Alex Tabarrok

Article

Alex Tabarrok is a recurring person in the Astral Codex Ten archive, appearing 13 times across 13 issues between January 21, 2021 and April 22, 2025. The archive places it in contexts such as “fun conversation with Alex Tabarrok about where our theories went wrong”; “dominant assurance contracts (a really neat consensus-building mechanism proposed by Alex Tabarrok)”; “Alex Tabarrok and Indian giant statues”. It most often appears alongside California, OpenAI, FDA.

Metadata

  • Category: People
  • Mention count: 13
  • Issue count: 13
  • First seen: January 21, 2021
  • Last seen: April 22, 2025

Appears In

Source Context

Recovered passages from the original issue text. When the raw archive preserved outbound links inside the source passage, they are listed directly under the quote.

January 21, 2021 · Original source
As I was trying to figure out how this was going to work financially, Substack convinced me that I could make decent money here. With that in place, I felt like I could also take a chance on starting my dream business. You guys have had to listen to me write ad nauseum about cost disease - why does health care cost 4x times more per capita than it did just a generation ago? I have a lot of theories about why that happened and how to fix it. But as Feynman put it, "what I cannot create I cannot understand". So I'm going to try to start a medical practice that provides great health care to uninsured people for 4x less than what anyone else charges. If it works, I plan to be insufferable about it. If it doesn't, I can at least have a fun conversation with Alex Tabarrok about where our theories went wrong. Since I'm no longer protecting my anonymity, I can advertise it here - Lorien Psychiatry - though I'm not currently accepting blog readers as patients, sorry.
August 02, 2021 · Original source
Or maybe it’s exactly cute enough that it needs to be its own city, who knows? Mariposa seems to be proposing some really interesting things, including quadratic funding (an innovative budgeting mechanism pushed by Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin, among others) and dominant assurance contracts (a really neat consensus-building mechanism proposed by Alex Tabarrok). Their form-based walkable city code thing also seems pretty neat. And I’m not a midwife so for all I know ecstatic birthing is also some kind of super-great idea. Honestly this random husband-and-wife team seems to have put more thought into genuinely good governance than 99.9% of the existing countries in the world, and I hope things work out for them.
September 06, 2022 · Original source
8: Alex Tabarrok and Indian giant statues:
October 18, 2022 · Original source
Alex Tabarrok, GMU and Marginal Revolution
February 09, 2023 · Original source
In theory this also paves the way for human meat, though regulators might have other ideas. 2: Eight years ago I wrote an article about how the government should stop restricting doctors’ ability to prescribe suboxone, a useful medicine for opioid abuse. Last month, the government finally stopped the restrictions. Good for them! 3: Carl Sagan married three times. His first wife was legendary biologist Lynn Margulis, who discovered mitochondrial endosymbiosis, then went off the deep end and became an AIDS denialist and 9/11 truther. His second wife drew the Pioneer plaque. His third wife was one of the women who designed the Voyager golden record. 4: Claim: Chinese sources seem to back this up (and related BBC), but I’m skeptical: is this really the best way to satisfy a “must fight with medieval weapons” constraint? Why not crossbows? 5: Did you know: Alex Berenson, who runs the most popular anti-vaccine Substack, has had an unusual career: he used to be an investigative reporter for the New York Times, and also wrote a series of bestselling spy novels. 6: Less Wrong: I Converted Book 1 Of The Less Wrong Sequences Into A Zoomer-Readable Format. Apparently there’s a thing where Zoomers are supposedly more likely to learn a text if you overlay it on on a fast-paced video game, example here. 7: By this point we’ve probably all heard stories about people who win the lottery and then end up bankrupt and miserable after X months or years. I had always assumed this was limited to very poor people with no understanding of money. This forum post argues it’s not, and tells the story of a man who started out with $15 million and still ruined his life after winning $170 million more in the lottery. 8: Did you know: Exiliarch Mar-Zutra II was a 5th century Jewish leader who took advantage of the chaos caused by weird Zoroastrian communists to secede and turn the city of Al-Mada’in, Iraq into an independent Jewish state for seven years. 9: Why doesn’t the Supreme Court have vice-justices? 10: Steve Sailer (warning: unz.com, far-right site, some firewalls will flag or block it): why aren’t there more gay English soccer players? Thousands of current or recent English pro soccer players, the media is really interested in finding a gay one so they can run a “Historic First” article, and apparently they can’t. There are rumors that players are afraid to come out because of homophobia, but there are at least 2,000 retired soccer players and only one of them has come out as gay. “I’m increasingly sympathetic to [the] theory that whatever psychosocial traits make men highly interested in team sports make them highly heterosexual too”. Is this true of other countries and other sports? 11: Adam Tooze on the demographic background to Iran’s protests. Iran thought it was facing an overpopulation crisis in the 80s and tried some reforms to lower family size. The reforms worked overwhelmingly well, causing “the most dramatic transition ever recorded in demographic history”, from 6.5 to 2.5 children per woman in thirty years. Iran now has “lower maternal mortality than the US”, and an education system where “women in university outnumber males”. This kind of demography isn’t usually compatible with patriarchal religious institutions, and the Ayatollahs are aware of this; in a rare admission of error, Khameini said that “Government officials were wrong on this matter, and I, too, had a part. . . . May God and history forgive us.” Now they’re trying to increase average family size and put the genie back in the bottle; Hungary can tell them about the limits of that strategy. 12: What it looks like to be on shrooms: I haven’t used shrooms myself so cannot confirm or deny, but this is oddly compelling, and makes some things I’ve read about neuroscience of vision make more sense. I wonder if you could get HPPD from watching videos like this for too long. 13: Study: federal cancer funding is extraordinarily effective. Cancer research produces so many valuable treatments that it saves one DALY per $326 spent. For comparison, health systems usually consider an intervention good value-for-money if it saves at least one DALY per $50,000. By combing the Earth far and wide, effective altruists have tentatively found one or two opportunities in the poorest parts of Africa to save lives at $100/DALY, but these are extremely rare exceptions and I wouldn’t have expected anything in the US to be within an order of magnitude of that. Either this finding is fake, or we should all be donating to federal cancer research instead of whatever else we’re doing. 14: Yet another person building a vast theory of human interaction off of the characters in The Office. This one is pretty good, also name-drops Bobos In Paradise. I’m still surprised this is such a common thing. 15: Marginal Revolution: FDA Deregulation Increases Safety And Innovation And Reduces Prices. Study looks at what happens when the FDA reclassifies medical devices from a highly-regulated to a less-highly-regulated category; in general, those devices get better, cheaper, and there are somewhere between similar and fewer deaths/injuries related to those devices. Why would safety increase? The author suggests that regulation is a defense against lawsuits (“Your Honor, the FDA agreed to approve our device, so it can’t have been bad!”), and removing that defense makes companies more lawsuit-conscious and careful; Alex Tabarrok suggests a bigger effect may be allowing more innovation towards safer versions. 16: Ozy writes about Interesting People Of History: Charles Williams (ie the other member of the Inklings) 17: Did you know: the Congressman who founded the House Committee On Un-American Activities was, in fact, a paid Soviet spy (tweet, Wiki article). This actually makes sense; he originally started HUAC to root out fascists, and it only got turned against communists later on. “There has been a push to rename the street [currently named after the Soviet spy], but as of 2018 it has been unsuccessful.” 18: Idle Words: Why Not Mars? Surprisingly strong argument for why sending humans to Mars is harder than people think, of minimal scientific value, and likely to contaminate all future searches for microbial life and ruin our chance to study the topic. Concludes that we should abandon the allure of human space travel and just send probes everywhere. This makes short-term sense, but I wonder what this author’s vision of the future is - do we just stay on Earth forever? If not, don’t we have to start trying to do the hard thing at some point? (I don’t care about this because I assume AI will will flip the gameboard one way or another, but Ceglowski is a noted singularity skeptic and should probably have opinions about long-term things). 19: Metacelsus and Razib on epigenetics. Stop using it to claim there’s “intergenerational trauma”! 20: Tafl games are a family of European games, played in areas as diverse as Iceland, Ireland, Britain, and Denmark, probably sharing descent from a now-lost board game of ancient Rome. One of them, Hnetafl, was the chief board game of the Vikings and is affectionately called “Viking chess”. The one we actually know the rules for is the Saami version, Tablut, which survived long enough for Linnaeus (the taxonomy guy!) to write down the rules. 21: Shot: Chaser: (source) 22: Related: the very center of GPT’s embedding space contains a few unusual tokens including the string “SolidGoldMagikarp”. GPT displays anomalous behavior if these tokens are inserted in a query; for example, it treats “SolidGoldMagikarp” as the word “distribute”. ChatGPT is pretty advanced and fails semi-gracefully here; GPT-2’s reaction to these tokens is more disturbing: (source: Less Wrong) Further investigation determined that many of these tokens are the screen names of a group of Redditors who attempted to count to infinity. The most likely explanation, according to the discoverers, is that these names were in GPT’s tokenization data, but not its training data (maybe they were especially common in the tokenization data because they made thousands of posts with numbers in them, but didn’t make it into the training data because their posts had no content?) - that leaves them existing without content, and GPT tries to round them off to some other “nearby” token (by incomprehensible AI standards of nearbyness). Congrats to the SERI-MATS AI alignment researchers who found all of this; maybe this makes it 0.0001% less likely that the AI which controls the nuclear arsenal in twenty years will have equally inexplicable behavior. 23: More language model news: LLM that understands and can explain images
January 18, 2024 · Original source
10: Alex Tabarrok: Don’t Let The FDA Regulate Lab Tests. The FDA does not usually regulate lab tests, but they took over this domain during the pandemic, took over this responsibility, then proceeded to bungle it so badly that American hospitals and public health departments spent months without working COVID tests long after other countries had made them cheap and easily available. Now they’re trying to take permanent control of the whole area. Don’t let them!
May 29, 2024 · Original source
36: Alex Tabarrok and New York magazine explain the Adderall shortage. Summary: the DEA, in its crusade against opioids, has put such strict standards on medication factories that many have gotten shut down for “trivial infractions” (for example, “orders struck from 222s must be crossed out with a line and the word cancel written next to them. Investigators found two instances in which Ascent employees had drawn the line but failed to write the word”). In this case, the FDA is the good guys trying to get the factories to re-open again, but so far the DEA hasn’t budged.
July 24, 2024 · Original source
7: Alex Tabarrok: three years after the government set aside $42 billion for rural broadband, nobody has been connected, partly because the government added too many "progressive wish list" items to the contract (must hire union workers, must hire ex-cons, etc). The $42 billion would have been enough to give every American without broadband access to a 4-year Starlink subscription. [update from comments: maybe this still counts as on track?]
November 11, 2024 · Original source
2: Comments on things related to last week’s Polymarket post: Michael Wiebe argues that Theo the French whale’s contrarian polling take was based on a simple misunderstanding of how to read polls (I stand by my claim that a single success demonstrates almost nothing about the trustworthiness of the underlying process). And Alex Tabarrok says more about why this was a big victory for prediction markets.
November 27, 2024 · Original source
Aftereffects2: Once a criminal is released from prison, they either reoffend or don’t. Perhaps long prison sentences reduce reoffending, because the prisoners have had more time to be “scared straight” or “find God” or get connected to good social services. Or perhaps long prison sentences increase reoffending, because the prisoners have lost their outside social connections, formed new criminal social connections in prison (eg joined gangs), or just forgotten how to survive on the outside. The earliest studies investigated these three effects through correlational studies: do states with longer sentences have less crime / less recidivism / etc ? These reviews all express skepticism about this method: it’s the old “correlation vs. causation” problem again. What if the causation is backwards, and more crime causes longer sentences (because high-crime states want to get tough and fight back)? Or what if they’re only linked through some third concept? For example, suppose all states are either generically tough-on-crime (with long sentences, more police, more social sanctions on criminals) or generically soft-on crime (short sentences, less police, etc). Then any part of the tough-on-crime package would confound all the others (eg if more police decreased crime, it would falsely look like longer sentences did). In order to avoid these problems, all three reviews recommend experimental and quasi-experimental studies. We’ll look into the exact methodologies later, but typical papers would look at crime rates just before or after new sentencing laws were passed, or at very similar crimes which quirks of the sentencing regime punish very differently. Roodman and Nagin look only at experimental or quasi-experimental studies, whereas Berger sometimes carefully examines some of the better and more-carefully-controlled correlational evidence. Let’s see how each one treats these three bins. Deterrence Rational actors consider the costs and benefits of a strategy before acting; this model has been successfully applied to the decision to commit crime. Studying deterrence is complicated, and usually tries to tease out effects from the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment; here we’ll focus on severity. A typical study here is Helland and Tabarrok 2007 (you may know Alex Tabarrok from Marginal Revolution). They looked at California’s famous Three Strikes law, which says that a criminal who has already committed two major crimes will automatically get a sentence of twenty years to life on their third. This is potentially a good way to study deterrence, because one group of criminals (those with no strikes) will get a normal sentence for their next crime, but another (those with 2 strikes) will get a long sentence. So if long sentences have a strong deterrent effect, we expect the second group to commit far fewer minor crimes than the first. It would be naive to jump straight to doing this study in the whole population, because people with multiple past “strikes” are more likely to be hardened criminals, and should be expected to offend more in the future. So H&T did something more complicated. They looked at criminals with one strike, plus a second crime that was on the border of being “major” enough to earn a second strike. Some had good luck at their trial, got their offense downgraded to a “minor” crime, and continued to only have one strike; others had bad luck, got their offense upgraded to a “major” crime, and earned a second strike. Now we have two groups with exactly equal criminal histories but different number of strikes! That means one group will be punished more severely for their next crime than the other. How much deterrent effect does this have? They found that 48% of the one-strike group and 40% of the two-strikes group got arrested per year, a difference of 17%. They re-ran their analysis with data from other states, and found the same pattern in Texas (the only other state with a three-strikes law) but not elsewhere. This reassured them that it’s a real effect of deterrence and not just an artifact. Still, Helland and Tabarrok are not impressed by this result. Yes, we decreased crime by 17%. But it took an extraordinarily severe threat. The Three Strikes Law raised the expected sentence for a third crime from ~5 years to ~20 years, so each extra year in the threatened sentence decreased crime about 1%. If you think about this economically, it’s a bad deal; it takes $150,000 worth of incarceration costs to deter one crime, but the social cost per crime is (they say, citing another economics paper) about $34,000. And most deterrence isn’t this strong. Only 4% of California crime is committed by offenders with two previous strikes, and there’s no political will to impose these kind of 20+ year sentences on first-time criminals. So most deterrence will look more like the Proposition 36 proposal we discussed last month, which increases shoplifting sentences from six months to three years. If we use H&T’s numbers (probably inappropriate since there may be nonlinear effects), we would expect that section of Prop 36 to deter crime by 2%. There are two other considerations that might increase or decrease our estimate of deterrence. First, how sure are we that the police caught all the crimes here? In general, only about 50% of violent crimes and 10% of property crimes are caught. Should we multiply these numbers by somewhere between 2-10x? I think in this case the multiplier should be somewhat less. The subjects in this study were on parole or probation from their previous strike, so they were more likely to be monitored by police. And they’d already gotten caught twice, which suggests they’re either worse at crime than average, or operating in areas with better-than-average police coverage. Still, maybe we should multiply by, idk, 2-5x? This won’t affect our percentages: we expect that arrests are some fixed proportion of offenses, so if a criminal gets caught 17% more often, they’re probably committing 17% more crimes (however many that is). But it might affect our estimate of the social costs of crime. Instead of saying that $150,000 worth of incarceration costs prevents $34,000 worth of crime, maybe we should say that it prevents $68,000 - $170,000 - which, at the higher end of the range, would be economically break-even. Second, what kind of crimes are we deterring? Here Roodman, the anti-incarceration review, analyzes H&T’s data more thoroughly and finds that their effect is concentrated in the least severe crimes: That is, overall crime decreased 17%. But violent crime decreased only 1.7% (not significant). The only crime where the decrease reached statistical significance was drug crime (31%). Should we take this completely seriously and say that the Three Strikes Law only deterred drug crime? I’m not sure. The argument against is that drug crime was the most common category of crime in this sample, so it’s possible that the study was powered to detect decreases in drug crime but not in other categories. In favor of this interpretation, vehicle theft (a category sometimes found to be especially deterrable in other studies) went down 19%, similar to the overall headline number - it just didn’t reach statistical significance. But against this interpretation, larceny (minor robberies like shoplifting) went up 22%. This is obviously random noise, and it would be unfair to ignore the larceny result but count the (equally weak) vehicle theft result just because it agrees with our priors. I think when you average everything together, it really does look like the effect on everything except drugs is small. Maybe it’s hard to deter violent crimes (because these are executed in a fit of passion), it’s hard to deter property crimes (because criminals need the money), but it’s easier to deter drug crimes (because people make more rational decisions about whether or not to use drugs)? (How much do we care about drug crime? Tabarrok says somewhat, because drugs can be a “gateway crime” that gets people into the criminal lifestyle. Roodman says not much. It’s either personal use, which is mostly victimless, at least compared to other crimes. Or it’s dealing, which is demand-driven and almost impossible to stop through incarceration - if you lock up every member of Cartel A, that just creates a lucrative niche for Cartel B to step in and fill.) So a pessimistic interpretation (which I find hard to avoid) is that an extra year added on to a prison sentence decreases drug crimes by 2%, and other crimes some unmeasurably-small amount that may or may not be literally zero. I went into this one study in depth so you have an idea where these numbers are coming from, but here’s a broader survey of deterrence research: Ross 1982 investigated the effects of some widely publicized laws that increased penalties for drunk driving. They found that it decreased drunk driving 66% (!) in the year the law came out, but this effect gradually faded to zero over the next three years. The most likely explanation is that the publicity around the new law got people excited, but nobody really knows the laws around drunk driving anyway (do you know what the range of sentences for DUI in your jurisdiction is?) and so once the excitement of “law is stricter now!” faded from memory, the law had no effect.
They re-ran their analysis with data from other states, and found the same pattern in Texas (the only other state with a three-strikes law) but not elsewhere. This reassured them that it’s a real effect of deterrence and not just an artifact. Still, Helland and Tabarrok are not impressed by this result. Yes, we decreased crime by 17%. But it took an extraordinarily severe threat. The Three Strikes Law raised the expected sentence for a third crime from ~5 years to ~20 years, so each extra year in the threatened sentence decreased crime about 1%. If you think about this economically, it’s a bad deal; it takes $150,000 worth of incarceration costs to deter one crime, but the social cost per crime is (they say, citing another economics paper) about $34,000. And most deterrence isn’t this strong. Only 4% of California crime is committed by offenders with two previous strikes, and there’s no political will to impose these kind of 20+ year sentences on first-time criminals. So most deterrence will look more like the Proposition 36 proposal we discussed last month, which increases shoplifting sentences from six months to three years. If we use H&T’s numbers (probably inappropriate since there may be nonlinear effects), we would expect that section of Prop 36 to deter crime by 2%. There are two other considerations that might increase or decrease our estimate of deterrence. First, how sure are we that the police caught all the crimes here? In general, only about 50% of violent crimes and 10% of property crimes are caught. Should we multiply these numbers by somewhere between 2-10x? I think in this case the multiplier should be somewhat less. The subjects in this study were on parole or probation from their previous strike, so they were more likely to be monitored by police. And they’d already gotten caught twice, which suggests they’re either worse at crime than average, or operating in areas with better-than-average police coverage. Still, maybe we should multiply by, idk, 2-5x? This won’t affect our percentages: we expect that arrests are some fixed proportion of offenses, so if a criminal gets caught 17% more often, they’re probably committing 17% more crimes (however many that is). But it might affect our estimate of the social costs of crime. Instead of saying that $150,000 worth of incarceration costs prevents $34,000 worth of crime, maybe we should say that it prevents $68,000 - $170,000 - which, at the higher end of the range, would be economically break-even. Second, what kind of crimes are we deterring? Here Roodman, the anti-incarceration review, analyzes H&T’s data more thoroughly and finds that their effect is concentrated in the least severe crimes: That is, overall crime decreased 17%. But violent crime decreased only 1.7% (not significant). The only crime where the decrease reached statistical significance was drug crime (31%). Should we take this completely seriously and say that the Three Strikes Law only deterred drug crime? I’m not sure. The argument against is that drug crime was the most common category of crime in this sample, so it’s possible that the study was powered to detect decreases in drug crime but not in other categories. In favor of this interpretation, vehicle theft (a category sometimes found to be especially deterrable in other studies) went down 19%, similar to the overall headline number - it just didn’t reach statistical significance. But against this interpretation, larceny (minor robberies like shoplifting) went up 22%. This is obviously random noise, and it would be unfair to ignore the larceny result but count the (equally weak) vehicle theft result just because it agrees with our priors. I think when you average everything together, it really does look like the effect on everything except drugs is small. Maybe it’s hard to deter violent crimes (because these are executed in a fit of passion), it’s hard to deter property crimes (because criminals need the money), but it’s easier to deter drug crimes (because people make more rational decisions about whether or not to use drugs)? (How much do we care about drug crime? Tabarrok says somewhat, because drugs can be a “gateway crime” that gets people into the criminal lifestyle. Roodman says not much. It’s either personal use, which is mostly victimless, at least compared to other crimes. Or it’s dealing, which is demand-driven and almost impossible to stop through incarceration - if you lock up every member of Cartel A, that just creates a lucrative niche for Cartel B to step in and fill.) So a pessimistic interpretation (which I find hard to avoid) is that an extra year added on to a prison sentence decreases drug crimes by 2%, and other crimes some unmeasurably-small amount that may or may not be literally zero. I went into this one study in depth so you have an idea where these numbers are coming from, but here’s a broader survey of deterrence research: Ross 1982 investigated the effects of some widely publicized laws that increased penalties for drunk driving. They found that it decreased drunk driving 66% (!) in the year the law came out, but this effect gradually faded to zero over the next three years. The most likely explanation is that the publicity around the new law got people excited, but nobody really knows the laws around drunk driving anyway (do you know what the range of sentences for DUI in your jurisdiction is?) and so once the excitement of “law is stricter now!” faded from memory, the law had no effect.
That is, overall crime decreased 17%. But violent crime decreased only 1.7% (not significant). The only crime where the decrease reached statistical significance was drug crime (31%). Should we take this completely seriously and say that the Three Strikes Law only deterred drug crime? I’m not sure. The argument against is that drug crime was the most common category of crime in this sample, so it’s possible that the study was powered to detect decreases in drug crime but not in other categories. In favor of this interpretation, vehicle theft (a category sometimes found to be especially deterrable in other studies) went down 19%, similar to the overall headline number - it just didn’t reach statistical significance. But against this interpretation, larceny (minor robberies like shoplifting) went up 22%. This is obviously random noise, and it would be unfair to ignore the larceny result but count the (equally weak) vehicle theft result just because it agrees with our priors. I think when you average everything together, it really does look like the effect on everything except drugs is small. Maybe it’s hard to deter violent crimes (because these are executed in a fit of passion), it’s hard to deter property crimes (because criminals need the money), but it’s easier to deter drug crimes (because people make more rational decisions about whether or not to use drugs)? (How much do we care about drug crime? Tabarrok says somewhat, because drugs can be a “gateway crime” that gets people into the criminal lifestyle. Roodman says not much. It’s either personal use, which is mostly victimless, at least compared to other crimes. Or it’s dealing, which is demand-driven and almost impossible to stop through incarceration - if you lock up every member of Cartel A, that just creates a lucrative niche for Cartel B to step in and fill.) So a pessimistic interpretation (which I find hard to avoid) is that an extra year added on to a prison sentence decreases drug crimes by 2%, and other crimes some unmeasurably-small amount that may or may not be literally zero. I went into this one study in depth so you have an idea where these numbers are coming from, but here’s a broader survey of deterrence research: Ross 1982 investigated the effects of some widely publicized laws that increased penalties for drunk driving. They found that it decreased drunk driving 66% (!) in the year the law came out, but this effect gradually faded to zero over the next three years. The most likely explanation is that the publicity around the new law got people excited, but nobody really knows the laws around drunk driving anyway (do you know what the range of sentences for DUI in your jurisdiction is?) and so once the excitement of “law is stricter now!” faded from memory, the law had no effect.
January 08, 2025 · Original source
Society-wide: The marketplace of ideas! This is where everyone gets to have their say. New hypotheses get stress-tested, bounced off against each other, and only the strongest survive. This level also produces true learning - if only one idea survives the marketplace, then average spectators can easily pick it out (although of course it can still be wrong). Its disadvantage is that it’s impossible for several billion people to hold a true “discussion” among themselves. Also, many of these people are extremely stupid, their ideas are bad, and they fill the conversation with noise. Is there a useful group size in between these two? What about discussing ideas in a group made of only the most intelligent and knowledgeable people? This gives you the debate and collaboration functions that you only get in group conversation. But it’ll have a better signal-to-noise ratio than all of society, and it might be small enough to manage. Also, you can make people sign on to good discussion norms before they enter, and you can expel them if they screw up. The Boundary Against The Public From this formulation, it becomes clear that such a priesthood is only useful insofar as it has some kind of barrier between itself and the general public. The priesthoods don’t exactly hate the public. But they hate the idea of letting the public’s ideas mix with their own. It’s not just that they discount the public’s ideas insofar as the public is less sophisticated than themselves. Their whole identity comes from their separation from the public. Ideas that seem too similar to the public’s get actively penalized, the same way it would be hard to convince Democrats to accept a plan that Donald Trump proposed first, even if it otherwise fit with Democratic ideals. I recently reviewed Tom Wolfe’s From Bauhaus To Our House, on the architectural priesthood. It discusses the response when renegade architects would build things in styles favored by the public - for example, Edward Stone and the Kennedy Center: Stone and Saarinen, like Frank Lloyd Wright and Goff and Greene, were too American, which meant both too parochial (not part of the International Style) and too bourgeois. Somehow they actually catered to the hog-stomping Baroque exuberance of American civilization. When Stone designed the Kennedy Center in Washington with a lobby six stories high and six hundred and thirty feet long – so big, as one journalist pointed out, that Mickey Mantle’s mightiest home run would have been just another long fly ball – it was regarded as an obscenity. Stone was actually playing upto American megolomania. He was encouraging the barbaric yawps. He was glorifying The Client’s own grandiose sentiments. More generally: In a way, the very productivity of a man like Wright, Portman, or Stone counted against him, given the new mental atmosphere at the universities. Oh, it was easy enough, one supposed, to go out into the marketplace and wheedle and vamp and dance for clients and get buildings to do. But the brave soul was he who remained within the compound, stayed within the university orbit. Or, from the comments, this quote by architect Peter Eisenman: What I’m suggesting is that if we make people so comfortable in these nice little structures of yours, that we might lull them into thinking that everything’s all right, Jack, which it isn’t. And so the role of art or architecture might be just to remind people that everything wasn’t all right. I used to wonder why so many econ-bloggers I liked were at GMU. GMU only is only the 74th best economics department in the country, but more than half of the econbloggers I like are affiliated with it in some way (Tyler Cowen, Alex Tabarrok, Garett Jones, Robin Hanson, Bryan Caplan, Arnold Kling, Scott Sumner, Mark Koyama, sorry if I’m forgetting anyone!). Granted that some of this is because I lean libertarian and so do they - but I don’t think there’s a mountain of amazing and popular left-wing econbloggers who I’m ignoring. Part of this must be that Mercatus head Tyler Cowen is better at spotting and cultivating talent than others - but you’d still think the #73 ranked department would try to poach some of his hard work. When I asked academics about this, they didn’t find it mysterious at all. The average high-ranked economics department doesn’t care that you have a popular blog. They might even count it against you. Only your reputation within the priesthood matters. This is my experience too. I once got rejected from a psychiatry residency I wanted, partly because they saw I had a blog and thought it might cause trouble (though the less prestigious hospital that eventually accepted me did consider it a plus, for which I remain grateful). I wish I could say that the program which rejected me is kicking themselves right now - I’m probably one of the most-read psychiatrists in the world, and most of what I write is relatively orthodox and (I hope) reflects well on the field. But outside of my fantasies, they are doing nothing of the sort. At best, my blog has gone from a liability to being neutral or a very slight positive. Certainly it doesn’t make me as impressive as someone who went to a medical school one tier above mine. Consider how impressive a boundary this is - someone can have literally tens of thousands of fans for doing popular writing in a field, and the amount of extra status it gives them in the field is within a rounding error of zero. Only your reputation within the priesthood matters. Still, at least I’m a member in good standing. At least I’m higher than pond scum. The lowest-status doctor in the world - the guy who, if doctors were Maoist revolutionaries, would get his face on the “Criticize X, Criticize Y” posters - is Dr. Oz. This isn’t because Dr. Oz lacks medical skill. Back in the day, he was a professor of surgery at Columbia, and by all accounts quite good at it. But then he went on TV and started catering to the public. He told them their stupid miracle cures and $19.99 supplements were Real Medicine. Imagine a Catholic bishop declaring ex cathedra that The Da Vinci Code is 100% real. Authority bestowed to fight the heresies of a fallen world, instead used to prop up those heresies. Columbia recently “cut ties” with Oz in some vague way, but as far as the medical profession is concerned, it’s too little, too late. I think the profession’s hatred for Oz is justified - his claims are false and probably cause a lot of harm. But other doctors who say false harmful things get only a fraction of the hatred that Dr. Oz does. He’s not just defrauding and maybe killing the people who take his supplements. He’s sullying Medicine itself. This hard boundary - this contempt for two-way traffic with the public - might seem harsh to outsiders. But it’s an adaptive artifact produced by cultural evolution as it tries to breed priesthoods that can perform their epistemic function. The outside world is so much bigger than the priesthoods, so much richer, so full of delicious deposits of status waiting to be consumed - that any weaker border would soon be overrun, with all priesthood members trying to garner status with the public directly. Only the priesthoods that inculcated the most powerful contempt for the public survived to have good discussions and output trustworthy recommendations. The Boundary Against Capitalism Dr. Oz illustrates another point: power corrupts, and the priests (as people known to be more knowledgeable than the public) have the power to bless or damn interventions in their field. Without some boundary against capitalism, they would abuse that power to make money. Again, cultural evolution has produced such a boundary. A doctor who seems too mercenary loses status in the priesthood. My father - a much more orthodox (and hence higher-status) member of the medical priesthood than I will ever be - used to even get suspicious of concierge doctors. Was it really in keeping with the principles of medicine to care about the amount of money you got for your service? Shouldn’t the usual insurance payments (calculated behind the scenes, without you ever having to think about it) be enough for anybody? If you let doctors charge extra for their services, they might do bad medicine in order to increase profits. In the worst case scenario, they might flatter members of the public who wanted all-natural $19.99 supplements. This taboo has faded as insurance squeezes doctors harder; even my father eventually relented. But there’s still the sense that doctor is a calling in a way that used-car salesman isn’t. If you pursue money too aggressively, can we really be sure you’ve heard the call? Why doesn’t every doctor pursue their own $19.99 supplement business? Some of this is professional regulation - there’s a sense that probably the Medical Board will come down on you if you do something wrong (though most doctors are proudly ignorant of the exact limits of the Medical Board’s power - why should the pious worry about the exact boundaries of excommunicable offenses?) But most of the barrier comes from self-regulation based on social status. By the time you’re done with medical school and residency, all of your non-doctor friends have long since abandoned you, and all the old sources of status and approval that you used to crave have been excised and replaced with the all-seeing eye of the medical priesthood. If you sell out and start the supplement line, you might get a new Ferrari, but everyone whose opinion you respect will hold you in contempt. The public might think it’s cool that you have a Ferrari, but doctors know better: nobody with a supplement line has ever been cool. This doesn’t mean doctors are incorruptible. Plenty of them become pharma company shills. But that’s because being a pharma company shill doesn’t burn intra-priesthood respect the same way. For better or worse, pharma companies straddle the priesthood boundary. They may not be fellow priests, but they’re at least nuns or deacons or something. They won this by sacrificing certain capitalist parts of themselves (for example, becoming heavily regulated) and by agreeing to follow the norms of the medical priesthood (for example, communicating through papers published in medical journals with high-status doctors as lead authors). Through their sacrifice, they achieve ritual purity; now priests can interact with them guilt-free. Is ritual purity really the same as moral acceptability? Sounds like the kind of question a member of the public might ask! Communication Norms Within The Priesthoods Although priests talk normally when when they meet one another at the water cooler, ex cathedra communication must be performed in a ritually pure way. For the medical priesthood, that means papers published in a medical journal. Consider ritually impure communication - for example, Twitter. Someone may try to make a medical claim (“SSRIs are a great depression treatment!”). But one can’t even predict the genre the reply will take. It could be any of: Insult (“You’re just another a big pharma shill trying to poison us!”)
February 07, 2025 · Original source
Regulatory Reciprocity: I will keep this one in here until somebody does something about it. It’s the idea that Americans should be allowed to buy medical products if they’ve been approved by some trusted ally, like the European Union, possibly in exchange for the EU giving FDA-approved products the same deal in Europe. This has been amply championed by Alex Tabarrok and the Mercatus crowd for years, and is starting to make inroads in other countries. If full reciprocity is a step too far, 1DaySooner proposes Makary build off innovative pilot programs like Project Orbis, which enables concurrent submissions and reviews of oncology drugs by multiple regulatory agencies, and the CoGenT pilot, which does the same for cell and gene therapies.
April 22, 2025 · Original source
The article doesn’t explain why the board did such a poor job communicating their grievances, maybe it’s in the full book. It does sound like part of board’s problem was that they were leaning heavily on Mira Murati but she was playing both sides off against each other. 23: And the Forethought Institute has been putting out some great analysis lately, including Will AI R&D Automation Cause An Intelligence Explosion?, by Daniel Eth and Tom Davidson, and AI Enabled Coups: How A Small Group Could Use AI To Seize Power, by Tom Davidson, Lukas Finnveden, and Rose Hadshar. And here’s Davidson defending the coups paper on the 80,000 Hours podcast. 24: Agent Village is a sort of "reality show” where a group of AI agents has to work together to complete some easy-for-human tasks (currently: pick a charity and raise money for it) and you get to watch. 25: University of Austin promises approximately-automatic admission to anyone with a 1460+ on their SATs (or similar scores on other standardized tests). 26: Cremieux on birth order effects (X). His conclusion: “The birth order effect is social. It is driven by parental interactions and investments, and sibling interactions that are dynamic with respect to age.” 27: Claim from new paper, via Alex Tabarrok: “Prohibiting the FDA from regulating e-cigarettes reduced smoking attributable mortality by nearly 10% on average each year from 2011-2019 for a total savings of some 677,000 life-years, or approximately 1/3 the estimated benefit of early HIV/AIDS drugs through year 2000”. Related: FDA will not regulate lab-developed tests for the near future. 28: Bryan Caplan on Natal Con, the pronatalist conference in Austin. My strongest opinion on this is that they should either change the name or hold the next one in Natal, Brazil. 29: Am I living in a conservative filter bubble? I keep hearing how we need a “reckoning” over the government’s disastrous anti-COVID policies, but the latest YouGov polling suggests that large majorities of Americans continue to support those policies: 30: A California legislator proposed a bill that would ban OpenAI’s nonprofit → forprofit conversion, backed by a suspiciously specific interest group, the Coalition For AI Nonprofit Integrity. I assume this is either Elon Musk or our conspiracy; not sure which. But their plan was stymied when the legislature “amended” the bill to remove its entire text and replace it with unrelated text about airplane loans. The legislator apparently got cold feet after being warned it might inflict collateral damage on other companies, and because of the way the California legislature works it’s sometimes more efficient to turn doomed bills into other bills than to simply withdraw them. 31: EthnoGuessr is a GeoGuessr variant: it shows you pictures of an ethnic group, you click on the map where you think they’re from. Warning that if you play this too much you might get into race science. Their source, humanphenotypes.net, divides humanity into a hundred or so ethnic groups. Although they cite sources, I don’t understand the philosophical basis of the classification. Also, 100 images is so few that you start memorizing them after a while. I hope they move on to real pictures of real people in naturalistic situations. Remember, asking where someone is from ‘originally’ is a microaggression, but inferring it yourself based on their “mildly platyrrhine, high-rooted nose” is A-OK! 32: Farmkind has a new version of their calculator to determine meat offsets, eg how much do you have to donate to animal welfare charities to compensate for the animals you harm by eating meat. Does the average person really eat chicken 9x a week? 33: Not going to waste your time listing every bad thing Trump has done this month, but among the worst is sending innocent people to horrible Salvadorean prisons (including one person picked up because he had an autism awareness tattoo in honor of his brother, which they mistook for a gang tattoo), then refusing to bring them back. I have seen a couple of people defend denying immigrants due process; I assume they will not be moved by humanitarian arguments, but I think there are some more practical considerations: Zaid Jilani points out that if immigrants don’t get a right to due process, citizens also don’t get a right to due process, because the government can kidnap citizens, claim they’re immigrants, and the citizens can’t prove otherwise since they don’t get due process.