers about this possibility, we would feel remiss if we didn’t mention them, and anyway it gives us the opportunity to look at pretty pictures of interesting weather phenomena. This is a sun dog. It’s caused by ice crystals in the upper atmosphere that refract sunlight in a very specific way. It’s very cool, but aside from a resemblance to a wheel, it looks nothing like the miracle of Fatima. A sun dog doesn’t have any unusual colors, it doesn’t change size, and it doesn’t spin (I’ve embedded a YouTube video not because a still image would be misleading - it wouldn’t be - but just in case you want to see for yourself how completely motionless it is). It’s just a halo shape with two smaller illusory suns on either side of the real one - something which no one at Fatima reported. (source) This is a solar corona3; cloud iridescence is a related phenomenon. I don’t know how much work the exposure length is doing in this particular photo, but I’m guessing more than zero. Coronae are also very pretty, and might explain the description of wheels and colors. They seem surprisingly common for something that I can’t ever remember seeing, supposedly happening several times a year in most locations. But they don’t spin, the colors don’t change or stain the surrounding landscape, and they don’t fall to earth and crush people. Let’s keep this one as a backup option and move on. This is a dust storm. Steuart Campbell wrote a paper arguing that the miracle was caused by one of these, and I admit if I saw this I would start praying pretty hard. Dust storms can change the color of the sun (including unusual colors like green or blue). And very, very charitably, whirling dust could look like the sun itself spinning around, and the thickening and thinning of dust could look like the sun approaching or receding. But this would require a dust storm localized to a 20 mile region of Portugal which does not, technically, have any dust (and where it was, technically, raining at the time). Campbell proposes that perhaps a storm blew a 20 miles x 20 mile dust cloud from the Sahara out to the Atlantic, then onto Fatima for ten minutes during a break in the rain, then back to the Atlantic again. But I don’t think any dust storm has ever behaved in quite this way. If it did, it probably wouldn’t be at the exact moment predicted by child-seers months in advance. At this point, we might as well talk about literal meteors. The way I’m imagining it is this: as a meteor approaches Earth, it breaks up into three big parts and a host of smaller particles. They strike the atmosphere head-on, from the approximate direction of the sun. The small particles hit first and make a firework show. Then the three big pieces hit, producing multicolored fireballs (meteors can absolutely stain the sky bright colors - see the video). Finally, they burn out a few miles above the ground, , convincingly producing the appearance of the sun falling to earth and nearly striking the spectators. This could even explain the warmth and dry clothes - a local meteor strike produces a lot of heat! I like this because it’s the only one that takes seriously the facet of the event which most impressed the witnesses - the part where it looked like the sun was plummeting to earth and about to kill them. But against it: would a rain of micrometeorites really look like the sun was “dancing”, “spinning”, or “zig-zagging”? Aren’t most nearby meteor strikes very loud? (the Fatima event was, according to witnesses, silent) Don’t they usually break windows? Aren’t most meteor strikes of this size visible for hundreds of miles, not just the twenty miles from which we have witness testimonies? Wouldn’t the strike have to be remarkably head-on, and remarkable close to the position of the sun, in order to look like a solar phenomenon rather than a long streak? Aren’t most meteor fireballs visible for between a few seconds and a minute, not the ten minutes of the Fatima event4? And if there were some extremely unusual meteor strike that was the exception to everything, wouldn’t it still be pretty surprising for it to happen at the exact time and place predicted by child-seers months in advance? We come to the unpromisingly-titled Derivation of equations of the model of the dynamic behavior of the three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces, in which Artur Wiroski argues that Fatima was a three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces. Actually, he offhandedly mentions Fatima in three sentences, with the majority of the paper looking more like the image above - but he eventually makes it into a Guardian article where he emphasizes that yes, he is trying to explain the miracle of the sun. However, if I’m understanding him correctly, he says that his theoretical ice crystal phenomenon can only happen when the sun is at an altitude below 22 degrees. But during the Fatima miracle, the sun was at 42 degrees (and Dalleur’s mysterious light source was at 30 degrees), so none of this applies. I’ve tried to include pictures of all the phenomena I mention in this section. I failed for this one, because it’s never been spotted or photographed. It’s just some incredibly weird thing that one scientist says ice crystals might do if parameters were ever exactly right, with such a precise definition of “exactly right” that it’s never happened in real life. If it ever did happen, it probably wouldn’t be at exactly the moment predicted by child-seers several months in advance. 2.3: Everyone’s Mad Here Except You And Me Another common response calls the Sun Miracle a “mass hallucination”. Can 70,000 people really hallucinate the same thing? “Mass hallucination” on Wikipedia redirects to List Of Mass Panic Cases. The Miracle of the Sun is on there, but listed as “(disputed)” - the only item to earn such a parenthetical. The other fifty items mostly belong to three categories: A disease with unusual symptoms spreads through a population; doctors eventually pronounce it psychosomatic.
We come to the unpromisingly-titled Derivation of equations of the model of the dynamic behavior of the three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces, in which Artur Wiroski argues that Fatima was a three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces. Actually, he offhandedly mentions Fatima in three sentences, with the majority of the paper looking more like the image above - but he eventually makes it into a Guardian article where he emphasizes that yes, he is trying to explain the miracle of the sun. However, if I’m understanding him correctly, he says that his theoretical ice crystal phenomenon can only happen when the sun is at an altitude below 22 degrees. But during the Fatima miracle, the sun was at 42 degrees (and Dalleur’s mysterious light source was at 30 degrees), so none of this applies. I’ve tried to include pictures of all the phenomena I mention in this section. I failed for this one, because it’s never been spotted or photographed. It’s just some incredibly weird thing that one scientist says ice crystals might do if parameters were ever exactly right, with such a precise definition of “exactly right” that it’s never happened in real life. If it ever did happen, it probably wouldn’t be at exactly the moment predicted by child-seers several months in advance. 2.3: Everyone’s Mad Here Except You And Me Another common response calls the Sun Miracle a “mass hallucination”. Can 70,000 people really hallucinate the same thing? “Mass hallucination” on Wikipedia redirects to List Of Mass Panic Cases. The Miracle of the Sun is on there, but listed as “(disputed)” - the only item to earn such a parenthetical. The other fifty items mostly belong to three categories: A disease with unusual symptoms spreads through a population; doctors eventually pronounce it psychosomatic.
LinkedIn

LinkedIn is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 3 times across 3 issues between February 03, 2022 and October 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://www.linkedin.com/in/guptaro"; "and on LinkedIn"; "here’s their LinkedIn page". It most often appears alongside ACX, Bitcoin, Elon Musk.

Article page
LinkedIn
Mention count
3
Issue count
3
First seen
February 03, 2022
Last seen
October 22, 2025
February 03, 2022 · Original source
#18: Philanthropic Messaging Strategies Using Evolutionary Ideas I’m Ro Gupta. Inspired initially by https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/what-is-the-greatest-good/395768/, I’d like to commission research that explores if and how Kin Selection and Hamilton’s Rule [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kin_selection#Hamilton%27s_rule] can be applied in mass communications for altruistic giving of humans in modern times. The goal is to uncover alternative messaging strategies that help subjects transcend blood-thicker-than-water hardwiring, based on underlying evolutionary biology theory – e.g. kin recognition, kin altruism – that ultimately serves to increase wealthy countries’ proportion of altruistic giving to less genetically familiar yet higher need/ impact populations, e.g. those of the Global South. [Estimates suggest around 5% of US giving currently goes to international causes.] I believe I have the right combination of academic, professional, NGO and global experience [https://www.linkedin.com/in/guptaro] to lead this, and access to a high quality network of research and communications experts to match grants to. I estimate a robust synthesis of existing work could be done for the low tens of thousands of USD, while a primary research phase one could be substantively scoped for the high tens to one hundred thousand USD. If of interest to be a part of this as a researcher, funder or general thought partner, please get in touch: http://www.rocrastination.com/contact/.
September 15, 2023 · Original source
Safe Enough, reviewed by Seth Miller. Seth is a chemist who consults on emerging technologies around energy storage, carbon capture, and other climate solutions. He periodically blogs on the intersection of science, technology, and business at perspicacity.xyz and perspicacity.substack.com, and on LinkedIn.
October 22, 2025 · Original source
Revelation 9:16: “And the number of the army of the horsemen were two hundred thousand thousand: and I heard the number of them.” These are all the same Greek word, ἀριθμός. None of them mean a secret mysterious number that symbolizes their identity. They all mean something like “headcount”. So to be consistent, you would translate Revelation 13:18 as: Let him that hath understanding take the headcount of the Beast: for it is the headcount of a man; and his headcount is 666. This is looking good for our hypothesis that the Beast is an AI company. There’s only one remaining hurdle. The second clause specifically says that we’re talking about the number/headcount “of a man” rather than of a company. Can we square this circle? Not all translations say “the number of a man”. Some say “the number of humanity”, or “the number of mankind”. The exact phrase is “ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου”, and the word at issue meaning man/humanity/mankind is the last one, “ἀνθρώπου”. In our alphabet, this word is anthropou. It is the genitive form of the stem anthrop-, meaning man/humanity, and predictably means “of man/humanity”. This word has come into English pretty much wholly intact, with the Greek genitive ending (-ου) simply changed to the corresponding English ending (-ic). It is our word “anthropic”, meaning “of man/humanity”. Why would you use any other word in a translation? Thus: Let him that hath understanding take the headcount of the Beast: for it is the headcount of Anthropic; and its headcount is 666. What is the headcount of Anthropic? I can’t find a precise answer, but here’s their LinkedIn page: Seems concerning. Anthropic might seem like an unlikely candidate for the Beast, given its emphasis on ethical conduct and safe AI research. However, they do perform various experiments on turning AIs evil - always in the context of examining these scenarios and figuring out how best to prepare - and one can imagine ways this could go wrong. We’ll examine likely failure modes in more detail later. The Mark Of The Beast John continues (13:17): And [the Beast] causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their foreheads. And that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark. In the context of AI, this resembles the idea of biometric proof of personhood. Suppose that future AI agents have access to bank accounts and can transact like humans. Some platforms may choose to let AIs access their services unrestricted; others may choose to limit use to humans. How would these work in a world where AIs can break CAPTCHAs? One plan is to assign each human a code based on some immutable feature of their body, like a fingerprint or eye scan, then let the humans use that code as an ironclad ID. The most famous plan along these lines is Sam Altman’s WorldCoin. The Mark of the Beast cannot be WorldCoin itself, because WorldCoin uses an iris scan, but the Mark uses the hand or forehead. Handprints are a common biometric recognition target, but foreheads? Yes! Just last year, researchers found that forehead creases were actually a cutting-edge biometric target, and suggested them as a superior alternative to fingerprints (contactless) and facial recognition (blocked by masks during a pandemic). This section suggests that Anthropic will come up with its own proof-of-personhood scheme, superior to OpenAI’s WorldCoin in that it uses the newer forehead-based biometric recognition (with the more commonly-used handprint as a backup). We’ll discuss more about why you might not want to be in their database later. The Woman Of The Apocalypse Revelation 12:1 introduces an unnamed figure commonly called the Woman of the Apocalypse: And there appeared a great wonder in heaven; a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars. The woman gives birth to a son, who is implied to be the Messiah. Satan tries to kill the son, so the mother flees with her child to Heaven, where she waits for 1,260 days. This is obviously a reference to the Virgin Mary and Christ, but (as per the multilayered symbolism of Revelation) somehow also a reference to some specific person in the End Times. I originally couldn’t figure out who that person was, but a now-deactivated Tumblr poster, resinsculpture, convinced me that it was Ursula von der Leyen, current president of the European Union. Here is a typical official picture of von der Leyen. She is in her trademark yellow suit (“clothed with the sun”), standing with her head centered in the twelve stars of the EU flag (“upon her head a crown of twelve stars”). In what sense is “the moon under her feet”? In her role as President, von der Leyen stands above, and frequently addresses, the European Parliament, which looks like this: The Parliament, also known as the Hemicycle, takes the shape of a half (or slightly crescent) moon. When von der Leyen stands in her yellow suit, in front of the Parliament, with the flag behind her, she is “clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars”.2 Von der Leyen is one of the leaders behind the EU’s push to become a “regulatory superpower”, which has born fruit in some surprisingly promising AI regulations. In particular, Europe has been especially strict on biometric proof-of-personhood: If the apocalypse involves a rogue Anthropic model somehow empowered by proof-of-personhood, Europe is one of the best candidates to resist. Von der Leyen, then, stands as a metonymy for the European Union as a bulwark for the forces of Good. The Witnesses / The Lamb Of God The Lamb is John’s version of the Messiah or the Second Coming. He gives us two clues about its identity. First, Revelation 11:3: And I will appoint my two witnesses, and they will prophesy for 1,260 days, clothed in sackcloth. The Lamb will be preceded by two witnesses. Revelation itself does not name them, but Jewish tradition says that one will be the prophet Elijah. Second, 12:1: And I looked, and, lo, a Lamb stood on Mount Zion, and with him a hundred forty and four thousand, having his Father’s name written in their foreheads. The Lamb will stand on Mount Zion. This is a specific mountain in Jerusalem, but also a poetic name for Israel (for example, “Zionism” = support for Israel). So we are looking for someone or something in Israel, which is being heralded by Elijah. The name Elijah is different in different languages, but the Russian version is “Ilya”. And in fact, famous AI scientist Ilya Sutskever recently founded an Israel-based AI company called “Safe Superintelligence”: Is there some sense in which Ilya Sutskever has “his Father’s name written on [his] forehead”? As weird as it sounds, I think this one might just be literally true. There is some kind of unusual pattern on his forehead (image source). I cannot make heads or tails of it right-side-up, but when I flip it over… …it appears to be the Name of God in Hebrew. In our working hypothesis, Ilya is Elijah, the First Witness3, which suggests that the one he is heralding - that is, the Safe Superintelligence which is to be built by his company - is the Lamb of God, the Messiah that will defeat the unsafe superintelligences produced by Anthropic and other companies. The Antichrist / The Dragon Revelation doesn’t use the word “Antichrist” - the concept comes from from the separate Epistles of John, which may or may not be by the same author. Most scholars identify the Epistle’s Antichrist with Revelation’s Beast, but I dissent: we hypothesize the Beast to be a company, but I can’t get past the elegance of having the Antichrist be - like the Christ - a particular individual. I prefer to identify him with a different character in Revelation, namely the Dragon. On the level of Biblical narrative - the same level where the Woman is the Virgin Mary - the Dragon is clearly Satan. On the level of apocalyptic prophecy, he may additionally represent an individual from our own age. Who? John says (13:2 - 13:4) The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority . . . People worshiped the dragon, because he had given authority to the beast. We saw above that the Beast is a company. Who gives companies their power, then demands to be worshiped by them? Obviously VCs. And in fact, venture capitalists are often identified with dragons in the popular imagination: But which venture capitalist? Plenty of people have claimed to know secret ways to identify the Antichrist, but surely the best-credentialled expert here is the Pope, and according to Wikipedia: Pope Pius IX in the encyclical Quartus Supra, quoting Cyprian, said Satan disguises the Antichrist with the title of Christ. What is the title of Christ? In the Bible, we find two common titles: “The Son of Man” (Matthew 12:32, Luke 12:8, John 1:51)
Learn Phrygian In Zero Days

Learn Phrygian In Zero Days is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 2 times across 2 issues between January 05, 2026 and January 09, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "New subscriber-only post, Learn Phrygian In Zero Days, about toddlers’ linguistic quirks"; "see subscribers-only post, Learn Phrygian In Zero Days". It most often appears alongside Jeff Bezos, AGI, AI.

Mention count
2
Issue count
2
First seen
January 05, 2026
Last seen
January 09, 2026
January 05, 2026 · Original source
1: New subscriber-only post, Learn Phrygian In Zero Days, about toddlers’ linguistic quirks.
January 09, 2026 · Original source
(for more child-related content, see subscribers-only post, Learn Phrygian In Zero Days)
L - P reviews

L - P reviews is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 20, 2024 and May 20, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "I’ve corrected the link to the L - P reviews". It most often appears alongside Astralcodexten Com, Austin, Bangalore.

Reference entry
L - P reviews
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 20, 2024
Last seen
May 20, 2024
May 20, 2024 · Original source
2: Thanks to everyone who’s rated the book reviews. If you missed Friday’s post and feel up to rating book reviews, take a look. I’ve corrected the link to the L - P reviews, and the link to Taymon’s random-review-picker.
La Nature

La Nature is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 20, 2022 and May 20, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "their French (e.g. La Nature ) counterparts". It most often appears alongside Aldous Huxley, Alexander Macmillan, Alfred Russel Wallace.

Reference entry
La Nature
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 20, 2022
Last seen
May 20, 2022
May 20, 2022 · Original source
Thomas Huxley. Also known for establishing a network of other famous Huxleys, such as his grandson Aldous, the author of Brave New World. Victorian Britain’s most beloved scientist — yes, I’m talking about Darwin again — also enjoyed publishing in Nature. Darwin was an elderly and highly respected scientist by the time of the journal’s founding, and the abstracts and letters he frequently sent to Lockyer’s publication certainly gave it a status boost. And this was only the start of a long list of household names who got involved with Nature at one point or another. In physics, for instance, Lord Kelvin, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Lise Meitner were all important contributors. Some of the most famous papers in the field, such as James Chadwick’s 1932 report on the possible existence of the neutron, or Meitner and Otto Frisch’s 1939 letter proposing the idea of nuclear fission, were published in Nature. In biology, James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 work on the structure of DNA is probably the most historic paper to have appeared within its pages. Since Nature in the mid-20th century was popular but still not very prestigious, I’m comfortable assuming that these famous scientists and discoveries helped its reputation rather than the other way around. Today, the arrow of causation is mostly reversed: scientists become influential because they publish research in the most prestigious journal, rather than the journal becoming prestigious because it publishes big names and big papers. Of course, this is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that keeps benefiting Nature, thanks to network effects. Finally, a word about language. Nature, obviously, is published in English. But English wasn’t the dominant intellectual language back in the 19th century: French and German were more important. The rise of English as the lingua franca of science occurred during the 20th century, thanks to the political dominance of the British Empire and then the United States. As a result, Nature and its American equivalent Science gained a major advantage over their French (e.g. La Nature) and German (e.g. Naturwissenschaften) counterparts. Making Nature doesn’t belabor this self-evident point, but it’s worth mentioning that Nature benefitted from a global network effect that would have been far less attainable outside the Anglosphere. Survival and Conservatism Speed, elite networks, and English are great, but they won’t help if your publication fails to turn a profit and shuts down. As they say, the lesson of survivorship bias is that you should optimize for being a survivor. Thus the story of Nature is also the story of how it managed to stay alive, unlike most of its contemporaries. Nature was (and still is!) a venture of a London publisher called Macmillan and Company. It was very much intended to make money. But Victorian Britain was a crowded market for periodicals. It was common for publications to last just a few years after proving unable to attract enough subscribers. Lockyer himself had been briefly involved as the co-founder and science editor of a generalist magazine called The Reader, which existed only from 1863 to 1867 (and lost its science section in 1865). It would be tempting to contrast this with the popular success of Nature, but as we saw, most of Nature’s target audience couldn’t even understand the journal, and as a result both its subscriber base and revenue remained small. The survival of Nature therefore depended on the goodwill of its owner, Alexander Macmillan. And it took a lot of goodwill! Nature operated at a loss for an entire 30 years. Only at the very end of the 19th century did it manage to turn a profit. This surprising tolerance for financial loss seems to have stemmed from the other activities of Macmillan and Company: they sold scientific books, and Nature was a good way to reach that market. Still, without a wealthy publisher who was committed to back up Lockyer’s project for a long time, it would likely not have survived. Lockyer also displayed impressive commitment. He remained at the helm of the journal for a full half-century, from 1869 to 1919. Although none of his successors would hold the position that long, most would last at least twenty years, resulting in a strikingly short list of eight editors-in-chief over a 153-year history. Meanwhile, the journal was never sold: Macmillan and Company still exists and still owns Nature, even though corporate mergers have made the exact ownership structure difficult to figure out. (Springer Nature, a company created in 2015 by merging some divisions of Macmillan and other entities, is the immediate parent company of Nature.) The picture that emerges is that of a stable, conservative institution, with committed owners and editors, that has changed slowly even as it was a witness to the changes in science itself. This is nicely reflected in the stability of Nature’s mission and visual identity. The original mission statement was left unchanged from 1869 to 2000, including gendered references to “Scientific men” and “men eminent in Science.” The current version is shorter and gender-neutral, but overall similar, although I note that the ordering of the two main aims has been reversed: First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their significance for knowledge, culture and daily life. Similarly, the original masthead image, which dates from the very first issue, appeared at the top of the journal for 89 years, until 1958 (with slight variations). A central point of Making Nature is that Nature co-evolved with the British and international institutions of science. To do so, it had to strike a balance between conservatism and innovation. My impression is that Nature was more often on the conservative end of the spectrum, serving as a rock-solid stage where the rest of science could take place. Such an attitude was helpful from the beginning, but it probably became even more important after the 1970s, when everything changed. III. WTF Happened in the 1970s? A fun puzzle from the social sciences: what happened in the early seventies? As evidenced from a multitude of charts, various patterns in society seem to have veered off course around 1971, including growth in wages, inflation, housing costs, energy consumption, number of lawyers, divorce rates, fertility rates, and meat consumption. Whether it was a coincidence or part of the same mysterious phenomenon, we can add to this list the rise of prestige in the science publishing industry. To be clear, I’m the one who claims that this shift was a specific and momentous event. Melinda Baldwin acknowledges many times that Nature went from a low-grade magazine to a prestigious journal, but she remains vague as to what, exactly, was the turning point. In the chapter on the 1970s, she treats the increased selectivity and reputation as just one of many things that happened during this period. It was only in the course of writing this review — with a deliberate focus on prestige — that I realized something significant had occurred in that decade, and that this something affected more than just Nature. Let’s see what the book does tell us, and then I’ll offer a plausible explanation from elsewhere. Changes to Nature in the 1970s The 1970s mostly coincide with the leadership of Nature’s shortest-tenured editor, David Davies. Davies took over from John Maddox in 1973 and proceeded to make a number of changes. He made Nature a unitary publication again, after a short-lived experiment to split it into three journals. He reformed the style guide for contributors. He allowed for cartoons and some humor in his editorials. He also overhauled the journal’s physical appearance: from now on, Nature’s covers would feature interesting images as opposed to articles or advertisements. Today’s covers are still in that tradition. Here’s the Nature cover from 2016, as used on the Wikipedia page of the journal. Nature under Maddox and Davies followed the same trend of internationalization as in the previous decades, but the seventies saw what was perhaps the fastest growth outside the UK. Consider these approximate statistics on the origin of research articles from the years when there was a change in editorship: 1966 (when Maddox became editor): 40% British and 60% international
Land and Liberty: Henry George, The Single Tax Movement, and the Origins of 20th Century Liberalism

Land and Liberty: Henry George, The Single Tax Movement, and the Origins of 20th Century Liberalism is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 11, 2021 and December 11, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Land and Liberty: Henry George, The Single Tax Movement, and the Origins of 20th Century Liberalism (a PhD thesis by Chris England)". It most often appears alongside /r/georgism, ACX community, Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 11, 2021
Last seen
December 11, 2021
December 11, 2021 · Original source
Land and Liberty: Henry George, The Single Tax Movement, and the Origins of 20th Century Liberalism (a PhD thesis by Chris England that is maybe the best comprehensive histories of the movement)
Land is Underrated as a Source of Wealth

Land is Underrated as a Source of Wealth is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 09, 2021 and December 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Noah Smith, on the other hand, claims that Land is Underrated as a Source of Wealth". It most often appears alongside 2017 PTAPP survey, AEI, agglomeration effect.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 09, 2021
Last seen
December 09, 2021
December 09, 2021 · Original source
Krugman and other skeptics don't believe you can raise enough with LVT alone to fund a modern state. Noah Smith, on the other hand, claims that Land is Underrated as a Source of Wealth. Regardless of who's right, LVT doesn't need to replace all other taxes to still be worth doing, as long as it can raise a significant enough chunk. So how much can it raise? Let's do the math and find out.
Land Value Appraisal Using Statistical Methods

Land Value Appraisal Using Statistical Methods is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 11, 2021 and December 11, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "The first on my list is Land Value Appraisal Using Statistical Methods by Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2019)". It most often appears alongside /r/georgism, ACX community, Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 11, 2021
Last seen
December 11, 2021
December 11, 2021 · Original source
Gwartney says that when he was the assessment commissioner and chief executive officer in British Columbia, he had a staff of 690, and that this number has not changed significantly since then. British Columbia has a population of about 5 million, so that's 1 assessment officer for every 7,250 British Columbians. For context, the IRS has a staff size of 74,454, or about one IRS agent for every 4,425 Americans. I don't have data on how many property tax assessors the USA has in total, but the above slide suggests British Columbia's figure is on the high end. As for how you actually do assessments, sure, you can send out an army of assessors to value each and every property in your jurisdiction by hand. However, not only is that labor-intensive, it's also a recipe for inconsistency. Whatever method you're using to value properties needs to be consistent and standardized across all properties, so you don't have sharp discontinuities on the assessment map that are due solely to differences between Assessor Fred and Assessor Sally's personal methodologies. Thankfully, we're living in the modern age, and we have some fancy new tools at our disposal. 4. Modern Technology Georgists were doing split-rate assessments to allegedly good success long before the rise of the computer, such as J. J. Pastoriza's effort in setting up a Georgist tax regime in Houston, Texas in 1911. Today, we have spreadsheets, property value databases, GIS mapping visualizations, regression analysis, machine learning...the works. According to Gwartney, the Canadian province of British Columbia has revalued all its land and all its property on an annual basis simply by using computers and market analysis, ever since he first helped them set up their system back in 1975. Not every jurisdiction revalues their land this thoroughly and this often, but Gwartney says there is no significant technical or staffing barrier standing in the way. Gwartney has been retired for some time, so his seminar didn't cover all the latest cutting-edge techniques that have come out in the last few years. Let's look at some recent papers and see what new tools assessors have to play with. The first on my list is Land Value Appraisal Using Statistical Methods by Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2019). This is a study on mass appraisal techniques using real estate transaction data from Berlin, Germany. It claims that not only are the results cheaper and faster to generate than those done by conventional property assessment methods, but they are also no less accurate than those done "by hand" by experts. Kolbe et al. assert that, provided you have access to high quality market transaction data, you can perform accurate and efficient mass appraisals of land values. They chose Berlin because it "has a very effective system of property transaction data collection and storage," in contrast to other parts of Germany. They cite some prior work by Almy (2014) studying Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, suggesting that the assessment cost per property can be brought down to 20 Euros–25 times cheaper than what some other people (Fuest, et al. (2018)) assert. Given an average tax receipt of 2,000 Euros per property, this means that the assessment cost should represent only about 1% of the funds raised. Is that good? Let's take this assertion at face value for the moment and compare it to the cost of the IRS. Federal tax receipts in 2020 were $3.42 trillion, and operation costs for the IRS were $12.3 billion, or 0.36%. However, the IRS outsources most of the labor of tax preparation to the taxpayers themselves, with compliance costs estimated between $200 billion and $400 billion a year, to the delight of Intuit. Add that up and the total cost of federal tax collection to the economy is anywhere between 6-12% of the amount it raises. And what about sales tax? According to a 2006 report by PriceWaterHouseCoopers: The study finds that the national average annual state and local retail sales tax compliance cost in 2003 was 3.09 percent of sales tax collected for all retailers, 13.47 percent for small retailers, 5.20 percent for medium retailers, and 2.17 percent for large retailers So a compliance cost of 1% would be way more efficient in terms of cost collection than the other two most common forms of taxation, and taxpayers don't even have to do anything themselves, other than pay the bill. Alrighty, how about the accuracy? The authors cite two international examples, Australia and Lithuania, as among the few countries in the world that have both a Land Value Tax and statistical methods for mass appraisals. Hefferan and Boyd (2010) assert that objections to assessments from property owners in Australia are less than 1%. I'm willing to buy the improved efficiency claims just by taking a look at some methodologies. It seems reasonable that computerized records and algorithms can cut costs significantly; the real question is if you're trading off accuracy. The other papers I found on the subject are Bencure, et al (2019) in BayBay City, Philippines, Kilić, et al (2019) in Croatia, Yalpir & Unel (2017) in Konya, Turkey, and Raslanas et al. (2014) in Vilnius, Lithuania. Let's dive in and examine some methods. 5. Mass Appraisal Methods Here are some of the latest mass appraisal methods cribbed from the research papers listed above. All of these are based on taking market transaction data, plotting them out on a map, and running computations over them to estimate valuations for the properties you don't have known values for. Furthermore, all of these methods are able to value land and building values separately. Multiple Regression Analysis This paper by Yalpir and Unel out of Turkey gives a straightforward example of using Multiple Regression Analysis for land valuation. For those of you who didn't study math, let me explain regression analysis. This is a family of mathematical models where you basically take a data set, ask the question "what mathematical formula would best fit this data," choose a basic equation model, and then have a computer search for a set of coefficients that "best fit" that curve to the data with the least amount of error. The simplest example is using linear regression on a scatterplot of observed data points to fit a trend line. This is a common exercise in freshman physics and statistics classes. You can use more complicated versions of this numerical method to take a big bag of observations (real estate sales) and use "multiple regression" to tease out dependent variables (land value and improvements value) based on the independent variables (size, location, age, number of bedrooms) of your observations. In this case the team identified about a hundred different factors that can affect the price of a property: Then you create an entry for each property, fill in the values for each of those characteristics, and run it through the regressor. Take note of how many of these factors start with the words "proximity to." Each of these can be calculated automatically just by knowing where the property is on a map, and each of them is an independent contributor to the value of the property's location. The next step is to generate individual "index maps" that combine various related features into combined heat maps. Then you run everything through and see if it works. You can get the land share of the final value by combining the contributions of all the individual factors that you associate with "land," such as proximity to important things. In the verification section the authors say: As a result of the analysis, since the significance level (0.000) p <.05, corresponding to the F values in the ANOVA test, indicates that the regression analysis is appropriate and the models are significant. The criteria that make up the model account for about 85% of the market value and 15% cannot be explained for reasons such as economic, non-existent data and unearned income. Unfortunately, they don't say anything about how accurate their model is for assessing land values specifically. Otherwise, this is a pretty good example of using the Multiple Regression method for estimating the individual contributions of various factors to overall property values. Gwartney says Multiple Regression Analysis was a standard method he typically used, of which this specific paper is just one example. Nonparametric kernel regression This will be a method familiar to the programmers in the audience who have any experience with image processing algorithms. Here's an example from this old Gamasutra article: The basic idea here is to take a matrix of numbers, called a "kernel", and run that over every pixel in a source image. The kernel tells you how strongly to weight all of the source pixel's neighbors to compute a final result for that position. A simple "box blur" is a kernel where every value is 1 (meaning it averages the values of all neighboring pixels within a range). The more subtle gaussian blur illustrated above uses a two-dimensional normal distribution of values so that each pixel is most affected by those nearest to it. So let's apply the same principle to land valuations. If you have a map with lots of transaction data of pure land sales–defined as sales of either vacant land or teardown properties (where the building value is essentially zero)–then you can use a special kernel filter to smoothly interpolate land values across the region. So you basically have a smooth curve that mostly favors close-by points, tapers off a bit, and then disregards anything outside a certain distance entirely. The big assumption here is that land values change smoothly and do not change suddenly across very short distances. There are, in fact, locations with sharp jumps in value (any town with an "other side of the tracks," for instance). But for cases where we know a priori that land values change smoothly, this method is appropriate. No other prior restriction is placed on the form of the land value map, however, and this is why it's called "nonparametric." Here's an illustration. The outer box is the entire search distance that the kernel considers, and the circles represent the falloff of the curve itself. The size of the box is called the "bandwidth" and is set by the user. Everything outside of it will have zero influence on the kernel's output at any given location. This method operates on the same basic logic that I used when I hand-estimated the land value of that San Francisco house in Part I based on the value of the empty lot next door. However, it makes the whole procedure systematic. It can easily and accurately estimate the land value of a property with a big fat building on it simply by smoothly interpolating the known values of the nearby parking lots. Of course, it has limitations. First and foremost, it's a highly local operation, so if you have properties you're trying to value that don't have nearby pure land sales data, you can't really do much with this. Also, most people assume that city centers have less market transactions for undeveloped land than the countryside, as did I until I read that paper by Albouy in Part I. But in any case, this is just one method in your toolbox and might not be sufficient by itself. Its key advantage is that it works directly from true market data for land and doesn't need or want any other subjective data. In the end, basic kernel estimation just fills in the land value of unmeasured locations with a local weighted average of known locations. Nonparametric adaptive regression Kolbe, et al. build on the kernel regression method with a technique called Adaptive Weights Smoothing (AWS), which runs in several iterations and adds additional weight to any observed data points that are sufficiently close to the point being estimated. I'm not 100% sure about what all the math means, but it seems like it's basically a "smarter" version of the basic kernel method. Left: Nonparametric kernel regression, Right: Adaptive Weights Smoothing. I think the authors goofed and printed the same figure twice with different headings because they're identical if you overlay them in Photoshop. Semiparametric regression Now, the above two methods assume you have plenty of "pure" land sale records to work with. But if you're trying to work out prices in the city center, you've probably mostly got land and buildings mixed together. To do this effectively, we need more data, and this is where the "parameter" in "semiparametric" comes in. The model described in Kolbe et al. seems like a flavor of multiple regression analysis that takes the price, the location, and various characteristics of the building and feeds it into a regressor. But we've got "semi" parametric here. What does that mean? Well, if you already know how certain relationships between the data work a priori, it's better to enforce those relationships yourself rather than leave it to the computer. Here, we enforce the assumption that if two properties are right next to each other, then the value due to location is going to be essentially identical. This algorithm starts by ordering things geographically and then working out the differences in observed price by regressing on the difference between remaining property characteristics. In this method, the power of "location, location, location" is not something we're leaving to the regressor to discover by itself. Results of the Semiparametric regression method, we can see some significant differences from the simple kernel-based model. As you can see above, this gives you more detailed and likely more accurate results, and you're better able to assess the values of properties with buildings on them, even in the absence of pure land sales. This technique is more complicated and bakes in assumptions about the power of location, but otherwise doesn't assign subjective human weights to the various property characteristics. The chief human bias comes in the form of deciding which property characteristics are measured and made legible to the model in the first place. Okay great, but how accurate are the above three methods? Their main point of comparison is this thing called the "Bodenrichtwerte," or BRW. I think that means "ground-level-values" in English, and it's an expert-assessed map of land values for Berlin done the traditional way. The nonparametric kernel regression method has a correlation of 0.704 with the traditional method and has the added disadvantage that it's not able to produce estimates for the city center, only the outlying areas. Furthermore, the BRW map does show sharp discontinuities, which is another knock against the kernel method, at least for the city center. What about the iterative method? Kolbe et al. find that "the agreement between [Adaptive Weights Smoothing] land value estimates and, both, land prices and BRW land values is fairly good for all values of λ." Doing some quick checks, their values seem to be within about 85% of the BRW values. A different Kolbe et al. paper called Identifying Berlin's land value map using adaptive weights smoothing goes into more detail and claims to give "similar" values to that of the BRW. For the semiparametric method, they "found a strong positive correlation of 0.845" between their numbers and a previously expert-assessed set done using the traditional method. That sounds pretty good. It seems their margin for error is about plus or minus 15% compared to the traditional expert method. I'd like to see more direct comparisons against market transactions themselves, though, because if the prior expert assessments are wrong, then the main achievement here is improved efficiency, not accuracy. However, this method doesn't seem to be dramatically less accurate than the old way of doing things. The last three models came from the Berlin case study, where you have excellent market transaction data in an extremely wealthy and high-trust society. But what if you're trying to assess land in a developing nation with poor market transaction records, weak institutions, and widespread poverty? Innovative Land Valuation Model (iLVM) This is the particular name of the method described in Development of an Innovative Land Valuation Model (iLVM) for Mass Appraisal Application in Sub-Urban Areas Using AHP: An Integration of Theoretical and Practical Approaches by Bencure, Tripathi, Miyazaki, Ninsawat, and Kim. They used BayBay City, Philippines as their case study. Whereas the previous models are very "hands-off" and let the computer work out the relationships between prices and property characteristics, here you get expert human opinion directly involved in building the model, baking in weights that directly embody judgments like "properties next to major roads are more valuable." These judgments are based on expert opinions that presumably come from observed experience but are a priori judgments nonetheless. Here, look at this big complicated flowchart. The "Analytic Hierarchy Process" in the box on the left is a particular kind of method for getting experts to set weights. The authors give this reason for using it: Despite criticism pinpointed by other scholars, the AHP remains the commonly used in many research fields and practical applications. This is because the AHP: (1) overcomes human difficulty in making simultaneous judgment among factors to be considered in the model; (2) is relatively simple as compared to other MCDA [multi-criteria decision analysis] methods; (3) is flexible to be integrated in various techniques such as programming, fuzzy logic, etc.; and (4) has the ability to check consistency in judgment After identifying a list of "factors" that can affect land value, they group them into taxonomical buckets: Note that certain factors like "Coastline" appear in multiple buckets; this captures the various influences a characteristic can have. For instance, land on the coast tends to be more economically valuable because of tourism, shipping, fishing, etc., so that goes under "economic." But land that's next to the coast is also more likely to flood, so it also goes under "environmental." And then there are various land use restrictions that apply specifically to coastal areas, so it goes under "legal" as well. In this way, a single factor like "the property is on the coastline" can have both positive and negative effects on land value (e.g., it's more economically valuable but it also might flood, and there are certain things you aren't allowed to do there). The next step is to set down some rules for how sensitive each factor is to location and distance. So here we can see that the economic benefit of being on the coast is most strongly felt if you're within half a kilometer of the ocean, but the environmental effect (e.g., risk of flooding) is most strongly felt when you're within 0.03 kilometers. And so on and so forth. Your experts help you work out all these rules. Note that for a few of these factors (such as land use and slope), you use metrics other than distance (e.g. land use classification and grade). Then you take all that stuff and assign everything a value between 0 and 5. Your team of experts then uses this table to come up with a set of weights for everything. What essentially comes out of this is a big linear equation with a bunch of coefficients for every one of your factors, which is then broadly fit to the observed market prices. When you're done, you can take any property on your list, multiply each of its characteristics by its respective weight, run that through your equation, and calculate the predicted price of the land. So how accurate is it? The authors compare it to standard Multiple Regression Analysis and claim it fares better. The Root Mean Square Error is quite a bit less than MRA. In addition, I think it's also saying that the MRA algorithm decided that only four of the factors were significant and basically ignored all the rest. By contrast, iLVM was able to maintain contributions from all the factors, because it doesn't leave that decision to the computer. I'm not 100% sure; it's not clear from the paper. The authors claim that about 67% of the variability is explained by their model, but they note that there are some areas where the model can be off by more than a factor of 1.0 in either the positive or negative direction. One thing that's kind of fun about this model is that you can make neat graphs like this that show the individual contribution of each factor: The main downside to this model is that it relies on a whole lot of subjective expert opinion and can be questioned on that basis. That said, it can be cheaply deployed in a transparent and consistent way across a large area. You can see why that's attractive for a developing nation with weak institutions and poor market transaction records; the argument is that this is a significant improvement over the former status quo. I wonder how well this model performs when you feed it better market transaction data, and how that would compare against all the others methods under identical conditions. More research is needed. Rather than drag you through a bunch more research papers, I'll just leave these others I found cited in the above studies: Killić et al. (2019) - Fuzzy expert system for land valuation in land consolidation processes
Language

Language is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 19, 2024 and July 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "published in the prestigious journal Language in 2009". It most often appears alongside Alan Turing, Amazon, Amazon jungle.

Reference entry
Language
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
July 19, 2024
Last seen
July 19, 2024
July 19, 2024 · Original source
You may have heard of a field known as "linguistics". Linguistics is supposedly the "scientific study of language", but this is completely wrong. To borrow a phrase from elsewhere, linguists are those who believe Noam Chomsky is the rightful caliph. Linguistics is what linguists study.
I'm only half-joking, because Chomsky’s impact on the study of language is hard to overstate. Consider the number of times his books and papers have been cited, a crude measure of influence that we can use to get a sense of this. At the current time, his Google Scholar page says he's been cited over 500,000 times. That’s a lot.
This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist
Language and Mind

Language and Mind is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 19, 2024 and July 19, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "( Language and Mind , pg. 1)". It most often appears alongside Alan Turing, Amazon, Amazon jungle.

Reference entry
Language and Mind
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
July 19, 2024
Last seen
July 19, 2024
July 19, 2024 · Original source
This is what he looks like. According to Wikipedia, the context for this picture is: “Noam Chomsky speaks about humanity's prospects for survival” Since around 1957, Chomsky has dominated linguistics. And this matters because he is kind of a contrarian with weird ideas. Is language for communicating? No, it’s mainly for thinking: (What Kind of Creatures Are We? Ch. 1, pg. 15-16) It is, indeed, virtual dogma that the function of language is communication. ... there is by now quite significant evidence that it is simply false. Doubtless language is sometimes used for communication, as is style of dress, facial expression and stance, and much else. But fundamental properties of language design indicate that a rich tradition is correct in regarding language as essentially an instrument of thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two. Should linguists care about the interaction between culture and language? No, that’s essentially stamp-collecting: (Language and Responsibility, Ch. 2, pg. 56-57) Again, a discipline is defined in terms of its object and its results. Sociology is the study of society. As to its results, it seems that there are few things one can say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations, intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. … Sociolinguistics is, I suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder whether it is likely to contribute much to it. … You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like butterflies, that’s fine; but such work must not be confounded with research, which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails if it has not done so. Did the human capacity for language evolve gradually? No, it suddenly appeared around 50,000 years ago after a freak gene mutation: (Language and Mind, third edition, pg, 183-184) An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of discrete infinity, rare in the organic world. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that takes objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new object: in the simplest case, the set containing them. Call that operation Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement. With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hierarchically structured expressions. The simplest account of the “Great Leap Forward” in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired, perhaps by some slight mutation, to provide the operation Merge … There are speculations about the evolution of language that postulate a far more complex process … A more parsimonious speculation is that they did not, and that the Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate. At best a reasonable guess, as are all speculations about such matters, but about the simplest one imaginable, and not inconsistent with anything known or plausibly surmised. It is hard to see what account of human evolution would not assume at least this much, in one or another form. I think all of these positions are kind of insane for reasons that we will discuss later. (Side note: Chomsky’s proposal is essentially the hard takeoff theory of human intelligence.) Most consequential of all, perhaps, are the ways Chomsky has influenced (i) what linguists mainly study, and (ii) how they go about studying it. Naively, since language involves many different components—including sound production and comprehension, intonation, gestures, and context, among many others—linguists might want to study all of these. While they do study all of these, Chomsky and his followers view grammar as by far the most important component of humans’ ability to understand and produce language, and accordingly make it their central focus. Roughly speaking, grammar refers to the set of language-specific rules that determine whether a sentence is well-formed. It goes beyond specifying word order (or ‘surface structure’, in Chomskyan terminology) since one needs to know more than just where words are placed in order to modify or extend a given sentence. Consider a pair of sentences Chomsky uses to illustrate this point in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (pg. 22), his most cited work: (1a) I expected John to be examined by a specialist. (2a) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist. The words “expected” and “persuaded” appear in the same location in each sentence, but imply different ‘latent’ grammatical structures, or ‘deep structures’. One way to show this is to observe that a particular way of rearranging the words produces a sentence with the same meaning in the first case (1a = 1b), and a different meaning in the second (2a != 2b): (1b) I expected a specialist to examine John. (2b) I persuaded a specialist to examine John. In particular, the target of persuasion is “John” in the case of (2a), and “the specialist” in the case of (2b). A full Chomskyan treatment of sentences like this would involve hierarchical tree diagrams, which permit a precise description of deep structure. You may have encountered the famous sentence: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It first appeared in Chomsky’s 1957 book Syntactic Structures, and the point is that even nonsense sentences can be grammatically well-formed, and that speakers can quickly assess the grammatical correctness of even nonsense sentences that they’ve never seen before. To Chomsky, this is one of the most important facts to be explained about language. A naive response to Chomsky’s preoccupation with grammar is: doesn’t real language involve a lot of non-grammatical stuff, like stuttering and slips of the tongue and midstream changes of mind? Of course it does, and Chomsky acknowledges this. To address this point, Chomsky has to move the goalposts in two important ways. First, he famously distinguishes competence from performance, and identifies the former as the subject of any serious theory of language: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 4) The problem for the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline. Moreover, he claims that grammar captures most of what we should mean when we talk about speakers’ linguistic competence: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 1, pg. 24) A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. Another way Chomsky moves the goalposts is by distinguishing E-languages, like English and Spanish and Japanese, from I-languages, which only exist inside human minds. He claims that serious linguistics should be primarily interested in the latter. In a semi-technical book summarizing Chomsky’s theory of language, Cook and Newson write: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) E-language linguistics … aims to collect samples of language and then describe their properties. … I-language linguistics, however, is concerned with what a speaker knows about language and where this knowledge comes from; it treats language as an internal property of the human mind rather than something external … Not only should linguistics primarily be interested in studying I-languages, but to try and study E-languages at all may be a fool’s errand: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 13) Chomsky claims that the history of generative linguistics shows a shift from an E-language to an I-language approach; ‘the shift of focus from the dubious concept of E-language to the significant notion of I-language was a crucial step in early generative grammar’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10). … Indeed Chomsky is extremely dismissive of E-language approaches: ‘E-language, if it exists at all, is derivative, remote from mechanisms and of no particular empirical significance, perhaps none at all’ (Chomsky, 1991b, pg. 10).1 I Am Not A Linguist (IANAL), but this redefinition of the primary concern of linguistics seems crazy to me. Is studying a language like English as it is actually used really of no particular empirical significance? And this doesn’t seem to be a one-time hyperbole, but a representative claim. Cook and Newson continue: (Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction, pg. 14) The opposition between these two approaches in linguistics has been long and acrimonious, neither side conceding the other’s reality. … The E-linguist despises the I-linguist for not looking at the ‘real’ facts; the I-linguist derides the E-linguist for looking at trivia. The I-language versus E-language distinction is as much a difference of research methods and of admissible evidence as it is of long-term goals. So much for what linguists ought to study. How should they study it? The previous quote gives us a clue. Especially in the era before Chomsky (BC), linguists were more interested in description. Linguists were, at least in one view, people who could be dropped anywhere in the world, and emerge with a tentative grammar of the local language six months later. (A notion like this is mentioned early in this video.) Linguists catalog the myriad of strange details about human languages, like the fact that some languages don’t appear to have words for relative directions, or “thank you”, or “yes” and “no”. After Chomsky's domination of the field (AD), there were a lot more theorists. While you could study language by going out into the field and collecting data, this was viewed as not the only, and maybe not even the most important, way to work. Diagrams of sentences proliferated. Chomsky, arguably the most influential linguist of the past hundred years, has never done fieldwork. In summary, to Chomsky and many of the linguists working in his tradition, the scientifically interesting component of language is grammar competence, and real linguistic data only indirectly reflects it. All of this matters because the dominance of Chomskyan linguistics has had downstream effects in adjacent fields like artificial intelligence (AI), evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. Chomsky has long been an opponent of the statistical learning tradition of language modeling, essentially claiming that it does not provide insight about what humans know about languages, and that engineering success probably can’t be achieved without explicitly incorporating important mathematical facts about the underlying structure of language. Chomsky’s ideas have motivated researchers to look for a “language gene” and “language areas” of the brain. Arguably, no one has yet found either—but more on that later. How Chomsky attained this stranglehold on linguistics is an interesting sociological question, but not our main concern in the present work2. The intent here is not to pooh-pooh Chomsky, either; brilliant and hard-working people are often wrong on important questions. Consider that his academic career began in the early 1950s—over 70 years ago!—when our understanding of language, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, among many other things, was substantially more rudimentary. Where are we going with this? All of this is context for understanding the ideas of a certain bomb-throwing terrorist blight on the face of linguistics: Daniel Everett. How Language Began is a book he wrote about, well, what language is and how it began. Everett is the anti-Chomsky. II. THE MISSIONARY We all love classic boy-meets-girl stories. Here’s one: boy meets girl at a rock concert, they fall in love, the boy converts to Christianity for the girl, then the boy and girl move to the Amazon jungle to dedicate the rest of their lives to saving the souls of an isolated hunter-gatherer tribe. Daniel Everett is the boy in this story. The woman he married, Keren Graham, is the daughter of Christian missionaries and had formative experiences living in the Amazon jungle among the Sateré-Mawé people. At seventeen, Everett became a born-again Christian; at eighteen, he and Keren married; and over the next few years, they started a family and prepared to become full-fledged missionaries like Keren’s parents. First, Everett studied “Bible and Foreign Missions” at the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. After finishing his degree in 1975, the natural next step was to train more specifically to follow in the footsteps of Keren’s parents. In 1976, he and his wife enrolled in the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to learn translation techniques and more viscerally prepare for life in the jungle: They were sent to Chiapas, Mexico, where Keren stayed in a hut in the jungle with the couple’s children—by this time, there were three—while Everett underwent grueling field training. He endured fifty-mile hikes and survived for several days deep in the jungle with only matches, water, a rope, a machete, and a flashlight. Everett apparently had a gift for language-learning. This led SIL to invite Everett and his wife to work with the Pirahã people (pronounced pee-da-HAN), whose unusual language had thwarted all previous attempts to learn it. In 1977, Everett’s family moved to Brazil, and in December they met the Pirahã for the first time. As an SIL-affiliated missionary, Everett’s explicit goals were to (i) translate the Bible into Pirahã, and (ii) convert as many Pirahã as possible to Christianity. But Everett’s first encounter with the Pirahã was cut short for political reasons: (Don’t Sleep There Are Snakes, Ch. 1, pg. 13-14) In December of 1977 the Brazilian government ordered all missionaries to leave Indian reservations. … Leaving the village under these forced circumstances made me wonder whether I’d ever be able to return. The Summer Institute of Linguistics was concerned too and wanted to find a way around the government’s prohibition against missionaries. So SIL asked me to apply to the graduate linguistics program at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. It was hoped that UNICAMP would be able to secure government authorization for me to visit the Pirahãs for a prolonged period, in spite of the general ban against missionaries. … My work at UNICAMP paid off as SIL hoped it would. Everett became a linguist proper sort of by accident, mostly as an excuse to continue his missionary work. But he ended up developing a passion for it. In 1980, he completed Aspects of the Phonology of Pirahã, his master’s thesis. He continued on to get a PhD in linguistics, also from UNICAMP, and in 1983 finished The Pirahã Language and Theory of Syntax, his dissertation. He continued studying the Pirahã and working as an academic linguist after that. In all, Everett spent around ten years of his life living with the Pirahã, spread out over some thirty-odd years. As he notes in Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: (Prologue, pg. xvii-xviii) I went to the Pirahãs when I was twenty-six years old. Now I am old enough to receive senior discounts. I gave them my youth. I have contracted malaria many times. I remember several occasions on which the Pirahãs or others threatened my life. I have carried more heavy boxes, bags, and barrels on my back through the jungle than I care to remember. But my grandchildren all know the Pirahãs. My children are who they are in part because of the Pirahãs. And I can look at some of those old men (old like me) who once threatened to kill me and recognize some of the dearest friends I have ever had—men who would now risk their lives for me. Everett interviewing some Pirahã people. (source) Everett did eventually learn their language, and it’s worth taking a step back to appreciate just how hard that task was. No Pirahã spoke Portuguese, apart from some isolated phrases they used for bartering. They didn’t speak any other language at all—just Pirahã. How do you learn another group’s language when you have no languages in common? The technical term is monolingual fieldwork. But this is just a fancy label for some combination of pointing at things, listening, crude imitation, and obsessively transcribing whatever you hear. For years. It doesn’t help that the Pirahã language seems genuinely hard to learn in a few different senses. First, it is probably conventionally difficult for Westerners to learn since it is a tonal language (two tones: high and low) with a small number of phonemes (building block sounds) and a few unusual sounds3. Second, there is no written language. Third, the language has a variety of ‘channels of discourse’, or ways of talking specialized for one or another cultural context. One of these is ‘whistle speech’; Pirahãs can communicate purely in whistles. This feature appears to be extremely useful during hunting trips: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 11, pg. 187-188) My first intense contact with whistle speech came one day when the Pirahãs had given me permission to go hunting with them. After we’d been walking for about an hour, they decided that they weren’t seeing any game because I, with my clunking canteens and machete and congenital clumsiness, was making too much noise. “You stay here and we will be back for you later.” Xaikáibaí said gently but firmly. … As I tried to make the best of my solitary confinement, I heard the men whistling to one another. They were saying, “I’ll go over there; you go that way,” and other such hunting talk. But clearly they were communicating. It was fascinating because it sounded so different from anything I had heard before. The whistle carried long and clear in the jungle. I could immediately see the importance and usefulness of this channel, which I guessed would also be much less likely to scare away game than the lower frequencies of the men’s normal voices. Fourth, important aspects of the language reflect core tenets of Pirahã culture in ways that one might not a priori expect. Everett writes extensively about the ‘immediacy of experience principle’ of Pirahã culture, which he summarizes as the idea that: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 132) Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker. One way the language reflects this is that the speaker must specify how they know something by affixing an appropriate suffix to verbs: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 12, pg. 196) Perhaps the most interesting suffixes, however (though these are not unique to Pirahã), are what linguists call evidentials, elements that represent the speaker’s evaluation of his or her knowledge of what he or she is saying. There are three of these in Pirahã: hearsay, observation, and deduction. To see what these do, let’s use an English example. If I ask you, “Did Joe go fishing?” you could answer, “Yes, at least I heard that he did,” or “Yes, I know because I saw him leave,” or “Yes, at least I suppose he did because his boat is gone.” The difference between English and Pirahã is that what English does with a sentence, Pirahã does with a verbal suffix. Everett also convincingly links this cultural principle to the lack of Pirahã number words and creation myths. On the latter topic, Everett recalls the following exchange: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 7, pg. 134) I sat with Kóhoi once and he asked me, after hearing about my god, “What else does your god do?” And I answered, “Well, he made the stars, and he made the earth.” Then I asked, “What do the Pirahãs say?” He answered, “Well, the Pirahãs say that these things were not made.” And all of this is to say nothing of the manifold perils of the jungle: malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, dangerous snakes, insects, morally gray river traders, and periodic downpours. If Indiana Jones braved these conditions for years, we would consider his stories rousing adventures. Everett did this while also learning one of the most unusual languages in the world. People on the bank of the Maici river. (source) By the way, he did eventually sort of achieve his goal of translating the Bible. Armed with a solid knowledge of Pirahã, he was able to translate the New Testament’s Gospel of Mark. Since the Pirahã have no written language, he provided them with a recorded version, but did not get the reaction he expected: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 267-268) When we returned to the village, I recorded Mark’s gospel in my own voice for the Pirahãs to listen to. I then brought in a wind-up tape recorder to play the recording, and I taught the Pirahãs how to use it, which, surprisingly enough, some of the children did. Keren and I left the village and returned a few weeks later. The people were still listening to the gospel, with children cranking the recorder. I was initially quite excited about this, until it became clear that the only part of the book that they paid attention to was the beheading of John the Baptist. “Wow, they cut off his head. Play that again!” One reaction to hearing the gospel caught Everett even more off-guard: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 269) "The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him." "Why not?" I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration. "Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them." Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus's penis was—a good three feet. But the Pirahã had an even more serious objection to Jesus: (Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, Ch. 17, pg. 265-266) Part of the difficulty of my task began to become clear to me. I communicated more or less correctly to the Pirahãs about my Christian beliefs. The men listening to me understood that there was a man named Hisó, Jesus, and that he wanted others to do what he told them. "The Pirahã men then asked, "Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is he dark like us or light like you?" I said, "Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time ago. But I do have his words." "Well, Dan, how do you have his words if you have never heard him or seen him?" They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy (and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren't interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. This is because, as I now knew, the Pirahãs believe only what they see. Sometimes they also believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting. In the end, Everett never converted a single Pirahã. But he did even worse than converting zero people—he lost his own faith after coming to believe that the Pirahã had a good point. After keeping this to himself for many years, he revealed his loss of faith to his family, which led to a divorce and his children breaking contact with him for a number of years afterward. But Everett losing his faith in the God of Abraham was only the beginning. Most importantly for us, he also lost his faith in the God of Linguistics—Noam Chomsky. III. THE WAR In 2005, Everett’s paper “Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã: Another look at the design features of human language” was published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. An outsider might expect an article like this, which made a technical observation about the apparent lack of a property called ‘recursion’ in the Pirahã language, to receive an ‘oh, neat’ sort of response. Languages can be pretty different from one another, after all. Mandarin lacks plurals. Spanish sentences can omit an explicit subject. This is one of those kinds of things. But the article ignited a firestorm of controversy that follows Everett to this day. Praise for Everett and his work on recursion in Pirahã: He became a pure charlatan, although he used to be a good descriptive linguist. That is why, as far as I know, all the serious linguists who work on Brazilian languages ignore him. Noam Chomsky, MIT professor and linguist
Regardless of who’s right and who’s wrong, the study language is certainly interesting and we have a lot more to learn. Something Chomsky wrote in 1968 seems like an appropriate summary of the way forward: (Language and Mind, pg. 1)
Language Log

Language Log is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 23, 2021 and June 23, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "From Language Log, self-explanatory"; "Language Log , self-explanatory". It most often appears alongside Arizona, Atlanta Black Crackers, Atlanta Crackers.

Reference entry
Language Log
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
June 23, 2021
Last seen
June 23, 2021
June 23, 2021 · Original source
18: From Language Log, self-explanatory:
…except that some of the article’s earlier claims about “what normal people don’t notice in language” seem really wrong to me. Normal people don’t notice that truth is just true+th, or depth is deep+th, or that horror is related to horrify? I had never even considered the possibility that people might not notice these things. Is the Language Log author crazy, or am I?
LanguageLog

LanguageLog is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 20, 2021 and May 20, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "LanguageLog: How does naming new chemical elements work in Chinese?". It most often appears alongside 5D Chess With Multiverse Time Travel, AI X-Risk Research Podcast, Alignment Research Center.

Reference entry
LanguageLog
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 20, 2021
Last seen
May 20, 2021
May 20, 2021 · Original source
12: LanguageLog: How does naming new chemical elements work in Chinese? Answer: you have very short words for each element, vaguely based on the Western name - for example, aluminum is “lǚ” and rutherfordium is “lú” - the characters are all the character for “metal” or “gas” or something plus something else - and it becomes so confusing that a commenter speculates it might be significantly holding back China’s technological progress.
Larson (2019)

Larson (2019) is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 09, 2021 and December 09, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "including Larson (2019)". It most often appears alongside 2017 PTAPP survey, AEI, agglomeration effect.

Reference entry
Larson (2019)
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 09, 2021
Last seen
December 09, 2021
December 09, 2021 · Original source
Larson (2019) uses this method, and AEI's figures are based directly on those results with a slight upward correction. The Lincoln Institute and the Federal Reserve's figures use the same basic approach, relying on official estimates of construction costs and housing prices. The one outlier is the PLACES lab estimate, which uses a machine learning model but gives a single-year result that tracks with the four cost approach lines.
Larson (2019), on the other hand, was co-written with Davis, Oliner, and Shui and uses the cost approach exclusively. Crucially, Larson (2019) explicitly and intentionally excludes all vacant land sales from the dataset. This estimate thus has the least direct contact with ground truth data from the market concerning land.
Both Albouy and Larson (2015) use regression models that include vacant land sales, but Albouy only considers vacant land sales. By contrast, Larson (2019) uses the cost approach and explicitly excludes vacant land sales. What about the Federal Reserve Method?
Learn Resource Therapy Clinical Qualification Student Training Manual

Learn Resource Therapy Clinical Qualification Student Training Manual is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 29, 2024 and May 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "‘Learn Resource Therapy Clinical Qualification Student Training Manual'". It most often appears alongside @ElytraMithra, Aaron, ACX.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 29, 2024
Last seen
May 29, 2024
May 29, 2024 · Original source
I believe I’m only one of two people in the USA trained in Resource Therapy…Resource Therapy posits a number of objects, one of which seems similar to the “Unattached Burden.”. . . Dr. Emmerson writes in ‘Learn Resource Therapy Clinical Qualification Student Training Manual': "When spoken with directly they will claim not to be a part of the personality, and unlike Resource States they can permanently leave the personality. While their etiology is unclear, I find when they are negotiated with to leave they can do so without any further indication of being present. Clients show improvement and often say they feel physically lighter.”
Learning at your brain’s rhythm: individualized entrainment boosts learning for perceptual decisions

Learning at your brain’s rhythm: individualized entrainment boosts learning for perceptual decisions is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 08, 2025 and September 08, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "The study “Learning at your brain’s rhythm: individualized entrainment boosts learning for perceptual decisions” claims that entrainment (flashing a bright white light) at a person's individual peak alpha frequency (IAF) helps". It most often appears alongside ABUJA, Alexander Putilin, Astralcodexten Com.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 08, 2025
Last seen
September 08, 2025
September 08, 2025 · Original source
A quick recap. The study “Learning at your brain’s rhythm: individualized entrainment boosts learning for perceptual decisions” claims that entrainment (flashing a bright white light) at a person's individual peak alpha frequency (IAF) helps them learn to distinguish two types of patterns faster.
Learning To Love Scientific Consensus

Learning To Love Scientific Consensus is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 15, 2023 and February 15, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "see Learning To Love Scientific Consensus for more". It most often appears alongside ACX, AI, Alexander.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
February 15, 2023
Last seen
February 15, 2023
February 15, 2023 · Original source
Eliezer Yudkowsky’s position is Let Them Debate College Students. I’m not a college student, but I’m not Anthony Fauci either, and I am known for blogging about extremely dignified ideas like the possibility that the terrible Harry Potter fanfiction My Immortal is secretly an alchemical allegory. I haven’t seen ivermectin advocates using “Scott takes this seriously enough to argue against it!” as an argument, and I have seen them getting angry about it and writing long responses trying to prove me wrong. Sometimes they have used me getting some points wrong as a positive argument, and I would be open to the argument that I failed in not arguing against it well enough that they couldn’t do that, but nobody has been making that argument, and if they did, then it would imply that people who are smarter than me should take over the job, which I endorse. III. I worry Scott Aaronson thinks I’m saying you shouldn’t trust the experts, and instead you should always think for yourself. I’m definitely not trying to say that. I’ve tried to be pretty clear that I think experts are right remarkably often, by some standards basically 100% of the time - I realize how crazy that sounds, and “by some standards” is doing a lot of the work there, but see Learning To Love Scientific Consensus for more. Bounded Distrust also helps explain what I mean here. I also try to be pretty clear that reasoning is extremely hard, it’s very easy to get everything wrong, and if you try to do it then a default option is to get everything wrong and humiliate yourself. I describe that happening to me here, and presumably it also happens to other people sometimes. What I do think is that “trust the experts” is an extremely exploitable heuristic, which leads everyone to put up a veneer of “being the experts” and demand that you trust them. I come back to this example again and again, but only because it’s so blatant: the New York Times ran an article saying that only 36% of economists supported school vouchers, with a strong implication that the profession was majority against. If you checked their sources, you would find that actually, it was 36% in favor, 19% against, 46% unsure or not responding. If you are too quick to seek epistemic closure because “you have to trust the experts”, you will be easy prey to people misrepresenting what they are saying. I come back to this example less often, because it could get me in trouble, but when people do formal anonymous surveys of IQ scientists, they find that most of them believe different races have different IQs and that a substantial portion of the difference is genetic. I don’t think most New York Times readers would identify this as the scientific consensus. So either the surveys - which are pretty official and published in peer-reviewed journals - have managed to compellingly misrepresent expert consensus, or the impressions people get from the media have, or “expert consensus” is extremely variable and complicated and can’t be reflected by a single number or position. And I genuinely think this is part of why ivermectin conspiracies took off in the first place. We say “trust science” and “trust experts”. But there were lots of studies that showed ivermectin worked - aren’t those science? And Pierre Kory MD, an specialist in severe respiratory illnesses who wrote a well-regarded textbook, supports it - isn’t he an expert? Isn’t it plausible that the science and the experts are right, and the media and the government and Big Pharma are wrong? This is part of what happens when people reify the mantras instead of using them as pointers to more complicated concepts like “reasoning is hard” and “here are the 28,491 rules you need to keep in mind when reading a scientific study.” IV. All of this still feels rambly and like it’s failing to connect. Instead, let me try describing exactly what I would advice I would give young people opening an Internet connection for the first time: You are not immune to conspiracy theories. You have probably developed a false sense of security by encountering many dumb conspiracy theories and feeling no temptation to believe them. These theories were designed to trap people very different from you; others will be aimed in your direction. The more certain you are of your own infallibility, the less aware you will be, and the worse your chances. The ones that get you won’t look like conspiracy theories to you (though they might to other people). When you run into conspiracy theories you don’t believe, feel free to ignore them. If you decide to engage, don’t mock them or feel superior. Think “there, but for the grace of God, go I.” Get a sense of what the arguments for the conspiracy theory look like - not from skeptics trying to mock them, but from the horse’s mouth - so you have a sense of what false arguments look like. Ask yourself what habits of mind it would have taken the people affected by the theory to successfully resist it. Ask yourself if you have those habits of mind. Yes? ARE YOU SURE? To a first approximation, trust experts over your own judgment. If people are trying to confuse you about who the experts are, then to a second approximation trust prestigious people and big institutions, including professors at top colleges, journalists at major newspapers, professional groups with names like the American ______ Association, and the government. You might ask: Don’t governments and other big institutions have biases? Won’t they sometimes be wrong or deceptive? And even if you’ve lucked into the one country and historical era where the government 100% tells the truth and the intellectuals have no biases, doesn’t someone need to keep the flame of suspicion alive so that it’s available to people in other, less fortunate countries and eras? The answer is: absolutely, yes, but also this is how conspiracy theories get you. They will claim that they are the special case where you need to take up the mantle of Galileo and Frederick Douglass and Jane Jacobs and all those people who stood up to the intellectual authorities and power structures of their own time. The whole point of “you are not immune to conspiracy theories” is that the evidence for them can sound convincing because something like it is sort of true. This is equally so for second-level claims like “prestigious institutions are fallible and biased”. Probably something like “make a principled precommitment never to disagree with prestigious institutions until you are at least 30 and have a graduate degree in at least one subject” would be good advice, but nobody would take that advice, and taking it too seriously might crush some kind of important human spirit, so I won’t assert this. But always have in the back of your mind that you live in a world where it’s sort of good advice. If you feel tempted to believe something that has red flags for being a conspiracy theory, at least keep track of the Inside vs. Outside View. Say “on the Inside View, this feels like the evidence is overwhelming; on the Outside View, it sounds like a classic conspiracy theory”. You don’t necessarily have to resolve this discomfort right away. You can walk around with an annoying knot in your beliefs, even if it’s not fun. Look for the strongest evidence against the idea. Keep in mind important possibilities like: Is it possible that everyone who disagrees with the idea is a bad mean cruel stupid person, but also, the idea really is false?
Length Of Incarceration And Recidivism

Length Of Incarceration And Recidivism is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 27, 2024 and November 27, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "National Sentencing Commission’s report on Length Of Incarceration And Recidivism". It most often appears alongside Abrams 2012, ACLU, age-crime curve.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
November 27, 2024
Last seen
November 27, 2024
November 27, 2024 · Original source
How does a longer prison term, as opposed to a shorter prison term, change one’s chance of being re-arrested? Unfortunately, these will be the most difficult and controversial questions we’ve encountered thus far. Even worse, we can’t escape answering them. If aftereffects are beneficial or neutral, then the beneficial effects of incapacitation win out, and prison is net good for preventing crime. Only if aftereffects are detrimental, and their magnitude is great enough to cancel out the benefits of incapacitation, can prison be net neutral or net negative for crime. As far as I can tell, most criminologists are confused on this point. They’re going to claim that the sign of aftereffects is around zero, or hard to measure - then triumphantly announce that they’ve proven prison doesn’t prevent crime. The only pro-shorter-sentences researcher who is actually thinking clearly about this is Roodman. He will argue that aftereffects are harmful, and that the best studies suggest their magnitude is around the same as the benefits of incapacitation - so that they more or less cancel out. His argument is logically valid, which tragically forces us to actually look at the evidence and see if he’s right. Question 1: How Does Any Prison Term At All Change The Chance Of Being Rearrested? The largest and most recent meta-analysis of this question is Petrich (2021). They analyze 116 studies and take a strong stand, saying: Beginning in the 1970s, the United States began an experiment in mass imprisonment. Supporters argued that harsh punishments such as imprisonment reduce crime by deterring inmates from reoffending. Skeptics argued that imprisonment may have a criminogenic effect. The skeptics were right. Previous narrative reviews and meta-analyses concluded that the overall effect of imprisonment is null. Based on a much larger meta-analysis of 116 studies, the current analysis shows that custodial sanctions have no effect on reoffending or slightly increase it when compared with the effects of noncustodial sanctions such as probation. This finding is robust regardless of variations in methodological rigor, types of sanctions examined, and sociodemographic characteristics of samples. All sophisticated assessments of the research have independently reached the same conclusion. The null effect of custodial compared with noncustodial sanctions is considered a “criminological fact.” Incarceration cannot be justified on the grounds it affords public safety by decreasing recidivism. Prisons are unlikely to reduce reoffending unless they can be transformed into people-changing institutions on the basis of available evidence on what works organizationally to reform offenders. Again, Petrich seems to think that, having proven aftereffects “have no effect on reoffending or slightly increase it”, he’s triumphantly proven prison doesn’t work. But in order to really prove that, he’d have to demonstrate that aftereffects’ tendency to “slightly increase” reoffending is large enough to neutralize prison’s positive incapacitative effects. So let’s look further at the effect size. The effect size statistic here is r, representing the correlation coefficient between a dummy variable where noncustodial sanctions are 0 and custodial sanctions are 1, and likelihood of reoffending. But later they give a better explanation, saying that: A mean correlation of approximately .080 translates into an 8 percentage point difference in reoffending between those sentenced to custodial and noncustodial sanctions (Bonta and Andrews 2017; see also Randolph and Edmondson 2005). Thus, assuming that 46 percent of the comparison (noncustodial) group reoffended, the percent reoffending in the custodial sanction group would be 54 percent. How do we translate this into number of crimes? They don’t tell us, but here’s my extremely sketchy hand-wavey suggestion: let’s imagine this is recidivism rate over one year. We know that 43% of prisoners usually reoffend during this time, so if we believe these data, 35% of similar offenders who got noncustodial sanctions would. That means they offend about 20% less. Although we absolutely cannot do this and we’re assuming all sorts of completely false things about how distributions work, let’s imagine this means the average person in this category commits 20% fewer crimes. That would mean that, if prisoners commit 10 crimes/year after release, the same people, given a noncustodial sentence, would commit 8 crimes/year. In order to neutralize the effect of one year imprisonment (-10 crimes), the negative effects of incarceration (+2 crimes/year) would have to continue for five years. But they probably won’t, because we know that most of these people get rearrested sooner than that anyway. So I think that at this level, it’s hard to conclude that aftereffects cause more crime than incapacitation prevents. What does Roodman - whose argument hinges on the claim that they do - say about this? He doesn’t separate out the custodial/noncustodial question from the sentence length question, so we’ll look at his arguments more in the next few sections. Question 2: How Do Long Vs. Short Prison Terms Change The Chance Of Being Rearrested? We’ll follow our usual pattern of looking at one study in depth and then racing through the others. Our deep study will be the National Sentencing Commission’s report on Length Of Incarceration And Recidivism, because it’s the most official-sounding. They examine 32,125 offenders and compare them to “matched control” offenders who got different sentence lengths to see which group reoffends more often. Here are their results (numbers represent how much more likely the group with longer sentences was to reoffend): So we see that among prisoners with short sentences, longer sentences don’t significantly increase or decrease recidivism. If we’re willing to look at nonsignificant results, then in the shortest-sentence group (<3 years), increasing the sentence increases recidivism, zeroing out by about 5 years, and then as sentences get increasingly longer than five years, longer sentences = less recidivism. I think this actually makes sense. A very short prison sentence (eg one day) doesn’t ruin your life. As the sentence lengthens, your life gets more and more ruined, as all the tragedies we talked about earlier - job loss, career obsolescence, partner divorce, friends drifting away, etc - start to come into play. But after five years, it maxes out - your life is as ruined as it can possibly get. So after that, increasing time in prison can only have positive effects (eg making you more convinced that crime is bad and that you don’t want another super-long prison sentence). My only concern about this finding is age. All research agrees on the absolutely crucial role of the age-crime curve: People take various policy implications from this (maybe “life sentences” should end at 65, since incapacitation is unlikely to help much after that). But here we’re interested in its potential to confound studies. A 20 year old who gets 5 years in prison is released at 25 - still young! - but a 20 year old who gets 10 years in prison is released at 30 - too old to be leaping on rooftops and running from cops. The National Sentencing Commission understands this problem, and matches the experimental and control groups by age at release. But this introduces a new bias - now they’re different ages when they start committing crimes. Might a person who starts crime at 15 be a more disturbed and committed criminal than one who starts at 20? Seems plausible. I think this might be responsible for a lot of the seemingly positive effect of sentences > 5 years. There are dozens of other studies on this topic, all hotly debated, so even in this part I’m only going to list a few highlights. Still, these are: Green and Winik (2010). They use random judge assignment, ie look at criminals with similar crimes who got lenient/strict judges and so shorter/longer sentences. They find that the total difference in rearrests is indistinguishable from zero. But the length of time in which they were measuring rearrests includes the time the offenders were in jail, so this is saying that incapacitation plus aftereffects was zero (plus or minus a margin of error), meaning that aftereffects must be detrimental and large enough to cancel out the benefits of incapacitation, just as Roodman claims. But this study looked at minor crimes where sentences were measured in months, so I think this matches our previous suspicion that aftereffects might be detrimental in short sentences but neutral-to-beneficial in longer ones. Roach and Schanzenbach (2015) More random judge assignment, this time in Seattle. They find that each month of longer sentence decreases future reoffending by one percentage point. Most of these sentences are short, so this contradicts our working theory that lengthening short sentences increases crime but lengthening long ones decreases it. Neither Berger nor Roodman really want to take this study too seriously; Berger objects that it’s an unusual study population (everyone entered a guilty plea), and Roodman objects that the judge selection might not have been truly random. Rhodes (2018) is a matching study - it artificially tries to create groups of prisoners who are as similar as possible except that one group got longer sentences. Its big advantage is that it has some people serving moderately long sentences (a few years), getting us out of the few-month range investigated by some of the other studies. It finds a mild beneficial effect of longer sentences: This study provides no evidence that an offender’s criminal trajectory is negatively affected – that is, that criminal behavior is accelerated – by the length of an offender’s prison term. If anything, longer prison terms modestly reduce rates of recidivism beyond what is attributable to incapacitation. This “treatment effect” of a longer period of incarceration is small. The three-year base rate of 20% recidivism is reduced to 18.7% when prison length of stay increases by an average of 5.4 months. We are inclined to characterize this as a benign, close to neutral effect on recidivism. What Do Our Experts Think? As mentioned above, these are only a few of the very many studies on this topic, and I’ve only given the briefest summary of each. Due to the complexity of this literature, I’m relying more than usual on the opinion of the expert reviewers. Berger (pro-longer-sentences) says: Considering the rigorous research published since the Nagin et al. (2009) review, the literature regarding length of stay on recidivism is still somewhat inconsistent, with many studies claiming no recidivism effects and some showing that increased prison length reduces recidivism slightly. However, just like the rest of the research examined thus far, the study methodologies vary in terms of their limitations, which could explain some of the mixed results [...] At present, there is no substantial evidence that a criminogenic effect exists in the aggregate. Thus, it remains unclear whether criminogenic effects exist, and if so, under what circumstances...Among the substantial number of published studies with varying methodologies, not one has found a large aggregate-level criminogenic effect. Roodman (pro-shorter-sentences) says: The preponderance of the evidence says that incarceration in the US increases crime post-release, and enough over the long run to offset incapacitation. A quartet of judge randomization studies (Green and Winik in Washington, DC; Loeffler in Chicago; Nagin and Snodgrass in Pennsylvania; Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang in Philadelphia and Miami) put the net of incapacitation and incarceration aftereffects at about zero. In parallel, Chen and Shapiro find that harsher prison conditions—making for incarceration that is harsher in quality rather than quantity—also increases recidivism. Gaes and Camp concur, though less convincingly because in their study harsher incarceration quality went hand in hand with lower incarceration quantity. Mueller-Smith sides with all these studies and goes farther, finding modest incapacitation and powerful, harmful aftereffects in Houston; but modest hints of randomization failure accompany those results. Some studies dissent from the majority view that incarceration is criminogenic. Roach and Schanzenbach find beneficial aftereffects in Seattle—a result that is also subject to some doubt about the quality of randomization. Bhuller et al. make a more compelling case that incarceration reduces crime after—in Norway. Berecochea and Jaman, one of the few truly randomized studies in this literature, also looks more likely right than wrong, and is also somewhat distant in its setting, early-1970s California. And there are the two Georgia studies, which upon reanalysis no longer point to beneficial aftereffects, but still do not demonstrate harmful ones either. Aftereffects must vary by place, time, and person. But the first-order generalization that best fits the credible evidence is that at the margin in the US today, aftereffects offset in the long run what incapacitation does in the short run. Nagin (neutral, tie-breaker) says: Compared with noncustodial sanctions, incarceration appears to have a null or mildly criminogenic effect on future criminal behavior. This conclusion is not sufficiently firm to guide policy generally, though it casts doubt on claims that imprisonment has strong specific deterrent effects. What conclusions do we draw from these studies of the dose-response relationship between time served and reoffending? The one experimental study is suggestive of a preventive effect, but that effect may be attributable to incapacitation. Two of the matching studies point weakly to a criminogenic type dose-response relationship, but both are extremely dated. The Loughran et al. (2008) study suggests a possible criminogenic effect of placement but finds no linkage between time served and reoffending. We draw no conclusions from the results of the regression studies. Not only are results extremely varied, but more importantly all of the studies suffer from a fundamental analytical flaw. This flaw relates to the potential sensitivity of regression- based studies to specification errors in the model of the relationship of age and offending rate. In other words: Berger and Nagin think evidence is weak and it’s kind of a wash and maybe there are slight criminogenic effects; Roodman thinks there are strong criminogenic effects that (on the current margin) are sizeable enough to approximately cancel out the benefit from incapacitation. So What’s Up With Roodman? At the risk of repeating myself: this is the question upon which this whole essay hinges. Everyone agrees that the beneficial effects of deterrence are real but small. Everyone agrees that the beneficial effects of incapacitation are real and large. Everyone except Roodman agrees that aftereffects range from slightly beneficial to slightly detrimental, for a net effect of incarceration significantly decreasing crime. Only Roodman says that aftereffects are large and detrimental, for a net effect of incarceration having no effect on crime. So where does Roodman disagree with everyone else? My impression is that the main difference is that Roodman gives more weight to certain judge selection studies. These find that being randomly assigned to a lenient vs. strict judge (and therefore on average getting a short vs. long sentence) doesn’t change rearrest rates after X years from the time the sentence started. This X year period includes both the time spent serving the sentence, and the time after release when aftereffects might materialize - ie they include both incapacitation and aftereffects. Since these studies fail to find any net effect, and incapacitation effects must be beneficial and large, Roodman concludes that aftereffects must be detrimental and large. Then he reanalyzes several of the other studies that other people use to demonstrate no or beneficial aftereffects, and finds them less convincing after reanalysis. So who is right? Roodman gets his strongest evidence from studies of short sentences vs. shorter sentences (eg going from 0 to 1 years, or 1 to. 2 years). These are naturally where we would expect the fewest benefits from incapacitation. But they’re also where we would common-sensically expect the worst aftereffects. Someone going from zero prison to one year in prison has had their life, career, and relationships profoundly changed, in a way that someone going from ten years in prison to eleven years hasn’t. This is consistent with the National Sentencing Commission study above. They found that aftereffects trended worse the shorter the sentences got, but didn’t investigate any sentences shorter than 2-3 years. If the trend continues, sentences shorter than that could have aftereffects > incapacitation. So maybe Roodman is right about shorter sentences, and everyone else is right about longer sentences. Going from a month to a year in prison is so disruptive and criminogenic that it risks canceling the benefits of eleven extra months of incapacitation. But going from ten years to eleven years mostly just gives you the incapacitation. Marginal Revolution This highlights a problem with all of these studies: we can only talk about particular margins. Imagine a country which currently incarcerates zero people, trying to decide whether to move up to a policy of incarcerating one person. If you only incarcerate one person, it will be the baddest dude in the whole country. That guy really needs to be behind bars! And we’re not worried about turning him into a hardened criminal, because he’s already maximally bad. Here it’s obvious that benefits outweigh costs. Now imagine a country which incarcerates 50% of its population, trying to decide whether to move up to 50% + 1. At this point, you’re imprisoning someone who went a few miles over the speed limit. You gain no benefits from incapacitation (he wasn’t going to commit any crimes anyway), but you stand to lose a lot from aftereffects (he’s probably a totally normal law-abiding citizen, so there’s a very high risk of ruining his life and turning him into a more hardened criminal). Here it’s obvious that costs outweigh benefits. So the question isn’t “do the costs of prison outweigh benefits?”, but rather “at what point between incarcerating 0% and 50% of people does the cost of imprisoning one more person start outweighing the benefits?”, or even “at the current US incarceration rate of 0.75%, does the cost of imprisoning one more person outweigh the benefits?” In some sense, this is what we’ve been investigating the whole time - all of these studies are being conducted at the current margin. But this hides big differences between them. We’ve already seen that European studies get stronger results than American studies. That’s because European countries have incarceration rates of ~0.05%, compared to America’s ~0.75%. In theory, Europeans countries’ incarceration rates are lower because they have less crime. But I notice that the European countries we’re talking about here all have high recent new immigrant populations, and in Europe these groups commit more crimes per person than natives. So it’s possible that Europe is still adjusting to being a high-crime continent, whereas America has already adjusted by raising incarceration rates. So one possible conclusion is that the benefits of incarceration strongly outweigh costs in Europe. I think this is clearly true by American values - we seem to care more about preventing crime, and be less horrified by imprisonment, than the average European. But there are many different margins even within America. Louisiana’s incarceration rate is >1%; Massachusetts is <0.25%. Some of the variance reflects the criminality of each state’s population, but other variance reflects the values of each state’s voters and policy-makers. We haven’t been keeping great track of which state each of our studies comes from, but plausibly the marginal prisoner in Massachusetts is a badder dude than the marginal prisoner in Louisiana, and releasing him is more likely to have costs > benefits. Margins also differ across eras. US incarceration ranged from 0.2% in 1970 to 0.95% in 2007 to about 0.75% today. Our studies cover this entire time period. This is probably why Levitt found stronger incapacitation effects (studying the 1970s) than Owens or Lofstrom+Raphael (studying the 2000s). Finally, there are the margins across sentences we discussed earlier. Going from zero years in prison to one year is a bigger deal than going from ten to eleven. When we examine our original question - does extending the average prisoner’s sentence for one year substantially decrease crime, we find that there’s no single answer - it depends where we are on all of these margins. Roodman’s skeptical position is most plausible for shorter sentences in high-incarceration areas, and Berger’s pro-prison position is most plausible for longer sentences in low-incarceration areas. So Why Do People Keep Saying That Prison Doesn’t Decrease Crime? We began with the observation that criminologists tend to deny that prison decreases crime. We now know why Roodman thinks this: he idiosyncratically believes that aftereffects equal (and so cancel out) incapacitation. But nobody else has even gotten this far. So what’s everyone else’s position? The Vera Institute is an anti-incarceration think tank. They have a policy paper titled The Incarceration Myth: More Incarceration Will Not Decrease Crime. It says: There is a very weak relationship between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates. Although studies differ somewhat, most of the literature shows that between 1980 and 2000, each 10 percent increase in incarceration rates was associated with just a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate. This is just taking the (real, positive) effect of incarceration on crime, and calling it “very weak”. Research shows that each additional increase in incarceration rates will be associated with a smaller and smaller reduction in crime rates. We saw above that this is true, but I find it annoying to mention here in this kind of advocacy context - it’s also true of everything else in the world! When the Vera Institute publishes anti-mass-incarceration white papers, the 500th white paper will be less influential than the first. If I claimed that “research showed” this, and so they should stop publishing anti-mass-incarceration white papers, they would look at me like I’d gone insane. Get a life. The weak association between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates applies almost entirely to property crime. Research consistently shows that higher incarceration rates are not associated with lower violent crime rates. This is sort of true. Research finds a stronger effect of incarceration on property crimes than violent crimes, although Levitt does find a violent crime effect of minus one violent crime per incarceration-year. Partly this is because violent crimes are rarer than property crimes, and so studies are underpowered to find them. And partly it’s because most studies are done on mass releases of prisoners, where (for example) the state has to release 25% of the prison population to decrease overcrowding, but they get to choose which 25% - and states are smart enough not to release the murderers and psychos. Still, if Vera Institute’s preferred decarceration policy is also smart, then it won’t release the murderers and psychos either, and this point will stand. So my interpretation of Vera Institute is that they’re making some good points about ways that incarceration isn’t an infinitely powerful cure-all, but that it’s deceptive to summarize them as “incarceration doesn’t decrease crime”. What about other groups? Prison Policy Institute has a list of “crime myths”. Myth #7 is that “Harsh punishments deter crime, making us safer”. They write: Many people mistakenly believe that long sentences, paired with austere and even brutal prison conditions, will have a deterrent effect on crime. But research has consistently found that harsher sentences do not serve as effective “examples” that would prevent new people from committing serious crimes. In 2016, the National Institute of Justice summarized the research on deterrence, finding that prison sentences, and especially long sentences, do little to deter future crime Here they’re using “deterrence” in the strict sense (that is, in a way that doesn’t count incapacitation), noting that it’s small, and rounding off “small” to “zero”. I’ve looked at some other sites and think tanks that claim to have arguments against the “myth” that prison prevents crime, and they’re all using these same two tricks. Either they ignore incapacitation and focus only on deterrence + aftereffects. Or they imagine some hypothetical prison super-fan who believes that incapacitation is infinitely effective, prove that it’s less effective than this, declare victory over this fake opponent, and then summarize their win as “prison has no effect”. What Are The Costs Vs. Benefits Of Prison? So a more honest version of the claim that “prison has no effect on crime” might be “the effect of prison on crime is weak”. How weak is it? We already saw one way to answer this: it probably prevents on average 7 crimes/year (6 property + 1 violent), minus some amount, especially for short sentences, if you believe in criminogenic aftereffects. For the shortest sentences at the highest-incarceration margins, it’s possible for the effect to be zero or less. Another way to answer is with elasticities. If we increase in incarceration rate 10%, how much crime do we prevent at the current margins? Levitt estimates 3%, Cohen finds 0.5-7%, and Dhodnt finds -2% (ie prison increases crime) but this is an outlier. Spelman writes: Our best estimate of elasticity is “in the neighborhood of [3% drop in crime per 10% increase in incarceration]” but “[a]ny figure between [2% and 4%] can be defended, and we should not be too surprised to find that the result is anywhere between [1% and 5%]” This broadly agrees with our numbers from Sweden, California, and El Salvador above. Small increases in incarceration cause small decreases in crime. Large increases in incarceration cause large decreases in crime. If you doubled the incarceration rate, locking up an extra million people, then crime would decrease ~30% at current US margins (maybe less, because you’re shifting the margin and getting diminishing returns). Would more prison be good or bad? We’d need to do a cost-benefit analysis. Surprisingly, Roodman does the best work here: after making his claim that costs and benefits mostly cancel out, he admits that most people won’t believe him, and tries to estimate the effect size in the “devil’s advocate” case where everyone else is right and he is wrong. He starts with our previous finding that incapacitation prevents ~7 crimes a year, and returns to the incapacitation studies to see what types of crime are most affected. Then he adjusts for the low level of aftereffects that everyone else believes in. I’ve redone his results for clarity. This table shows the total number of each type of crime prevented by keeping the marginal prisoner in jail for one extra year: Why does prison prevent negative robberies? Roodman is subtracting the small aftereffects found by other researchers, and the data for rare crimes is noisy, so probably this is just an artifact. I round this to zero for the full analysis. If we’re trying to calculate the costs vs. benefits of imprisonment, we need to put a cost on all these crimes. This is hard to quantify - a robber may steal $100 worth of goods, but valuing his crime at $100 in costs ignores the disutility of (eg) living in fear Roodman uses two methods: first, he values a crime at the average damages that courts award to victims, including emotional damages. Second, he values it at what people will pay - how much money would you accept to get assaulted one extra time in your life? These estimates still exclude some intangible costs, like the cost of living in a crime-ridden community, but it’s the best we can do for now. Here are his answers (I’ve taken the geometric mean of the two methods): So one extra year of incarcerating the marginal criminal saves society $44,000 in crimes prevented. Now we add in the opposite side of the ledger: the costs of incarceration: According to Roodman, the average prisoner costs the state $31,000 per year. He got his data from 2008, and it’s since ballooned to about $60,000, but we’ll keep his number so that everything is from the same time period. (also, as always, California is more expensive - here it’s $120,000) Roodman also adds in the costs to the prisoner. He uses some surveys to value the disutility of the suffering caused by a year in prison at $50,000; additionally, the prisoner loses about $16,000 in earning potential. The end result: if you don’t count the costs to the prisoner themselves, and you don’t use the more modern number, and you’re not in an expensive state like California, then the marginal incarceration-year saves society about $13,000. If you do count those things, or you’re in an expensive state, the costs far outweigh the benefits. Realistically, most people won’t care about analyses like this. They’ll be more interested in the unquantifiable costs and benefits, including: The “benefit” of feeling like justice has been done and an evil deed has been avenged.
Lenny’s Newsletter

Lenny’s Newsletter is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 29, 2022 and September 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Business: Lenny’s Newsletter". It most often appears alongside 1 Kings 10-11, 2008 Democratic National Convention, Adam Scheffer.

Reference entry
Lenny’s Newsletter
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 29, 2022
Last seen
September 29, 2022
September 29, 2022 · Original source
Overall I find Tipping Point Prophecy Update a disappointment. Business: Lenny’s Newsletter I feel sort of bad advertising the top Substack in every category, even if it does make for a simple universe-hopping itinerary - it feels kind of rich-get-richer. Still, I feel like it makes sense for Business. Whoever clawed their way to the top of the Substack Business rankings clearly must know a thing or two about capitalism.
Less Wrong Curated Podcast

Less Wrong Curated Podcast is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between June 27, 2022 and June 27, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "expanding his empire to run a Less Wrong Curated Podcast". It most often appears alongside ACX Podcast, Astralcodexten Com, Cameron Bucker.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
June 27, 2022
Last seen
June 27, 2022
June 27, 2022 · Original source
1: Solenoid_Entity, who runs the ACX Podcast, is expanding his empire to run a Less Wrong Curated Podcast and Metaculus Journal Podcast. Good luck, Solenoid!
Less Wrong Sequences

Less Wrong Sequences is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 02, 2022 and February 02, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "I know from the Less Wrong Sequences". It most often appears alongside Aztec gods, barberpole model of fashion, Bari Weiss.

Reference entry
Less Wrong Sequences
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
February 02, 2022
Last seen
February 02, 2022
February 02, 2022 · Original source
You could argue this represents a failure on my part: the zeitgeist has caught up to what I knew in 2015, but I haven’t learned new things to keep me ahead of the zeitgeist. Seems plausible. Half of what I know, I know from the Less Wrong Sequences; the other half, from a basic medical school education. But nobody else explains things quite like Eliezer, and I’m sure as heck not going back to med school.
Less.Online

Less.Online is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 01, 2026 and April 01, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "Held shortly after Less.Online". It most often appears alongside 1108 R St, 11841 Wagner Street, 131 Colonie Center.

Reference entry
Less.Online
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
April 01, 2026
Last seen
April 01, 2026
April 01, 2026 · Original source
Contact: Scott, Ari, and Skyler Contact Info: skyler[@]rationalitymeetups[.]org, ari[@]zerner[.]com Time: Wednesday, June 10th, 6:30 PM Location: 2740 Telegraph Ave, Berkeley Coordinates: https://plus.codes/849VVP5R+X5 Group Link: bayrationality.com Notes: Children welcome, please no pets. We’ll have food, and possibly Q&A with Scott. Held shortly after Less.Online, we expect a lot of neat out-of-town visitors.
Lessons From Forecasting The Ukraine War

Lessons From Forecasting The Ukraine War is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 01, 2022 and March 01, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "See his Lessons From Forecasting The Ukraine War". It most often appears alongside ACX, Afghan government, Aleppo.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
March 01, 2022
Last seen
March 01, 2022
March 01, 2022 · Original source
See his Lessons From Forecasting The Ukraine War.
LessWrong community page

LessWrong community page is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 29, 2025 and August 29, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "There should shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page". It most often appears alongside "Beer Capital" pub, 100 Black Birch Trail, 11841 Wagner Street, Culver City.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 29, 2025
Last seen
August 29, 2025
August 29, 2025 · Original source
There should shortly be a map of these meetups on the LessWrong community page.
Let Them Debate College Students

Let Them Debate College Students is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 15, 2023 and February 15, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Eliezer Yudkowsky’s position is Let Them Debate College Students". It most often appears alongside ACX, AI, Alexander.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
February 15, 2023
Last seen
February 15, 2023
February 15, 2023 · Original source
Eliezer Yudkowsky’s position is Let Them Debate College Students. I’m not a college student, but I’m not Anthony Fauci either, and I am known for blogging about extremely dignified ideas like the possibility that the terrible Harry Potter fanfiction My Immortal is secretly an alchemical allegory. I haven’t seen ivermectin advocates using “Scott takes this seriously enough to argue against it!” as an argument, and I have seen them getting angry about it and writing long responses trying to prove me wrong. Sometimes they have used me getting some points wrong as a positive argument, and I would be open to the argument that I failed in not arguing against it well enough that they couldn’t do that, but nobody has been making that argument, and if they did, then it would imply that people who are smarter than me should take over the job, which I endorse. III. I worry Scott Aaronson thinks I’m saying you shouldn’t trust the experts, and instead you should always think for yourself. I’m definitely not trying to say that. I’ve tried to be pretty clear that I think experts are right remarkably often, by some standards basically 100% of the time - I realize how crazy that sounds, and “by some standards” is doing a lot of the work there, but see Learning To Love Scientific Consensus for more. Bounded Distrust also helps explain what I mean here. I also try to be pretty clear that reasoning is extremely hard, it’s very easy to get everything wrong, and if you try to do it then a default option is to get everything wrong and humiliate yourself. I describe that happening to me here, and presumably it also happens to other people sometimes. What I do think is that “trust the experts” is an extremely exploitable heuristic, which leads everyone to put up a veneer of “being the experts” and demand that you trust them. I come back to this example again and again, but only because it’s so blatant: the New York Times ran an article saying that only 36% of economists supported school vouchers, with a strong implication that the profession was majority against. If you checked their sources, you would find that actually, it was 36% in favor, 19% against, 46% unsure or not responding. If you are too quick to seek epistemic closure because “you have to trust the experts”, you will be easy prey to people misrepresenting what they are saying. I come back to this example less often, because it could get me in trouble, but when people do formal anonymous surveys of IQ scientists, they find that most of them believe different races have different IQs and that a substantial portion of the difference is genetic. I don’t think most New York Times readers would identify this as the scientific consensus. So either the surveys - which are pretty official and published in peer-reviewed journals - have managed to compellingly misrepresent expert consensus, or the impressions people get from the media have, or “expert consensus” is extremely variable and complicated and can’t be reflected by a single number or position. And I genuinely think this is part of why ivermectin conspiracies took off in the first place. We say “trust science” and “trust experts”. But there were lots of studies that showed ivermectin worked - aren’t those science? And Pierre Kory MD, an specialist in severe respiratory illnesses who wrote a well-regarded textbook, supports it - isn’t he an expert? Isn’t it plausible that the science and the experts are right, and the media and the government and Big Pharma are wrong? This is part of what happens when people reify the mantras instead of using them as pointers to more complicated concepts like “reasoning is hard” and “here are the 28,491 rules you need to keep in mind when reading a scientific study.” IV. All of this still feels rambly and like it’s failing to connect. Instead, let me try describing exactly what I would advice I would give young people opening an Internet connection for the first time: You are not immune to conspiracy theories. You have probably developed a false sense of security by encountering many dumb conspiracy theories and feeling no temptation to believe them. These theories were designed to trap people very different from you; others will be aimed in your direction. The more certain you are of your own infallibility, the less aware you will be, and the worse your chances. The ones that get you won’t look like conspiracy theories to you (though they might to other people). When you run into conspiracy theories you don’t believe, feel free to ignore them. If you decide to engage, don’t mock them or feel superior. Think “there, but for the grace of God, go I.” Get a sense of what the arguments for the conspiracy theory look like - not from skeptics trying to mock them, but from the horse’s mouth - so you have a sense of what false arguments look like. Ask yourself what habits of mind it would have taken the people affected by the theory to successfully resist it. Ask yourself if you have those habits of mind. Yes? ARE YOU SURE? To a first approximation, trust experts over your own judgment. If people are trying to confuse you about who the experts are, then to a second approximation trust prestigious people and big institutions, including professors at top colleges, journalists at major newspapers, professional groups with names like the American ______ Association, and the government. You might ask: Don’t governments and other big institutions have biases? Won’t they sometimes be wrong or deceptive? And even if you’ve lucked into the one country and historical era where the government 100% tells the truth and the intellectuals have no biases, doesn’t someone need to keep the flame of suspicion alive so that it’s available to people in other, less fortunate countries and eras? The answer is: absolutely, yes, but also this is how conspiracy theories get you. They will claim that they are the special case where you need to take up the mantle of Galileo and Frederick Douglass and Jane Jacobs and all those people who stood up to the intellectual authorities and power structures of their own time. The whole point of “you are not immune to conspiracy theories” is that the evidence for them can sound convincing because something like it is sort of true. This is equally so for second-level claims like “prestigious institutions are fallible and biased”. Probably something like “make a principled precommitment never to disagree with prestigious institutions until you are at least 30 and have a graduate degree in at least one subject” would be good advice, but nobody would take that advice, and taking it too seriously might crush some kind of important human spirit, so I won’t assert this. But always have in the back of your mind that you live in a world where it’s sort of good advice. If you feel tempted to believe something that has red flags for being a conspiracy theory, at least keep track of the Inside vs. Outside View. Say “on the Inside View, this feels like the evidence is overwhelming; on the Outside View, it sounds like a classic conspiracy theory”. You don’t necessarily have to resolve this discomfort right away. You can walk around with an annoying knot in your beliefs, even if it’s not fun. Look for the strongest evidence against the idea. Keep in mind important possibilities like: Is it possible that everyone who disagrees with the idea is a bad mean cruel stupid person, but also, the idea really is false?
Letters From Bethlehem

Letters From Bethlehem is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 11, 2024 and October 11, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "She writes Letters From Bethlehem". It most often appears alongside AmandaFromBethlehem, Amedeo Rothson, analogfutures.substack.com.

Reference entry
Letters From Bethlehem
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
October 11, 2024
Last seen
October 11, 2024
October 11, 2024 · Original source
1st: Two Arms And A Head, reviewed by AmandaFromBethlehem. Amanda is active in the Philadelphia ACX community. She writes Letters From Bethlehem and is working on a novel. When she’s not writing existential horror, she is busy with home improvement projects.
Levitt 1996

Levitt 1996 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 27, 2024 and November 27, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "The best study here is probably Levitt 1996". It most often appears alongside Abrams 2012, ACLU, age-crime curve.

Reference entry
Levitt 1996
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
November 27, 2024
Last seen
November 27, 2024
November 27, 2024 · Original source
We previously predicted a similar increase in incarceration would lead to an 80% decrease in crime in the US, but El Salvador got a 95% decrease in crime. Why did they do so much better than our prediction? I think because they started with half our incarceration rate and ten times our murder rate. When you’re starting from someplace terrible, without any of the low-hanging fruit picked, it’s easy to make progress! I can’t find good statistics on other crimes like theft, but the crappy statistics I find say it hasn’t budged (1, 2). Why not? Either my statistics are bad, or the gangs that the government cracked down on weren’t in the theft business.4 Incapacitation Fine, so despite power laws there’s no way to easily solve crime just by imprisoning a small number of people. How much bang for the buck do we get by incapacitating criminals? You would think this would be easy to figure out: just determine how many crimes the marginal prisoner commits per year. Then that’s how many crimes incapacitation prevents per year. But although it’s easy to see how many times the marginal prisoner has been arrested, most crimes don’t result in arrest. How do you know how many crimes they really committed? Some bold scientists have tried asking them - giving prisoners surveys about their criminal histories - but obviously these should be greeted with heavy skepticism. The method criminologists have settled on is to wait for big shocks to incarceration - big enough to affect the general crime rate - then see how much the crime rate goes up or down. The best study here is probably Levitt 1996 (you may know Steven Levitt from Freakonomics). In the 1970s, US prisons were overcrowded. The ACLU argued the overcrowding was a rights violation - a form of “cruel and unusual punishment” - and sued a dozen states. They won all their lawsuits, and judges in all states said the government had to free prisoners until prison crowding returned to a non-cruel, usual level. So at a slightly different time in each state, many prisoners got released all at once. By examining the effects of this sudden release on the crime rate, we can determine how much crime the incarceration of those prisoners was preventing. Levitt does a lot of fancy statistics, and Roodman reanalyzes with even more fancy statistics, but the good news is they both agree and get numbers somewhat contrary to Roodman’s biases, which make me trust them more. Each year of imprisoning the type of prisoner who got released under the ACLU lawsuits prevented 6 property crimes and 1 violent crime. This suggests the average criminal commits ~7 crimes per year, which I think matches well with the data above showing that the median prisoner has 10 past arrests and some have 30+. Other studies on incapacitation, mostly taken from Roodman, that I trust less than Levitt: Owens (2009) investigated a Maryland law that caused some criminals to get released early. They found a crime increase corresponding to about 3 crimes per prisoner per year. This is lower than Levitt’s estimate of 7, but crime rates went down in general between Levitt’s study period (the 70s) and Owens’ (the 2000s), so they might both be right.
Liberalism Needs Community

Liberalism Needs Community is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 05, 2025 and August 05, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "last month he wrote Liberalism Needs Community". It most often appears alongside Amish, Bay Area rationalist community, Christian media.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 05, 2025
Last seen
August 05, 2025
August 05, 2025 · Original source
Francis Fukuyama is on Substack; last month he wrote Liberalism Needs Community. As always, read the whole thing and don’t trust my summary, but the key point is:
libertarian blogs

libertarian blogs is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 08, 2021 and August 08, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "In 2014, libertarian blogs were using it as an example of excessive FDA delay". It most often appears alongside 2013 NBC article: Drug Treatment Omegaven That Could Save Infant Lives Not Yet Approved By FDA, 9/11 trutherism, aducanumab.

Reference entry
libertarian blogs
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 08, 2021
Last seen
August 08, 2021
August 08, 2021 · Original source
That story would be wrong. In 2013, NBC ran an article called Drug Treatment Omegaven That Could Save Infant Lives Not Yet Approved By FDA. In 2014, libertarian blogs were using it as an example of excessive FDA delay - here’s one of them (search for “Bureaucratic Delay Endangers Lives”). Also in 2014, I personally learned about this for the first time, when writing my review of The Perfect Health Diet (I thought the book was generally bad, but it did alert me to this issue and the evidence supporting Omegaven). In 2016, my friend Eliezer Yudkowsky started writing a book about bureaucratic inefficiency that used the FDA failure to approve Omegaven as one of its central cases; in 2017, he published it as Inadequate Equilibria and I reviewed it here, including a mention of the Omegaven story. In January 2018, my friend Kelsey Piper also blogged about the FDA’s failure to approve Omegaven. Finally, in July 2018, the FDA finally approved the drug. I’ve been hearing about this story for so long that I thought I could recite it from memory (I was wrong, which is why I screwed up so many details in the original).
Lies To Tell Your Doctor

Lies To Tell Your Doctor is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 11, 2022 and November 11, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "using a deliberately eye-catching title (Lies To Tell Your Doctor) to get clicks". It most often appears alongside Aella, astral projection, Bayes.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
November 11, 2022
Last seen
November 11, 2022
November 11, 2022 · Original source
This person is using a deliberately eye-catching title (Lies To Tell Your Doctor) to get clicks. But if you read what they’re saying, it’s reasonable and honest! They’re saying “If you used to faint all the time, and then after making a bunch of difficult lifestyle changes you can now mostly avoid fainting, and your doctor asks ‘do you have a fainting problem yes/no’, answer yes!” THIS IS GOOD ADVICE.
LIFE magazine

LIFE magazine is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 19, 2025 and September 19, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "September 1945 issue of LIFE magazine". It most often appears alongside 1987, 1988, Adleman.

Reference entry
LIFE magazine
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 19, 2025
Last seen
September 19, 2025
September 19, 2025 · Original source
Science has provided the swiftest communication between individuals; it has provided a record of ideas and has enabled man to manipulate and to make extracts from that record so that knowledge evolves and endures throughout the life of a race rather than that of an individual.
Of course, they didn’t, and so Engelbart spent two years faffing around in the Philippines. He lived on a remote island with nothing to do but read and read and read. He spent his first five days camping out by a little stilt hut with a sign reading “Red Cross Library”—and in the Red Cross Library, there was a copy of the September 1945 issue of LIFE magazine in which Vannevar Bush’s description of the memex had been reprinted.
compilable "Command Meta Language" Live on stage, in the year 1968, Engelbart started up the NLS, opened a document, and typed some words into it. The words, he said, constituted a statement. And statements made up a file. Engelbart copied, manipulated, saved, and loaded his words and statements and files, zipping around with his newly-invented mouse. He demonstrated his ability to embed documents in one another—images with links to statements, words nested and categorized by one another, files filled with metadata. And then he paused, and the screen went blank. He explained that he and his colleagues at the ARC had been using this system to do their daily work for the last six months. He mentioned that they had, now, six consoles up and running. He showed the crowd a real document, then navigated to a statement within it. “This presentation is devoted to the AHIRC.” “What is the AHIRC?” he asked. Engelbart “froze” the initial statement, clicked on the acronym, and below the words “Augmented-Human-Intellect Research Center” appeared. He kept clicking and freezing, and a trail of nested and related information appeared—a list of funders, a graph of staffing over time, a mission statement. This was hypermedia. These were hyperlinks, he explained. NLS was a hypertext system. The presentation went on for 90 minutes longer, and became known as The Mother of All Demos.2 At around the 75-minute mark, Engelbart shows that two different NLS users could edit a single document simultaneously. While this was extremely impressive functionality, it was achieved with time-sharing—computation was done on a single machine, switching rapidly between tasks—and became infeasible the very next year, when ARPANET was released and the number of machines you could connect to one system grew rapidly. Engelbart’s hypertext system was impressive in its own right, even without collaborativity. And still, little came of it—Andy van Dam, an attendee and revolutionary computer scientist himself, would reflect decades later: “Everybody was blown away … and nothing else happened. There was almost no further impact.” Engelbart’s ideas were just a little too out there. ARC quickly faded into obscurity. In 1972, Engelbart joined an organization called Erhard Seminars Training. EST, or “est” as it was marketed, offered a 60-hour self-improvement course for tech entrepreneurs modeled loosely on Zen Buddhism. Critics suggested that the est course was a mind-control method aimed at raising an authoritarian army. It was quite credibly branded a cult. The founder of est, Werner Erhard, was accused of tax fraud (he fought the claims and won $200,000 from the IRS) and incest (by his daughter, who later recanted). Engelbart served, for many years, on est’s board of directors. His researchers all left for greener, less cult-y pastures, and ARC died with hardly a whimper. No one really wanted to associate with Engelbart. His crackpot theories about an internet modeled after the memex fell into disrepute, and, if he was remembered at all, it was for the invention of the mouse. No one cared anymore about the memex, or hypertext. 3. Hyper-dreams of Hyper-everything Well, one man cared. Ted Nelson was born in 1937 to two twenty-year-olds, Ralph Nelson and Celeste Holm. His parents divorced in 1939, leaving him to be raised by his grandparents. Both Nelson (the elder) and Holm would go on to extremely-successful film careers: the former became an Emmy-winning director; the latter an Oscar-winning actress. And, at first, Ted seemed to be following in their footsteps. As a philosophy major at Swarthmore College, he produced a film called The Epiphany of Slocum Furlow, which he described as “a short comedy about loneliness at college and the meaning of life.”3 Nelson also claims to have “[d]irected [and written] book and lyrics for what was apparently the first rock musical” in his junior year at Swarthmore. Thankfully, his interest in a career as an entertainer soon waned, and Nelson went off to study sociology in grad school—first at the University of Chicago, then at Harvard. Nelson took a computer class at Harvard, in 1960, and “[his] world exploded.”4 He realized the incredible power of computing, quickly intuited that these new machines could be generally applied to everything, and founded Project Xanadu.5 Initially, Xanadu’s scope was pretty limited. Word processors weren’t around yet, but Nelson wanted to build something strikingly similar: he wanted to write a program that could store and display documents, with version histories and edits all stored and displayed at the same time too. Later, Nelson would call this version-history feature “intercomparison.” (Strange coinages will be a… theme; I’m just trying to get you ready.) Nelson began working on an implementation, but his feature wishlist grew quickly, and he didn’t really know what he was doing, so in 1965, he sought help. He prepared a talk for the Association for Computing Machinery, and dropped, quite frankly, a bomb on the audience: The kinds of file structures required if we are to use the computer for personal files and as an adjunct to creativity are wholly different in character from those customary in business and scientific data processing. They need to provide the capacity for intricate and idiosyncratic arrangements, total modifiability, undecided alternatives, and thorough internal documentation. The original idea was to make a file for writers and scientists, much like the personal side of Bush's Memex, that would do the things such people need with the richness they would want. But there are so many possible specific functions that the mind reels. These uses and considerations become so complex that the only answer is a simple and generalized building-block structure, user-oriented and wholly general-purpose. The resulting file structure is explained and examples of its use are given. Ted Nelson was building the memex. Of course, he wasn’t a very technical guy, and so his talk mostly focused on the philosophy of Xanadu, not its implementation. He commented (emphasis mine): There are three false or inadequate theories of how writing is properly done. The first is that writing is a matter of inspiration. While inspiration is useful, it is rarely enough in itself. “Writing is 10% inspiration, 90% perspiration,” is a common saying. But this leads us to the second false theory, that “writing consists of applying the seat of the pants to the seat of the chair.” Insofar as sitting facilitates work, this view seems reasonable, but it also suggests that what is done while sitting is a matter of comparative indifference; probably not. The third false theory is that all you really need is a good outline, created on prior consideration, and that if the outline is correctly followed the required text will be produced. For most good writers this theory is quite wrong. Rarely does the original outline predict well what headings and sequence will create the effects desired: the balance of emphasis, sequence of interrelating points, texture of insight, rhythm, etc. We may better call the outlining process inductive: certain interrelations appear to the author in the material itself, some at the outset and some as he works. He can only decide which to emphasize, which to use as unifying ideas and principles, and which to slight or delete, by trying. Outlines in general are spurious, made up after the fact by examining the segmentation of a finished work. If a finished work clearly follows an outline, that outline probably has been hammered out of many inspirations, comparisons and tests. Between the inspirations, then, and during the sitting, the task of writing is one of rearrangement and reprocessing, and the real outline develops slowly. The original crude or fragmentary texts created at the outset generally undergo many revision processes before they are finished. Intellectually they are pondered, juxtaposed, compared, adapted, transposed, and judged; mechanically they are copied, overwritten with revision markings, rearranged and copied again. This cycle may be repeated many times. The whole grows by trial and error in the processes of arrangement, comparison and retrenchment. Nelson recognized that the creation of knowledge is cyclical, recursive, self-referential. And he figured that our computer systems should accept and reflect that process: If a writer is really to be helped by an automated system, it ought to do more than retype and transpose: it should stand by him during the early periods of muddled confusion, when his ideas are scraps, fragments, phrases, and contradictory overall designs. And it must help him through to the final draft with every feasible mechanical aid—making the fragments easy to find, and making easier the tentative sequencing and juxtaposing and comparing. How do you design such a system? To navigate intuitively within complex file systems, between document versions, and across source materials—to access all the scraps and fragments writers need to write—you would need to establish what Vannevar Bush called “tracks.” You would need to connect and save different ideas, linking them together. That was it—you needed links. Nelson went further, though—it wouldn’t do to simply have links to all the other files, a writer needed to see the other files before him, needed them to be brought up and displayed alongside his current work on demand. The links needed to contain their targets within themselves—so Nelson called them hyperlinks. And he called text embedded with hyperlinks hypertext, and movies embedded in his structure became hyperfilms, and so on. Nelson wanted us using computers to write and create self-referential, intricately-interconnected (“intertwingled,” as he’d later put it), eminently-accessible hypermedia. And recall, in 1965, state-of-the-art computing looked like this. Ted Nelson was thinking far, far ahead. Maybe too far ahead. Conference attendees were initially excited about his idea, but when he revealed himself to know very little about the technical task of building Xanadu—or even whether it was possible at all—interest evaporated. 4. Failing to Develop Xanadu But Nelson was all in. He would later write, “This is not a technical issue, but rather moral, aesthetic and conceptual.” Nelson loved knowledge and connection and abstraction—mere technical details wouldn’t stop him from building the best possible computer system for producing and consuming information. He met Doug Engelbart in the mid 60s, forming a friendship with the only other man taking hypertext seriously at the time, and hopped around unhappily between various academic and scientific appointments. At one point, he and Andy van Dam worked together and produced the Hypertext Editing System—released in 1967, just before Engelbart’s NLS. It was the first computer application to ever have an “undo” button—Nelson claims to this day that he invented it (and the “back” button). Shortly thereafter, Nelson’s wife left him. In his 2010 autobiography, he writes, “She, reasonably, wanted a Nice Life; women want that sort of thing.” They had a son, whom Nelson continued to visit regularly. “Debbie has been a friend and great support all these years,” Nelson adds. “[S]he believed in me.” Nelson gave a talk at Union Theological Seminary in 1968 that included this slide, which Nelson considers “the first depiction of what the personal computer turned out to be.” “About six years later they started building computers like this at Xerox PARC.” Around the same time, Nelson claims to have called Vannevar Bush and told him about Project Xanadu. Bush “wanted very much to discuss it with” Nelson, but Nelson “hated him instantly [because] he sounded like a sports coach” and never contacted him again. This, of course, proved to be extremely self-destructive (though I can’t honestly say I would’ve done otherwise). Because Xanadu was as good as dead. No one would give him the money he needed to work on it, especially not after Doug Engelbart poisoned the idea of hypertext. Nelson went where there was funding, working briefly on an early word processor called Juggler of Text (JOT). …And then he lost investment, stopped working on the project, and moved to Chicago, where he’d been offered a job teaching at the University of Illinois, to start work on a book. He would call it Computer Lib. In fact, he started work on another book at the same time, called Dream Machines. By the time he completed each of them, in 1974, ARPANET had been released, and his vision for Project Xanadu had evolved. He published the two works together—Computer Lib was his lamentation over the industry’s disdain for hypertext, and Dream Machines was Xanadu’s manifesto. Nelson designed and printed the book himself. Its pages mostly look like this: Self-referential, multimedia, creative, and fun—they were a blueprint for the internet he was building. In the Dream Machines half, Nelson writes, “The real dream is for ‘everything’ to be in the hypertext. Everything you read, you read from the screen (and can always get back to right away; everything you write, you write at the screen (and can cross-link to whatever you read).” In one section Nelson asks himself, “Can It Be Done?” His answer: “I dunno.” Remember, Xanadu wouldn’t only involve links between works—it required hyperlinks, which as Nelson understood them, would need to contain the targets in themselves. (Eventually, Nelson would give these embeddings a new name—“transclusions”—and hyperlink came to simply mean “link between hypertext files.”) Every link would run both ways, each hypertext file would know exactly which other files were linked to it and how. This introduced a few problems, in the new interconnected ARPANET age: How do you keep track? Where’s the metadata stored? Can you afford enough space for it all?
Lifespan

Lifespan is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between December 02, 2021 and December 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "An unexpectedly lovely kabbalistic correspondence on Lifespan’s cover". It most often appears alongside Alexandre Gueniot, Algernon’s Law, Alzheimers.

Reference entry
Lifespan
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
December 02, 2021
Last seen
December 02, 2021
December 02, 2021 · Original source
David Sinclair - Harvard professor, celebrity biologist, and author of Lifespan - thinks solving aging will be easy. “Aging is going to be remarkably easy to tackle. Easier than cancer” are his exact words, which is maybe less encouraging than he thinks.
Epigenetic damage could potentially still be unfixable: how do you convince the thousands of different intermixed cell types in the body to all be the right type again? But Sinclair thinks the body already has a mechanism for doing this: epigenetic repair proteins called sirtuins. I’m a bit confused about where sirtuins are getting their information from: is there a backup copy of epigenetics that they read to figure out what’s wrong and needs repair? I get the impression from one or two cryptic statements that Sinclair thinks maybe yes (see the discussion of “the observer” on page 171). But for some reason, the system works well enough to keep you alive for the normal human lifespan (and no better).
If you want to live longer, can you just add more sirtuins? These people say they gave mice a gene that caused them to overproduce sirtuins, and the mice lived 30% longer. Other people have tried the same experiment in worms, fruit flies, etc, with controversial but generally positive results.
Limelihood

Limelihood is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 29, 2024 and May 29, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "comments...from Limelihood and Radford Neal". It most often appears alongside @ElytraMithra, Aaron, ACX.

Reference entry
Limelihood
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 29, 2024
Last seen
May 29, 2024
May 29, 2024 · Original source
20: Related: good discussion of Lindley’s Paradox in the comments of the Hanson/medicine post, from Limelihood and Radford Neal. My understand: the paradox only causes problems if you assume the true effect is quite likely to be zero. Then if you get an effect of (let’s say) 0.1, you think “nah, it’s probably just zero with some noise”. This is a hackish way of representing the idea of “the null hypothesis”. But since the effect of health insurance is probably not exactly zero (it probably comes from some benefit of good treatments, minus some cost of bad treatments) we probably don’t have to worry. I might be explaining it wrong, read the comments.
Liminal Revolutions

Liminal Revolutions is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 18, 2023 and September 18, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "Liminal Revolutions ( blog ) writes:". It most often appears alongside 787, adderallposting, ADL.

Reference entry
Liminal Revolutions
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 18, 2023
Last seen
September 18, 2023
September 18, 2023 · Original source
Liminal Revolutions (blog) writes:
Lines Composed In A Fake Sequoia Forest

Lines Composed In A Fake Sequoia Forest is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 16, 2026 and March 16, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "New subscribers-only post, Lines Composed In A Fake Sequoia Forest". It most often appears alongside 1790, Astralcodexten Com, Caral.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
March 16, 2026
Last seen
March 16, 2026
March 16, 2026 · Original source
4: New subscribers-only post, Lines Composed In A Fake Sequoia Forest. If you see a beautiful photo, and later learn it was AI-generated, are you harmed? What is the harm?
Links At Length: Democratic Socialists’ Budget Crisis

Links At Length: Democratic Socialists’ Budget Crisis is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 14, 2025 and January 14, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Links At Length: Democratic Socialists’ Budget Crisis". It most often appears alongside Astral Codex Ten, Biden, Contra The Atlantic On Polyamory.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
January 14, 2025
Last seen
January 14, 2025
January 14, 2025 · Original source
Links At Length: Democratic Socialists’ Budget Crisis. Haha, socialists bad with money, but can we learn anything more interesting from this?
List of EA funding opportunities

List of EA funding opportunities is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between January 03, 2022 and January 03, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "List of EA funding opportunities: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/DqwxrdyQxcMQ8P2rD/list-of-ea-funding-opportunities". It most often appears alongside EA Funds, EA Infrastructure Fund, Eliezer.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
January 03, 2022
Last seen
January 03, 2022
January 03, 2022 · Original source
List of EA funding opportunities: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/DqwxrdyQxcMQ8P2rD/list-of-ea-funding-opportunities
List Of Mass Panic Cases

List Of Mass Panic Cases is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 01, 2025 and October 01, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "“Mass hallucination” on Wikipedia redirects to List Of Mass Panic Cases. The Miracle of the Sun is on there". It most often appears alongside 1910s Portugal, 1999 British eclipse, 2017 US eclipse.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
October 01, 2025
Last seen
October 01, 2025
October 01, 2025 · Original source
We come to the unpromisingly-titled Derivation of equations of the model of the dynamic behavior of the three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces, in which Artur Wiroski argues that Fatima was a three-dimensional atmospheric cloud of electrically charged ice crystals under the influence of electrostatic forces. Actually, he offhandedly mentions Fatima in three sentences, with the majority of the paper looking more like the image above - but he eventually makes it into a Guardian article where he emphasizes that yes, he is trying to explain the miracle of the sun. However, if I’m understanding him correctly, he says that his theoretical ice crystal phenomenon can only happen when the sun is at an altitude below 22 degrees. But during the Fatima miracle, the sun was at 42 degrees (and Dalleur’s mysterious light source was at 30 degrees), so none of this applies. I’ve tried to include pictures of all the phenomena I mention in this section. I failed for this one, because it’s never been spotted or photographed. It’s just some incredibly weird thing that one scientist says ice crystals might do if parameters were ever exactly right, with such a precise definition of “exactly right” that it’s never happened in real life. If it ever did happen, it probably wouldn’t be at exactly the moment predicted by child-seers several months in advance. 2.3: Everyone’s Mad Here Except You And Me Another common response calls the Sun Miracle a “mass hallucination”. Can 70,000 people really hallucinate the same thing? “Mass hallucination” on Wikipedia redirects to List Of Mass Panic Cases. The Miracle of the Sun is on there, but listed as “(disputed)” - the only item to earn such a parenthetical. The other fifty items mostly belong to three categories: A disease with unusual symptoms spreads through a population; doctors eventually pronounce it psychosomatic.
List Of Top US Causes Of Death

List Of Top US Causes Of Death is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between March 31, 2026 and March 31, 2026. The archive places it in contexts such as "can’t bring themselves to care about anything on the List Of Top US Causes Of Death". It most often appears alongside 9-11, COVID pandemic, Dave Barry.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
March 31, 2026
Last seen
March 31, 2026
March 31, 2026 · Original source
Maybe there is some possible comparison where some altruist cares about some set of foreigners more than a comparable set of countrymen? The war in Gaza killed 50,000 people, but the opioid crisis kills a bit over 50,000 Americans per year - is everyone who cares about Gaza exactly equally concerned about the opioid crisis? No, but there’s a better explanation - people care about dramatic deaths in big explosions more than boring health crises, regardless of where they happen. Everyone, lib and con alike, cared more about 9-11 than about a hundred opioid crises, even though the former only killed 4% as many people as the latter. And even the people who care about the opioid crisis usually can’t bring themselves to care about anything on the List Of Top US Causes Of Death, which are all extra-boring things like diabetes. Once you match like to like, nope, it’s pretty hard to find a “telescopic altruism” example that stands out from the general background of people having weird priorities.
List of U.S. states and territories by carbon dioxide emissions

List of U.S. states and territories by carbon dioxide emissions is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 25, 2021 and August 25, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions". It most often appears alongside AP News, Associated Press, Bitcoin.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 25, 2021
Last seen
August 25, 2021
August 25, 2021 · Original source
24. Sources conflict a lot here, probably because a lot depends on what you hold constant (eg if you move from the suburbs to the city while keeping the same sized house and car, you might not save much carbon, but realistically city-dwellers have smaller houses and cars). The extreme low estimate is represented by https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-22/suburbs-might-be-just-as-green-as-cities , which is not sure suburbanites emit any more carbon at all, because suburban households are larger and so their carbon expenses (like heating, cars, etc) are divided over more people when producing a per capita estimate. But a very literal estimate - taking the average carbon output of an urbanite vs. a suburbanite - produces high numbers more like the one I listed. For example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions claims that Washington DC inhabitants produce only 4 tons of carbon yearly, much less than the US standard of 16; NYC claims its residents only produce 6 tons. I've backed off slightly from these estimates to reflect uncertainty and the fact that most cities are less dense than NYC and DC.
Litany Coroner

Litany Coroner is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 23, 2024 and August 23, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "one of the final publications of the now-appropriately-named “Litany Coroner”". It most often appears alongside A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste, A Hymn to God the Father, Alabama.

Reference entry
Litany Coroner
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 23, 2024
Last seen
August 23, 2024
August 23, 2024 · Original source
Throughout the early 30s, the student newspaper of the University of British Columbia (affectionately named the ‘Ubyssey’) would run various comic poems and light verse in a recurring feature, alternately titled “Litany Coroner”, “POME”, or in one case, “Poetic Ballyhoo” (featuring GK Chesterton, who probably would have approved of being there). These poems were, mostly, submitted by students, and can’t be found anywhere else online. They were, mostly, written with traditional rhyme and metre, with some free verse here and there. They were, mostly, not the highest-caliber poems you’ll ever read.
And the Ubyssey inadvertently buried them with one of the final publications of the now-appropriately-named “Litany Coroner”.
Literary Substack

Literary Substack is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 30, 2025 and October 30, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "I read Literary Substack sometimes". It most often appears alongside 767 AD, @Scientific_Bird, ACX.

Reference entry
Literary Substack
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
October 30, 2025
Last seen
October 30, 2025
October 30, 2025 · Original source
38: Eliezer and Nate’s book If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies is now out and is an NYT bestseller. Authors’ Atlantic article here (paywalled). Online resources/FAQ/answers to objections here. My review here. Peter Wildeford’s review here. Mostly negative Asterisk review here, criticisms/arguments about the Asterisk review here, Eliezer’s response to this line of criticism here (X). I thought all the reviews, positive and negative, had something useful to say - except the NYT review, which was remarkably bad (Steven Adler points out that it accuses the book of failing to define the term “superintelligence”, but it very explicitly does that on page 4). I read Literary Substack sometimes, and I am so confused - it seems like there’s this entire ecosystem of Ivy graduates who spend years backstabbing each other in order to win the one bigshot publication book reviewer slot, and then the 1/1000 who reach this exalted position phone it in and don’t even read the books they’re reviewing.
Literotica

Literotica is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between February 16, 2022 and February 16, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "like on Literotica". It most often appears alongside Abercrombie & Fitch, Athenian democracy, Athenians.

Reference entry
Literotica
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
February 16, 2022
Last seen
February 16, 2022
February 16, 2022 · Original source
And - why do people like porn? I’m not asking for answers of the form “it has hot sex”, I mean why is porn better than imagining the hot sex, in your head? “My imagination isn’t as high-definition as a real computer screen.” But lots of people like story porn, like on Literotica. “But that’s more creative than they can come up with themselves”. My impression is that people can use the same story over and over - the words on the page seem to have power even when realistically they’ve memorized all the sexual beats by now. Teach writes: “Porn doesn’t depict fetishes - porn is your fetish.” This seems totally insane and also I can’t rule it out.
Locating the engram: Should we look for plastic synapses or information-storing molecules?

Locating the engram: Should we look for plastic synapses or information-storing molecules? is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 12, 2025 and September 12, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "“ Locating the engram: Should we look for plastic synapses or information-storing molecules? ” Langille and Gallistel, Neurobiology of Learning and Memory (2020)". It most often appears alongside A Change of Heart, Abraham, Adams.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 12, 2025
Last seen
September 12, 2025
September 12, 2025 · Original source
“Locating the engram: Should we look for plastic synapses or information-storing molecules?”
Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between July 21, 2021 and July 21, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know is the most ambitious post I've tried to write". It most often appears alongside Democrats, Euler, Republicans.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
July 21, 2021
Last seen
July 21, 2021
July 21, 2021 · Original source
Lockdown Effectiveness: Much More Than You Wanted To Know is the most ambitious post I've tried to write since starting the new blog.
Logos Audio

Logos Audio is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 15, 2023 and September 15, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "uploads these mp3 files under a Creative Commons license to his website Logos Audio". It most often appears alongside @campeters4, A Strange Dream, a_reader.

Reference entry
Logos Audio
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 15, 2023
Last seen
September 15, 2023
September 15, 2023 · Original source
Simulacra, reviewed by Matthew Pagan. He is an infrastructure engineer who publishes poetry and short fiction to his Substack Captive Liberty. He occasionally produces AI-read audiobooks of public domain literature (or of literature from which he has received publisher permission); he uploads these mp3 files under a Creative Commons license to his website Logos Audio.
Logue study

Logue study is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 02, 2021 and September 02, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "This was similar methodology to the Logue study". It most often appears alongside 1DaySooner, AC&E, AcesoUnderGlass.

Reference entry
Logue study
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 02, 2021
Last seen
September 02, 2021
September 02, 2021 · Original source
Haverfall et al in Sweden found that 26% of people with previous non-hospital-grade COVID, and 9% of a control group, reported long COVID-esque symptoms after 2 months. After 8 months, this was down to 15% and 3%. I’m not sure why the control group decreased; maybe it was about symptoms that had lasted the whole time, and not point prevalence? Anyway, this was similar methodology to the Logue study, but finds a somewhat lower prevalence. Maybe this is because this study was on healthcare workers, who are generally high-functioning people and who probably did a good job treating their COVID infections? I don’t know, but a lot of these things are really sensitive to how you ask questions and I don’t find the small difference too mysterious.
Long-Termism Vs. Existential Risk

Long-Termism Vs. Existential Risk is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 23, 2022 and August 23, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "I wrote a post about this on the EA Forum recently, called Long-Termism Vs. Existential Risk". It most often appears alongside 80,000 Hours, abolitionist literature, AI.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 23, 2022
Last seen
August 23, 2022
August 23, 2022 · Original source
But this is a selfish preference coming from the part of me that wants to see philosophers have interesting fights. Most of me agrees with MacAskill’s boring good-PR point: long-termism rarely gives different answers from near-termism. In fact, I wrote a post about this on the EA Forum recently, called Long-Termism Vs. Existential Risk:
Lord of the Rings

Lord of the Rings is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between May 28, 2021 and May 28, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as ""A Game of Thrones a more 'grounded' Lord of the Rings."". It most often appears alongside A Game of Thrones, Africa, African Americans.

Reference entry
Lord of the Rings
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
May 28, 2021
Last seen
May 28, 2021
May 28, 2021 · Original source
Now Curtis has cunningly compared an extremely specific (chained to a radiator) with a much more general (falling in love). But the numbers still work if you widen his point out to all kidnappings. Or all serious crime. This kind of thing is everywhere - George R. R. Martin is fond of calling A Game of Thrones a more 'grounded' Lord of the Rings. It's actually drastically less real, just nastier.
Loss Of Loss Aversion

Loss Of Loss Aversion is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between August 30, 2021 and August 30, 2021. The archive places it in contexts such as "Gal & Rucker’s Loss Of Loss Aversion". It most often appears alongside Acceptable Losses, Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion, Alex Imas.

Reference entry
Loss Of Loss Aversion
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
August 30, 2021
Last seen
August 30, 2021
August 30, 2021 · Original source
I find I usually click the third box on both. I want to tip generously, but giving the maximum possible tip seems profligate. Surely the third box is the right compromise. I recently noticed that this is insane. For a $35 meal, I’m giving GrubHub drivers $3 and UberEats drivers $7 for the same service (or maybe there’s some difference between their services which makes UberEats suggest the higher tip - but if there is, I don’t know about it and it doesn’t affect my decision). Again, this is Behavioral Economics 101 - in particular, one of the many biases lumped together under menu effects. Instead of being a rational economic actor who values food delivery at a certain price, I’m trying to be a third-box-of-four kind of guy. That means that whoever is in charge of this menu has lots of power over the specific dollar amount I give. Not infinite power - if the third box said $1000 I would notice and refuse. But enough power that “nudging” seems like a fair description. Nobody believes studies anymore, which is fair. I trust in a salvageable core of behavioral economics and “nudgenomics” because I can feel in my bones that they’re true for me and the people around me. Let’s move on to Hreha’s article and see if we can square it with my belief in a “salvageable core”. II. Yechaim’s Historical Detective Story Hreha writes: The biggest replication failures relate to the field's most important idea: loss aversion. To be honest, this was a finding that I lost faith in well before the most recent revelations (from 2018-2020). Why? Because I've run studies looking at its impact in the real world—especially in marketing campaigns. If you read anything about this body of research, you'll get the idea that losses are such powerful motivators that they'll turn otherwise uninterested customers into enthusiastic purchasers. The truth of the matter is that losses and benefits are equally effective in driving conversion. In fact, in many circumstances, losses are actually *worse* at driving results. Why? Because loss-focused messaging often comes across as gimmicky and spammy. It makes you, the advertiser, look desperate. It makes you seem untrustworthy, and trust is the foundation of sales, conversion, and retention. "So is loss aversion completely bogus?" Not quite. It turns out that loss aversion does exist, but only for large losses. This makes sense. We *should* be particularly wary of decisions that can wipe us out. That's not a so-called "cognitive bias". It's not irrational. In fact, it's completely sensical. If a decision can destroy you and/or your family, it's sane to be cautious. "So when did we discover that loss aversion exists only for large losses?" Well, actually, it looks like Kahneman and Tversky, winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics, knew about this unfortunate fact when they were developing Prospect Theory—their grand theory with loss aversion at its center. Unfortunately, the findings rebutting their view of loss aversion were carefully omitted from their papers, and other findings that went against their model were misrepresented so that they would instead support their pet theory. In short: any data that didn't fit Prospect Theory was dismissed or distorted. I don't know what you'd call this behavior... but it's not science. This shady behavior by the two titans of the field was brought to light in a paper published in 2018: "Acceptable Losses: The Debatable Origins of Loss Aversion". I encourage you to read the paper. It's shocking. This line from the abstract sums things up pretty well: "...the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it." When the two biggest scientists in your field are accused of "systemic misrepresentation", you know you've got a serious problem. Which leads us to another paper, published in 2018, entitled "The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?". The paper's authors did a comprehensive review of the loss aversion literature and came to the following conclusion: "current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains." Yikes. But given the questionable origins of the field, it's not surprising that its foundational finding is *also* dubious. If loss aversion can't be trusted, then no other idea in the field can be trusted. This argument relies on two papers - Yechaim’s Acceptable Losses and Gal & Rucker’s Loss Of Loss Aversion. Yechaim’s paper is a historical detective story. It looks at how Kahneman and Tversky first “discovered” and popularized the idea of loss aversion from earlier 1950s and 1960s research. It concludes they did a bad job summarizing this earlier research; looked at carefully, it doesn’t support the strong conclusions they drew. From one perspective, nobody should care about this. All the 1950s and 1960s research was terrible - one of the most important studies it discusses had n = 7. Since then, we’ve had much more rigorous studies of tens of thousands of people. All that hinges on Yechaim’s paper is whether Kahneman and Tversky were personally bad people. Hreha thinks they were. He calls their behavior “shady”, “shocking”, and says they “systematically misrepresented findings to support their pet theory…I don't know what you'd call this behavior... but it's not science.” Again, nothing important really hinges on this, but I feel like fighting about it, so let’s look deeper anyway. Here’s how Yechaim summarizes his accusation against K&T: In addition, the results of several studies seem to have been misrepresented by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Galenter and Pliner (1974) were wrongly cited as showing loss aversion, whereas, in fact, they did not observe an asymmetry in the pleasantness ratings of gains and losses. Likewise, in Green (1963), the results were argued to show loss aversion, even though this study did not involve any losses. In addition, the objective outcomes for some of the participants in Grayson (1960) were transformed by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) so as to better support a model assuming different curvatures for gains and losses (see Table 1). Finally, studies showing no loss aversion or suggesting aversion to large losses were not cited in Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) or in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Yechaim bases his argument on three sets of early studies of loss aversion: Galenter and Plinter (1974), Fishburn and Kochenberger’s review (1979) and miscellaneous others. —Galenter and Plinter— is actually really neat! It explores “cross-modal” perceptions of gains versus losses. That is, if you ask how much a certain loss hurt, people will probably just say something like “I dunno, a little?” and then it will be hard to turn that into a p-value. G&P solve this by making people listen to loud noises, and asking questions like “is the difference between how much loss A and loss B hurt greater or lesser than the difference between the volume of noise 1 and noise 2?” The idea is that the brain uses a bunch of weird non-numerical scales for everything, and we understand its weird-non-numerical scale for noise volume pretty well, and so maybe we can compare it to how people think about gains or losses. I don’t know why people in 1974 were doing anything this complicated instead of inventing the basic theory of loss aversion the way Kahneman and Tversky would five years later, but here we are. Anyway, Yechaim concludes that this study failed to find loss aversion: Summing up their findings, Galenter and Pliner (1974) reported as follows: “We now turn to the question of the possible asymmetry of the positive and negative limbs of the utility function. On the basis of intuition and anecdote, one would expect the negative limb of the utility function to decrease more sharply than the positive limb increases... what we have observed if anything is an asymmetry of much less magnitude than would have been expected ... the curvature of the function does not change in going from positive to negative” (p. 75). Thus, our search for the historical foundations of loss aversion turns into a dead end on this particular branch: Galenter and Pliner (1974) did not observe such an asymmetry; and their study was quoted erroneously [by Kahneman and Tversky]. I looked for the full text of Galenter and Pliner, but could not find it. I was however able to find the first two pages, including the abstract. The way Galenter and Pliner summarize their own research is: Cross-modality matching of hypothetical increments of money against loudness recover the previously proposed exponent of the utility function for money within a few percent. Similar cross-modality matching experiments for decrements give a disutility exponent of 0.59, larger than the utility exponent for increments. This disutility exponent was checked by an additional cross-modality matching experiment against the disutility of drinking various concentrations of a bitter solution. The parameter estimated in this fashion was 0.63. If I understand the bolded part right, the abstract seems to be saying that they did find loss aversion! I was also able to find the Google Books listing for the book that the study was published in. Its summary is: Three experiments were conducted in which monetary increments and decrements were matched to either the loudness of a tone or the bitterness of various concentrations of sucrose octa-acetate. An additional experiment involving ratio estimates of monetary loss is also reported. Results confirm that the utility function for both monetary increments and decrements is a power function with exponents less than one. The data further suggest that the exponent of the disutility function is larger than that of the utility function, i.e., the rate of change of 'unhappiness' caused by monetary losses is greater than the comparable rate of 'happiness' produced by monetary gains. (Author). Again, the way the book is summarized (apparently by the author) says this study does prove loss aversion. Without being able to access the full study, I’m not sure what’s going on. Possibly the study found loss aversion, but it was less than expected? Still, I feel like Yechaim should have mentioned this. At the very least, it decreases Kahneman and Tversky’s crime from “lied about a study to support their pet theory” to “credulously believed the authors’ own summary of their results and didn’t dig deeper”. But also, why did the authors believe their study showed loss aversion? Why does Yechaim disagree? Without being able to access the full paper, I’m not sure. —Green 1963— is the second study that Yechaim accuses K&T of misrepresenting. Here’s how K&T cite this study in their paper: It is of interest that the main properties ascribed to the value function have been observed in a detailed analysis of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for changes of wealth (Fishburn and Kochenberger [14]). The functions had been obtained from thirty decision makers in various fields of business, in five independent studies [5, 18, 19, 21, 40]. Most utility functions for gains were concave, most functions for losses were convex, and only three individuals exhibited risk aversion for both gains and losses. With a single exception, utility functions were considerably steeper for losses than for gains. Green 1963 is footnote 19. So K&T don’t even mention it by name. They mention it as one of several studies that a review article called Fishburn and Kochenberger analyzes. F&K are reviewing a bunch of studies of executives. In each study, a very small number of executives (usually about 5-10 per study) make a hypothetical business decision comparing gains and losses, for example: Suppose your company is being sued for patent infringement. Your lawyer’s best judgement is that your chances of winning the suit are 50–50; if you win, you will lose nothing, but if you lose, it will cost the company $1,000,000. Your opponent has offered to settle out of court for $200,000. Would you fight or settle? Then they ask the same question with a bunch of other numbers, and plot implied utility functions for each executive based on the answer. Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)
Green is one of these five studies, and it does superficially find loss aversion. But Fishburn and Kochenberger have done something weird. They argue that “loss” and “gain” aren’t necessarily objective, and usually correspond to “loss relative to some reference frame” (so far, so good). In order to figure out where the reference frame is, they assume that the neutral point is wherever “something unusual happens to the individual’s utility function” (F&K’s words). So they shift the zero point separating losses and gains to wherever the utility function looks most interesting! After doing this, they find “loss aversion”, ie the utility curve changes its slope at the transition between the loss side and the gain side. But since the transition was deliberately shifted to wherever the utility curve changed slope, this is almost tautological. It isn’t quite tautological: it’s interesting that most of the utility curves had a sharp transition zone, and it’s interesting that the transition was in the direction of loss-aversion rather than gain-seeking. But it’s tautological enough to be embarrassing. Still, this is Fishburn and Kochenberger’s embarrassment, not Kahneman and Tversky’s. And Fishburn and Kochenberger included this study in their review alongside several other studies that didn’t do this to the same degree. Kahneman and Tversky just cited the review article. I don’t think citing a review article that does weird things to a study really qualifies as “systematic misrepresentation.” I guess I’m having a hard time figuring out how angry to be, because everything about Fishburn and Kochenberger is terrible. The average study in F&K includes results from 5-10 executives. But the studies are pretty open about the fact that they interviewed more executives than this, threw away the ones who gave boring answers, and just published results from the interesting ones. Then they moved the axes to wherever looked most interesting. Then they used all this to draw sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Then F&K combined five studies that did this into a review article, without protesting any of it. And then K&T cited the review article, again without protesting. I have to imagine that all of this was normal by the standards of the time. I have looked up all these people and they were all esteemed scientists in their own day. And I believe the evidence shows K&T summarized F&K faithfully. Shouldn’t they have avoided citing F&K at all? Seems like the same kind of question as “Shouldn’t Pythagoras have published his theorem in a peer-reviewed journal, instead of moving to Italy, starting a cult, and exposing his thigh at the Olympic Games as part of a scheme to convince people he was the god Apollo?” Yes, but the past was a weird place. As best I can tell, K&T’s citation of G&P agrees with the authors’ own assessment of their results. Their citation of F&K agrees with the reviewers’ assessment and with a charitable reading of most of the studies involved, although those studies are terrible in many ways which are obvious to modern readers. I would urge people interested in the whodunit question to read Kahneman and Tversky’s original paper. I think it paints the picture of a team very interested in their own results and in theory, and citing other people only incidentally, and in accordance with the scientific standards of their time. I don’t feel a need to tar them as “misrepresenters”. III. Okay, But Is Loss Aversion Real? Remember, all that is about the personal deficiencies of Kahneman and Tversky. Realistically there have been hundreds of much better studies on loss aversion in the forty years since they wrote their article, so we should be looking at those. Here Hreha cites Gal & Rucker: The Loss Of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? It’s a great 2018 paper that looks at recent evidence and concludes that loss aversion doesn’t exist. But it’s a very specific, interesting type of nonexistence, which I think the Hreha article fails to capture. G&R are happy to admit that in many, many cases, people behave in loss-averse ways, including most of the classic examples given by Kahneman and Tversky. They just think that this is because of other cognitive biases, not a specific cognitive bias called “loss aversion”. They especially emphasize Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect. Status Quo Bias is where you prefer inaction to action. Suppose you ask someone “Would you bet on a coin flip, where you get $60 if heads and lose $40 if tails?”. They say no. This deviates from rational expectations, and one way to think of this is loss aversion; the prospect of losing $40 feels “bigger” than the prospect of gaining $60. But another way to think of it is as a bias towards inaction - all else being equal, people prefer not to make bets, and you’d need a higher payoff to overcome their inertia. Endowment Effect is where you value something you already have more than something you don’t. Suppose someone would pay $5 to prevent their coffee mug from being taken away from them, but (in an alternative universe where they lack a coffee mug) would only pay $3 to buy one. You can think of this as loss aversion (the grief of losing a coffee mug feels “bigger” than the joy of gaining one). Or you can think of it as endowment (once you have the coffee mug, it’s yours and you feel like defending it). These are really fine distinctions; I had to read the section a few times before the difference between loss aversion and endowment effect really made sense to me. Kahneman and Tversky just sort of threw all all this stuff out and saw what stuck and didn’t necessarily try super hard to make sure none of the biases they discovered were entirely explainable as combinations of some of the others. G&R think maybe loss aversion is. They do some clever work setting up situations that test loss aversion but not status quo or endowment - for example, offering a risky bet vs. a safer bet. Here they find no evidence for loss aversion as a separate force from the other two biases. Somewhere in this process, they did an experiment where they gave participants a quarter minted in Denver and asked them if they wanted to exchange it for a quarter minted in Philadelphia. 60% of people very reasonably didn’t care, but another 35% had grown attached to their Denver quarter, with only 5% actively seeking the novelty of Philadelphia. Psychology is weird. I understand why some people would summarize this paper as “loss aversion doesn’t exist”. But it’s very different from “power posing doesn’t exist” or “stereotype threat doesn’t exist”, where it was found that the effect people were trying to study just didn’t happen, and all the studies saying it did were because of p-hacking or publication bias or something. People are very often averse to losses. This paper just argues that this isn’t caused by a specific “loss aversion” force. It’s caused by other forces which are not exactly loss aversion. We could compare it to centrifugal force in physics: real, but not fundamental. Also, you can’t use this paper to argue that “behavioral economics is dead”. At best, the paper proves that loss aversion is better explained by other behavioral economic concepts. But you can’t get rid of behavioral econ entirely! The stuff you have to explain is still there! It’s just a question of which parts of behavioral econ you use to explain it. Complicating this even further is Mrkva et al, Loss Aversion Has Moderators, But Reports Of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated (h/t Alex Imas, who has a great Twitter thread about this). This is an even newer paper, 2019, which argues that Gal and Rucker are wrong, and loss aversion does have an independent existence as a real force. There are many things to like about this paper. Previous criticisms of loss aversion argue that most experiments are performed on undergrads, who are so poor that even small amounts of money might have unusual emotional meaning. Mrkva collects a sample of thousands of millionaires (!) and demonstrates that they show loss aversion for sums of money as small as $20. On the other hand, I’m not sure they’re quite as careful as G&R at ruling out every other possible bias (although I don’t have a great understanding of where the borders between biases are and I can’t say this for sure). The main point I want to make is that all the scientists in this debate seem smart, thoughtful, and impressive. This isn’t like social priming experiments where one person says a crazy thing, nobody ever replicates it at scale, and as soon as someone tries the whole thing collapses. These have been replicated hundreds of times, with the remaining arguments being complicated semantic and philosophical ones about how to distinguish one theory from a very slightly different theory. If that takes replicating your result on a sample of thousands of millionaires, people will gather a sample of thousands of millionaires and get busy on the replication. Just overall really impressive work. I don’t feel qualified to take a side in the G&R vs. Mkrva debate, but both teams make me really happy that there are smart and careful people considering these questions. And this is just a drop in the bucket. Alex Imas also links Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk, which says: Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds. Beyond any reasonable thresholds! IV. Do Nudges Work? or, How Small Is Small? Continuing through the Hreha article: For a number of years, I've been beating the anti-nudge drum. Since 2011, I've been running behavioral experiments in the wild, and have always been struck by how weak nudges tend to be. In my experience, nudges usually fail to have *any* recognizable impact at all. This is supported by a paper that was recently published by a couple of researchers from UC Berkeley. They looked at the results of 126 randomized controlled trials run by two "nudge units" here in the United States. I want you to guess how large of an impact these nudges had on average... 30%? 20%? 10%? 5%? 3%? 1.5%? 1%? 0%? If you said 1.5%, you'd be right (the actual number is 1.4%, but if I had written that out you would have chosen it because of its specificity). According to the academic papers these nudges were based upon, these nudges should have had an average impact of 8.7%. But, as you probably understand by now, behavioral economics is not a particularly trustworthy field. I actually emailed the authors of this paper, and they thought the ~1% effect size of these interventions was something to be applauded—especially if the intervention was cheap & easy. Unfortunately, no intervention is truly cheap or easy. Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. Uber infamously had a team of behavioral economists working on its product, trying to “nudge” people in the right direction. Relatedly, Uber makes $10 billion in yearly revenue. If they can “nudge” people to spend 1% more, that’s $100 million. That’s not much relative to revenue, but it’s a lot in absolute terms. In particular, it pays the salary of a lot of behavioral economists. If you can hire 10 behavioral economists for $100,000 a year and make $100 million, that’s $99 million in profit. Or what if you’re a government agency, trying to nudge people to do prosocial things? There are about 90 million eligible Americans who haven’t gotten their COVID vaccine, and although some of them are hard-core conspiracy theorists, others are just lazy or nervous or feel safe already. (source) Whoever decided on that grocery gift card scheme was nudging, whether or not they have an economics degree - and apparently they were pretty good at it. If some sort of behavioral econ campaign can convince 1.5% of those 90 million Americans to get their vaccines, that’s 1.4 million more vaccinations and, under reasonable assumptions, maybe a few thousand lives saved. Hreha says that: Every single intervention requires, at the very minimum, administrative overhead. If you're going to do something, you need someone (or some system) to implement and keep track of it. If an intervention is only going to get you a 1% improvement, it's probably not even worth it. This depends on scale! 1% of a small number isn’t worth it! 1% of a big number is very worth it, especially if that big number is a number of lives! A few caveats. First, a small number only matters if it’s real. It’s very easy to get spurious small effects, so much so that any time you see a small effect you should wonder if it’s real. I’m ready to be forgiving here because behavioral economics is so well-replicated and common-sensically true, but I wouldn’t blame anyone who steers clear. Second, Hreha says: To be honest, you can probably use your creativity to brainstorm an idea that will get you a 3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics "science" required. Which leads me to the final point I'd like to make: rules and generalizations are overrated. The reason that fields like behavioral economics are so seductive is because they promise people easy, cookie-cutter solutions to complicated problems. Figuring out how to increase sales of your product is hard. You need to figure out which variables are responsible for the lackluster interest. Is the price the issue? Is the product too hard to use? Is the design tacky? Is the sales organization incompetent? Is the refund/return policy lacking? etc. Exploring these questions can take months (or years) of hard work, and there's no guarantee that you'll succeed. If, however, a behavioral economist tells you that there are nudges that will increase your sales by 10%, 20%, or 30% without much effort on your part... Whoa. That's pretty cool. It's salvation. Thus, it's no surprise that governments and companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on behavioral "nudge" units. Unfortunately, as we've seen, these nudges are woefully ineffective. Specific problems require specific solutions. They don't require boilerplate solutions based on general principles that someone discovered by studying a bunch of 19 year old college students. However, the social sciences have done a good job of convincing people that general principles are better solutions for problems than creative, situation-specific solutions. In my experience, creative solutions that are tailor-made for the situation at hand *always* perform better than generic solutions based on one study or another. Hreha is a professional in this field, so presumably he’s right. Still, compare to medicine. A thoughtful doctor who tailors treatment to a particular patient sounds better (and is better) than one who says “Depression? Take this one all-purpose depression treatment which is the first thing I saw when I typed ‘depression’ into UpToDate”. But you still need medical journals. Having some idea of general-purpose laws is what gives the people making creative solutions something to build upon. (also, at some point your customers might want to check your creative solution to see whether it actually gives a “3-4% minimum gain, no behavioral economics required”, and that would be at least vaguely study-shaped.) Third, everyone who said nudging had vast effects is still bad and wrong. Many of them were bad and wrong and making fortunes consulting for companies about how to implement the policies they were claiming were super-powerful. This is suspicious and we should lower our opinion of them accordingly. In a previous discussion of growth mindset, I wrote: Imagine I claimed our next-door neighbor was a billionaire oil sheik who kept thousands of boxes of gold and diamonds hidden in his basement. Later we meet the neighbor, and he is the manager of a small bookstore and has a salary 10% above the US average... Should we describe this as “we have confirmed the Wealthy Neighbor Hypothesis, though the effect size was smaller than expected”? Or as “I made up a completely crazy story, and in unrelated news there was an irrelevant deviation from literally-zero in the same space”? All the people talking about oil sheiks deserve to get asked some really uncomfortable questions. And a lot of these will be the most famous researchers - the Dan Arielys of the world - because of course the people who successfully hyped their results a lot are the ones the public knows about. Still, the neighbor seems like a neat guy, and maybe he’ll give you a job at his bookstore. V. Conclusion: Musings On The Identifiable Victim Effect I actually skipped the very beginning of Hreha’s article. I want to come back to it now. It begins: The last few years have been particularly bad for behavioral economics. A number of frequently cited findings have failed to replicate. Here are a couple of high profile examples: The Identifiable Victim Effect (featured in the workbooks I wrote with Dan Ariely and Kristen Berman in 2014)
losttools.substack.com

losttools.substack.com is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 15, 2023 and September 15, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The Lost Tools of Learning ( losttools.substack.com )". It most often appears alongside @campeters4, A Strange Dream, a_reader.

Reference entry
losttools.substack.com
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 15, 2023
Last seen
September 15, 2023
September 15, 2023 · Original source
1st: The Educated Mind, reviewed by Brandon Hendrickson. Brandon is the founder of Science is WEIRD, a sprawling online science course that helps kids fall in love with the world. He’s also re-imagining what education can be at his Substack, The Lost Tools of Learning (losttools.substack.com).
Lots Of People Going Around With Mild Hallucinations All The Time

Lots Of People Going Around With Mild Hallucinations All The Time is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 11, 2022 and November 11, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "my own Lots Of People Going Around With Mild Hallucinations All The Time". It most often appears alongside Aella, astral projection, Bayes.

Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
November 11, 2022
Last seen
November 11, 2022
November 11, 2022 · Original source
You should believe the spoonies! You should believe the DID people! You should believe that people experience astral projection - it’s just a cheap off-brand lucid dream, and I’ve personally tried lucid dreaming and can confirm it’s real! You should believe that people experience auras - see eg Paranormal Misinterpretations Of Vision Phenomena, Colored Halos Around Faces And Emotion-Evoked Colors: A New Form Of Synesthesia (note first author!), the many stories of people seeing auras while on drugs, and my own Lots Of People Going Around With Mild Hallucinations All The Time! You should believe that people experience John Edwards - I think my parents voted for him in 2004!
Lu (hymn)

Lu (hymn) is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 01, 2023 and September 01, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "That is the reason it says in a Lu hymn". It most often appears alongside 536 BC, ACX, Ai Jiang.

Reference entry
Lu (hymn)
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 01, 2023
Last seen
September 01, 2023
September 01, 2023 · Original source
…The noble man considered this a deviation from ritual propriety: “In the performance of ritual there is nothing that does not follow the right order. Sacrifices are among the great affairs of a domain. Can it be called ritual propriety to violate the right sacrificial order? [...] That is the reason it says in a Lu hymn,
Lucid

Lucid is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between September 29, 2022 and September 29, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "names that suggest ... reasonableness - “Lucid”". It most often appears alongside 1 Kings 10-11, 2008 Democratic National Convention, Adam Scheffer.

Reference entry
Lucid
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
September 29, 2022
Last seen
September 29, 2022
September 29, 2022 · Original source
Political Substacks tend to have names that suggest stability - “The Bulwark”, “North Star”, “Steady” - or reasonableness - “Common Sense”, “Civil Discourse”, “Lucid”. They all have taglines like “Just the news, the way it should be, without the craziness and partisan bias”. Their articles are all things like “WATCH how the FASCIST ultra-MAGA Republicans ABUSE women and CHILDREN because THE CRUELTY IS THE POINT!!!”
I’m actually a bit charmed by this. I make fun of politics Substackers for not really living up to their “Just the news without craziness or bias” taglines. But Richardson gets two out of three, and she does them really well. And one or two paragraphs per article calling Republicans the party of bigotry is the necessary tax these days to avoid accusations of being a Republican sympathizer yourself. Maybe all of those people who said that what people really want is clear lucid explanations of important issues by experts with lots of context were just right all along?
I found myself imagining the scene after my death. I would arrive at the Pearly Gates, and God would say: “Depart from Me, for you did not serve Me, but followed false prophets and wolves in sheep’s clothing.”
Luke

Luke is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 22, 2025 and October 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as ""The Son of Man (Luke 12:8)"". It most often appears alongside 10th century, 19th Century, A16Z.

Reference entry
Luke
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
October 22, 2025
Last seen
October 22, 2025
October 22, 2025 · Original source
Luke 22:3: “Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve [apostles].”
“The Son of Man” (Matthew 12:32, Luke 12:8, John 1:51)
Luke 10:18

Luke 10:18 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between November 17, 2023 and November 17, 2023. The archive places it in contexts such as "The phrase “I see Satan fall like lightning” comes from Luke 10:18". It most often appears alongside Abel, Adam and Eve, America.

Reference entry
Luke 10:18
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
November 17, 2023
Last seen
November 17, 2023
November 17, 2023 · Original source
The phrase “I see Satan fall like lightning” comes from Luke 10:18. I’d previously encountered it on insane right-wing conspiracy theory websites. You can rephrase it as “I see Satan descend to earth in the form of lightning.” But “lightning” in Hebrew is barak. So the Bible says Satan will descend to Earth in the form of Barak. Seems like a relevant Bible verse for insane right-wing conspiracy theorists!
Luke 22:3

Luke 22:3 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between October 22, 2025 and October 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as "Luke 22:3 : 'Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve [apostles]'". It most often appears alongside 10th century, 19th Century, A16Z.

Reference entry
Luke 22:3
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
October 22, 2025
Last seen
October 22, 2025
October 22, 2025 · Original source
Luke 22:3: “Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve [apostles].”
Lumina

Lumina is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 22, 2024 and April 22, 2024. The archive places it in contexts such as "Possible correction by Natalia to my Lumina post". It most often appears alongside ACX, Astralcodexten Com, Atlanta.

Reference entry
Lumina
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
April 22, 2024
Last seen
April 22, 2024
April 22, 2024 · Original source
2: Possible correction by Natalia to my Lumina post: there might not have been three different trials, my objections here, Natalia’s response here. I am still confused by this situation, for the reasons discussed.
Luxwolda 2012

Luxwolda 2012 is a recurring publication in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 1 times across 1 issues between April 22, 2022 and April 22, 2022. The archive places it in contexts such as "Luxwolda 2012 measured Vitamin D levels in the Hadza". It most often appears alongside Autier meta-analysis, Barger-Lux 2002, Ben.

Reference entry
Luxwolda 2012
Mention count
1
Issue count
1
First seen
April 22, 2022
Last seen
April 22, 2022
April 22, 2022 · Original source
Luxwolda 2012 measured Vitamin D levels in the Hadza and found values from 28 to 68 ng/ml, averaging about 44. How many IU of Vitamin D supplementation would it take to get an average American to 44 ng/ml? Garland 2011 exists to answer this question for us: